THE HUNGARIAN ARMY SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
FORCES IN PEACE OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

ARNOLD KOLTAI, CPT, HUNGARY
B.S., Lajos Kossuth Military Academy, Szentendre, Hungary, 1993

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2001

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.
Name of Candidate: Captain Arnold Koltai

Thesis Title: The Hungarian Special Reconnaissance Forces in Peace Operations

Approved by:

_________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
LTC Mark A. Beattie, B.S.

_________________________________________, Member
Dr. Harold S. Orenstein, Ph.D.

_________________________________________, Member
LTC Jody M. Prescott, J.D., LL.M.

Accepted this 1st day of June 2001 by:

_________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE HUNGARIAN ARMY SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE FORCES IN PEACE OPERATIONS by CPT Arnold Koltai, 108 pages.

Ever since the collapse of the world of the bipolar opposition between the former USSR led Warsaw Pact and NATO, political and military leaders have been facing a different security environment with overwhelming instability and uncertainty. In this environment peaceful states are endangered by erupting conflicts in different regions in the world. Eventually, leaders shifted their attention from global confrontation to regional conflicts in which they must be evermore politically and militarily involved to restore and keep peace. Hungary is currently modernizing its forces to become more compatible with NATO and enhance its defensive capabilities. NATO forces, including Hungary, are currently deployed in peace operations in the Balkans. Hungary has particular interest in the success of peacekeeping in the Balkans because it borders on the region and is directly affected by the instability of the area. The Balkans, given their nature and history, are likely to remain one of the primary areas into which NATO peacekeeping forces are deployed in the foreseeable future. Hungarian and multinational peacekeeping experiences, in the Balkans and elsewhere, show that the use of special reconnaissance forces (SRF) would increase interoperability of Hungarian forces with other NATO forces in peace operations. The Hungarian Ministry of Defense should build upon the existing Hungarian SRF structure and capacity to create an immediately deployable SRF capability, which would increase interoperability and give the political and military leadership another option Hungary could use in offering forces to NATO missions, thereby enhancing Hungary’s participation in NATO in general, and interest in the Balkans specifically.

The study concludes that Hungarian SRF could improve Hungarian interoperability with NATO forces in peace operations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank my family for being patient with me, and putting up with the long night hours I had to spend in relative peace putting this project together. Secondly, I would like to thank my Hungarian friends and colleagues who have helped me sending all the necessary information from home, without which this project would have been impossible to complete. Finally, special thanks go to my committee: my chairman LTC Mark A. Beattie, Dr. Harold S. Orenstein, and LTC Jody M. Prescott. Throughout the project, LTC Beattie, LTC Prescott and Dr. Orenstein were tremendous help in keeping me encouraged and focused to meet the requirements of the program.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES AND FIGURES IN TEXT AND APPENDIXES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO. HUNGARY’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE BALKANS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE. THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE FORCES</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR. HUNGARIAN PEACE OPERATIONS</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE. ANALYSIS</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. FIGURES</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. TABLES</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCE LIST</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table

1. Hungarian Territories Given to Successor States ................................................. 21
3. Comparison of Conventional and SRF Capabilities in Peace Operations .............. 71
4. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Employing SRF in PO .............................. 76
5. Expenditure-Strength Comparison Between the Land and Air Components ....... 79

Tables in Appendix

6. Data of Small Arms Used by SRF. ................................................................. 98
7. MI-8 data ...................................................................................................... 98
8. MI-17 data .................................................................................................... 99
9. MI-2 data .................................................................................................... 99

Figure

1. Hungary Before and After the First World War .................................................. 19
2. Hungary’s Territorial Losses after World War I. ................................................ 20
3. Hungary’s Regained Territory After Entering World War II .............................. 22

Figures in Appendix

4. The Subordination of SRF Units....................................................................... 96
5. The Structure of the 34th Recon Battalion ......................................................... 96
6. Special Reconnaissance Company structure (34th Battalion) ............................ 97
7. Special Reconnaissance Company of the 24th Recon Battalion ....................... 97
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AASSLT</td>
<td>Air Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF(L)</td>
<td>Allied Mobile Forces (Land)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Air Traffic Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>Battle Damage Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDL</td>
<td>Below Division Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZ</td>
<td>Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Command and Control and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2S</td>
<td>Command and Control and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQB</td>
<td>Close Quarter Battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAR</td>
<td>Combat Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Direct Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>Drop Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMJ</td>
<td>Full Metal Jacket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWF</td>
<td>Former Warring Factions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>High Altitude Low Opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDF</td>
<td>Hungarian Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEC</td>
<td>Hungarian Engineer Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGSC</td>
<td>Hungarian Guard and Security Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>Headquarters Headquarters Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVO</td>
<td>Croat Defense Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVT</td>
<td>High Value Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFF</td>
<td>Identification Friend or Foe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRF</td>
<td>Immediate Reaction Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbr.</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>Light Antitank Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRSU</td>
<td>Long-Range Surveillance Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>Landing Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUT</td>
<td>Military Operations in Urban Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNDSE</td>
<td>Multinational Division South East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNDSW</td>
<td>Multinational Division South West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Observation Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEVAL</td>
<td>Operational Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPFOR</td>
<td>Opposition Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operation Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIFWC</td>
<td>Persons Indicted for War Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Peace Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Physical Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVT</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRB</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Intelligence Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>Satellite Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETAF</td>
<td>Southern European Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Sergeant First Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPABRI</td>
<td>Spanish Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Special Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Special Reconnaissance Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACEVAL</td>
<td>Tactical Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Target Force Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>Very Important Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XO</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOS</td>
<td>Zone of Separation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

