MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: SHOULD THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION CONSTITUTE A RAPID REACTION FORCE?

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This paper examines the viability of an Asia-Pacific Rapid Reaction Force (APRRF), using existing regional structures. The catalyst for change is the recently released Brahimi Report which recommended to the United Nations that regions of the world establish rapid reaction forces, of several coherent brigade-size forces, in order to respond to regional emergencies. Regional organizations within the region may be able to develop a model for an APRRF. These include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its offshoot the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). Within this framework the reasons an APRRF may or may not be warranted will be examined, as will the potential for Australia and the United States to join the force. The prism of recent operations in East Timor will be used to examine some challenges facing an APRRF, as well as opportunities the region now has to enable it to embrace change, and some structural issues will be examined. The paper concludes that a combination of ASEAN, the ARF, and APEC would be appropriate to provide support to an APRRF. Australia should seek to become involved in an APRRF, and could offer excellent organizational and doctrinal skills. The United States would probably not want to become a member of an APRRF, but could possibly support the concept financially.
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**Executive Summary**

**Title:** Should the Asia-Pacific region constitute a Rapid Reaction Force?

**Author:** Major Chris Field

**Thesis:** This paper examines the viability of an Asia-Pacific Rapid Reaction Force (APRRF), using existing regional structures, in order to enable the Asia-Pacific Region to make an efficient and effective contribution to regional stability. The catalyst for change is considered to be the recently released Brahimi Report which recommended to the United Nations that regions of the world establish rapid reaction forces, of several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, in order to respond to world emergencies.

**Discussion:** The Asia-Pacific Region is well placed to make a significant contribution to the Brahimi Report’s call for regionally based rapid reaction forces. There exist regional organizations within the Asia-Pacific region that may be able to support and develop a model for an Asia-Pacific Rapid Reaction Force (APRRF). These include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its offshoot the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), both will be examined in the paper. It is time for the Asia Pacific region to embrace the opportunities of the post-Cold War multi-polar world, and form a modern, flexible, robust and effective rapid reaction force in order to:

1. Synergise the Asia-Pacific region into a stable neighborhood,
2. Simplify the forming of a regional coalition response to regional crises,
3. Allow economies of scale in regional defense forces, and
4. Enhance transparency, habits of cooperation, and trust amongst Asia-Pacific nations.
Within this framework the reasons an APRRF may or may not be warranted will be examined, as will the potential for Australia and the United States to join the force. The prism of recent operations in East Timor will be used to examine some challenges facing an APRRF, as well as opportunities the region now has to enable it to embrace change. Some structural issues will be examined, paying attention to areas such as structure, readiness, participants, command, finances, training, logistics, procedures, response options, means of deployment, and language.

**Conclusion:** Preferably a combination of ASEAN, the ARF, and APEC would be appropriate to provide support to an APRRF. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could be expected to provide troops from member nations to an APRRF. APEC, with its economic focus, could provide funds for an APRRF especially from nations unwilling or unable to provide troops to the force. In addition, APEC may follow the example of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Australia should seek to become involved in an APRRF and could offer excellent organizational and doctrinal skills, as well as significant experience in rapid deployment and peacekeeping operations.

The United States would probably not want to become a member of an APRRF, but could possibly support the concept financially. In any regional crisis, the US may choose to remain uninvolved or only involved on the periphery, especially as the US appears to be over-committed to many scenarios both now and into the foreseeable future. Alternatively the US may see an APRRF as a potential partner in a regional peacekeeping operation.
# SHOULD THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION CONSTITUTE A RAPID REACTION FORCE?

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Regional organizations within the region may be able to develop a model for an APRRF. These include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its offshoot the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). Within this framework the reasons an APRRF may or may not be warranted will be examined, as will the potential for Australia and the United States to join the force. The prism of recent operations in East Timor will be used to examine some challenges facing an APRRF, as well as opportunities the region now has to enable it to embrace change, and some structural issues will be examined.

The paper concludes that a combination of ASEAN, the ARF, and APEC would be appropriate to provide support to an APRRF. Australia should seek to become involved in an APRRF, and could offer excellent organizational and doctrinal skills. The United States would probably not want to become a member of an APRRF, but could possibly support the concept financially.
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Should the Asia-Pacific region constitute a Rapid Reaction Force?

The Drive for Change – The Brahimi Report

The Brahimi Report recently recommended to the United Nations that regions of the world establish rapid reaction forces, of several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, in order to respond to world emergencies, with the following overarched doctrine and strategy:

1. Once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully, and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust Rules Of Engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.

The Report recognizes that it is the essential responsibility of UN member states for the maintenance of international peace and security, and that there is a need to strengthen both the quality and quantity of support provided to the UN system to carry out that responsibility. The Report seeks to build the UN’s capacity to contribute to peacebuilding, both preventative and post-conflict, in a genuinely integrated manner. The UN views the Report’s recommendations as the minimum threshold of change needed to give it the opportunity to become an effective 21st Century peacekeeping body.

Current world ready reaction capabilities include NATO’s Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the European Union’s EUROCORPS, and Scandinavia’s SHIRBRIG.
In addition, the nascent efforts of both the Organization of African Unity, and Organization of American States, point to a desire by those regions to establish rapid reaction and crisis management capabilities. The world is becoming collectively conscious of the need to provide troops, support and, on occasion, force to support world peace. The United Nations has produced a broad plan for change to the way coalition operations are to be conducted. The challenge for the 21st Century has been issued.

Given the Asia-Pacific’s post World War II struggle to emerge from colonialism, combined with the almost continuous friction, change, and conflict that has beset the region since 1941, it is remarkable that the region has been able to contribute strongly to world peacekeeping. Not only has the region contributed to regional peacekeeping missions, such as Cambodia and East Timor, but they have also contributed strongly to non-regional missions in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

As a result of this wealth of experience, the Asia-Pacific Region is well placed to make a significant contribution to the Brahimi Report’s call for regionally based rapid reaction forces. There exist regional organizations within the Asia-Pacific region that may be able to support and develop a model for an Asia-Pacific Rapid Reaction Force (APRRF). These include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its offshoot the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), both will be examined later in this paper. It is time for the Asia Pacific region to embrace the opportunities of the post-Cold War multi-polar world, and form a modern, flexible, robust and effective rapid reaction force in order to:

1. Synergise the Asia-Pacific region into a stable neighborhood,
2. Simplify the forming of a regional coalition response to regional crises,
3. Allow economies of scale in regional defense forces, and
4. Enhance transparency, habits of cooperation, and trust amongst Asia-Pacific nations.

A Force to enhance Asia-Pacific Stability?

The aim of this paper is to examine the viability of an Asia-Pacific Rapid Reaction Force (APRRF), using existing regional structures, in order to enable the Asia-Pacific Region to make an efficient and effective contribution to regional stability.

What is the Asia Pacific Region?

The geography of the Asia-Pacific can be defined as:

All countries that abut the Pacific Basin which include Russia, a group of East Asian countries (Japan, China, the Koreas, Taiwan, Hong Kong), Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and the Central American States as well as numerous Pacific island states such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the mini-states of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.

This definition extends across one-third of the globe and contains the planet’s greatest concentration of human population. At the center of this region and the key to developing an APRRF concept is Australia. Arguably, in terms of a strategic environment Australia needs to recognize that, far from being isolated from the rest of the world, it is situated at the hub of the world’s most developing region. In addition, Australia should regard the Asia-Pacific as a single strategic system. With this view, Australia can take advantage of its geographic position, largely
positive regional diplomatic ties, strong regional economic relationships, and a robust defense force to lead the way in developing an APRRF concept.

