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CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS & OPERATIONAL ART: POLLUTING THE PROCESS OR METHOD TO THE MADNESS?

by

Thomas S. Fisher
Major, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _________________________________

04 February 2002

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ABSTRACT

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Civil Considerations & Operational Art: Polluting the Process or Method to the Madness?

By
Thomas S. Fisher
Major, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

February 4, 2002
“If you don’t know where you’re going, you’ll probably end up somewhere else…”

Introduction

The most recent publication of the U.S. Army’s operational manual, FM 3-0 Operations, added an additional factor to the process commanders use to assess a situation and visualize an operation. This process, known as METT-T\(^1\), now includes the additional factor of civil considerations. The Naval War College also includes “METT-TC” as part of developing a Commander’s Estimate of the Situation (CES).\(^2\) As the FM explains, “the first five factors (of METT-TC) are not new. However, the nature of full spectrum operations requires commanders to assess the impact of nonmilitary factors on operations. Because of this added complexity, civil considerations has been added to the familiar METT-T to form METT-TC.”\(^3\) The rationale for adding the new factor seems to be linked to the growing recognition of the impact of nonmilitary aspects and influences on current military operations. But, are we beginning to convolute the METT-T process by adding civil considerations?

The other factors of METT-T have been well understood by planners and commanders at all levels for many years. Injecting any additional factor or process to a proven method is always suspect until proper analysis justifies its inclusion. There are many questions that immediately come to mind. What do “civil considerations” mean? Are they important? If they are important, why and what effect do they have on planning and visualizing an upcoming operation? Do civil considerations mean different things at the different levels of war?

Adding the “C” to METT-T significantly improves the planning process, resulting in greater mission effectiveness at the strategic and operational level, provided it is properly defined and understood. Arbitrarily adding another factor to the METT-T process, seemingly related to peace support operations because of an increase in such operations over the last decade, tends to
convolute the system. This paper explores the concept of civil considerations by determining what different organizations have defined as civil considerations. Based on the disparity between the differing concepts that comprise civil considerations, categories are developed by examining civil considerations at the strategic and operational levels using lessons learned to identify the areas where these considerations apply. Finally, the paper produces some recommendations for commanders and planners at the theater-strategic and operational levels concerning this new factor and its impact on situation assessments and the scope of the visualization process.

*Research – Defining “Civil Considerations”*

To determine an initial set of criteria defining civil considerations and their relationship to a proper assessment of the situation, a review of current doctrine is beneficial. FM 3-0 defines four different aspects of civil considerations:

- The interaction of the diplomatic, economic, information and military instruments of national power at the operational level and support to civil authorities at the tactical level of war,
- Political boundaries of nations, provinces and towns,
- Interaction with the media, and
- Control, protection and welfare of local populations and displaced persons.  

Reviewing these aspects, one finds the first deals primarily with the different functions of a campaign plan at the operational level while acknowledging tactical commanders have to understand the impact of civilians on the battlefield and the commander’s responsibilities under the laws of war, Geneva Convention and other treaties/agreements. The second aspect is normally covered during the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and the third aspect falls into the new (and also loosely defined) realm of information operations.
The last aspect is an activity of civil affairs units according to the civil affairs doctrinal manual, FM 41-10. The manual lists a total of six activities that support Civil-Military Operations:

- Foreign Nation Support
- Populace and Resource Control
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Military-Civic Action
- Emergency Services
- Support to Civil Administration

Tactical civil affairs units assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) conduct these activities in support of military operations and are a predominant force during peace support operations. However, reviewing the different aspects of civil considerations according to FM 3.0 and comparing them to the activities of civil affairs units, one can see that "civil considerations" does not equate to "civil affairs."

Joint Publication 3-08 discusses the tasks of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) and confuses the issue further by proposing the following tasks for the CMOC:

- Carry out guidance and institute CJTF decisions regarding civil-military operations
- Perform liaison and coordination between military capabilities and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace
- Provide a partnership forum for military and other engaged organizations
- Receive, validate and coordinate requests for support from the NGOs, PVOs and regional and international organizations.

These tasks are associated with the interaction between military, governmental and nongovernmental organizations in support of the local population. One begins to notice the publications address several very different areas including: 1) integration of the national instruments of power, 2) interaction with the media, 3) interaction with the civilian leadership to
include governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and 4) interaction with the local population.