In 1989, the world experienced one of the most significant changes of the second half of the twentieth century. The fall of the Berlin Wall, among other things, ended the Cold War and turned the political world upside down, leading to global arms reduction and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Hungary played a significant role in these changes by opening the Iron Curtain that had kept her sealed from the West, and by allowing the unification of many families that had been separated during the former regime. With this move, Hungary decided not only to set its course towards the West, where she has always belonged both culturally and spiritually, but also to play an active role in the development and security of the Euro-Atlantic region. With the fading of the world of bipolar opposition involving the former USSR and the US, the threat of a global armed conflict has been reduced to a minimum. At the same time, however, the danger of ethnic- and religious-based regional conflicts and instability has dramatically increased and grown more complex.

Hungary’s security is affected by the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and the political, social, and economic events that happen within it. Besides ethnic and religious tensions, other problems, such as organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, demographic issues, and the lack of democratic developments, raise potential risks for instability, especially in the Balkans. Hungary, therefore, together with other former Warsaw Pact countries, has been participating in different military programs, for example, Partnership for Peace (PfP), international arms control and nonproliferation programs, the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and the Open Skies
program, to enhance and strengthen the stabilization process in the Euro-Atlantic, and Central and East European regions. Part of Hungary’s contribution to this effort is the conduct of peace operations (PO), for example, in the Sinai Peninsula, Bosnia, Kosovo and Cyprus, to mention only a few.

Hungary is currently modernizing and restructuring its forces to be able to better meet the new security challenges and become more compatible with NATO forces. As are many other NATO countries, Hungary is contributing its share to the peacekeeping effort in the Balkans. Hungary has particular interests in the success of the stabilization process, not only because it borders on the area, but also because it has socio-political and economic ties with the region, and is, therefore, directly impacted by the instability of the region.

Given the history and nature of the Balkans, it is likely that this will remain the primary area to which NATO peacekeeping forces will be deployed in the foreseeable future, and that Hungary will be part of this effort. Although Hungary has been involved in peacekeeping operations for only a decade, experiences in the Balkans and elsewhere have indicated that use of special operations capable special reconnaissance forces (SRF) would increase the interoperability of Hungarian forces with other NATO forces in peacekeeping missions. This thesis, therefore, intends to recommend and encourage the creation of an immediately deployable SRF capability that could improve interoperability with NATO forces, thereby enhancing Hungary’s participation in NATO in general, and its interests in the Balkans specifically.
Background

Hungarian Interests and Goals in the Balkan Region

Of the seven states bordering Hungary, four, including Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Romania are part of the Balkan region. It is primarily these neighboring states with which its political, security and economic interests are bound. A high priority goal is to develop stable, cooperative, and good-neighborly relations; the conditions for developing this sort of relationship with Yugoslavia will be created through its democratization, in the context of, among other things, settlement of the Kosovo conflict. NATO and the European Union (EU) are the defining actors in the stabilization and democratic transformation of the region. Hungary, as a NATO member and prospective EU member, has an interest in bolstering the efforts of regional states to make further economic and democratic strides and to increase their cooperation with integration organizations, such as PfP, to prepare for EU accession, and to support the open door policy of these organizations.

Following Hungary's eventual accession to the EU, the boundary of integration will run between Hungary and its southern and eastern neighbors. It is in Hungary's national interest to make sure that the integration boundary -- while fulfilling its indispensable law-enforcement, economic, and security functions -- does not form a barrier in the relations Hungary maintains with the ethnic Hungarian communities across the borders, and that it enables the benefits and stabilizing effect of the integration to be extended. Hungarian foreign policy must seek a balancing role between the states of the region-states, which are different in their respective levels of development and orientation, and are also, occasionally, at loggerheads. It must ensure that, over the long
term, the region develops stable and well-balanced state-to-state relations, with no room for regional dominance of any sort (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary 1999, Chapter II, Paragraph 2/a-e).

To Hungary, the Balkans is a historically important area, likely to represent a natural economic sphere of interest in the future as well. Even after the reorientation of Hungary’s external economic relations in the 1990s, and despite the conditions of the Yugoslav wars, some 6 percent of Hungarian exports are directed at this region, which corresponds to the level of the 1980s, and surpasses the share of Hungarian exports to France, with a population of comparable size. Total trade with the region, amounting to some $1.5 billion US, shows a sustained and substantial surplus for Hungary amounting to an annual $700 million US, according to latest available data (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary 1999, Chapter I). However, it can be stated that in the field of external economic relations, Hungary has not sufficiently utilized the advantages of geographical proximity and traditional business contacts. Neighboring states -- Romania, Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Slovenia -- are of crucial importance for its current and potential commercial, economic and infrastructural relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary 1999, Chapter I, Paragraph 3/b).