**Why an Asia Pacific Rapid Reaction Force?**

Australia’s success in drawing together a regional coalition force for OPERATION STABILISE in East Timor in late 1999, demonstrated a new regional political maturity, and a potential for the region to take regional cooperation to a new level. The effectiveness of the International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET), is of great significance particularly given the strong the regional support, despite some vacillation from parts of ASEAN, and the seamless transition of responsibility from INTERFET to the United Nations Transitional Authority.\(^7\) There is now an unprecedented opportunity for member states in the Asia-Pacific region to take advantage of the success of the East Timor operation, and move to formalize an agreement that will allow similar rapid responses to military contingencies in the future. This could be done within a framework aimed at establishing a process of military transparency, mutual cooperation, and understanding.

Why is an APRRF warranted? First, operations in Kosovo and East Timor have provided a new model for dealing with the full spectrum of peace operations in failed states. In Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia, United Nations Forces failed to effectively control the crises in what were UN Chapter VII operations, designed for peace enforcement. In Kosovo and East Timor lead nations and regional organizations were able to carry out the difficult, combat oriented, task of peace enforcement, and then when the situation had stabilized, and an effective peace agreement was in place, the mission then transferred to the UN. In Kosovo, although there remain 30,000 NATO peacekeeping troops, the UN is coordinating the many facets of nation building. In February 2000, the Australian led INTERFET mission ended, and the 42 nation United Nations
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Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) mission was established to run the country. It now appears that UN forces are regarded as too weak and lacking the credibility needed to enforce, at least in the early stages, a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate on another nation or national crisis. This was vividly demonstrated by the disastrous UN mission in Sierra Leone, prior to the British intervention.

If the UN cannot implement Chapter VII peace enforcement operations, then a lead nation or regional organization may be required. However, UN peacekeeping forces frequently suffer from a lack of wealthy member nation support in the form of troops or logistics. It may be that the UN is unable to deal with certain high intensity crises, and will be forced to seek intervention by regional organizations such as, NATO, OAS, or OAU. Once a regional organization has ensured stability, the UN can then assume responsibility for the operation in a more benign environment.

An APRRF would probably not work on the lead nation model, but should seek a consensus approach by incorporating a regional organization methodology. Nations contributing to an APRRF would have the advantage of being able to understand a local situation better than the UN Security Council, which may still be debating a particular regional crisis. If the Security Council was unable to reach an agreement, an APRRF could elect to deploy to a crisis without UN approval. This was the case with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. This represents a significant extension of the APRRF concept, but is useful in that it shows that in an increasingly multi-polar world regions may need to assume responsibilities for crises, and perhaps cannot guarantee that the UN will make timely or appropriate decisions. Therefore, having an integrated, professional, and robust regional organization capable of conducting rapid Chapter VII peace enforcement operations would represent a significant collective capability for the
Asia-Pacific region. However, legitimacy of the force would be questionable if a decision to act was made without UN approval.

Second, in a regional context, the Asia-Pacific region is becoming increasingly unstable, with crises and tension in Indonesia - including Aceh, the Moluccas, and Irian Jaya; The Philippines - including separatist Muslims in Mindanao and on the island of Jolo, and Communists in Luzon; the Spratly Islands; Taiwan; Korea; India and Pakistan – the region of Kashmir; Sri Lanka; Burma; Fiji; the Solomon Islands; and the Papua New Guinea province of Bougainville. This current ‘arc of instability’ should generate a sense of urgency amongst those nations interested in regional economic, political, and social stability. Following the removal of Cold War ideological constraints, a multitude of worldwide regional crises, and unprecedented deployments by UN peacekeepers, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has boldly argued that national sovereignty can no longer be used as a shield to protect those that commit ‘gross and systematic violations of human rights.’ He has indicated that concepts of national interests need to be amended to recognize that in a shrinking world ‘the collective interest is the national interest.’ An APRRF would be designed with collective regional interests at the forefront of its motivation.

In the post Cold War environment each country within the Asia-Pacific region, with the exception of the US, defines strategic security preoccupations in relation to countries within the Asia-Pacific system, rather than to those outside the region. In contrast, the Cold War paradigms drove most countries in the Asia-Pacific to tie their strategic security priorities closely with the balance of power. Paradoxically, the inherent instability of the region’s diverse strategic interests, could be the catalyst for a realization of the need to embrace the concept of a collective
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regional security body: such as an APRRF. This should also help to improve cooperation and consultation with neighbors.

Most, but not all, regional crises reflect a trend in the region: the desire for self-determination. Present boundaries of nations closely represent the limits imposed by European powers from the 17th through to the 20th Centuries. Post-colonial governments largely retained these arbitrary borders, many of which resulted in 20th Century conflicts and 21st Century tensions. Both the parties seeking independence and the governments facing a domestic crisis may, with the correct model, welcome the availability of an APRRF. An impartial, well trained, doctrinally prepared, integrated, and highly responsive APRRF, could be available to allow regional governments to avoid direct confrontation with secessionists and independence leaders, and give the breathing space required during sensitive negotiations. Issues of national sovereignty, and external interference by third parties in domestic issues will always need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, but the formation of an APRRF would mean that discussing these issues, in a broad context, could begin without waiting for a regional crisis to occur.

Third, regional stability is needed to ensure economic prosperity. With the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis still affecting many Asia-Pacific Nations, economic recovery will be driven largely by regional nations being able to maintain stability, and control their economies. An APRRF could foster a better understanding of local issues, and facilitate openness throughout the region. It could also act as a regional partnership, encouraging a policy of ‘good neighborliness,’ and willingness to assist those in need when a crisis looms. Through such actions, closer relations could have a positive impact on the stability of the entire region. As a military force, the APRRF
would need to be an apolitical organization, prepared to rapidly assist, guide, and support the processes of reconciliation, and change within the region when called upon to do so.

Fourth, the APRRF represents the art of the possible. Given growing commitments and limited funding, the United Nations will not always have forces available for peackeeping, especially for rapid response operations and clearly the Brahami Report favors the UN stepping away from intervening in every regional crisis. Thus an APRRF would appear to be an opportunity for Asia-Pacific nations to show the world that they can fend for themselves in an effective, professional, and deliberate manner. The Brahimi Report is unequivocal about the serious message the new model of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement intends to send. Willingness of member states to contribute troops to a credible operation also implies a willingness to accept the risk of casualties on behalf of the UN mandate. The UN Secretary General must be able to make the case that troop contributors, and indeed all member states, have a stake in the management and resolution of all conflicts, if only as part of the larger enterprise of establishing peace that the UN represents.¹³

Brahimi has criticized the US and Europe for allowing 75 percent of 30,000 UN troops currently deployed worldwide to come from developing nations – “you can’t have a situation where some people contribute blood and some contribute money.”¹⁴ The Western powers now prefer to pay around 85 percent of the $3 billion annual peacekeeping budget. The message for an APRRF is clear: commitment to a rapid response force is a potentially hazardous business, demanding coordinated, integrated, and professional training. The UN, based on the Brahimi model, can be expected to require that highly capable organizations rapidly deploy within regions to support a
UN mandate. An APRRF should be able to fulfill such requirements; otherwise the lives of soldiers will be at risk.

Fifth, an APRRF makes good economic sense. Nations such as Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia maintain separate rapid reaction forces. Such ready forces are integral to national defense policies; however, due to the Asian economic crisis Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan have all canceled or delayed planned procurements and have seriously reduced exercises integral to operational readiness. The danger in allowing this trend to continue is that reduced defense spending will mean that regional cooperative efforts such as intelligence sharing, combined patrolling, and combined exercises, that were previously seen as vital to the security architecture of the region, will not be maintained at viable levels. An APRRF could produce economies of scale for regional nations so they could contribute to a regional security arrangement, without being burdened with the entire cost of such a program. Quite possibly nations such as Japan, given the restrictive nature of the Japanese Constitution, may choose to support an APRRF financially without a concomitant deployment of troops. Such steps could help to broaden the appeal of an APRRF, especially to less affluent nations.

