NATO’S EXPANSION DECISION

by

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Concerned by the ever looming threat of Soviet expansion, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created on April 4, 1949 for the sole purpose of promoting peace in Europe. It accomplished this goal through a trans-atlantic link that created an umbilical relationship between sovereign member nations and promoted peace through collective defense. It has prevailed in this endeavor since its inception and stopped Soviet aggression during the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, NATO’s charter was fulfilled. Now, the organization struggles to redefine its post Cold War identity. In the midst of this colossal organizational identity crisis, many countries want the economic security and defense guarantees associated with the Cold War NATO. Anxious to appease prior adversaries and insure security to the Eastern European theater, the United States is supporting the gradual expansion of the Alliance. In fact, President Clinton announced that the NATO membership would be offered to some nations as early as 1999. As NATO struggles to seek its European security niche in a post cold war environment, it may be the wrong time to expand, and expansion may be being heralded for the wrong reasons. Consideration must be given to stability for the fledgling Russian democracy, the assets that newcomers will bring to the Alliance, the security risks of expanding the NATO nuclear umbrella, the investment of member countries in a downsizing environment, the effect on Russian ratification of Start II agreements, new security frontiers of an expanded NATO, and many other factors. The Partnership For Peace (PfP) program provides a setting for new members who wanted to test the offerings of the Alliance in a probationary forum. The NATO aspirants naturally want repatriation into Western Europe through NATO, however NATO can not afford to allow the Alliance to be used as a Marshall Plan for the struggling democracies created by a failed Soviet system. NATO must legitimize its institutional value within the new world order before it can effectively serve the needs of its members. As NATO’s Secretary General, Javier Solana, said on October 23,1996, the expansion of NATO should be done in a way to enlarge and deepen our bilateral relations with Russia.1 Early consumption of new members to satisfy the political agenda of NATO may ultimately do more to alienate the security of Europe than to protect it.
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Preface

During this time when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is trying to reestablish its post Cold War identity, almost every defense publication that you pick up has at least one article dedicated to the fate of NATO. Should it expand or shouldn’t it? Should it shed its Article V, Cold War security umbrella and transition to a European political forum; a western economic mecca perhaps, or even a diplomatic demilitarized zone where potential Euro-Asian enemies can barter for peace. As these issues are debated, President Clinton has announced NATO expansion by the year 1999. Even so, many argue that this announcement was tailored to a pre-election audience whose Midwestern ethnic ties to likely expansion candidates which made it a popular political move, however much remains to be solved during post election reflection. With the United States paying much of the NATO bill, and NATO being a political surrogate for US power projection, one must carefully consider this issue before deciding how NATO should expand. I argue in this paper that NATO should expand slowly for a variety of reasons, but primarily I’ve written this paper to challenge the reader to think about expansion and its ramifications, as well as, the transformation that NATO must make to be effective in a new security environment.

I would like to thank Colonel Vic Budura for his advice, materials, recommendations, constructive criticism and willingness to assist me in making this research paper a reality.
Abstract

Concerned by the ever looming threat of Soviet expansion, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created on April 4, 1949 for the sole purpose of promoting peace in Europe. It accomplished this goal through a trans-atlantic link that created an umbilical relationship between sovereign member nations and promoted peace through collective defense. It has prevailed in this endeavor since its inception and stopped Soviet aggression during the Cold War.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, NATO’s charter was fulfilled. Now, the organization struggles to redefine its post Cold War identity. In the midst of this colossal organizational identity crisis, many countries want the economic security and defense guarantees associated with the Cold War NATO. Anxious to appease prior adversaries and insure security to the Eastern European theater, the United States is supporting the gradual expansion of the Alliance. In fact, President Clinton announced that the NATO membership would be offered to some nations as early as 1999.

As NATO struggles to seek its European security niche in a post cold war environment, it may be the wrong time to expand, and expansion may be being heralded for the wrong reasons. Consideration must be given to stability for the fledgling Russian democracy, the assets that newcomers will bring to the Alliance, the security risks of expanding the NATO nuclear umbrella, the investment of member countries in a
downsizing environment, the effect on Russian ratification of Start II agreements, new security frontiers of an expanded NATO, and many other factors.

The Partnership For Peace (PfP) program provides a setting for new members who wanted to test the offerings of the Alliance in a probationary forum. The NATO aspirants naturally want repatriation into Western Europe through NATO, however NATO can not afford to allow the Alliance to be used as a Marshall Plan for the struggling democracies created by a failed Soviet system.

NATO must legitimize its institutional value within the new world order before it can effectively serve the needs of its members. As NATO’s Secretary General, Javier Solana, said on October 23, 1996, the expansion of NATO “should be done in a way to enlarge and deepen our bilateral relations with Russia.”¹ Early consumption of new members to satisfy the political agenda of NATO may ultimately do more to alienate the security of Europe than to protect it.

Notes

Chapter 1

NATO: Its History and Purpose

NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

—1995 NATO Handbook

NATO’s Origins: 1945-1948

The genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dates back to the end of the Second World War. Faced with growing concerns over Soviet expansionist policies, Western European countries, in concert with their North American comrades, recognized the need for a common defense against this looming threat in the East. As Western forces demobilized and resumed a peacetime posture, it was clear that the Soviets intended to maintain a near wartime force on Europe’s Eastern front. In addition, it became obvious that fledgling post-war democracies would have little chance to mature in war-torn Europe if influenced by a dominant socialist regime to the East. Europe’s vulnerability became increasingly clear as it faced a numerically superior Soviet arsenal and it became obvious that Europe was the new chessboard of an emerging standoff between rising bi-polar super powers.
Several key political events between 1945 and 1948 raised the ante on tensions between the Europeans and their Soviet neighbors. There were direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece, Turkey and other Western European countries, there was a coup in Czechoslovakia that thrust it into the Soviet sphere, and the illegal blockade of Berlin which began in April 1948.¹

Based upon this emerging threat, five European nations signed a fifty-year collective defense alliance known as the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948. These countries included: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.² The purpose of this precursor to NATO was to strengthen the combative capability of Continental European resistance against their potential Eastern aggressors, and solidify their collective resolve against pressures exerted by the Soviets.