Regional cooperation is an important instrument for Hungary's commercial-economic interests, as well as for creating stability in the region. The unsettled international status of Yugoslavia and the ethnic and political tensions dividing the region have prevented the emergence of regional cooperation forms and structures promoting the internal economic and democratic integration of the region. These can only be established gradually and with encouragement from outside. The stable states
surrounding the region, including Hungary, have a vital role to play in enhancing the effectiveness of the operation of existing regional cooperation structures.

Running through the Balkans are transit routes and transportation and economic corridors, which are of strategic importance for international transport and communication. These provide a link between northern and southern Europe, and also with the Middle East. The ports of the north Adriatic offer the Hungarian economy transportation possibilities with the potential for further commercial activities. The Danube offers possibilities for cooperation currently underutilized because of the Yugoslav crisis. Hungarian tourism directed towards the Adriatic and the Greek and Turkish seacoasts - currently involving hundreds of thousands of dollars but with a potential to involve millions - is an important factor for the manifold network of ties with the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary 1999, Chapter I, Paragraph 3/d).

The crises resulting from the Yugoslavian wars of succession pose grave security challenges to both Hungary and the ethnic Hungarian minority of Vojvodina in northern Yugoslavia. Hungary's interests lie in localizing crises, preventing new humanitarian disasters, supporting the efforts aimed at finding a political settlement, and guarding against negative effects and risks.

It is of vital concern to Hungary that, in the transformation of the states of the region, the system of values and norms of international conduct, as practiced by the more advanced democratic states, should prevail. This is also a prerequisite for the stabilization of the region and its transformation according to democratic and free-market principles, and for the full observance of human and minority rights.
Building comprehensive relations encompassing the entire region is a task beyond Hungary's potential; neither its international standing nor the specific conditions of the Balkans would permit it to do this. In asserting its interests, Hungary should pursue the following priorities: encouraging observance of human and national minority rights by means of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy aimed at finding a political settlement to the crisis; ensuring the active participation of international organizations aimed at the stabilization and reconstruction of the region, for example, NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation, Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe, EU relations, regional cooperation structures, and, wherever possible, playing a catalyzing role (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary 1999, Chapter II, Paragraph 3).

As part of promoting its national interests and security policies, Hungary has been participating in the NATO-led peacekeeping process in the Balkans. Having sent forces into both Bosnia and Kosovo, Hungary has committed itself to bringing peace and stability to the region. These forces, however, are part of larger multinational peacekeeping forces and lack some capabilities, which, if brought to the theater, would allow Hungary to better contribute to the combined effort to stabilize the region, thus further enhancing its national security.

The ultimate solution could be the employment of Hungarian SRF capabilities to support POs and further improve Hungary’s effectiveness and interoperability with NATO forces in such operations. Hungarian SRF are capable of conducting reconnaissance, special reconnaissance, including target acquisition, battle damage assessment, and area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. Furthermore, SRF can conduct sabotage, diversion, and limited direct action missions across the entire spectrum
of military operations, day or night, and in all types of terrain. In addition to these operations, SRF also have the ability to conduct hostage rescue, recovery, and combat search and rescue missions without excessive external support. These forces can deploy into specific locations within hostile territory or denied areas by means of land, water, or air delivery, as well as by stay behind methods. Furthermore, these forces can deploy at a relatively low cost and present a much lower profile than conventional forces. If employed, SRF could effectively contribute to POs by providing additional assets to improve one of the shortcomings of multinational POs: the capability of conducting effective intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and surveillance operations. Supporting and enhancing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations could ultimately enhance the overall military effectiveness and information superiority of multinational peacekeeping forces and enhance Hungarian interoperability with NATO forces.

The Research Question

The primary question of this analysis, therefore, is: Would use of Special Reconnaissance Forces (SRF) units improve Hungary’s interoperability with NATO in peacekeeping operations?

In answering the primary question one must examine the current capabilities of the Hungarian military to conduct peacekeeping missions and the benefits Hungary and other NATO peacekeepers could acquire from adding special operations capable units to the effort of those missions.

The secondary questions derived from the research question are: What can SRF do that conventional forces cannot do in POs? What SRF capabilities can enhance
interoperability with NATO peacekeepers? What are the advantages and disadvantages of employing SRF in POs? What developments could be pursued to further improve SRF capabilities? How could SRF be used in POs?

**Research Methodology**

The study will use a comparative analysis to examine the capabilities of Hungarian SRF and compare them to the capabilities of Hungarian conventional ground forces. The study will also use explorative research to find capability gaps and problem areas based on both Hungarian and multinational lessons learned from POs, which affect Hungarian interoperability with NATO, and which could be improved and enhanced by employing Hungarian SRF.

