

THE ARMY'S INSTITUTIONAL VALUES: CURRENT DOCTRINE  
AND THE ARMY'S VALUES TRAINING STRATEGY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2001

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

THE ARMY'S INSTITUTIONAL VALUES: CURRENT DOCTRINE AND THE  
ARMY'S VALUES TRAINING STRATEGY, by CH (MAJ) Keith A. Jackson,

146 pages.

Army leaders state that values enable leaders to “do the right thing,” but the Army needs a system that enables soldiers to make good decisions in a complex environment. As prioritized lists of “what matters,” values help people make deliberate and hasty decisions. The primary question is, Are the Army’s doctrine and its institutional values training strategy adequate to ensure that the future force can meet emerging challenges? Institutional values fit within two categories: organizational values and member values. The seven Army Values are actually virtues. The Army’s real institutional values are assumed but evident in Army doctrine. FM 22-100 suggests four assumed organizational values: mission performance, member development, tradition cultivation, and team building. The Army’s member values are less apparent in FM 22-100. Currently tradition trains values and helps the Army meet challenges, but doctrine does not capture this process. The Army must define its professional absolutes by stating its institutional values as required actions, not as desired virtues. Values training is most effective when it is integrated into mission-focused training. Values inculcation must go beyond maintaining assumed values and relying on shared culture; it must be a conscious objective in all training.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I gratefully acknowledge the advisory assistance of my entire thesis committee, Dr. Ron Cuny, LTC John Koivisto, and CH (MAJ) Bob Roetzel. The contributions of each of these committee members enhanced both the academic and intellectual dimensions of this project. I also express my gratitude for the assistance I received from the research staff at the Combined Arms Research Library and the staff of the Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs. Finally, I thank my family: my wife Cherisse who tirelessly accepted the tedious challenge of proofing the text, and my boys, Colt and Luke, who faithfully encouraged their dad to “stay on top of the homework and just knock it out.”

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

While much has changed, it's important also to recognize that there are cornerstones to our solid foundation which will never change. . . . Finally and probably most importantly, is the importance of values to our organization. Our seven inherent values--duty, honor, courage, integrity, loyalty, respect, selfless service--are what make our profession different. . . . Our professional code must be those values. We must adhere to them, and instill them in our subordinates. Our job is not done until that is accomplished. Again, this is leadership by example and I expect that to happen at all levels. We will spend more time in initial entry training educating our recruits on the tradition and history of the United States Army and the importance of values. But one shot is not enough. We must have a sustained program in the field and it must be more than just classroom instruction. We must make values come alive for all soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

General Dennis J. Reimer  
Memorandum for All Army Leaders

General Dennis J. Reimer challenged the Army with these words in a memorandum he wrote for "All Army Leaders," 21 July 1997. His intent was clear: to charge leaders Army-wide with the responsibility of ensuring that the Army maintains a values-based bearing as it navigates through change. General Reimer called for consistent institutional values training against a backdrop of change, beginning with entry-level institutions and extending throughout the field Army.

This paper is a pilot study of the Army's institutional values. It examines institutional values reflected in Army doctrine and attempts to identify the Army's values training strategy. Chapter one introduces the occasion for study, the research questions, the assumptions, the definitions, and the scope of research. Chapter two reviews the sources consulted during research. Chapter three proposes an institutional values model

and details the research design. Chapter four provides research analysis, and chapter five discusses conclusions and recommendations.

### Occasion for Study

The twenty-first century is presenting the Army with an array of challenges. The world is changing and the Army has seen the need to advance its technology, to reconfigure and reorganize its units, and to redesign its operations doctrine. These crucial changes have come only after leaders have completed thorough assessments of their military's capabilities and have forecast future requirements of U.S. forces.

Throughout these years of transition, senior military leaders have routinely reaffirmed the fundamental need to retain and train key military values. There is little question that leaders believe that values will continue to affect the strength of tomorrow's Army. To ensure success, however, there must be a clear understanding of what those values are and how they should be trained.

### Emerging Challenges

As the world changes, the U.S. Army must respond to the progressive elements of its environment. Elements of change challenge the Army's institutional values in three ways: (1) The Army's institutional values must continue to reflect the evolving culture of the people it serves; (2) The Army's institutional values must support emerging military missions; and (3) The Army's institutional values must ensure continuity as the Army modifies its own practices, traditions, and training.

U.S. culture is changing rapidly at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Cultural confluence, an increase in multicultural awareness, revisions of traditions, the



adaptations of institutions, and developments in technology contribute to a changing social landscape. American cultural values and norms reflect these alterations.

The types of U.S. military missions have also changed steadily since the end of World War II. As the Cold War ended, the last decade has demonstrated a trend toward a different type of U.S. military mission that involves new reasons for commitment, new rules of engagement, and new, more-complicated endstate objectives.

FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, describes this challenge.

Since 1989, the Army has fought a large-scale land war and been continually involved in many different kinds of stability operations and support operations. There has been a greater demand for special, joint, and multinational operations as well. Initiative at all levels is becoming more and more important. In many instances, Army leaders on the ground have had to invent ways of doing business for situations they could not have anticipated.<sup>2</sup>

As these changes have occurred, U.S. Army traditions, practices, and training, too, have changed. Many traditional practices and assumptions are no longer valid in today's Army community. This is particularly evident in soldiers' personal matters. The Army's reach into and control over the personal affairs of its members has declined. As the perception of the scope and strength of a command's influence and authority have changed, military families also seem less submissive to institutional authority, and institutional expectations for the military spouse have adapted.

An emphasis on Equal Opportunity has prompted internal and external demographic studies and assessments of multicultural tolerance, fairness, and harassment within the Army. Overall, Army training has changed to reflect the perceived needs of a changing military force.

The Army addressed this changing culture in August 1999 through the publication of FM 22-100. In it, the authors remind the reader concerned with change that the Army has handled change in the past. They go on to optimistically assert that it will continue to do so in the future.<sup>3</sup> They add, however, that to do so, Army leaders must “emphasize the constants--Army values, teamwork, and discipline--and help their people anticipate change by seeking always to improve.”<sup>4</sup> Army leadership includes managing change and making it work. To do that, one must know what to change and what not to change.<sup>5</sup>

Within this context of broad scope military transition, the Army must do more than react to change. Senior leaders must have a clear vision and provide deliberate direction. Leaders must conspire to forecast how the Army should evolve to meet the demands of transformation and still remain effective in accomplishing its primary mission.

The first step in this process is to accurately assess the adequacy of current procedures. The effect of today’s actions on the readiness of tomorrow’s force is greatest within the Army’s training programs. As the Army maneuvers through this period of transformation, it must develop training systems that prepare it to accomplish its mission in a different environment.

FM 22-100 states,

The Army has no choice but to face change. It’s in a nearly constant state of flux, with new people, new missions, new technologies, new equipment, and new information. At the same time, the Army, inspired by strategic leaders, must innovate and create change. The Army’s customs, procedures, hierarchical structure, and sheer size make change especially daunting and stressful. Nonetheless, the Army must be flexible enough to produce and respond to change, even as it preserves the core of traditions that tie it to the nation, its heritage and its values.<sup>6</sup>

Army doctrine goes on to say, “Today, given the rapid growth of technology, unpredictable threats, and newly emerging roles, Army leaders can’t cling to new hardware as the key to the Army’s vision. Instead, today’s strategic leaders emphasize the Army’s core strength: Army values and the timeless character of the American soldier.”<sup>7</sup> While there is much public discussion about Army assessments and improvements in doctrine and training, senior leaders do not seem eager to conduct a deep, comprehensive assessment of the Army’s institutional values doctrine and training.

### Research Questions

This study focuses on the Army’s values doctrine and training strategy and considers the following primary question, Are the Army’s doctrine and its institutional values training strategy adequate to ensure that the future force can meet emerging challenges? This primary question looks for an Army system that will ensure that Army members can make the right decisions in an increasingly complex environment.

The Army places a premium on its leaders' ability to do the right thing, even when no one is watching.<sup>8</sup> But as Army doctrine points out, that is not an easy task, and it requires a foundation of the right values. “Occasionally, when there’s little or no time, [leaders] have to make a snap decision based on experience and intuition about what feels right. For Army leaders, such decisions are guided by Army values, the institutional culture, and the organizational climate.”<sup>9</sup>

The following subordinate questions outline information needed to answer the primary question.

1. Does Army doctrine accurately describe the Army’s institutional values?
2. What is the Army’s values training strategy?

3. What does the Army intend to accomplish through its values training efforts?
4. Is there a single institutional values proponent responsible for ensuring the accuracy of Army doctrine and designing a comprehensive values training strategy?
5. What components does the Army use to train institutional values?
6. Are the Army's doctrine and values training strategy consistent with organizational values construction theory?
7. Are the Army's values training initiatives consistent with Army training doctrine?

### The Role of Army Doctrine

An examination of the effectiveness of the Army's values training efforts begins with an understanding of doctrine. FM 34-1 explains that, "Doctrine provides a common flexible framework of thought and expectations within which soldiers think about and debate the issues of our profession."<sup>10</sup>

While the actual practice of soldiers and units in the field is not always consistent with Army doctrine, doctrine generally identifies those practices the Army endorses. Doctrine also "provides a basis for the institution to incorporate new ideas, technologies, and organizational design to help leaders become the adaptive, creative problem solvers that modern military operations require."<sup>11</sup> As it relates to leadership and values, doctrine attempts to provide the systematic framework for good leader-theory.

### Assumptions

This study begins with several assumptions. These assumptions help narrow the scope of research, contribute to the development of a productive research design, and

establish starting points from which logical thought may proceed. The discussion of the validity and implications of these assumptions is limited to this section of chapter one.

### A Values Based Institution

The Army is a values based institution. FM 22-100 makes this point early and often. While some may argue the meaning and implications of this statement, it is widely accepted throughout the Army and evident in those words of General Reimer quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

In a United States Army War College strategy research project titled, *Values Based Organizations: How Does the Army Stack Up?* Lieutenant Colonel David Brooks cites a second support for the assumption that the Army is a values based institution. He notes that historically, the Army has recognized the significant positive impact that a values focus has on its ability to accomplish its mission.<sup>12</sup>

The assumption that the Army is a values based organization is important to this study for two reasons. First, since it establishes the critical importance of values within the organization, this assumption exposes the need for a comprehensive institutional values doctrine. If the Army were not a values based organization, an extensive values doctrine may not be essential. Institutions that do not claim to be values based may be able to survive without a clear values doctrine. Such institutions might be able to localize their values concerns and decentralize values standards making them subject to individual interpretation and application.

In a values based organization, however, values issues require centralized attention and resolution. Values identification and definitions, values inculcation challenges, values incongruence, and values conflicts are critical to mission

accomplishment and the success of such institutions. The identification of the Army as a values based organization mandates a comprehensive and coherent values doctrine.

The second reason why the assumption that the Army is a values based organization is important to this study is that it exposes the need for continued internal values assessments. As a values based organization, the Army must continually assess the adequacy of its values doctrine. It must consider the role of values within the history of the military, it must examine the current state of values consistency, and it must look to develop solutions for emerging values challenges within the military. As a values based organization, the Army must also consider any training requirements necessary to ensure the continued maintenance and development of its values foundation.

Finally, the identification of the Army as a values based organization suggests the relevance of organizational leadership theory to the Army's values doctrine. This identification reveals that the emphasis the Army places on values is not unique to the Army as an institution. There are other values based organizations. As a values based organization, the Army can identify with other organizations and potentially glean from their research. Information abounds, based on internal and external institutional studies, that can contribute to the Army's values assessments and strategies for improvement. The Army can conduct institutional reviews of organizational leadership theory and apply proven criteria for assessing the adequacy of its values based agenda.

#### Determining Adequacy

A second assumption is that this study may establish criteria that will enable a valid assessment of the adequacy of the Army's doctrine as it relates to its institutional values training strategy. The primary question of this study examines the adequacy of the

Army's values agenda in light of the need to ensure future force readiness. The word "adequate," which literally means "able to satisfy a requirement,"<sup>13</sup> suggests the existence of an objective standard. There is, however, no existing standard that would enable a researcher to objectively assess the adequacy of the Army's values doctrine and training strategy.

This study does not assume that this deficiency precludes the validity of the research question. Instead, it assumes that a credible set of criteria may establish adequacy. These criteria flow logically from the intent of the primary question, the assumptions outlined in this chapter, the relevance of the subordinate questions, and the consistent implications of organizational values theory.

This study presumes the validity of the considerations described below. It also establishes them as the criteria for answering the primary question.

As it applies to the primary question of this study, adequate is determined by

1. A clear, accurate doctrinal description of the Army's institutional values.
2. The presence of an identifiable institutional values training strategy with an accountable proponent, clear components, and reasonable intent; and
3. Consistency with recognized educational values construction theory and Army training doctrine.

#### The Difference between Army Values and the Army's Institutional Values

This study's third assumption is that there is a difference between Army Values and the Army's institutional values. FM 22-100 lists seven Army Values. This list includes loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. This study does not assume the list of seven Army Values is a comprehensive or accurate list of the

Army's actual institutional values. This assumption suggests the possibility of assumed or even hidden institutional values.

Organizational values experts James Collins and Jerry Porras agree that “core values are essential and enduring tenets of an organization.”<sup>14</sup> They go on to say that these core values are a “small set of timeless guiding principles that require no external justification and have intrinsic value and importance to those inside the organization.”<sup>15</sup> If these statements about the “enduring” and “timeless” nature of core values are true, and if it is also true that the Army was a values based organization before 1999 when the Army established its current list of seven Army Values, then the Army's actual values may be different than the advertised new Army Values.

The Army Values set may contain components that are not actual institutional values. It may also omit some of the Army's actual institutional values. Evidence of this is that previous official lists of the Army's values included values not contained in the current list of seven. Further evidence is that some writings and speeches of earlier Army leaders, although not official doctrine, cited values which are not included in the current list.

If Collins and Porras are correct that a values based organization has timeless, enduring values, then the mere announcement of a “new” values set should provoke skeptical analysis throughout the institution. For any new list to be accurate it would need to first show that its contents are legitimate values and secondly show that the list is derived from extensive historical precedent. This study observes that the official Army Values do not meet the values criteria established under “Definitions” below. The



official Army Values are, however, consistent with this study's definition of "virtues" (see below).

This study assumes that the Army's actual values are its institutional values and values inculcation beyond the scope of Army Values may occur within the Army. This assumption prompts research that extends beyond an examination of doctrinal references to the Army Values. This research requires a review of Army doctrine to determine if the Army maintains institutional values other than the official Army Values set. This assumption invites an assessment of any other values training that may occur within the Army, not only the intentional training of the Army's official values set.

The study assumes that valid research of the primary question does not require a precise identification of all of the Army's institutional values. It will therefore not attempt to develop an exhaustive list of all of the Army's institutional values.

This study uses the term "Army Values" (note lack of possessive spelling and capitalization of "Values") to denote the values set that includes the Army's list of seven values. The construct "Army's values" will refer to the conscious and unconscious institutional values of the professional U.S. Army community.

#### Intentional and Nonintentional

A fourth assumption is that the Army trains values intentionally and nonintentionally or incidentally. Intentional values training is that training which takes place in any context where leaders consciously and deliberately train values. Intentional values training may be conducted formally or informally, but it is never accidental.

Unintentional or incidental values training is that training that occurs when military members form a values conclusion based on their observation of their leader's

unintentional example. Most often this example is incidental to some other situational priority. Unintentional values training is the lesson a soldier learns when he acquires or reinforces an existing value, based on his observation of a leader's unscripted behavior or unannounced priorities. Unintentional values training can be positive or negative. This assumption is critical to this study because it enables an assessment of values training that goes beyond the Army's deliberate, structured values training.

#### Fulfilling Values Requirements

A fifth assumption is that the Army will continue to meet its values requirements in two ways. First, it recruits soldiers who have a basic, military-compatible values formation, and the Army rejects applicants with incompatible values foundations. Second, it trains soldiers to become effective leaders who share strong, dependable institutional values.

This assumption enables this study to understand the realistic parameters of the Army's values training efforts. The study assumes that the Army is not trying to train values to members who already have values that are fundamentally at odds with the Army's values system.

#### The Legitimacy of Doctrinally Implied Assumed Values

The sixth assumption is that doctrine contained within Army field manuals may reveal assumed values without clearly labeling them as values. This means that a lack of a doctrinal values label does not mean that a value is not doctrinal or that it is not one of the Army's actual values. Assumed values may be doctrinal, and they are relevant to this study. Chapter two explains this relationship.

The following conditions must be met in order to identify a doctrinally assumed value.

1. It must be clearly described within the field manual.
2. It must fit the values criteria described below.
3. It must be consistent with organizational values theory as identified in those texts reviewed in chapter two.

This assumption is critical to this study for two reasons. First, organizational values theorists point out that institutions often maintain assumed values without actually identifying them. In order to get beyond an examination of Army Values doctrine and examine the Army's real institutional values doctrine (see definitions below), it must consider any assumed values.

Second, the earlier assumption that there is a difference between the Army's values and Army Values introduces the possibility that the Army may have unidentified institutional values. This possibility is addressed in chapter two's review of FM 22-100. There the review includes an extensive examination of the Army's leadership doctrine in order to discover hidden institutional values.

#### The Validity of Establishing a Values Training Model

A seventh assumption in this study is the validity of establishing a values training model in chapter three based on the findings of the chapter two leadership doctrine review. This model is necessary in order to clarify the subject of analysis and to eliminate any outstanding confusion of terms that may result from the Army's limited values lexicon and the likely existence of values beyond the scope of the Army Values set.

### An Inexact Study

The final assumption is that the study of values is a contentious field within a pluralistic, secular institution. This makes precise assessments difficult. It is not an exact science and definitions vary, even among experts. Values theories are just that – theory, and values systems and the implications of values training are topics frequently charged with emotion.

This complex environment makes research difficult, and although objective assessments are possible, this study does involve much subjective analysis. While this assumption alone cannot validate the findings of this study, it does prompt a realistic understanding of the nature of this research. This assumption also precludes any expectations of universal concurrence among key individuals within the field of study.

### Definitions

The following definitions apply throughout this study.

Community Values. These are values shared by members of a common community. Such shared values relate to the role of the community, community member interests and standards, and relationships among members and between members and the community.

Generational Values. These are a type of community values. In the case of generational values, the community is defined by shared experience due to chronological proximity rather than by geographic proximity, ethnic heritage, or religious affiliation. In their book, *The Organizational Behavior Reader*, authors David Kolb, Irwin Rubin, and Joyce Osland point out, “The dominant values of each generation of Americans appear to be closely related to the agenda and themes of the era in which they grew up.”<sup>16</sup>

In this context generational boundaries are difficult to define, and a determination of generational membership is not always predictable. Generations tend to last fifteen to twenty years, and the beginning and end of a generation is usually defined by significant common experiences.<sup>17</sup> This short fifteen to twenty year span of a generation means that the Army must routinely address the challenge of simultaneously integrating members of three different generations.

The end of World War II was one such experience. Children born during the fifteen to twenty years after the war are typically considered to be members of the Baby-boomer generation, and sociologists have noted common values shared by members of this generation. The generation that followed is often called Generation X, and the generation after that is being referred to as the Millennials. The current demographic makeup of the Army includes members of all three of these generations.

Individual Values. These are the list of values a person establishes and determines he or she will follow in life. Individual values affect a person's behavior, establish habits, and ultimately forge his or her character. The formation of individual values is a complex process. It involves the external influences of the individual values of other people, and it involves such community values as family values, religious values, cultural values, and national values.

Institutional Values. These are institutional priorities. They are a prioritized list of what is important and what matters most to the institution. Institutional values relate to the success or failure of the institution and its members. They are a type of community values, but distinct in that membership in the institution is often conditional and reaches

across other community boundaries. For these reasons, institutional values inculcation is not as natural or automatic as other types of community values inculcation.

