**Abstract:** Focused Logistics "is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place at the right time"\(^1\) and is the logistics key to Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) success. While the Service components operate jointly in a theater for a Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander or a regional Commander in Chief (CINC), the Joint Commander has little visibility of, or influence on, competing interservice operational logistics requirements and assets that affect many aspects of his current and future operations. Service component commanders remain responsible for logistics support to their forces according to Joint Publication 4-0, except when interservice agreements are in place.

The Joint Force Commander needs logistics information that is useful, relevant, and accurate to create a logistics picture of the battlespace. But this is not enough. He must also be able to exercise control over the logistics in theater. As systems are developed to provide an integrated, synchronized, end to end distribution system to meet warfighter requirements for information and material as envisioned in Joint Vision 2020, who will be in charge? This paper argues that Focused Logistics requires a Joint Forces Logistics Commander with authority to direct the logistics efforts of all Services in a comprehensive joint logistics operation to support the theater CINC or JTF Commander.
Naval War College
Newport, RI

Joint Military Operations

Joint Focused Logistics -- Who is in Charge?

Branson P. Rector
Major, Quartermaster, United States Army

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:_____________________

4 February 2002

Wilfred Brown, Colonel U.S. Army ____________________________
David Maresh, Captain, U.S. Navy__________________________
Abstract
Focused Logistics "is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place at the right time"1 and is the logistics key to Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) success. While the Service components operate jointly in a theater for a Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander or a regional Commander in Chief (CINC), the Joint Commander has little visibility of, or influence on, competing interservice operational logistics requirements and assets that affect many aspects of his current and future operations. Service component commanders remain responsible for logistics support to their forces according to Joint Publication 4-0, except when interservice agreements are in place. The Joint Force Commander needs logistics information that is useful, relevant, and accurate to create a logistics picture of the battlespace. But this is not enough. He must also be able to exercise control over the logistics in theater. As systems are developed to provide an integrated, synchronized, end to end distribution system to meet warfighter requirements for information and material as envisioned in Joint Vision 2020, who will be in charge? This paper argues that Focused Logistics requires a Joint Forces Logistics Commander with authority to direct the logistics efforts of all Services in a comprehensive joint logistics operation to support the theater CINC or JTF Commander.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Report Classification</strong></th>
<th><strong>Classification of this page</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Classification of Abstract</strong></td>
<td><strong>Limitation of Abstract</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>UU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Pages</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Joint Focused Logistics --Who is in Command?

“The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation...It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much more knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there.” General A.C.P. Wavell, quoted in Martin Van Creveld’s Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 1977

Focused Logistics "is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place at the right time" and is the logistics key to Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) success. While the Service components operate jointly in a theater for a Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander or a regional Commander in Chief (CINC), the Joint Commander has little visibility of, or influence on, competing interservice operational logistics requirements and assets that affect many aspects of his current and future operations. Service component commanders remain responsible for logistics support to their forces according to Joint Publication 4-0, except when interservice agreements are in place.

Thesis

The Joint Force Commander needs logistics information that is useful, relevant, and accurate to create a logistics picture of the battlespace. But this is not enough. He must also be able to exercise control over the logistics in theater. As systems are developed to provide an integrated, synchronized, end to end distribution system to meet warfighter requirements for information and material as envisioned in Joint Vision 2020, who will be in charge? This paper argues that Focused Logistics requires a Joint Forces
Logistics Commander with authority to direct the logistics efforts of all Services in a comprehensive joint logistics operation to support the theater CINC or JTF Commander.

**Background**

Joint Publication 4-0 (JP 4-0) states that "Combatant Commanders exercise directive authority for logistics." The Combatant Commander normally retains this authority and relies on his J-4 (Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics) to advise and lead, through committee, the efforts of the joint logistics community. However, theater logistics are too important to be left to staff officers and committees. While the Theater CINC should remain the key operational decision maker, he would be better served by having a subordinate Joint Logistics Commander to oversee and direct joint logistics operations for him, just as he has a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC).

JP 4-0 further states that:

To exercise control at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, commanders must also exert control over logistics. For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics especially in the joint environment. The logistics support system must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is best attained under a single command authority…. Commanders must be able to call forward in a timely manner those assets needed to initiate and sustain war.  