The introductory chapter will discuss Hungary’s relationship to the current politico-military situation of the southeastern European region, specifically the Balkans, pointing out some of the main historical events still affecting Hungarian policy making, and showing Hungary’s actions to protect its national interests. The aim of this chapter is to give the reader a better understanding of the circumstances in which Hungary has to direct its actions to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. To obtain the necessary information, this thesis relies primarily on researching the official website documents of Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. Regular news from the Hungarian electronic media and from neighboring countries has been monitored to ensure the reliability and credibility of the study. The research will also use personal interviews with István Gyarmati, former Deputy State Secretary of Defense of Hungary, who worked for four years on Hungary’s integration into NATO and is currently responsible for the Balkan Project of the East West Institute in New
York. His professional knowledge about the political-military considerations of the topic of the thesis and his personal experience further add to the reliability and credibility of the study.

Chapter two provides a historical overview about Hungary’s political, military, and socio-political relations with the Balkans. It shows which historical events led to the problems about which Hungary is currently concerned in light of its national interests, and provides current data on the results and consequences of those events still affecting Hungary’s policymaking.

Chapter three gives a detailed explanation about the structure, missions, training, limitations, capabilities, composition, disposition and current problems of the Hungarian SRF today. This is essential to better understand the very nature of these forces. The study will also discuss problems Hungarian SRF are facing by using the author’s personal experience, and interviews with military personnel in SRF command positions.

The fourth chapter then examines Hungarian peace operations and lessons learned by using information from unclassified Hungarian military reports and personal interviews with military personnel who have gained experience in POs. Besides those with this experience, the author’s own military experience in this area is another source used to give a more complete view on Hungarian experiences in POs. The study will also use other sources to collect lessons learned from the IFOR-SFOR missions that directly relate to the topic of the thesis.

Chapter five examines why the Hungarian Army should develop and employ SRF to be part of the Hungarian peacekeeping effort. The chapter will provide a comparison between the capabilities of conventional forces and SRF, highlighting the capability gaps
that SRF units could fill to enhance interoperability with the Alliance, especially in POs. To achieve a credible comparison, the study will use JP 3-07.3, *JTTP For Peace Operations*, as a source dealing with joint procedures in POs. This chapter will also provide answers to the secondary questions of the thesis, and, based on the identified shortfalls in capabilities, the study will make recommendations on how the Hungarian military could use SRF units to enhance interoperability with NATO in POs.

Additionally, the study will use interviews obtained via e-mail and in-person with SMEs of the US Special Forces and international Command and General Staff College students from Canada, Australia, and Italy who have experience in operating with special operations capable units in POs. Since these individuals have adequate knowledge about the use and employment of special operations capable units in such operations, they can provide useful insights about interoperability issues, methods of employment of special operations capable forces, and the benefits such forces bring to POs.

The sixth chapter will answer the research question, summarizing both the short and long-term advantages of employing SRF units in support of POs. Finally, this chapter will provide recommendations for further studies in order for other individuals to be able to research areas this study touches upon, but which remain outside its scope.

**The Significance of the Study**

The primary significance of this study is that it offers the concept of a very useful asset for improving the Hungarian Defense Forces’ (HDF) strategic and/or operational level information gathering capability and NATO interoperability. Secondly, it studies the potential for enhancing Hungary’s joint military capability. It also offers political and military leaders a possible means to increase Hungary’s military capability to participate
in POs under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), OSCE, or NATO. Furthermore, if the needed political decisions were made, it would mean a slight change in the current force structure of the Hungarian reconnaissance forces. The development and employment of SRF in POs could support Hungary’s national interests, further promoting its national pride and international prestige. Lastly, there has not been a published article on either the development or the possible employment of Hungarian SRF in POs. Therefore, this paper offers a unique approach to developing SRF and employing them in future peacetime operations.

**Assumptions**

This study makes three assumptions. The first is that, due to the complexity and increasing requirements of today’s military challenges, interoperability amongst NATO members will be increasingly essential in future peace and other military operations. There is no single country that will be able to cope individually with the enormous financial and political burden of supporting democratic developments and providing humanitarian assistance in war torn countries in NATO’s area of interest. Even the United States, the world’s leading military power, emphasizes the importance of a common effort in bringing stability to troubled regions, where erupting tensions can cause wide-spread and long-lasting conflicts and problems to global peace and economy.

The second assumption is that the Hungary will continue to participate in peacekeeping operations, especially in the Balkans, due to the slow stabilization process within the region. This assumption is based on experiences of HDF personnel, including officers from G-5 and G-3 shops at the Army Staff level who have been involved in the Bosnian peacekeeping mission.
The third assumption is that, based on the priorities of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense regarding the development of Hungarian military capabilities, Hungarian SRF will be a beneficiary of the improvement and development of the HDF reconnaissance system.

**Limitations**

This study is constrained by two limitations. The first is the availability of open-source materials about the SRF. This is because material regarding the particulars of certain equipment and SRF operational issues is not obtainable through official channels. The second limitation is the number of SRF subject matter experts (SMEs). There are approximately 350 SRF soldiers, only 10 of whom are in company or battalion level leadership positions and able to provide significant support to this study.