This means that there is usually a need for institutions to deliberately clarify and train their values to institution members. It is common for institutions to target membership among individuals who already possess similar or compatible individual values. It is not uncommon for institutions to evict members who do not live up to institutional values.

Institutional values tell institution members what is important. They provide a template that members can apply to a situation to help make a decision. Good institutional values should be simple and clear, but should also be able to expand. As leaders grow in their understanding of institutional values, they become better decision-makers, better communicators of institutional perspectives, and better transmitters and trainers of the institution's priorities. There are two types of institutional values: organizational values and member values.

Member Values. These are the institutional priorities that ensure the success of the organization's members. They are the secondary institutional values. Institutions expect their members to develop and maintain member values as part of their contribution to accomplishing the institution's goals.

National Values. These are the shared values among citizens of a nation. National values are a type of community values. They may change slightly over time, but such things as a nation's constitution, ideologies, and laws tend to keep national values relatively constant.

Organizational Values. These are the institutional priorities that ensure the success of the organization. They are the primary institutional values. They justify and validate the institution's requirements for member values. Institutions expect their members to maintain these organizational values and the institutionally prescribed balance between organizational values, member values, and other personal values.

Primary Values. These are the main values of any value set. They form the values set framework for individual or community values.

Soldier Values. For the purpose of this study, soldier values refer to the U.S. Army's member values.

Service Values. For the purpose of this study, service values refer to the U.S. Army's organizational values.

Subordinate Values. These are values that fit within the values framework established by the primary values. Subordinate values expand upon the primary values, providing detail and clarity.

Virtue. A virtue is part of a person's character. It is a component quality of moral excellence that contributes to the formation of positive character within an individual. Virtues are developed over time and are influenced by a person's values.

Value. A value is a determined principle that identifies what an individual or institution deems as important. It is measured relative to other important principles, and, together, these priorities indicate preferences and influence selections. As prioritized lists of "what matters," values help people make decisions, both deliberate and hasty. Although values may relate to ethics or morality, they are not limited to matters of an ethical or moral nature.

Using this definition, this study assumes that four criteria are necessary to identify something as a value.

1. A value is determined by an individual or an institution. Whether observed or deduced, a value is learned not imposed. Neither is it an instinctive principle someone is born with; it is therefore distinct from a person's conscience.

2. A value identifies what a person or institution considers important.

3. A value establishes priorities. It enables a person to rate the relative importance of something.

4. A value helps a person choose between options.

The intangibility and invisibility of values make them difficult to study. Values are not always stated, and priorities are not always consciously established or clearly identified.

In poorly developed value systems, a particular value may not be stated. In some cases the value is assumed and understood; in other cases it is assumed but not even identified. When values are not stated, prioritization may be unconscious. A person may hold a value, meaning that he has decided something is important and that decision may be influencing his choices, but he may remain unaware that this is happening. This kind of invisible value may be dominant (or prioritized) even though its prioritization does not result from a conscious act on the part of the person who holds the value.

#### Scope of Research

This study limits the scope of research to the following areas. First, it looks at Army doctrine. It reviews doctrine as it relates to institutional values training. The Army's training doctrine describes how the Army trains its force. This research reviews



the Army's training doctrine to see if those same principles that guide Army training in general are also specifically employed to accomplish the task of institutional values training.

The study also examines Army doctrine to see if it consistently and coherently addresses practical values issues throughout the institution. It looks to see if Army doctrine clearly and accurately describes the Army's institutional values and provides a valid framework for institutional values training.

#### Limitations and Delimitations

This study limits its research to existing institutional elements. It looks specifically at the Army's doctrine and training development process.

The intent of this pilot study, which examines a narrow cross-section of the Army's doctrine and institutional values training strategy, is primarily to facilitate an overview of the Army's institutional values doctrine and training continuum.

This research concentrates on answering previously mentioned subordinate questions, providing thorough analysis and rationale for research conclusions that answer the primary question. This restudy offers recommendations discovered throughout its course and suggests areas for further study.

This study relies heavily on the Army field manuals that contain doctrine related to the Army's values. Although the literature suggests variations of opinion and practice in the field, this study does not use surveys or analytical devices to identify specific field trends. It considers the statements of senior Army leaders and subject matter experts on values as significant sources. It does not assume that these statements reflect Army doctrine unless they are supported by Army field manuals.

Since this study assumes the existence of Army institutional values beyond the seven Army Values listed in FM 22-100, it looks for evidence of these values in chapter two. To achieve clarity it attempts to classify any obvious institutional values it identifies. This aspect of the study facilitates the development of a values analysis model in chapter three. Findings from chapter two are applied in chapter three to support and validate the utility of the model developed in chapter three.

This study does not attempt to prove the model, merely to validate its utility for the purpose of studying the Army's values training efforts. This study does not attempt to establish a comprehensive list of Army values or design a system to train the Army's values.

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<sup>1</sup>Dennis J. Reimer, "Memorandum for All Army Leaders" (Washington DC: Department of the Army, July 21, 1997).

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), 3-11.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 3-11.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 3-11.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 3-11.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 7-24.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, 7-15.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-8.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-8.

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<sup>10</sup>U.S. Army, FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994) iii.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>David R. Brooks; “Values Based Organizations: How Does the Army Stack Up?” (United States Army War College Strategy Research Project; 12 April 1999), 20.

<sup>13</sup>William Morris, ed; *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, New College ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), 15.

<sup>14</sup>James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, “Building Your Company’s Vision,” *Harvard Business Review* 74, no. 5 (September–October 1996): 66.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin, and Joyce S. Osland, *The Organizational Behavior Reader* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991), 11.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 7-9.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Source Categories

This research considers literature from four source categories. It explores organizational leadership texts and articles from civilian authors, it looks at U.S. Army publications, and it surveys lesson materials designed for Army institutions that teach values. It also reviews articles, papers, and senior leader speeches relating to the subject of the Army's values training.

#### Organizational Leadership Texts

##### Introduction

Organizational leadership texts provide the foundation for this study. A survey of their content informs the discussion, enables the development of an institutional values model, and helps to answer the sixth subordinate question: Are the Army's doctrine and values training strategy consistent with organizational values construction theory? These texts provide a backdrop for assessing the adequacy of Army doctrine to assess the adequacy of any institutional values training strategy.

This study surfaced numerous relevant organizational references. Among these the following six warrant discussion in this literature review: *Organizational Frontiers and Human Values*, edited by Warren H. Schmidt; *Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues*, edited by Thomas Lickona; *Choices and Decisions: A Guidebook for Constructing Values*, by Michael Bargo Jr.; *The Organizational Behavior Reader*, by David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin, and Joyce S. Osland; *Hope Is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army*, by Gordon R. Sullivan

and Michael V. Harper; *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, edited by Malham M. Wakin.

### Institutional Values Challenges

In his book *Organizational Frontiers and Human Values*, Warren H. Schmidt, a Professor at the University of California Los Angeles in the 1960s, describes “a new breed of professionals.”<sup>1</sup> He calls them specialists in organization development. These professionals develop concepts and provide expertise to organizations. They identify institutional values and develop institutional values training programs. Schmidt details the challenges they face and identifies organizational specialists as the professionals who address the institutional issues that emerge when “people with radically different values and life styles meet in the same organizational arena.”<sup>2</sup> This is the environment the Army faces at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Schmidt’s work compiles a series of articles by several experts that describe aspects of the values challenges which he said organizations would face at the end of the twentieth century.

In chapter thirteen, “Values, Man and Organizations,” Robert Tannenbaum and Sheldon Davis describe the values challenges arising within organizations. They point out that unprecedented value issues emerge as changing organizations confront an evolving culture. It is their view that never before have the issues at the interface between changing organizations and maturing man been so apparent, so compelling, and of such potentially critical relevance to both.<sup>3</sup> This is the environment in which the Army operates as it tries to adapt to twenty-first century cultural, technological, and political challenges.

Tannenbaum and Davis write that the tension between organizational values and individual values causes enormous change.<sup>4</sup> Their language initially appears alarmist, “Human values are coming loose from their moorings,” and “functional relevance” of many values is being examined and tested.<sup>5</sup> However, the writers go on to describe a responsive, workable process for developing a progressive institutional values program.

Central to their approach is a call for organizations to explicitly state clear and accurate values. They propose an organizational values model under the heading, “Values in Transition.”<sup>6</sup> This discussion contrasts what they see as positive, emerging institutional values against negative, “less personally meaningful and organizationally relevant values.”<sup>7</sup>

Their insights are relevant to any institution’s effort to accurately identify and adequately communicate its values. For institutional values to be effective, they must convey consistent meaning to the members of the organization. They must also clarify priorities and compel members to make constructive decisions that will move the individuals and the organization in a mutually desirable direction.

Tannenbaum and Davis believe that in the face of organizational transition, people internal to the organization hold the key to developing progressive values programs that are essential to both the survival and evolution of the organization. They point out that, unfortunately, organizations typically overlook their internal resources. They charge that organizations tend to see members as “parts of persons,” rather than “whole persons.” As a result organizations do not often exploit the potential of their people. As they see it, “the organizational challenge is to recognize this tendency toward

failure and discover ways to provide outlets for the rich, varied, and often untapped resources available to them.”<sup>8</sup>

Tannenbaum and Davis advocate an institutionally internal process to fix organizational values shortfalls. They point out that, although organizations often downplay the institution’s responsibility to foster individual growth, this responsibility is a necessary part of any organization’s long-term survival.<sup>9</sup> They stress the need for change through adaptation and innovation. As the Army looks at its values doctrine and confronts the challenge of integrating individuals from a recruitment pool of heterogeneous cultures and multiple value systems, it needs to consider military-internal solutions that flow out of its history and professional resources in order to ensure a common ethos.

Common theories evident throughout much of the organizational leadership literature suggest that values based organizations, like the Army, can stand to gain insight into human values development processes. These texts point out the interdependence and interrelationship between organizational and individual values development.

#### Values Acquisition and Development

In his book *Moral Development and Behavior*, Editor Thomas Lickona includes several chapters that relate to the development of an institutional doctrine and training strategy. This book provides social science conclusions in the study of moral development and behavior. To values based institutions it offers foundational insights into the process of human values acquisition and development. As an academic text it is relevant to an institution’s effort to understand values inculcation and to develop an effective values training strategy.

Within this book, chapter five, “A Cognitive Social-learning Approach to Morality and Self Regulation,” is an essay by Walter and Harriet Mischel that describes cognitive social learning. In this chapter they conduct a psychological analysis of moral judgment, moral conduct, and self regulation. They explain how people acquire, maintain, and modify the moral patterns that form their values.<sup>10</sup> In the same chapter they also describe how a community or institution establishes patterns of moral development and discipline.<sup>11</sup>

Their work shows the impact of the individual on the institution and the impact of the institution on the individual within the complex processes of values formation. Although it is not often stressed, institutional values doctrine must consider the mutual interplay between individual and organizational values development.

The Mischels’ work also contrasts the limited effectiveness of formal values education attempts with the broader effectiveness of experience based training. They admit that the hypothetical dilemmas presented through stories provide a limited test of moral maturity, but the Mischels stress that real life moral success comes from the faithful execution of long term commitments that demand high levels of discipline.<sup>12</sup> Their findings are consistent with what many Army leaders have traditionally understood--that stress-filled, holistic leadership development courses, such as Basic Training and Ranger School, provide effective environments for the inculcation of values.

#### Values Training Methodology

Organizational leadership literature goes beyond forecasting emerging organizational values development challenges and describing the social science



foundations for values training theory. Some texts also provide practical procedures for values training methodology. Michael Bargo Jr. points out, in the preface to his book

*Choices and Decisions: A Guidebook for Constructing Values,*

There are many books available that help people clarify their personal goals. There are fewer that aid them in the process of identifying and clarifying the goals of the social systems of which they are members. Still fewer books teach people how to go about the process of constructing their own integrated set of values.<sup>13</sup>

Bargo attempts just that. He begins his book by describing the brief history of modern systematic approaches to values education. He cites John Dewey's work *Theory of Valuation* which, in 1939, was the first to propose a systematic approach to building values. He then traces the development of subsequent authors through the 1970s. Most of them centered on values clarification. Their books employed games, exercises, case studies, and similar teaching methods designed to explore and explain values.

Such common values clarification activities encourage people to think about values, respond to values stimuli, make values choices, and then clarify the basis for choice, but Bargo sees their effectiveness as limited.<sup>14</sup> Although values clarification activities encourage students to think about their values, perhaps for the first time in their lives, these activities do not help people evaluate and construct their own life plans based on values.<sup>15</sup>

Bargo introduces an alternative. *Choices and Decisions: A Guidebook for Constructing Values* walks the reader through the task of developing an integrated system of values. It returns to a systematic approach to constructing values and outlines a template to guide individuals through the construction of a value system. Bargo believes that institutions need to do more than clarify values. He points out that all too often

people's values are either constructed for them, or else they go about trying to build them in a haphazard way.<sup>16</sup>

People need to know how value decisions are made and how to build a set of values that can support individual and institutional goals.<sup>17</sup> His model emerges from research in the fields of counseling and interpersonal relations, and he introduces behavior modification methods to improve personal values.

Bargo also provides a simple, but initially confusing definition of the term "value." He writes, "A value is a decision made about choices."<sup>18</sup> He then explains the difference between a decision and a choice: "A choice is a selection made between alternatives,"<sup>19</sup> and, "A decision on the other hand, is a contract to make similar choices in the future."<sup>20</sup> He elaborates:

Deciding to make a valued choice over and over again when a situation arises is forming a value. In other words, stating that you have a value is the same as declaring that when you encounter a certain situation you typically will act in a certain way. The value you already have when entering a situation is the decision you have made in the past. A value functions by helping you choose what to do in future situations. The value is a guide or pre-selected choice for you.<sup>21</sup>

This description reveals the practical use of values sets. Bargo sees values sets as decision support templates not lofty philosophical tenets. Such a practical application of values as tools to help with decision making should have a strong appeal to Army leaders looking to point soldiers away from the confusing realm of abstract principles and toward a more soldier friendly application of values within the familiar form of a decision matrix.

Bargo believes that some individual values remain the same throughout adult life and others are subject to revision. He suggests that constant scrutiny and new kinds of

stress, particularly in areas of personal growth and career development, contribute to values change. He writes that values change when people confront new experiences and make new choices.<sup>22</sup> He sees life experience rather than books or classroom lecture as the key ingredient to values formation because life experience includes the challenges that demand new choices.

### Identifying Organizational Values

These writers not only explain how people learn values, but organizational theorists also describe how organizations can accurately identify their institutional values. Edgar H. Schein contributed several chapter articles to a book by David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin, and Joyce S. Osland, titled *The Organizational Behavior Reader*. Chapter twelve includes a relevant article by Schein titled “Coming to a New Awareness of Organizational Culture.” In this article, Schein provides helpful insight into identifying organizational values. He points out that an understanding of organizational values helps explain many organizational behaviors.<sup>23</sup>

He stresses that although values are often difficult to observe directly, it is possible to infer them by interviewing key members of the organization or by analyzing the content of key artifacts, documents, or charters. Schein goes on to say that an organization’s real values often elude discovery because they may be so basic to the institution that they are assumed but never espoused as values. Although real, such values may remain concealed as an institution’s unconscious values.<sup>24</sup>

In such cases, in order to understand an organizational culture and identify its values it is often necessary to delve into the underlying assumptions that may be unconscious but that determine how group members perceive, think, and feel.<sup>25</sup> In many

cases, these assumptions begin as espoused values. Over time, these values prompt behavior, and as behavior proves successful, values gradually transform into assumptions. As organizational members increasingly take assumed values for granted, those values become unconscious.<sup>26</sup>

These unconscious value assumptions are organizationally intrinsic and powerful. Still, because they are so basic and widely accepted, they can be virtually invisible to the organization. Familiarity may cause senior members of the organization to overlook their foundational function within the institution.

Schein points out that organization members often signal the presence of assumed values when they refuse to discuss the obvious. He cites the following examples of this phenomenon: “the notion that businesses should be profitable, that schools should educate, or that medicine should prolong life.”<sup>27</sup> He adds that these values can be brought back to institutional consciousness through focused inquiry involving the insiders who make the unconscious assumptions and the outsiders who help uncover the assumptions by asking the right questions.<sup>28</sup>

Schein is not alone in describing invisible organizational values: former Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, also discusses this tendency. In his book *Hope Is Not a Method*, Sullivan states that in an institution, “The official value set-- shown by the posters on the walls--may be at odds with actual practice.”<sup>29</sup> This makes institutional values identification difficult.

Sullivan addresses this challenge and suggests that organizational documents may offer clues to understanding an organization’s true values. He adds that the published statements an organization makes about itself are the logical place to begin looking for evidence of real organizational values. Dissonance between stated values and actual values is common.<sup>30</sup> Sullivan sees this dissonance as resulting from shortsighted training.

Investing in values is a long term undertaking, and in the short term it is almost impossible to measure the bottom line contribution of programs that develop values.<sup>31</sup>

Sullivan asserts that institutions need to accurately identify their values because values help the institution overcome the tendency to be reactionary. He writes that institutions need to envision and build a future where new behaviors prevent problems. He also warns that this process is not easy. It involves accurate institutional values identification and the courageous, innovative investments of senior leaders.<sup>32</sup>

Sullivan recognizes that institutional values are not limited to the ethical type member values that seem to distract many institutions. Organizational values are what keep an institution on track and align the institutional members with institutional objectives. The important question is not whether or not an organization is values based, but rather: What are the values? and, Will they will help the organization prosper in the long run?<sup>33</sup>

Sullivan states that the evolution of an organization's core values is unique to every organization. He identifies five categories that help an institution identify its real organizational values. They include purpose, continuity, people, responsibility, and integrity. He sees common features that organizational leaders can use to identify and define organizational values.<sup>34</sup>

The first value category, purpose, is obvious. While it may seem unnecessary, identifying an organization's purpose should be an organization's central value. When members see their organization's purpose as a primary value, it enables them to identify with that purpose and subordinate individual tasks and responsibilities to accomplishing that purpose.

Sullivan's second category is continuity. He points out that too often organizations ignore their history. They do this, he believes, to their own peril. He explains that every organization should preserve its past accomplishments in every area of the organization's history because a successful, winning tradition is powerful.<sup>35</sup>

The third category is people. Sullivan reminds his readers that people and organizations are inseparable. He writes, "You cannot value your organization without valuing the people in it."<sup>36</sup> The way an organization values its people is also significant. An organization can value its people as replaceable factors of production or as renewable assets to be cultivated.<sup>37</sup> The difference between these two approaches is significant.

Sullivan identifies the fourth value category as responsibility. Although leaders typically assume absolute responsibility in an organization, they are better off if they see the leader's role as investing responsibility rather than taking responsibility.<sup>38</sup> Sullivan believes that one of the keys to organizational success is empowerment, a word he links to responsibility.

Sullivan's identification of responsibility as a separate value category gives it emphasis but it seems to fit better in his earlier category of purpose. If organizational members see the organization's purpose as a primary value, then it logically follows that the members' responsibilities to prioritize and pursue that purpose are components of that same value.

The fifth category of values that Sullivan identifies is integrity. He explains that integrity is not a synonym for honesty, but rather a "strong pattern of internal consistency."<sup>39</sup> Integrity is a commitment to consistently do the right thing for the long run, regardless of the short term pressures or temptations. Although Sullivan lists it as a

separate value category it seems to be a component value of his people category. Integrity, as Sullivan points out, is a desired characteristic of the people within the organization. To extract it and identify it as a separate category gives it emphasis, but perhaps at the expense of opening the door for identifying other people-characteristics such as separate values.

These five value categories, as discussed above, may be understood as three categories with two sub-categories. They provide a useful framework for assessing organizational values. While these three/five categories are not exhaustive, they do introduce a helpful way of looking at values and establishing an organizational values model that, rooted in Sullivan's Army experience, is relevant to establishing a workable model for studying the institutional values of today's Army.