Viewing strictly "civil affairs activities," one finds many of these missions are conducted primarily at the tactical level of war during hostilities and that they take on a higher priority during war termination or military operations other than war (MOOTW), particularly as they affect the operational level of war in the termination phase of a campaign or during peace support operations. This introduces another dimension; civil considerations that affect or apply to different phases of a campaign from pre-hostilities through conflict to war termination and subsequent exit strategy. To determine the civil considerations that must be analyzed at the operational level and their relation to strategy, identifying the process that assesses where civil considerations influence military operations is useful.

Reviewing the different components of METT-T, one finds several effective processes for analyzing the situation and assisting in developing courses of action, thereby allowing the commander to visualize the execution of his mission. The mission is examined during the process of Mission Analysis. Enemy and terrain are examined through the process of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Troops are examined by using mathematical computations based on correlation of forces and relative combat power and by assessing the intangible factors such as morale, discipline, espirit de corps, or fatigue. Time is also reviewed based on four fundamental areas: time to plan, time to prepare, time to execute and time to assess. 7

However, here one finds a problem as civil considerations do not have a system or process to identify what needs to be considered and how these considerations are to be incorporated into the planning process. Subsequently, an operational or strategic planning staff
may dismiss any relevant considerations as tactical missions given to a civil affairs unit while a tactical staff, waiting for guidance from “higher,” has problems employing these units effectively as has been the case during recent peace support operations. Public Affairs officers may see civil considerations as the responsibility of psychological operations to influence the local population; however, FM 3-0 defines interaction with the media as a consideration. Therefore, to begin understanding the impact of civil considerations, one must categorize them at the strategic and operational level.

**Strategic Civil Considerations**

When examining what is meant by civil considerations, one must first determine the context in which these considerations will be viewed and applied. To do so, it is important to differentiate between crisis resolution and war. War can be defined as “a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed.” A crisis on the other hand, often begins prior to bloodshed and the measures taken prior to military action frequently shape the scope and duration of the measures used in its resolution. When exploring civil considerations, it is prudent to examine them from the standpoint of resolving a crisis instead of merely fighting a war. In doing so, one includes the options exercised prior to bloodshed as they will enhance or limit future operations, particularly during actual combat operations and the subsequent war termination. To understand where civil considerations are crucial for assessing the situation, one must first determine where they most profoundly affect a crisis at the strategic level.

Based on lessons learned from previous conflicts, civil considerations affect the use of military force in conjunction with other aspects of national power to affect the behavior of a population. It is the focus on civilian behavior versus military activity that makes this factor
fundamentally different from the other factors of METT-T. To understand this important difference, a theoretical construct helps to examine this relationship.

Military theory creates a common mental framework for conceptually defining a problem and providing methods for determining a possible solution. Before a coherent approach to analyzing civil considerations can be determined, this functional mental framework must be established. As Sir Julian Corbett wrote, “Without... a theory [of war] we can never really understand its scope or meaning, nor can we hope to grasp the forces which most profoundly affect its conclusions.”

Clausewitz frames the nature of war as a triangle of the people, the army and the government which defines the nature of each belligerent in war and it is the interaction within and between these trinities of two opposing nations which create the nature of the war. He states that “our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.” To develop a construct that allows one to determine where civil considerations apply, one point to begin is to define elements where civil considerations affect behavior. To do so, one starts with three tangible magnets consisting of the people, the military and the government to begin developing a model for the nature of war. A crisis occurs when two policies “clash” and each nation involved begins using instruments of national power to resolve the dispute. Were one to develop a model of two nations in crisis, it would portray a clash of policy affecting each aspect of the respective trinities. Figure 1 depicts two nations in crisis:
It has often been said that tactical actions can have strategic effects. The reason they have strategic effects is that often, military actions impact on the activities of another instrument of national power. Therefore, execution of military courses of action must be accomplished in relation to the other aspects of national power because the subsequent effects must work in conjunction with the effects of other instruments of national power. The essence of the operational art is the management of the various options executed by the diplomatic, information, economic and military instruments of national power in resolving a crisis. As Joint Publication 3.0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, points out, “Operational Art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate and effective joint, interagency and multinational cooperation.”

