The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

MANNING THE FUTURE ARMY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES A. KNOWLES
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2002

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MANNING THE FUTURE ARMY

by

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Knowles, Ph.D.
United States Army

Colonel David W. Cammons
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel James A. Knowles
TITLE: Manning the Future Army
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGES: 37 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

It is sometimes easy to overlook that manning-the-force is an integral part of the United States' National Security plan. Increasing worldwide demands for US military presence have put pressure on all of the military Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) Active, Reserve, and National Guard components to maintain their respective Congressionally mandated personnel strengths. Recruiting success for all of the Services is largely dependent on both economic conditions and amount of available resources with success occurring when economic conditions are deteriorating and/or the services recruiting means are in a satisfactory state. Simplistically speaking, when unemployment is high and the recruiting elements have an adequate level of resources—the ends, ways, and means—all of the Services usually meet annual recruiting objectives and endstrengths.

If the Army's objective is to maintain a volunteer force in accordance with the national All-Volunteer Force (AVF) policy, the ends can be defined as successfully meeting annual recruiting objectives for both the enlisted soldiers and officers. Given the ends, the national strategic concepts, i.e., the ways, are the approaches and concepts used by the Department of Army (DA) to successfully recruit the annual AVF goals. The means, or the national resources, to achieve the ends are the funding and infrastructure provided to the Army for AVF recruiting. After reviewing the future force and potential knowledge, skills, and attributes of the 21st century soldier, this paper examines the AVF policy and past calls for reinstating the draft before outlining four means that support future AVF recruiting. The means discussed include providing additional recruiting resources (monetary and manpower), using contractors, increasing annual percentage of 2-year term-of-service contracts, and doing more with the resources currently in place. In the end, the recommendations in this paper will provide the Army's senior leadership confidence to make well-informed decisions, following a path to future AVF recruiting success.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................................. vii

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................... ix

MANNING THE FUTURE ARMY ...................................................................... 1

THE IMPORTANCE OF RECRUITING AND NATIONAL SECURITY ......................... 1

THE FUTURE FORCE ....................................................................................... 2

THE FUTURE SOLDIER’S KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ATTRIBUTES ............... 3

THE ARMY RECRUITING CRISIS OF 1999 ...................................................... 5

RECRUITING ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS ....................................................... 7

ADDITIONAL RECRUITING RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS .............. 8

CONTRACT RECRUITING AS A METHOD TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS .............. 9

INCREASE THE NUMBER OF 2-YEAR ENLISTMENTS .................................. 10

INCREASE RECRUITER PRODUCTIVITY TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS .............. 16

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 17

ENDNOTES ....................................................................................................... 19

GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................... 23

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 25
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF TERMS OF SERVICE BY FISCAL YEAR.......................... 11
FIGURE 2. COHORT LOSS BY TERM-OF-SERVICE .................................................. 12
FIGURE 3. COMPLETED 72-MONTH ATTRITION CYCLE ......................................... 13
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. STEADY-STATE ENLISTMENT OBJECTIVES .................................................. 12
TABLE 2. EXPECTED TOTAL ATTRITION BY FISCAL YEAR VARYING THE 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENLISTMENTS ........................................... 13
TABLE 3. VARIANCE OF THE HIGHS AND LOWS LOSSES OF TOTAL ENLISTMENTS .... 14
TABLE 4. EXPECTED 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE ATTRITION BY FISCAL YEAR VARYING THE 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENLISTMENTS ............... 14
TABLE 5. VARIANCE OF THE HIGHS AND LOWS LOSSES OF 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE ENLISTMENTS ...................................................................................................................... 14
TABLE 6. TOTAL NUMBER OF EXPECTED ENLISTMENTS BY TERMS OF SERVICE VARYING THE PERCENTAGE OF 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE ENLISTMENTS ............. 15
MANNING THE FUTURE ARMY

Recruiting in the modern era, because it depends on the individual voluntary actions of the thousands who choose to serve, is best viewed not as a routine governmental function but as a continuing experiment in democracy.

—Kathleen Welker

THE IMPORTANCE OF RECRUITING AND NATIONAL SECURITY

When President Richard Nixon discontinued the draft and created the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, there was a period of time when it became very difficult for all of the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) to meet their Congressionally mandated manning levels because there was no longer a guaranteed way to fill the ranks. It took a few years for the military to adapt and thrive under a national AVF policy to the point where 28 years later it is taken for granted. However in the latter half of the 1990s, the expanding economy fueled the military's competing demands for the workforce with the industrial and educational sectors. Consequently, this intense competition strained all of the Services' abilities to maintain their required personnel strengths. Given the competing workforce demands, and in combination with the terrorist events of 11 September 2001, it is possible that the United States can no longer afford the idealism of a continuing experiment in democracy if the AVF fails to meet the nation's demands for security. Focusing on just the Army, this paper will review whether or not the national AVF policy is still applicable in meeting annual recruiting objectives by examining prospective ends, ways, and means that can support a volunteer Army.

