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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND  
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

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by

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v The journal, International Organization, was first published in 1947 by the World Peace Foundation. As the founder's name indicates, its purpose is to promote peace, justice, and goodwill among nations. The Journal represents the Foundation's efforts to increase public understanding of the international problems by an objective presentation of the facts of international relations. From 1947 to 1970, the Journal's stated focus had been on American foreign relations as it pertained to the international community. In 1971, the Journal adjusted its focus to an international perspective. This adjustment changed the Journal's stated purpose to a more universal view of world affairs. Because this journal views world affairs so intently, the purpose of this project will be to show the Journal author's view of how the United Nation's role played in world peace for the first 15 years which were its most critical years as it evolved from the League of Nations. The project will use the Journal material exclusively to keep the views limited to its authors. To provide an accurate account of the views of the authors, the Journal's summaries of the Security Council's meeting minutes were also used. The project will be based on the first of three basic objectives of the UN and will show the views of the authors with respect to the successes and failures of the UN to prevent or curtail war. First, there will be a description of the complexion of the UN after World War II with special attention given to the Security Council. We will see that world politics is a matter of various interests of all states. The study will concentrate on three cases; the Kashmir dispute, the Korean conflict, and the Congo intervention. The purpose in studying the perspectives of the authors writing on these conflicts are two-fold. First, the three conflicts involve different levels. The Kashmir dispute is at the localized level involving two neighboring countries. The Korean conflict, although it could have become a global conflict, stayed regional, and involved members of the Security Council and their coalitions. It sets the stage for how superpower politics affects the rest of the world. The Congo intervention involved a newly formed state that was previously a colony. Its infrastructure was so fragile, it was inevitably headed toward civil war. The second purpose is to show the UN's intervention tactics from the onset. For each conflict, the UN applied different applications of intervention which involved financial assistance, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, police actions, or military intervention. For the purpose of this project, financial and humanitarian assistance, although prevalent in all three cases, won't be specifically addressed.

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## *Preface*

This research project investigates how the journal, International Organization, and its authors see the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council in meeting the United Nation's objective of world peace. The reason for choosing to research this topic is to identify key contributions of the UN toward world peace during its early years. These articles provide lessons from which the "New World Order" can learn from. The turmoil that the world faced after the Second World War was much like it is today; a feeling that the world is further away from catastrophic destruction, yet a sense of far more uncertainty and the realization of many smaller conflicts across the world.

My initial research proposal was very broad and virtually impossible to present given the requirements for this project. After an extensive narrowing-down process, much gratitude must be given to my research advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Forsyth. His patience, guidance and assistance was and is greatly appreciated.

### *Abstract*

The journal, *International Organization*, was first published in 1947 by the World Peace Foundation. As the founder's name indicates, its purpose is to promote peace, justice, and goodwill among nations. The Journal represents the Foundation's efforts to "Increase public understanding of the international problems by an objective presentation of the facts of international relations.": From 1947 to 1970, the Journal's stated focus had been on American foreign relations as it pertained to the international community. In 1971, the Journal adjusted its focus to an international perspective. This adjustment changed the Journal's stated purpose to a more universal view of world affairs.

Because this journal views world affairs so intently, the purpose of this project will be to show the Journal author's view of how the United Nation's role played in world peace for the first 15 years which were its most critical years as it evolved from the League of Nations. The project will use the Journal material exclusively to keep the views limited to its authors. To provide an accurate account of the views of the authors, the Journal's summaries of the Security Council's meeting minutes were also used. The project will be based on the first of three basic objectives of the UN and will show the views of the authors with respect to the successes and failures of the UN to prevent or curtail war. First, there will be a description of the complexion of the UN after World War II with special attention given to the Security Council. We will see that world politics is a matter of various interests of all states. The study will concentrate on three cases; the Kashmir

dispute, the Korean conflict, and the Congo intervention. The purpose in studying the perspectives of the authors writing on these conflicts are two-fold. First, the three conflicts involve different levels. The Kashmir dispute is at the localized level involving two neighboring countries. The Korean conflict, although it could have become a global conflict, stayed regional, and involved members of the Security Council and their coalitions. It sets the stage for how superpower politics affects the rest of the world. The Congo intervention involved a newly formed state that was previously a colony. Its infrastructure was so fragile, it was inevitably headed toward civil war. The second purpose is to show the UN's intervention tactics from the onset. For each conflict, the UN applied different applications of intervention which involved financial assistance, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, police actions, or military intervention. For the purpose of this project, financial and humanitarian assistance, although prevalent in all three cases, won't be specifically addressed.

## Chapter 1

### The United Nation's Make-up

On April 18, 1947, the League of Nations officially disbanded and transferred its properties and assets to the United Nations. The charter of the UN was based on three major activities; (1) the maintenance of international peace and security by pacific settlement of disputes and the taking of enforcement measures; (2) the promotion of international economic and social cooperation; and (3) the protection of the interests of the people of non-self-governing territories.<sup>1</sup>

The first activity, pacific settlement of disputes, follows two principles; (1) parties involved in a dispute must seek a peaceful settlement by means of their own choice; and (2) the UN will only intervene if the dispute becomes a threat to the international peace, and then only in a mediatory or conciliatory manner. These principles didn't differ from what existed under the League of Nations. In fact, at the time of the UN's formative years, critics saw the UN as an evolution of the League of Nations' interaction with world affairs, although in retrospect, the power of actors changed dramatically.<sup>2</sup>

The most marked difference between the UN and the League of Nations was in the application of enforcement actions. The charter of the UN made the Security Council responsible for deciding what enforcement measures would be taken to ensure the peace. If military force was the option chosen by the Security Council, UN members were

obligated to supply those needed forces to accomplish the mission at hand. Under the covenant of the League of Nations, there was no such provision to ensure this military option would be carried out.