The speed with which modern crises unfold may mean that there will not be time to integrate an effective regional force. Instead, the nations of the Asia-Pacific region would conceivably arrive at the crisis poorly coordinated, minimally integrated, and without unity of command. Pundits may point to the East Timor experience to indicate that such integration is not required. But lessons from East Timor, as discussed later in this paper, should be read with caution.
Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief US Pacific Command (CINCPAC) has suggested that the Asia-Pacific should adopt a ‘security community’ approach to regional cooperation. Karl Deutch coined the term 40 years ago in the European context, but the principles can be applied in Asia. He cites Northeast Asia, and the process led by former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry that brought together the United States and its Japanese and South Korean allies for genuine consultation and policy coordination on North Korea. Rather than responding to a specified external threat, as exemplified by the Perry model, an APRRF could enhance regional stability during a period of enormous regional upheaval and uncertainty, and provide an option for regional leaders to collectively deploy forces during a regional crisis. An attractive feature of ‘security communities’ for Asian states is the absence of any requirement, with the possible exception of the Five-Power Defence Arrangement, for security institutions or regimes specified by treaty.

The APRRF would be aimed to allow, within a ‘security community’ framework, for regional military forces to be sufficient for self-defense, in whatever way that may be defined by individual nations. The key is that an APRRF should be capable of cooperating with others in the region by creating habits of cooperation, among non-like minded states through the development of ad hoc, informal and flexible processes that promote trust among the regional actors. These processes would encompass a broad range of regional missions, from search and rescue through to peacekeeping operations under United Nations mandate.

**Would Australia be welcome in an APRRF?**

The Australian Defence Force *White Paper 2000* states that Australian strategic objectives include: fostering security in the ‘immediate neighborhood’ of the Asia-Pacific region,
promoting stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia, contributing in appropriate ways to maintaining strategic stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region, and contributing to the efforts of the international community, especially the United Nations, to uphold global security. Australia recognizes that the Asia-Pacific region remains an area of great promise, albeit with a number of security issues that need careful handling, and acknowledges that the relationships between the region’s great powers – China, Japan, India, Russia, and the United States will set the tone for the whole region. A key factor in the evolution of Australia’s strategic environment is the development of military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, which has recently seen the fastest growth of military capabilities in the world. Australia needs to balance any desire to participate in a regional cooperative arrangement, such as an APRRF, with the need to ensure that the Asia-Pacific nations do not force such compromise into the arrangement that the process becomes fatally flawed. Such a balance is well within Australia’s political, diplomatic, and military capabilities. Australia is currently seeking to strengthen its alliance with the US by consolidating the 1951 ANZUS Treaty which was originally aimed at providing a trilateral mutual security agreement, although the US suspended security obligations to New Zealand in 1986, through combined Australian and US annual meetings. Australia is also aiming to enhance defense ties with China, Japan, and principal ASEAN States. In addition, the success of UNTAC and INTERFET, both Australian led missions, have proven to the region, that Australia is a balanced, reasonable, and professionally capable nation, that can conduct missions in a timely manner, with mercifully few casualties, and with a clear end state.
The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, in his now infamous ‘Howard Doctrine,’ which ran for five days before it was disowned, proposed Australia play an ‘influential, constructive and decisive role in the affairs of the region’ by ‘defending the values we hold as Australians.’

This political *faux pas* has perhaps raised some suspicion from Australia’s erstwhile regional partners who may have some suspicion that Australia is seeking a hegemonic position in the region. Howard’s assertive moral tone albeit briefly, reflected a departure from the previous Australian foreign policy, which had emphasized regional engagement. An APRRF may be just the tonic required to build regional confidence in Australia’s desire to be a partner, and participate in the region, as opposed to acting as a regional moral policeman or ‘deputy marshal’ to the US.

The INTERFET mission has triggered disparate responses from Australia’s key regional neighbors. Australia was heartened by the strong support obtained from Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as partners further afield like South Korea, China, and Japan, and was gratified that no criticism was forthcoming from the Indo-Chinese ASEAN States. This can be contrasted with the criticisms from Malaysia and obvious Indonesian displeasure.

Thailand was the first Asian nation to deploy forces to East Timor, with 1,500 troops and a Thai Major General as the Deputy INTERFET Commander. This was the second largest contribution to the mission after Australia. The rapid Thai response to the INTERFET mission gave impetus for other regional countries to contribute forces to East Timor, adding legitimacy to Australia’s actions. Had the Thais withheld support, Australian efforts may have been hamstrung by a grudging and only token ASEAN participation. Despite being criticized as being ‘too close’ to the Australians, the Thai government defended its strong support by noting Australia’s one
billion-US dollar contribution to the IMF Thailand post Asia-crisis bail out package, as well as Australian Prime Minister Howard’s public support in 1998 for the Australia-Thailand bilateral relationship. However, the ‘Howard Doctrine’ issue did cause a minor hiccup, with Thailand immediately condemning Howard, stating that it was too early to speak about a prominent security role in Asia for Australia.

Singapore adopted a pragmatic stance during the East Timor crisis, due to its strong bi-lateral trading and defense ties with Australia, despite being aghast at the ‘clumsiness’ of the ‘Howard Doctrine’ declaration. Singapore demonstrated its support for the Australian led INTERFET by providing a substantial military commitment of two ships and a logistic force, while stressing that its participation was in response to calls from Indonesia for ASEAN participation.

As a founding member of the ASEAB forerunner, the ‘Maphilindo’ (Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia) organization, the Philippines has a long and credible influence within ASEAN. The former Philippine President, Fidel Ramos, complimented the Australian actions in East Timor stating “we must credit Australia for taking the initiative and picking up the ball.” Australian actions were strongly endorsed with the rapid augmentation of INTERFET by the Philippines, initially deploying 240 soldiers, and later increasing that commitment to 1,500 personnel. In addition Philippine Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos assumed the role as the UNTAET Commander in February, 2000, taking over from the INTERFET Commander, Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove. In light of the strong Philippine support to both INTERFET and UNTAET, it is significant that Philippines President Estrada is a notable dissenter from the ASEAN ‘non-interference’ policy. His attitudes to ASEAN suggest that he may also listen favorably to an APRRF concept.
Conversely, the impact of the East Timor operations on Malaysia has been to provide fuel for another round of diplomatic antagonism with Australia. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad vented his anger over the INTERFET operation complaining of confusing changes to Australian foreign policy, and thwarting what he saw as Australian attempts to secure a leadership role in the region. Malaysia made a small contribution to INTERFET of thirty personnel, although it was one of the rotating members of the UN Security Council that voted for the intervention in Timor. Malaysia claimed that Australia was the only beneficiary of a disintegrated Indonesia, and from the start of the crisis had voiced its opinion that ASEAN peacekeeping members should lead the peacekeeping force for East Timor. Mahathir claimed that INTERFET’s operations contravened ASEAN’s principle of ‘non-intervention,’ despite wider regional perceptions that Australia’s actions were based on legitimate humanitarian grounds. Mahathir sided with Indonesia by criticizing Australian soldiers as too aggressive and called for their reduction and a higher quota of troops from ASEAN States. This resulted in the East Timorese rejection of Malaysia’s bid for leadership of UNTAET. Such ASEAN attitudes will need to be addressed before an APRRF can become effective. The antagonism between Australia and Malaysia is a challenge that needs to be overcome, not just for an APRRF, but for regional stability and harmony.

The greatest impact for Australia has been on the relationship with Indonesia, bringing it to its lowest ebb since Konfrontasi, in the early to mid-1960s. It has been claimed that during the East Timor crisis, Indonesia was confused about Australian objectives and indignant at the enduring stereotypes of Australians as racist, rich, arrogant, and possessing an unrivaled propensity to lecture others. Canberra did not object to Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, in 1976 and may even have encouraged the action with its propensity
to use appeasement policies. It quickly recognized Indonesian sovereignty over the territory, and then turned a blind eye to persistent atrocities committed by the Indonesian military in the interests of maintaining good relations with Jakarta. The Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Arizal Effendi, accused the Australian press of continuing ‘to engage in incrimination and stereotype reporting.’ Indonesia suffered a sense of national humiliation over East Timor. These feelings were sorely aggravated by a perception of Australia indulging in ‘triumphalism’ over its key role and successes of INTERFET.

The signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) in 1995, between the Keating and Suharto governments, had strengthened the bi-lateral security relationship between Australia and Indonesia. Still, the AMS compelled neither party to do anything more than consult in the event of an external security threat. It did not constitute a binding defense agreement. Its importance lay in more its symbolism, particularly since it was the first such arrangement that Indonesia had made in the region. With Australia’s intervention in East Timor, military ties foundered and Indonesia formally repudiated the AMS on 16 September 1999. Its abrogation was of symbolic rather than practical importance. However, in diplomacy, especially within Asia, symbolism is often much more important than pragmatism.

The assessment of Australia’s Ambassador to Indonesia, John McCarthy, is that the Australian/Indonesian relationship is ‘60 to 70 percent’ of what it was before the East Timor crisis, and that the deficit could take months or even years to win back. Australian Foreign Minster, Alexander Downer has stated that ‘it’s important that we have a constructive relationship with Jakarta but not at any price.’ Indonesia has adopted this pragmatic approach, with Ambassador Arizal, stating optimism for his diplomatic task of ending the deep mistrust
between the two nations brought about by the East Timor crisis. Indonesian President Wahid recently praised John Howard for his strength in sticking to his controversial views on Asia, and offered to build a new relationship with Australia.

Importantly for Australia-Indonesia reconciliation have been moves within Indonesia to work toward national stability. Recent positive signs include Indonesia’s announcement that special autonomy will be granted from May 2001, for two of its most restless and resource-rich provinces, Aceh and Irian Jaya in a bid to end separatist struggles. These measures are intended to allow people within each Province to gain a greater say in their own affairs, although observers argue that endemic corruption and bureaucratic inertia will continue fuelling the separatist flames. The separatist Free Aceh Movement has been waging a war against Indonesian rule for more than 25 years. In Irian Jaya, separatists have likewise fought a long-running guerilla campaign against Jakarta, and look set to continue threatening to declare independence from Indonesia.

Further afield, China’s recently published white paper on national defense was assessed in US circles as being an attempt by China to ease international concerns about its military ambitions. China has indicted that it is interested in reducing tensions in the Pacific, and sees the US as a threat to stability in Asia. This Chinese disdain for ‘big powers’, may be a positive development for an APRRF. A regional defense partnership comprising small and mid-level powers, of brigade size, is not a threat to Chinese sovereignty. It does represent an opportunity for the region to show large region powers, such as China, Russia, and the US, that the region is capable of making an integrated and cooperative effort to ensure regional stability. A more stable region is precisely the desired end state for major regional players.
Should the Asia-Pacific region constitute a Rapid Reaction Force? – Major Chris Field, Australian Army

What could Australia contribute?

Australia maintains two brigade-sized ready reaction forces in northern Australia, configured as heavy and light organizations. These represent a sizeable potential contribution to an APRRF. Australia’s good record in peacekeeping, and willingness to rapidly respond to regional crises, is exemplified by the almost 2,000 troops currently participating in peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Bougainville, and the Solomon Islands. The lesson is that Australia must participate in an APRRF in order to continue to share the burden of response for regional crises.

Australia has proven to be pragmatic about leadership of regional peacekeeping missions. At the end of the INTERFET mission, Australia recognized that its continued leadership of the peacekeeping forces in East Timor would not be acceptable to the region. A condition of an APRRF, from Australia’s perspective, would be the establishment of an integrated HQ with access to key positions, and ideally a rotation of the APRRF leadership. That said, and based on the East Timor experience, it is likely that the actual leadership of the APRRF leadership would figure more heavily in Asian minds, and would largely be a non-issue for Australia. Providing there are mechanisms for Australia to influence the planning and operational capability of an APRRF.

Australia has demonstrated that it can work cooperatively within a region context through the Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). The 1971 Agreement, that includes Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and Singapore, allows for common doctrine and procedures, based on the NATO model of consensus, mutual deterrence, and a relative certainty of response in a crisis situation. The FPDA has allowed Australia to maintain a long record of military engagement and cooperation with countries in the region. It provides for standardized
command and control, arrangements, communications, and combat force interoperability. The most active, and only permanent, component of the FPDA has been the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), commanded by a senior Royal Australian Air Force officer with a twinning of Malaysian and Singaporean officers a deputies. This reflects the unwillingness of either Malaysia or Singapore to hand over responsibility of air defense to the other nation. In this way Australia has already demonstrated how it can assist in the construction of regional coalitions, and act as relatively independent party, playing the role of honest broker.  

To further support Australia’s role in an APRRF by regional powers is the Australian Defence Cooperation Program. This program provides important defense access for Australia to nations throughout the region, and a level of transparency of capabilities that allow a reduction in suspicions and trust building between regional countries. In addition, Australia’s strategic planning recognizes that while bilateral relationships will remain at the heart of its regional security diplomacy, they are now being complemented by important multilateral activities. These include business and personal links, which together with regional economic, political, social, and technological forces are pulling the Asia-Pacific region closer together.  

Significantly, Australia and New Zealand recently discussed the prospects of joining economies with South East Asia. The immediate prospect before the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, and the New Zealand leader, Helen Clark, is the proposal to join the Australia-New Zealand free trade area with that being created by the ten ASEAN economies in South East Asia. ASEAN Trade Ministers met in Thailand during October 2000 to discuss a proposal recommending the go ahead for the ASEAN combined free trade area. There have also been discussions on a common Australia-New Zealand currency combined with a proposed joint
central bank. Economic regional integration of Australia and New Zealand with ASEAN, would be a significant lever with which to gain support of an APRRF, based on a combined desire of regional nations to gain and maintain economic prosperity.

Who will belong to an APRRF and how will it work?

Where commonality of interest exists, it makes sense for nations to enter political, economic, and/or military partnerships. These partnerships occur as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests or seek mutual security. The APRRF would aim to harness the commonality of interests that are evolving in the Asia-Pacific Region. Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, and political factors all influence the formation and conduct of such partnerships.

The issue regarding which nations would belong to an APRRF is outside the scope of this paper, except to say that the Asia-Pacific region has been defined, is culturally varied, politically heterogeneous, and geographically dispersed. The APRRF composition is a political question. Issues of regional democracy and human rights may need to be considered and discussed by regional powers. Open, honest, and frank discussions can be used to enhance regional understanding, and so perhaps an APRRF may assist in breaking down barriers between nations that have traditionally been wary of other national motives. The western predilection for creating organizations and formal structures, deciding modalities, and delineating responsibilities are generally disdained by Asian nations. The Asian-way stresses patience, informality, consensus, and evolution.
This can be largely overcome by defining an APRRF as a *security community*, which is not formed against any threat, in contrast to the traditional Western paradigm of a *defense community*, which implies an alliance and is directed against a pre-recognized or commonly perceived external threat. With this in mind, the principles for the formation of an APRRF are:

1. **Agreement on structure.** In line with the Brahimi Report recommendations, the aim should be a brigade-sized force. The Report does not define exactly what is meant by ‘several coherent’ brigade-sized forces throughout regions of the world, probably reflecting disparate capabilities and requirements of regions worldwide. Although the following is a useful guide:

   Forces participating in UN operations should deploy as a brigade formation, not as a collection of battalions that are unfamiliar with one another’s doctrine, leadership and, operational practices. That brigade would have to come from a group of countries that have been working together to develop common training and equipment standards, common doctrine, and common arrangements for the operational control of the force.