Before examining the ends, ways, and means supporting AVF policy, it is first necessary to explore the nature of the future force and identify some of the potential knowledge, skills, and attributes that the Army's future soldiers will need to have. It is important to understand the future force because it is anticipated that both the industrial and educational sectors will continue to demand many of these same individual characteristics from their future workers and college-bound high school seniors. This implies a competitive future market for the same technically savvy young men and women. Therefore, during this paper's discussion of ends, ways, and means of recruiting an AVF, it is essential to keep in mind the impact the future force has on the prospective 21st century soldiers' knowledge, skills, and attributes and its subsequent influence on the future recruiting process.
THE FUTURE FORCE

Recently, General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, embarked upon a transformation path to develop a 5,000-man brigade capable of worldwide deployment within 96 hours.\textsuperscript{1} To accomplish this seemingly Herculean task, he proposed that the new medium brigade discard the heavy armored weapon system in favor of a new lightweight, heavy-hitting "Future Combat System."\textsuperscript{2} The proposed future combat system will take advantage of science and technology and will range from conventional wheeled or tracked armored vehicles to a combination of robotic devices and unmanned aerial drones.\textsuperscript{3} By 2003, he intends to select one of the evaluated systems as the new future combat system, meaning that upcoming 21st century soldiers will be increasingly involved with high-tech weapon systems.

In the digital age, innovations across all spectrums of science and technology ultimately will, and do, influence the warfare perceptions, attitudes, and notions of the nation's civilian and military leaders. The rapid advancement of technology within the last fifteen years is having an impact on how the United States Army's senior leadership envisions the conduct of warfare in the 21st century. The future digital Army, conceived only a few short years ago, is rapidly becoming a reality. Nevertheless, even with the promise of technological advances to revolutionize future battlefields, soldiers will still be required to close with and destroy the enemy using all available weapon systems.\textsuperscript{4}

Former Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera, stated that the 21st century Army needs soldiers educated for high-tech warfighting and other vital missions.\textsuperscript{5} He further added that these individuals must be comfortable with a network-centric battlefield using instantaneous digitally shared command, control, communication, intelligence, and situational awareness across the battlefield.\textsuperscript{6} There is the clear intent to give the notional 21st century soldier an improved level of situational awareness.\textsuperscript{7} Key to the new battle-dress ensemble will be a battlefield-hardened, miniature computer.\textsuperscript{8} Depending on the source, the model for the 21st century soldier ranges from an arm-chaired warrior operating robotic devices to an exoskeleton armed-to-the-teeth soldier. Whichever concept ultimately comes to fruition, the underlying tenet supporting the future digital Army is that prospective soldiers will be intelligent, adaptable, and completely at ease with technology.\textsuperscript{9}

Indeed, the new rapidly deployable brigade envisioned by General Shinseki would have three out of its four component battalions comprised of the common "boots-on-the-ground" soldiers needed for patrolling, controlling, and if necessary, fighting urban house-to-house warfare.\textsuperscript{10} However, it is within the fourth battalion that technology will impact the Army's new brigade in the near-term. The proposed manpower and equipment organization for the fourth
battalion currently contains a large number of scouts and military intelligence experts using a wide range of advanced equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles.\textsuperscript{11} Going beyond the planned 2003 date for fielding the new brigade, some of the proposed high-tech advances supplying the common soldier are even more technologically enhanced than the projected equipment in the new fourth battalion.

Aside from the previously mentioned heightened individual situational awareness, the value of the soldier will increase just as rapidly as the destructive capabilities of the anticipated new weapon systems.\textsuperscript{12} The 21\textsuperscript{st} century soldier may have weapons based on electro or electro-thermal ammunition. These new weapons in all likelihood will be fully integrated with the battlefield-hardened miniature computer and helmet mounted image.\textsuperscript{13} Not only will these weapons have the capability to disable the enemy, but also when maximum force is required, the weapons will provide bunker-bursting, anti-armor support.\textsuperscript{14} Add in the embedded health-monitoring diagnostic system, enhanced water purification system, and hazard-resistant uniform and suddenly, the 21\textsuperscript{st} century soldier is truly an army of one.

**THE FUTURE SOLDIER'S KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ATTRIBUTES**

In 1995, the Army brought together a group of senior military, civilian, and academic leaders to discuss the soldiers of 2010. In general, the panel agreed that the 21\textsuperscript{st} century soldier must have the ability to scan, focus, and act quickly during ambiguous situations.\textsuperscript{15} The panel further supported the premise that there will be more available information provided to the soldier that will necessitate seamless processing and quick judgment. Brigadier General John Mountcastle, the Army’s former Chief of Military History and panel member, served on the panel and stated that the Army has always looked to recruit soldiers with these qualities since the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century. He further added that because the Army still looks for individuals with these same desired qualities, it provides a testimonial to the endurance of these attributes throughout the process of change.\textsuperscript{16} Unfortunately, the panel’s published report failed to address the United States’ education system and the requirements of the Army in sufficient detail to determine if the high school-educated youth of today can become the technically savvy soldiers of tomorrow.

Scout R. Gourley, a former United States Army Officer and contributing editor for *Army* magazine reported that the individual soldier would continue to be the most important "system" on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{17} The focus of his article reinforced the concept that a soldier is an integral weapons system. Given the desire to fully combine man and machine, Gourley takes this a step further by suggesting that modern military planners need to view the 21\textsuperscript{st} century soldier as
a single-platform system. As with the Army’s 1995 review panel, Gourley doesn’t address the soldierly requirements of the future in the context of today’s educational system.