When the Security Council was established, its charter was to keep the peace for the entire international community and as such, the Security Council's decisions needed to occur with the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council along with at least two votes from the six non-permanent members of the Council as a counterbalance for the smaller states' voice to be heard. Those permanent members were the United States, Soviet Union, France, China, and Great Britain. In the aftermath of the Second World War, United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain power was clearly the most dominant in the world. Although France or China could not be placed in the same category as the other three, reasons of their moral and political weight, and of their future possibilities in Europe and Asia made their inclusion on the permanent Council desirable.<sup>3</sup> Unanimity was extremely difficult to achieve amongst the permanent members because of their different national interests which had already begun to polarize the world into separate camps of communism and democracy.

Because of the makeup of the Security Council, its activities concentrated on enforcement of peace amongst the smaller states. If the permanent members were in agreement, actions would be taken, yet any dispute which involved one of the great powers or one of their surrogate states would most likely end with no unanimity amongst the permanent members of the Security Council. As a consequence, political interests of the great powers would continue to take precedence over most collective agreements taking place. Normally, when this occurred, as we saw during the Korean conflict and the

intervention in the Congo, the debate for what needed to be done would be deferred to the General Assembly.

During the early years of the UN's existence, the US had dominance over the majority of the UN delegation in many spheres which influenced much of the decisions of the UN in a positive interest for the US. It wasn't until the early 1960's that US predominance came to an end. This was probably due to the significant increase of the membership of the UN during that period.<sup>4</sup> The only position the US remained dominant on was over Cold War issues.

The promotion of economic and social cooperation was perhaps the most important advance of the UN's charter over the covenant of the League of Nations. The League of Nations made no specific mention of economic and social cooperation although the League was responsible for setting up numerous internal groups for this issue. Those internal groups dealt with broad issues and were under the general direction and supervision of the League. The UN took a different approach in this regard by establishing specialized agencies, each operating within a defined area and more or less independently of the others. This method of organization was intended to reduce the political constraints that in many ways binded the groups within the League but the critics of the time saw the weakness of a lack of interagency coordination.<sup>5</sup> Although this study doesn't specifically point out the efforts of the UN with respect to economic and social support, all three cases received financial assistance and social guidance to alleviate the strain of the situations.

The UN's charter of the protection of the interests of the people of non-self-governing territories was not a new mandate from the League of Nations because of the

proliferation of colonies during the life of the League. Conversely, the UN experience involved the proliferation of nation-states during its early years as a result of most colonial powers relinquishing their holdings of foreign territories.<sup>6</sup>

Although the activities to protect non-self governing territories dwindled as the emergence of new self-determining countries took hold in the mid-1950's, one important difference that came about as a result of the UN's efforts. States engaged in the administration of non-self-governing territories were required to submit reports to an international organization set up by the UN and allow UN observers to make periodic visits to the territories to get information on the spot and verify the reports were accurate and complete. The idea of UN observer teams turned out to be a key tool for the Security Council in their decision making process because it allowed for an untainted view of a conflict and recommendations for mediation from on-site UN observers. In fact, UN observers turned out to be a major vehicle for all conflict resolution decision making. The observers were used extensively, but in many cases, their UN directives were so restrictive that they were misunderstood by their host nations the observers were sent to support.

The conclusions of Dr. Goodrich made it clear that the UN was a continuation of the League of Nations and was a necessary part of the evolution of world affairs. He went on to say,

The United Nations is not world government and it was not intended to be such. Rather it represents a much more conservative and cautious approach to the problem of world order. As such, it inevitably falls into the stream of institutional development represented by the League of Nations and its predecessors. Different names may be used for similar things, and different combinations of words may be devised to express similar ideas. There may be changes of emphasis, and in fact important substantive changes, deemed desirable in the light of past experience or thought

necessary in order to meet changed conditions. But there is no real break in the stream of organizational development.<sup>7</sup>

Other scholars of the time saw the importance of the UN, yet realized the slow process that the UN would have to work through. As Dr. Lee wrote in his article,

it is clear in practice as in theory, that no system of voting can solve international problems. The slow process of persuasion, by argument and removal of suspicion, of compromise, and ultimately of agreement is the only method by which “sovereign and equal” powers can compose their differences peacefully.<sup>8</sup>

This fundamental problem to solve international problems has haunted the UN since its inception. The two greatest powers at the time, the US and USSR, had come onto the scene with a distinct lack of experience in the international realm. Both had a record of isolationism and the two nations weren't as experienced in world politics as other nations, like Great Britain, who developed their skills through years of experience on the international scene. As a result there were opportunities to advance the ideals of the UN, but on many occasions the result was deadlock and finger pointing. Dr. Joseph Johnson pointed out the fundamental tension between the US and the USSR. He suggested the US position of peace dictated a concept of preservation; that is in order to secure peace within the US, that security could only be achieved in a world in which other nations are also secure. Conversely, he suggested the Soviet ideal for the security of their nation dictated policy that was essentially aggressive and inconsistent with the security of lesser nations.<sup>9</sup> Both nations' attitudes have been influenced by past experiences and political views.

The US approach to diplomacy was that of free discussion and a belief in the value of compromise to allow more international solidarity and effort to occur. This made perfect sense when one considers the lead position the US took in the aftermath of the Second World War. The US took on the preponderance of rebuilding Japan, Germany, and other

war torn nations and, along with its financial ties across the world based on the Bretton Woods Institutions,<sup>10</sup> it could use the relief from some of its commitments.