#### Military Values

Samuel P. Huntington provided insight into understanding military values in a book edited by Malham M. Wakin titled *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*. In his chapter three essay titled "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic," Huntington shows how a study of military values is an important aspect of understanding a military ethic. Not everything that comes from a military source derives its character from that military source.<sup>40</sup> Just because a military professional says or believes something does not mean that that statement or belief is a product of his military ethic. Huntington explains that this is because military professionals come from different communities. These communities often reflect differences in ethnic heritage, political ideology, religious conviction, and countless socio-economic subgroups.

This means that military values are not responsible for every attitude, perspective, or conviction held by a military professional. Having said that, Huntington acknowledges that the demands of the military profession are so dominant and distinct that they do create what he calls a military mind and they contribute to the formation of military values. These military values profoundly affect military professional behavior. A military value is one that is “derived from the peculiar expertise, responsibility, and organization of the military profession.”<sup>41</sup> Huntington sees these military values as nearly universal and timeless within a military institution.

The nature of the military profession typically requires a significant change of common human values. For example, Huntington points out, “Man is selfish. He is motivated by drives for power, wealth, and security.”<sup>42</sup> He goes on to say, “No one is more aware than the professional soldier that the normal man is no hero.”<sup>43</sup> But the “military profession organizes men so as to overcome their inherent fears and failing.”<sup>44</sup> He states that the military professional, “emphasizes the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group.”<sup>45</sup> He identifies tradition, esprit, unity, and community as rating high in the military value system. He sees tradition as a primary value. He argues that military professionals should conduct a purposeful study of history that looks for principles in the military tradition that would shape the military organization’s future.<sup>46</sup>

### The Relevance of Organizational Literature

These six books demonstrate the relevance of organizational leadership literature to an assessment of the adequacy of the Army’s values doctrine and training strategy. While they represent different types of organizational resources, together, these works



provide a foundational explanation of educational values construction theory. As leaders consult such literature in their efforts to refine Army doctrine and institutional values training programs, they should look for ways to use proven theory to maximize the Army's internal resources.

### U.S. Army Publications

#### Relevant Publications

U.S. Army publications provide the primary data for this study. These sources outline policies and provide insight into the doctrine and strategies of the Army's values training efforts. The primary Army publications examined in this study include AR 350-1 *Army Training*; AR 600-20, *Command Policy*; TRADOC Regulation 351-10, *Institutional Leader Training and Education*; FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*; and FM 25-100, *Training the Force*.

#### The Army Training System

AR 350-1 outlines the Army's overall training strategy. Published in August of 1981, it offers relatively old, overall regulatory direction to the changing field of training within the Army. It is relevant to this study as the current regulation governing training.

The regulation accurately points out that, "Good training is the key to soldier morale, job satisfaction, confidence, pride, unit cohesion, esprit de corps, and combat effectiveness. Leaders at every level must understand the training system now in effect, make that system work, and avoid disruptive changes to that system."<sup>47</sup> These points should not be lost within the field of institutional values training: training is a leader's responsibility, and effective training affects combat readiness.

AR 350-1 states that the goal of all Army training is to produce a force trained to mobilize, deploy, fight, and win anywhere in the world. The objective is always unit readiness. The focus of all training is mission performance. Training of soldiers and leaders in schools or units serves to enhance the ability of units to perform to standard.<sup>48</sup>

The regulation identifies the three primary components of the Army Training System. These include individual training, unit training, and training support. These three components are consistent throughout all types of training. The Army uses them to train everything from weapons systems and tactics to consideration of others and equal opportunity.

Individual training, the component central to the Army's values training, is training conducted at the entry level as part of the Army's training base, later at specialized Army and civilian institutions (including the Army School System), and finally, by field units throughout the Army. At the entry level, individual training provides all Army members, officer and enlisted, with baseline combat and technical skills. Within field units individual training sustains basic skills and trains skills not taught at the entry level.<sup>49</sup>

The Department of the Army outlines its individual training requirements through the Common Military Training program. AR 350-1 includes a table that indicates when the subject is to be taught, ranging from entry level to Army schools and field units. This table also identifies the amount of emphasis on each subject that the Army requires. In addition, the Combined Arms Training Strategy recommends frequencies for training exercises that enable units to sustain required proficiency on mission essential tasks.<sup>50</sup>

The training system is practical. Commanders of major commands may increase emphasis in a subject or add subjects that fit their missions, but the intent is to keep from imposing too many requirements on mission training. The Army has a stated interest in keeping Common Military Task training from becoming a training detractor.<sup>51</sup> This requires striking a careful balance between providing necessary training and preventing bureaucratically imposed requirements that undermine effective training.

### The Army School System

Although most individual, training man-hours occur within unit training, the Army provides its primary individual training through the formal training conducted in the Army School System. The Army School System's mission is to "provide progressive and sequential leader training to prepare its leaders to execute the Army's operation doctrine in war or peace."<sup>52</sup>

The Army includes values training as part of the curriculum of each institution within the Army School System. The Army School System also contributes to individual training beyond the specific curriculum of its individual schools. It does this by supporting training research and system development, by contributing to the formulation of military doctrine, by developing individual proficiency training, by developing strategies to export training programs to the unit level, and by promoting high standards of professional military competence.<sup>53</sup>

In addition to providing instruction, Army service schools generate doctrine. Schools develop procedures and techniques for training newly approved doctrine. They develop training strategies and products that support the school's individual training plan. These training products include extension training materials, trainer's guides, soldier's

manuals, military qualification standards manuals, job books, and training support packages.<sup>54</sup>

### Commanders and Training

AR 350-1 assigns unit commanders the responsibility of training the force. Commanders determine the mission essential tasks that subordinate leaders and units must be ready to perform during war. Commanders tailor unit training programs based on these tasks to build and sustain proficiency. Although time and resource constraints limit unit training programs to include only battle-focused training, this unit training does include individual training of soldiers and subordinate leaders.<sup>55</sup>

Unit leaders identify the soldier and leader tasks that support the mission essential tasks. Commanders ensure that the unit training program addresses every aspect of their soldiers' abilities to perform prescribed mission essential tasks.<sup>56</sup> Since values training affects individual and unit battle focus, leaders need to understand that it is central to soldier readiness and is an important part of the unit training program.

Decentralization enhances the relevance of training. AR 350-1 directs commanders to create a demanding training climate with standards and to reward subordinates who are bold and innovative trainers. Soldiers respond better to training that is built on a personal assessment of their learning styles and needs. Training is more effective when it takes advantage of existing relational dynamics to leverage the effects of trust and relevance. The Army's training doctrine emphasizes the importance of freedom to take reasonable risks, to exercise initiative, and to exchange ideas.<sup>57</sup>

### Institutional Values and Leadership Doctrine

AR 350-1 provides the Army's training regulations, but FM 22-100 establishes the leadership doctrine that outlines the Army's values assumptions. Published in August of 1999, FM 22-100 is the latest addition to the Army's leadership publications. It replaces several previous Army leadership publications, and it provides a comprehensive overview of the Army's leadership doctrine. Its broad scope provides a comprehensive overview of the doctrine that outlines the Army's values and the institution's strategy for training these values.

FM 22-100 addresses several of this study's subordinate questions. As the Army's primary leadership training resource, the manual helps the reader understand the Army's values training strategy even though the authors do not directly define this strategy (second subordinate question). The manual does introduce the primary components of the Army's values training program (fifth subordinate question). It also helps soldiers understand the Army's intent behind its values training efforts (third subordinate question).

### Application of Organizational Theory to Leadership Doctrine

In light of the theory introduced in the above reviews of *The Organizational Behavior Reader*, *Hope Is Not a Method*, and *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, it is possible to identify, within FM 22-100, the Army's assumed organizational values. As Schein points out in his article in *The Organizational Behavior Reader* discussed above, an organization's real values may be so basic to the institution that they elude discovery: they are assumed but never espoused.<sup>58</sup> These values remain concealed as an institution's unconscious values.

Sullivan's statements in *Hope Is Not a Method* fits with Schein's theory. Sullivan's assertion that an institution's official values may be at odds with its actual values is consistent with Schein's ideas about assumed organizational values."<sup>59</sup>

Sullivan suggests that leaders searching for the organization's true values should review organizational documents for clues to understanding the organization's true values.<sup>60</sup> FM 22-100, the Army's definitive work on leadership doctrine, promises to be the definitive source for identifying such invisible, real, doctrinal values. To discover these hidden values, however, one must look beyond the limited member values (such as the ethically focused Army Values-set) that often obscure an institution's real values. In searching for organizational values, one must look for those values that keep the institution on track and align the institutional members with institutional objectives.<sup>61</sup> Organizational values are what ensure the long term success of the organization.

#### Evidence of Assumed Organizational Values

FM 22-100 contains passages that suggest four assumed organizational values that fit with the theories of Schein, Sullivan, and Huntington described above. Although FM 22-100 does not identify these four emphases as values, evidence suggests that they are. All four meet the value criteria established in chapter one.

It is also evident that these four values are organizational values rather than member values. Organizational values are the institutional priorities that ensure the success of the organization. They are the first type of institutional values. Army doctrine contained within FM 22-100 assumes that members understand these organizational values and maintain them. It also assumes that competent soldiers will maintain a

balance between these organizational values, member values, and the soldier's personal values.

### Mission Performance as an Assumed Value

The first assumed organizational value evident in FM 22-100 is mission performance. This is consistent with Sullivan's first organizational value category of purpose. The organizational mission at every level is that organization's purpose. The Army's focus is always "mission first." This preeminent role of mission performance fits the value criteria established in chapter one.

1. The preeminence of mission performance within the Army is determined by the institution.

2. The preeminence of mission performance identifies something the Army considers important.

3. The preeminence of mission performance establishes a priority.

4. The preeminence of mission performance helps members choose between options.

FM 22-100 suggests this value of mission performance when it states, "It has always been important to accomplish the mission the right way the first time; today it's more important than ever."<sup>62</sup> The manual stresses that it is the leader's job at every level to "inculcate" in their people the "winning spirit." It goes on to describe that winning spirit as "the [soldiers'] commitment to do their part to accomplish the mission, no matter when, no matter where, no matter what."<sup>63</sup> It further establishes the preeminence of this value, "In war, soldiers' comfort is important because it affects morale and combat effectiveness, but comfort takes a back seat to the mission."<sup>64</sup>

The manual identifies the need for all Army members to know and understand the primary role of mission performance. Such knowledge affects motivation and individual willingness to do what's directed.<sup>65</sup> Motivation results when members understand and have faith in the larger mission of the organization. This gives soldiers a sense of being part of the big picture.<sup>66</sup>

The effect of this mission first commitment goes beyond motivating the soldier to do what's directed, and it instills in organizations and members the awareness of doing what's needed even without being directed.<sup>67</sup> A collective desire to accomplish the mission underlies good organizational discipline. Soldiers perform even when it's a nuisance or hardship because they understand that doing so leads to success.<sup>68</sup>

Training "mission first" promotes trust. Soldiers who understand the mission trust their leaders and share Army values. They are more apt to do the right thing because when they understand the mission they feel committed to the organization.<sup>69</sup>

FM 22-100 points out that this "mission first" value promotes determination. It builds the will to win the nation's wars. It carries soldiers through the challenges of combat. It promotes the ability to "gut it out" when things get tough, even when things look hopeless. It provokes the will to persevere and find workable solutions despite adversity. It instills the ability to forge victory out of the chaos of battle, to overcome fear, hunger deprivation, and fatigue, and ultimately, to accomplish the mission.<sup>70</sup>

FM 22-100 suggests that this "mission first" value should also serve well in peacetime. This value keeps soldiers mission focused during training "when it's easy to become discouraged, feel let down, and spend energy complaining instead of investing to



make things better.”<sup>71</sup> Discipline holds the team together; the warrior ethos motivates its members to continue the mission.<sup>72</sup>

An understanding of mission performance as an organizational value also gives soldiers confidence in the organization’s ethical environment. This is vital because the performance demands of war often seem to violate the societal values people bring into the Army. FM 22-100 points out that a soldier’s conscience may tell him it’s wrong to take human life while the unit mission is directing him to do so. Unless the soldier understands the preeminence of the value of mission performance and the subordination of other values, he will not understand his duty. This conflict of unclear values may undermine his will to fight.<sup>73</sup>

FM 22-100 gives strong support for training mission performance as the institution’s primary value, against which all other values must yield. Properly prioritized and trained to every soldier, this value enables institution members to continue with integrity and confidence despite the confusing stress of combat.

Leaders in combat combine interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills to accomplish the mission. Training mission performance as an organizational value prepares soldiers to put distractions aside. A focus on mission performance in peacetime promotes tactical proficiency. In war, it enables leaders to seize control of the situation and lead the unit to accomplish its mission.<sup>74</sup>

#### Member Development as an Assumed Value

The second assumed organizational value evident in FM 22-100 is member development. Member development is consistent with Sullivan’s second organizational value category of people. The organization’s members are a clear priority for the Army.

During his tenure as the Army Chief of Staff, General Reimer repeatedly referred to soldiers as “the Army’s credentials,” a phrase that survived his service in the Army and made its way into FM 22-100.<sup>75</sup> This Army emphasis on member development fits the value criteria established in chapter one.

1. The emphasis of member development within the Army is determined by the institution.
2. The emphasis of member development identifies what the Army considers important.
3. The emphasis of member development establishes a priority.
4. The emphasis of member development helps members choose between options.

FM 22-100 subordinates this organizational value of member development to the primary organizational value of mission performance stating that if leaders, “accomplish the mission and take care of [their] soldiers, [they] have guidance for a career.”<sup>76</sup> The field manual explains this prominent place of member development in the hierarchy of organizational values, stating, “All United States military doctrine is based upon reliance on the ingenuity of the individual working on his own initiative as a member of a team and using the most modern weapons and equipment which can be provided him.”<sup>77</sup> People are not only the foundation on which all Army doctrine rests, but without them, the mission would be impossible.

While it is easy to see that the Army could not exist without soldiers, some may question the Army’s prioritized commitment to develop the individual. FM 22-100 addresses this doubt.

The Army is not made up of people; the Army is people . . . living, breathing, serving human beings. They have needs and interests and desires. They have spirit and will, strengths and abilities. They have weaknesses and faults, and they have means. They are the hearts of our preparedness . . . and this preparedness-- as a nation and as an Army--depends upon the spirit of our soldiers. It is the spirit that gives the Army . . . life. Without it we cannot succeed.<sup>78</sup>

The Army's interest in member development begins with the premise that subordinates are the leaders of tomorrow's Army."<sup>79</sup> Recruiting campaigns of the past twenty years have highlighted this emphasis on member development beginning with the slogan, "Be all you can be" nearly twenty years ago. It is also evident in the new slogan released in 2001, "An Army of one." Both campaigns have targeted prospective recruits who are interested in individual development.

The entire training system as well as the assignment process reflects this value. Permanent change of station moves, school requirements, promotion considerations, and other unavoidable service "gates" through which service members must move at determined points in their career are a result of the expectation that tomorrow's leaders come from today's force.

Although many people cite the inconveniences these requirements cause as proof that the institution does not care for its people. These inconveniences are actually evidence of the dominance of this value. The Army is routinely willing to sacrifice the increased efficiency that might result from the long term stabilization of institution members in a particular grade, job, or location, in order to maximize member development.

The Army emphasizes several aspects of member development, including member welfare, discipline, professional development, character development, leader

development, and personal and family support--usually in that progression. The Army's concern for member welfare begins with the safety and security it attempts to provide its members. It includes training safety, mission security, force protection measures, and an investment in the interpersonal tolerance of its members.

FM 22-100 points out that this concern for soldier welfare includes, ironically enough, demanding that soldiers do their duty, even at the risk of their lives.<sup>80</sup> The manual explains this apparent contradiction by stressing that caring for soldiers doesn't mean coddling them or making training easy or comfortable because that kind of training can get soldiers killed.<sup>81</sup>

The Army wants its training to be rigorous and as much like combat as is possible, while being safe. Hard training prepares soldiers for combat, and the Army believes that the best way to look after the welfare of soldiers is to give them the training, equipment, and support they need to keep them alive in combat.<sup>82</sup> Former Sergeant Major of the Army, Richard A. Kidd, once said, "Readiness is the best way of truly taking care of soldiers."<sup>83</sup>

Another way in which the Army looks after the welfare of its members is in the interpersonal tolerance it demands among its members. The Army cannot expect to establish cohesive teams in a lethal environment unless its people understand and maintain a basic level of dignity for fellow members of the institution. This value accounts for the Army's emphasis on equal opportunity and intolerance of sexual harassment and extremist behaviors. The words of General J. Lawton Collins, cited in FM 22-100, support this interest in providing for the welfare of soldiers. He believed that

an army of strong individuals that respected personal initiative and the rights and dignity of the individual were key to a reliable force.<sup>84</sup>

The Army institution believes that creating an environment that fosters this type of member development is a leader responsibility. It results in an essential, mutual understanding that enables soldiers to treat one another as they should.<sup>85</sup>

Discipline marks the second level of the Army's member development value. FM 22-100 states that the highest form of discipline is the willing obedience of subordinates who trust their leaders, understand and believe in the mission's purpose, value the team and their place in it, and have the will to see the mission through.<sup>86</sup> This is the Army's goal in establishing discipline as a means of member development. The Army believes that discipline produces members who come up with solutions in tough circumstances.<sup>87</sup>

FM 22-100 also indicates that character development is an essential component of member development. Based on the nature of the institution's current prescribed Army Values, character development is that aspect of member development that the Army considers most relevant to values training. Although FM 22-100 acknowledges the importance of member competence, it stresses that member character is even more critical.<sup>88</sup>

The Army's concern for member character causes the Army to begin character development from the first day new recruits enter the service.<sup>89</sup> FM 22-100 explains this process as follows.

Leaders teach Army values to every new member of the Army. Together with the leader attributes, Army values establish the foundation of leaders of character. Once members learn these values, their leaders ensure adherence. Adhering to the principles Army values embody is essential, for the Army cannot tolerate unethical behavior. Unethical behavior destroys morale and cohesion; it

undermines the trust and confidence essential to teamwork and mission accomplishment.<sup>90</sup>

This emphasis on character development is not limited to training for new recruits. Army leaders train character development at every level through role modeling, teaching, and coaching in order to build a climate in which soldiers and organizations can reach their full potential.<sup>91</sup> The Army believes that it is a career-long process, involving both self development and developmental counseling.<sup>92</sup>

Professional development is the next level of member development. FM 22-100 explains that Army values show the relationship between character and competence.<sup>93</sup> Competence is the result of professional development. The Army wants its members to be technically and tactically proficient. This competence requires training in everything from basic soldiering taught through common military task training and military occupational specialty training, to the advanced individual skills and unit training the soldier receives throughout his career. The Army's emphasis on competence through professional development is apparent throughout FM 22-100 and AR 350-1. Member competence determines the force capability whenever the Army is called to execute any mission.

FM 22-100 shows that the Army's commitment to leader development also emphasizes a foundation of training and education. It pours expectations, standards, values and ethics into that foundation.<sup>94</sup> This foundation supports three leader development pillars: school training, operational assignments, and self development.<sup>95</sup>

Personal and family support is the final area into which the Army expands its organizational value of member development. FM 22-100 explains this aspect of

member development, stating, “The Army has obligations to soldiers, DA civilians, and their families that most organizations don’t have.”<sup>96</sup> These obligations focus on the personal and family welfare of all organization members. The Army refers to these obligations as “taking care of soldiers.” FM 22-100 describes it as follows.

Taking care of soldiers encompasses everything from making sure a soldier has time for an annual dental exam to visiting off post housing to make sure it’s adequate. It also means providing the family support that ensures soldiers and their families will be taken care of, whether the soldier is home or deployed. Family support means ensuring there’s a support group in place, that even the most junior soldier and most inexperienced family members know where to turn for help when their soldier is deployed.<sup>97</sup>

The Army asks its members to be ever ready to perform critical and dangerous missions. FM 22-100 shows that the Army’s dependence on people is backed by a strong emphasis on member development. This emphasis fits within the definition of an organizational value.