After researching the most current information available from the Army’s official Internet sites, it appears that the Army is robustly developing the organization and fully integrating the conceptual framework for exploiting technology for the soldier. However, information is sparse and it suggests that the Army is failing to vigorously address the basic recruiting requirements for initial entry knowledge, skills, and attributes. This could be a very important oversight because conceptual analysis of the future force appears to indicate that the 21st century soldier may be the holder of many skills that will require the Army to plan for further specialized technological training for the traditional boots-on-the-ground soldier.

Could the lack addressing 21st century soldier characteristics be because the Army has yet to come to terms with the multidiscipline military occupational specialty concept? After all, the concept of one soldier having many military specialties is directly opposed to the current Army structure. As advertised in the new "An Army of One" campaign, there are 212 military occupational specialties. The plethora of military occupational specialties makes the soldier in today’s Army a very specialized system—perhaps even too specialized for the 21st century warfighting vision. Reviewing numerous articles, such as "Robo-Soldiers" written by Mathew Cox for the The Army Times, the 21st century Army organization, technological advances, and potential military doctrine, makes it increasingly apparent that the future common soldier will require a skill set far in advance of the present-day infantryman. If one accepts the single-platform argument suggested by Gourley, augmented by the proposed new-generation weaponry and anticipated enhanced situational awareness availability, one can conclude that the future common soldier’s knowledge, skills, and attributes are going to be greater and broader compared to today’s basic infantryman.

Taking the argument that the boots-on-the-ground soldier will remain a steadfast requirement, the Army needs to ensure that the 21st century soldier will continue to be an expert in basic infantry skills. All the same, it is the advances in technology and science and the proposed future warfighting strategy that suggest the 21st century common soldier will need additional competencies and skills in electronics, communications, and computers. The 21st century soldier may in fact operate an armor system, i.e., a robotic vehicle, wheeled or tracked vehicle, or an individual exoskeleton enhanced suit. Therefore, it is conceivable and not too difficult to envision that these additional combat competencies and skills will become an integral part of the training proficiency requirements for the 21st century soldier.
The point to this discussion is to call attention to the fact that while the Army continually refines, develops, and conceptualizes new tactics, doctrines, and weapon systems for the 21st century, the basic system—the common soldier—is not given the same detailed consideration. If the Army integrates a personnel aspect in conjunction with the development of future tactics, doctrines, and weapon systems, perhaps the Army can begin to shape a recruiting strategy that will fully support a national AVF policy. The risk to not defining a robust recruiting strategy is failure to recruit the number of soldiers required to meet the Congressionally mandated endstrength. Future failures to meet the endstrength will lead to a similar review of the AVF policy as it did after the recruiting crisis of 1999.

THE ARMY RECRUITING CRISIS OF 1999

Recruiting for all of the Services largely depends on economic conditions and resources (funding, manpower, and infrastructure). When the economic conditions are deteriorating and the resources are in a satisfactory state, the Services usually are successful in achieving recruiting objectives. Such conditions prevailed between 1980 and 1985 when the United States had a high average unemployment rate of 8.1 percent for people 16-years and older. During that period, the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), the Army's recruiting agency, had the resources it required to penetrate the target market, and it successfully met annual recruiting goals.

Between 1990 and 1995, the booming economy created an employment demand for people 16-years and older and, consequently, the unemployment rate dropped to 6.4 percent. During this same period, the United States was in the process of reducing its armed forces and by doing so, the individual ready reserve (IRR) increased in size and provided all of the Services with a pool of ready-to-serve applicants that could easily be tapped to meet endstrength requirements. This IRR safety net facilitated USAREC in achieving its recruiting goals, but at the same time, the reliance on the IRR safety net inadvertently jeopardized future annual recruiting objectives by enabling USAREC to shift the recruiting focus from the post-high school market to the still-in-high-school market. USAREC placed the still-in-high-school applicants into the delayed entry program (DEP) warehouse for up to a year and filled as many as possible "ship-to-training-now" demands with IRR applicants. By using the DEP and IRR in such a robust manner, USAREC's recruiters didn't need to pursue as many potential applicants from the post-high school market. Consequently, the post-high school recruiting skills fell into disuse and by 1996, these atrophied skills began to negatively impact USAREC's ability to meet recruiting objectives.
After the Army stabilized at its 1996 Congressionally mandated Regular Army (RA) endstrength of 482,000, the IRR pool of applicants shrank and USAREC struggled to meet the annual recruiting objectives through an AVF policy. By 1998, the industrial and educational competition for the 16-years and older workforce and USAREC’s loss of post-high school skills were prime factors that created a difficult recruiting environment and allowed the AVF policy to become a binding constraint to national security obligations. Specifically, the Army failed to meet the recruiting objective in fiscal year (FY) 1998 by 800 and by 6,300 in FY 1999. General Eric K. Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, addressed the recruiting shortfall in his testimony to Congress at the end of FY 1999.