The USSR approach to diplomacy was much different. The USSR paid a heavy toll because of Germany's invasion during the Second World War and they were understandably in a state of internal rebuilding of both the nation and its economy. They were far more concerned with national sovereignty and regional security through a coalition of states surrounding the USSR as a buffer zone. In addition, USSR's belief in the communist model and Stalin's iron-fisted tactics didn't mesh well with US democracy.

Free discussion and a belief in the value of compromise were not diplomatically attractive to USSR. As a result, US attempts to find a basis of agreement through discussion and compromise met with repetitious USSR arguments accompanied by occasional charges that since the US kept offering new proposals, they could not possibly have much regard for the ones already established. As one can see, this led to a distinct atmosphere of mistrust. During the first years, the US and USSR relationship had a slowing down effect on virtually all the UN set out to do. Whether it happened to be a protocol issue on voting procedures for the Security Council or decisions concerning post-war reparations, each issue met with adversity, with the exception of one. The Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN agreed on the formulation of plans for international control of atomic energy, primarily because of its potential for destructiveness. Although the UN seemed to have little effect on decision-making in world politics, it did provide an international forum for views to be laid on the table and everyone benefited. As Dr. Joseph Johnson said,

...the USSR derives sufficient advantage for its national security from membership in the United Nations to deter it from withdrawing voluntarily in advance of an irrevocable decision to start, or bring about, a war. The United States also benefits greatly from membership. So do other states. Therefore, even though the continued participation of the Soviet Union in the United Nations will, and for some time to come, make impossible the appreciable strength of the organization, international security will better be served by it, with all its weaknesses, than by any alternative which envisages or leads to the exclusion of either of the super-powers.<sup>11</sup>

In summary, the UN became the predominant meeting place for the victors of World War II. It served (and still does) its members to keep the lines of communication open in order to alleviate the potential of a superpower showdown. Both the USSR and the US had interests at stake across the world but their tendency toward isolationism magnified the need to use the UN to express their position. The UN's impact on world affairs was limited by the different views and interests of the major actors, yet as we will see, the leverage and influence exercised by the major actors often provided the intervention needed to spare the world another global armed conflict. These political maneuvers had a consequence however. Distrust, bickering among the nation's UN ambassadors, and a widening of differences between ideologies seemed to create a combative attitude which was, and still is to some extent, pervasive during UN deliberations.

One of the very first conflicts the UN dealt with occurred between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir and Jammu provinces. Although the superpowers were in agreement with the intervention, the two principle actors, India and Pakistan, saw the situation in very different ways. Political maneuvering and self-interest, under the blanket of a plebiscite, shows an attitude that was not exclusive to the superpowers.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> International Organization, *From League of Nations to United Nations*, Goodrich, Leland M. 1947, Vol. 1, p.14

<sup>2</sup> International Organization, *From League of Nations to United Nations*, Goodrich, Leland M. 1947, Vol. 1, p.12

<sup>3</sup> International Organization, *The Genesis of the Veto*, Lee, Dwight E. 1947, Vol. 1, p. 34.

<sup>4</sup> International Organization, *The United States, the United Nations, and the Cold War*, Rowe, Edward T., 1971, Vol. 25, p. 59

<sup>5</sup> International Organization, *From League of Nations to United Nations*, Goodrich, Leland M., 1947, Vol. 1, p.20

<sup>6</sup> International Organization, *The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal*, Jacobson, Harold K., 1962, Vol. 16, p. 37.

<sup>7</sup> International Organization, *From League of Nations to United Nations*, Goodrich, Leland M. 1947, Vol. 1, p.21.

<sup>8</sup> International Organization, *The Genesis of the Veto*, Lee, Dwight E. 1947, Vol. 1, p. 42.

<sup>9</sup> International Organization, *Soviet and American Policies*, Johnson, Joseph E., 1949, Vol. 3, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> International Organization, *The Bretton Woods Institutions*, Knorr, Klaus, 1948, Vol. 2, pp. 19-38.

<sup>11</sup> International Organization, *Soviet and American Security Policies*, Johnson, Joseph E., 1949, Vol. 3, pp. 12-13.

## Chapter 2

### The Kashmir Dispute

In his article, *The Kashmir Dispute and the United Nations*, Josef Korbel describes the process commonly used by the Security Council in the UN in resolving disputes through the use of specific commissions. The Kashmir dispute was one which had been brewing between India and Pakistan, yet the Security Council started devoting time to the conflict in January of 1948. Both India and Pakistan submitted complaints against one another to the Security Council concerning the situation in the Jammu and Kashmir provinces. Fighting broke out between the forces of Maharajah Sir Hari Singh and Indian troops on one side and the Azad Kashmir movement consisting of mostly the local Moslem population. India maintained the accession of Kashmir and Jammu was legal and justified and therefore they had a right to protect their interests in the region. Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained the Moslem majority of the region would prefer to join Pakistan if given a choice. The only common ground the nations could agree to was that the fate of the region should be decided by the people dwelling in the region.

In April of 1948, the Security Council passed a resolution which stressed the peaceful resolution of the situation by the withdraw of Indian troops in the region, recommendations for representation of all major parties in the region and a secure yet free vote of the Kashmiri population. The resolution also provided for a United Nations

Commission chartered to go to the region to work with both India and Pakistan through the settlement process. Both India and Pakistan raised rejections to the resolution. India objected primarily because the withdrawal of their troops in the region would create a destabilizing vacuum of security. They also saw the idea of allowing rebels some kind of representation within the region to be absolutely against their interests. Pakistan's rejections were based on the part of the resolution that dealt with the elections. They felt it didn't ensure against Indian intimidation and corruption of the results.