To understand where the instruments of national power fit into the nature of a crisis, one may logically follow the normal national response to a crisis and fit it into the model. At the onset of a problem, diplomatic channels try to resolve the crisis through covert and overt negotiation. As the crisis continues through failure to resolve the dispute by diplomatic
channels, an Information campaign is conducted to explain the nation’s or diplomat’s point of view and build popular support both nationally and internationally for that nation’s policy. As talks break down, Economic measures are implemented to coerce a government into changing its policy or to build support among the opposing nation’s population through humanitarian assistance or economic aid. When all else fails, Military options are exercised. Because of this routine progression of the application of the instruments of national power, the term DIEM will be used to refer the instruments of national power.15

What is sometimes overlooked is that DIEM options are exercised in different realms to change another nation’s policy. The diplomatic efforts occur in a “diplomatic realm” involving the nations in dispute conducting bi-lateral negotiations and also attempting to resolve differences through the United Nations or third parties. In an “information realm,” each side involved in a crisis attempts to use various media to include the internet (web pages, chat rooms, e-mail) as well as national and international news services transmitting messages via television, radio and print media to influence and garner national and international support for their side. The “people” of each side are more connected due to globalization and the resulting media of the 21st Century. When negotiations break down, the military options are exercised in the realm generally referred to as war.

Figure 2 depicts the interaction of the “government” and “people” factors of nations involved in a dispute within the diplomatic realm and the information realm according to the “Nature of Crisis” model. One can see that civil considerations are paramount during the pre-hostility phase and will directly affect warfare by shaping the environment where it is eventually fought.
Therefore, civil considerations at the strategic level address the governments and people of both nations involved in a crisis. The lessons learned at the strategic level also fall into four distinct categories of civil considerations. The first category consists of the considerations involving the military and the civilian leadership of the government translating policy into strategy. Each observation begins with the conflict where they were observed:

- **VIETNAM WAR:** “A failure to clearly define political and military objectives is probably one of the most severe criticisms one can make of the Vietnam War.”

- **GULF WAR:** “While national policy goals are reasonably well articulated, rarely are these translated into strategic political-military objectives expressed as endstates and attainable supporting objectives.”

- **SOMALIA:** “A review of the literature, most authors agree (1) conflict termination planning and the development of an exit strategy prior to or at the beginning of a conflict is a must, (2) not enough time and thought are dedicated to termination planning, (3) current doctrine does not provide the necessary guidance to military strategists…”
Planning staffs must consider the intent of the civilian leadership and their policies as a crisis unfolds and during hostilities. Prior to hostilities, they should ensure they have approved war termination objectives, a defined post-hostilities status quo and clear exit strategy.

The second category involves the relationship between the military and the American public. The military leadership has a legal and ethical responsibility to ensure the American public understands how they are using the military instrument of national power. Maintaining popular support for military actions and operations in other countries is critical for it allows CINCs and their strategic planners enough time to complete the mission and affect the policy of a belligerent nation:

- **EL SALVADOR:** “As a people, Americans tend to be impatient and are quickly frustrated with long, drawn out wars.”

- **SOMALIA:** “Public support for such missions is critical.”

- **SOMALIA:** “The international media is the most powerful offensive and defensive information warfare asset available to lesser-developed countries and/or parties to a conflict.”

- **BOSNIA:** “The speed at which the world communicates, the ever-present threat of asymmetric warfare, and the increasingly important role of domestic and international support for military operations makes public affairs a real force multiplier.”

Making sure the American public is informed has become a major concern during recent military operations and highlights the importance of information operations. Determining how to exploit media opportunities to keep American and international civilian population support for military operations is a valid consideration.

In addition to the US government, civil considerations involve developing plans for interacting with United Nations representatives, coalition partners and the host or occupied nation’s government officials. The lessons from this third category involve:
• SOMALIA: “The mandate (UNSCR 814) took on the label of “nation building” a determined effort backed by military force to bring into being new, formal Somali political and administrative structures at the local, regional and national levels.”

• BOSNIA: “The most daunting of these challenges invariably will be to overcome resistance from powerful political elites who calculate they will be disadvantaged by the outcome of the reform process.”

• BOSNIA: “Absent the political will to permit the intended democratic transformation to take place, the result will merely be legalistic mirage.”

The considerations of “nation building,” public security, negotiation and interaction with “political elites” charged with recovery and reconstruction efforts comprise this consideration.

In addition to the host/occupied nation’s government, military planners must also consider a fourth category, the local population:

• GULF WAR: “the U.S…constituted an occupying power under international law…US forces were required to provide for the well-being of the local population.”

• SOMALIA: “A delegation of U.S. nongovernmental organization (NGOs) representatives was invited to CENTCOM Headquarters…their suggestions proved useful in identifying the most urgent humanitarian needs and in planning logistical approaches.”