The North Atlantic Treaty: April 4, 1949

Unfortunately the signatories of the Brussels Treaty did not feel that, collectively, they had the necessary punch to forestall the Soviets without the assistance of the United States. Soon treaty members began to seek support for a reinforced coalition, and a series of meetings were held in the United States to consider a combined alliance to add balance to the Soviet threat. Based upon these negotiations, and the authority of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which allows either individual or collective defense, the Treaty of Washington (North Atlantic Treaty) was signed on April 4, 1949 in Washington DC by 12 Nations. Signatories included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.³
Thus the Alliance was born under the auspices of individual sovereignty and collective defense. Each nation retaining its individual rights, but committed to a collective defense when the sovereignty of one of its members was violated with the overall goal of stability within Europe. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) explains why NATO was established this way, “NATO was established primarily to protect the Western democracies from an expansionist Soviet Union that seemed determined to spread its influence through subversion, political intimidation and the threat of military force.”

The Cold War Years: 1949-1991

NATO’s success throughout the Cold War can only be categorized by phenomenal. The Alliance continued to evolve as did its membership. On February 18, 1952 both Greece and Turkey were accepted into the Alliance and West Germany joined on May 5, 1955 after much debate. On May 30, 1982 Spain became the sixteenth member of NATO, but not before President de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military command structure on May 10, 1966.

Other dramatic changes continued to shape the complexion of the Alliance as it struggled to maintain a strong deterrent against the expansionist ideology of the Soviet Union. NATO was challenged by everything from the Berlin Wall, the blockade of Cuba, the crisis between Turkey and Greece, the Vietnam War, allocation of nuclear arsenals, invasion of Czechoslovakia, SALT/INF/START/ABM agreements, and a myriad of other issues that had the potential to fragment its international political and military power. NATO saw itself during this period this way:

[This] is how NATO works and how 16 independent sovereign nations have been able to maintain their political cohesion and solidarity for over
40 years, despite the national differences which distinguish them from each other. It is an Alliance which has been able to adapt to changing circumstances in an age of rapid transformation. It has continued to adapt and change as relationships throughout the European continent, and between the major powers, are redefined. Based upon the voluntary association of like-minded nations with common goals, the ultimate objective of the Alliance is to maintain peace and security and to enable its members to develop a successful partnership with other countries, through bilateral relations as well as other multinational organizations, within a framework of interlocking relationships designed to create the stability which Europe needs to prosper and to play its proper role in world affairs.

NATO Struggles With Its Identity

The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9-10 November 1989, the unification of Eastern and Western Germany on October 3, 1990 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union with the transition to the Commonwealth of Independent States on 8 December 1991, drastically changed the focus of the Alliance from the military bastion that protected the free world from Communism, to a relic in search of a new world mission. Regardless of the intense propaganda effort asserting that the world is still a very dangerous place, and that an unstable Russia may be even more a threat than before, the news that NATO needed a job inevitably began to infiltrate the media. Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman, a former US Military Representative to NATO and a supporter of its continuation writes,

In short, we need to ensure that we do not lose our core combat competencies and structures as we embrace new missions. Collective defense remains the fundamental purpose of NATO and should be the basis for a rational transformation of the Alliance to respond to new demands. Non-Article V capabilities are derivative from Article V requirements—not the reverse.

While his desire to continue to support NATO is understandable, many are asking: Where is the threat that requires such a large investment, especially when national units are having trouble fielding the forces necessary to respond to NATO taskings because
their forces have been decimated by the “peace dividend?” In the same article, General Christman states, “…some NATO countries find it difficult to sustain more than a battalion-sized deployment.”

Today NATO has become a victim of its own success; now, this super-bureaucracy is searching the globe for a reason to exist in a new “mean & lean” environment. Daniel N. Nelson, who directs graduate programs in international studies at Old Dominion University, says: “Gone is the unambiguous adversary that gave NATO its meaning, that unarguable threat against which regional unity was forged and domestic opposition to military spending crushed. The first phase of NATO’s career is now over.” The economic realities of a uni-polar world make a cost neutral NATO the only luxury the nations can afford.

Notes

3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Origins, Compton’s Living Encyclopedia, America On-Line, page 1
9 Ibid. p 77
10 Nelson, Daniel N., “NATO, Use Only In Moderation” Bulletin Of Atomic Scientists, Nov-Dec 94, Vol. 50 No. 6, p 33
Chapter 2

The Brussels Summit

The Brussels Summit of January 1994 represented a major turning point for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From the January summit until the Istanbul Ministerial meeting of June 1994, a number of important decisions began to be implemented, particularly in relationship to Partnership For Peace (PFP) programme and prospects for the eventual enlargement of NATO.

—M J de Weger

The Evolution Of NATO: The Brussels Summit And Beyond

By January 1994, NATO was clearly an Alliance in transition. Any residue of Cold War thinking was being supplanted by the desire to protect the Alliance from the natural question of; where is the threat, and absent of any threat, who needs NATO? Is it naive to think that all the creative energy of the Alliance wasn’t focused on a plan to prevent an ideological lull where nations would have time to sit back and think about whether they needed a fully funded NATO.

The London Summit of 1990 and the Rome Summit of 1991 had, to a large extent, marked the end of the Alliance’s Cold War policies, structures and programs.¹ The Brussels Summit was a watershed event that would set in motion a series of programs to reduce the vulnerability of NATO in a post Cold War environment. While charting new ground, NATO had a created a lifeline to the future and by the lifeline, NATO would live or die by its ability to convince the world of its utility in a dramatically different Europe.
NATO’s response was expectantly clever. Three major initiatives were launched at the Brussels Summit that each sent different signals to the world but with one central theme—NATO is needed as much today as it has been over the last forty-five years. The three initiatives were Partnership For Peace (PfP), Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NP).