The Commission, with representatives from Argentina, Belgium, Columbia, Czechoslovakia, and the United States arrived in the region in July, 1948. Events had already intensified when they arrived. Pakistan sent three brigades in Kashmir to deal with the anticipated influx of Kashmiri refugees into Pakistan and to counteract the anticipated movement of Indian troops to the water system of the southern part of the Kashmir region, which, if tampered with, would have tremendous affects on the agriculture of both Kashmir and portions of Pakistan. The Commission asked for all factions to stop fighting in Kashmir and establish a cessation of hostilities in the area. India flatly refused, citing the cease-fire would legitimize and continue the presence of Pakistani troops in what the Indians felt was Indian territory. India felt as though there was a state of undeclared war and Pakistan was the aggressor. The only way they were willing to agree to a cease-fire was if Pakistan removed their troops from the area. Pakistan agreed to a withdrawal but only if Indian troops also withdrew. Along with this new situation, Pakistan identified the need to secure the approval of the Azad Kashmir element who also had its own armed force. The position of the two governments of India and Pakistan were so divergent that the Commission had to temporarily abandon its initial proposal for the cease-fire.

Since the Commission had no real power to deal with the situation other than as a mediator, and it relied on the good will and faith of India and Pakistan, it set out to formulate a proposal that would be acceptable to both. For two weeks it worked on a proposal that both sides would agree to. The proposal they presented was 1) a cease-fire agreement for the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date, 2) a truce agreement, providing for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops and the Azad Kashmir military element with an additional provision for a temporary administration for the Azad controlled area and the withdrawal of Indian troops with the exception of a small contingent to maintain law and order, and 3) a general description of the future moves toward how Jammu and Kashmir would decide their own course in accordance with the will of the population in the area.

Initially, both parties had problems with the terms of the new proposal. India was concerned about recognizing the so-called Azad Kashmir government and Pakistan was still leery about the threat toward free elections. The Commission came to realize how much the dispute had tainted the relations between the two countries; there was a distinct lack of confidence toward each other. After much clarification and reassurances, both sides agreed to the proposal, although the provision for a plebiscite was a worrisome issue for both the UN and Pakistan since India had previously established its position as the region of Kashmir and Jammu being part of India regardless of election results.

Both nation representatives and the Commission transferred their peace talks to Paris to explore the terms of the plebiscite, provide a more neutral atmosphere and show the disputing factions their potential impact to the international community. The talks were interrupted when Pakistan accused India of increased military activities in Kashmir. India

denied the accusations, and as a gesture of goodwill, India reaffirmed its commitment to the plebiscite. A series of informal discussions ensued with the Commission's guarantee that there was no binding transactions at this point of the process. The main thrust of this stage of the process was to break through the walls of distrust between Pakistan and India. As these discussions progressed, the Commission developed another proposal for the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir and Jammu provinces. They proposed an immediate cease-fire and truce which was the same proposal as previously submitted but they also proposed a neutral administrator for the region, nominated by the Secretary General of the United Nations, for the overall responsibility and authority to conduct and organize a free and impartial plebiscite. Another advance of this proposal allowed the current leaders of the region, namely the Azad Kashmir and Kashmir's Indian leader, Sheik Abdullah, to remain in power, as long as they supported the plebiscite. The proposal was accepted by both India and Pakistan and a cease-fire was initiated on 1 January 1949. The efforts of the Commission were the main reason for the settlement of the dispute in 1948-49, although they had virtually no real power to resolve the situation other than the faith and goodwill of India and Pakistan. The author, Josef Korbel, said, “

The real solution to the effectiveness of the United Nations activities lies in mutual confidence among nations and goodwill among states; once these basic conditions are established there would be no conflict which would not be solved by peaceful means and no commission which would not be able to report that it had carried its task to a final and successful end.<sup>1</sup>

Many things can be seen from this case. The circumstances surrounding the Kashmir dispute didn't involve the vital interests of any of the major actors of the world. Great Britain had given up India as a colonial satellite long before the dispute and the USSR's interests focused on other parts of the world. The US interests were peripheral however they still played an active role when one considers a US citizen was on the UN Commission chartered to alleviate the situation and the administrator appointed to

oversee the region in 1949 was US Navy Admiral Chester Nimitz.<sup>2</sup> Clearly the US was assuming its role as the world's premier post-war nation. The solidarity that the Security Council exhibited showed the power of the UN to support a peaceful settlement when the major actors are in agreement.

The Commission had virtually no coercive power at their disposal, yet by moving the peace talks to Paris, it provided an ideal setting to show India and Pakistan the significance of their dispute to the international community. And it pushed them harder to reveal their "goodwill" toward a peaceful resolution. By the end of March 1949, when the administrator had been announced and India, Pakistan, and the Azad Kashmir had met the terms of the agreement, each group was able to save face without taking anything away from the international community.

In the next case dealing with the Korean conflict one can see a different set of circumstances. Whereas the interests toward Kashmir stayed within a local area, strong interests from the US, USSR, and the People's Republic of China made the Korean affair far more complex within the international community. Whereas diplomacy was the primary means for the Kashmir settlement, military intervention took hold in Korea.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> International Organization, *The Kashmir Dispute and the United Nations*, Korbelt, Josef, 1949, Vol. 3, p 287.

<sup>2</sup> International Organization, *The Security Council Minutes*, 1949, Vol. 3, p. 301.

