HOMELAND SECURITY INITIATIVE

JUNE 2001
DISCLAIMER

The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official documentation. Comments or suggestions should be addressed to:

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Center for Army Analysis
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6001 Goethals Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230
# Homeland Security Initiative (HLSI)

This report documents the Homeland Security Initiative (HLSI), conducted by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) for Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (DAMO-SS). The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of HLSI, to include a summary of insights gained from the two issues workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game conducted as part of HLSI. The intent of HLSI was to provide the Army with a working definition of Homeland Security (HLS) and a better understanding of its roles and responsibilities in supporting Homeland Security.

## Subject Terms
- Homeland security (HLS)
- Homeland Security Initiative (HLSI)
HOMELAND SECURITY INITIATIVE (HLSI)

SUMMARY

THE PROJECT PURPOSE was to provide the Army with a working definition of Homeland Security (HLS) and a better understanding of Army roles and responsibilities in supporting Homeland Security. This report includes a summary of insights gained from two issues workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game conducted as part of the Homeland Security Initiative (HLSI).

THE PROJECT SPONSOR was Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, (ODCSOPS) Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (DAMO-SS).

THE PROJECT OBJECTIVES were to:

1. Develop a working definition for Homeland Security (HLS)
2. Identify Army support roles and responsibilities in HLS and examine interfaces with Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the commanders in chief (CINCs), and the Federal civil community
3. Identify Army-unique preparedness and response capabilities that can be leveraged for HLS
4. Provide a road map for Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support (DTLOMS) development to support the Army’s role in HLS
5. Identify the challenges the Army faces in responding to the HLS requirement

THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT was to examine the Army’s strategy in support of the evolving HLS mission out to the 2010 timeframe.

THE MAIN ASSUMPTION used in this project was the Army is primarily supporting other lead federal agencies in Homeland Security with a few exceptions.

THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are:

1. The following working definition for HLS was developed:

   Active and passive measures taken to protect the population, area, and infrastructure of the United States, its possessions, and territories by:
   - Deterring, defending against, and mitigating the effects of threats, disasters, and attacks;
   - Supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and
Helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.


(3) For several reasons depicted in this report, the HLS definition and identification of mission areas promotes an “all-hazards” approach to Homeland Security, to include natural as well as manmade disasters.

(4) The Department of Defense (DOD) must work closely with the civil sector in planning its support for HLS.

(5) DOD must address internal organizational issues in supporting HLS.

(6) The Army must further examine its capability to support HLS, especially the availability of specialty units in conjunction with a major theater war or multiple simultaneous homeland incidents.

(7) The Army should leverage the use of current capabilities and units in support of HLS.

THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION is to develop Army Homeland Security Strategic Planning Guidance using the insights gained from HLSI as its foundation.

THE PROJECT EFFORT was conducted by Mr. Greg Andreozzi, Conflict Analysis Center, Center for Army Analysis (CAA).

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, Center for Army Analysis, ATTN: CSCA-CA, 6001 Goethals Road, Suite 102, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230.
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1 BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Introduction

This report documents the Homeland Security Initiative (HLSI), conducted by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) for the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (DAMO-SS), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS).

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the Homeland Security Initiative, to include a summary of insights gained from the two issues workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game conducted as part of HLSI. The intent of HLSI was to provide the Army with a working definition of Homeland Security (HLS) and a better understanding of its roles and responsibilities in supporting Homeland Security.
1.3 Outline

The outline followed in this report is shown below.

- Background
- Game Plan
- Political-Military Gaming Methodology
- HLSI Analytical Architecture
- LEXINGTON 2000 Game Concept and Organization
- Homeland Security Initiative Key Insights
- Homeland Security Army Strategic Plan Workshop Overview

A glossary of acronyms is provided.

1.4 Background

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<td>HLSI Working Group Established</td>
<td>1 Dec 98</td>
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<td>24-25 Feb 99</td>
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<td>25 Feb, 2 Mar 00</td>
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<td>4-5 Apr 00</td>
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<td>HLS Army Strategic Plan Workshop</td>
<td>12-13 Jul 00</td>
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Figure 2. Background

Figure 2 provides a timeline of key events associated with the Homeland Security Initiative. HLSI was launched following the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA’s) challenge at the October 1999 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) meeting for the Army to prepare for its role...
in supporting homeland security. The Conflict Analysis Center (CSCA-CA) of the Center for Army Analysis proposed the analytical effort to the War Plans Division (DAMO-SSW), Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans. Following work plan approval by the Director, CAA, and the Deputy Director, DAMO-SS, an HLSI Working Group was established on 1 December 1998 to lay the groundwork for the effort. This was followed over the next 2 years by a pair of issues workshops (IW), the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game and an Army Homeland Security Strategic Plan Development Workshop, with a series of information briefings throughout to keep senior Army and Department of Defense (DOD) leadership informed on the initiative’s progress.