**Partnership For Peace**

Many privately suspect that the PfP program was created for a variety of reasons. The official one is as follows:

> The Partnership is working to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance. It offers participating states the possibility of strengthening their relations with NATO in accordance with their own individual interests and capabilities. NATO will consult with any active participant in the partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.  

Unofficially, this program helps convince member nations that the ‘new NATO’ is the inevitable link between the Cold War and the new European security footprint. The devouring of vulnerable new European players into the giant NATO infrastructure can shield the organization from the budget cutters long enough to lay claim to the outreach process. This preemptory move would make a transition of the outreach process to a more efficient, cooperative forum very difficult. Whether the PfP was orchestrated with malice, or through fear of change, or even self protection, ultimately doesn’t matter. The important point is to stop long enough to inject decision points in the process where member nations have the opportunity to shape the NATO of the future without having to
simply fund an organization that has metamorphasized into a beloved institution that defends everyone against no one but enjoys a great political heritage.

The success rate for attracting participants in this “new deal” has been extraordinary. As of March, 1996, twenty-six states have accepted the invitation and in most cases, Individual Partnership Programmes (IPP) have been tailored to meet their individual needs.³

The question is, what do these states have to offer NATO in terms of a common defense capability and was their contribution carefully evaluated prior to tailoring them an IPP? Article 10 of the Washington Treaty has been heralded as the impetus for expansion based upon its imbedded invitation to other European states. One must be careful to keep the invitation within the context of the entire Article. It reads, “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty…”⁴ The speed at which NATO has offered to consume these new states couldn’t have allowed an opportunity for serious evaluation of their long term ability to support the principles of the Alliance and/or to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area (especially the extension of NATO’s nuclear umbrella). It could be argued that meeting these more stringent criteria isn’t necessary for PfP, only for membership in NATO. In isolation that is true enough, except that NATO trumped their own effort by saying that, “Active participation in the Partnership For Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of including new members in NATO.”⁵ Is it any wonder that fledgling democracies see this as the new Marshall Plan for Europe?
They receive security, wealth, political savvy, and economic assistance as well as prestige in the European community at large.

Many would argue that this is a win-win: NATO continues, an architecture for a new Europe is institutionalized, struggling states get assistance, Euro-American jobs continue, etc. Unfortunately, there are only two losers in this win-win. One is the economic burden bearer and the other is Russia.

Cost estimates for expansion run the gamut from $10 billion to $110 billion over a fifteen year period. The effect on Russo-NATO relations has yet to be determined. One author writing for the *New York Times* astutely argues, “Expanding NATO is as likely to provoke Moscow’s hostility as it is to prevent it.” Nonetheless, the mass effort to keep from answering the fundamental question of, “why a full-sized NATO in a downsized environment?” is perpetually subjugated by the interim successes of ancillary programs.

**Combined Joint Task Forces**

Why the creation of CJTFs now, when the Cold War is behind us? Much like PfP, there are probably at least two reasons; one of them is articulated throughout NATO’s official media. It’s literature claims that NATO offers CJTF as a concept to restructure its commands and forces, to facilitate peacekeeping operations, allow the Western European Union (WEU) to integrate NATO forces and commands, and to permit non-NATO states to join in NATO CJTF operations. Staunch supporters of NATO will argue that the second reason is sinister and cynical. They vehemently argue this in order to avoid focus on its candor. Specifically, it is that this new found flexibility within NATO will offer the appearance of a trim, lean & mean, 21st century capable,
organization equipped to be the architect of the new European floor plan rather than the 20th century relic that lost its adversary. The goals, aspirations, and perceived elasticity of the CJTF are admirable and lofty considerations, however, one need be mindful of his and her absolute responsibility to protect the burden bearer before charging majestic rainbows. Protecting the burden bearer may involve asking the question whether or not NATO is the right organization (at full strength) to carry the expansion banner at this time.

**Nuclear Non-Proliferation**

Though certainly not a new issue for the Alliance, revisiting this issue sent an important message to the world on NATO’s new world functionality. The Brussels Summit created three new committees to work NP issues: The Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP), the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP), and the Joint Committee on Proliferation. This move cleverly abated concerns about nuclear leadership in a post Cold War environment and refocused emphasis on NATO as the new European manager of weapons of mass destruction, lest a challenger seize the moment, or a budget cutter take exception based upon NATO’s huge costs. It also recapitalized NATO’s investment in the new Europe.

The summit went on to suggest that the Alliance should:

- consult more regularly on proliferation threats,
- discuss existing efforts and new initiatives,
- try to take more joint stands in other fora,
- involve cooperating partners, acquainting them with NATO policies and seeking their active support,
- adapt existing defense planning and capabilities.⁹
Conceptual and ideological as this list might seem, the message was never really intended to alter NATO’s stance on nuclear policy. Rather, it demonstrated a resolve to maintain a preeminence with regard to nuclear policy throughout Euro-Asia, thus avoiding any challenge by would be competitors on this issue.

Each of the three major initiatives addressed in the Brussels Summit by itself may seem sincere with no hidden agenda. Optimists will argue that coincidentally, the issues were presented at the right time and circumstantially they happen to bolster the public’s opinion concerning the need for NATO in this post Cold War climate. Some of the more skeptical realize the political nature of the organization and that issues are rarely what they appear at face value. These individuals tend to look deeper into stated policies and ascertain the ulterior motive, which may be equal to, or more important, than the stated purpose. It can be argued that such is the case here; NATO’s long term existence was threatened by the termination of its mission i.e., to protect Europe from the Soviets. Thus it reacted to preserve the institution by quickly absorbing new missions (PfP), demonstrating its “lean & mean” flexibility to respond to new world types of crisis (CJTF), and to reinforce its role as the preeminent arbitrator of non-proliferation (NP) policy, and thus prey upon the public’s greatest fear—an unstable Soviet nuclear arsenal out of control.