## **Chapter 3**

### **The Korean Conflict**

The significance of the Korean Peninsula has been notorious since the occupation by Japan in 1931. After World War II, Japanese troops surrendered to the USSR north of the 38th parallel and to the US south of this line. With the subsequent development between the hardening of USSR/US relations, the 38th parallel became not only a military line but a political and economic boundary. This affected the reunification efforts of Korea to the point where the country had little chance to be reunited. The US efforts to bring this to the attention of the UN resulted in the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, despite the objections of the USSR based on the belief that earlier agreements were struck as part of the peace agreements from World War II and the UN had no authority to get involved. The commission was chartered to ensure elections throughout Korea of a Korean National Assembly took place and a subsequent national government was formed. This new government would unite North and South Korea and arrange the withdraw of the occupying forces of the US and USSR.

The Commission arrived in Korea but once in country, they were refused entry into North Korea. This made their charter extremely difficult to achieve and as a result, the General Assembly of the UN advised the Commission to conduct the elections in “as much of Korea as was accessible.” Although the ensuing elections were conducted in “a

reasonable degree of free atmosphere,” and the results were pronounced “a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission,”<sup>1</sup> it fell short of resolving the original dispute the Commission was designed to resolve. The “Iron Curtain” over Eastern Europe had been extended into the Korean Peninsula. Between 1948 and the start of the North Korean invasion, little information was available about the state of affairs in North Korea. About the only relationship constant during this period was the repeated denunciations and threats to unite the peninsula by force from both North and South Korea.

Obviously upset with the state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula, the General Assembly of the UN, in December of 1948, pronounced the South Korean government, known as the Republic of Korea, as the only lawful government in Korea and once again advocated the withdraw of all foreign forces on the peninsula. Shortly after this resolution, the USSR announced the withdraw of its troops on the peninsula, presumably because of the separate government it had helped to establish in the north. The US, on the other hand were slow to withdraw its troops. It took six months to get the US troops out of the peninsula, leaving an advisory group of military and diplomatic officials behind. The author suggested economics drove the US to maintain its slower withdraw and higher interests on the peninsula. The Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Economic Assistance Act of 1950 stated that, “when all our expenditures involved in the occupation and in assistance rendered Korea are aggregated, the total would probably be well over a billion dollars.”<sup>2</sup> The 1950 Act went on to call for on-going assistance of \$100 million for the ensuing year. These developments set the stage for the conflict that occurred when North Korea invaded South Korea in June of 1950.

The US, realizing the threat of its interests on the peninsula and its special responsibility toward the security of Japan, requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council during the same month of the invasion. The US proposed strong actions against the North Koreans and the Security Council adopted the resolution. Ironically, the USSR was not in attendance at these Security Council sessions because of a previous protest against Nationalist China (exiled to Formosa) representation on the Security Council. The resolution demanded an immediate withdraw of North Korean troops in South Korea and, if necessary, UN forces to provide assistance to South Korea. In July of 1950, UN assistance for South Korea was critical and the US took the lead by making the initial forces available to the UN under a unified command structure with General MacArthur as the supreme commander. The author points out the US had already taken unilateral steps to protect their interests in the region. The Seventh Fleet was moved up to Formosa, the stronghold of the Nationalist Chinese, in order to provide air and naval cover to the South Koreans. President Truman also asked the Nationalist Chinese to cease their military actions against mainland China, presumably to slow down the confrontation between the Nationalist Chinese, backed by the US, and Communist China. This move would allow the US to concentrate on the Korean situation and appease the communists in China, at least for the short term.

By August 1950, the USSR delegate returned to the Security Council to assume his responsibility as the president of the Council for that month. Charges and mudslinging began to emerge as the USSR accused the US of provoking the conflict and the Korean affair was really a “civil war” that the UN and US had no business in. The US fired back by accusing the USSR of providing material aid and encouragement to the North Koreans

and if the USSR wanted to, it could call off the invasion at any time. The Security Council became a banal group because of the opposing views of those present. No resolutions were passed by the Council to alleviate the conflict and during this time frame, the UN forces had been pushed back to the Pusan Perimeter and were in a desperate situation. It wasn't until mid-September that UN forces made any headway. The landing at Inchon turned the tide of the conflict, and by the end of September, the line at the 38th parallel had been re-established.

Because of the ineffectiveness of the Security Council and the US insistence that Korea was of international concern, the General Assembly continued to do the work of the Security Council by passing continuing resolutions to reaffirm the previous position of the UN. During these critical months, the US was also being criticized by Peking for "committing aggression" against China when they placed the Seventh Fleet around Formosa and violating the sovereignty of Chinese airspace and territory as a result of the fighting on the Korean Peninsula.

Non-communist states, like India and a portion of the Arab League also felt the measures taken to resolve the conflict were too harsh, the possibility of drawing Communist China and USSR into the fray was real, and not enough diplomatic measures were taken. Although the US took notice of these charges and differences of opinion, a resolution was adopted with the goal of a unified, democratic and independent Korea through the use of UN force. The countries who disagreed with the resolution refused the policy position and opted to abstain from voting on the resolution. Although the abstaining non-communist states were not aligned toward communist diplomacy, the outcome ended up being the same; opposition against the resolution and no support from

strategically placed states to sustain the military operations from other than the US or Australia.

Major events occurred in the conflict to affect the going-ons of the UN relationships during the months of October and November, 1950. General MacArthur launched a full-scale attack above the 38th parallel in order to end the hostilities on the entire peninsula. As a consequence, the Chinese mounted a counter-offensive across the Yalu River. MacArthur announced to the world “a wholly new war situation prevailed,” while Peking radio proclaimed Chinese forces would stop at nothing short of “hurling the Americans out of Korea.”<sup>3</sup> Peking demanded their conditions: 1) the withdraw of all foreign troops in Korea, 2) the withdraw of US forces from Formosa, and 3) a seating Peking representative in the UN (at this time the People’s Republic of China was not a UN member.)

