ARMY READINESS ISSUES WORKSHOP

JUNE 2001

CENTER FOR ARMY ANALYSIS
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This report documents the Army Readiness Issues Workshop (ARIW), conducted by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) for the Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate (DAMO-OD), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), Headquarters, Department of the Army. The purpose of the report is to provide an overview of ARIW to include insights gained during the conduct of the workshop. The intent of ARIW was to provide an initial position for the Army’s Readiness Story in preparation for the Quadrennial Defense Review.

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ARMY READINESS ISSUES WORKSHOP

SUMMARY

THE PROJECT PURPOSE was to examine key Army readiness issues in preparation for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

THE PROJECT SPONSOR was Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate (DAMO-OD).

THE PROJECT OBJECTIVES were to:

(1) Review the state of Army readiness.

(2) Examine the feasibility of implementing a rotational or tiered readiness system.

(3) Examine the impacts of long-term deployments on readiness.

(4) Identify manpower and unit policies required to support engagement greater than 120 days.

(5) Examine the impacts of limiting the length of Reserve Component (RC) non-major theater war (non-MTW) deployments.

(6) Outline the Army Readiness Story in preparation for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT was to examine Army readiness issues out to 2010.

THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are:

(1) The Army is ready to execute the National Military Strategy with risk.

(2) Improving readiness requires adequate resources and time.

(3) Long-term small-scale contingencies (SSCs) negatively affect readiness as currently resourced.

(4) Rotational readiness merits study.

(5) Providing deployment duration flexibility to the Reserve Component is key to balancing the impact on units, employers, and families.
THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION is that the insights generated during the Army Readiness Issues Workshop (ARIW) establish an initial Army position on readiness that can be used as a foundation for telling the Army Readiness Story in preparation for the Quadrennial Defense Review.

THE PROJECT EFFORT was conducted by Mr. Greg Andreozzi, Conflict Analysis Center, Center for Army Analysis (CAA).

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, Center for Army Analysis, ATTN: CSCA-CA, 6001 Goethals Road, Suite 102, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230.
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1 BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Introduction

This report documents the Army Readiness Issues Workshop (ARIW), conducted by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) for Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, (ODCSOPS), Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate (DAMO-OD).

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the Army Readiness Issues Workshop (ARIW) was conducted to examine key Army readiness issues in preparation for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

1.3 Background

Figure 1 provides a timeline of key events associated with the Army Readiness Issues Workshop (ARIW). Needing a vehicle for the Army's QDR Readiness Panel to address key issues in a structured format, the Force Readiness Division (DAMO-ODR), Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) asked CAA's Conflict Analysis Center (CSCA-CA) for support. CAA proposed conducting an issues workshop to address key readiness issues in preparation for the QDR. The ARIW was conducted on 2-3 August 2000, followed by a synthesis work group on 28 August 2000, at which insights gained from ARIW were refined.

- Working meeting between DAMO-ODR and CAA 14 Apr 00
- ARIW Work Group 15 May 00
- IPR for COL Cox, Ch/DAMO-ODR 24 Jul 00
- IPR for Mr. Vandiver, Dir/CAA 27 Jul 00
- Army Readiness Issues Workshop (ARIW) 2-3 Aug 00
- ARIW Synthesis Work Group 28 Aug 00

Figure 1. Background
1.4 Pol-Mil Gaming Methodology

Figure 2 depicts the CAA political-military gaming methodology used to execute ARIW.

![Diagram](image_url)

Figure 2. Pol-Mil Gaming Methodology

Overview.

CAA conducts issue workshops and political-military games in support of Headquarters, Department of the Army, US Army major commands, and Army components of US unified commands. All political-military games are developed in direct coordination with the sponsor and are designed for use as a tool in policy development and decision making. Future references to political-military games also describe methodology for conducting issues workshops. The exception is that some issues workshops, including ARIW, do not use opening and special situations (scenarios) as part of their methodology.