1.5 Game Plan

- Define Homeland Security and review Army support roles, responsibilities, and interfaces
- Refine Homeland Security forces’ mission, operational tasks, force capability requirements across the spectrum of conflict
- Phases
  - Establish HLSI Working Group 1 Dec 98
  - HLSI Response 99 IW 24-25 Feb 99
  - HLSI IW 2000 8-9 Mar 00
  - LEXINGTON 2000 Pol-Mil Game 4-5 Apr 00
  - HLS Army Strategic Plan Workshop 12-13 Jul 00

Figure 3. Game Plan

Figure 3 depicts the game plan for executing the Homeland Security Initiative. Over the course of events, the goal was to define “Homeland Security” and review Army support roles, responsibilities, and interfaces. It was understood that the Department of Defense and the Army were primarily in a support role to civil agencies in executing homeland security responsibilities.
1.6 Pol-Mil Gaming Methodology

Figure 4 depicts CAA’s political-military gaming methodology. This methodology was used to execute the two HLSI Issues Workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game.

Overview

CAA conducts issue workshops and political-military games in support of Headquarters, Department of the Army, US Army major commands, and Army components of US unified commands. All political-military games are developed in direct coordination with the sponsor and are designed for use as a tool in policy development and decision making.¹

A CAA political-military game provides direct feedback for issue identification, prioritization, and clarification of questions involving the application of national power. Experts attending political-military games draw from their professional experience to address specific

¹ Future references to political-military games also describe methodology for conducting issues workshops. The exception is some issues workshops do not use opening and special situations (scenarios) as part of their methodology, which was the case for the HLSI Issues Workshops.
issues as part of the political-military game scenario. The political-military game scenario provides a specific structure for issue analysis and the development of key insights.

**Political-Military Game Structure.** The political-military game structure is composed of three phases: preprocessing, gaming, and postprocessing (see Figure 4). CAA developed the three-phase structure to increase efficiency and ensure successful execution. During the preprocessing phase, issues are identified and a scenario is developed. The participants are then grouped, based on their background and perspective, and assigned to teams. Finally, within the framework of the scenario, the teams are charged with addressing the issues in a logical, disciplined manner. Their responses form the basis of the preliminary key insights (PKIs) for the political-military game. These PKIs are then briefed to a Senior Council, composed of executive defense planners and decision makers.

**Preprocessing.** Preprocessing takes the conventional form of a discussion that yields concept definition. This process is initiated by an Army component commander, member of the Army's senior leadership, Army staff principal, or a noted expert. Preprocessing includes initial research and data collection.

**Onsite Research and Discussion.** An action officer assigned to the project by the sponsor is the main point of contact during the preprocessing phase. The CAA project director coordinates directly with the action officer to determine the purpose, scope, and objectives for the political-military game. Research is conducted by the project director to establish specific details on the project, within the context of the sponsor's original guidance.

**Issue Identification.** Draft issues are provided by the sponsor as a set of objectives or concerns for the subject of the political-military game. The issues are tied directly to the objectives of the political-military game and may be revised and enhanced as preprocessing progresses. Once the issues are finalized, they are logically grouped and synchronized with the scenario.

**Political-Military Game Design.** The design consists primarily of establishing an individual plan for a specific political-military game. The process involves determining the most productive combination of team assignments, confirming an appropriate sequence for the presentation of objectives and charges, and ensuring that the detailed scenario encompasses all aspects of the overarching problem or hypothesis. Based on this sequencing, the game is broken up into a series of moves, each addressing one or more objectives.

**Political-Military Game Participant Roster.** Identification of appropriate participants is absolutely key to a successful political-military game. The sponsor identifies principal participants during the initial stages of planning. Additions or deletions are made based on the scope and experience required.