**Delimitations**

The SRF structure and units addressed in this study are reflective of today’s situation. The SRF have been going through changes since the transformation of the HDF began, and issues, such as organization and SRF tasks, are slightly different than ten years ago. To overcome the limitations mentioned earlier the study uses SMEs’ experiences, as they can provide up-to-date information on the most current trends in the SRF community and are the most familiar with the consequences of the transformation process in the HDF that affect SRF. In addition the study also relies on the author’s personal experience as a former SRF teamleader and company commander.
Definitions of Key Terms

Unless otherwise indicated, all definitions have been taken from Joint Pub (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

Collateral Mission: A mission other than those for which a force is primarily organized, trained, and equipped, that the force can accomplish by virtue of the inherent capabilities of that force.

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operation other than war.

Combating Terrorism (CBT): Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counter-terrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), terrorism consequence management (preparation for and response to the consequences of a terrorist incident/event), and intelligence support (collection and dissemination of terrorism-related information) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum, to include terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction and/or high explosives.

Command and Control (C2): The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
Deployment: The movement of forces within areas of operation. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas.

Direct Action (DA): Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct-assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct stand-off attacks by fire from the air, and/or ground; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct sabotage.

Force Protection: Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.

Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.

Interoperability: The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
**Multinational Operations**: A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

**Peacekeeping Operation**: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Also called PK.

**Peace Operations (PO)**: Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace (JP 3-07, 1995).

**Precision Engagement**: Precision engagement is the ability of joint forces to locate, surveil, discern, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations.

**Psychological Operations (PSYOP)**: PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective, reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals (FM 100-25, 1991).

**Reconnaissance**: A mission undertaken to obtain information by visual observation, or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy or a potential enemy, or about the meteorologic, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics
of a particular area. Reconnaissance differs from surveillance primarily in duration of the mission.

**Recovery Operations:** Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.

**Rules of Engagement (ROE):** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other encountered forces (FM 100-23, 1994).

**Sabotage:** An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human or natural resources.

**Special Operations:** Actions conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by nonconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas; they are conducted in peace, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of general purpose forces; politico-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and oversight at the national level; special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets (FM 100-23, 1994).
**Special Reconnaissance (SR):** Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance (FM 100-25, 1991).

**Surveillance:** The systematic observation of airspace or surface areas by visual, aural, photographic, or other means (FM 34-130, 1994).
CHAPTER TWO
HUNGARY’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE BALKANS

The southeastern European region has been infamous for its religious- and ethnic-based instability for hundreds of years. Hungary has been a key player in the political and military events that have taken place in the Balkans for centuries. Besides its influence in the Balkans, Hungary itself, as well as its national politico-military policies, has been influenced by the Balkans, especially in the twentieth century. For a better understanding of the background of atrocities in the Balkans and how this has affected and still is affecting Hungary’s national security and interests we need to take a quick look at some critical events in the recent history of Hungary.

The Consequences of Two World Wars

World War I

In 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a nationalist Serbian student, supported and armed by Serbian military officers, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo, igniting a series of conflicts that became the First World War. Despite warnings from the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs not to intervene militarily, Austro-Hungary declared war against Serbia. Although the Serbs were defeated, Russian troops, called in to support Serbia, eventually defeated the Hungarian forces. As punishment, Hungary had to accept the Trianon Treaty, by whose terms, Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its former territory and nearly two-thirds of its inhabitants. Czechoslovakia was given what today is Slovakia, sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the region of Pressburg (Bratislava), and other minor sites. Austria received western Hungary (most of Burgenland). The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
(Yugoslavia) took Croatia-Slavonia and part of the Banat. Romania received most of the Banat and all of Transylvania. Italy received Fiume. Figure 1 shows Hungary before World War I and the Treaty of Trianon, while figure 2 illustrates Hungary’s losses in terms of territory and population (Lázár 1993, Chapter 12).

Figure 1. Hungary before and after the First World War. (Source: Yves de Daruvar 1974, List of Maps available from http://web.ucs.ubc.ca/szeitz/books/daruvar/map6.gif).
The countries receiving Hungarian territory were:

Poland: High-Carpathian Country.

Italy: Fiume, the only access for Hungarians to the sea.

Austria: Western Pannonia (Burgenland).

Slovenia: South-Western Hungary (Muraköz).

Croatia: Besides their former own country along the Dalmatian Coast, four times as much from the Hungarian South.

Serbia: Bácska, part of Bánát, part of Szerémség (South Hungary).

Rumania: Transylvania, Bánát, part of the Great Plain.

Ukraine: Sub-Carpathia.

Slovakia: The Northern Highland.