A CAA political-military game provides direct feedback for issue identification, prioritization, and clarification of questions involving the application of national power. Experts attending political-military games draw from their professional experience to address specific issues as part of the political-military game scenario. The political-military game scenario provides a specific structure for issue analysis and the development of key insights.
Political-Military Game Structure. The political-military game structure is composed of
three phases: preprocessing, gaming, and postprocessing (see Figure 2). CAA developed the
three-phase structure to increase efficiency and ensure successful execution. During the
preprocessing phase, issues are identified and a scenario is developed. The participants are then
grouped, based on their background and perspective, and assigned to teams. Finally, within the
framework of the scenario, the teams are charged with addressing the issues in a logical,
disciplined manner. Their responses form the basis of the preliminary key insights (PKIs) for the
political-military game. These PKIs are then briefed to a Senior Council, composed of executive
defense planners and decision makers.

Preprocessing. Preprocessing takes the conventional form of a discussion that yields
concept definition. This process is initiated by an Army component commander, member of the
Army’s senior leadership, Army staff principal, or a noted expert. Preprocessing includes initial
research and data collection.

Onsite Research and Discussion. An action officer assigned to the project by the
sponsor is the main point of contact during the preprocessing phase. The CAA project director
coordinates directly with the action officer to determine the purpose, scope, and objectives for
the political-military game. Research is conducted by the project director to establish specific
details on the project, within the context of the sponsor’s original guidance.

Issue Identification. Draft issues are provided by the sponsor as a set of objectives
or concerns for the subject of the political-military game. The issues are tied directly to the
objectives of the political-military game and may be revised and enhanced as preprocessing
progresses. Once the issues are finalized, they are logically grouped and synchronized with the
scenario.

Political-Military Game Design. The design consists primarily of establishing an
individual plan for a specific political-military game. The process involves determining the most
productive combination of team assignments, confirming an appropriate sequence for the
presentation of objectives and charges, and ensuring that the detailed scenario encompasses all
aspects of the overarching problem or hypothesis. Based on this sequencing, the game is broken
up into a series of moves, each addressing one or more objectives.

Political-Military Game Participant Roster. Identification of appropriate
participants is absolutely key to a successful political-military game. The sponsor identifies
principal participants during the initial stages of planning. Additions or deletions are made based
on the scope and experience required.

Political-Military Game Scenario. The scenario provides perspective and
establishes a platform from which to address the objectives of the game. Ideally, the scenario
will consist of a realistic situation that tasks the participants to draw from their professional
experience to conduct problem solving and decision making. A majority of the situations carry
the participants forward in time and displaces them to a future state of events that requires
consideration. This intentional displacement serves the additional benefit of removing any
preconceived notions or current-day issues that may complicate the problem.
Political-Military Game Objectives. The number of political-military game objectives is determined by the scope of the political-military game. A standard political-military game might examine four or five objectives. Each objective, in turn, may have four or five charges (questions) that should be addressed.

Conduct of the Political-Military Game. Participants are welcomed and then given a series of introductory briefings before breaking into teams to address the objectives and related issues.

Scenario Briefing. Participants will come from various backgrounds and must be brought together to interact toward the common objectives of the political-military game. This interaction is synchronized through the use of a special scenario developed specifically for the political-military game. The scenario answers questions and provides information on assumptions required in order to accurately address the issues.

Political-Military Game Dynamics. Team composition, and the small number of personnel on each team (normally 15 or less), allows for unique interaction that encourages individual participation. In the small group setting, the ability to elicit a response under the constraints of the scenario and time schedule comprises the group dynamic.

Preliminary Key Insights (PKIs). The product of each team discussion is a set of responses to each charge and PKIs, representing the most important insights gained during that particular move. The charge responses and PKIs are carried forward to the plenary session at the end of each move and presented to the political-military game. Summary PKIs are briefed to the Senior Council at the end of the game.

Record of Proceedings. In addition to a team leader, each team is assigned an analyst who assists the team leader and records insights. The insights are recorded on a computer and take the form of bullet comments augmented by text passages where required. At the conclusion of the political-military game, all comments are compiled to form a nonverbatim, not-for-attribution written report of proceedings for the political-military game. This report includes all key insights and provides the sponsor with a complete accounting for all phases of the game.