**Political-Military Game Scenario.** The scenario provides perspective and establishes a platform from which to address the objectives of the game. Ideally, the scenario will consist of a realistic situation that tasks the participants to draw from their professional experience to conduct problem solving and decision making. A majority of the situations carry
the participants forward in time and project a future state of events that requires consideration. This intentional displacement serves the additional benefit of removing any preconceived notions or current day issues that may complicate the problem.

**Political-Military Game Objectives.** The number of political-military game objectives is determined by the scope of the political-military game. A standard political-military game might examine four or five objectives. Each objective, in turn, may have four or five charges (questions) that should be addressed.

**Conduct of the Political-Military Game.** Participants are welcomed and then given a series of introductory briefings before breaking into teams to address the objectives and related issues.

**Scenario Briefing.** Participants will come from various backgrounds and must be brought together to interact towards the common objectives of the political-military game. This interaction is synchronized through the use of a special scenario developed specifically for the political-military game. The scenario answers questions and provides information on assumptions required in order to accurately address the issues.

**Political-Military Game Dynamics.** Team composition, and the small number of personnel on each team (normally 15 or less), allows for unique interaction that encourages individual participation. The conduct of some games requires larger team composition, in which case, the team leader must exercise additional control in balancing individual participation and group interaction with time constraints in addressing game objectives. In the small group setting, the ability to elicit a response under the constraints of the scenario and time schedule comprises the group dynamic.

**Preliminary Key Insights (PKIs).** The product of each team discussion is a set of responses to each charge and PKIs, representing the most important insights gained during that particular move. The charge responses and PKIs are carried forward to the plenary session at the end of each move and presented to the political-military game. Summary PKIs are briefed to the Senior Council at the end of the game.

**Record of Proceedings.** In addition to a team leader, each team is assigned a CAA analyst who assists the team leader and records insights. The insights are recorded on a computer and take the form of bullet comments augmented by text passages where required. At the conclusion of the political-military game, all comments are compiled to form a nonverbatim, not-for-attribution written memorandum report of proceedings for the political-military game. This report includes all key insights and provides the sponsor with a complete accounting for all phases of the political-military game.

**Postprocessing.** During the postprocessing phase, the sponsor determines the steps to take in order to maximize the benefits of the political-military game (based on the impact of the insights, applicability of the scenario, Senior Council's instructions, etc.). Normally the results and memorandum report are presented as a series of briefings to key decision makers throughout
the Department of Defense. New objectives and issues derived as a result of the game's cardinal insights could form the basis of another related or unrelated political-military game, as required.

1.7 Pol-Mil Game Dynamics

The key to successful game execution is the use of a structured process to ensure the events flow, and all important issues are addressed. This is accomplished by working closely with the sponsor to formulate objectives and key issues to be addressed. The game is then organized into a series of moves, usually three for a 2-day game, where each move addresses a series of charges to answer one or more objectives. Participants are divided into teams to address the charges. The number and size of teams depends on the number of participants and the desired game dynamics. The completion of each move is followed by a plenary session where each team briefs its responses to the charges. This also includes discussion, and for some issues consensus is reached on specific charges, while for others, lack of consensus is noted. Upon completion of the moves and plenaries, preliminary key insights (PKIs) are briefed to a Senior Council made up of senior leaders. Consensus PKIs may be briefed or individual team PKIs can be briefed. Completion of the Senior Council ends the game, and then PKIs are refined into Cardinal Insights in the postprocessing phase of the effort. This process is portrayed in Figure 5.
2 ANALYTICAL ARCHITECTURE

Figure 6 provides a pictorial look at HLSI. Due to the postponement of LEXINGTON 99 at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), it deviates from our standard three phased analytical approach of Working Group (WG)/Issues Workshop (IW)/Political-Military Game by adding a second issues workshop (8-9 March 2000) to capture emerging issues that occurred since the conduct of the 24-25 February 1999 issues workshop, in preparation for the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game.

A working group was established in December 1998 to define key HLS issues and identify subject matter experts and interested organizations. The 24-25 February 1999 issues workshop resulted in a draft definition for Homeland Security and examined roles and responsibilities. The 8-9 March 2000 issues workshop reconfirmed this definition with minor revisions, addressed political concerns with use of the term "Homeland Defense" (opting instead to carry forward the term "Homeland Security") and examined capabilities, requirements, and Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support (DTLOMS) issues. The 4-5 April 2000 LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game, the capstone event of HLSI, examined issues raised during the previous workshops in an operational context through the use of stressful opening and special situations. The HLS Strategic Plan Workshop was convened to outline the
road ahead for turning insights gained during HLSI into an Army Homeland Security Strategic Planning Guidance.