Notes

1 Ibid.
Notes

6 Questions About NATO Expansion, The Baltimore Sun, Oct 9, 1996, p 22
9 Ibid. p 4.
Chapter 3

Study On NATO Enlargement

To solidify the tenants so carefully constructed during the Brussels Summit, the NATO Foreign Ministers, in December 1994, initiated a study to examine questions relating to the inclusion of new members into the North Atlantic Alliance. They stated that enlargement, when it takes place, will be a part of a broad European security architecture based on cooperation throughout Europe. The study was completed in September 1995 and was given to the PfP partners and briefed individually to interested governments. Following that, NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels in December 1995 to chart a course for enlargement licensed by the conclusions of their own study.

The Introduction

The study’s introduction appropriately speaks to the lofty ideals of a redesigned security architecture within Europe during this time when a “unique” opportunity presents itself. The study indicates that, “NATO views security as a broad concept embracing political, and economic, as well as defence, components.” Though multilateral cooperation is mentioned with other European institutions such as the EU, WEU, and OSCE, the study proclaims in its first paragraph that, “In this process, which is well under
way, the Alliance has played and will play a strong, active, and essential role as one of the cornerstones of stability and security in Europe.”

Neither the placement or the phrasing of these statements should be viewed as accidental. Readers are tempted to quickly scan the introduction and concentrate on the fundamentals of the effort. Should one do that, the salient points of its meaning could be entirely missed. The words “embracing political and economic” in the first quote and “which is already well underway” in the second quote require some special consideration.

If NATO exists fundamentally for defense, and is a conglomeration of independent sovereign countries with sovereign identities and objectives, what are the authors of this study suggesting? Will the new role for NATO encompass those things that are traditionally judiciously guarded by sovereign nations? Will NATO involve itself in the economies of fledgling partners? By extension, does the Alliance intend to economically influence Europe or constrain itself to a forum where security threats can be realistically assessed with common resolve. If the statement is illustrative of loftier goals, then more than survival of the institution is imbedded within its this license to enlarge. Realistically, far reaching visions of coup-like proportions are highly improbable, however, by appointing oneself as the architect for the security of the new Europe, who would dare challenge the institution based upon its cost?

It is also important to briefly focus on the second quote; specifically, “which is well underway.” Why is this in the study? Everyone involved should know the status of current programs. Besides, any status statement would clearly date itself in a far-reaching, long-term study. If one expected a challenge to the institution, in the form of
cheaper, more efficient alternatives, then one could argue, using this statement, that any interruption in continuity to such a critical process which has encapsulated the confidence of vulnerable democracies would be extraordinarily detrimental to their Western European lifeline and therefore unconscionable. Simply put - NATO either remains at full strength or grows larger to accommodate its new mission(s).

Philip H. Gordon, the Carol Deane Senior Fellow for US Strategic Studies, says in a Survival article entitled, Recasting The NATO Alliance, “When the Cold War ended and NATO’s original mission was largely undermined, many saw its expansion as a promising way to save an otherwise imperiled alliance.” He explains the reason the Alliance has weakened this way, “The most fundamental reason why the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance is weakening is that it is no longer held together by a common threat.”

So, while the Enlargement Study uses its introduction to proclaim the Alliance as the indisputable master draftsman for a new Europe, many are suggesting that an ulterior motive may exist for its new found energy. The grandstanding is not lost on the citizenry of member countries who recognize that if NATO didn’t need a job, so much energy wouldn’t be devoted to explaining its qualifications.

**NATO Enlargement and the OSCE, EU, WEU**

The Study On NATO Enlargement suggests that NATO’s relationship with the other European institutions, especially the OSCE, is complementary and mutually reinforcing. Even the casual reader waits for an explanation of why an expanded NATO isn’t duplicative of these other organizations and why, without an obvious threat, the security of Europe couldn’t be authored by the OSCE who has 20 years of experience in doing just...
that. The ambiguities used to avoid the duplication of effort argument are blatant.

Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO’s Assistant secretary General for Political affairs, outlines NATO’s relationship to its competitors this way,

[They] will proceed autonomously according to their own respective dynamics; they are unlikely to proceed at precisely the same pace. Both processes will make a significant contribution to strengthening Europe’s stability and security structure which encompasses political, economic, social and environmental aspects.\(^7\)

These intangible goals, being orchestrated by many organizations self-actualizing in duplicative forums erode confidence in the sincerity of a revisionist NATO and cause the new NATO to look more like the old NATO but with a new political face. Johan Olsson, from Hawaii Pacific University, writes, “…political changes identified by the end of the Cold War has changed NATO’s original intention and purpose, and the institution is presently concentrating on promoting political, social, and economic ties among its members.”\(^8\) Parallel efforts, with differing memberships, proceeding at different speeds, can cause confusion, blur the security vision, and disburse continuity within the European security construct.

The arguments describing the relationship with the EU and WEU are similarly vague and nondescript. Dr. Klaus Kinkel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, hints at the notion that the world is leery of duplication and tries to comfort the uneasy by stating,

I therefore welcome the fact that the links between NATO and the WEU have increasingly been strengthened on the basis of the agreed principles of complementary and transparency. NATO will support the WEU in developing its operational capabilities, but this must not lead to a duplication of structures and bureaucratic procedures if only for reasons of efficiency and cost.\(^9\)

While the thought is admirable, the process has not adopted his cautionary advice concerning the efficiency and cost of duplicative efforts. Given that, it is time to stop,
reflect on the various architectural competitors for security in Europe and award the contract. Those who have lost their bid should abandon the effort - a worthy gesture that offers the best hope for a visionary European Security future.