The entry of Communist China onto the Korean peninsula damaged and divided world opinion. The question of a global conflict was at the doorstep of the UN and the world. The US took even a harder stance during this phase, to the point where Truman left the impression that the use of atomic weapons was being considered. This caused consternation with even the US’s closest allies and revealed even larger gaps in the views of the world. Britain’s Prime Minister hastily visited Truman to discuss how to settle the situation. Although there were differences between the two, both agreed they would be willing to negotiate an “honorable settlement” of the Korean conflict, and that if negotiations failed, the UN should decide how to fulfill the principles of its Charter for a peaceful settlement of hostilities.

The US/Great Britain offer produced a stalemate. Peking was in no mood to negotiate until its demands were met. Infuriated with Chinese demands, the US requested world wide sanctions be brought against Peking and insisted on the Chinese as the aggressor. This position pushed the US away from even their closest allies, Britain and Canada, who were more inclined to seek “clarification” of Peking’s terms.<sup>4</sup>

Two proposed resolutions came out of this turmoil. One was submitted by the Asian-Arab group, headed up by India. It sought “clarification” of Peking’s position and made any wide array of arrangements possible toward a peaceful settlement. The other proposal was made by the US who obviously felt isolated in its earlier position with Peking. They proposed a UN committee could seek a negotiated settlement while another committee look into possible restrictive measures against Peking in the event negotiations failed. A vote by the Political Committee of the General Assembly opted for the US resolution. The author points out the US got their way by stiffening the UN position against Peking and North Korea, but because of the possibility of using restrictive measures while negotiations were going on, there was still a great fear of no peace and from an over-all political point of view, the UN was further divided. But many states felt they couldn’t vote any other way because of their political ties with the US.

With all of this, the negotiations stalled between the UN and Peking, and by Spring of 1951, the Chinese had launched an offensive south of the 38th parallel only to be pushed back. The military leadership saw the same stalemate as the UN / Peking negotiations had been victim to. Without clearing his actions with Washington, and during the UN peace negotiations, General MacArthur announced his readiness to meet with top Chinese military officials to arrange a truce. He coupled this with the threat of attack on Chinese

territory if his proposal was not accepted and he said that no other discussions, most notably US forces in Formosa, would be part of the agenda. This announcement sent shock waves through Washington and the UN. Truman had no choice but to remove MacArthur as Supreme Commander. He was replaced by General Ridgway.

With virtually a deadlock of negotiating and fighting taking place in Korea, it was obvious, by June of 1951, the UN had enough of the conflict. Padelford states,

The UN Secretary-General declared that if a cease-fire could be arranged “approximately along” the 38th parallel the main aim of the Security Council’s resolutions of June 1950 would have been achieved. The military aim of the United Nations, he asserted, was to repel the invasion of the Republic of Korea and restore peace. The political objective of a free and united Korea could be achieved only by political means over a considerable period of time.

Leaders from the US, USSR, and Britain reiterated the Secretary General’s words and as a result, the first cease-fire was announced and truce talks formally opened on July 10, 1951, at Kaesong, Korea.

At the time this article was written, Dr. Padelford provides some key insights. First he points out how the USSR’s absence during the Security Council’s initial talks concerning Korea affected the whole chain of events afterward. They could have vetoed the passage of Security Council resolutions a year earlier had they been there. He suggested the major players of the Security Council will always maintain their position to ensure their interests are being taken care of in the future. There was an unprecedented percentage of UN members offering assistance of all kinds; diplomatic, economic, and militarily. Twenty-six countries offered assistance which compares favorably with the thirty-six states who had broken relations with the Axis Powers during World War II. The author suggested this was in large part due to the efforts of the US leadership. One

negative insight Dr. Padelford points out was poor congruence between military operations and political ends. None of the resolutions passed by the UN indicated whether the objective of the UN forces were to restore the status quo or to secure as much of the peninsula as possible. The method of unification was thrown back and forth between military and political realms throughout the conflict. The most significant insight the author had to offer was the idea of differences between major actors in the UN:

These protracted parleys—with their “incidents,” charges and interruptions, while military and air operations continued elsewhere—form an instructive episode in themselves in the problems of trying to negotiate a local issue between the communist and free nations while the principal powers remain at odds on the over-all issues of east-west conflict.

Again, as in the Kashmir dispute, one sees national interests at stake. In the case of the Korean conflict, it was a war of ideologies—democracy against communism—that began the conflict. South Korea had emulated the US and the US had been successful in getting them representation in the UN. North Korea had emulated the USSR but the Soviet delegation had been unsuccessful in getting the North Korean government recognized by the UN.<sup>5</sup> This is an indicator of the political leverage the US enjoyed and exercised in the UN before the conflict started.

Both the US and the USSR took initiatives from the very beginning of the conflict. By the USSR having been absent during the first few Security Council meetings dealing with the North Korean invasion, the US had virtually no opposition to its position. And in keeping with the UN charter, the UN was obligated to do some type of intervention. The US continued to enjoy the lion’s share of decision-making until the rest of the world saw a regional affair turn into a potential global war. With the intervention of Communist China, some of the US’s individual actors, most notably General MacArthur and President

Truman, lost much of the US advantage by the hard line tactics they employed. The USSR, on the other hand, called the conflict a “civil war” and the US was meddling into the Korean’s internal affairs. This thought seemed to have some appeal to many countries and although there were no moves toward USSR ideology, the US hegemony, with its attractive idea of democracy and its tremendous coercive power, slipped during this critical period.