Therefore, a possible model for an APRRF could be an integrated headquarters, three infantry battalions (with an option for light or heavy units), artillery (with an option for a light or medium unit), aviation (reconnaissance and utility helicopters), communications, transport, repair and maintenance, supply, and medical. It is considered essential to develop the ability to augment the APRRF military structure with civilian specialists,
such as international law professionals, police, electoral scrutineers, information gathering agencies, and UN officials.

2. **Agreement on readiness notices.** The notices would need to be at least in line with the Brahimi Report, of deploying traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. The author considers these timelines to be conservative, and would envisage any worthwhile APRRF, to be able to respond to a crisis within, as a minimum, seven days.

The Brahimi Report stresses that “all peace operations should be given the capacity to make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people in their mission area, relatively early in the life of the mission.” The value of rapid reaction was demonstrated during the INTERFET mission, in September 1999. However, significant violence and destruction occurred in East Timor between the August 30th Referendum on independence, and the September 20th INTERFET deployment. A similar experience occurred during the UN delay in deploying to Rwanda in 1994. Speed of deployment is essential if the UN and an APRRF are to provide a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping operations.

3. **Agreement on participants.** The principle of multi-national operations should be maximum nations available for a mission, in order to ensure a cooperative approach to regional crises. Care should be taken not to exclude key regional interests, as such
exclusion would likely weaken the APRRF’s ability to intervene in crises. This would help to avoid the view of an APRRF as neo-colonial, pro-American, pro-western, or simply not compatible with their perception of regional objectives. Ideally all nations of the Asia-Pacific region would need to be convinced that the APRRF is warranted and appropriate. This ideal may be difficult and slow to achieve. However, anything less than total regional cooperation would reduce the efficacy of an APRRF.

The complexity of this challenge should not be underestimated. The coming to power in the Asia-Pacific region, of new generations with no personal experience of the wars of revolution and independence, has been a factor in leading states to review the foundations for their security. Australia’s post World War II generation leaders such as Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating, and Howard, for instance have largely been able to unburden themselves from regional isolationism, Eurocentric ambitions, and the tutelage of the United States. This has markedly improved Australia’s ability to deal with Asia-Pacific nations, and begin to cooperate as a regional partner. The leadership displayed by Australia during UNTAC and INTERFET, and more importantly, the ability of Asia-Pacific nations to cooperate with that leadership exemplifies this improvement.

4. **Agreement on command.** An APRRF should avoid a *lead nation command* approach because such a model would discourage participation by regional nations who prefer a consensus approach to military partnerships, as is the case with ASEAN. Similarly a *parallel command* structure, where no single commander is named, should be avoided. Instead, a combination of both could be employed. Nations would maintain oversight of troops committed to an APRRF, but a commander would be able to exercise command
over multinational troops in a combined headquarters environment. Command should be
designed to rotate, so that all nations can gain influence with an APRRF, an important
aspect of face saving for nations of the region. Perhaps a permanent headquarters could
be established, although such details are beyond the scope of this paper. Ultimately the
Brahimi Report requires, for complex peacekeeping operations, that the mission HQ
should be fully installed and functioning within 15 days, and therefore an APRRF would
need a headquarter team to be identified, and preferably conduct regular training focused
on likely scenarios.\textsuperscript{68}

Sovereignty issues will be the most difficult challenges for the commander of an APRRF,
both in regards to forces contributed by regional partners and by host-country nations.
Agreement would have to be made so that the commander of an APRRF would be more
than a ‘commander’ in title only, to ensure that he could act decisively if the mission
required determined and forceful leadership. Regardless, an APRRF commander would
need to accomplish missions through coordination, communication, consensus, and
leadership, rather than traditional command concepts.\textsuperscript{69} Political sensitivities would need
to be acknowledged and an APRRF commander may be required to act at times, more as
a diplomat than as a formal military leader. The commander would need to cultivate
between the participating nations: mutual confidence through liaison and openness; good
rapport through understanding characteristics, personalities, capabilities, ambitions, and
cultural habits; respect for culture, religion, customs, values, and ideas; an understanding
of member capabilities and limitations; and, an atmosphere of cooperation and trust.\textsuperscript{70}
5. **Agreement of finances, training, logistics, and procedures.** A minimum of number annual exercises, rotated between participating nations would be required. In addition, exchanges between APRRF nations would be helpful. The Brahimi Report also stresses the importance of training military, police, and other civilian personnel on human rights issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law. This would need to be a priority of the APRRF.

Despite extensive bilateral interactions, the armed forces of the Asia-Pacific region currently have no standardized procedures to work together. Communications are difficult, both because equipment is not fully interoperable and because of language difficulties. INTERFET demonstrated that a broad array of questions regarding deploying and sustaining forces, defining questions of rules of engagement, and operating procedures had not been previously addressed. An APRRF coordinated readiness program would go a long way to improving such a dysfunctional situation.

Financial and logistic issues would be complex. For simplicity, a single nation may opt to assume the financial and/or logistic burden for the APRRF, or finances and logistics may be based on separate contributions from member nations. Even in comparatively wealthy Europe, the daunting prospect of providing logistical support to the proposed 60,000-strong European Rapid Reaction Force mean that NATO - primarily the US would, for the foreseeable future, be asked to provide support.\(^7\) Logistics for an APRRF, although on a lesser scale, would be equally problematic.
The Brahimi Report recommends that the United Nations General Assembly authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, Italy, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. The appropriateness of the mission start-up kits in Italy would need to be examined, with an APRRF requiring forward positioning of the equipment at a convenient location within the Asia-Pacific region.

6. **Agreement on response options.** This would be primarily a challenge for political leaders. Ultimately an APRRF should be prepared and flexibly configured with robust capabilities for peacekeeping (including humanitarian operations), peacemaking, and peace-enforcement options.

7. **Agreement on means of deployment.** It is likely that many nations will be unable to deploy their own elements of an APRRF to a crisis. Troop and equipment deployment, along with when the headquarters will be inserted, will loom large in the contingency planning required for an APRRF. It would be critical for planners to identify nations willing to provide strategic lift for an APRRF, with a preference to having assets permanently earmarked to support operations.

8. **Agreement on language.** English is probably preferable at an APRRF headquarters level in order to allow the organization to more easily integrate with potential UN, NATO, EU, or US partners. For simplicity, keeping national languages at battalion headquarters level and below would appear to be appropriate.
APRRF parent organization one: ASEAN and the ARF

ASEAN was established as an organization based on consensus between a group of economically, politically, and culturally disparate nations. In addition, ASEAN’s 1967 establishment was predicated on the desire for regional reconciliation with Indonesia. Despite its long existence, it may be argued that ASEAN represents a nascent security community. Participants in the group have developed patterns of mutual predictability contributing to trust within a framework that preserves their independence while advancing national interests. Despite this, ASEAN vacillated on East Timor, until Thailand took the lead and pressed other members into action. Arguably, ASEAN’s only consistent diplomatic or military response to the East Timor crisis was a grudging respect for the professionalism and moral weight that characterized the Australian Defence Force performance. It is possible now that ASEAN feels a renewed maturity from its successful participation in the INTERFET, and current UN operations in East Timor.

Several ASEAN states resent what they consider ‘inappropriate’ security concepts being foisted on them by outsiders. The Association’s doctrine of ‘non-intervention’ means, that member states are supposed to refrain from open criticism of others, and from providing support to a neighboring country’s opposition movements. This does not mean that ASEAN never becomes involved in the affairs of neighbors. Indeed, helping neighboring governments and countries - acting as a mutual support group - is very much the essence of ASEAN. However, ASEAN does not readily tolerate external interference.