Postprocessing. During the postprocessing phase, the sponsor determines the steps to take in order to maximize the benefits of the political-military game (based on the impact of the insights, applicability of the scenario, Senior Council’s instructions, etc.). Normally the results and project report are presented as a series of briefings to key decision makers throughout the Department of Defense. New objectives and issues derived as a result of the game’s cardinal insights could form the basis of a follow-on political-military game, as required.
1.5 Pol-Mil Game Dynamics

The key to successful game execution is the use of a structured process to ensure the events flow and all important issues are addressed. This is accomplished by working closely with the sponsor to formulate objectives and key issues to be addressed. The game is then organized into a series of moves, usually three for a 2-day game, where each move addresses a series of charges to answer one or more objectives. As described previously, participants are divided into teams to address the charges. The number and size of teams depend on the number of participants and the desired game dynamics. The completion of each move is followed by a plenary session where each team briefs its responses to the charges. This also includes discussion, and for some issues consensus is reached on specific charges, while for others, lack of consensus is noted. Upon completion of the moves and plenaries, PKIs are briefed to a Senior Council made up of senior leaders. Consensus PKIs may be briefed or individual team PKIs can be briefed. Completion of the Senior Council ends the game, and then, in the postprocessing phase of the effort, PKIs are refined into cardinal insights. This process is portrayed in Figure 3.

![Figure 3. Pol-Mil Game Dynamics](image-url)
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2 ANALYTICAL ARCHITECTURE

Figure 4 provides a pictorial look at the preparation (15 May Army Readiness Work Group (WG)), execution (2-3 August ARIW), and postprocessing (28 August ARIW Synthesis Work Group) of ARIW. A work group was established on 15 May 2000 to define key readiness issues and identify workshop participants. The 2-3 August 2000 Army Readiness Issues Workshop developed initial positions on five key Army readiness issues as part of developing the Army Readiness Story in preparation for the QDR. DAMO-ODR and CAA then conducted a synthesis work group on 28 August 2000 to refine the workshop results, including the Army QDR Readiness Panel position outlines for the five key readiness issues.

Figure 4. Analytical Architecture
2.1 Army Readiness Work Group

Figure 5 presents the framework for the Army Readiness Work Group, which was established on 15 May 2000 and met periodically to prepare for the 2-3 August 2000 issues workshop.

**PURPOSE:** Focus the Army's QDR Readiness Panel preparation for the QDR by defining key issues

**MEMBERS:** DAMO-ODR and CAA

**SCOPE:** Examine Army Readiness issues out to 2010

**OBJECTIVES:**
- Establish key terms and concepts
- Review issues identified by Readiness Panel
- Capture emerging issues
- Identify IW participants
- Identify key guiding documents

**PROJECT DIRECTOR:** Mr. Greg Andreozzi (703) 806-5665

![Diagram showing the Army Readiness Work Group framework]

Figure 5. Army Readiness Work Group
2.2 Army Readiness Issues Workshop (ARIW)

Figure 6 presents the framework for the 2-3 August 2000 Army Readiness Issues Workshop. Key subject matter experts from throughout the Army Staff participated in ARIW. The workshop’s primary objective was to outline the Army’s Readiness Story for inclusion in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

**Figure 6. Army Readiness Issues Workshop (ARIW)**
2.3 Key Readiness Issues for the Army

ARIW was conducted to tell the Army Readiness Story in preparation for the QDR. The basis for the readiness story consists of position outlines on the five key Army readiness issues presented in Figure 7. Workshop participants were asked to refine draft position outlines for each of these issues—Army readiness, rotational readiness, effects of long-term deployments, manpower (SKILLTEMPO) and unit (DEPTEMPO) policies, and Reserve Component deployment policy. Each issue had a series of questions associated with it that were to be addressed in the respective position outline.

- **Army Readiness.** What is the current state of Army readiness? What are the recent trends? What are our projections for future readiness?

- **Rotational Readiness.** What are the options for, and impacts of, implementing a rotational readiness system? Is this an option for the Army? If so, how soon could such a system be implemented?

- **Effects of Long-term Deployments.** What are the effects of long-term deployments (i.e., long-duration, small-scale contingencies (SSCs) on Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Mission Essential Task List (METL) readiness? Are we measuring these impacts properly?

- **Manpower (SKILLTEMPO) and Unit (DEPTEMPO) Policies.** What are the manpower (SKILLTEMPO) and unit (DEPTEMPO) policies required to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than 120 days?

- **Reserve Component Deployment Policy.** What are the impacts of establishing a policy that limits RC non-MTW deployments to 150, 120, or 90 days? How can we move in this direction (by combat, combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), or by military operational specialty (MOS) ...)?