Table 1 gives the exact percentages of Hungary’s territorial losses broken down into receiving states. Note that 71.3 percent of Hungary’s territory was lost, and 63 percent of its population was left on the successor states’ soil.
Table 1. Hungary Dismembered at Trianon

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary Pre-Trianon</td>
<td>324 411 km²</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>103 093 km²</td>
<td>31.78%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>62 092 km²</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (Slovakia &amp; Ruthenia)</td>
<td>61 633 km²</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4 020 km²</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>589 km²</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>21 km²</td>
<td>0.000065%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successor States Total</td>
<td>231 448 km²</td>
<td>71.345%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remainder to Dismembered Hungary</td>
<td>92 963 km²</td>
<td>28.655%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


World War II

Hoping for territorial revision that would regain some of its lost territories, Hungary entered World War II on the German side. Between 1939 and 1940, Germany and Hungary concluded treaties in Munich and Vienna, according to which Southern Slovakia and Northern Transylvania were returned to Hungary. In the spring of 1941, Hitler invaded Yugoslavia, dividing the country into several parts. Since this presented another opportunity for Hungary to regain some more of its pre-Trianon territories in Croatia-Slavonia and in the Bánát, Hungary not only permitted the transit of German forces, but also did its share in assisting German troops in the attack. The territory retaken from Yugoslavia by force had around 36 percent Hungarian inhabitants; the Germans among them represented 20 percent, while the rest were Southern Slavs and other nationalities (one must, however, take into account the fact that a significant Serbian colonization had occurred after 1918). Having regained its territories, Hungary
reincorporated most ethnic Hungarians, together with some non-Hungarians, into the Hungarian state. Figure 3 shows the areas regained by Hungary.

Figure 3. Hungary’s regained territory after entering World War II.

As Hungary joined the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, it immediately found itself in a state of war against the Allied Powers. The disastrous outcome of the war against the Soviet Union, in which the 2nd Hungarian Army was annihilated at the Don River, as well as the late political decision to pull out of the war, played a significant role in crushing Hungary’s primary aim to restore its borders to their pre-Trianon status. Hungary found itself on the losing side for the second time over a historically very short period of time. As a result of this, the Paris Peace Treaty, signed in 1947, further reduced Hungary’s territory within the Trianon borders by giving the so-called Bratislava bridgehead and three villages on the southern bank of the Danube to Czechoslovakia. It should be mentioned that the earlier restoration of the Trianon borders had precipitated massive migrations resulting in the formation of a rather homogeneous Hungarian population with only fewer than half a million German, Slovak, South Slav, Romanian,
Ruthenian, and other inhabitants of non-Hungarian ethnicity remaining on Hungarian territory. What is more relevant to current Hungarian national interests and foreign policy is that after the 1947 reaffirmation of the Trianon borders, several million Hungarians, living in the centuries-old dwelling places of their ancestors, were obliged to live as citizens of neighboring countries, separated from their motherland. Today, Hungarians living in minority status in neighboring countries number in the millions (Lázár 1993, Chapter 14).

| Table 2. Numbers of Ethnic Hungarians Abroad and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------|---------|-------------|
| Hungary                                       | *1       | 2       | 3           |
| Germans                                       | 35,000   | 175,000 | 220,000     |
| Slovaks                                       | 30,000   | 120,000 | 150,000     |
| South Slavs                                   | 40,000   | 60,000  | 80,000      |
| Romanians                                     | 10,000   | 20,000  | 25,000      |
| **Romania**                                   | 1,620,000| 2,000,000| 2,500,000   |
| Hungarians                                    |          |         |             |
| **Slovakia**                                  | 560,000  | 650,000 | 750,000     |
| Hungarians                                    |          |         |             |
| **Serbia**                                    | 300,000  | 350,000 |             |
| Hungarian                                     |          |         |             |

* 1 = official or semiofficial figures, of variable credibility
2 = highest credible figures
3 = highest available figures, generally not credible.
** Note that the ethnic division of Transylvania is 72.3% Romanian, 23.9% Hungarian and 3.7% other (source Adevarul, 30-31 May 1992).
An additional 10-20,000 Hungarians live in Austria, and 200,000 in the Ukraine.
(This table is adapted from André Liebich, “Minorities in Eastern Europe: Obstacles to a Reliable Count,” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 20 (15 May 1992).
http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chaot/chai073.htm - chap7)
The Southern Slav Conflict and Hungary

After the four-decade-long conflict-free period that followed the end of the Second World War in Europe, the interethnic explosions of the Balkans in 1991 finally broke the European peace. In light of its close historical relationships with, and its geographical proximity to the Balkan countries, Hungary is in a special position in terms of enhancing regional peace and stability. According to the Security and Defense Principles of the Republic of Hungary, one of the main objectives of Hungary’s security policy is “to facilitate the preservation of international peace and the enhancement of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region, Europe and its ambit” (Hungarian Ministry of Defense 1999, 4). The wars in Croatia, Bosnia and later in Kosovo have presented undeniable challenges to the efforts Hungary has been making towards peace and stability in the region. Hungary, being a neighbor of Croatia and Yugoslavia and having economic interests in the Balkan states, is very keen to create long-lasting regional stability.