• BOSNIA: “The task of rebuilding or reforming the public security apparatus requires that the judicial process, associated legal code, and penal system be addressed during the earliest stages, along with reform of the police force.”

Determining the legal responsibilities to the local population, working with civilians from the private sector and establishing a security apparatus where the civilians can feel secure enough to establish some semblance of normalcy following a conflict constitute additional considerations for the military planner.

Combining the theoretical classifications of applicable civil considerations with these lessons learned support defining strategic level civil considerations as: 1) Determining the intent of the friendly government and translating their policy into a coherent strategy, 2) Keeping the friendly public informed and maintaining popular support, 3) Defining the enemy government’s
actions required to create a policy acceptable to the friendly government, and 4) Influencing the enemy public to discourage support for the enemy policy. Logically, one can surmise that the considerations will be different for each phase of a crisis (Pre-hostilities, Conflict and Post-hostilities). Therefore, defining strategic objectives by DIEM for each phase and reviewing them during each phase is critical for the successful integration of all instruments of national power.

These objectives, in turn, help to define the conditions that must be met prior to moving into the following phase of a campaign plan in relation to the four strategic categories of civil considerations. Each condition for attaining a national strategic objective and, subsequently, the Desired Endstate (DES) becomes an objective for the appropriate diplomatic, information, economic or military instrument of power. The CINC’s planning staff must assess the strategic civil considerations, determine the impact of other DIEM objectives on the overall military campaign and develop a campaign plan to achieve the DES:

![Civil Considerations Diagram](image)

**Figure 3: Relationship of strategic civil considerations to the planning process**
Understanding the impact of these considerations on each phase of a crisis (from pre-hostilities through conflict to war termination) allows the operational commander to better understand the constraints and restraints on military action as well as how the other instruments of national power will assist him in achieving strategic objectives and the overall DES.

**Operational Civil Considerations**

Now that civil considerations have been defined in terms of their impact on strategy, the question becomes how to translate the strategy into an operational concept and determine the impact of civil considerations from an operational perspective. One way to view the operational level of war is to think of it in joint terms, the Military node in the center of Figure 2 being a combination of military options available from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines synchronized in time, space and purpose according to a campaign plan. This approach to the operational level of war is the result of combining various tactical options available from each branch of service together at the operational level to achieve purely military strategic objectives. An issue concerning this approach is the fact that the military often requires conditions to be set by the other instruments of national power in addition to those set by achieving the military objectives in order to attain the desired endstate, terminate the conflict and conduct an exit strategy.

Starting from a national perspective, the strategic level consists of identifying national strategic objectives that focus directly on altering an opponent’s policy by influencing that government and people. These national strategic objectives are achieved through a combination of DIEM options exercised together to attain the national strategic objectives and the DES, altering the opponent’s policy. These options combine to affect the Diplomatic and Information realms (of Figure 2) as well as the War should the crisis result in conflict. Managing the
relationships between the four instruments of power (DIEM) becomes a fundamental responsibility of operational planners at the CINC or theater-level. This is due to the fact that in addition to destroying an enemy’s military structure during the course of a war, the military must maintain popular support in the information realm and dictate terms in the diplomatic realm consistent with national policy during the war termination phase. Therefore, at the operational level, commanders must execute a military campaign while supporting national efforts in the information and diplomatic realms in an overall effort to change the enemy’s policy.

The United States military does not have a substantial problem focusing combat power and destroying things once war is declared. A more vexing problem is combining the elements of national power to set the conditions for success once hostilities are over. Because planners fail to consider the civil aspects of a mission or operation, they begin reacting to civil problems and concerns once forces are committed rather than planning for these issues initially. Invariably, some planners dump these problems on civil affairs units and hope the problems will go away rather than realizing they will eventually be at the very core of success. Most good planners know, “Hope is not a method.”

A place to start in order to alleviate this problem is to review the specific DIEM objectives that support the national strategic objectives and overall policy. Determining how these objectives will affect the military campaign becomes a key consideration. At the operational level, civil considerations include working with the civilians associated with the Diplomatic instrument of power (United Nations, NGOs, PVOs), the Information instrument of power (national and international media, internet) as well as implementing those economic measures (blockades, humanitarian assistance, etc.) directed by the civilian leadership and affecting the enemy population. Figure 4 provides a graphic representation of how operational
objectives (be it diplomatic, informational or military) combine to become conditions for achieving a national strategic objective and thereby changing an enemy’s policy:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 4: Civil Considerations crosswalk between strategic and operational objectives**

When developing a campaign plan, planners should identify ways in which each instrument of national power can support the military effort in accomplishing its tasks. They should also identify those implied tasks that come from the support required by other instruments of national power to achieve their objectives and, in turn, national strategic objectives.