#### Tradition Cultivation as an Assumed Value

The third assumed organizational value evident in FM 22-100 is the cultivation of tradition. Tradition cultivation is consistent with Sullivan’s third organizational value category of history. Army doctrine places a strong emphasis on the importance and power of tradition within the service. This institutional tradition, rooted in history, shapes the other values. Large, complex institutions, like the Army, have a broad tradition influenced by internal subcultures of active and reserve components, heavy and light forces, and conventional as well as special operations forces. Institutionally external subcultures, such as gender, ethnic, religious, occupational, and regional differences, also contribute to the cultivation of Army tradition.<sup>98</sup> The Army’s emphasis on the cultivation of tradition meets the value criteria established in chapter one.

1. The emphasis of tradition cultivation within the Army is determined by the institution.
2. The emphasis of tradition cultivation identifies something the Army considers important.
3. The emphasis of tradition cultivation establishes a priority.
4. The emphasis of tradition cultivation helps members choose between options.

FM 22-100 points out, “Soldiers draw strength from knowing they’re part of a tradition.”<sup>99</sup> Traditions not only remind a soldier of his place in history, they also help him better understand his role in the context of current events whether in training, war, or operations other than war. Traditions establish the soldier’s place in the big picture of history and the nation, and his potential to impact the future. Traditions serve as daily reminders to institution members that they are building a link in the military’s chain of history. Elements of soldiers’ lives--uniforms, ceremonies, salutes, titles, organizational practices--connect them to the past and to American soldiers of the future.<sup>100</sup>

Army doctrine describes three aspects of tradition. These three aspects influence soldiers and the Army’s institutional environment enough to affect the success or failure of the Army as an institution. FM 22-100 discusses the role of climate, culture, and national values in shaping the direction of the Army’s institutional progress. Together they define the environment in which Army members function.

Climate is local. It includes the environment of units and organizations.<sup>101</sup> It is also immediate--how people feel about their organization right now.<sup>102</sup> The responsibility to create a positive climate belongs to an organization’s commander. FM 22-100 states that leaders establish their organization’s climate, whether purposefully or



unwittingly.<sup>103</sup> In 1998 the Army began requiring commanders to conduct unit climate surveys as a routine part of assuming command.

Leaders must establish a climate consistent with the traditions of the Army institution. FM 22-100 explains that a positive climate promotes Army Values, fosters the warrior ethos, encourages learning, and promotes creative performance. A positive climate is the result of a clear, widely known intent; well-trained and confident soldiers; disciplined, cohesive teams; and trusted, competent leadership.<sup>104</sup> A negative climate not only undermines member development through a decline in soldier morale and competence, but it also interferes with mission performance.

For these reasons, the Army emphasizes tradition and charges leaders with the responsibility of monitoring and maintaining positive climate. The local and immediate nature of climate make it that aspect of tradition most prone to change, and simultaneously, most responsive to leader influence.

The second aspect of tradition, culture, is broader than climate. It refers to the environment of the Army as an institution and the communities within that institution.<sup>105</sup> Culture involves a longer lasting, more complex set of shared expectations.<sup>106</sup> It consists of the shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution.<sup>107</sup> Beliefs, customs, and practices, regulations, and laws affect culture.

Culture is not only a product of the ways in which institutional members tend to behave, it is a tool that leaders can use to influence the behavior of their people. Leaders can use culture to remind soldiers that they are part of something big. Cultural traditions help soldiers see that their behavior affects the reputation of the institution, the people

who preceded them, those who will follow them, and those who are serving their nation around the world today.<sup>108</sup>

Army doctrine stresses that soldiers want to belong to something bigger than themselves.<sup>109</sup> FM 22-100 cites examples of soldiers wearing sports logos, the jersey numbers of famous athletes, and brands endorsed by celebrity personalities. It points out that it is easy to let the media influence this appetite of young soldiers, but it is better when Army leaders understand this opportunity and influence their people by exposing them to the powerful traditions of which they are a legitimate part.<sup>110</sup> FM 22-100 suggests that leaders should teach their soldiers about their organization's heroes. It advocates teaching them the history behind unit crests, greetings, decorations and badges. It points out that the Army's culture does not exist independent of soldiers, it is part of who they are. It can give soldiers pride in themselves and in what they are doing with their lives.<sup>111</sup>

The third aspect of tradition discussed in FM 22-100 is national values. National values form the parameters in which the Army culture rests. While the Army's influence on national values may be difficult to observe, the influence of America's national values on the Army's culture is clear. National values affect recruitment and the values foundations of new soldiers entering the Army. National values are a composite trend of the beliefs and convictions of the nation's citizens influenced by their upbringing, cultural heritage, families, and religions.<sup>112</sup>

U.S. national values rest on the principle that people are free to choose their own beliefs and the basis for those beliefs.<sup>113</sup> That principle remains valid within the Army. Army members are free to choose religions, philosophies, ideologies, moral convictions,

and political and social affiliations consistent with U.S. national values. When it comes to behavior, however, the Army culture, through standards, regulations, and codes, becomes more restrictive. Examples range from prohibited political demonstrations to institutionally imposed restrictions on the sexual behavior of Army members. This tension between acceptable beliefs and acceptable behavior is a catalyst for current debate. Its effect on the institution and its members both influences and is influenced by the Army's institutional values.

FM 22-100 shows that Army doctrine respects values diversity, but it also shows that Army training is concerned with ensuring congruence between its members' values and the Army's values. The Army emphasizes traditions that establish acceptable practice. The Army tries to use Army Values training to influence the attitudes of its members. While the Army recognizes that everyone enters the institution with their own values, developed in childhood and nurtured through experience, FM 22-100 points out that member oaths sworn at induction establish a new standard and invite the influence of the institution to shape the continued formation of those values.<sup>114</sup> Army Values are more than a code or system of rules, they tell soldiers what they need to be, every day, in every action they take.<sup>115</sup> FM 22-100 explains this emphasis.

Army values form the very identity of the Army, the solid rock upon which everything else stands, especially in combat. They are the glue that binds together the members of a noble profession. As a result, the whole is much greater than the sum of its parts. Army values are nonnegotiable: they apply to everyone and in every situation throughout the Army.<sup>116</sup>

While institutional values contribute to the formation of standards within the Army, national values also affect morale. They influence people's decision to join the Army, and they motivate the performance of members within the Army. FM 22-100

quotes the words of General of the Army George C. Marshal, “It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the issue. It is morale that wins the victory.”<sup>117</sup>

FM 22-100 explains that the U.S. Constitution reflects the nation’s deepest national values and ensures the protection and preservation of these values for Army members. The national value of freedom accounts for much of the nation’s diversity, but it also ensures opportunities for soldiers to prepare for battle. FM 22-100 further explains the role of national values in preparing soldiers to fight.

Soldiers often fight and win over tremendous odds when they are convinced of the ideals (beliefs) for which they are fighting. Commitment to such beliefs as justice, liberty, freedom, and not letting down your fellow soldier can be essential ingredients in creating and sustaining the will to fight and prevail. A common theme expressed by American PWs during the Vietnam Conflict was the importance of values instilled by a common American culture. Those values helped them to withstand torture and the hardships of captivity.<sup>118</sup>

Using language similar to that of Schein and Sullivan described above, FM 22-100 describes how, over time, “An institution’s culture becomes so embedded in its members that they may not even notice how it affects their attitudes. The institutional culture becomes second nature and influences the way people think, the way they act in relation to each other and outside agencies, and the way they approach the mission.”<sup>119</sup> This description fits with the characteristics of the assumed, invisible institutional values described above.

Although Army doctrine does not label tradition as a value, FM 22-100 shows its vital role in defining boundaries of acceptable behavior and influencing how people approach problems, make judgments, determine right from wrong, and establish

priorities.<sup>120</sup> Tradition shapes Army customs through doctrine, policies and regulations, and the philosophy that guides the institution.<sup>121</sup>

### Team Building as an Assumed Value

The fourth assumed organizational value evident in FM 22-100 is building the team. Team building is an Army priority. Chapter Two of FM 22-100 explains that the Army cannot function except as a team. As a “team of teams” the Army focuses on ways to coordinate the contributions of all its members in order to perform the mission.<sup>122</sup> FM 22-100 explains that this team building priority does not happen naturally; it is a leader responsibility.

The Army’s focus on the team has been a long standing institutional emphasis. FM 22-100 quotes the words of World War II hero, Captain Audie Murphy, “You have a comradeship, a rapport that you’ll never have again... There’s no competitiveness, no money values. You trust the man on your left and your right with your life.”<sup>123</sup> This Army emphasis on team building meets the value criteria established in chapter one.

1. The emphasis of team building within the Army is determined by the institution.
2. The emphasis of team building identifies something the Army considers important.
3. The emphasis of team building establishes a priority.
4. The emphasis of team building helps members choose between options.

FM 22-100 describes several important aspects of team building. It describes the functional requirement for building an Army team made up of organizational teams. It describes the relationship between team building and morale. It also explains the

complex process of team building, leader responsibilities within that process, and the components necessary to build a team.

Team building within the Army is a matter of functional importance. Individual competence is essential, but the Army cannot accomplish the complexity of tasks necessary to fight and win wars unless it masters the art and science of building team synergy. FM 22-100 explains that when people are part of a good team they can complete the mission on time with available resources with a minimum of wasted effort. In combat, that translates into economy of force and unity of effort.<sup>124</sup>

The effectiveness of Army teams is the result of careful planning, good training, effective communication, and the shared intent that produces a collective will.<sup>125</sup> People who know that they are part of a competent, well trained team act on what the team needs; they are confident in themselves and feel a part of something important and compelling. Team members know that what they do matters and so they discipline themselves.<sup>126</sup>

Combat is stressful, and good training requires a simulation of that stress. Units can achieve technical and tactical combat proficiency by building events that demand the performance of collective tasks and require institutional members to work together. If the Army does not train as a team then it will fail when it attempts to fight as a team.

FM 22-100 explains that “as cohesive teams combine into a network, a team of teams, organizations work in harness with those on the left and right to fight as a whole.”<sup>127</sup> The Army believes that this synergy enables it to succeed where isolated excellence may fail. The Army is so convinced of the power of team dynamics that it suggests that organizations should resource their units to achieve balance. FM 22-100

gives an example of this philosophy saying that it is more important to have three good battalions than a single outstanding one.<sup>128</sup>

Team building not only affects individual and unit proficiency, it also contributes to morale. “High morale results in a cohesive team that enthusiastically strives to achieve common goals.”<sup>129</sup> Morale comprised of esprit de corps and individual motivation accounts for the willingness of soldiers to subordinate themselves to the needs of the organization.<sup>130</sup>

The Army Value of selfless service rests solidly on this assumed organizational value of team building. FM 22-100 points out, “People will do the most extraordinary things for their buddies.”<sup>131</sup> Selfless service is itself a virtue not a value. It is a character quality of individuals. Among soldiers selfless service is not apt to result from some inexplicable absolute of self denial. It is much more likely to be a product of effective team building--a result of soldiers performing for the people in their squad or section, for others in the team or crew, for the person on their right or left. FM 22-100 states this as a fundamental truth: “Soldiers perform because they don’t want to let their buddies down.”<sup>132</sup>

FM 22-100 explains that team building contributes not only to unit esprit and individual motivation, but it also produces optimism and positive attitudes of team members even in discouraging circumstances.<sup>133</sup> Such attitudes are infectious and further bond members together. They enable members to see problems as mere obstacles and they lead to greater efficiency of mission performance and a greater probability of mission success.<sup>134</sup>

Team building is not automatic. It is a process that involves deliberate planning on the part of team leadership and willing participation on the part of team members. It requires hard work, patience, and interpersonal skill.<sup>135</sup> It can only begin when leaders have an appreciation for the extraordinary effort the Army's team tasks place on individual members.<sup>136</sup> This relationship of mutual obligation and responsibility forms the recipe that builds trust among members and between members and leaders.<sup>137</sup> A team will not form without this trust, and trust accounts for the creation of the team's collective will.<sup>138</sup>

Team building is a team effort. This means that the leader cannot do it alone. Leaders have to create an organizational climate that allows members to contribute to the process of group growth.<sup>139</sup> The Army relies on team member feedback to facilitate team growth. Feedback enables leaders to see problems from the perspective of their subordinates, and leaders hear recommendations for improvement from those same members.<sup>140</sup> Honest feedback only occurs within an organization that allows people to make mistakes and that looks for ways to help individual members and the collective team to learn from those mistakes. Trust is the bond that makes this kind of collective team building possible.<sup>141</sup>

As Army teams develop, they must constantly integrate new members. This involves the individual technical training essential to bring the performance of new members up to the team standard and the collective training that enables the team to function together with a new member. But there are more than just technical integration requirements when new members join a team. They must also be woven into the team's



circle of trust and sense acceptance by the team. FM 22-100 points out that leaders are responsible for ensuring this happens. It explains the process as follows.

Teams don't come together by accident; leaders must build and guide them through a series of developmental stages: formation, enrichment, and sustainment. This discussion may make the process seem more orderly than it actually is; as with so many things leaders do, the reality is more complicated than the explanation. Each team develops differently: the boundaries between stages are not hard and fast.<sup>142</sup>

Trust requires effective communication. Team members must understand their leader's intent and team leaders must understand the challenges team members are facing. Leaders must clarify missions throughout the ranks by producing an intent, concept, and systematic approach to execution.<sup>143</sup> FM 22-100 points out that team members and team leaders must constantly review their inventory of resources and options to ensure that the entire team understands the current state of operations.<sup>144</sup> Poor communication leads to failure when members of the team do not understand the challenges at hand or the resources and options available. When leaders encourage open communication, they reinforce team values and send a message of trust to subordinates.<sup>145</sup>

### Significance of Army Publications

FM 22-100 is a central document to any study of values doctrine and training within the Army. The manual establishes the Army's leadership doctrine and in so doing it does more than define the seven Army Values. As this review points out, FM 22-100 also provides insight into understanding the assumed organizational values of mission performance, member development, tradition cultivation, and team building.

In an article titled “Developing Great Leaders in Turbulent Times,” published in the January-February issue of *Military Review*, Reimer wrote of these same four values. Although he did not call them organizational values and his terms did not precisely match those used above, his explanation was consistent with these service values. He spoke of them as “constants we must preserve,” and listed them as mission, people, profession, and team.<sup>146</sup> Whether leaders call them constants or values, their primary importance to the institution is obvious, and any study of the Army’s values must consider their emphasis.

TRADOC Regulation 351-10 is another Army document relevant to this study. It prescribes the institutional training and education policies for officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer leader development, and it identifies precommission and preappointment training as integral parts of the Officer Education System. Since the regulation applies to all TRADOC service schools and agencies responsible for officer training and education (including precommissioning), it gives this study a consistent benchmark for TRADOC procedures.

This document is also relevant to the purpose of this study because it establishes roles and responsibilities throughout TRADOC. It describes the role of Cadet Command, Army Management Staff College, and the Total Army School System. It also establishes horizontal alignment between the officer schools, and it refines common core training roles and responsibilities. TRADOC Regulation 350-10 also shows the link between TRADOC approved Common Core Courses and the Common Task Tests administered by units.

### Lesson Materials

Lesson planning materials designed for those Army institutions that teach values are a fourth category of source material. This category includes such documents as training support packages, course syllabi, and programs of instructions. These documents provide a description of how the Army disseminates its values doctrine and how it executes its values training strategy (sixth and seventh subordinate questions). These materials show whether or not the Army's values training strategy is consistent with educational values construction theory. They also provide information that contributes to an assessment of consistency or inconsistency between the Army's values training strategy and the Army's training doctrine. These primary sources also help establish the consistency between the Army's values training strategy and educational values construction theory.

### Related Articles, Papers, and Speeches

Recent articles, papers, and speeches provide this study with the current insights of key individuals such as senior Army leaders, instructors at military educational institutions, and students who have conducted research at the Army War College and the Command and General Staff Officer College. While these research sources are often provocative and controversial, they do address the question of the adequacy of the Army's values doctrine and training strategy to meet emerging challenges.

Five published articles relevant to the topic of this study stand out among recent writings about the Army's values. The first is an article in the autumn 1998 issue of *Parameters* magazine, titled "Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance" by Chaplain (Colonel) John W. Brinsfield. Chaplain Brinsfield briefly traces

the Army's values training developments of the past thirty years and forecasts four challenges he predicts will emerge during the next thirty years.

The second article, also from *Parameters* magazine (autumn 2000 Issue), is titled "The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need for Renewal and Redefinition" by Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins. Snider and Watkins explore the health of Army professionalism and challenge the institution to tend to its declining emphasis on professionalism.

The third article relevant to the topic of this study is a paper presented to The Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics and published on the World Wide Web. This paper, written by Major Michael A. Carlino, titled "Ethical Education at the Unit Level" provides a critical assessment of the Army's values doctrine and training strategy and proposes improvements to the current model.

These articles highlight the importance of a clear, cohesive, systematic values doctrine and training strategy within the Army. All three articles mentioned agree, that as a values based institution, the Army cannot afford to merely react to emerging values challenges.

The fourth article, "Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century," is another article published on the World Wide Web. It was written by three West Point instructors: Professor Don Snider, Major John Nagle, and Major Tony Pfaff. These authors cite several issues that they consider corrosive to Army professionalism.<sup>147</sup> Both web articles address the need to correct deficiencies of the Army's current values strategy.

The fifth article relevant to this study is an article titled “The Wrong Road to Character Development,” written by Colonel W. Darryl Goldman and published in the January-February edition of the *Military Review*. Goldman writes that not just the Army, but the entire Department of Defense is struggling with a dilemma in the wake of misbehavior by men and women in uniform. The dilemma he describes is how to address the need for a “moral compass” in a relativistic society. At the heart of this issue is the challenge of integrating recruits from an increasingly diverse aggregation without the “homogenous values of their grandparents.”<sup>148</sup>

Goldman criticizes the military saying that it is proficient in devising programs that present an appearance of progress without actually getting somewhere. He asks, “If we do not know where we want to get to, how do we know if we are going in the right direction?”<sup>149</sup> Goldman charges that the military is “relentlessly challenging [its young members] to embrace ever-increasing ethnic, racial, gender, religious and cultural diversity, and they are surprisingly elastic. However, we fail to provide these young adults with the training and education required for appropriate cognitive development and change.”<sup>150</sup>

Goldman makes it clear in this article that he believes the Army lacks a vision for effective values training. He blames this lack of vision on a “business as usual” approach that does not reflect an appreciation for the depth of the challenge at hand. He recommends providing a single, coordinated systematic approach to training values to the military’s increasingly diverse population of new members.

Among unpublished works, one particularly relevant paper is a United States Army War College research project, titled “Values Based Organizations: How Does the

Army Stack Up?” by Lieutenant Colonel David R. Brooks. Brooks proposes criteria for judging the success of values based organizations and provides a helpful discussion on the importance of values definition consensus within values based institutions. He points out that it is more important for the members of an institution to agree on a definition of values than it is for them to agree on what those values are.<sup>151</sup> His research provides relevant conclusions that contribute to an understanding of the Army’s values training strategy.

### Summary

Source materials for this study fit within five categories: U.S. Army publications; organizational leadership texts; institutional procedure documents; lesson materials; and recent articles, papers, and senior leader speeches.

U.S. Army publications including regulations, policies, and field manuals are the foundation for this study. Such primary sources as TRADOC Regulation 351-10, *Institutional Leader Training and Education*; FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*; and FM 25-10 answer basic questions about the doctrine and strategies of the Army’s values training efforts.

Organizational leadership texts provide information that validates the adequacy of Army doctrine and its institutional values training strategy. Primary texts include *Organizational Frontiers and Human Values*, edited by Warren H. Schmidt; *Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues*, edited by Thomas Lickona; and *Choices and Decisions: A Guidebook for Constructing Values*, by Michael Bargo Jr.