The main contribution made by the UN during this period was one of compromise. The pressure of the various players within the UN negated the harsh action that the US was presumably willing to take and the UN was not willing to let the “chips falls where they like” as the USSR advocated. In the end they wanted, and got, a cessation of hostilities to preclude an all-out war.

In the third case, the Congo intervention, a civil war was in fact occurring and the potential for the conflict to spread into other parts of Central Africa was real. The case shows a new twist in that an ex-colony is now independent yet very unstable. Belgium, the parent state for the years prior to the Congo’s independence, sends in troops to protect its interests. Although the chain of events in relation to the military intervention seem similar to the Korean conflict, US forces were the predominant tool used in the conflict. The Congo intervention were one of the first efforts in creating a true UN force.

### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> International Organization, *The United Nations and Korea: A Political Resume*, Padelford, Norman J., 1951, Vol. 5, p. 686.

<sup>2</sup> International Organization, *The United Nations and Korea: A Political Resume*, Padelford, Norman J., 1951, Vol. 5, p. 688.

## Notes

<sup>3</sup> International Organization, *The United Nations and Korea: A Political Resume*, Padelford, Norman J., 1951, Vol. 5, p. 695.

<sup>4</sup> International Organization, *The United Nations and Korea: A Political Resume*, Padelford, Norman J., 1951, Vol. 5, p. 698.

<sup>5</sup> International Organization, *Security Council Minutes*, 1949, Vol. 3, pp. 303.

## Chapter 4

### The Congo Intervention

In July of 1960, the UN's Secretary General received requests from the newly independent Republic of the Congo (formerly the Belgian Congo) to intervene because of recent uprisings within the Congo of a mutineering faction called Force Publique and partially because of the presence of Belgian troops, most notably in the area of Katanga, one of the more wealthy regions of the area. Although the Congo was not yet a member of the General Assembly, the Congolese government felt this act of "Belgian aggression" was seen as a direct threat to the sovereignty of the Congo.<sup>1</sup> The requests were for both technical and military assistance in order to establish law and order and remove the Belgian troops from the region. The leaders within the Congo, most notably President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, felt the situation was desperate and if the UN could not help, they had appeals to both the US and USSR for intervention should the UN's efforts fail.

The Security Council met to determine what could be done. It was universally agreed that Belgian forces need to leave the Congo because of its destabilizing effect both internally and internationally. The USSR pressed for Belgium to be labeled the aggressor in this instance using the Korean experience as precedence, yet this was dismissed after the Security Council heard from the Belgian representative who explained the need to protect

the 20,000 Belgian nationals still in the Congo. The Security Council passed its resolutions for: 1) the withdraw of Belgian troops in the area and 2) the return of law and order by providing the Congo with military assistance until its own national security forces could be able to do so in the eyes of the Congolese government.<sup>2</sup> There was a concern as to the means in which this military assistance should be conducted. The government that existed at this time was in shambles and there was little to no discipline of the Congo's national security forces. There was no local police force to turn over any violators of law and order and the UN Operations in the Congo (ONUC) was not given any powers to arrest or even disarm the violators of law and order.

The previous requests by the Congolese government for US and USSR intervention was a concern. It was declared by the Secretary General that no forces from the Security Council's respective countries would be used and the ONUC would be a predominantly African continent force to avoid the impression of a re-emergence of colonial powers in the region.<sup>3</sup> The ONUC would not be authorized to use force beyond self-defense. It could not become involved in the internal politics of the Congo and could only be used to enforce law and order. Although the rules of engagement seemed clear, they contradicted themselves. On the one hand they were supposed to maintain law and order and ensure the departure of the Belgians which was a task next to impossible given the circumstances. Yet the ONUC could not get involved in the political affairs of a country that was in the midst of some kind of political turmoil that was creating violence and the lack of law and order.

This was further exacerbated by the Congolese interpretation of the resolution. They saw the ONUC as the vehicle to re-establish the central government's authority and

territorial integrity all over the country. The UN's interpretation did not include the central government's re-establishment of authority and in addition, the territorial integrity issue was only meant for the exclusion of foreign troops in the Congo.

After more refinement of the rules of engagement and authority given by the UN to the ONUC, they had been able to establish law and order in five of the six Congo provinces. Katanga, where the Belgian garrisons existed, was the last province to be occupied by the ONUC and by this time the local leaders of the province declared their wish to be independent from the rest of the Congo. The Security Council pressed the Belgians to begin their withdraw from Katanga. The process was slow; so slow, in fact, that the Congo's Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba, went to the USSR to receive help in an effort to drive the Belgians out. His actions caused his dismissal by President Kasavubu because of the disruption it may cause in the UN's efforts. Mr. Lumumba formed his own group opposed to the government under President Kasavubu. This essentially created a huge vacuum of power and the rush began. Although the UN Security Council proceedings between the 924th to the 942nd meetings don't entirely agree with Dr. Hoffmann's assessment of the situation between September 1960 and March 1961<sup>4</sup>, both sources indicate the violence that ensued between political factions and rival tribes within the country. Much of what the ONUC had accomplished up to this time had been undone. It had gotten to the point within the region that any action the ONUC took would be seen as politically intended to help another faction. In fact, because of the various views of the factions within the Congo, and the ONUC's activity or inactivity, the ONUC had no supporters throughout the Congo.