By creating this synergy between the instruments of national power, DIEM works in a complementary manner instead of an independent one. Ultimately, complementary objectives place enemy forces on the “horns of a dilemma” by making the belligerent leadership choose between two unpleasant alternatives. For example, rather than meeting an information operation head on with the same instrument, other aspects of DIEM may be used to counter the enemy operation asymmetrically. Military efforts in support of diplomatic tasks (as was the case during
the war over Kosovo) or economic measures in support of an information campaign could compound the effect on the civil components involved in the crisis. At a minimum, employing complementary objectives complicates the situation and adds complexity to the conflict forcing the enemy to contend with multiple problems affecting his center of gravity. Figures 5 and 6 depict the traditional versus complementary employment of DIEM:

![Figure 5: Traditional employment of DIEM](image)

**Traditional Approach**

Friendly options countered by similar enemy options result in strength vs. strength, single-dimension application of power

![Figure 6: Complementary employment](image)

**Complementary Objectives**

Complementary application of national instruments of power in support of national objectives

If employing a DIEM option is directed by the National or theater-strategic leadership, then the operational level is usually where it is executed. This is similar to operational planners incorporating joint options into a plan and having them executed at the tactical level. Therefore, incorporating an assessment of operational civil considerations into the planning process enables military planners to synchronize the activities of all instruments of power into a consolidated campaign plan that executes a national strategy supported by the operational level. The question involves defining the considerations at the operational level.

There are three categories of civil considerations at the operational level directly related to the other instruments of national power: 1) The integration of United Nations personnel, coalition civilian leadership, and NGO/PVOs civilians operating in the area, 2) Information
operations by US military public affairs officers and coalition public information officers that support the national/coalition strategy, and 3) Civil affairs operations responsible for the distribution of economic aid and services to the local population. These considerations are crucial for coordinating activity at the operational level and support that first consideration addressed by FM 3-0, namely, “the interaction of the diplomatic, economic, information and military instruments of national power at the operational level.” Lessons learned indicate incorporating DIEM considerations into the planning process increases mission effectiveness:

- **DIPLOMATIC:** “The process of defining operational objectives with a high degree of clarity should prompt increased communication between the civilian and military leadership that will help to ensure congruence between operational objectives and the larger policy aims of a campaign.”

- **ECONOMIC:** “Reform of public security will require two developments: commitment of resources over time that are capable of overcoming deficiencies in the capacity of public security structures, and generating political consensus among former disputants that these structures should function in a reasonable impartial manner.”

- **INFORMATION:** “More effective use of the power of information in peace operations will significantly enhance the capabilities of US forces to maintain the peace, contain the conflict, and accelerate the process of establishing peace and stability with the minimum loss of life.”

It is important to understand that the other instruments of national power are only as effective as the military plan incorporating them into the overall campaign. A teaching point from Operation Desert Storm reminds us, “A second aspect of the interagency game is that no player except the military has the means to carry out those activities required to achieve post-conflict objectives.”

Each instrument of national power must be coordinated and integrated into an overall campaign plan to resolve a crisis. Enduring Freedom operations in Afghanistan are an example of effective use of integrated instruments. Surgical employment of the military instrument supported by humanitarian assistance directed by (or categorized as) the economic instrument resulted in the removal of the enemy political instrument (Taliban) with the support from the
local population. This kind of integration is executed at the operational level and is the result of considering the civil factors in an analysis of how these instruments will be synchronized to achieve national goals and policies. Whereas military force during post-hostilities or MOOTW prevent external influences from endangering the peace, civil considerations define missions and identify enablers that will enhance internal influences to stabilize the operating environment.

**The Beginning: Recommendations for developing a System**

*Civil Considerations does not equal civil affairs.* Viewing the civil aspect of crisis resolution as merely a Civil Affairs mission without setting the conditions for that unit to succeed during post-hostilities or MOOTW is to risk mission failure. Therefore, including civil considerations as part of METT-T is absolutely essential for success. To summarize the definitions developed from the research of this paper, the four Strategic Civil Considerations areas are:

- Determining the intent of the friendly government and translating their policy into a coherent strategy,
- Keeping the friendly public informed and maintaining popular support,
- Defining the enemy government’s actions required to create a policy acceptable to the friendly government, including a war termination plan, and
- Influencing the enemy public to discourage their support for the enemy policy.