The first step in the creation of a multilateral security vehicle in the Asia-Pacific region has been the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Inaugurated in July 1994, it was
intended to establish a multi-dimensional approach to security aimed at developing, ‘shared perceptions of the strategic landscape [and] giving and receiving assurances about the role of military forces.’ The ARF provides for a security dialogue, emphasizing consensus and incrementalism, between ASEAN and its dialogue partners, is comprised of 22 countries, and is now recognized as the primary forum for discussion of security issues in the Asia-Pacific. Gradual expansion of membership is expected to occur in Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as the Central and Southwest Pacific region. However, the ARF is presently stymied over how to move from phase one (confidence-building measures) to phase two (preventative diplomacy) of its self-proclaimed three-phase development. The final phase would see the ARF involved in conflict resolution.

Whilst the ARF is a significant consultative forum, it remains a long way from providing a basis for an APRRF. As Alexander Downer, then Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, said in September 1996, ‘the ARF was never conceived as the sole answer to managing security in the Asia-Pacific…the ARF is about adding a new regional layer to security relationships that will work together with management at the bilateral level.’ In the foreseeable future the ARF is likely to remain a forum for discussion, combined educational programs, and training in areas such as peacekeeping and peace support operations. In a region with no previous tradition of inclusive multilateral security dialogue, the ARF remains an opportunity for regional colloquy, transparency, confidence and trust building, which perhaps may provide the framework for the region to consider an APRRF.

ASEAN’s multitude of interests include transnational challenges of cybercrime, cross-border terrorism, religious extremism, drugs and weapons trafficking, piracy, search and rescue
coordination, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and demining. Given the complexity of these issues, ASEAN has an interest in achieving a regional atmosphere of cooperation simply to ensure that the common interests of the region may be best served. Therefore, the current climate established following the post-1997 Asian economic collapse, regional cooperation in East Timor, numerous regional challenges, and the Brahimi report, point to an unprecedented opportunity for the Asia-Pacific region to think, and act, collectively. The time appears perfect for an APRRF, to consolidated regional cooperation, and confirm the direction of ASEAN in the 21st Century.

In a series of meetings held in Bangkok between a delegation of key US Senate staff and Thai policymakers in early June 2000, there was a great deal of discussion about the changing nature of ASEAN. In the words of a senior Thai official, "while Thailand wishes to keep non-interference as the basis of ASEAN, the lines between foreign and domestic issues are blurring." Thailand hopes, in the future, that ASEAN will be capable of ‘flexible engagement or enhanced interaction,’ which is the ability of ASEAN to engage in dialogue with partners on internal events.

Thailand had previously made an unsuccessful attempt to alter the ASEAN charter to allow ‘constructive intervention’ when the domestic problems of an ASEAN state spilled over its borders. The primary driver for this proposal was cross-border difficulties that Thailand was having with Myanmar, although Thailand also cited ASEAN’s intervention in Cambodia’s domestic strife in July 1997 as a precedent. Despite this precedent and a range of other problems which pre-dated the East Timor crisis, notably the Indonesian smoke haze problem, the Asian financial crisis, and a number of cross-border difficulties between member nations, the
ASEAN members remain unwilling to amend its Charter. A consequence of East Timor may be further pressure on the increasingly unworkable policy of non-interference. If this were to change, there would be enormous implications for regional security relationships.

In November 2000 ASEAN officials, less representatives from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia, held unprecedented discussions on proposed collaborative military efforts. In an attempt to strengthen and enhance military relationships, promote peace in the region, and establish a framework for cooperation among ASEAN, the meeting agreed to “join forces to handle low-intensity military operations such as disaster and humanitarian-relief missions.” The emphasis was on cooperation in politically benign operations such as providing relief in the wake of natural catastrophes. A memorandum of understanding will now be drafted to reflect this agreement. This move is further evidence that ASEAN may be receptive to the idea of an APRRF, within strict parameters, and while maintaining the sovereign integrity of Southeast Asian nations.

APRRF parent organization two: APEC

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is a 21-member organization, with members ranging from tiny Brunei to giants like China, the United States, and Russia. It accounts for half of world trade, 60 per cent of global output and has its own goal of free and open trade by 2020. Unlike the World Trade Organization (WTO) where trade concessions are negotiated, APEC operates on a voluntary basis supplemented increasingly by bilateral Free Trade Agreements. APEC is an economic organization formed to promote economic liberalization and open regionalism. Australia’s view is that,
It is one grouping which brings together leaders from across the Asia-Pacific, thereby contributing to habits of consultation and dialogue, and the development of personal relationships which help strengthen trust and confidence between regional countries.  

It is not inconceivable therefore; that APEC could become involved in activities designed to support UN resolutions aimed at Asia-Pacific stability. A possible model is the 55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Of note was OSCE’s ability to place monitors in Kosovo before NATO forces began the 1999 bombing campaign, and well before a single NATO soldier set foot on Kosovar soil. OSCE was able to deploy people to Kosovo free from the constraints and political baggage that accompanied NATO’s mission.

OSCE has a key role in enhancing Europe’s stability. The US aim is to use the OSCE as a venue for developing Europe’s security architecture in a manner that complements NATO strategy. Using OSCE to secure peace, deter aggression, and prevent, defuse, and manage crises offers great flexibility to the nations of Europe. The November 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit agreed on principles and modalities to further cooperation in the Charter on European Security. The Charter commits members to, among other things, the establishment of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams to assist in conflict prevention and crisis management. The Charter also recognizes that European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as between societies.  

This model could act as a pertinent reference point for APEC deliberations on an APRRF.
APEC has an advantage over ASEAN in that it has a broad and diverse membership that more accurately reflects the Asia-Pacific region. It does not have a military role and significant adjustments to APEC’s Charter would be required before it could become involved with an APRRF. That said an APRRF is a noble cause, backed by the Brahimi Report, and would give APEC an opportunity to extend a powerful influence on regional issues. Given APEC’s current non-military perspective, a resultant APRRF may not be designed to participate in peace enforcement, but may be tailored to peacekeeping or perhaps peace support operations. An APEC sponsored APRRF, even if it was peacekeeping in nature, could enhance regional stability by ensuring APEC nations cooperated in a transparent, consultative, and positive manner. APEC’s goal of economic cooperation could be paralleled by military cooperation.

APEC enjoys the status of maintaining both ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum as observer organizations. After a recent meeting of the South Pacific Forum in Kiribati, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, praised fellow leaders in the Pacific for reforming the region's peak organization. The South Pacific Forum's major achievement has been the adoption of rules and procedures for dealing with threats to security and democracy in the region. There it was decided the forum would establish a set of democratic ideals. If member countries breached those ideals, the forum will condemn them, intervene in other ways, and reserve the option of imposing what is called ‘targeted measures.’ These measures could include expulsion or suspension. The communiqué is designed to send a message to Indonesia and West Papuan separatists, calling for an end to violence. Howard said the Forum has made a quantum leap forward in relevance. Such a powerful message being collectively sent by Pacific nations may serve to bolster APEC’s resolve to get involved in regional security issues.
Which parent?

Preferably a combination of ASEAN, the ARF, and APEC would be appropriate to provide support to an APRRF. It is preferable to use the structures currently in existence, otherwise the issue of ready reaction will be lost in the detail of trying to raise yet another Asian and Pacific organization. APEC and ASEAN may provide distinct components of an APRRF, with APEC furnishing OSCE style rapid response observers, and ASEAN or ARF providing the rapid response troops. There must be no perception that this is a model, although proposed by the West, that is solely pursuing Western interests. If that occurs an APRRF will be soundly rejected. Once the agreement on an APRRF has been made, an inter-governmental working group should be established. The actual details and mechanics of an APRRF brigade would be a relatively simple process for military leaders and planners. The key requirement is political agreement, and political overview once the APRRF process begins.

Include the United States?