At the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, Major General Gus Pagonis was promoted to Lieutenant General to be the single, authoritative joint logistics point of contact in theater. He did serve as the single point of contact for US Army logistics as the 22nd Theater Support Commander. However, he had little information about Air Force or Marine Corps Logistics, and no information on Navy or Coalition Forces. His inability to see the theater logistics picture was due to incompatible systems, Service
specific logistics pipelines, and lack of intransit visibility. Thus, there was no comprehensive logistics picture for the CINC. Nor was there a reliable means of monitoring movement (deployment) of forces. Cargo was reported in terms of the number of flights or ships arriving on a given day, further detailed as quantities of passengers, aircraft, vehicles, pallets, or containers. None of these raw numbers were associated with the reception of units, capabilities, or build up of support. Subsequently, there was no way to evaluate the deployment surge or combat force capability deployed in theater based on these reports.\(^6\)

The inability of the logisticians to paint a meaningful picture of the deployment progress and the logistics effort to build stocks caused General Schwartzkopf to rely on “Brute Force Logistics” – ensuring he would never run out of supplies by requiring a normal thirty days of supply stockage level to be increased to sixty days of supply. This requirement greatly overburdened the transportation system, created mountains of stocks, and required an enormous logistics footprint. Adding to this problem, a lack of prioritization and final destination information caused much of this material to sit in Dhahran, never reaching its final destination. To get a critically needed item, it was often ordered three times. Abuse of the priority system was rampant – even common items were ordered using the highest shipment priority. Abuses in the priority system and lack of intransit visibility necessitated the establishment of a daily Desert Express flight for true “War Stopper” material as high priority requirements exceeded lift capabilities six fold.\(^7\)

*Gulf War* stockage levels were based on unrealistic Cold War models – an estimated ninety percent of the ammunition brought into Saudi Arabia was sent back to
the United States after the operation; yet according to some commanders, the desired munitions were never on hand. The experience of Marine pilots illustrates this point best. Although, at the end of the war, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing had a fourteen day supply of ordnance on hand, they flew an estimated twenty-five percent of their missions without the preferred munitions, reducing target hit probabilities. At one point they were down to a half-day’s supply of a particularly important munition. Yet senior commanders acknowledge that one of the worst decisions made during the Gulf War was to stock sixty days of supply and ammo in country. Better requirement models, enhanced intransit visibility, and a capability to track commodities flow into theater would have bolstered confidence in the logistics effort. Instead, distrust required a "Brute Force" approach so General Schwartzkopf would feel confident that he had sufficient sustainment stocks on hand to support the mission at hand. A single, effective, joint logistics commander with the appropriate systems, responsible for establishing priorities and instilling discipline and confidence in those systems, would have drastically improved the effectiveness and efficiency of the logistics effort in theater.

**Literature Support**

David Shrady makes a strong case for Logistics Command and Control at the Joint Force Commander level. He states that the Joint Force Commander needs a logistics command and control system that "will allow him to plan the sustainability of his forces, track their stocks of supplies, and make running predictions. Otherwise he is doomed to having to use brute force." He argues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Theater Logistics Command and Control Initiative only addresses organizational
concepts for supporting joint operations and is not enough; but even Shrady stops short of calling for a Joint Logistics Commander.  

Newly published JP 4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution, also supports the argument for a Joint Logistics Commander, although like Shrady, it stops short of specifically calling for one. Instead, it advocates the creation of boards and the JTF LOG C2 System which will be described in the Future Enablers section of this paper. JP 4-09 defines Global Distribution as having two distinct line of communication (LOC) "segments." The first is the segment created from the points of origin or sources of supply external to the theater. The second segment is from the point of debarkation to the point of need. JP 4-09 states that this entire LOC is the responsibility of the supported combatant commander. The implication here is that the CINC (or his representative) must be involved once the item departs its point of origin. Managing this potentially worldwide LOC must be fully coordinated and synchronized under a central commander because deployment, sustainment and redeployment will normally use the same LOC. Inside the theater, the commander must establish and maintain an efficient distribution system. The Joint Logistics Commander would play a key role in providing oversight for this theater distribution interface, ensuring that the Global Support System does not overwhelm the theater system’s capacity or capability. JP 4-09 lays out all of these CINC level command responsibilities only to then suggest that these functions will be handled by functional boards.