The Secretary General of the UN took the lion's share of the criticism for the break out of the civil war. By this point, the Security Council was deadlocked on passing any resolutions and had to defer to the General Assembly. Finally by February of 1961, a resolution was passed along with two others in April. The resolutions consisted of both old initiatives and new ones. First and foremost, the UN demanded Belgian withdraw of not only troops but also mercenaries, paramilitary advisors, and political advisors. Noninterference by other states was also included as before. ONUC would still maintain law and order and would be authorized to use any force necessary to quell any civil war actions. The ONUC would reorganize the Congolese army to help the stability of the region. And finally the UN demanded the Congolese parliament be convened. President Kasavubu was upset by the stringent guidelines and tried to change the resolution's guidelines through the Tananarive Conference. The author pointed out it was soon obvious he would be better off working with the UN on the existing resolutions. By early August of 1961, the crisis had subsided, yet the question of Katanga independence still loomed. The author also points out the Secretary General's resignation from his office as a result of the policies he laid out for the initial intervention.

There had never been force used in the region of Katanga in removing the Belgians. By August 1961, all the troops were out, yet there were still some mercenaries in the region. The ONUC's charter only allowed the use of force to avert a civil war. Under the new acting Secretary General, the ONUC engaged the mercenaries twice during late August and early September. This was defended under the issuance of using force to avert civil war. And the mercenaries were representing Katanga in their goal of

independence. The Security Council was also in agreement as they reaffirmed the ONUC's actions in "assisting the central government in maintaining law and order."<sup>5</sup>

Hoffmann points out many lessons as a result of the Congo experience. The initial policy was one of finding an easy way around the issues when there was no easy way. The initial contradictions in the charter for the ONUC led to its lack of positive effect on the situation. Hoffmann suggests a stronger mandate doesn't necessarily mean a submission of the Congo to the UN, but a subordination of the UN to the central government of the Congo. But he admits that each case involving a civil war is cumbersome, isolated, and requires the UN to "muddle through."

This case points out the subtle difference between intervention of a nation-state in complete disarray and a nation-state's sovereignty. It was evident the UN didn't properly assess the fragile infrastructure of the Congo. And it was also evident the restrictions it initially placed on the ONUC were dooming the group to failure. In retrospect, there was partial truth and partial faults in the UN assessment and actions. The UN relied too heavily on the ONUC because of its own unwillingness to demand Belgium to withdraw its troops through diplomatic channels of the UN. If Belgium was in fact worried about its citizens in the area, why didn't the ONUC protect them first so that the Belgian troops could leave sooner? Although the eventual actions of the UN and ONUC were appropriate, much of the confusion and bloodshed could have been avoided had they properly assessed the region first and mandated the requirements to all parties who were negligent in the situation.

On the other hand, the UN's decision to use predominantly African continent forces was a very appropriate measure since the Congolese population may have been

intimidated by a Western/European force. Their experience with colonial rule was too fresh in the minds of the local population and would have created a far more complex situation.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> International Organization, *The UN in the Congo Labyrinth*, Hoffmann, Stanley, Vol. 16, 1962, p. 332.

<sup>2</sup> International Organization, *The UN in the Congo Labyrinth*, Hoffmann, Stanley, 1962, Vol. 16, p. 333.

<sup>3</sup> International Organization, *UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe*, Nicholas, Herbert, 1963, Vol. 17, p. 321.

<sup>4</sup> International Organization, *Security Council Minutes*, 1961, Vol. 16, pp. 273-278

<sup>5</sup> International Organization, *The UN in the Congo Labyrinth*, Hoffmann, Stanley, 1962, Vol. 16, p. 350.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Conclusions**

The Kashmir dispute, Korean conflict and the Congo intervention all share many of the same actions carried out by the UN. All three attempt to maintain international peace and security. The sequence of events and means in which this peace was attained varied between all three cases. In the case of Kashmir, diplomacy and international pressure seemed to be the most prevalent method for peace in the region sought by two countries both recognized by the UN.

In Korea, UN forces engaged quickly because of an invasion from a country not recognized by the UN into a country with full recognition. With the absence of the Soviet delegation during the first Security Council deliberations over Korea, they lost ground in protecting their interests on the international scene. Judging from the initial power of the North Korean advance, USSR must have thought their ally could handle the invasion quickly before the UN could act. Because of the US interests in the region, the USSR misread the US influence and support of the UN toward the Korean conflict. International pressure and diplomacy was used later as a stalemate between the forces evolved and the threat of a larger scale war loomed over the international scene.

In the Congo, UN forces engaged without hostile intentions to pacify local anarchy within a country not recognized by the UN. The UN attempted to apply its objective of

allowing a peaceful settlement by means of the Congo's own choice. When it became evident the measures taken were not adequate, the measures became more strict in order to maintain order through international pressure yet much of the conflict could have been averted if the UN had read the Congo's inability for self-determination, set up an infrastructure of support as in the Kashmir dispute, and had taken stronger actions against Belgium.

The post Cold War world of today is much like the world of the post World War II era. Shifts of power, the emergence of new self-determining countries, and the settlement of old disputes among nations. Now that the UN has 50 years of experience, its relevance today is even greater than it was in the early years of its existence. The most powerful tool the UN has at their disposal is solidarity in the form of international pressure and diplomacy, yet this is tempered by individual nation-state interests, especially the world's strongest powers. Yet, as we saw in the Korean case, the UN provides a forum for nations with common interests to form coalitions, to hear other nations with varying views about world events and seek solutions to situations that are the most difficult to solve. The UN provides a viable forum for nations to illicit help from the international community and although the UN, in and of itself, is not a powerful entity, its collective nature between nation states allows it to provide a sense of the world striving toward peace. Given that position, the UN will become even more important toward peace as the world re-organizes.

The articles were compared to the UN Security Council minutes during the time frames of the cases. These authors understand the realist world in which we live, yet to

maintain fairness and justice, the globalist perspective of the world attempts to find the power of cooperation and community. The UN is the forum that harnesses that power.

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