The conflicts in this region in the 1990s, together with the United Nations Security Council embargo imposed on all of the former republics of former Yugoslavia in 1992, troubled Hungary’s commercial activities, which are important to Hungary in light of its efforts to join the EU in the near future. However, according to the Financial Times Survey:

“Hungary has remained on the path of strong growth despite a series of negative influences including the impact of last year's (1998) collapse in the Russian economy, which hit in particular the country’s agricultural exports, the war in neighboring

24
Yugoslavia, which hurt both tourism and transport (Danube shipping is still blocked), and heavy flooding which again undermined the agricultural sector.” (Done 1999).

The Minority Issue

As discussed earlier, Hungary is tied to the Balkan region by a manifold network of relations and by important national policy, security, and economic interests. Over half of the ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary inhabit the countries adjacent to Hungary. Their situation varies from place to place, depending on the democratic and economic developmental level of the country in question. The ethnic Hungarian community that is worst off is the one in Vojvodina: it has had to endure the severe consequences of the Yugoslav crisis for some ten years, including the curtailment of its minority rights, the threat it faces from Serb refugees settled in the area, a prejudicial administrative recasting of the historical ethnic balance and political power equation, and the danger of becoming the target of reprisals by Serb paramilitary forces. Hungarian foreign policy must concentrate on making sure that the ethnic Hungarians survive as a community in their birthplace and preserve their identity. Hungarian foreign policy must promote the observance of the rights of minorities, in accordance with European norms and practice and under international guarantees. A Kosovo settlement will, presumably, legitimize autonomy in the region as an instrument of handling the minority question (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary 1999, Chapter II, Paragraph 3/a).

Hungary’s national interests, therefore, include the three million Hungarians living in minority status in neighboring countries. The Principles of the Security and Defense Policy of the Republic of Hungary state: “Besides Euro-Atlantic integration, Hungarian foreign policy focuses on its neighborhood policy and the welfare of the
Hungarian communities living abroad” (Hungarian Ministry of Defense 1999, 10).

Bearing this in mind, Hungary had a lot at stake in the Kosovo crisis. Since it shares a border with Serbia, where some 350,000 ethnic Hungarians live. Many of these ethnic Hungarians were drafted into the Yugoslav Army during the crisis, and Hungary was wary of fighting fellow Hungarians in the Kosovo conflict. The Financial Times Survey stated: “In the Kosovo conflict, Hungary opened its skies and its airbases to NATO bombers, despite calls from some quarters not to do so because of possible repercussions on the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, northern Serbia” (Wright and Done 1999).

In view of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic’s simple and drastic minority policy, it was also worrisome that he would again turn to ethnic cleansing, driving the 50,000 Croatian and 300,000 Hungarian minorities out of their homes in Vojvodina, just as he did to the non-Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia between 1991 and 1995. If this had happened, Hungary could have faced economic troubles and social crisis. Hungary in 1991 was already providing shelter to an unofficially estimated 10,000 refugees fleeing from the atrocities of the war in Croatia. This was a difficult task due to the limited number of refugee camps and available supplies. A possible flow of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Hungarian refugees fleeing into Hungary from Vojvodina could have dramatically increased the demands on an economy that was already coping with the hardships of getting on its feet after the end of the communist centralized market economy, which had left Hungary with a huge international debt.

By 1993, 50,000 ethnic Hungarians had fled to Hungary, around half of whom were thought to be from Vojvodina, many of them of military age and escaping Serbian conscription. In Vojvodina, the resettlement of Serbian refugees from Bosnia and Croatia
created a tense situation, since many of them were looking for a place to live and regarded the homes of the minorities as a convenient solution. Receiving another flow of refugees would have necessitated building housing for thousands of families in addition to those Hungarians who lost their belongings in the later floods in the Great Plains of Hungary.

Another difficulty would have been the problem of keeping the refugees alive during the coming winter until appropriate shelters could be found. Providing care for so many for an unpredictable period of time would have required tremendous resources and would have probably caused the Hungarian economy to reverse its tendency of continuous growth. Taking into account that one of the pillars on which Hungary builds its security is its national resources, it is essential for Hungary to maintain economic growth to be able both to develop its ability to defend itself and meet its international obligations of restructuring the armed forces to fit NATO standards, and to reach the required economical stability and growth to successfully join the EU in the near future. Meeting these obligations promotes Hungary’s national interests and is considered necessary for the mid- and long-term success of the country. (Schöpflin 1993, Chaillot Paper 7).
CHAPTER THREE

THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE FORCES

Hungary’s deep and abiding interests in the Balkans have been tremendously impacted by the crises resulting from the Yugoslavian wars of succession. In concert with its NATO partners, Hungary has contributed military forces to assist the international peacekeeping process in the region. While several of the larger NATO countries deployed special operations forces (SOF) to the former Yugoslavia to complement the efforts of their conventional forces, Hungarian forces included no SOF, such as the Hungarian SRF. SRF, unlike conventional Hungarian forces, have unique capabilities that could be useful to both Hungarian and international efforts to bring stability to this troubled region. A more capable force package would further promote Hungary’s security and national interests within the Central-Eastern European region, and would increase its international prestige.