Senator Cleland: "Are we running out of Army? Are we in need of more personnel? Are you in need of more troops just to handle your worldwide commitments?"

General Shinseki: "I think in my gut we have an endstrength problem...[we're] in [the] process of laying out the analytics to answer that question...[we've] been at it for several months...once we get the numbers...I will be more than happy to lay out the requirements at the same time. I've got to go and fix my recruiting challenge. We came up short last year...it is hard for me to make an argument for more endstrength even though the analysis makes that case, if I can't demonstrate we can recruit."

Each year USAREC is accountable for recruiting 75,000 (plus or minus 5,000) RA enlisted soldiers. From a realistic viewpoint if the AVF fails to adequately man the force, the first solution to meeting the nation's needs, seems obvious—reinstate the draft. After the FY 1999 recruiting shortfall, Lawrence Korb, then a member of the Council of Foreign Relations, offered his opinion on the draft:

"Well, I mean it is not only not politically feasible, it just doesn't make sense, given the way in which we want people to serve longer. This is a very professional force, and to say you've had one year in which your standards were higher than they've ever been in history in a great economy that you want to go back to the draft is trying to, you know, kill an ant with an elephant or something. It is a way, way overreaction."

In another opinion, Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, reported:

"The draft was bad policy during the Cold War. It would constitute amazing foolishness today. Renewed conscription would simultaneously reduce the quality of new servicemen and increase the cost of raising a military. A draft would also sacrifice the very constitutional liberties that the military is charged to defend."

Perhaps the Honorable Louis Caldera bests summed up the most compelling argument against the reinstatement of the draft. As Secretary of the Army, he stated:
"A draft may not be fair or practical today. With our smaller, post-Cold War forces, our strong volunteer tradition, and our need for longer terms of service to get a decent return on the high up-front training costs, it would be hard to fashion a fair draft. A draft might not actually address the underlying problems of young people who are not inspired to serve. To turn this around, we must do more than compel service by a few - we must reanimate the spirit of citizen service to the nation by all. America needs an ethic of service that tells young people that there are many ways to serve our nation honorably and expand opportunities for them to serve."\textsuperscript{29}

There is nothing to suggest that the opinions of Korb, Bandow, and Caldera differ from those of our present-day politicians, civic leaders, and populace in general. Right or wrong, the AVF policy is a deeply embedded institution and it will probably take a major catastrophe requiring national mobilization to reinstate the draft. For now, and for the near-term future, it appears that the draft will only remain as a crisis response and that the nation will continue to sustain a national AVF policy. Therefore, this paper contends that the success of future AVF recruiting ends, ways, and means is with the same approaches that solved the manning issues in FY 2000 and FY 2001.

**RECRUITING ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS**

The Army's objective is to maintain a volunteer force in accordance with the national AVF policy. The ends can be defined as meeting annual recruiting objectives for both the enlisted soldiers and officers. Given the ends, the national strategic concepts, i.e., the ways, are the approaches and concepts used by the Department of Army (DA) to successfully recruit the annual AVF goals for new enlisted soldiers and officers. The means, or the national resources, to achieve the ends are the funding and infrastructure provided to the Army for AVF recruiting.

The Army established two separate military commands to oversee officer and enlisted manning objectives. The recruiting of new officers, excluding the United States Military Academy at West Point, is the responsibility of the United States Army Cadet Command—a sub-command of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. The responsibility to recruit enlisted soldiers lies with USAREC, which is a major command operating under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Future discussion on AVF ends, ways, and means will focus on meeting the annual enlisted soldier's objectives since it is the larger goal of the two and has the greatest impact on national security.

USAREC aggressively recruits potential volunteer applicants from the 1.4 million military-available, 17 to 21-year-old population hereinafter defined as the prime market.\textsuperscript{30} The prime market has two distinct sub-groups. The first group is the senior (still-in-high-school) market and the second is the graduate (minimum of a high school degree or equivalent and also known
as post-high school) market. The major factors that directly affect AVF recruiting are the USAREC annual command-operating budget, the DA funding set aside for recruiting incentives (enlistment bonus, Army College Fund, and other inducements), and the number of recruiters assigned to USAREC. A significant factor outside the Army's control is the prime market's attitude toward the Army. This leads to the development of four possible ways to support the current and future AVF policy ends.

The first proposed way is to increase recruiting resources (monetary and manpower). The second proposal explores the use of contracting while the third focuses on the prime market's attitude toward long term commitment and explores increasing the annual percentage of 2-year term-of-service contracts. The last way focuses on doing more with the resources currently in place.

ADDITIONAL RECRUITING RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS

One solution supporting the AVF policy would be to increase the monetary and/or manpower resources to USAREC. In today's fiscally constrained environment, recruiting competes with the pressing need for transformation, i.e., the future combat system and base infrastructure revitalization. Currently, and for the future, a substantial monetary increase to the USAREC operating budget would be a difficult course of action to support. There is still the option of providing more recruiters to increase USAREC's sales force power. This can only be a viable AVF support option if the hypothesis that more recruiters will significantly increase the number of new enlistments is a true outcome. In other words, is giving USAREC an additional soldier for recruiting duty a greater utility to the Army than having that same soldier in a combat unit?