### 2.1 HLSI Issues Workshop 99

**SPONSOR**

DAMO-SS

**PURPOSE:** Examine the Army's roles and responsibilities in support of the evolving HLS mission

**PARTICIPANTS:** DCSOPS, DCSINT, Army Secretariat, OCAR, USARC, NGB, FORSCOM, SBCCOM, TRADOC, 1st Army RTF, 5th Army RTF, NGIC, ACIC, AWC/SSI, SMDC, OSC, JS, DIA, DTRA, TRANSCOM, SPACECOM, AF, Navv, DOJ, FEMA, DOE, VA, and CAA

**SCOPE:** Examine Army's Strategy for responding to potential threats and vulnerabilities out to 2010 timeframe

**OBJECTIVES:**
- Define Homeland Security (HLS)
- Examine HLS Threat Environment
- Identify Army HLS support roles/responsibilities and interfaces with OSD, JS, and Federal civil agencies
- Examine revisions to UCP and Army Title 10 responsibilities in terms of HLS
- Outline strategy for responding to HLS threats and vulnerabilities
- Refine HLS force's mission, operational tasks, force capability requirements

**STUDY DIRECTOR:** Mr. Greg Andreozzi (703) 806-5665

Figure 7. HLSI Issues Workshop 99

Figure 7 presents the framework for the 24-25 February 1999 Issues Workshop. Over 70 people from throughout the Army as well as other DOD and Federal civil organizations participated in this issues workshop, the first major event under HLSI. This workshop produced a draft definition for Homeland Security. In addition, this workshop examined Army HLS roles and responsibilities as well as interfaces with other DOD and Federal civil organizations. During this workshop, participants were also asked to define functional areas that should be included under the HLS umbrella. Preliminary key insights from this and subsequent events have been consolidated and are presented in Figures 13 through 20.
2.2. HLSI Issues Workshop 2000

Once again, over 70 people from throughout the Army as well as other DOD and Federal civil organizations participated in the 8-9 March 2000 Issues Workshop, whose framework is presented in Figure 8. This second issues workshop, conducted in preparation for the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game, was included to reexamine Army issues in supporting homeland security following the postponement of LEXINGTON 99 at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This workshop refined the definition developed at the previous workshop, examined challenges the Army faces when responding to HLS requirements, reexamined the Army’s roles in support of the commanders in chiefs (CINCs) and other DOD and Federal civil agencies, and examined DTLOMS issues under HLS. It was during this workshop that the Army adopted the term Homeland Security in place of Homeland Defense to satisfy political concerns. The change in terminology had no effect on the definition or functional areas included under Homeland Security.
2.3 LEXINGTON 2000 Pol-Mil Game

Figure 9 presents the framework for the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game. LEXINGTON 2000, the capstone event of the Homeland Security Initiative, was conducted on 4-5 April 2000 and once again included participants from throughout the Army as well as other DOD and Federal civil agencies. LEXINGTON 2000 was used to operationally test, assess, and refine the insights gained at the two previous issues workshops. LEXINGTON 2000 was designed to examine the Army’s response capabilities and ability to synchronize them in supporting HLS incidents by identifying and examining Army-unique preparedness and response capabilities that can be leveraged for HLS, examining interfaces in support of interagency functions, and identifying critical areas of concern to improve the Army’s HLS response capabilities.
2.4 Game Concept

Figure 10 outlines the flow of LEXINGTON 2000. We used a series of three moves to gain a better understanding of Homeland Security by examining Army response capabilities and interagency integration and then outlining strategic plan requirements for the Army in its mission to support HLS. Following a series of overview briefings to set the foundation for the game, participants were divided into three teams, two Friendly Force (FRNDFOR) teams and an Opposition Force (OPFOR) team. An opening situation outlining national and international conditions (political, economic, cyber, etc.) set the stage for the game. Special Situations 1 and 2, introduced in Moves 1 and 2, respectively, provided accumulating incidents designed to stress the resources required to support the HLS missions.