Army doctrine and training development procedures also address the issue of the Army's values doctrine and training strategy. They define relationships and provide the details that expand definitions.

The lesson materials of Army institutions describe how the Army disseminates its values doctrine and how it executes its values training strategy. Training support packages, course syllabi, and programs of instruction help establish the consistency between the Army's values training strategy and educational values construction theory.

Recent articles, papers, and speeches provide current insights on Army values issues. Credible authors speaking through a variety of media continue to provide source material that can help measure the adequacy of the Army's doctrine and training strategy as it tries to meet emerging challenges.

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<sup>1</sup>Warren H. Schmidt, *Organizational Frontiers and Human Values* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), 5.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 146.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 136.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 132.

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<sup>10</sup>Thomas Lickona, ed., *Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 84.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 92.

<sup>13</sup>Michael Bargo Jr., *Choices and Decisions: A Guidebook for Constructing Values* (San Diego, CA: University Associates, 1980), viii.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., viii.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin, and Joyce S. Osland, *The Organizational Behavior Reader* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, NJ, 1991), 371.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Gordon R. Sullivan, *Hope Is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army* (New York: Broadway Books, 1996), 66.



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<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 67.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 68.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 69.

<sup>40</sup>Malham M. Wakin, ed., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 37.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 39.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 40.

<sup>47</sup>U.S. Army, AR 350-1, *Army Training* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 2-1.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 2-1.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 7.

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 4-1.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>58</sup>Kolb, Rubin, and Osland, 371.

<sup>59</sup>Sullivan, 66.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>U.S. Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), 3-11.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 3-6.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 6-3.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 6-3.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 3-2.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>73</sup>Ibid., 5-23.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 2-25.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., 3-2.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., 3-3.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., 6-27.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., 3-1.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., 5-14.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., 3-3.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., 3-2.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 7-17.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., 3-2.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., E-1.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., E-1.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., E-1.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., E-2.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., E-2.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., E-1.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., 5-14.

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<sup>95</sup>Ibid.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., 3-1.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., 7-17.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., 3-14.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., 3-12.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., 3-14.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., 3-12.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., 6-17.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., 3-12.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., 3-12.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 3-14.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., 2-2.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>117</sup>Ibid., 6-17.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., 2-24.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid., 7-17.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., 3-6.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., 3-1.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., 5-19.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., 3-2.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., 6-18.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., 6-28.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., 3-3.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid., 6-18.

<sup>131</sup>Ibid., 5-20.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid., 5-18-19.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid., 5-19.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid., 5-20.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid., 3-1.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid., 3-2.

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<sup>139</sup>Ibid., 6-17.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., 6-17.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid., 5-20.

<sup>143</sup>Ibid., 6-1-2.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid., 6-28.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid., 6-14.

<sup>146</sup>Dennis J. Reimer, "Developing Leaders in Turbulent Times," *Military Review* 78, no. 1 (January-February 1998): 6.

<sup>147</sup> Don Snider, John Nagle, and Tony Pfaff; *Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century*. Essay written for the Center for the Professional Military Ethic at the United States Military Academy, West Point. Available from the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, 2000, [www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Snider/Snider00.html](http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Snider/Snider00.html). Snider, 3.

<sup>148</sup>W. Darryl Goldman, "The Wrong Road to Character Development," *Military Review* 28, no. 3 (January-February 1998): 62.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid.

<sup>150</sup>Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> David R. Brooks; "Values Based Organizations: How Does the Army Stack Up?" (United States Army War College Strategy Research Project; April 12, 1999), 2.  
<sup>152</sup>

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH DESIGN

#### Areas of Investigation

After proposing an institutional values training model and providing an overview of the institutional values described in Army doctrine, this chapter outlines a systematic approach to answering the primary question. It introduces the five sections of analysis chapter four uses to answer the subordinate questions. These sections include Doctrine and Training Strategy Overview, Training Intent, System Design, Components, and Values System Shortfalls.

#### Values Doctrine and Training Model

##### Introduction

Before proceeding with an introduction of research analysis, this section introduces a values training model in order to clarify terms and the subject of chapter four's analysis. This model is necessary for the following reason. The Army's only established values set, called Army Values, is not an accurate list of the Army's actual values. As chapter two demonstrates, Army doctrine suggests other (assumed) institutional values.

FM 22-100 provides a definition of "Army Values" and establishes the familiar value set that includes loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. The review of organizational theory texts and FM 22-100 supports the chapter one assumption that this list of seven Army Values is inaccurate. While some of the entries in the Army Values set resemble values, the list is not prioritized, and its components are virtues not values. Still, these virtues are relevant to an assessment of the

Army's institutional values. As desired member virtues, they relate to the Army's real member values.

These mislabeled Army Values confuse the values terminology and doctrine. Limiting research to the doctrine's narrow Army Values references would preclude an assessment of the Army's actual values-related doctrine and its values training strategy. An institutional values model helps resolve confusion and improves analysis of the Army's actual institutional values. This model explains how the Army's institutional values fit together, and it illustrates components that influence and contribute to the development of the Army's institutional values.

### Institutional Values

Institutional values are a type of community values. They tell institution members what is important to the institution. The Army's institutional values include two value sets: organizational values and member values (see figure 1).




Figure 1



The Army's organizational values, called "service values" within this study, are the Army's primary value set. The chapter two review of FM 22-100 identifies four service values. This organizational values set includes mission performance, member development, tradition cultivation, and team building (see figure 2).




Figure 2

Army doctrine does not label these four organizational values. They are assumed but foundational to the Army's other subordinate institutional values. Although they are the Army's primary organizational values, other subordinate values exist. Chapter two explains these values and describes their components. These service values are the institutional priorities that ensure the success of the Army organization.

Service values are a product of U.S. national values, the Army's specific military ethos, and the Army's role as an element of national power. These three influences establish what is important to the institution and shape institutional priorities (see figure 3).

The Army's member values, called "soldier values" within this study, are the Army's other important value-set. These soldier values are the institutional priorities that ensure the success of the individual soldier (see figure 4).




Figure 3




Figure 4

Although the seven Army virtues are undisputedly desirable characteristics for the Army's members, Army doctrine does not accurately identify real soldier values. It is beyond the scope of this study to do so; however, chapter four does identify several Army emphases that relate to the Army's soldier values. The following sections explain the relationship between soldier values and other aspects of the Army's institutional values.

### Individual Values

Individual values are the personal values set a person chooses to maintain. They affect behavior, establish habits, and ultimately forge character. The formation of individual values is a complex process involving the external influences of the individual values of other people and such community values as family values, religious values, cultural values, and national values. Individual values include personal values and may incorporate several community value sets including institutional and professional values.

### Development of Soldier Values

When the Army recruits members, it tries to find individuals who have compatible individual values. This is difficult for two reasons. First, most people are unaware of the complex components of their own value sets. A values self assessment is not easy. People seldom attempt to identify their values and many people hold values unconsciously.

The second reason why it is difficult for the Army to limit recruitment to individuals with Army-compatible values is that it is even more difficult to assess the values of others than it is to assess the values of oneself. An assessment of the values of someone else is a complex, subjective process requiring a clear values standard applied to

individual values systems derived from a consistent, shared philosophy. Such a process exceeds the capability of Army recruitment.

The Army has standard questions and simple criteria it uses to screen obviously incompatible candidates. The criteria seek to identify people who espouse U.S. national values. This process is crude and subject to error. Although the family, religious, and cultural values of prospective recruits vary significantly, the Army does not assess these community values.

During recruitment, the Army's values concerns focus on conducting compatibility assessments of prospective recruits in the civilian community. As recruits enter the Army's institutional community, the Army's values concerns shift to training (see figure 5).




Figure 5

The Army continues to invest in values training throughout the individual's service. This process builds on the foundation of the service member's individual values. The Army respects the Army-compatible aspects of the individual's family values, cultural values, and religious values. Service values contribute to the continued development of individual soldier values (see figure 6).




Figure 6

### Sections of Analysis

#### Values Doctrine and Training Strategy Overview

This study begins research analysis by examining the role and function of doctrine within the Army. It looks at those key documents reviewed in chapter two that currently shape the Army's values agenda. This provides the background necessary to understand the context of further research.

This overview addresses the first subordinate question: Does Army doctrine accurately describe the Army's institutional values? It looks at how Army tradition supports the transmission of the Army's values, it seeks to identify the significance of institutional values within the Army, and it identifies the Army's member value emphases. It also considers the second subordinate question: What is the Army's values training strategy?

### Training Intent

This section addresses the purpose of the Army's values training agenda and considers the third subordinate question: What does the Army intend to accomplish through its values training efforts? It examines the purpose to see if it is clear and if it is realistic. It looks at how the Army integrates values training into its leadership development efforts. By reviewing Army publications this section seeks to determine the extent to which the Army intends to train leaders to apply an institutional values system to meet the demands of military leadership.

### System Design

This section examines the design of the Army's values training program. It considers the fourth subordinate question: Is there a single institutional values proponent responsible for ensuring the accuracy of Army doctrine and designing a comprehensive values training strategy? If there is, is it an individual, a committee, or an institution?

It goes on to see if this architect provides a discernible program architecture. In addition, it will consider the following.

1. What is the current structure of the Army's values training program?
2. Can this design meet the established intent?

3. Does the Army design its values training program according to a specific system?
4. Does its content selection seem to be systematic, arbitrary, or random?
5. Is the design consistent with other types of military training?
6. Do the program elements complement the program intent?

It considers these questions by looking at the process of Army doctrine development and the structure of the Army's training systems. It also examines recent values training developments of significance.

### Components

The next step in determining the adequacy of the Army's values training strategy is to analyze the values training components. This section considers the fifth subordinate question: What components does the Army use to train institutional values? It looks at how the Army has organized its values training efforts, and it identifies the primary components of the Army's values training program. It examines the content and approach of the Army's values training programs.

This section looks at the Army's strategy for training values within Army schools and within organizational units. It discusses organizational teaching programs, organizational practice programs, and organizational feedback programs. It assesses the integration of the Army's values training components. It also examines the similarities and dissimilarities between the way the Army trains values and the way the Army trains other subjects.

This section asks the following questions in order to determine the effectiveness of the Army's values training components.

1. Is the Army's values training consistent with the Army's overall training doctrine?
2. Is the Army's values training consistent with the Army's values doctrine?
3. Do the Army's values training efforts reflect considerable familiarity with organizational values construction theory?

Since the approach of training often reflects the system through which an institution derives content, an important part of this research is determining the Army's values doctrinal foundation. This section investigates the basis for the Army's values doctrinal content in order to see what, if any, systematic foundation the Army has for its values doctrine. Findings help define the approach that the Army uses to train values.

#### Values System Shortfalls

This final section of analysis looks for shortfalls within the Army Values training system. It looks to identify what, if any, values training deficiencies may be preventing the Army from accomplishing its values training goals. It looks for any outstanding challenges that currently hinder effective values transmission within the Army.

This section provides the final angle necessary to answer the primary question. The analysis identifies the findings that lead to logical conclusions about the Army's values doctrine and training strategy. This section also facilitates the identification of outstanding issues that require further research.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESEARCH ANALYSIS

#### Areas of Investigation

This chapter analyzes information that addresses the primary question: Are the Army's doctrine and institutional values training strategy adequate to address emerging challenges? It examines the findings described within the literature review in order to answer the remaining subordinate questions. It considers these research questions within the following sections: Doctrine and Training Strategy Overview, Training Intent, System Design, Components, and Values System Shortfalls.

#### Doctrine and Training Strategy Overview

##### The Function of Doctrine

Army regulation states that doctrine is the centerpiece of all Army training.<sup>2</sup> This is true of individual training as well as unit training, values training, and skill training. Leaders are responsible for creating innovative training opportunities that ensure doctrinal consistency.<sup>3</sup> These regulation requirements mean that Army training has centralized standards but decentralized execution. This is key to the success of the Army's total training program.

The Army's values doctrine is widely dispersed throughout its publications, it is often referenced in the speeches of senior leaders, and there is evidence that it is commonly practiced throughout the institution. Still, there is no single document that contains a comprehensive description of the Army's values doctrine. This is due in part to a narrow, ethical, and character related application of the term "values" within Army doctrine. This narrow application of the term keeps Army doctrine writers from

accurately describing the Army's actual institutional values. As the review of FM 22-100 points out in chapter two, Army doctrine does suggest an understanding of the Army's real organizational values, although the manual's failure to label these values shows that the Army's values doctrine is incomplete. As the institutional values model in chapter three demonstrates, these organizational service values are the Army institution's primary values. They account for much of the Army's values training agenda.

### The Function of Tradition

The Army maintains its values primarily through its traditions rather than through its publications. This conclusion is based on three observations. The first observation is that despite the lack of an Army wide comprehensive values model there is significant continuity among senior leader value related statements and between those senior leader statements and institutional practice.

The second observation suggesting that tradition accounts for the primary transmission of the Army's values is the lack of institutional concern for clear doctrinal alignment between official publications that speak to the Army's values. An example of this is the difference between FM 22-100's identification of seven Army Values and FM 100-1's identification of four Army Values. Both documents are current values doctrine sources, published in 1999 and 1994, respectively. If these two documents were the primary sources of the Army's values doctrine, this disparity should be a cause for institutional concern. In practice, however, these discrepancies have not been an issue. Military members searching for the Army's real values seem to look more to the authority of tradition than to the authority of doctrine contained within a field manual in order to find the Army's values.

The third observation suggesting that tradition accounts for the primary transmission of the Army's values relates to the nature of values. Values are guiding principles for an individual or institution. They are both empirical, meaning that they describe what someone or something does, and they are normative, meaning that they describe what the individual or institution ought to do.<sup>4</sup> Values define what is most important to an individual or institution in theory and in practice.

Beneath an institution's identity, values function at the top of the hierarchy that determines the way organizations and members perform and behave. Values contribute to the development of standards by answering the "why" questions of performance. Orders, regulations, and directives follow in this hierarchy and contribute to the development of standards by answering the "what" questions of performance. Finally, doctrine functions at the bottom of this hierarchy and contributes to the process by answering the "how" questions of performance.

Army doctrine must often identify the correct answers to the institution's "why" questions and its "what" questions, but it only determines the answers to the "how" questions. For example, as it relates to training, Army doctrine is concerned with answering the question, How will the Army train? As part of training, doctrine may identify why the Army is training, but it does not determine why the Army is training. That is the job of values. In this case, readiness is the institutional value that explains why the Army is training. As part of training, doctrine will also identify what the Army is training, but it does not determine what the Army is training. That is the job of the mission statement and the Mission Essential Task List.

This means that while doctrine should concern itself with accurately identifying the institution's real values, doctrine is not responsible for determining those values. This institutional values identification must be comprehensive and detailed in order to ensure accurate transmission and adequate inculcation of values throughout the institution. Without this comprehensive doctrinal detail, tradition becomes the primary vehicle for the transmission and inculcation of institutional values.

As the chapter two review of Army publications reveals, Army doctrine does suggest some primary institutional values, but it does not label them or even acknowledge that they are values. The literature review does not find documents that contain a comprehensive description of the Army's values agenda. This suggests that, in the U.S. Army, tradition is the primary vehicle for values transmission.

#### Areas of Interest and Member Value Emphases

As chapter three's institutional values model demonstrates, the Army's institutional values agenda addresses three areas of interest. The first area of interest relates to the alignment of the Army's values with the nation's values. The Army tries to remain consistent with the values evident within the *Declaration of Independence* and the *Constitution*. Those evident values include national independence; preservation and expansion of individual freedoms; individual dignity; equality under the law; and human rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.<sup>5</sup>

The Army also watches contemporary changes within American society to ensure that it not only respects, but that it also progressively reflects America's evolving societal values. Senior leaders are well aware of the dangerous implications of allowing an army to grow apart from its society's value base and risk becoming an anachronistic relic with

its own, independent agenda. They also realize the practical need for values congruity between the Army and its civilian base since the integration of new members is an ongoing institutional requirement. Values incongruity between the Army and the civilian community would hinder recruitment, retention, and effective member integration.

The Army's second area of values interest is its service values. Service values form the framework into which other Army values must fit. The Army's service values are those institutional priorities that ensure that the Army stays on track with its charter in order to accomplish its purpose. Although the Army does not publish a list of service values as the chapter two review points out, FM 22-100 suggests four assumed service values. These include mission performance, member development, tradition cultivation, and team building. These primary values form the value categories that outline what the Army considers most important.

Many other secondary values expand these primary service values. Such secondary values explain how the Army performs its mission, how it develops its members, how it cultivates its traditions, and how it builds teams at every level.

Military leaders and doctrine writers have not identified these priorities as values because they lack the ethical flavor that most people expect values to have. These organizational values instead possess an operational flavor and an organizational focus that many people do not associate with values. Still, unless Army members understand the importance of these primary service values, the Army will struggle. These service values are important. They are priorities. They influence decisions. The Army consciously inculcates these values in its members often without realizing they are

values, and it also unconsciously inculcates these values through the operational, training, and community building priorities it routinely establishes.

The Army's third area of values interest is its soldier values. This area of interest contains the Army's most clearly articulated and deliberately defined elements. The Army Values set belongs to this area of soldier values. As the fourth assumption in chapter one points out, however, the seven Army Values do not fit the chapter one values criteria. These Army Values are virtues, not values.

The Army's actual soldier values are the priorities that the Army thinks its members must maintain in order to become good soldiers. In addition to its Army Values, the Army routinely demonstrates that it has other soldier values that it considers necessary to ensure proper member development. The Army expects its members to pursue these values. It is beyond the scope of this study to identify the components of the Army's soldier values set. Without attempting to produce a definitive list, a review of Army publications reveals several emphases that may suggest some of the U.S. Army's soldier value categories. The Army emphasizes

1. The importance of members demonstrating an appropriate level of consideration for others;
2. The importance of soldiers controlling how they allow issues of sexuality to influence their behavior;
3. The importance of soldiers properly presenting themselves in public--on and off duty, in and out of uniform, on and off post;
4. The importance of soldiers accommodating the needs of family members--their own and others;

5. The importance of soldiers consistently demonstrating competence, efficiency, and legal and ethical behavior--on and off duty;

6. The importance of soldiers accessing resources to prepare themselves mentally, physically, and spiritually for Army operations.

All these Army emphases suggest the existence of unidentified, assumed, soldier values.

The Army has several established programs that it uses to train these values to its members. Most of these programs exist outside of what the Army typically considers institutional values training programs. Soldiers learn that these emphases are important to the Army, not by sitting in a class titled "Soldier Values," but by observing the emphasis the Army places on these subject areas. This emphasis does include formal instruction, but the Army also stresses behavior and practice; assessments, surveys, and evaluations; and integrated training, counseling, and mentoring.

Through tradition and doctrine the Army integrates conscious and unconscious emphases within these three areas of interest. The result is the Army's complex values training agenda. Nowhere do the components of this agenda come together to form an identifiable values training strategy. Nevertheless, the documents reviewed in chapter two suggest that this agenda is widely maintained among the Army's senior leaders.

#### Training Intent

Since the maintenance of the Army's values doctrine seems to occur more through tradition than through a comprehensive description contained in any single document source, it is difficult to determine with certainty the Army's values training intent. Still, the assumptions underlying this study make it possible to identify the probable intent of the Army's values training efforts. FM 22-100 proves to be a valid

source for researching this study's fourth subordinate question: What does the Army intend to accomplish through its values training efforts?

This section seeks to answer this question by examining four areas related to the intent of the Army's values training agenda. It looks for any clear statements of the Army's values training intent. It seeks to identify who establishes the values training intent. It tries to identify the system that forms the basis for the Army's values doctrine. It considers the extent to which the Army expects its recruits to already have a consistent values base when they enter military service.