Figure 7. Key Readiness Issues for the Army
2.4 Issues Workshop Concept

Figure 8 outlines the flow of ARIW. The five key readiness issues were addressed across a series of four moves over 2 days. Following a series of overview briefings, participants were divided into two teams to begin addressing the issues. Each team was asked to address all five issues. In Move 1, the Army Readiness issue was addressed. Move 2 examined three key readiness issues--effects of long-term deployments, manpower (SKILLTEMPO) and unit (DEPTEMPO) policies, and Reserve Component deployment policy. Teams looked at rotational readiness in Move 3, and Move 4 was used to synthesize insights gained from the first three moves into the Army’s Readiness Story. At the conclusion of each move, a plenary session was conducted where each team briefed out its insights from that move. Finally, at the conclusion of the issues workshop, preliminary key insights were presented to a Senior Council.

Figure 8. Issues Workshop Concept
2.5 Issues Workshop Organization

Figure 9 presents the organization for ARIW. As discussed previously, two teams with balanced skill sets were formed to allow each to address all issues presented.

![Organization Chart]

**Figure 9. Issues Workshop Organization**
3 INITIAL POSITION OUTLINES FOR KEY ARMY READINESS ISSUES

3.1 Issue 1 – Army Readiness

**INITIAL ARMY POSITION:** The Army stands ready to execute the National Military Strategy with increased risk. The Army is taking actions to improve readiness throughout the force and has a strategy to address future readiness requirements.

**Key Points:**
- Will help define the Army Readiness Story.
- The Army is the Full Spectrum force of choice. The Army remains ready to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS) and National Command Authority (NCA) directed mission across the full spectrum of operations.
- The path to future readiness must not compromise current readiness.
- The Army will continue to support multiple SSCs.
- Current policies are improving the readiness of Active Component (AC) major combat units (MCUs). Future policies must provide added value to the total force.
  - Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Manning the Force
  - 180-day SSC deployments
- Maintaining readiness requires adequate resources.
- Risk is associated with long term SSC commitments—“consumption” of readiness.
- Successful implementation of the Chief’s readiness system requires adequate resources

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<td>Identify requirements studies</td>
<td>Evaluate MRR Data</td>
<td>Organize Sub-panels-Bi-weekly meetings</td>
<td>QDR Readiness Data Base</td>
<td>Evaluate MRR Data (Aug Report)</td>
<td>Initial White Paper</td>
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**Figure 10. Issue 1 – Army Readiness**

Initial position outlines refined at the 2-3 August Issues Workshop and the follow-on 28 August synthesis Work Group are presented in Figures 10 through 19. Each position outline is structured to contain an initial position on the issue, key points supporting the position, a timeline of key events, applicable supporting material for the position, to include organizations responsible for identified actions, and a concluding statement or statements. Figures 10 and 11 address Issue 1 – Army Readiness.
The Full Spectrum Force of Choice

- Shape, Respond, Prepare
  - Analysis Requirement: Army must show unit, man day, and LD/HD resource costs for Shape and Respond
- Army Unique: Stays for the duration, supports the other Services, nation building, Homeland Security (HLS)

The Army Readiness Story

- The Army stands ready to execute NMS
  - Readiness Status: Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), Monthly Readiness Review (MRR), Congressional Testimony
  - Managing shortages by shifting risks (Analysis - OD, OCAR, NGB)
    - History of deployments
    - Shortening of rotations
    - Increased use of the RC
      - Army has reduced impacts of SSCs on AC Readiness; Affected Reserve Component -
      - Unit Data - Bosnia, Kosovo, & 30 other countries
  - Readiness Management (OD)
  - Congressional mandate (OCLL)

Army Initiatives to Improve Readiness

- CSA Manning Policy (DAPE-MPE)
- Training Initiatives (DAMO-TR)
- Deployment
  - Corps alignment (SSW)
  - Army policies to manage SKILLTEMPO/DEPTEMPO (OD, DAPE, CAA)
  - Readiness Management (OD)
  - Changes to AR 220-1
  - Strategic Readiness System
  - Need resolution between Unit Status Report (USR), OPTEMPO & combat training centers (CTCs)
  - Need to allow local commanders to set local policy
  - Transformation Campaign Plan (FD, SSW)
  - AC/RC initiatives (ADRS, Multi-COMPO, teaming, and integrated divisions)
  - Need system to track sub-unit Unit Identification Codes (UICs) & derivative-UICs

Conclusions

- Army is ready to execute NMS with risk
- Taking action to improve readiness - but will take adequate resources and time to implement
- Long-term SSCs negatively affect readiness as currently resourced

Figure 11. Issue 1 – Army Readiness, Additional Supporting Information
3.2 Issue 2 – Rotational Readiness

**INITIAL ARMY POSITION:** Adequately supported rotational readiness could address PERSTEMPO/DEPTEMPO concerns and provide for force/mission sustainability. To support the current NMS, a rotational readiness system requires either increased resources or risk.