Data from 1999 indicates there was an average of 6,000 RA recruiters assigned to USAREC. A key indicator, known as the net write rate (NWR), is one of many standard measurements to gauge recruiting success.\textsuperscript{31} The NWR measurement tracks the number of new enlistment contracts produced each month by a single recruiter. For 1999 the average monthly NWR was 0.97 meaning that on the average a recruiter contracted (produced) less than one new enlistment into the Army in a given month.\textsuperscript{32} What does this mean for USAREC in terms of recruiting manpower?

If NWR remains at 0.97 and the annual recruiting mission stays at 75,000, the Army would need to increase the number of recruiters to USAREC from 6,000 to 6,444 (75,000 divided by 0.97 NWR divided by 12 months). If the recruiting mission increases to 80,000, as was the case in FY 2000, the required number of recruiters goes from 6,000 to 6,873 (80,000 divided by 0.97
NWR divided by 12 months). On the surface, increasing the number of recruiters by either 444 or 873 seems reasonable given that the Army has a 482,000 endstrength. However, the feasibility of providing more recruiters is doubtful because of the priority established by the Secretary of the Army to man combat units at 100 percent authorizations of enlisted personnel grade and skill levels for ten active component divisions and armored cavalry regiments.33 Simply put, there are not sufficient noncommissioned officers in the Army to meet the demands for recruiting duty and to support the Secretary’s combat unit manning goal.34 The concluding analysis of this alternative suggests that neither monetary nor manpower resource increases are supportable for future practical solutions to achieving the ends.

**CONTRACT RECRUITING AS A METHOD TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS**

In the last few years, there are numerous examples of the Army contracting services with civilian firms in an effort to reduce the administrative and logistical burden while lowering operating cost. With this in mind, the FY01 National Defense Authorization Act proposed an experiment, or test, to displace recruiting soldiers with contractors. The concept of the test proposes a five-year experiment requiring USAREC to displace ten complete recruiting companies with contract recruiters. The goal of the experiment is two-folded. First, if contractors can successfully recruit new RA soldiers it will provide the Army with the ability to return over 8,000 recruiters and support personnel to other military duties. Second, it is possible that by contracting recruiting functions the Army will be able to have a less expensive way to meet manpower objectives while still supporting the desired AVF policy.

The problem that concerns USAREC with this proposed experiment that replaces military personnel with contractors is that it may have a devastating effect on the AVF policy that will transcend well beyond the proposed five-year experiment.35 The experiment is an unnecessary risk according to USAREC. Their analysis states that it will take at least two years after the end of the test for Army recruiters to reestablish themselves in the community and rebuild relationships with the centers of influence (community leaders, churches, school officials, and parents).35 More importantly, if the contractors fail to recruit their assigned number of new recruits, the experiment will put the Army’s future targeted endstrength at risk—meaning that the AVF policy once again could be called into question.

Currently, this experiment is still an unfunded Congressional requirement that in all probability will take place. In an effort to minimize the risk of destroying the recruiting markets that have been so carefully cultivated over the last 27 years, USAREC is making contingency
plans to conduct this experiment safely, and they developed two counterproposals for this experiment.

The first proposal is to ask Congress not to replace entire Army recruiting companies, but instead, allow USAREC to use the contract recruiters to expand the Army's presence on college campuses. Analysis by USAREC indicated that this expanded recruiting action has the potential to tap into a vast market that could increase the Army's accession quality as well as enhancing a positive mix of gender and ethnicity. Furthermore, these contract recruiters could provide recruiting assistance to tenant ROTC units and aid these same units in meeting their recruiting objectives. Overall, USAREC believes that by using the contractors as college campus recruiters the Army has a new means to expand the recruiting efforts.

If Congress fails to adopt the proposed college recruiting expansion, USAREC's second proposal for the contracting experiment calls for the use of two or more separate contractors recruiting through predetermined company areas and in contiguous markets. In this manner, USAREC wants to promote a head-to-head competition between the contractors while encouraging a positive and competitive recruiting environment. By creating a head-to-head competition USAREC will shape the experiment to positively aid the contractors in meeting recruiting targets and, thus, minimize the risk to the Army's targeted annual endstrength. The ultimate goals of the head-to-head competition is to reward the victor with monetary incentives for the purpose of increasing Army recruiting efforts in order to substantially lower costs and reduce the risk to the AVF policy.

The concluding analysis of this alternative is that the inherent risk to the recruiting market is greater than the benefits of lowering recruiting costs. This is especially true since USAREC proved during the last two fiscal years (FY 2000 and FY 2001) that the organization could successfully recruit and meet the required manning objectives.