The US vision of an Asia-Pacific community links security interests with economic growth, a commitment to democracy, and human rights. A prosperous and open Asia-Pacific is key to the economic health of the US. The US is determined to cement a role as a stabilizing force in a more integrated Asia-Pacific region, by assisting in conflict prevention and resolution, and expanding US participation in the region’s economies. The US maintains bilateral treaty alliances with Japan, The Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. It has healthy relations and security access agreements with ASEAN and Singapore, and supports regional dialogue with the ARF on a full range of common security challenges. The US is encouraging ASEAN to emerge as a strong and cohesive organization capable of enhancing regional security and prosperity.
It is unlikely that the United States would want to become a member of an APRRF, due to its historic desire not to become involved in entangling alliances, its political aim of allowing regions to take responsibility for their own defense, and the US reluctance to work for non-US commanders. Most importantly for the United State’s non-participation in an APRRF is that the US does not need to be part of the capability. The US is quite capable of rapidly deploying fully integrated task forces from battalion group to divisional level based on the US Marine Corps and light US Army Divisions, throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific does not need to be concerned with the US ability to react to crises when US national interests are at stake.

However, perhaps the United States would want to be included as an observer to an APRRF. Obviously the reactions by the other great powers in the Asia-Pacific region, such as China and Russia, would have some impact on US involvement in an APRRF. These powers may decide to allow the APRRF to develop independently, may choose observer status in a similar fashion to the current US-ASEAN relationship, or choose to provide logistic support, command and control, or troop lift capability. The fundamental tenet of an APRRF is that no nation would be excluded from applying to participate in the force. Exclusions would reduce the effectiveness, deployability, and legitimacy of a force designed to assist in bringing stability to the region.

The APRRF could cover three scenarios in which the US would probably not assist, couldn’t assist, or needed to be assisted:

First, a regional crisis in which the US chooses to remain uninvolved or only involved on the periphery. The East Timor crisis was a good example of the US being careful to remain in the background of the operation and not wanting to become involved as the lead nation. The US
provided other highly important functions including communications and logistics aid, intelligence, and airlift of personnel, equipment, and humanitarian materiel.  

Second, when the US is over-committed to other scenarios it may simply not be able to support a regional crisis, given the huge burden the US faces for defense tasks in the elsewhere. The Kosovo operation stretched the US defense abilities to commit ground troops, deploy aircraft and ships. Also earlier in the conflict, the significant use of precision guided missiles and bombs markedly degraded US military capability. The US would therefore welcome the burden of short notice military operations being shouldered by regional nations, with an APRRF fitting that US vision.

Third, when the US needs assistance for a particular crisis, it may request an APRRF to be prepared to operating through a wide spectrum of potential operations. The more robust, capable, and lethal that an APRRF becomes the more valuable it would be to the US through the continuum of potential operations. An APRRF that is capable of operating throughout the region would offer a significant boost to coalition operations that the US may plan. A note of caution - an APRRF may not want to participate in a particular US coalition operation, and certainly operating with the US would be determined on an as required basis. Regardless, without developing an APRRF, it is presently unlikely that the states of the Asia-Pacific could offer the US any form of combined, coordinated, integrated, and therefore effective support during any crisis.

The Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) is central to CINCPAC’s new ‘security communities’ concept is, which has been funded by a US $10m appropriation from Congress.
APRI has a number of components, principle of which is facilitating a series of multilateral exercises focussing on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation, search and rescue, UN Chapter VI peacekeeping, and Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. The APRI aligns well with the goals of an APRRF, and utility can be made of the US initiative. Regardless, an APRRF should avoid being seen to wholly rely on US direction, on US material support, and training. The APRRF should concentrate on being a homegrown organization that can accept responsibility for tasks, without appearing to be a surrogate of the US. If not, it is unlikely that the concept will be accepted in the region.

A Future for Asia-Pacific Stability?

This paper has examined the viability of an Asia-Pacific Rapid Reaction Force (APRRF), using existing supra-national structures, in order to enable the Asia-Pacific Region to make an efficient and effective contribution to regional stability and security. The Brahimi Report offers an opportunity for the Asia-Pacific region to come of age. The UN needs regional commitments to peacekeeping in the world. To avoid tragic loss of life as occurred in Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and East Timor, UN sanctioned forces need to be able to react quickly and decisively. The Asia-Pacific region can now strive to achieve that goal. ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC represent organizations where effective dialogue can occur between Asia-Pacific nations. The organizations are less developed than their European peers, yet there are strong indications that both could support an APRRF.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could be expected to provide troops from member nations to an APRRF. The military focus of the ARF could be used as a lever for nations to seek cooperation for peacekeeping duties. An APRRF would represent a significant extension of the
ARF’s role, however, under the guise of the Brahimi Report, the aim would be to provide legitimacy to the force, and overcome ARF sensitivities. APEC, with its economic focus, could provide funds for an APRRF especially from nations unwilling or unable to provide troops to the force. In addition, APEC may follow the example of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has led peace support activities separately from European armed intervention, notably in the Balkans.

Based on a brigade size organization, an APRRF would rely on transparency, cooperation, and compromise between regional partners. Questions over structure, membership, readiness, finance, roles, tasks, and capabilities are problematic. However, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), in September 1999, proved that it is possible for Asia-Pacific nations to rapidly unite to achieve a common goal. The momentum and cooperation emanating from the East Timor success should be capitalized upon, and open and frank dialogue between the nations of the region will be required.

Australia should seek to become involved in an APRRF and could offer excellent organizational and doctrinal skills, as well as significant experience in rapid deployment and peacekeeping operations. The challenge for Australia is to be supportive of the concept, within the Brahimi framework, without appearing to want to force an APRRF on its neighbors. Regional stability is paramount in Australia’s foreign policy priorities, and an APRRF would appear to offer positive opportunities for Australia to influence the region.

The United States would probably not want to become a member of an APRRF, but could possibly support the concept financially. In any regional crisis, the US may choose to remain
uninvolved or only involved on the periphery, especially as the US appears to be over-committed to many scenarios both now and into the foreseeable future. Alternatively the US may see an APRRF as a potential partner in a regional peacekeeping operation.

An APRRF is one model for the future cooperation of Asia-Pacific nations. The benefits of regional cooperation, integration, and partnerships have the potential to bring together like-minded nations to produce a positive result for regional stability. An APRRF, based on the Brahimi model is an opportunity for change. Visionary leaders will seek to make this opportunity a reality.
ENDNOTES:

1 Katherine Old, Deputy Director United Nations Peacekeeping and Arms Control, International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra, note to author 28 Aug 2000, pg.1. The Brahimi Report, written by a UN panel led by former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi, is officially known as the ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects,’ document number A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. The report recommends that the UN should define “rapid and effective deployment capacities” as the ability from an operational perspective to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. In the case of the latter, the mission HQ should be fully installed and functioning within 15 days.

2 Ibid., p. 3

3 Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)- Its peacetime planning structure includes 10 divisions plus corps troops from 12 NATO countries, allowing a rapid response to a wide range of eventualities. It became fully operational in 1995. (NATO Office of Information and Press, ‘NATO Handbook,’ 1995, p. 174) In 1999 a NATO strategic review reaffirmed its core mission, as detailed in the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, for collective security and defense of NATO member states. The review also stressed the importance of non-Article 5 operations to include ethnic conflict resolution, and humanitarian intervention.

EUROCORPS – Is an independent European Rapid Reaction Force that has adapted to the structures and procedures of NATO in order to promote a rapid integration within the Alliance in case of engagement. EUROCORPS can be placed under NATO operational command. Indeed, since June 1998, part of the EUROCORPS headquarters has been engaged under NATO’s command in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The 15 member European Union, which until recently was concerned almost exclusively with economic integration and not defense, signed the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI) agreement in 1999. By 2003, the ESDI will be able to rapidly deploy up to 60,000 troops. Such deployments will be in concert with other tools at the EU’s disposal: sanctions, diplomatic pressure, humanitarian, and development assistance. This displays the EU’s desire to provide a common response to external crises, international calamities, humanitarian tragedies, and natural disasters. The EU wants to back its economic influence with military might, and participate more effectively in world security issues.