**Key Points**
- Rotational readiness does not equal historical tiered readiness.
- Rotational readiness could address PERSTEMPO/DEPTEMPO concerns and provide for force/mission sustainability.
- Rotational readiness system requires either increased resources or risk.
- Rotational Readiness exists in the Navy and Air Force (RAND, Sep 99).
- Historically, Tiered Readiness increases casualties (CUBIC, MAR 97).
  - WW II
  - Korea
- Tiered Readiness results in increased training cost & risk (Study, QDR May 97).
- Need to evaluate alternatives to implement a rotational system.
- Current system is tiered resourcing with bands of excellence.
- No work-rest cycle (must have a stand-down process).

**Figure 12. Issue 2 – Rotational Readiness**

Figures 12 and 13 address Issue 2 – Rotational Readiness.
Figure 13. Issue 2 – Rotational Readiness, Additional Supporting Information
3.3 Issue 3 – Effects of Long-term deployments

**INITIAL ARMY POSITION:** The Army’s continued experience with measuring and managing the readiness and training of units while deployed indicates that additional resourcing is required to reduce the impacts of long term deployments on METL Readiness. Employment in SSCs enhances certain readiness aspects and degrades others.

**Key Points:**
- SSCs require both Warfighting and Peacekeeping task proficiency.
- The Army has extensive experience in managing unit readiness while deployed.
- The Army accomplishes the NMS by balancing METL readiness with SSC mission requirements.
- Slows the flow of forces to the warfight; however CINCs have said it is an acceptable risk

**History of deployments**
- Record of long-term deployments
- Units involved
- Individual soldier deployments

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**Figure 14. Issue 3 - Effects of Long-term Deployments**

Figures 14 and 15 address Issue 3 – Effects of long-term deployments.
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<th>Conclusions</th>
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<td>• Sourcing strategy; provides predictability</td>
<td>• Long-term operations impact readiness</td>
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<td>• Two skill sets</td>
<td>• Corps alignment (FD, SSW)</td>
<td>• Must train to two skill sets</td>
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<td>• DEPTEMPO (OD)</td>
<td>• Individual augmentation and organization</td>
<td>• More resources are required</td>
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<td>• Continues to increase</td>
<td>policies (OD, DAPE, OCAR, NGB)</td>
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<td>• Effects over time</td>
<td>• Varied tour length (DAPE)</td>
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<td>• Analysis of deployed units</td>
<td>• Study alternatives - Rotational readiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>(OD, DAPE)</td>
<td>• Change of personnel policies (PERSTEMPO)</td>
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<td>• CBT and CS skills decline</td>
<td>(DAPE)</td>
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<td>(RAND 99)</td>
<td>• Unpredictability of funding disrupts</td>
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<td>• CSS units training levels</td>
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<td>increases (RAND 99)</td>
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<td>• Means to measure (OD, TR)</td>
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<td>• CTC results</td>
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<td>• OPTEMPO</td>
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Figure 15. Issue 3 - Effects of Long-term Deployments, Additional Supporting Information
3.4 Issue 4 - Manpower (SKILLTEMPO) and Unit (DEPTEMPO) Policies

**INITIAL ARMY POSITION:** The Army is resourced to fight MTWs and has sufficient policies for MTWs. Current or increased levels of NCA-directed missions are stressing soldiers (SKILLTEMPO) and units (DEPTEMPO) and require policy changes.

**Key Points:**
- Sustained operations have an adverse effect on particular "skills" and type units.
- Current policies are designed to balance unit readiness and soldier welfare for MTWs.
- Congressional PERSTEMPO constraints will break up unit cohesion and therefore readiness for both SSCs and MTWs.
- Unfunded Congressional PERSTEMPO constraints will have additional negative operational impacts.