In Michael Salvi’s unpublished paper, he makes a very clear argument for a Joint Theater Logistics Command and Commander. He suggests that the Army’s proposed Theater Support Command could be the ideal organization to manage theater-level
common logistics support for all US forces and coalition partners. He makes the case that such an organization could address the key issues facing the logistics community pointed out in JP 4.0: inadequate transportation means and port capabilities; insufficient quantities of certain munitions, equipment, and spare parts; lack of trained logisticians; and failure to plan for adequate, interoperable Logistics C4 Systems. He adds that implementing this organization and command will "eliminate redundancy at the operational level, mirror consolidation at the strategic level, will provide credibility to the logistics community, and meet the needs of the forces envisioned in JV 2020."¹²

**Future Service Logistics Operations and Systems Under JV 2020**

While Focused Logistics, by definition, requires joint thinking for the full spectrum of logistic operations, the Services have focused first on their own logistics transformation needs.

Under JV 2020, the Army retains its Title 10 responsibilities for all in-theater Services, including (but not limited to): inland Class I (Subsistence) support; Intermodal Container Management; Common User in-theater land transportation; land based water resources; overland Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL) support; and sole management of conventional ammunition.¹³ The Army has taken the lead in developing comprehensive logistics systems for the future. Lessons learned from the Gulf War combined with its Title 10 responsibilities have given the Army the impetus to develop the most comprehensive plan for Joint Logistics. The development of the Theater Support Command, while activated as an Army specific organization, has the capability, when augmented, to support other forces and to integrate other Services support
organizations. Additionally, it is ideally suited to support the Joint Theater Distribution System, an Army initiative.

Sea Based Logistics is to support the US Navy and Marines afloat and ashore. As the Navy transitions from a "Blue Water Navy" to a littoral force, Sea Based Logistics will enable the Marines to realize the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea. The Navy will operate under the tenets of sea base primacy. Sea Based Logistics allows power projection from over the horizon and the means to support it. Ships will be employed as floating distribution centers with organizational and intermediate level maintenance workshops providing indefinite sustainment to Marine forces and reducing the on-shore logistics footprint. Inland forces will be sustained through aerial delivery or logistics over the shore (JLOTS), both of which can be integrated into the Theater Distribution system.

The Air Force initiative, Agile Combat Support, addresses logistics operations for the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) under the Global Engagement concept. Essentially, the Air Force's plan is to rely on "time definite" resupply and expedient delivery (just-in-time resupply) as a means to reduce lift requirements. As the provider of airlift to the Joint Force, the Air Force will be in the best position to employ the "factory to flightline" (or foxhole) concept.

While this broad overview of the Services’ ongoing logistics developments only provides a limited picture of their efforts, it should demonstrate that without a Joint Logistics Commander to direct fusion of these initiatives, a truly integrated agile and precise joint logistics support capability for early operations, as envisioned in Focused Logistics, will never be achieved.
Future Enablers

“The route of sustainment – from point of supply to user – is the lifeblood of our combat power.” Henry H. Shelton, Chairman JCS, Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support for Joint Operations, 6 April 2000

The Joint Logistics Commander would be the focal point through which logistics requirements flow out of the theater and resources flow into the theater. The Joint Logistics Commander, with full visibility of requests leaving the theater and commodities flowing into theater, stands in the position to speak, with authority, on the logistics situation in theater. Moreover, he knows the status of forces flowing in, and at the end of the operation, the status of reconstitution as well as theater closure. As the focal point of logistics for the Joint Force Commander, he makes improvements in the system and oversees implementation of joint sustainment doctrine. Parochialism and mistrust of other systems plague logistics organizations, and part of what reduces optimization of any support system are those who try to work around the established systems for expediency’s sake. Often this may be justifiable, but more often these workarounds only reduce the effectiveness or reliability of the established systems as resources are diverted by the extraordinary effort given to a workaround.