In Move 1, the two FRNDFOR teams were asked to respond to the opening situation and Special Situation 1 (SS1) through a series of charges by identifying lead federal agencies, DOD and Army roles, and interfaces for each incident requiring support. The OPFOR was asked to evaluate the threat concept of operations introduced and develop improvements to this concept. The OPFOR was also introduced to Special Situation 2 (SS2) and given the charge to further develop SS2 to attack US (including DOD/Army) centers of gravity. Following a plenary
session where each FRNDFOR team presented their response to the opening situation and SS1, the OPFOR in Move 1A took this information and modified their update to SS2 to take advantage of the FRNDFOR response in Move 1.

In Move 2, the two FRNDFOR teams repeated Move 1 activity using the OPFOR modified SS2. Key in Move 2 was identifying shortfalls in general terms as the accumulation of incidents overstressed our ability to provide support. While the FRNDFOR was responding to SS2, the OPFOR used Move 2 to develop an outline for a Threat Strategic Plan for attacking the US. Finally, in Move 3, using insights gained during the first two moves, all three teams were asked to outline the various elements that will contribute to the development of an Army Strategic Plan for supporting HLS.

2.5 Game Organization

Figures 11 and 12 present the game organization for LEXINGTON 2000. Once again we had over 70 people from throughout the Army as well as other DOD and Federal civil organizations participating. We also had a distinguished group of executives serving as team leaders and participating on the Senior Council at the conclusion of the game, as shown in Figure 11. While...
the DCSOPS was unable to participate on the Senior Council, he came out during game execution and visited each of the team rooms, offering his perspectives and receiving updates on game progress.

### 2.6 Team Organization

#### BLUFOR - Team A

<table>
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<th>Team Leaders: MG (Ret.) Silvasy</th>
<th>CAA Analysts: Mr. Barrett / MAJ Tanner</th>
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<tr>
<td>MG Barbisch/OCAR</td>
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#### OPFOR - Team C

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Figure 12. Team Organization
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3 HLSI KEY INSIGHTS

3.1 Key Insights – Threats

- Homeland Security threats are broad, diverse, and rapidly evolving with technological advancements
  - Threats - nation states, terrorists, transnational criminal activities, cyber-warriors, insiders (e.g., DOD employees with access to computer files)
  - Weapons - weapon(s) of mass destruction (WMD), non-WMD physical attacks, information warfare, missiles, etc.

- Prioritization of threats will facilitate planning, programming, budgeting process

- Political and cultural realities of an open society increase vulnerability

Figure 13. Key Insights – Threats

Figures 13 through 20 present the key insights developed during the course of the Homeland Security Initiative, covering the two issues workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game. Figure 13 addresses threats to homeland security. What is not depicted here, and what will be reinforced in later figures as falling under the Homeland Security “umbrella,” are threats from natural disasters, which require some of the same resources required by man-made incidents.
### 3.2 Key Insights – HLS Mission Areas

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<td>✓ Counterdrug</td>
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<td>✓ Counterterrorism</td>
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#### Figure 14. Key Insights – HLS Mission Areas

Figure 14 shows the mission areas falling under Homeland Security as developed under HLSI. Mission areas were grouped under two major categories, National Defense and National Civil Support.

The following are reasons for including the mission areas identified in Figure 14 under the Homeland Security umbrella: (1) many share common resource requirements, i.e., natural disasters and WMD incidents have many of the same support requirements; (2) asymmetric threats of the future can include synchronized use of various “weapons”, i.e., missile attack/WMD incident(s)/information operations/cyber attacks, where a coordinated US response would require visibility over all incidents; and (3) there may be competing resource demands among the various mission areas. Maintaining visibility over them holistically will allow more effective requirements prioritization. Unity of effort in dealing with future asymmetric threat(s) is critical.
3.3 Homeland Security Definition

Active and passive measures taken to protect the population, area, and infrastructure of the United States, its possessions, and territories by:

- Deterring, defending against, and mitigating the effects of threats, disasters, and attacks;

- Supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and

- Helping to insure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets

Figure 15. Homeland Security Definition

Figure 15 presents a definition for Homeland Security that was initially drafted at the 24-25 February 1999 Issues Workshop and refined through the follow-on events under HLSI and the staffing of the Army Homeland Security (HLS) Strategic Planning Guidance. Without addressing specific mission areas, it is broad-based to cover the full array of potential DOD missions and shows DOD in a support role.
As a matter of record, there is ambiguity in the definition concerning the term *consequence management*. When the Homeland Security definition was initially developed, *consequence management* was used in the context of its definition in DOD Directive 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*, in which it is defined as the following: “Comprises those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes….” This definition emphasizes the all-hazards approach, to include natural and man-made disasters. An alternate definition is presented in the *Terrorism Incident Annex* of the *Federal Response Plan*, where consequence management is defined as “...measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.” This takes a more narrow approach to defining consequence management as supporting only man-made disasters, i.e., terrorism incidents.