INCREASE THE NUMBER OF 2-YEAR ENLISTMENTS

In the last few years, Doctor Charles Moskos, a leading military sociologist from Northwestern University, has advocated that the Army should consider offering a 15- and/or 18-month term-of-service contract. There are many factors influencing his recommendation ranging from the creation of a national service obligation for all of America's youth to the prime market's, initially comprised of Generation X-ers and now shifted to the Millennials, socio-demographic attitudes. Both Generation X and the Millennials share a common trait in that these groups shy away from long-term commitments as 67 percent choose instead to attend college after completing high school. Moskos noted:
"The biggest disincentive for college youths is the long enlistment option. With such inducements as high recruit pay and job training, the armed forces try to get recruits to sign on for three or more years. For college youths, this a nonstarter."42

Since 1994, new enlistments selecting a 2-year term-of-service contract have averaged 4 percent peaking in FY 1996 and FY 2000 at 6.30 percent.43 Figure 1 provides a chart tracking the percentages of enlistments by terms of service for new non-prior service (NPS) enlistments contracted for each of the last eight fiscal years. Clearly, the 3- and 4- year terms of service comprised the dominant NPS enlistment choice during each of the last eight fiscal years. Without taking a position in the debate on whether or not it is feasible for the Army to accept Moskos's proposed 15- and/or 18-month terms of service, the examination of increasing the percent of 2-year term-of-service enlistments yields some interesting facts concerning attrition rates.

![Figure 1. Percentage of Terms of Service by Fiscal Year](image)

Each year, the Army groups all new NPS enlistments by type of term-of-service into cohorts for tracking and evaluating group specific characteristics such as attrition and retention rates. From data gathered over the last ten years, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) has created a projected cohort loss chart (Figure 2) that tracks expected attrition over a 72-month period. Analysis indicates that those new NPS enlistments in the 2-year term-of-service cohort do have a lower attrition rate through the first 24 months of service. However, when those in the 2-year term-of-service cohort extend beyond their initial term-of-service (extensions and first term reenlistments), almost 75% of the cohort are lost prior to completing 32 months of service. This suggests that the majority of the new NPS enlistments in the 2-year term-of-service cohort are more likely to complete their initial 2-year term-of-service but not become part of the profession, meaning only a small number of the cohort enter into the
noncommissioned officer corps. Furthermore, the higher first term loss rate suggests that increasing the number of 2-year term-of-service NPS enlistments has the potential to increase the Army annual attrition rate.\textsuperscript{44}

FIGURE 2. COHORT LOSS BY TERM-OF-SERVICE

To evaluate how increasing the number of 2-year term-of-service enlistments would impact the Army it is first necessary to note that as of FY 2002 the authorized endstrength for the Army is 482,000 which breaks down to approximately 395,000 enlisted soldiers and 87,000 commissioned and warrant officers. For evaluation purposes only, if the Army maintains the current authorized endstrength with the same 395,000 enlisted soldier strength for the next 6 years, the requirement for new annual enlistments would be 75,000. The 75,000 requirement does assume a constant success in meeting retention objectives, minimizing the training attrition rate, and maintaining other losses (retirement, administrative, medical, etc.) at manageable loss rates so that the overall annual Army attrition rate stays approximately 19 percent. From a recruiting mission perspective, the 75,000 new enlistment requirement would breakdown into a NPS objective of 69,000 and prior service (PS) goal of 6,000. The analysis of the impact of increasing the number of 2-year term-of-service enlistments focuses on the 69,000 NPS objective. Table 1 provides a summary of a steady-state recruiting mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted Endstrength</th>
<th>395,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission NPS</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission PS</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attrition</strong></td>
<td>18.99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1. STEADY-STATE ENLISTMENT OBJECTIVES**
As previously depicted in Figure 2, the tracking of cohort attrition occurs over a 6-year, or 72-month, period of time. To evaluate the impact of increasing the number of 2-year term-of-service enlistments it is necessary to use a completed 72-month cycle of enlistments and losses. The first completed cycle takes place during FY+4 and ends at FY+9 as Figure 3 indicates. Each arrow represents 72-months of attrition for each term-of-service cohort as shown in Figure 2. The cycle begins at the 48-month point on the FY arrow and ends on the FY+9 12-month point.

FIGURE 3. COMPLETED 72-MONTH ATTRITION CYCLE

Interestingly enough, by increasing the 2-year term-of-service enlistments percentage from the 8-year average of 4 percent to 25 percent, the total amount of cohort losses during the 72-month cycle does not vary that greatly (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY+4</th>
<th>FY+5</th>
<th>FY+6</th>
<th>FY+7</th>
<th>FY+8</th>
<th>FY+9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>37,740</td>
<td>34,205</td>
<td>37,326</td>
<td>38,970</td>
<td>33,320</td>
<td>30,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>38,760</td>
<td>34,961</td>
<td>33,726</td>
<td>37,633</td>
<td>32,580</td>
<td>32,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>39,612</td>
<td>35,586</td>
<td>34,313</td>
<td>36,519</td>
<td>31,963</td>
<td>33,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40,125</td>
<td>35,966</td>
<td>34,669</td>
<td>35,851</td>
<td>31,592</td>
<td>34,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40,463</td>
<td>36,217</td>
<td>34,906</td>
<td>35,405</td>
<td>31,345</td>
<td>35,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41,314</td>
<td>36,843</td>
<td>35,492</td>
<td>34,290</td>
<td>30,726</td>
<td>36,399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. EXPECTED TOTAL ATTRITION BY FISCAL YEAR VARYING THE 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENLISTMENTS

There is a greater variance between the highs and lows during the 72-month attrition cycle. This is important because a larger variance has the potential to impact negatively on DCSPER’s management of endstrength and USAREC’s ability to manage the recruiting environment. Table 3 indicates that for the most part, increasing 2-year term-of-service enlistments percentages above 4 percent does increase the variance between the expected highs and lows. The exception is that by increasing the 2-year term-of-service enlistments percent to 10 percent of the annual enlistments actually reduces the variance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>37,740</td>
<td>30,901</td>
<td>6,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>38,760</td>
<td>32,472</td>
<td>6,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>39,612</td>
<td>31,963</td>
<td>7,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40,125</td>
<td>31,592</td>
<td>8,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40,463</td>
<td>31,345</td>
<td>9,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41,314</td>
<td>30,726</td>
<td>10,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3. VARIANCE OF THE HIGHS AND LOWS LOSSES OF TOTAL ENLISTMENTS**

Examining only the 2-year term-of-service percentage of total enlistments paints a different picture on the impact of increasing the number of 2-year term-of-service enlistments. Table 4 shows the expected 2-year term-of-service enlistment losses by fiscal year and Table 5 indicates the expected highs and lows. Unlike the total expected losses, varying the percentage of the 2-year term-of-service increases the variance between the highs and lows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY+4</th>
<th>FY+5</th>
<th>FY+6</th>
<th>FY+7</th>
<th>FY+8</th>
<th>FY+9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2,163</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>2,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5,409</td>
<td>4,627</td>
<td>4,434</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>2,147</td>
<td>5,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8,114</td>
<td>6,941</td>
<td>6,651</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>8,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9,736</td>
<td>8,329</td>
<td>7,981</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>3,865</td>
<td>10,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10,817</td>
<td>9,254</td>
<td>8,868</td>
<td>3,516</td>
<td>4,293</td>
<td>11,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13,522</td>
<td>11,567</td>
<td>11,084</td>
<td>4,395</td>
<td>5,366</td>
<td>14,010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4. EXPECTED 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE ATTRITION BY FISCAL YEAR VARYING THE 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENLISTMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2,241</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>1,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5,605</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>3,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8,407</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>5,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10,088</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>6,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11,208</td>
<td>3,516</td>
<td>7,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14,010</td>
<td>4,395</td>
<td>9,615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5. VARIANCE OF THE HIGHS AND LOWS LOSSES OF 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE ENLISTMENTS**

To appreciate the full impact of increasing the percentage of 2-year term-of-service enlistments it is crucial to review the actual numbers of expected enlistments by terms of service cohort. Table 6 is a summary of the expected number of enlistments by terms of service cohort. Not surprisingly, it appears that by increasing the 2-year term-of-service percentage, number-wise, there will be a greater reduction of 3- and 4-years terms of service enlistments compared to the 5- and 6-year terms of service enlistments. The reduction of 3- and 4-years terms of service enlistments is by over 12,000 (%4 row 26,910 + 29,670 minus 25% row 21,023 +
23,181) between the 4 and 25 percent while the 5- and 6-year terms of service is roughly 1,100 (%4 row 4,830 + 4,830 minus 25% row 3,773 + 3,773). The impact of increasing the percentage of 2-year term-of-service enlistments could negatively manifest itself in the management of the noncommissioned officers. The higher attrition rate of the 2-year term-of-service cohort (75 percent loss rate by 32 months) would significantly reduce the number of soldiers that are available for promotion into the noncommissioned officers corps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms of Service</th>
<th>2 (-)</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6 (+)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td>26,910</td>
<td>29,670</td>
<td>4,830</td>
<td>4,830</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>25,228</td>
<td>27,816</td>
<td>4,528</td>
<td>4,528</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10,350</td>
<td>23,827</td>
<td>26,269</td>
<td>4,277</td>
<td>4,277</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12,420</td>
<td>22,986</td>
<td>25,342</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13,800</td>
<td>22,425</td>
<td>24,725</td>
<td>4,025</td>
<td>4,025</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17,250</td>
<td>21,023</td>
<td>23,181</td>
<td>3,773</td>
<td>3,773</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6. TOTAL NUMBER OF EXPECTED ENLISTMENTS BY TERMS OF SERVICE VARYING THE PERCENTAGE OF 2-YEAR TERM-OF-SERVICE ENLISTMENTS

Reviewing the results of this analysis suggests that increasing the number of 2-year term-of-service enlistments may not dramatically increase attrition as suggested by DCSPER (refer to Table 2). However, the variance between the highs and lows could have a negative effect on the management of endstrength (refer to Table 3). Furthermore, the analysis from Table 6 suggests that there would be a risk to the development of future noncommissioned officers. This has the potential to adversely affect the operational readiness of the combat line units because of the unavailable of noncommissioned officers or because of lowering standards to promote noncommissioned officers to fill vacancies.

Overall, the analysis does imply that there may be some utility in increasing the number of 2-year term-of-service enlistments to 10 percent of the total number of required annual NPS enlistments. If the Moskos’s suggested 15- and 18-month terms of service enlistments follow a similar pattern to the 2-year term-of-service cohort, there may be some usefulness in adopting a smaller term-of-service enlistment option. This would have to be measured against a potential increase in the Army annual attrition rate as well as readiness issues at the unit level balanced against the potential for an increased ease of prime market recruitment.