The Global Combat Support System (GCSS)

GCSS is a Family of Systems (FoS) providing information interoperability spanning the logistics functions of transportation, maintenance, supply, personnel, force health protection, acquisition, finance, and engineering in support of the joint warfighter. GCSS builds on existing technology, products, applications, and integration strategies, and is geared to provide a seamless integrated picture of the logistics pipeline.14
It is built on four pillars:

**Pillar 1:** *Optimize the logistics processes to minimize Customer Wait Time using variance based metrics.* Right now, the Services use different metrics to measure the effectiveness of their supply systems. In most cases, performance is measured in terms of averages, impeding the means of identifying where a problem exists in a particular process and degrading customer satisfaction because of unmet expectations. The goal is to shorten Customer Wait Time (CWT) and to deliver when promised. This has the effect of increasing customer confidence which is pillar number two.\(^{15}\)

**Pillar 2:** *Build customer confidence in a simplified priority system with time definite delivery.* Increasing customer confidence so that he will get the requested item on the required delivery date by reducing the number of priorities (currently there are fifteen) to three: Immediate (ninety-six hour CWT worldwide); Priority (seven day CWT); and Routine (thirty day CWT). With a ninety-five percent confidence rate in delivery by the Required Delivery Date, the intent is to avoid the previous abuses of the priority system and double ordering.\(^{16}\)

**Pillar 3:** *Provide total asset visibility through use of Automatic Identification Technology (AIT), shared data environment, and other applications.* By pursuing the fielding of Automatic Identification Technology (AIT) at all levels and nodes of the distribution and supply chain on a shared data environment, the intent is to provide Total Asset Visibility. The goal is to have a world-wide automated information capability linked to Services and Defense Agencies through a network or information-centric environment using web-based systems to provide real time information required by the joint warfighter.\(^{17}\)
In the last several years the Army logistics community has attempted to bring Total Asset Visibility into the forefront of logistics activities. Joint Total Asset Visibility, or JTAV, unfortunately is being pursued independently by the Services. While the intent of GCSS is for common hardware and common software, the current development of JTAV is following Service lines with each Service having its own system. It is unclear at what level JTAV information will be available across the Services.

**Pillar 4: Attain real-time, actionable, web-based, logistics information systems.**

The intent of the GCSS Family of Systems is to provide a real-time, actionable, network or information-centric logistics information environment through web-based technology using upgradeable (perhaps leased) automation platforms to interface with all DOD users including the warfighter, industry and contractors. The linkage of military and industry logistics information will provide the warfighter with real-time sustainment situational awareness of the battlespace.18

“GCSS is the link in achieving information fusion and providing universal access to information and interoperability of that information across the spectrum of logistics and ultimately with command and control.”19

Despite the shortfall mentioned above, Joint Total Asset Visibility is expected to improve asset visibility substantially for the warfighter and the logistics support community. Yet to date, there is no integrated logistics distribution system that combines Services’ assets into a responsive, reliable and efficient joint sustainment operation. Defense Logistics Agency provides over eighty percent of the common supply support to...
the Services, yet each has its own distribution pipe. In terms of Joint Logistics, this creates redundant and inefficient distribution.

A GAO report on Defense Logistics, dated October 2001, criticizes DOD as a whole for not being specific enough in describing its future requirements, how it will organize, and who will provide specific types of support. This report highlights the problems DOD faces as the Services transform from Service Specific Logistics to Joint Focused Logistics.\(^{20}\) A Joint Logistics Commander, representing the warfighting CINCs, would serve well in this capacity to assist in focusing DOD efforts toward fusing the Services’ logistics systems.

**End to End Distribution (E2E)**

End to End distribution is a new initiative put forth by the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics, for execution by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). E2E puts logistics distribution into one management scheme. All components have a common operating picture and for the first time, the CINC has the ability to understand and influence logistics operations. This allows him to set priorities and track logistics flow with relative ease.\(^{21}\) But once the system is in place who, with authority, will direct, prioritize, and monitor logistic activities for the CINC or the JTF Commander? Below is a brief description of some of the issues E2E intends to address and what role a single Joint Logistics Commander might play.

a. Unnecessary Warfighter Workload - Reducing the redundancy of Service logistics nodes will free up personnel across the Services. Additionally, a central theater hub lends itself to early contractor support operations. The Joint Logistics Commander
would realize efficiencies and the reduced logistics footprint that Focused Logistics hopes to achieve.