**The Russian Dynamic**

An enlarged NATO’s relationship with Russia could be tenuous at best. An article in *National Review* says, “A dialogue with Russia is in order, and in fact is essential to any strategy for enlarging NATO successfully.” Russia, as well as its satellite neighbors, has serious concerns about an expanded NATO. The Prime Minister of Poland, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, explains it this way,

> The Russian government openly and steadfastly opposes the expansion of NATO eastward and this view, it should be noted, is shared by the leaders of major opposition parties [in Poland]. According to their line of reasoning, the enlargement of the Alliance would be no more than another Cold War arrangement. The admission of new members in Central Eastern Europe would only mean that the dividing line would be drawn closer to Russia. Surrounding states would be inimically disposed towards Russia, and agreements on vital issues could result not only in a ‘cold peace’ but also in a revival of tensions and the arms race.\(^\text{11}\)

The enlargement study, openly patronizes Russia and leads the reader to believe that Russian concerns can be assumed away. Again, broad generalities raise the tension amongst the skeptical who want concrete assurances that the second most capable nuclear power in the world will not be unduly threatened by the expansion of an alliance that has been their foremost adversary for forty years. A former US arms control ambassador, Jonathan Dean, explains it this way:

> All the ingredients for disaster are there: a former great power humbled by political defeat on the global stage, the loss of huge territories, and a continuing economic disaster involving the pauperization of tens of millions of people and growing crime….Meanwhile the US is making a
bad situation worse by insisting on the expansion of NATO, a project that has mobilized nationalist emotions in Russia while undermining efforts to develop a productive link between Russia and the West.12

As a minimum, the study owes Russia honest assurances that an expanded NATO will not pose a threat. This must be accomplished through stipulated, verifiable, tenets that assure Russia her sovereignty is not threatened. Phrases like ‘broad, enhanced dialogue,’ ‘mutual political considerations,’ and ‘cooperative security architecture’ are indicative of an unwillingness to take Russian concerns seriously.

It is not until paragraph 6 of the discussion on the relationship with Russia that the study even mentions that Russia has concerns. It says that, “Russia has raised concerns with respect to the enlargement process of the Alliance.”13 Clearly this is appropriate - it finally addresses the largest single concern (arguably) of NATO enlargement—the relationship with Russia. Unfortunately instead of a serious discussion of the extended ramifications of this decision, it merely writes off the issue as an announcement that “the [NATO] enlargement process including the associated military arrangements will threaten no-one and continue to a developing broad European security architecture based upon true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, enhancing security and stability for all.”14 This pronouncement that, although NATO’s nuclear umbrella is being butted up against your border, it threatens no-one, provides little solace to a moderate Russian government who is trying to reassure hard liners that the US sponsored alliance is not a threat. In fact, it is obvious by omission that Russian concerns, stemming from the internal pressures that threaten her democratic evolution, have become secondary to NATO’s lifeline to the future—the strategic scheme of appointing itself as the European Security Czar. Clearly, there is a priority problem that demands seasoned diplomatic
leadership—it is unconscionable to allow the desires of the security catalyst [NATO] to overshadow those of the principle players.

**Role of the NACC and PfP**

The roles of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace programs are properly defined in the study. These organizations/programs are described in terms of their ability to provide a pre-absorption forum where potential members can queue-up while fine tuning their qualifications until they are in a position to pass NATO entrance exams. Additionally, PfP can serve as a repository for associates who cannot, and most likely will not, meet the requirements for membership. PfP is touted as an essential first step to membership. The study says, “Active participation in PfP will play an important role in possible new members preparation to join the Alliance, although it will not guarantee Alliance membership.”

Although PfP has been enormously successful in its own right, the wisdom of associating PfP participation with the potential for membership is questionable. Why create the expectation of full membership; why not let the PfP be an end in and of itself? After all, it does satisfy one of the primary reasons for NATO enlargement alone i.e., it provides a forum where the security issues that are affecting PfP members can be addressed, adjudicated, and hopefully resolved in a way satisfactory to all parties involved. For non-PfP members, the NACC provides essentially the same thing. Many ask why you need full membership to enjoy that privilege. Making PfP/NACC membership an end in itself, creates an environment where the extension of the NATO nuclear umbrella is the clear exception, not the expectation. Other provisions of the study
appropriately outline fundamental issues of NATO/PfP/NACC participation i.e. interoperability, defense-related cooperation, involvement in out-of-area operations etc.

What’s In It For NATO?

Chapter 4 of the study does an excellent job addressing the subtle, but critical aspects of NATO membership. It divides these issues into 8 distinct elements, each with its salient points couched amidst NATO niceties:

- Collective Defense—members will not just benefit from, but must contribute to, collective defense
- Command Structure—may require new command headquarters and/or CJTF headquarters
- Conventional Forces—must participate in NATO exercises
- Nuclear Forces—new members must embrace the allies Strategic Concept
- Force Structure—must participate in and reinforce if necessary; and may require stationing of forces on new member territory
- Intelligence—share as equal
- Finance—membership is costly - must pay common infrastructure as well
- Interoperability—make every effort to meet NATO interoperability standards

The study spends some time flushing out these enlargement elements. With respect to collective defense, it appropriately highlights that collective defense is multifaceted in that there are basically 3 ways in which NATO countries can contribute to collective defense:

- Full participation in the integrated military structure and planning processes
- Non-membership in the integrated military structure but participation in the collective planning process
- Non-participation in either but cooperation on all

Clearly, the opportunity for participation as a non-player i.e. the third alternative would be attractive as NATO absorbs new debtor nations that have little to offer in terms of collective defense and the accompanying planning process. One has to ask though, what benefit is there to NATO for new members who opt not to participate in either the
military integrated command structure or the planning process and, by extension, is not a supplier of weaponry and personnel. Further dialog in the Enlargement Study does speak of bilateral dialogue on defense capability prior to assumption but goes on to talk about flexibility in assuming new members so that the reader is never able to ascertain whether or not the study leaves these loopholes to allow political flexibility or whether the authors felt that it was too preliminary to be definitive.

Under the auspices of command structure modifications, three important aspects are addressed. Specifically, multinational representation, new headquarters (or modified existing headquarters) and, most importantly, the statement that a review of the size of staffs at most NATO headquarters. This is an important recognition, for the first time in the study, that NATO recognizes that enlargement may involve some trade-offs and that its new strategic view of itself is expensive and may not be funded at current levels at Major NATO Command (MNC) level and below.

Under conventional forces, the study uses these paragraphs to debate the pros and cons of forward deployment of both NATO assigned personnel and prepositioned equipment. Most of the study’s direction is expectedly vague, but it clearly states that NATO’s resolve to expanding training and exercises into new members territories. The costs associated with this are not fully delineated, however, it does say, “…as a general principle, new members should be ready to host multinational training exercises relating to all Alliance missions.”