FM 22-100 provides what seems to be the Army's most direct published statements regarding the intent of the Army's institutional values training. FM 22-100 explains that the Army wants its people to not only *act right*, but to *act right* because they *understand right* and because they want to *do right*. This understanding of *right* and desiring of *right*, according to FM 22-100, is a result of self-development and a realization that the Army's values are worth adopting and living.<sup>6</sup> From this explanation it is obvious that the Army wants a force that America can trust to act correctly with minimum supervision, in the absence of guidance, or in any environment that demands critical decisions with a minimum of external resources. The Army wants its members to be worthy of trust.

FM 22-100 shows that the Army believes this kind of trustworthy force is made up of individuals who have character and who accept the Army's values as their own. This is the clear intent of the Army's values training efforts. The Army needs soldiers who not only have integrated the Army's values into their own personal code, but who act with certainty and confidence on those values.<sup>7</sup>



This values training intent is shared by the Army's senior leaders, and according to FM 22-100, it is a responsibility of leaders throughout the Army to communicate this intent to their subordinates. Leaders are also responsible for ensuring that their subordinates gain the experience necessary to personally validate these values.<sup>8</sup>

These references show that the Army's intent for values training goes far beyond familiarity training, or even a comprehensive understanding of what the Army's values are. The Army intends for its values training efforts to build soldiers from the inside out.

If this is true, it is important to identify the system that forms the basis for the Army's values doctrine. The most effective values sets, individual or institutional, reflect philosophical consistency. The parts of any system must work together or the system will not function. For example, a values system may be based on the philosophical framework of a religion, or it may be rooted in an egalitarian philosophy, or some other secular, modern, or classical system of thought. The bottom line concern in values development is consistency and institutional relevance. It must facilitate the institution's reason for being. As reviewers examine the appropriateness of any values system, they must balance philosophical consistency and relevance.

In his autumn 1998 *Parameters* article "Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance," John Brinsfield discusses this issue as it influenced the writing of FM 22-100. He reveals that as draft documents were circulated among doctrine writers and ethicists, there was a concern that the document would either lack philosophical consistency or be a "hodgepodge of ethical principles, a mix of individual and organizational values held together by many diverse historical illustrations."<sup>9</sup>

While some writers contend that the Army arbitrarily chose its seven Army Values based on the fact that they form the acronym LDRSHIP,<sup>10</sup> this is not the case with the Army's assumed organizational values. These organizational values, identified in chapter two, consistently reflect the philosophy of a warrior ethos as described in Wakin's *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*. These four values are also consistent with the kind of functional relevance Sullivan described in *Hope Is Not a Method*.

The Army's member values are not as clear as its organizational values. In contrast to the philosophical consistency of the Army's organizational values, the Army's illusive member values are more functional and reactive. While this study has not attempted to identify the Army's precise member values set, or the priorities such a set might reflect, it has identified those emphases, listed earlier in this chapter, that suggest some of the member value concerns the Army has for its soldiers.

Several Army writers including Goldman,<sup>11</sup> Carlino,<sup>12</sup> and Brinsfield<sup>13</sup> suggest that these emphases reflect a disjointed and reactionary agenda designed to train soldiers away from controversy and not necessarily toward a prioritized system for determining those most important things that will help soldiers pursue their potential. These emphases and the current Army Values set grew out of an Army environment marked with growing moral and media tensions through the decade of the 1990s. What some may refer to as the emergence of an exaggerated concern for political correctness, Brinsfield describes as follows:

The application of civil laws to the military over the course of 20 years, at first to combat racism and sexism, had opened the door to endless litigation . . . Writers of Army doctrine found themselves asking whether proposed statements might

result in civil law suits . . . For the third time since the end of World War II, the Army undertook the task of determining and explaining its values, and the rationale for those values, in a new statement of the Army ethic.<sup>14</sup>

These concerns did not produce a clear set of soldier values that would tell soldiers what is most important and outline soldier priorities that would help them make decisions. Instead, these concerns led to a sequence of what seemed to be a randomly released emphasis on values related aspects of equal opportunity, sexual harassment, and such legal issues as fraternization and military ethics. In an era that promises increasingly confusing choices, soldiers need something more, but they need it in a simpler package.

The Army expects young people who enter service from a wide range of cultural backgrounds to possess individual value systems that reflect cultural diversity.<sup>15</sup> This diversity is the result of many different kinds of family models, religious convictions, philosophical beliefs, educational systems, and personal experiences.<sup>16</sup>

The Army believes that these differences do not prevent competent service or undermine the effectiveness of the Army institution. To the contrary, the Army considers this diversity to be a source of strength.<sup>17</sup> While this may be true, Army doctrine does not explain why or how this diversity is a source of strength.

Despite its appreciation for diversity, the Army does expect some common values. FM 22-100 lists the criteria for service as “a value system that does not conflict with Army values.”<sup>18</sup> This is the minimum standard but the Army prefers to get recruits who have a values set that affirms American national values. At their induction into service, all soldiers take an oath that initiates their commitment to the Army’s values, stated and assumed. The process of learning and living those values guides soldiers through the remainder of their Army career.

## System Design

### Dispersion

Values training within the Army is decentralized. This means that units at every level are responsible for planning, conducting, reviewing, and assessing training. This is consistent with other forms of Army training. Unlike other Army training, however, the development of values training is dispersed. This means that no single organization is responsible for designing or improving the Army's institutional values doctrine or the Army's institutional values training strategy. There are several reasons why this responsibility is dispersed.

The first reason for this dispersion of responsibility is the distinctive nature of values doctrine. Values doctrine is fundamentally different than other types of Army doctrine. Army doctrine is generally prescriptive by nature. This means that it prescribes how to *be* or *do*. As it relates to tactics, for example, doctrine developers examine the different ways to fight, identify the best way, and feed that information back to commanders in the form of doctrine. Values doctrine, in contrast, is descriptive. It is not about *determining* what the values are; it is about *identifying* what the values are. That is difficult for most doctrine writers who do not typically have extensive training in organizational theory and behavior.

The second reason for this dispersion of responsibility is that no single agency is responsible for determining the Army's values. Institutional values are dependent on the Army's identity, and they are determined by the institution and not an agency within the institution. Factors that influence the Army institution's determination of values include

the Army's response to its mission, its function within American society and the global environment, its emerging technologies, and its military ethic.

The third reason for this dispersion of responsibility is its breadth of scope. The Army's values are an Army-wide product and they affect everyone. Most of the Army's institutional proponents have an interest in shaping the Army's values training strategy. Many offices including the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODSOPS), the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), the office of the Judge Advocate General (JAG), the office of the Chief of Chaplains (COC), the Equal Opportunity (EO) office, and several service schools have something to contribute to the process of value identification. All of them have an interest in examining the topic from their perspective. Because no single agency owns the field of values, no single agency is exceptionally qualified to write the Army's values doctrine.

The result is that no single office is the proponent for the Army's institutional values doctrine or for developing a comprehensive values training strategy. As it stands now, several offices have significant influence within the process and others contribute to programs that teach secondary values.

To understand its complex design, it is necessary to look at the tributaries that have influenced the system that shapes the Army's values doctrine and training strategy. These tributaries include the process of Army doctrine development, the Army's training system, and significant values related developments in 1997.

### The Process of Army Doctrine Development

The process of developing U.S. Army doctrine begins with the assignment of a doctrine proponent. This assignment usually goes to an organization within TRADOC that has a functional relation to the topic.

The proponent coordinates with force developers across the Army to make sure that emerging doctrine is integrated into the combat development process. It reviews the contributions of commanders and staffs to see how doctrine and training affect mission performance. These reviews look at lessons learned from Army service schools, unit exercises, Combat Training Center evaluations, major commands, and field surveys. The proponent then integrates this information into emerging doctrine concepts and produces the initial draft of the new doctrine manual.<sup>19</sup>

Before any draft document becomes official doctrine, it is circulated throughout TRADOC to ensure accuracy, continuity, and consistency with other existing and emerging doctrine. The proponent receives comments, corrections, and recommendations, and makes the appropriate revisions. The TRADOC Commanding General must review and approve the final draft before sending it to Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) where it becomes Army doctrine.

### The Army's Training System

The Army Training system is a complex and extensive system that includes everything the Army does to train its members and organizations. It encompasses individual and unit training as well as school and field training.

The extraordinary breadth of this system precludes a comprehensive analysis within this narrow study; however, a brief description of several key components

demonstrates how the Army's complex training system contributes to the challenge of developing an effective values doctrine and training strategy within the Army.

These key components include two major participants with general oversight and responsibilities affecting all aspects of Army training. It also includes three other sources of influence with more limited roles.

All Army staff agencies participate in the Army's training system. The heads of these staff agencies influence the overall policy that governs military education and training in the Army, but the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) has the lead in this process.<sup>20</sup> He is the first major participant in the Army training system.

The DSCOPS establishes the specific policies that govern Army training. He serves as the chairman of the Standards in Training Commission and reviews Army training requirements annually.<sup>21</sup> His office defines concepts, strategies, resources, policies, and programs for the Army's training. His office approves Army training programs and Common Military Task (CMT) training requirements.

The DCSOPS also makes the policies that govern soldier and leader training, and it establishes individual training requirements for subjects, such as Code of Conduct training, over which he serves as the proponent.<sup>22</sup> He also validates the training requirements of other proponent agencies.<sup>23</sup> The DCSOPS coordinates with the DCSPER to develop the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) products including policies and programs that support training. This coordination is supposed to ensure compatibility, logical integration, and the right training priorities.<sup>24</sup>

The TRADOC Commander is the next primary participant in the Army training system. He controls training development and instruction throughout TRADOC institutions, and he is responsible for developing and standardizing training doctrine for Army units.<sup>25</sup> He develops and updates the Combined Arms Training Strategy, designing descriptive strategies for unit training and prescriptive strategies for school training. He projects long term strategies for training in units and schools, and he sets the priorities needed to execute training throughout the Army.<sup>26</sup>

As the proponent for the training standardization policy, TRADOC attempts to ensure consistent, realistic training standards throughout the Army.<sup>27</sup> TRADOC designs, develops, and distributes training programs and products that support individual and unit training. These training programs and products include school curriculum, soldier training publications, correspondence courses, computer based training, self development tests, and even contracted soldier training courses.

TRADOC also reviews recommendations for additions and deletions of training conducted at Army schools. It reviews proposed changes in course prerequisites, curriculum, and course length. TRADOC also approves the Programs of Instruction (POIs) of all Army schools, and it monitors the cumulative impact of POI changes to ensure the right distribution of resources throughout TRADOC.

Based on input from the field and coordination with Army major commands (MACOMs), TRADOC develops training programs, curriculum, and instructional materials that support training in field units.<sup>28</sup> TRADOC provides the training model for all Combat Training Centers (CTC) and manages the enlisted, warrant officer, and officer individual training programs.



The DCSOPS and the TRADOC commanders are the two major participants in the Army training system. Their authority and responsibilities outline the framework and define the content of the Army's training. In addition to these two participants, there are three other sources of influence with more limited roles.

The DCSPER has significant influence in the Army training system. His influence is particularly evident in the area of values training due to three important responsibilities.

First, he supervises the Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) in managing the professional development of active duty soldiers and Army civilians. This includes exercising Army Staff responsibility for leadership.<sup>29</sup> Leadership is the doctrinal subject area that currently accounts for most of the Army's values doctrine.

The second DCSPER responsibility that significantly influences values training has to do with his relationship to the officer precommissioning curriculum. The DCSPER develops policy for direction, control, and approval of the curriculum for officer precommissioning courses.<sup>30</sup> Although TRADOC develops the curriculum, DCSPER writes the policy that guides its development, and he must approve it before it makes its way into the precommissioning institutions.<sup>31</sup> In addition to Army Values training, the precommissioning training curriculum includes the other values related subjects taught throughout the Army. The influence of the DCSPER's policies and curriculum input determines the institutional values comprehension of all new officers entering the Army.

The third DCSPER responsibility that significantly influences the Army's values training comes out of its Human Resources Directorate. This directorate is the proponent

agency for many of the values related subjects trained Army-wide. These subjects contribute to the transmission and inculcation of the Army's assumed soldier values.

In addition to the separate influences of the DSCOPS, TRADOC, and DSCPER , training proponents also contribute to the complexity of the Army's training system. Whenever the Army decides to train a subject, it assigns a proponent agency responsible for developing the programs that will train that subject to the standard of Army doctrine.

The assignment of a training program proponent is closely aligned with, if not the same as, the doctrine proponent for that subject. New subject proposals require a preliminary assessment of the requirements for time, instructor training, equipment, publications, training aids, and other resources needed to conduct the instruction effectively.

Proponents for each program outline and justify specific learning objectives and identify who is to receive the training and why. Proponents submit these proposals to HQDA for review.<sup>32</sup> They then coordinate with ODCSOPS, TRADOC, and the service schools to make sure that the required references, training aids, and instructor experience are available to conduct the training."<sup>33</sup> This process requires proponents of new training to communicate regularly with ODCSOPS throughout the training development process.<sup>34</sup>

Commanders also contribute to the complexity of the Army's training system. Commanders influence the Army training system at the strategic, operational, and direct levels.

The training decisions a commander makes determine the quality and effectiveness of all Army training. The decentralized nature of Army training means that

individual commanders have a greater opportunity to influence individual and unit training within their commands.

Commanders publish METLs and set the conditions and standards for subordinate units and their staff. They also publish quarterly training guidance that includes long range training calendars. They develop unit missions, goals, training philosophies, and training strategies. They allocate resources to support training plans. They also decide what training their subordinates receive by deciding how far to go in protecting subordinate units from unprogrammed taskings or outside training requirements.

Commanders ensure that their subordinates understand and use the appropriate training management tools including field manuals, publications, and relevant components of the Combined Arms Training Strategy.<sup>35</sup> They plan and conduct training to Army standards, evaluate proficiency, and build component training requirements into collective training events that train several things to multiple levels of command simultaneously.<sup>36</sup>

Commanders also provide feedback to proponent agencies, TRADOC, and the DCSPER. This feedback may be direct in the form of recommendations or lessons learned, or indirect through the conclusions senior leaders make based on training statistics gathered from around the Army.

#### Significant Developments of 1997

In response to several moral scandals within the Army, 1997 became a year of significant, institutional, values related developments. The year began with a Sexual Harassment Chain Teaching Program conducted Army-wide. At the same time, the Army Senior Review Panel conducted a review of Sexual Harassment within the Army,

and the Inspector General conducted an inspection of sexual harassment policies and procedures within Initial Entry Training. The Army released both reports that spring. Based on the conclusions of these two sources, the Army published its Human Relations Action Plan to address key findings and recommendations of the reports.<sup>37</sup>

The goal of this action plan was to improve the human relations climate within the Army by encouraging an environment of dignity and respect and by combining individual talents to provide team success.<sup>38</sup> The plan suggested a focus on three areas of concern. First, it suggested improving Army institutional values. Second, it suggested improving soldier awareness of how individual actions affect others. Third, it suggested implementing programs that would contribute to increased respect between Army members of different races, creeds, genders, and ethnic heritage.

The action plan was an effort to enable soldiers to understand the link between their actions toward others and their unit's ability to accomplish the mission. The Army wanted to create an environment wherein America's young men and women could achieve their own highest potential.<sup>39</sup>

That same fall Reimer introduced a video called "Living Army Values" and published a pamphlet titled *Leadership and Change in a Values-Based Army*. These initiatives stressed the principles of teamwork, discipline, and values. The Army also revised its evaluation reports to increase the emphasis on values and ethics and began an extensive revision of AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, to strengthen human relations emphases within every command.

The Army made several additional, significant, internal organizational changes. The Chief of Staff appointed the DCSPER to serve as the Army's staff agency with

responsibility for leadership, leader development, and human relations. He created a Human Relations Task Force under the authority of the DCSPER, and he named a brigadier general to serve as the director of the Army's Human Resources Directorate within the office of the DCSPER.

By the fall of 1997 the Army's emphasis on improving human relations led to several new programs. The Army added a week of formal values training to the curriculum of Basic Training. As part of their precommissioning curriculum, cadets also received increased emphasis in officer values at the Military Academy, Reserve Office Training Course (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School.

The Army also increased its media emphasis on values through its literature, on internet websites, on promotional posters, and through the Army values cards which leaders issued to soldiers. Leaders encouraged soldiers to carry these cards in their wallets and wear them on their identification chains (dog tags).

### Components

#### Overview

As shown earlier in this chapter, the Army's stated institutional values doctrine does not clearly describe the Army's actual institutional values. This prevents the formation of a single training strategy that ensures the conscious, comprehensive training of the Army's institutional values. If the Army does not identify the information it wants to train, it cannot develop a supraliminal strategy to train what it has not identified. This does not mean that the Army is not adequately training values. It does mean that it is not consciously training its most important values.

The Army transmits and inculcates its values largely through tradition. It trains its values through its professional traditions as well as its cultural traditions. This study does not examine the ways in which the Army uses tradition to instill its values in its members. It does look at how the Army deliberately trains values whether consciously or unconsciously.

There is a difference between deliberately training values and consciously training values. To deliberately train values means that the institution knows what it wants to train, but it hasn't necessarily identified the training content as values. To consciously train values means that the institution has identified the training content as values. For example, the Army can deliberately train mission performance as its premier value without being aware that mission performance is a value. It is deliberate training, but it is not conscious values training. The soldier can learn it and use it as a value without ever realizing it is a value.

The Army's deliberate training efforts include many values training components that work together, not because they are part of a clear published strategy, but because of the strength and influence of the Army's traditions that hold these components together. These components are developed by different agencies, they are administered independently of each other, and they are not always recognized as values training programs. Still, they do train values, and they are deliberate Army programs.

The Army's deliberate values training begins with an individual's first exposure to the Army. Potential recruits begin to recognize the Army's values as they are exposed to recruitment campaigns through the media and personal attention of recruiters and the

soldiers they know. Cadets begin to see the Army's values as they study in ROTC or the Academy.

When a person stands up to take the oath of induction, whether as an officer or as an enlisted member, he or she decides to commit to the Army's values even without a full understanding of those values or what that commitment entails. This decision to commit to the Army's values means that the individual adopts the Army's institutional values set and begins the on going process of learning the Army's values and making them his or her own.

Although Army doctrine does not categorize its training programs, FM 22-100 mentions three ways that leaders teach values: "Army leaders must teach their subordinates moral principles, ethical theory, Army values, and leadership attributes. Through their leader's programs, soldiers and DA civilians develop character through education, experience, and reflection."<sup>40</sup>

These categories of education, experience, and reflection correspond to the three categories of organizational leadership development described in the Command and General Staff Officer School (CGSOC) Leadership text, *Fundamentals of Excellence: Character and Competence Advance Book*. These three programs include study programs, practice programs, and feedback programs.

This CGSOC text is not Army doctrine but it is produced by CAL, the same department that wrote FM 22-100. As a CGSOC text, it contains some of what the Army wants its field grade officers to know about leadership and the Army's values. This makes it a valid source for understanding how the Army intends to train values related topics within its organizations.

This section describes some of the Army's values related programs, introducing them according to four categories. These categories are school training, organizational teaching, organizational practice, and organizational feedback. Although Army doctrine does not explicitly state that it trains values using these four methods, it does state that it trains values in its schools and in its units.

The first of the following categories separates what the Army does to train values in its schools from what it does to train values in its units. The last three categories are based on the three categories of education, experience, and reflection and the corresponding categories of study, practice, and feedback mentioned in FM 22-100 and *Fundamentals of Excellence*, respectively.

### School Training

The Army deliberately trains values in its schools. FM 22-100 states, "A trained and ready Army rests on effective leader development."<sup>41</sup> It goes on to explain that this development relies on a foundation of the right values, and that value foundation is reinforced by the training of the Army's schools.

Basic Training is the first school training enlisted soldiers receive in the Army. During Basic Training soldiers undergo deliberate values training. This includes a forty-hour Army Values Program of Instruction (POI) as well as the deliberate integration of values training into all other aspects of Basic Training. Since the Army school system is designed to provide formal education and training for job related and leadership skills, the Army expects soldiers to take the values integration skills they learn in Basic Training and use them throughout their military service.<sup>42</sup> This approach is consistent with the



practical emphasis that organizational values construction experts say is the most effective way to train values.