Though not analyzed in this paper, logically it can be deduced that by increasing the number of short-term enlistments there will be a corresponding increase in training costs. The potential increase in training cost is another factor that must be considered before deciding to enlarge the percentage of short-term enlistments.
INCREASE RECRUITER PRODUCTIVITY TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS

For the near-term, as well as for the health of supporting future AVF recruiting, the last alternative is to increase the net write rate (NWR) production of USAREC’s recruiters, that is, doing more with available resources. The hypothesis for this option suggests that increasing recruiter productivity directly translates into increased volunteer enlistments that support the AVF policy without requiring additional resources. If this hypothesis is true, what has the Army and USAREC done to facilitate an increase in recruiter productivity, thereby demonstrating that the AVF policy can remain a viable national objective for the future force?

First, USAREC refocused its recruiting effort from the senior market to the graduate market. This was an important fundamental to ensure recruiting success. From October through June, the senior market is unavailable for military training due to educational obligations meaning that seniors can only be trained between July and September. October through June represents 75 percent of the fiscal year and July through the September the remaining 25 percent. In contrast, the graduate market is available for military training throughout the year. The logical conclusion drawn from this information is that AVF recruiting success relies upon the graduate market for at least 75 percent of the time. Therefore, 75 percent of the recruiters’ efforts should be directed into securing volunteers from the graduate market. USAREC’s Program, Analysis, and Evaluation Directorate presented this set of optimal recruiting conditions to USAREC leaders in FY 1999, providing the USAREC leaders a chance to chart a change in the market strategy. As a result, recruiting success followed in FY 2000 and FY 2001.

Second, the Army has an obligation to support an AVF policy by reviewing enlistment incentives and bonuses to ensure that employment in the Army remains competitive with the industry and college sectors. Prior to FY 1996, the Army retained a competitive advantage with the Army College Fund (ACF). It was a positive attraction and inducement to get applicants into the Army by appealing to the market’s desire for educational support. The 1990s’ hot economy, and its subsequent demands for employment, saw many industrial leaders offering better college incentives and, consequently, the Army lost its educational incentive edge. The same can be said for enlistment bonuses in that the Army was a leader in offering sizeable enlistment bonuses to applicants, but they lost the lead as industry began offering similar or better enticements. In recognizing this shortcoming, the Army began offering selective applicants $50,000 toward college and in some cases, an additional $20,000 enlistment bonus.

Third, USAREC acknowledged the requirement that the AVF policy requires an effective advertising campaign. In January 2001, the Army supported USAREC by adopting the new “An Army of One” slogan replacing the 18-year run of “Be All You Can Be.” While the new ad
campaign was met with controversy, Leo Burnett, the ad agency, reported that interests, or leads, in recruiting were up 95,000 from FY 2000. Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White even singled out the new advertisement campaign as a large contributor to the FY 2001 recruiting success. This significant increase in leads, coupled with the last two years of Army recruiting success in a very competitive market, indicates that Americans still support an AVF policy.

CONCLUSION

Establishing a national military draft is a solution to ensuring a fully-manned military, but it does not support the desired domestic AVF policy. On the other hand, supporting an AVF policy in a resource-constrained environment is not feasible without causing negative effects elsewhere as in the case with the Army’s conflicting manpower requirements between combat and recruiter units. In regards to contract recruiting, the concluding analysis of this alternative suggests that the inherent risk to the recruiting market is greater than the benefits of lowering recruiting costs. While Moskos suggests that the Army should consider offering 15- and/or 18-month terms of service enlistment options, analysis of the 2-year term-of-service enlistment option only demonstrated limited improvements that would have to be weighed against readiness issues and a potential increase in training costs. This leads to the conclusion that the course of action of supporting the AVF policy by doing more with what is available is the proper end that supports current and future manning-the-force issues. The Army and USAREC adopted this approach in FY 2000 and increased recruiter productivity. As such, USAREC had recruiting success in FY 2000 and FY2001 without a draft, without an increase in manpower, and without a rise in short-term enlistment options.

If the AVF policy is to remain an integral part of the United States’ national security plan, it is incumbent upon the Army and USAREC to continually review, and improve when required, the three conditions for a successful AVF policy: market focus, enlistment incentives, and advertisement campaign. Over time, this may very well require the hard decision to increase recruiting resources (both manpower and budget) to support the AVF policy.

WORD COUNT = 6,749
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.


6 Ibid.

7 West and Reimer, 1.


11 Ibid.

12 Hartzog and Diehl.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.


16 Ibid.


18 Ibid.


23 Ibid.


25 Ibid.


30 Knowles et al.


32 Ibid.


36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Gaddis.
42 Moskos, 38.
45 Gaddis.
47 Gaddis.
50 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Army College Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVF</td>
<td>All-Volunteer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Non-Prior Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWR</td>
<td>Net Write Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Prior Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Regular Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREC</td>
<td>United States Army Recruiting Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Knowles, James A. unpublished working papers, Fort Knox, KY, 1 February 1999.