On nuclear force commitment, the study is clear, “The coverage provided by Article 5, including the nuclear component, will apply to new members. There is no priori requirement for stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.”
Again, new members who do not contribute to the nuclear arsenal, are now eligible to sit on the Nuclear Planning Group and participate in decisions upon which they have no direct involvement. Again, one must ask, what’s in it for NATO?

The force structure presentation contains a very cleverly worded declaration. The initial statement says, “The Alliance’s military strength and cohesion depends on its multinational forces and structures, and the fair sharing of risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits.” Even though this articulates the Alliance’s dependency on a ‘fair share’ contribution it doesn’t require it. The section goes on to say that the prepositioning of equipment, and both intra-theater and inter-theater lift are important to military effectiveness. As NATO expands and there is a larger requirement for lift over longer distances, who will fill the void and provide the assets? Again, one must ask, what is in it for NATO?

The section on the Security Assistance Program attempts to pinpoint financial responsibility on new members. It starts out with rigor but loses momentum and ultimately dilutes any responsibility for new members; it says, “Financially, new members would be expected to contribute their share, as from the start, to all new program activities, with a contribution level based, in a general way, on “ability to pay.” The assumption that debtor democracies like Hungary most probably will have no “ability to pay,” and therefore will not pay. The words “ability to pay” were even italicized in the study to add emphasis to the fact that payment for security is not an issue. Again, one must ask, what’s in it for NATO?
Section D of Chapter 4 is entitled *Administration and Budgets*. Finally the question of what’s in it for NATO comes to light. Unfortunately, its not NATO as a security Alliance that benefits but NATO as a bureaucracy that benefits. It says,

> Enlargement will lead to new activities and a need for increased resources. Additional office space will be needed at NATO HQ to accommodate new members and possible increases to the staffs of the IS and IMS. Operating and capital costs in the Civil Budget will grow…Enlargement will also mean increases in the Military Budget…

Herein lies the thrust of the issue. The question of, ‘What’s in it for NATO?’ in an environment of decreasing resources, defense budgets, and downsized force structure, should be answered by increased security in Central Europe at the same/decreased cost. Ironically, just the opposite has occurred. An Alliance who just lost their threat and their reason for existence, is claiming the need for increased budgets, infrastructure, force structure etc. in a global demilitarized environment. One could argue that NATO’s new strategic vision, as a minimum, requires that we stop, analyze cost versus benefit and institute trade-offs that make enlargement, as a minimum, cost neutral.

In fairness, paragraph 2 of Section D, does go on to say that new members must be aware that they face significant financial obligation when joining the Alliance. While potentially true, and clearly appropriate, the obscure placement of that notice is somewhat ill conceived.

Throughout the explanation of the enlarged security arrangements, costs seem to be an afterthought. They are only mentioned after member nations are put on notice that the NATO budgets, staffs positions, and headquarters office space will increase with the addition of new members. It gives the appearance that new members will be significantly contributing to the perks of the Western NATO bureaucracy.
Notes


3 Ibid.


5 Ibid.


11 Cimoszewicz, Wlodzimierz, Building Poland’s security: Membership in NATO a Key Objective, NATO Review, No 3, 1996, pp. 3-5, Available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/natodata/NATOREVIEW/1995-1996/9603-1


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid. Chap 4, p 7.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. Chap 4, p 9

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.
Chapter 4

Poland, Hungary, The Czech Republic, and Beyond - What Does Enlargement Cost?

The Decision To Enlarge

It’s no secret that the immediate heirs apparent to NATO enlargement are Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. On Tuesday, December 10, 1996, NATO announced that it will hold a summit in Madrid in July 1997 to name its first new members from what used to be Communist Europe. President Clinton was quoted as saying that the summit would, “carry forward our goal of building a Europe that is undivided, democratic, and at peace for the first time in history.” The article went on to say, “The United States has not publicly said which countries it would like to see join the Alliance first, but Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are considered to be the front runners.”

While the debate lingers on, it is clear that a decision has been reached and even though the “who pays” question remains largely unanswered, NATO’s strategic vision has been sanctioned by member nations and the enlargement process has begun. Given that, it is generally counterproductive to argue that the Alliance should not enlarge because it is meaningless. But, the factors that were pertinent to the argument before the
decision was announced, are still very relevant to the “who pays” discussion and, if its a zero sum game, where the trade-offs will come from.

**The Cost Dynamic**

Who will underwrite NATO’s expansion, and how much that expansion will cost, remain crucial questions. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a study in 1996 that put the cost of absorbing the Visegrad four (signatories to the 15 Feb 91 cooperation agreement in Visegrad, Hungary - Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) at $60-125 billion. Their estimate funded an enlarged NATO at a defense posture capable of defending itself against Russia throughout NATO’s expanded territory.

Another comprehensive study on NATO enlargement that was not threat based like the CBO’s, but capability based instead, has been done by Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler and Steve Larrabee from RAND Corporation. The goals of their study were threefold:

1. To define a spectrum of possible defense postures and calculate their associated budgetary costs
2. Establish a political and military framework for assessing which posture NATO should choose
3. Examine the set of political and military trade-offs inherent in deciding how to build the posture and how to distribute the burdens among both current and new members

This study suggests that formulating a cost for the enlargement of NATO is not just a financial equation. The authors suggest that enlargement is a dynamic that incorporates both political and economic variants and is based upon assumptions that are deemed most probable over time. That notwithstanding, their approach was to create four possible options for enlargement and cost these as accurately as possible. Their four options were:6
1. Self Defense
2. Air-Power Projection
3. Joint-Power Projection
4. Forward Presence

The following table shows the relative cost of each of these options and what they entail:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Cost ($bn)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self Defense</td>
<td>$17bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Projection</td>
<td>$25bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Projection</td>
<td>$42bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Presence</td>
<td>$82bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1. The Cost Of NATO Enlargement**

By far the cheapest option is for the new members to defend themselves. In this scenario, the authors suggest that NATO would provide the C³I (command, control, communications and intelligence) as well as the necessary logistical support while the new members would take on the responsibility for making their forces compatible with NATO forces. The costs of this version of enlargement would be about $17 billion over the ten to fifteen years that it will take them to fully get into NATO.