The Army's school system is progressive. This means that soldiers must work sequentially through the appropriate school at the right time in their career. Soldiers learn foundational values in Basic Training, and then go on to learn more complex values in follow on schools.<sup>43</sup>

Since the Army's interest in providing school training is to support the organizational value of member development, the Army exposes soldiers to school training intermittently throughout their career. This intermittent exposure gives soldiers an opportunity to learn new skills in schools, and then return to their units to practice those skills and integrate them into training for the Army's missions. As soldiers acquire new responsibilities, the Army sends them back to schools to learn new skills.

This progressive, intermittent nature of the Army's school system enables Army traditions to build interlocking layers of new values exposure and experience. Soldiers go to schools to learn what the Army thinks is important, and then they return to their units to practice those values.

After Basic Training enlisted soldiers continue to learn the Army's values at the Advanced Individual Training (AIT) course, and then later at the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC), the First Sergeant Course, and the Sergeant Major Academy.

Following their precommissioning training, officers continue to learn the Army's values at the Officer Basic Course, the Army Career Course, CGSOC, and the Army War

College. These schools conduct formal courses in the Army Values, but they also train the Army's assumed institutional values through other subjects.

The Army also has several schools available to soldiers of all ranks that teach values. Such schools as Basic and Advanced Airborne Schools; Air Assault School; Ranger School; Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) School; and Special Forces Assessment and Selection train values through a curriculum that exposes students to hands-on training through real life stress. Organizational values theory states that this is the most effective means of training values.

### Organizational Teaching

Teaching programs are the first category of values related training programs typically used within Army organizations. The Army uses classroom instruction within units to teach soldiers about important values related subjects. This instruction can include lecture, interactive discussion, multimedia illustrations, case studies, and in some situations role playing. Organizations tend to rely primarily on internal assets to conduct these classes. Course topics include the Army Values, Consideration of Others, Sexual Harassment, Fraternalization, Code of Conduct Training, Character Development, Law of War, Military Ethics, Suicide Prevention, Army Family Advocacy, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, and others. They are usually conducted as part of the Army's CMT training.

The Army has six categories of CMT task subjects including program training, mission training, refresher training, integrated training, awareness training, and time sensitive training. Most of the Army's values related training fits within three of these six categories: program training, refresher training, and awareness training.

Program training is training that applies to the majority of soldiers. It is the Army's most structured training. As part of Initial Entry Training (IET) it must closely follow an approved POI. It has a prescribed maximum number of hours, specific learning objectives, and it concludes with an evaluation of learning.<sup>44</sup> Code of Conduct training and Equal Opportunity training are examples of values related program training conducted during IET.<sup>45</sup>

Field units also conduct program training according to a prescribed schedule and the standards recommended by subject proponents and determined by ODSCOPS. The values related training field units conduct seldom fits within this category of training. Possible exceptions include the requirement to conduct Army-wide chain teaching in response to a new directive.

In addition to program training, commanders use refresher training to emphasize training that soldiers have already received. Refresher training usually reviews and reinforces IET. Commanders at every level determine the frequency of refresher training. AR 350-1 lists Equal Opportunity training and Code of Conduct training as part of refresher training in field units.<sup>46</sup> Other recent values related additions to unit refresher training include such subjects as Consideration of Others and Sexual Harassment training.

In some cases commanders impose values related refresher training requirements on their subordinate units. As part of their command policy, they may identify an annual requirement, such as Suicide Prevention training. At other times, commanders require subordinate units to conduct values related refresher training in response to specific incidents or trends such as sexual harassment, increased gang activity, or perceived racial

tension within a community. Commanders use refresher training to support unit cohesion, discipline, and morale.<sup>47</sup>

Awareness training is the third category of training, and the one most commonly associated with the Army's values related training. Since the Army doesn't consider awareness training to be "critical task based," it recommends conducting it through briefings and orientations designed to increase knowledge and awareness in subject areas.<sup>48</sup>

Based on their assessment of the need, commanders determine how and when to conduct this training.<sup>49</sup> Awareness training tends to be the most decentralized and unstructured form of individual training. Unit moral ethical development training is an example of values related awareness training.<sup>50</sup>

The Army does not require units to maintain training records for most of these subjects; however, commanders often maintain soldier and leader training records to assist in developing the unit training program. First line leaders maintain leader books to record administrative information, personal information, and soldier proficiency in military occupational specialty areas, common tasks, collective tasks, and drills that support performance of the unit METL. The Standard Army Training System offers a format for maintaining information in the leader book but leaders can use any format. Information in a leader's book is not transferred with the soldier on reassignment.<sup>51</sup>

### Organizational Practice

As the words of Reimer quoted at the beginning of chapter one indicate, when it comes to values training, "One shot is not enough. We must have a sustained program in the field and it must be more than just classroom instruction. We must make values come

alive for all soldiers.”<sup>52</sup> Organizational assignments give soldiers that experience. They provide countless opportunities for soldiers of all ranks to practice the institutional values they’ve learned about in Army classes.

FM 22-100 points out that organizational assignments enable soldiers to gain and expand an experience base through performing a wide range of duties and tasks under a variety of frequently changing conditions and situations.<sup>53</sup> This is the most powerful kind of values training, the opportunity to learn by doing.<sup>54</sup>

This values training category of organizational practice is too situationally varied and includes too many components to describe fully within the scope of this section. There are, however, several types of activities within this category that commanders routinely use to deliberately train institutional values. These include activities that shape the unit climate and Army culture, training exercises, qualification training, and spiritual fitness activities.

Activities that shape the unit climate and Army culture are deliberate, but generally invisible values training devices. They include the enforcement of standards of appearance, military bearing and conduct, physical training, and organizational teambuilding activities. FM 22-100 explains that leaders must create a climate in which everyone is treated with dignity and respect. The way the leader lives the Army’s values shows soldiers how they should live those values.<sup>55</sup>

Many people fail to see these activities as deliberate values training programs. The Army’s standards for how soldiers look and act have a significant impact on the Army’s soldier values. FM 22-100 states that in recent years, “The Army has redefined what it means to be a soldier.”<sup>56</sup> It explains that by introducing height and weight

standards, raising PT standards, emphasizing training and education, and deglamorizing alcohol, Army leaders have fundamentally changed not only the appearance of American soldiers and the way they perform but also the Army's institutional culture.<sup>57</sup>

These activities do help the Army transmit and inculcate its values. For example, standards of appearance are typically considered more a matter of uniformity than of values. Uniformity is part of the Army's interest in enforcing standards of appearance, but the Army's interest in standards of appearance also reflects the Army's institutional values. The Army wants its people to look a certain way, always. A concern for uniformity alone does not account for the Army's real concern with how soldiers dress off duty, while not in uniform.

An August 1998 change to AR 670-1 established a new standard for the appearance of soldiers on and off post. The change prohibits male soldiers from wearing pierced earrings while in uniform, in civilian clothes while on duty, or at any time on a military installation or other place under military control regardless of attire and duty status.<sup>58</sup>

By prescribing proper attire for off duty male soldiers, this policy demonstrates that soldier uniformity is not the only reason the Army cares about its people's image. This regulation reflects an institutional value or at least a value common among the senior leaders who approved the regulation.

Not only does the Army want its people to appear a certain way while on duty, but it wants them to look a certain way off duty as well. This regulation discourages male soldiers from adopting an appearance that runs counter to the values of the senior leaders within the institution. This suggests that consistent member appearance is one of

the Army's assumed soldier values. This would explain a regulation that seems to suggest that a violation of this value at anytime on or off duty can undermine the Army's effectiveness. The level of enforcement of this regulation by junior leaders will reveal whether or not the regulation reflects an actual institutional value.

In addition to conducting activities that shape the unit climate and Army culture, commanders routinely use training exercises and range qualification to deliberately train values. FM 22-100 explains how direct leaders use field training to build discipline in their units and develop the values of their soldiers. It says they can use mastery of equipment and doctrine to train their subordinates to standard. This creates and sustains teams with the skill, trust, and confidence to succeed--in peace and war.<sup>59</sup>

FM 22-100 further advocates organizational practice as a valid device for training values when it says, "The Army's values form the foundation on which the Army's institutional culture stands. They also form the basis for Army policies and procedures. But written values are of little use unless they are practiced."<sup>60</sup> The organizational unit provides the environment that enables soldiers to practice these values.

Army doctrine stresses the importance of using hands on learning as a training method because realistic conditions help people learn.<sup>61</sup> The Army's institutional values are no exception to this principle of hands on learning. FM 22-100 states, "First, you must motivate the person to learn. Explain to the subordinate why the subject is important or show how it will help the individual perform better. Second, involve the subordinate in the learning process; make it active."<sup>62</sup>

Field training exercises and range qualifications provide some of the most realistic opportunities for soldiers to apply the conceptual skills needed to determine the

best way to accomplish a mission. They introduce scenarios that require soldiers to practice and test their institutional values. They challenge individuals to identify the right thing to do, and they challenge teams to collectively improve team cohesion and their team performance.

Spiritual fitness training is one more practical device that commanders sometimes use to deliberately train values within their units. American Army commanders have long regarded the role of spiritual fitness as essential. At the end of World War II, General George Marshall described the role of spiritual fitness.

I look upon the spiritual life of the soldier as even more important than his physical equipment. It's morale--and I mean spiritual morale--which wins the victory in the ultimate, and that type of morale can only come out of the religious nature of the soldier who knows God and who has the spirit of religious fervor in his soul. I count heavily on that type of man and that kind of Army.<sup>63</sup>

Following the Gulf War, Sullivan also expressed profound appreciation for the role of spiritual fitness in any unit. Within the now superseded 1991 version of FM 100-1, Sullivan stated,

Courage is the ability to overcome fear and carry on with the mission. Courage makes it possible for soldiers to fight and win. Courage, however, transcends the physical dimension. Moral and spiritual courage are equally important. There is an aspect of courage which comes from a deep spiritual faith which, when prevalent in an Army unit, can result in uncommon toughness and tenacity in combat.<sup>64</sup>

Not only have commanders long understood the importance of spiritual fitness, but Army Regulation also directs commanders to actively promote spiritual fitness within their units through such initiatives as human self development activities, spiritual fitness activities, and family support activities.<sup>65</sup> These spiritual fitness events are non-sectarian and therefore they are distinct from the unit chaplain's religious support activities.<sup>66</sup>



Spiritual fitness training provides soldiers with interactive opportunities to enhance their spiritual fitness. It uses activities that encourage them to reflect and practice a lifestyle based on the qualities soldiers need to sustain themselves and each other during times of stress, hardship, and tragedy.<sup>67</sup> The Army recognizes that personal conflicts arise when a soldier's actions do not support his or her stated values.

Although not everyone in the Army recognizes the potential for a well developed spiritual fitness training program to contribute significantly to values training, it is one of the greatest tools a commander can implement to enhance values congruity within his command. FM 16-1 states, "Spiritual fitness training strengthens the soldier's faith, will, and hope."<sup>68</sup>

Within every organization, direct leaders serve as the primary trainers. This is as true for values training as it is for training individual skills, tactics, or staff procedures. The Army's organizational leaders create the organizational environment that enables individuals and teams to implement training through near-real-world conditions. The same conditions that make for good tactical training also make for the most effective values training. "The best way to improve individual and collective skills is to replicate operational conditions."<sup>69</sup>

### Organizational Feedback

Feedback programs are the third category of values related training programs typically used within Army organizations. Leaders contribute to improving an organization's values by providing the proper role model for subordinates and by establishing an effective learning environment.<sup>70</sup> To do this they must create a climate that encourages honest, constructive feedback that enables healthy unit and individual

assessments. The Army uses two types of feedback programs to train values. These include unit feedback programs and individual feedback programs. These two terms are descriptive of doctrinal practice but the terms themselves do not appear in doctrine.

Unit feedback programs include those devices that enable leaders to see and understand the values strengths, weakness, and issues within their units. Commanders have several resources they use to help them understand the level of values proficiency within their units. These include subordinate leaders, EO managers, the staff judge advocates (SJAs), provost marshals, Family Advocacy personnel, inspector general officers, and chaplains. All these people can assist the commander with values training and assessments, but the ultimate responsibility for training values within the unit remains with the commander.<sup>71</sup>

Subordinate leaders serve as the commander's primary sources of feedback. Through routine discussions, meetings, reports, and briefings, subordinate leaders give the commander information that he can use to assess the effectiveness of values training within the unit. Based on this routine information he receives from subordinate leaders, commanders can identify individuals and subordinate units who manifest incongruence with the Army's service values, and he can also identify individuals whose performance does not suggest consistency with the Army's soldier values. In addition to this routine flow of information, commanders and subordinate leaders also communicate directly to address values training issues that surface.

Subordinate leaders occasionally provide commanders with important values feedback through after-action reviews following training. The Army routinely uses after-action reviews to assess the quality and effectiveness of training and to identify

performance strengths and weaknesses. While most units use after-action reviews to assess technical and tactical proficiency, few units recognize how these after-action reviews can help them assess values and isolate values related problems within the unit. The Army does not usually identify values inculcation as a training objective during tactical field exercises, but they potentially are an effective, deliberate values training tool.

The Equal Opportunity manager provides the commander with feedback that relates to member values training within the unit. His reports usually do not contain information that would enable a commander to assess the effectiveness of organizational values training within the command. Most of the information he reports to the commander reflects value weaknesses. Although some Equal Opportunity reports reflect positive trends, the nature of the report tends to identify negative incidents and trends in the area of human relations.

The information the SJA, the provost marshal, and Family Advocacy provide the commander is less routine than most of the commander's other values feedback resources. These sources report almost exclusively negative information. The SJA, provost marshal, and Family Advocacy give the commander information on specific situations involving individual or unit legal violations that indicate values problems. This information comes to the commander in the form of briefs, updates, and reports, including daily blotter reports. Commanders can use this information to identify trends or possible deficiencies within the unit's values training program. In some cases commanders may see exactly where a failure resulted from inadequate values training--that is soldiers trying to do the right thing, but confused about what that right thing is.

The inspector general (IG) conducts assessments of training management Army-wide. These assessments look at how training policy is being implemented and how it affects readiness, sustainability, and the units' ability to fight. These assessments look at training resources and provide feedback to commanders that is designed to improve the efficiency of training.<sup>72</sup>

Chaplains provide commanders with a unit values assessment different from any of the commander's other sources of information. As a member of the commander's personal staff and as a confidential resource for soldiers, the chaplain has direct access not only to the commander, but also to the soldiers down to the lowest ranking member of any unit. While the chaplain must guard confidential communication carefully, he sees and hears things that enable him to assess the effectiveness of values training within the command, and to identify specific areas of strength or weakness.

Since 1998 commanders have had an additional feedback device that contributes to their assessment of values training within their units.<sup>73</sup> The Ethical Climate Assessment Survey (ECSA) examines morale, teamwork, and communication within a unit. While it is designed to evaluate the ethical climate within a command, the information it derives is also useful for assessing the values training effectiveness within a unit and for improving the unit's values training plans. AR 600-20 introduces the requirement for commanders to conduct climate assessments within 90 days of assuming command.

FM 22-100 suggests three uses for the ECAS. First, commanders may use it to assess ethical aspects of their own character and actions. Second, commanders may use it to assess the ethical climate of their workplace. Third, commanders may use it to

assess the ethical climate of their external environment. Once they have done their assessment, the manual explains how leaders can prepare and carry out a plan of action that focuses on solving unit-internal problems and informing their higher headquarters about unit external problems that they cannot influence.<sup>74</sup>

As FM 22-100 states, “Army leaders train values by creating organizations in which the Army values are not just words in a book but precepts for what their members do.”<sup>75</sup> Unit values assessments give the commander insight into the effectiveness of the unit’s values training program. The commander can identify positive trends and exploit them to enhance successful training. If he identifies negative indicators early, he can address them through training improvements in order to prevent their spread.

Individual feedback programs are the third type of program that the Army uses to train values. Individual feedback programs are those devices that enable soldiers of every rank to see and understand their own values strengths, weaknesses, and issues. Counseling, evaluation reporting, and mentoring programs are the most common individual feedback programs used Army-wide.

Counseling is the most frequent feedback mechanism soldiers have for assessing their values development. The Army counseling program is designed to give every military member a quarterly assessment of their professional performance. Based on these assessments soldiers identify how well their performance meets their rater’s expectations.

Soldiers may use counseling feedback to identify performance strengths and weaknesses that result from occasions when their values are or are not aligned with the values of their rater and the Army. Soldiers may be working hard, but if their emphasis is

in the wrong area their performance suffers. Such improper emphasis may be the result of poor values development. If soldiers have not properly prioritized what is important, then counseling may identify this weakness. Raters and counselees need to be careful to distinguish between performance weaknesses that result from improperly aligned institutional values and between weaknesses that result from poor initiative or weak skills.

Evaluation reports are another feedback device soldiers have for assessing their values development. Evaluation reports function in much the same way as counseling, but they are generally only given once a year, they are much more formal, and they are a part of the soldier's permanent career record. This makes evaluation reports a less effective tool for addressing minor values issues, but they are useful in helping soldiers identify major values conflicts. Soldiers whose evaluation reports indicate that their personal values are seriously at odds with the Army's institutional values can choose to modify their values or to leave the service.

Mentoring is a third feedback mechanism soldiers have for improving their values development. FM 22-100 states that soldiers who are mentored learn to internalize Army Values.<sup>76</sup> The manual describes mentoring as a leader-subordinate relationship that helps the subordinate develop individual attributes, learn the skills, and master the actions required to become leaders of character and competence themselves.<sup>77</sup> This process requires the focused attention of a leader who is responsible for observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, counseling, and evaluating the subordinate. Mentoring is the Army's most informal individual values feedback device, but it is the most personal, and therefore, one of the most effective.

Army values training begins with the environment of school training, but it also relies heavily on organizational training. At the unit level the Army's values training uses internal assets to conduct values related classes: EO officers train Consideration of Others, JAG personnel teach ethics, and chaplain resources conduct spiritual fitness classes.

Institutional values tell institution members what is important. Institutional values provide a template that leaders can apply to a situation in order to make a decision. Good institutional values should be simple and clear, but they should also be expandable. As leaders grow in their understanding of institutional values they become better decision makers, better communicators of institutional perspectives, and better transmitters and trainers of the institution's priorities.

#### Values System Shortfalls

The Army is concerned with its institutional values training. Senior leaders talk publicly about the Army's values. Basic training initiatives demonstrate the Army's commitment to instill institutional values within new recruits. DA directives also reveal the Army's intent to ensure on going values development throughout the ranks. But, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the Army does not have a clear institutional values model, an accurate values doctrine, or a single values strategy for training values to its members. This, together with the confusion of values terminology and the dispersion of values training responsibilities throughout many separate programs, contributes to the complexity of the system that the Army uses to train values.

In addition to these weaknesses, the current, complex system that trains the Army's institutional values has two other significant shortfalls. First, while Army doctrine promises that Army Values will help military members make decisions, the seven Army Values most people consult seldom deliver on that promise.

FM 22-100 states,

Army values remind us and tell the rest of the world – the civilian government we serve, the nation we protect, even our enemies – who we are and what we stand

for. The trust soldiers and DA civilians have for each other and the trust the American people have in us depends on how well we live up to Army values. They are the fundamental building blocks that enable us to discern right from wrong in any situation.<sup>78</sup>

Despite such statements the Army Values do not often help soldiers make decisions or discern right from wrong. This is because the Army Values set does not capture the Army's current institutional values. In fact, according to the definition and criteria established in chapter one, the Army Values set does not contain real values. The Army Values do not fit the values criteria. They do not help institution members make decisions. Selfless service, for example, sounds hollow to a soldier who has been told that his service is about "being all he can be." Selfless service is even less effective as a value when issued to a soldier who believes that he is "an army of one."

This is not to suggest that selfless service is unnecessary or that the Army's recruitment campaigns are inappropriate. Both recent recruitment campaigns accurately and appropriately emphasize the Army's organizational value of member development.