### 3.4 Key Insights - Planning

- Develop a comprehensive Army HLS strategy based on DOD and National HLS strategies to ensure coordinated response to civilian agency leads
- Resourcing is not focused through a single program. Programs are competing for resources
- The Army is built for warfighting IAW Title 10. HLS must be worked like an MTW
  - Mission requirements (for AC and RC forces) in support of HLS need to be appropriately defined as “war missions” so that required funding will follow
- Homeland Security mission must be included in the planning process as a dimension of the war fight
  - CONUS (+) as an AOR
- Homeland Security Mission planning and execution is iterative and evolutionary
- Joint and Army doctrine should be developed to adequately address HLS
- TAA-09, QDR, and other planning efforts should address HLS requirements
- DOD WMD/MSCA domestic support plans and policies must be integrated

*Figure 16. Key Insights - Planning*
Figure 16 presents key insights developed that fall under Planning. During the LEXINGTON 2000 Senior Council briefing, the following challenges for DOD to consider in HLS planning were identified: (1) states are sovereign and have varying degrees of capability to respond to incidents, and (2) DOD must have a clear understanding of civilian requirements and interfaces to effectively plan for its roles and missions. Thus, DOD must plan to provide varying degrees of support for HLS incidents based on civilian response shortfalls.

3.5 Key Insights – Synchronization of Roles

- Need one office in DOD for policy guidance and a single all-hazards execution chain of command within DOD
- Missions and responsibilities of JFCOM, DOMS, JTF-CS, and the RTFs must be clarified in supporting Homeland Security
- High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) units not capable of handling multiple simultaneous incidents
  - Specialty Units (CB/RRT, TEU, CBIRF, etc.)
  - C2 Units (JTF-CS, RTFs)
- Maximize use of current capabilities and units in support of HLS
  - Examine RC role in meeting shortfalls
    - Skills well adapted to HLS missions
    - Integral part of civilian communities
- Army medical force structure ability to respond to HLS support missions in conjunction with supporting MTW requirements needs to be examined
- Current IA LNO structure needs enhancement

Figure 17. Key Insights – Synchronization of Roles

Figure 17 presents key insights covering the synchronization of roles and responsibilities in support HLS missions. These insights address interface requirements, potential shortfalls, and Army-unique capabilities.
3.6 Key Insights - DTLOMS

- The HLSI definition should be the starting point for DTLOMS development
- Include Interagencies in vetting joint Homeland Security doctrine
- Functional doctrine must be developed followed by a Commander's Guide to Homeland Security
- Joint doctrine needs to be developed for employing HD/LD units to multiple simultaneous incidents
- Exercises (at HQ and responder level) must continue to work plans and tactics, techniques, and procedures
- Expand current capabilities through doctrine development, integrated training and exercises, and technology experimentation
- Rewrite FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, once requisite DOD guidance and Joint doctrine in place
- Incorporate HLS doctrine in the professional development of officers

Figure 18. Key Insights - DTLOMS

Figure 18 provides several recommendations focused around Homeland Security Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support (DTLOMS) issues.
3.7 Key Insights - Requirements

- Build JMTOF(s) addressing multiple near simultaneous geographically dispersed incidents with/without MTW - will help identify LD/HD multiple taskings and shortfalls
  - Develop integrated response plan(s), to include TPFDDs, with the LFA
  - Need to identify thresholds that would require DOD support of various incidents
  - Large initial incident will absorb resources that will make it difficult to support follow-on incidents or deploy to an MTW without prioritization decisions
  - Reconcile competing Deployment vs Homeland Security missions using threat/vulnerability assessments to determine priorities

- Dichotomy in how FEMA requests DOD support (in terms of capabilities) and how DOD provides support (in terms of units)

- National Homeland Security must have a plan if military can’t deliver required support