In the next two options, Air-Power Projection and Joint Projection, NATO would commit to deploy forces into Eastern Europe in the event of a crisis. The second option includes about 300 additional aircraft in ten fighter wings available, and adds over $8 billion to the cost of the ‘Self Defense’ option. The ‘Joint Projection’ option would set
aside five army divisions to protect these new members on top of the 300 aircraft allocated under option two. This raises the cost of enlargement, including associated NATO funded infrastructure, to nearly $42 billion over the same period.9

The fourth alternative, ‘Forward Presence’, would move NATO into its new Eastern countries in a permanent way. It would involve creating new headquarters, training facilities and bases in Eastern Europe. Costs range in this area depending on sub-options, from $70 - $100 billion depending upon the capability desired and the amount of forces forward based.10 The authors of the study were realistic in their assessment of this option; they stated: “Such a posture is clearly not needed today. Politically, it would be perceived as very threatening by Moscow; economically it is very expensive; and strategically, it is unnecessary.”11

Which option will be chosen, or whether some hybrid will ultimately develop, remains to be seen. The authors of this study produced an earlier study on the same subject which outlined three alternative paths for enlargement that determine, to a large extent, which force structure option will be chosen and ultimately at what cost. These three enlargement options were:12

1. **Evolutionary**—A scenario in which NATO faces no immediate security dangers and therefore enlarges slowly in concert with the EU,
2. **Promote Stability**—enlargement is vital in support of the Eastern European democracies and will fill the security vacuum created by the loss of Russia as a bipolar stabilizer,
3. **Strategic Response**—NATO enlargement in preparation for a reemerging Nationalist Russia that reasserts itself as a threat of Cold War proportions.

The ‘Promote Stability’ option appears likely to emerge as the candidate of choice because it fits neatly into the niche creating by the Study on NATO Enlargement, which says that, “The aim of an improved security architecture is to provide increased stability
and security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area…\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, it is less confrontational to the Russians than the ‘Strategic Response’ option and is also significantly less expensive.

The following chart illustrates various alternative strategies available to the Alliance as it enlarges. This chart graphically combines strategic approaches (Evolutionary, Promote Stability, Strategic Response) with the four force postures. These are then overlaid upon the corresponding threats.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Alternative Strategies To Enlargement}
\end{figure}


From this it is easy to see that there alternative courses of action available; each with different strategic implications and associated costs. With NATO’s new world psyche, it seems logical that the most likely path through the alternative strategies will be ‘Promote Stability—Joint Projection—Regional Dangers.’ Cost estimates range from $30bn - $52bn.\textsuperscript{14}

Who Pays?

Even though cost estimates vary for most likely enlargement strategy from $30bn to $52bn, the authors of the RAND study chose a $42bn enlargement strategy to illustrate
considerations beyond the cost itself. Given that, they estimate that the breakdown of contributions between current members, new members and NATO infrastructure funds would be as follows:

![Pie chart showing contributions: $25.6 billion for Current NATO Members (61%), $8.4 billion for NATO Infrastructure Funds (20%), and $8.0 billion for New Members (19%).]


**Figure 3. Comparative Contributions**

One note of caution not addressed by the RAND Study are the NATO infrastructure funds. These funds are not magical; they must be generated, or regenerated from participating countries. So when considering national contributions, it is necessary to combine both infrastructure and current members contributions even though they are funded from differing budget sources.

**Force Structure**

Even if current members can overcome the debt brought on by expansion in a downsizing environment, a key question remains as to where the participating countries will allocate or generate the necessary force structure for an enlarged Alliance. In theory, forces will be generated in concert with a particular country’s ability to do so as some percentage of their defense capacity. In practice however, countries like the US, UK,
France, etc. will probably again shoulder the burden as the force providers. This “in-kind” contribution, on top of their fair share will further exaggerate the cost.

Taxpayers of the United States must be shown the true cost of expansion. Fairness dictates that the “hidden” costs of NATO expansion including the costs of force allocation, exercises, deployments, those outlined in the Study on Enlargement (more European jobs, office space etc.) new headquarters, contribution to NATO infrastructure etc. be brought out in a very straightforward way. Gone is a time when the NATO contribution can be cleverly couched as a percentage of GNP (GDP) as has been the practice over the last forty years. This ‘feel good’ tactic to downplay the American contribution needs to be exposed, and the real cost should be debated in terms of the intra-American alternatives to purchasing goodwill in Eastern Europe. Stanley R. Sloan, from the Congressional Research Office writes:

It may be reassuring that NATO still remains a popular concept with the American public. But the more important question may be whether or not this level of support for U.S. leadership in NATO can be sustained at a time when Americans believe that the United States needs to reduce its involvement in world affairs. In the same survey, 67 percent of those polled chose the view that because the United States ‘has limited resources and its own problems at home, it needs to reduce its involvement in world affairs’. Only 27 per cent chose the alternative statement that ‘because the US is the world’s strongest and richest country, it has the responsibility to take the leading role in world affairs’.

People of the US are not the only ones who’s opinions matter concerning an enlarged NATO. The success of an enlarged Alliance may depend upon how it is perceived within the countries being absorbed. Clearly, their opinions will have long term ramifications as they either support or oppose NATO expansion within their homeland. A recent pole shows general support for NATO as illustrated below:
Figure 4. NATO Support

However, when the more important questions are asked, support drops off dramatically. When the most important question is asked, i.e. will you pay, an alarming 79% (average) oppose paying the bill for NATO defense requirements at the expense of their own social programs as indicated below:

Table 1. Visegrad Country’s Opinions On NATO Enlargement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Czechs</th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
<th>Poles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about sending troops to defend another country?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about having NATO Troops Stationed In your Country?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about regular NATO Exercises In Your Country?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1—continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think about regular NATO flights over your country?</th>
<th>( \text{Support} )</th>
<th>( \text{Oppose} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you support spending a bigger share of your budget on defense and not social needs?</th>
<th>( \text{Support} )</th>
<th>( \text{Oppose} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes

3 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. p 18
14 Ibid. p 6
15 Ibid. p 23
Chapter 5

A Regional Studies Perspective

The Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama offers its students the opportunity to participate in a regional studies program which includes a trip to Eastern Europe. In Poland, The Czech Republic and Hungary, the issue of NATO membership was a common topic of discussion both at US Embassies and at meetings with various foreign heads of state within these countries.