b. Multiple, unsynchronized distribution pipelines - This is the heart of the matter. As mentioned above, DLA provides close to eighty percent of what each Service requests and much of that eighty percent comprises common items (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle parts, for example). Under the current system, parts are warehoused at Service specific supply points and when a part is needed, it moves through a Service specific distribution system until it competes for lift into theater. Once in theater, it again travels via its intra-theater Service specific distribution system. Because Total Asset Visibility currently does not exist across the Services, one Service could have an abundance of an item which is a critical but common item for another Service. In this case, with E2E, and GCSS enablers, the Joint Logistics Commander would have the visibility and the Command Authority to authorize or direct Cross Service Support or transfer.

c. Incomplete information, lack of E2E visibility - GCSS is the family of information systems that has the potential to fix the visibility problem, both in transit and item identification. With this problem solved, the Joint Logistics Commander could provide real time precision logistics information on deployment or replenishment.

d. Suboptimized use of distribution assets both inter and intra-theater - This is where the Joint Logistics Commander can benefit the most. The potential to maximize every lift asset available based on real time, intransit visibility, common knowledge of stock status, and deployment information has enormous potential to free up critical lift assets to allow for acceleration of the deployment process. For example, by reducing the
number of days of supply a unit must deploy with (often times up to 30) because of precise knowledge of what is in theater, more combat forces may be able to be deployed sooner. Desert Shield provides the perfect case study for intra-theater distribution management by a Joint Logistics Commander. By the time Lieutenant General Pagonis got into country with his team, the Services had leased all available commercial transportation assets. The Army leased the majority, leaving the Marines short when they had to move their resupply nodes over an extended distance.

While End to End distribution has yet to be fully defined, its expected results of combining supply and transportation into one team to achieve efficiency, real time visibility using the other enablers discussed above, and creating a smaller logistics footprint hold promise for achieving precision logistics for the warfighter. The question remains, who will be in charge?

**Joint Theater Logistics Command and Control (JTLOGC)**

Currently, the J4 of the Joint Chiefs is developing a concept design for a Joint Service Support Organization modeled after the Army's Theater Support Command. This approach is similar to the proposal put forth by Salvi with one exception: the Joint Staff proposal does not put the commander of this organization in charge of theater logistics. Instead, the JTF J-4 plans for logistical support with assistance of joint boards. “This organization would be an operational Logistics Support Command expandable to a bona fide Joint Support Command working directly for a CINC.” Even the words seem contradictory. Under this concept, the "Services retain their Title 10 responsibilities but as Joint Force Operations commence, theater distribution will be handled by an in-theater
joint logistics organization comprised of a multiservice group of senior logistics advisors. n23

**Conclusion: What can the CINC expect as the result of having a single Joint Logistics Commander overseeing an End to End logistics system into theater?**

Going back to the earlier Desert Shield example, the CINC or JTF Commander can expect most of the problems General Schwartzkopf faced to have been resolved. First, he can go to one Commander with confidence, to whom he can give direction, and from whom he can get relevant, useful information. He can expect better supply chain decisions, stock provisioning, and efficient use of transportation and delivery for improved service at lower cost to meet warfighter requirements. This translates into improved readiness for the entire deployed force. He can expect full integration of material distribution requirements into the Joint Reception Staging Onward movement and Integration (JRSOI) plan, thus accelerating the force closure rate. The JTF Commander can expect the Joint Logistics Commander to have accurate, timely, in transit visibility so he can predict when a critical item or commodity is available for operations, as well as Total Asset Visibility enabling the Joint Logistics Commander to provide a clear picture of the status of deploying forces and accurate predictions of their closure times. Additionally, he could count on the JTF Logistics Commander to identify and coordinate for Host Nation sources of material and distribution. In contrast, had the Iraqis attacked Saudi Arabia in the fall of 1990, in the midst of deployment, General Schwartzkopf would not have had a clear picture of his inbound forces and their
capability to conduct operations, simply because no one on his staff had personnel and equipment reception visibility.

With a joint logistics stock reception base established in theater (regardless of the actual structure of support throughout the theater) supported by one “pipe” the JTF Commander will enjoy the benefits of a smaller logistics footprint, which has many advantages. First, a smaller footprint reduces vulnerability and thus reduces risk in terms of force protection. Additionally, the smaller footprint is likely operated by fewer people requiring less support themselves, again further reducing the footprint. A smaller footprint also has the added benefit of being easier to move, either further into theater or out of theater at the end of the operation. Infrastructure benefits are numerous as well. Theater logistics operations often require a great deal of space near a port or airhead (or both), and ideally fixed facilities. A smaller footprint reduces the requirements for these nodes creating less of an impact on the host nation in terms of key land or facilities that may be limited in the first place.