- An assessment of medicine and vaccine deployment throughout the US (military and civilian) is needed

Figure 19. Key Insights - Requirements

Figure 19 highlights Requirements recommendations for supporting Homeland Security.
3.8 Key Insights – Additional Findings

- DOD must be cognizant of Federal Response Plan (FRP) and accompanying Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) in supporting civil community
- Information sharing from Federal to State to Local is critical
- DOD/Army emerging role in critical infrastructure protection needs further study
- Public Relations / Education must be a priority - Public Affairs role is key
- A comprehensive study of all laws, policy, and guidance affecting HLS is needed
- A Homeland Security DOD capabilities/units data base needs to be funded, developed, and maintained with a lead agent assigned responsibility
- Protection and treatment of GIs and their families will be critical to MTW deployment and execution during Homeland crises
- DOD's role in Information Operations needs to be further examined
- Examine other countries effort in HLS (Best Practices)
- Examine role of DOD Intelligence agencies in HLS

Figure 20. Key Insights – Additional Findings

Figure 20 presents additional insights generated during HLSI. Any Army look at interagency coordination and the development of an interoperability plan must consider the Federal Response Plan (FRP). Independent of the creation of an interoperability plan, as a minimum, there is a need for an integrated, coordinated interagency liaison officer (LNO) network. There are a number of existing DOD/interagency communication avenues in existence, both formal and informal. Informal networks of communication should become more formalized to increase institutional awareness of military support to Homeland Security missions.

A concern was expressed during LEXINGTON 2000 over the dilemma of deploying soldiers to a major theater war when there was an actual or perceived terrorist risk to their families at home. Soldiers need to be assured that their families will be protected. Also, DOD’s role in Information Operations needs to be further examined in the context of its roles, responsibilities, and interfaces with the Law Enforcement community.
3.9 The Road Ahead

Following LEXINGTON 2000, the road ahead called for the development of an Army Strategic Plan for supporting Homeland Security. A workshop was convened on 12-13 July 2000 to develop a framework for this strategic plan. The ODCSOPS took the framework developed at this workshop as well as the insights gained from the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game and the two HLSI issues workshop and used them as the launching point to develop the Army Homeland Security (HLS) Strategic Planning Guidance, which is planned for publication this summer.
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APPENDIX A  PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS

1. PROJECT TEAM

   a. Project Director

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      MAJ Howard Hall (CSCA-CA)

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      Issues Workshop and Game Participants (see Figure 12 for LEXINGTON 2000 participants)

2. PRODUCT REVIEWERS

   Dr. Ralph E. Johnson, Quality Assurance
   Ms. Nancy M. Lawrence, Publications Center
APPENDIX B  REQUEST FOR ANALYTICAL SUPPORT

Performing Division:  CA
Account Number:  2000132

Tasking:  Verbal
Mode (Contract-Yes/No):  No

Acronym:  LEXINGTON 2000

Title:  LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game

Start Date:  10-Mar-00
Estimated Completion Date:  30-Jun-00
Requestor/Sponsor (i.e., DCSOPS):  DCSOPS
Sponsor Division:  SSW

Resource Estimates:

- Estimated PSM:  
- Estimated Funds:  $0.00
- Models to be Used:

Description/Abstract:
Assess the Army's preparedness and response capabilities in supporting the Homeland Defense Mission. This includes an examination of the Army's interfaces with the CINCs and other DOD and civil agencies.

Study Director/POC Signature:  Original Signed

Phone#:  703-806-5665
Study Director/POC:  Mr. Gregory Andreozzi

If this Request is for an External Project expected to consume 6 PSM or more, Part 2 Information is Not Required. See Chap 3 of the Project Directors' Guide for preparation of a Formal Project Directive.

Background:

CAA began the Homeland Defense Initiative (HLDI) in FY 99 and successfully conducted an IW in Feb 99 to define HLD, identify/review roles and responsibilities, and identify other critical HLD issues. Following an OSD-requested postponement, we were given the go-ahead to continue the effort in Dec 99 and subsequently conducted an Issues Workshop on 8-9 Mar. The 4-5 Apr LEXINGTON 2000 Pol-Mil Game will refine and build on the results of the two issues workshops.