Selfless service does not function well as a member value. This is because it is a virtue, not a value. An emphasis on selfless service does not help a soldier facing a difficult circumstance make the right decision. It does not tell him what is important to the institution or clarify institutional priorities. Of ten options in any given situation, an evaluation of the selflessness of each of the options offers little to help the soldier make the right decision.

If a soldier tries to use selfless service as a value template in making a decision, he may walk away from the situation doubting the integrity of Army leaders. Soldiers, who hear that they are the Army's "credentials," are confused when they attempt to apply



selfless service as a value. On the other hand, if soldiers understand selfless service as a virtue, they can appreciate it as an internal character check, guarding against self seeking motivation, even when it does not help them make a decision.

FM 22-100 does acknowledge the weakness of Army publications when it says, “The right action in the situation you face may not be in regulations or field manuals.”<sup>79</sup> FM 22-100 points out that these publications are “designed for the routine, not the exceptional.”<sup>80</sup> The manual goes on to say that one of the most difficult tasks facing leaders is determining when a rule or regulation does not apply because the situation falls outside the set of conditions envisioned by those who wrote the regulation.<sup>81</sup>

Here FM 22-100 depicts Army Values as more of an obstacle intended to block wrong decisions than as a tool to help soldiers make the right decisions. Here, it is apparent that the Army Values do not provide real help for soldiers trying to understand the institution’s priorities. Accurate institutional values would help by reminding leaders what is important to the Army.

The second, significant shortfall of the Army’s current values training system is its inability to inform current institutional debates. This is due to the Army’s narrow values focus, its inaccurate values language, and its lack of an institutional values model.

One current institutional challenge is the Army’s need to define its distinctive military ethic. Many texts highlight the relationship between the military ethic and an army’s organizational values. This relationship is vital to any army’s identity and continued development.

Although there are shared components, an army’s military ethic is not the same as an army’s organizational values. The military ethic is general; it provides the philosophical foundation armies use to build their institutional values. The military ethic outlines principles that become an army’s organizational values. The four assumed U.S.

Army values identified in chapter two are primary principles taken from the military ethic. Unlike institutional values, military ethic principles are not prioritized. They are, therefore, not values.

Mission performance, member development, tradition cultivation, and team building are universal principles of the military ethic. It is likely that they will appear among the institutional values of any army. The prioritization of these principles, however, depends on the identity of the specific military institution. Which of these principles an army considers most important depends on how that army identifies itself.

The nature of a military's missions, the nation's values, international security forecasts (what types of threats are expected), tactical doctrine, and technological developments contribute to this identity. Whether a military sees itself as an offensive force, a defensive force, or a constabulary force influence which of its values has precedence.

In their article titled "Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century," Snider, Nagle, and Pfaff describe a significant values debate currently on going within the Army.<sup>82</sup> This debate seems to be caused in part due to a perceived shift in the Army's organization value priorities. Some military members are concerned that the Army's priorities are currently unstable and may continue to shift in an undesirable direction.

The Army has always maintained mission performance as its first organizational value.<sup>83</sup> The other three values may have changed positions as threat levels, national values, and doctrine have changed over time and as changing generational value shifts

have influenced national values. The priority of team building has declined, and the priority of member development has increased.

As long as the U.S. Army remains either an offensive or defensive force, mission performance will remain as the Army's foremost organizational priority. There is evidence though, that some military members believe that the Army's primary value of mission performance is being threatened by values subordinate to the Army's member development value, particularly those values related to soldier safety.

If the Army transitions to become a constabulary force in order to accommodate new mission types and lower global threat assessments, then the Army's current organizational value priorities could change. Such a shift in priorities would be fueled by two factors. The first is American national values that already have a high regard for the individual. Emerging generational values suggest an even stronger emphasis on individual development. The second factor is the Army's emerging new doctrine that forecasts the employment of smarter weapons with enhanced remote control capabilities.

These two factors could lead to new organizational value priorities that would result in the elevation of member development to replace mission performance as the Army's primary value. Mission performance would be subordinate to soldier safety, which is a component of member development. Such a shift would be unprecedented in U.S. military history and would affect mission capabilities and international perceptions of the U.S. Army's effectiveness and lethality.

Even if this does not occur, Snider, Nagle, and Pfaff suggest that the possibility of its occurrence does exist. If this becomes a widespread concern among military members, it would affect morale Army-wide. For this reason, the Army must continue to

define itself and monitor value implications of transition decisions as it moves through change in the twenty-first century.

### Synopsis

This chapter has examined the Army's doctrine and some of the Army's values related training programs. It has discussed how the Army understands institutional values, how it establishes values training requirements, and how it intends to conduct institutional values training. This examination has provided most of the information necessary to answer the primary question of this study.

Values training occurs as soldiers receive the clear values messages the Army disseminates through official publications and other media. Values training also occurs as soldiers assimilate the values messages that emanate from day to day garrison and field training experiences and as a result of the professional ethic to which they are exposed. Finally, values training occurs through the deliberate values training events conducted within Army units.

An institution's real values define the institution. The Army Values set does not. Army Values do not say what the Army is and what the Army does. Instead, they are qualitative. They list quality standards the Army expects of its members.

The Army's current definition of values prevents the conscious evolution of a comprehensive institutional values model. It prevents constructive discussion and keeps the institution from inventing an appropriate apparatus that would review the effectiveness of values training, study values training theory, and develop necessary improvements to the Army's institutional values training programs.

These deficiencies result in numerous separate, independent initiatives that provoke competition for resources; lead to the confusion of values training issues, guidance, and policies; and hinder constructive training.

The gradual initiation of the Army's revised values training program in the late nineties may account for some of the apparent holes in the program's implementation. Without clarity in the inter-relationship between values related training components, leaders cannot conduct consistent training programs that ensure adequate Army-wide training to standard.

The effectiveness of the Army's deliberate values training strategy depends on the accuracy of doctrine. Although the Army does have an effective strategy to train what it thinks is important, it does not identify that training as values training. The Army does not always maintain consistent priorities, and some resulting, values dependent choices become confusing.

Army doctrine reflects the difficulty senior leaders have in explaining how the elements of the Army's values related training components fit together. This lack of clarity undermines the effectiveness of institutional values training. It often obscures the most important point of the training: how the subject at hand contributes to individual soldier and collective unit readiness.

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<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army, AR 350-41, *Training in Units* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1993), 11.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>4</sup>John Dalla Costa, *The Ethical Imperative: Why Moral Leadership Is Good Business* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998), 23.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-1, *The Army* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 15.

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1999), E-2.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, 7-17.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>John Brinsfield, "Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance," *Parameters* 28, no. 3 (autumn 1998): 78.

<sup>10</sup>Michael A. Carlino, "Ethical Education at the Unit Level," (Paper presented to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, Washington, DC, 27-28 January 2000), 2, accessed online 11 September 2000, available from the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, 2000, [www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Carlino00.html](http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Carlino00.html), Internet.

<sup>11</sup>Goldman, 62.

<sup>12</sup>Carlino, 2.

<sup>13</sup>Brinsfield, 69-84.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>15</sup>FM 100-1, 11.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 2-22.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 2-24.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup>U.S. Army, AR 351-1, *Individual Military Education and Training* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 13.

<sup>20</sup>AR 350-1, 4-1.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-1.

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<sup>22</sup>AR 350-41, *Training in Units* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 1.

<sup>23</sup>AR 351-1, 7.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>26</sup>AR 350-41, 3.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>28</sup>AR 351-1, 9.

<sup>29</sup>AR 350-41, 2.

<sup>30</sup>AR 351-1, 8.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>32</sup>AR 350-1, 4-1.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-1.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-1.

<sup>35</sup>AR 350-41, 5.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>37</sup>Gerry J. Gilmore, "Panels: Army to Re-emphasize Leadership Principles," *ArmyLink News*, September, 1997, accessed online 20 February 2001, available from [www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/SEP1997/a19970911srpigrpt.html](http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/SEP1997/a19970911srpigrpt.html); Internet.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>FM 22-100, E-2.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 5-14.

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 5-14.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 5-14.

<sup>44</sup>AR 350-1, 4-2.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 4-5-6.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 4-5-6.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 4-2.

<sup>48</sup>AR 350-41, 32.

<sup>49</sup>AR 350-1, 4-3.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 4-5-6.

<sup>51</sup>AR 350-41, 11.

<sup>52</sup>Dennis J. Reimer, “Memorandum for All Army Leaders” (Washington DC: Department of the Army, July 21, 1997).

<sup>53</sup>FM 22-100, 5-14-15.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 5-14-15.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 2-5.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 7-18.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 7-18.

<sup>58</sup>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, ST 27-1, *Military Law* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), 4-4.

<sup>59</sup>FM 22-100, 4-14.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 7-17.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 5-26.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.



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<sup>63</sup>Robert Gushwa, *The Best and Worst of Times: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1920-1945* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 1977), 157.

<sup>64</sup>FM 100-1, 17.

<sup>65</sup>U.S. Army, AR 600-63, *Army Health Promotion* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 4.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup>U.S. Army, FM 16-1 *Religious Support* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), 1-8.

<sup>69</sup>FM 22-100, 4-13.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 5-27.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 5-23.

<sup>72</sup>AR 350-41, 3.

<sup>73</sup>FM 22-100, 2-22.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, E-2.

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*, 2-22.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, 5-15.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, 2-2.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-8.

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup>Don Snider, John Nagle, and Tony Pfaff; *Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century*. Essay written for the Center for the Professional Military Ethic at the United States Military Academy, West Point.

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Available from the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, 2000,  
[www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Snider/Snider00.html](http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Snider/Snider00.html). Snider, 3.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., 4.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

#### Summary

This study has demonstrated that the Army's attempts to identify its institutional values within its doctrine reflect a narrow understanding of the term values. The Army Values set shows that doctrine focuses on the moral and ethical dimensions of individual character, but the review of organizational texts shows that institutional values should have a broader application. An institution's real values not only affect ethical decision making, they affect every decision institution members make.

The Army's limited application of the term values contributes to institutional confusion regarding the Army's values and its efforts to train them. As the review of FM 22-100 demonstrates, Army doctrine suggests but does not label the Army's assumed organizational values. Doctrine does not clearly reveal the Army's actual member values. Despite this confusion, senior leaders maintain the Army's actual institutional values as assumed values. By not labeling these institutional values, however, Army doctrine denies soldiers and junior leaders the clear description they need to understand the Army's institutional values.

#### Answer the Questions

This study has focused on answering the primary question: Are the Army's doctrine and its institutional values training strategy adequate to ensure that the future force can meet emerging challenges? Chapter one outlines the eight subordinate questions that guide the research in collecting information needed to answer the primary question.

Chapter two reviews several types of literature to find relevant information. It examines organizational theory texts in order to identify principles of institutional values construction theory. It also reviews the Army publications that contain the Army's values doctrine. This review reveals that Army doctrine suggests but does not label four assumed organizational values that are consistent with organizational values construction theory.

Chapter three introduces an institutional values model based on chapter one's definitions and chapter two's identification of relevant principles of institutional values theory and the Army's four assumed organizational values. Chapter three also introduces the design for research analysis.

Chapter four provides the research analysis. It describes the role and function of doctrine, the key role of tradition in the transmission of the Army's institutional values, and the Army's member value emphases without identifying the Army's actual member values. It describes the Army's values training intent and explains the complex system that transmits and inculcates the Army's values. Chapter four then explains how the Army uses three types of programs to train values to its members. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of how these components work together within the Army's overall training environment.

These chapters answer the subordinate questions and provide the information necessary to answer the primary question. By applying this information to the adequacy criteria established in chapter one, this study may now answer the primary question: Are the Army's doctrine and its institutional values training strategy adequate to ensure that the future force can meet emerging challenges?

As chapter one established, “adequate” is determined by

1. A clear, accurate doctrinal description of the Army’s institutional values;
2. The presence of an identifiable, institutional values training strategy with an accountable proponent, clear components, and reasonable intent;
3. Consistency between recognized educational values construction theory and Army training doctrine.

The review of Army doctrine publications in chapter two reveals that the Army does not have a clear, accurate doctrinal description of its institutional values. The research analysis in chapter four shows that the Army does not have a stated, comprehensive, institutional values training strategy, and there is no single institutional values proponent.

Although, as chapter four explains, the complex system that trains the Army’s institutional values does have many components, their relation to the Army’s institutional values is not clearly stated and their relationship to each other is seldom explained. While the values training intent identified in chapter four is reasonable, the Army is unable to ensure its accomplishment without linking it to a strategy.

Since the Army’s doctrine does not provide a clear, accurate description of the Army’s institutional values, there are obvious inconsistencies with educational values construction theory and Army training doctrine. Separately, however, the individual training components and the different types of values training do show significant consistency with both theory and doctrine.

Based on the established criteria, this study concludes that the Army’s doctrine and its values training strategy are not adequate to ensure that the future force can meet

emerging challenges. While this conclusion addresses the adequacy of Army doctrine and the Army's values training strategy, it does not evaluate the adequacy of tradition to ensure successful values transmission.

### Meeting the Challenges

This study's conclusion does not necessarily mean that the Army cannot meet emerging challenges. As described in chapter four, the Army's tradition and its members account for the Army's current values training success despite doctrinal ambiguity and values confusion within the institution.

The Army is a large organization with a long history, and as chapter two points out, it relies extensively on the engine of tradition to accomplish its values training agenda. Army tradition is strong, and so far, it has guided the institution's transmission of values. The strength of Army tradition and the professionalism of Army members may continue to bring the Army success in meeting these challenges. There is, however, much room for improvement, and there are several reasons why the Army must now improve its values doctrine and develop a comprehensive values training strategy.

First, the current system is vulnerable. The complex system that transmits the Army's values is not clear. If the Army's senior leaders are unable to explain it through doctrine, then soldiers and junior leaders must find it even more confusing. Such confusion undermines accurate values transmission and effective values inculcation.

Second, soldiers need clear doctrine. Soldiers who know and understand the Army's values have a stronger foundation for appreciating the role and implications of their professional responsibilities. Clear values doctrine enables soldiers to improve their technical proficiency and make difficult decisions, even under stressful circumstances.

Third, current practices are corrosive to morale. Soldiers who know the institution's most important priorities have higher morale and feel a stronger sense of

collective purpose and institutional connection with fellow members. An understanding of institutional values brings people together and motivates their performance. When members know the institution's primary value, they understand that subordinate values must yield to it. When the Army's values are properly prioritized and trained, every soldier can perform with consistent integrity and confidence despite the confusing stress of changing peacetime operations or combat.

Fourth, the Army is facing change. Missions are increasingly diverse. Technology is changing, systems are changing, doctrine is changing, and even the Army culture is changing. Times of transition are particularly important moments for doctrine. As tradition also evolves, the Army risks losing its tradition dependent functions if they are not reflected in doctrine. The Army must capture these functions in its doctrine to ensure that they continue into the future. The Army's doctrine must be clear enough to carry the Army through this period of change.

Fifth, as the Army moves toward transformation, current leaders are responsible for shaping not only the institution, but also the next generation of leaders. To do this, they must accurately describe where the Army is and cast the clearest possible vision of where the Army needs to go. Institutional values clarity is essential throughout this process.

FM 22-100 quotes Sullivan's words,

In an organization like ours, you have to think through what it is that you are becoming. Like a marathon runner, you have to get out in front, mentally, and pull the organization to you. You have to visualize the finish line--to see yourself there--and pull yourself along--not push--pull yourself to the future.<sup>1</sup>

This process requires senior leaders to develop doctrine and improve the training methods that support it.<sup>2</sup> Leaders must visualize the sequence of activities that will move the organization from its current state to the desired end state and must express that vision as simply and clearly as possible.<sup>3</sup> Senior leaders must define the Army's professional absolutes by stating the Army's values as required actions, not as desired virtues.

When soldiers see that their leaders know, understand, and are able to clearly communicate what is important to the Army and what the Army's priorities are, even in the face of conflicting circumstances, it inspires soldier confidence in the leaders, in the institution, and in themselves.

#### Recommendations for Further Study

The Army's institutional values doctrine and training strategy are broad topics. This study has answered its primary question. In doing so, it has introduced several new questions and identified other questions requiring further research. The following is a list of questions requiring further study:

1. What should the Army do to correct its institutional values related doctrinal deficiencies?
2. What must the Army do to develop a single, effective institutional values training strategy?
3. How does an increase in multi-cultural influences affect the Army's values doctrine and its values training strategy?
4. What is the U.S. Army's military ethic?



5. How do different military mission types affect the identity of the U.S. Army and its distinctive military ethic?

6. Does the Army's values training strategy need to develop special accommodations for training values transgenerationally?

### Requirements

In order to establish an effective institutional values doctrine and training strategy, the Army must determine the philosophical foundation on which the institution's values rest. The U.S. Army builds its values on the foundation of a military ethos and the philosophy underlying its nation's *Declaration of Independence* and its *Constitution*. The integration of these two philosophies is a necessary part of developing consistent Army values.

At the same time, the Army must manage the tension inherent in remaining a strong military power within a modern civilized society. The U.S. Army must balance the military demand for lethality with the national desire for peaceful security. The management of this tension requires clear institutional values.

As the Army accurately identifies its institutional values, it must identify and label its organizational values and its member values and develop a distinctive military ethic unique to the Army's role in the modern global community.

This military ethic should be based on military philosophy and the warrior ethos, not the philosophies of a civilian ideology, religion, or a reactionary accommodation of media driven political correctness.

The military ethic is difficult to discuss during times of peace because offensive and defensive missions require actions that a peacetime culture find unpalatable. In

recent years during times of relative world peace, information powers have extended a campaign of global goodwill in order to enhance societal evolution, political alliances, and a global economy. In this environment many informed citizens find the discussions required to define the Army's military ethos to be backward, brutal, and even disdainful.

Few people like to consider that the Army's role often requires it to kill people and destroy things. It is easier to shift the focus to the Army's security and stability roles, demand the moral and ethical behavior of its members, and allow each leader and soldier to develop a personal military ethos that balances military requirements with personal values.

This approach may be easy for the institution; however, as Sullivan pointed out in *Hope Is Not a Method*, leaders must take responsibility for clearly outlining the institution's values. They must resolve issues of values confusion and establish a clear, consistent, institutional philosophy.

#### Final Thoughts

The Army needs to develop a clear institutional values doctrine. Maintaining assumed values and relying upon a shared culture as the primary means of inculcation will not ensure that the future force can adequately meet emerging challenges.

If, as so many senior leaders have stated, the Army's values are central to everything it does, then values inculcation must be a conscious objective in every kind of training. Values training should not be confined to a separate curriculum. It is most effective when it is integrated into the Army's mission focused training. There, it is realistic; there, soldiers see its relevance; there, its intent is clear.

Clear values training can greatly enhance the efficiency of all Army training. Rather than asking people to memorize volumes of regulations, good values training identifies what is important, establishes priorities, and asks soldiers to apply those priorities in various real world contexts. The Army's values training must not only teach soldiers principles, it must also show them opportunities where they can begin to practice applying these principles. The most effective values training encourages conscious application.

Values training does not need to be one program, but it must be a well integrated system of multiple components with one proponent responsible for reviewing components and recommending changes to the program proponents of participating programs. It should be well developed, simplified, and thoroughly trained at rank appropriate levels throughout the Army.

FM 22-100 offers Army leaders many valuable insights into the Army's institutional values. In it is a reminder that the Army's values training efforts extend beyond the content of any institutional programs, and they affect the nation:

And in the end, the Army returns its people back to the nation. America's sons and daughters return with their experience as part of a winning team and share that spirit as citizens. The traditions and values of the service derive from a commitment to excellent performance and operational success. They also point to the Army's unwavering commitment to the society we serve. Those characteristics serve America and its citizens--both in and out of uniform--well.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), 6-5.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 7-24.

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 6-5.

5 <sup>4</sup>Ibid., 2-22.

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