**Recommendation**

The benefits of having a Joint Logistics Commander are clear. Unity of effort requires that the Services redundant systems work together rather than apart. The complexity of the U.S. logistics infrastructure requires the full time attention of a senior logistics commander to oversee development and implementation of systems, ensure compatibility, fight for resources, and determine effectiveness of systems. In planning contingencies, he matches sustainment capability with requirements for the forces to be introduced into theater. He influences the Time Phased Force Deployment Data
(TPFDD) so logistics structure and sustainment is introduced early, and ensures capability is established to support the deployed forces. Meanwhile, he monitors force flow, ensuring a maximization of lift assets to support the most rapid and efficient deployment of forces. Once in theater, he becomes the orchestrator of the logistics effort, including reception of forces, into theater. As forces flow in, he ensures a sufficient logistic infrastructure is in place for proper reception, staging, onward movement and integration of incoming joint forces, with the ability to provide sustainment as soon as they arrive. He provides the vision for intra-theater distribution ensuring all forces have sufficient resources to conduct sustainment and movement operations throughout the theater.

Rather than waiting until crisis generates a JTF, this paper recommends the creation of a Joint Logistics Command within U.S. Joint Forces Command now. U.S. Joint Forces Command is the facilitator of building joint capabilities on existing Service infrastructure. The U.S. JFCOM Joint Logistics Commander would assume the role of the CINC’s Joint Logistics Commander for Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPB). Since U.S. JFCOM is the Joint Force trainer and integrator, the Joint Logistics Commander would wargame logistics and develop Joint Logistics Doctrine. Since U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as the Joint Deployment Process owner, he is in perfect position to coordinate and insert improvements into the TPFDD process. Finally, as U.S. JFCOM is also the provider of Joint Forces, the Joint Logistics Commander stands ready to step into any CINC’s area of responsibility (AOR) when a regional crisis occurs. In a smaller regional contingency, he recommends selection of a JTF level Joint Logistics Commander, and serves as mentor and advisor to this individual.
Summary

The CINC is the Combatant Commander responsible for successful planning and execution of joint operations in his theater. Focused Logistics is the key to his operational success. End to End distribution provides the joint logistics system to support these operations most efficiently and effectively. The CINC’s Joint Logistics Commander stands as pivot man in the center of the action commanding, prioritizing, predicting and monitoring, with precision, the joint logistics effort.
Endnotes

2 Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 231

3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020. (Washington, D.C.: June 2000), 30

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (Joint Pub 4-0), (Washington, D.C.: 6 April 2000), II-1

5 Ibid., II-5, II-6


7 Ibid., 6

8 Ibid., 7

9 Ibid., 17

10 Ibid., 17

11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution (Joint Pub 4-09), (Washington, D.C.: 14 December 2001), viii - II-6

12 Salvi, Micheal A. “Within the Context of JV2010, Is There a Requirement For a Theater Level Joint Forces Logistics Commander (JFLOGC) And a Joint Theater Logistics Command?” Unpublished NWC Student paper. 5 February 1999, 11

13 Ibid., 4


15 Ibid., 3 (technical summary)

16 Ibid., 4 (technical summary)

17 Ibid., 4 (technical summary)

18 Ibid., 4 (technical summary)

19 Ibid., 20

21 E-mail from COL Dean Vakas, Executive Officer to the J3 at DLA ref E2E Logistics to me.


23 Ibid.

Bibliography

Cusick, John C., LGEN USA and Pipp, Donald C., LT COL USAF. "In Search of Focused Logistics." Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 97, 125-127


Jeffrey A. Hughes, “Military Logistics Continues to Repeat Itself,” Army Logistician Jan/Feb01, (http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/JanFeb01/MS585.htm)


Salvi, Micheal A. “Within the Context of JV2010, Is There a Requirement For a Theater Level Joint Forces Logistics Commander (JFLOGC) And a Joint Theater Logistics Command?” unpublished NWC paper, 5 February, 1999


Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977