Operational Civil Considerations involve the other instruments of national power and include:

- The integration of United Nations personnel, coalition civilian leadership, and NGO/PVOs civilians operating in the area,
- Information operations by US military public affairs officers and coalition public information officers that support the national/coalition strategy, and
- Civil affairs operations responsible for the distribution of economic aid and services to the local population.

The problem is that the concept of civil considerations is neither clearly understood nor has a systematic, analytical process been developed to ensure the issues repeatedly cited during previous operations are resolved. At the center of the problem is the fact that there is no system
linking operational and strategic objectives, nor are they adequately defined or modified over time, as the situation changes.

*Civil considerations are critical to providing the linkage between objectives at the strategic and operational levels of war.* One way to begin the integration process is to develop a synchronization matrix during interagency coordination meetings that define the conditions (or DIEM objectives), by phase and instrument of national power and then nest the Operational Function objectives within the instruments of national power. Using John R. Ballard’s JTF Synchronization Matrix and incorporating the different instrument of national power, a crosswalk could be devised identifying national-strategic objectives by phase and breaking down these objectives into objectives for each operational function, nesting each operational function into an instrument of national power. Identifying the objectives by phase would create a common understanding of the conditions required for success while acknowledging these may change over time. It would also ensure assets dedicated to accomplish tasks by different national agencies work in a complementary vice independent manner.

![Figure 7: DIEM Objectives Synchronization Matrix](image)
The Operational Level of War is where the integration and synchronization of operations executed by the instruments of national power occurs, increasing the necessity of civil considerations. The research shows that military planners do not incorporate all options available from DIEM into military operations, even though in most cases the military may be expected by civilian counterparts to carry out many of these missions. The research suggests that as military planners execute more missions combining the different instruments of national power, civil considerations will play an increasingly important role in assessing the situation and visualizing the operation, thereby justifying their inclusion in METT-T. Operational level planners must incorporate these considerations into the overall campaign planning process. As Joint Publication 3-0 explains, “A campaign is the synchronization and integration of necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations – as well as interagency and multinational operations – in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives.”

A system or process integrating civil considerations into the military decision making process must be developed. Much more work remains to be done. The research indicates that although civil considerations are critical for the successful conclusion of a crisis and identifies the various issues associated with this factor from pre-hostilities to war termination, the considerations themselves have not been thoroughly defined nor a system developed to complement the METT-T process. Therefore, it is proper to include the “C” in METT-TC but it is just as important to develop a methodology for including the aspects outlined in this paper into the planning and visualization processes. The model of modern crisis developed by this paper may help planners to understand why civil considerations are important as well as where they fit into the process, however, an in-depth cause and effect analysis of each consideration is
recommended to further develop this new aspect of operational and strategic planning. Although this paper yields some rudimentary tools to nest objectives by DIEM over time and account for operational and strategic civil considerations in the planning process, much more work remains to develop a complete and coherent approach to considering these aspects of a conflict and their impact during crises and war.

NOTES

1 This process is a means for evaluating a mission using five different factors: Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops – Time. The resulting acronym is METT-T.
2 NWC Pub 4111D, Commander’s Estimate of the Situation (Newport: Naval War College, 2001), 2-4. The previous version of this workbook (4111C) is included in NWP 5-01 (REV A) Naval Operational Planning as Annex A.
4 FM 3-0, 5-5 to 5-6.
7 For a complete description of the different components involved in analyzing the factor of Time see NWP 5.01 (REV A), pp. A-22 to A-24, May 1998.
10 Clausewitz, 89.
11 Ibid., 89.
12 For a complete explanation on viewing Clausewitz from a non-linear perspective and his discussion of magnets, see Beyerchen article, “Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), 59-90.
13 The policy clash between two nations occurs when the course of action the antagonist is pursuing runs contrary to the accepted norms of behavior of the protagonist.
15 Many people use the term DIME to refer to Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic instruments of national power. As most nations typically use economic measures prior to bloodshed via the military instrument of power, DIEM seems to be a more appropriate acronym.
16 As Clausewitz states, “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature” On War, 88.
18 John Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992) 2.
19 Strednansky, 3.
23 Kirby, 83.
26 Ibid., 307.
27 Fishel, 8.
29 Dziedzic, Goldberg & Oakley, 511.
32 Dziedzic, Goldberg & Oakley, 512.
33 Brennan & Ellis, v.
34 Fishel, 5.
36 JP 3-0, III-4.
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