Scope:
Conduct LEXINGTON 2000 Pol-Mil Game involving Army, JS, CINCs, OSD, other Defense agencies, DOJ, FBI, FEMA, and other civil agencies

Issues:

1) Assess Army's response capabilities and ability to synchronize them for HLD incidents; 2) Evaluate Army HLD mission evolution and supporting Title 10 responsibilities; 3) Examine Army-unique preparedness and response capabilities that can be leveraged for HLD; 4) Examine interfaces in support of interagency functions; 5) Identify critical areas of concern to improve Army's domestic response capabilities

Milestones:
1) ID participants / coordinate with SSW 2) Send out invite memo 3) Conduct coordination meetings 4) Develop Opening and Moves/charges 5) Conduct Working group meeting to develop Opening and Special Situations 6) Prebrief Team Leaders on 3 Apr 7) Conduct LEXINGTON 2000 4-5 Apr 8) Conduct postprocessing analysis and outbrief PKIs

Signatures:
Division Chief Signature:  Original Signed and Dated

Date:  
Division Chief Concurrence:  Mr. John Elliott
Sponsor Signature:  Original Signed and Dated
Date:  
Sponsor Concurrence (COL/DA Div Chief/GO/SES):  

HLSI  B-1
GLOSSARY

AC  Active Component
ACIC  Army Counterintelligence Center
AF  Air Force
Air NG  Air National Guard
AOR  area of responsibility
ARC  American Red Cross
ARNG  Army National Guard
ARSPACE  Army Space Command
ASA(M&RA)  Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
ASD(RA)  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
ASD(SO/LIC)  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
AUSA  Association of the United States Army
AWC/SSI  Army War College/Strategic Studies Institute
BG (Ret.)  Brigadier General (Retired)
CAA  Center for Army Analysis
CBIRF  Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
CBRNE  Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and High Yield Explosives
CB/RRT  Chemical-Biological Rapid Reaction Team
CINC(s)  commander(s) in chief
CND  Computer Network Defense
COMMZ  communications zone
CONUS  continental United States
CSA  Chief of Staff of the Army
CSCA-CA  Conflict Analysis Center (CAA)
DAMO-FDF  DCSOPS Force Integration and Management Division
DAMO-OD  DCSOPS Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate
DAMO-ODI  DCSOPS Information Operations Division
DAMO-SS  DCSOPS Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate
DAMO-SSD  DCSOPS National Security Policy Division
DAMO-SSW  DCSOPS War Plans Division
DAS  Director of the Army Staff
DCSINT  Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DCSOPS  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DDir  Deputy Director
Dep DOMS  Deputy Director of Military Support
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD  Department of Defense
DODD  Department of Defense directive
DOE  Department of Energy
DOJ  Department of Justice
DOMS  Director of Military Support
DOS  Department of State  
DTLOMS  Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, and Soldier Support  
DTRA  Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
ESF  Emergency Support Function  
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FBI (NICP)  FBI National Infrastructure Protection Center  
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency  
FORSOM  US Army Forces Command  
FRP  Federal Response Plan  
HD/LD  High Demand/Low Density  
HLS  Homeland Security  
HLSI  Homeland Security Initiative  
HQ USAF  Headquarters, United States Air Force  
HQDA  Headquarters, Department of the Army  
HQDA (OCPA)  Headquarters, Department of the Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs  
IA LNO  Interagency liaison officer  
IAW  in accordance with  
INTEL  intelligence  
IO  Information Operations  
IPR  in process review  
IW  issues workshop  
JFCOM  Joint Forces Command  
JMTOF  Joint Mission Task Organized Force  
JS  Joint Staff  
JTF-CS  Joint Task Force Civil Support  
LFA  Lead Federal Agency  
LIA  Logistics Integration Agency  
LIWA  Land Information Warfare Activity  
LNO  liaison officer  
MACA  Military Assistance to Civil Authorities  
MACOM  major Army command  
MANSCEN  Maneuver Support Center  
MG (Ret.)  Major General (Retired)  
MSCA  Military Support to Civil Authorities  
MTOF  Mission Task Organized Force  
MTW  major theater war  
NG  National Guard  
NGB  National Guard Bureau  
NGIC  National Ground Intelligence Center  
NMD  National Missile Defense  
NMRI  Naval Medical Research Institute  
NMS  National Military Strategy  
NSS  National Security Strategy  
OASD(C3I)  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
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<td>OCAR</td>
<td>Office of the Chief, Army Reserve</td>
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