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- Analyze RAND Study
- Organized Sub-panels
- Initial findings (White Paper)
- Identified requirements
- Workshop Goals
- PERSTEMPO Requirements
- Analyze Current policies
- Army Goals for mandates
- Final Report (White Paper)

**Figure 16. Issue 4 - Manpower (SKILLTEMPO) and Unit (DEPTEMPO) Policies**

Figures 16 and 17 address Issue 4 – Manpower (SKILLTEMPO) and unit (DEPTEMPO) policies.
Figure 17. Issue 4 - Manpower (SKILLTEMPO) and Unit (DEPTEMPO) Policies, Additional Supporting Information
3.5 Issue 5 - Reserve Component Deployment Policy

**INITIAL ARMY POSITION:** The Army's current policy of providing deployment duration flexibility by unit type to the Reserve Component is key to balancing the impact on units, employers and families. A deployment policy not to exceed 179 days (IOC to IOC) coupled with deployment duration flexibility will allow the Army's Reserve Component to best manage unit / personnel readiness and mitigate employer, family and public concerns.

**Key Points**
- The Army remains engaged in long duration SSCs requiring increased use of RC.
- 54% of the Army is in the Reserve Component.
- Reserve Component is currently bearing an increased deployment burden.
- RC unit mobilization under a specific PRC is limited to 270 days.
  - This number of days creates management flexibility.
- Certain capabilities required for SSC support are almost entirely RC.
- Shorter rotations may require either additional units or more frequent rotations.
- Redundant training & validation increases actual mobilization time.
- Shorter rotations can lead to higher costs as a whole (such as personnel transportation, training, etc.).
- Currently lack appropriate analytical tools.

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- Analyze RAND Study
- Organized Sub-panels
- Initial findings
  (White Paper)
- Identified requirements
- PERSTEMPO Requirements
- Workshop Goals
- Analyze Current policies
- Define and coordinate issue
- Army Goals for mandates
- Final Report
  (White Paper)

Figure 18. Issue 5 - Reserve Component Deployment Policy

Figures 18 and 19 address Issue 5 – Reserve Component deployment policy.
Effects of Deployments (OD, DAPE, NGB, OCAR)

- Effects of deployments on RC (Current Policy)
  - Personnel, Family, Community, Employer-Employee Relations
  - Unit impacts
  - Without flexibility, Low Density/High Demand units and personnel will be exhausted
  - Increased deployments and shorter rotations will place additional requirements on transportation nodes, with associated costs

Requirements

- Determine the requirements to support SSCs. - (historical data, ODR)
- Determine the available RC Force Structure. - (historical data - ODR, DAPE, and FDF)
- Identify the desired RC contribution by SRC/ UTC

Deployment Duration

- Model the effects of deployment duration (150, 120, 90 days) by type unit
- Determine policy and resource requirements
- Determine policy impacts
- Recommend Course(s) of Action by type unit and/or MOS
- Identify capabilities that can be contracted
- Develop shorter train-up cycle
- Look at mobilization vice deployment
- Need to examine impact of various deployment durations on force structure

Conclusion

- Providing deployment duration flexibility to the Reserve Components is key to balancing the impact on units, employers and families

Figure 19. Issue 5 - Reserve Component Deployment Policy, Additional Supporting Information
APPENDIX A  PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS

1. PROJECT TEAM
   a. Project Director
      Mr. Greg Andreozzi, Conflict Analysis Center
   b. Team Members
      MAJ Gregory Barrack
      Mr. John Elliott
      Mr. Duane Gory
   c. Other Contributors
      COL Robert Cox, DCSOPS (DAMO-ODR)
      LTC Malcolm Kirsp, DCSOPS (DAMO-ODR)
      LTC Larry Hayes, DCSOPS (DAMO-ODR)
      MAJ Kevin Smith, DCSOPS (DAMO-ODR)
      Issues Workshop Participants (see Figure 9)

2. PRODUCT REVIEWERS
   Dr. Ralph E. Johnson, Quality Assurance
   Ms. Nancy M. Lawrence, Publications Center
APPENDIX B  REQUEST FOR ANALYTICAL SUPPORT

P  Performing Division:  CA  Account Number:  2000167
A  Tasking:  Verbal  Mode (Contract-Yes/No):  No
R  Acronym:  ARW
T  Title:  Army Readiness Workshop