When confronted with the issue of NATO enlargement, the immediate response was remarkably consistent. Everyone connected with these countries, as well as the country teams within the US Embassies, said that NATO should enlarge and the first recipients should be the Visegrad countries of Poland, The Czech Republic, and Hungary. When asked why NATO should enlarge, the answer was invariably the same; to provide stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

The responses became a bit more convoluted when asked if new members would pay their share of expansion costs. The immediate answer was expectedly yes, however, when the harder questions were unfurled, it became increasingly unclear as to both the level at which they were willing to pay and whether or not they ultimately had the ability to pay.
To put it in perspective, the following statistics provide a relative framework to ascertain each countries commitment to its defense establishment\(^1\).

**Table 2. Comparative Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Czech Republic (1995)</th>
<th>GDP $39bn</th>
<th>Growth 4.8%</th>
<th>Inflation 9.2%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt $10.8bn Defense Budget $1.1bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Armed Forces 70,000 Population 10,400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poland (1995)</th>
<th>GDP $100bn</th>
<th>Growth 6.5%</th>
<th>Inflation 26.8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt $42.6bn Defense Budget $2.6bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Armed Forces 248,500 Population 38,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungary (1995)</th>
<th>GDP $43bn</th>
<th>Growth 1.9%</th>
<th>Inflation 28.0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt $31.7bn Defense Budget $0.6bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Armed Forces 64,300 Population 10,155,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of these statistics reveals that these nations may not be willing (or able) to make the financial commitment to create a capable force that is interoperable with NATO standards. The Czech Republic, the most affluent of the three enlargement candidates, is only dedicating 2.8% of their GDP to defense, Poland 2.6%, and Hungary 1.3%. These countries are crippled by Soviet era technology that has plagued their ability to field capable forces. Flying hours are not funded sufficiently to maintain combat capability.
spare parts are often non-existent, old equipment is not compatible with NATO standards, and is not likely to be anytime in the near future.

**New Procurement**

To divert attention from the status of their armed forces, discussions often turn toward the planned procurement of new combat aircraft for which the United States has offered two candidates—the F-16 and the F-18. These countries proudly tell of their plans to purchase a new multi-role fighter to upgrade their capability consistent with NATO standards. Unfortunately, the elation is often lost upon reflection, because these countries cannot currently even afford to buy spare parts for existing aircraft thus, without a revised national commitment to defense, the nation’s contribution to NATO is an illusion, even with new multi-role fighters.

Additionally, there is no national fervor in any of these three nations to bolster defense spending. Conversations in this arena constantly drift toward the drawdown of armed forces around the world, and their particular nation’s need to economically recover from post Cold War oppression.

**Final Impressions**

Final impressions confirm suspicions that these nations want NATO because they want status within Europe, a chance to get into the EU, and any economic prosperity that interaction with NATO nations may bring. Final impressions also confirm that, while the jargon is positive and consistent, they neither have the ability, nor the national resolve, to pay their fair share for “full” membership.
Notes

Chapter 6

Recommendations

This analysis suggests there are a lot of unsolved issues concerning an expanded NATO. Since the decision to expand has already been taken, it is counterproductive to argue to the contrary. However, the substantive arguments offered for not expanding NATO are still relevant in any discussion on how to proceed. NATO expansion must maximize the benefits offered by its supporters, but at the same time minimize the negative effects that those who opposed expansion have espoused. Given that, the following recommendations are offered to meet the aforementioned goals:

1. Expand NATO slowly—allow the PfP Program and the NACC to nurture and mature countries seeking membership
2. Accurately and openly reveal the “real” cost of NATO expansion—unreservedly publish a “fair share” payment profile
3. Use US influence to defuse competitors for NATO (OSCE etc.) as the architect for European Security in post Cold War Europe—create unity of effort vice parallel efforts
4. Make expansion cost neutral to NATO—use US influence to downsize/downscope existing Cold War, and NATO infrastructure to support expansion
5. Make an honest and open dialogue with Russia a top priority—postpone extension of the nuclear umbrella to the Visegrad countries until Russia is more stable, include Russia as a G-7 member.
Chapter 7

Conclusions

This issue of NATO expansion has been adjudicated in literature throughout the world. It appears that advocates for expansion have won the argument and clearly the Alliance will announce the victors of enlargement and trudge forward. Many will continue to argue that when the Cold War threat went away, NATO-philes artfully crafted themselves as the new architect for security in Europe without missing a beat. As this analysis has suggested, if motives are inward directed, the outward expression may not be the ‘best fit’ for European security over time. That notwithstanding, the road ahead unveils an expanded NATO. Now, the vision needs to be carefully focused on implementation; not an easy task given its strategic implications.

The recommendations offered earlier can optimize the chances of success and minimize NATO’s vulnerability as it sets out to accomplish its task. It is faced with many competitors: less force structure, larger territory, other European security competitor organizations, declining budgets, need for increased infrastructure, mediocre popular support in Visegrad countries, an irritated Russia, and maintaining control of an enlarged, often divided, organization.

Periodically, it is important to examine the opposition’s position on any given issue to know the issues that remain contentious. Such is what has been examined here.
NATO is recharged, invigorated and has been jump started for expansion. Her success lies in the careful consideration of both the positive and negative aspects of the task. Peace and security in Europe is of paramount importance, and both supporters and those that opposed expansion are counting on NATO to succeed.
**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGP</td>
<td>Senior Defense Group On Proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPP</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>International Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Major NATO Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization For Security And Cooperation In Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership For Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>Senior Political-Military Group On Proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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