SHIRBRIG – The Nordic community’s Standby High Readiness Brigade. A 5000-person brigade that is prepared to carry out UN missions. Nine nations provide troops to units and personnel for the multinational headquarters. Participants train to the same standard and routinely conduct exercises to improve their effectiveness as an organization.


A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, October 1999, p. 46. To foster regional stability and peace in Africa, the US in 1996 launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to work with Africans to enhance their capacity to conduct effective peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The US, French and UK governments, in cooperation with African partners, are developing a regional exercise program to promote common doctrines and command and control capability, and interoperability for peacekeeping missions. This is being conducted in close cooperation with the
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UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the OAU and its Crisis management Center.


2. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Op Cit., p. 40. The Organization of American States, supported by the US, has made efforts to advance regional security cooperation. Activities focus on bilateral security dialogues, transparency, regional confidence and security building measures, exercises, and exchanges with key militaries, principally focusing on peacekeeping.


4. Alan Ryan, From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and ‘New Age’ Coalition Operations, Study Paper No. 302, Land Warfare Studies Center, January 2000, p. 22


6. INTERFET consisted of regional forces from Australia, Canada, the Republic of South Korea, New Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States as well as contributions from Portugal, Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Brazil, Germany, and Ireland.


9. Ryan, Op Cit., p. 32

10. John Owen, Department of Defence, ‘Strategic Issues’, Address to Australian Army Command and Staff College, 16 Feb 00, p. 6


12. Israel two brigades, New Zealand one battalion group, Malaysia one brigade, Thailand one battalion group, and Indonesia one division (-).


14. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander US Pacific Command (CINCPAC), International Herald Tribune, Security communities are the way ahead for Asia, from Dr. Paul Taloni, Director General ASEAN, International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra, note to author 31 Aug 2000, p. 3

15. The 1971, Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), that includes the Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and Singapore, allows for common doctrine and procedures, based on the NATO model of consensus, mutual deterrence, and a relative certainty of response in a crisis situation. The FPDA has allowed Australia to maintain a long record of military engagement and cooperation with countries in the region.

16. Synder, Op Cit., p. 11

17. Blair, Op Cit., p. 4


19. Ibid., p. 24


25 Owen, Op Cit., p. 22


32 The ‘Maphilindo’ states, including Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia, were the forerunner to ASEAN. Thompson, Roger C., 1994, The Pacific Basin since 1945, (Longman Group, New York), p. 115.


39 One of the defining characteristics of ASEAN has been the ‘ASEAN way’ which encourages musjawarah (consultation) as a precursor for mufakat (consensual decision-making). These are supported by the three principles written into the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation: respect for state sovereignty; non-intervention; and rejection of the threat or use of force in resolving disputes. Ethel Solingen 1999, ‘ASEAN, Quo Vadis? Domestic Coalitions and Regional Cooperation’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol 21, no 1, p. 45.

40 Mahathir feared that a precedent may be set for intervention. This criticism was consistent with his support for Indonesia as a ‘benevolent overlord’ in East Timor due to traditional Malaysian appeasement of its giant neighbor, and to avoid antagonizing bilateral economic and security ties. Dzirhan Mahadzir 1999, ‘East Timor – a Malaysian view’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Dec, p. 13 and Peter Alford 1999, ‘Mahathir backs Jakarta’, Australian, 19 Oct, p. 8.

41 Konfrontasi was the conflict precipitated by Indonesian raids across the Kalimantan border in Borneo designed destabilize the newly formed Federation of Malaysia, from April 1963 to September 1965. Australian, British and Malaysian troops opposed the Indonesian insurgency. Roger C. Thompson 1994, The Pacific Basin since 1945, pp. 89-94.

Indonesian national humiliation was worsened by the inability to influence the referendum result and the worldwide coverage of the destruction that followed. There had been a sense of betrayal by the TNI who appeared impotent and/or indifferent to restoring order in East Timor calling into question the validity of their fundamental dwi fungsi (dual function) role. John McBeth 1999, 'Drifting apart', Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 Oct, p. 14.

Additionally there were lingering suspicions raised about the Australian military intentions, emanating from the Chief of Defence Force, Admiral Chris Barrie. He stated that the success of the Australian Defence Force in enforcing peace in East Timor, had ensured Australia’s further selection for United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the ‘question of an independent peacekeeping force was one of the issues been considered.’ ‘US’s deputy sheriff not our role’, and ‘Call for ADF to serve globally rebuffed’, Canberra Times, 15 Dec 1999.


This assessment is independently supported by the Former Singaporean President Lee Kuan Yew who sees Australian - Indonesian relations recovering in the wake of East Timor within the more pragmatic context of Indonesia’s other major problems. Whilst Indonesian domestic politics will prevent Indonesia becoming ‘chummy’ with Australia in the short term, the imperative for ‘help and understanding of the region, including that of Australia’ means that the rebuilding of Australian - Indonesian relations ‘will take a few years’. Kuan Yew, Lee 2000, ‘Lee Kuan Yew on East Timor,’ Bulletin, 14 March, p. 26.


Lincoln Wright 2000, ‘Media threat to relations, says Indonesian envoy’, Canberra Times, 10 Feb.


1,500 personnel comprising infantry, armor, aviation, combat support, and combat service support in East Timor, serving with UNTAET. 200 unarmed observers and monitors in Bougainville, serving with the Australian-Fiji-New Zealand-Vanuatu Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). 26 unarmed observers serving in the Solomon Islands.

Ryan, Op Cit., p. 84.

Ibid., p. 80. The Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) is intended to contribute to Australia’s defense and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and concentrates on generic relationships rather than specific operational requirements. It consists of five components: South East Asia, Papua New Guinea, South Pacific, Other Regional Activities, and Facilities for Training within Australia.


Ryan, Op Cit., p. 27

Ibid., p. 32

Old, Op Cit., p. 1

Ibid., p. 8

Ibid., p. 4

Ibid., p. 5

Blair, Op Cit., p. 3

Old, Op Cit., p. 7


Ibid., pp. xi-xii


Old, Op Cit., p. 4

Australia was the first developed country to establish relations with ASEAN, which was instituted on 8 August 1967, in the aftermath of Konfrontasi, ‘to foster regional, economic, social and cultural cooperation and to promote regional peace and stability.’ R. D. Palmer and T. J. Reckford, Building ASEAN - 20 Years of Southeast Asian Cooperation, Praeger Publishers, New York, p 5.

The first ASEAN-Australia Forum took place in Canberra in April 1974 and Australia has continued to participate as a formal dialogue partner. ASEAN Secretariat 1997, ASEAN Economic Cooperation Transition & Transformation, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1997, pp. 165-9.

The membership of ASEAN (and date of membership) is: Indonesia (1967), Malaysia (1967), Philippines (1967), Singapore (1967), Thailand (1967), Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1998), Myanmar (1998), and Cambodia (1999). Observers include Papua New Guinea, consultative partners are China and Russia, and dialogue partners are Australia, Canada, the EU, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the US.

Old, Op Cit., p. 3

Blair, Op Cit., p. 3


Ryan, Op Cit., p. 76


These countries are Australia, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New
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Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the USA, and Vietnam. Bishop, Op Cit., p. 3
82 Ryan, Op Cit., p. 78
83 Old., Op Cit., p. 3
84 Taloni, Paul, Dr., Director General ASEAN, International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra, note to author 31 Aug 2000, p. 2
86 Ibid.
APEC Members – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, NZ, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, US, Vietnam.
87 Wong, Douglas, ‘Singapore and Australia may enter Free Trade Talks,’ Straits Times, Singapore Press Holdings, 11 Nov 2000
88 Bishop, Op Cit., p. 3
89 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Op Cit., p. 30
92 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Op Cit., p. 34
93 Ibid., p. 37
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