1  Start Date:  08-May-00  Estimated Completion Date:  31-Oct-00
Requestor/Sponsor (i.e., DCSOPS):  DCSOPS  Sponsor Division:  ODR
Resource Estimates:
   a. Estimated PSM:  
   b. Estimated Funds:  $0.00
   c. Models to be
Description/Abstract:  Examine key Army Readiness Issues in preparation for the QDR

Study Director/POC Signature:  Original Signed  Phone#:  703-806-5665
Study Director/POC: Mr. Gregory Andreozzi

If this Request is for an External Project expected to consume 6 PSM or more, Part 2 Information Is Not Required. See Chap 3 of the Project Directors’ Guide for preparation of a Formal Project Directive.

Background:  The QDR Readiness panel is addressing key readiness issues in preparation for the upcoming QDR. They have asked CAA to conduct a workshop whose goal is to tell the "Army Readiness Story".

P
A
R  Scope:  Examine Army readiness issues to support the QDR

T

2  Issues:  1) Examine current readiness of the major combat units (MCUs) to support the MTWs  2) Identify known impacts of SSCs on Army operation units to support MTWs  3) Identify today's Army readiness challenges  4) Examine readiness options and impacts of implementing those options  5) Examine the impacts of establishing an Army policy that limits peacetime operational deployments to 180/150/120/90 days  6) Examine the impacts of establishing an RC non-MTW policy that limits peacetime operational deployments

Milestone:  1) Obtain sponsor concurrence with project concept in principle 2) Update Dir/CAA and DDir/OD 3) Coordinate participants with ODR  4) Coordinate Invitation memo with ODR  5) Refine workshop objectives  6) Develop moves/charges to obtain objectives  7) Conduct Army Readiness Workshop (T 15-16 Jun)

Signatures
Division Chief Signature:  Original Signed and Dated  Date:
Division Chief Concurrence:
Sponsor Signature:Original Signed and Dated  Date:
Sponsor Concurrence (COL/DA Div Chief/GO/SES)

Entry Date:  17-May-00  Print Date:  27-Sep-01
### GLOSSARY

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<td>CAA</td>
<td>Center for Army Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCSA</td>
<td>Command and Control Support Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander in chief</td>
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<td>COMPO</td>
<td>component</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>combat support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>combat training center</td>
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<td>DAMO-FD</td>
<td>ODCSOPS Force Development Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAMO-FDF</td>
<td>ODCSOPS Force Development Directorate, Force Integration and Management Division</td>
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<td>DAMO-OD</td>
<td>ODCSOPS Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ODCSOPS Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate, Force Readiness Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAMO-SSW</td>
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<td>ODCSOPS Training Directorate</td>
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<td>DAMO-TRC</td>
<td>ODCSOPS Training Directorate, Collective Training Division</td>
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<td>DAMO-ZD</td>
<td>ODCSOPS Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate, Office of the Technical Advisor</td>
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<td>DAMO-ZR</td>
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<td>DAPE</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel</td>
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<td>DAPE-MPE</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Military Personnel Management Directorate, Enlisted Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPTEMPO</td>
<td>Deployment Tempo</td>
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<td>FD</td>
<td>ODCSOPS, Force Development Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>high demand</td>
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<td>HD/LD</td>
<td>high demand/low density</td>
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HLS homeland security
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
IOC Initial Operational Capability
JMRR Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
LD low density
MCU major combat unit
METL Mission Essential Task List
MFO multinational force and observers
MOS military occupational specialty
MOSO-SOP US Army Special Operations Agency, Special Operations Division
MRR Monthly Readiness Review
MTW major theater war
NCA National Command Authority
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NGB National Guard Bureau
NMS National Military Strategy
OASA(M&RA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
OASA(PA&E) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Program Analysis & Evaluation)
OAVCSA Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
OCAR Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
OCLL Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison
OD ODCSOPS, Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate
ODCSOPS Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
OPTEMPO operational tempo
PERSCOM US Army Personnel Command
PERSTEMPO Personnel Tempo
PKI preliminary key insight
PRC Presidential Reserve Callup
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>SKILLTEMPO</td>
<td>skill tempo</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>standard requirement code</td>
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<td>small-scale contingency</td>
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<td>TR</td>
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<tr>
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