Historical Background

The predecessor of today’s Hungarian SRF was established after World War II on the basis of the first Hungarian Parachute Battalion, founded in 1941 and commanded by Major Árpád Bertalan (Pataki 1942, 85). Hungary, after being liberated in 1945 and later occupied by Soviet forces, was kept both politically and militarily under Soviet control. The whole Hungarian military was molded by requirements dictated by Moscow. Hungary had the bulk of its forces positioned along its western borders, and had the role of a glorified main supply route support area and reserve base for the Soviet main axis across Germany, if and when that axis was to move West (Lázár 1993, Chapter 15).
After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, Hungary was divided into three military districts. Each district had a mechanized division with an organic independent reconnaissance battalion, including three armored reconnaissance, one SRF, and one signal intelligence (SIGINT) company. Among these units were the 42nd, 24th, 32nd, and the 34th Reconnaissance Battalions, of which the only pure special reconnaissance battalion was, and is still today, the 34th Long Range Reconnaissance Battalion. In 1996, the 42nd and the 24th Battalions were augmented by one special reconnaissance company each to increase SRF capabilities (Hornyacsek 2000).

Due to the on-going restructuring of the Hungarian Armed Forces, however, there are only two divisions left in the Hungarian Defense Forces, the 2nd and the 3rd Mechanized Divisions, subordinated to the Army Staff. While the 2nd Division is tasked with providing basic training for conscripts for their follow-on assignments and with contributing to the main defense forces in case of mobilization, the 3rd Mechanized Division provides the backbone of the reaction forces. It must be ready at all times to deal with tasks deriving from the mission of the ground forces. The main ground force components are the mechanized infantry and the armored units, which have high mobility and considerable firepower (Hungarian Army General Staff 1997, 8).

Subordinated to the 3rd Division are the SRF assets, which have been significantly reduced over the last five years. The 32nd and the 42nd Reconnaissance Battalions were disbanded in 1996 and 1997 respectively, leaving the Hungarian SRF at 50 percent of their former strength. Today, SRF consist of a battalion-size unit and one company-size unit.
Missions and Activities

The general mission of the Hungarian SRF, which operate deep behind enemy lines and far from friendly units, is to provide the higher commander specific information on an enemy or terrain. These units are responsible for conducting deep reconnaissance operations both in the offense and defense. If needed, SRF units can be tasked with special reconnaissance missions, designating and preparing drop zones-landing zones (DZ-LZ), assisting air assault forces in their missions, and conducting battle damage assessment (BDA) and area assessment. Normally SRF teams are assigned a specific target or a 100-square-kilometer area per day to reconnoiter. Besides the responsibilities for these reconnaissance operations, SRF units also have the missions of direct actions, sabotage, and diversionary activities (Hungarian manual 700/0501 -- “A Felderítő Deszantszázd Alkalmazása” -- The Employment of the Special Reconnaissance Company).

One can see that the missions of the Hungarian SRF, as one specialized branch, are comparable to what the US Army Special Forces (SF) and Ranger units conduct separately. These missions require units with a combination of specially trained personnel, equipment, and tactics that provide SRF unique capabilities conventional units do not possess. SRF personnel are required to have a very thorough and broad knowledge about their specific equipment, infantry and special tactics, and foreign military forces to be able to successfully operate across the entire spectrum of military operations.

Officially, the Hungarian SRF are considered combat support forces, supporting the intelligence collection effort of the higher headquarters. Therefore, their training is mainly focused on deep and special reconnaissance operations. Recently, however,
because of their unique capabilities, and due to the changing international and regional security environment, SRF units have started to train for collateral activities, such as urban warfare training, including tactics and techniques of close quarter battle (CQB); hostage rescue; combat search and rescue (CSAR); underwater reconnaissance; special convoys escorts; and limited air assault (AASSLT) operations (Peto and Sánta 2000).

**Organization**

Figure 1 in the appendix shows how Hungarian SRF units are subordinated under the 3rd Mechanized Division, which comes under the direct control of the Army Staff. As previously stated, the 3rd Division controls the HDF reaction forces. In the reaction forces there are two independent reconnaissance battalions, the 24th Bornemissza Gergely and 34th Bercsényi László Reconnaissance Battalions. While the 34th Battalion is a pure SRF unit, the 24th is a mixed armored and long-range reconnaissance battalion with three armored reconnaissance and one SRF company (Sánta 2000).

**The 34th “Bercsényi László” Special Reconnaissance Battalion**

The 34th Battalion is located in Szolnok in the very heart of Hungary. Its general mission is to provide its controlling higher command and the Army commanders with specific, accurate, and timely intelligence on an enemy or terrain. Specific missions with which the battalion can be tasked have been mentioned earlier. Conducting missions deep behind enemy lines gives the commander the ability to shape the battlefield by attacking the rear and second echelon elements, thus preventing them from influencing the close fight. The 34th Special Reconnaissance Battalion is, therefore, organized to conduct deep
operations employing its subunits far from friendly units and immediate supplies. Figure 2 in the appendix illustrates the structure of the 34th Battalion.

Besides its headquarters company (HHC) and the mixed communications and logistics company, which includes a parachute maintenance section, a transportation section, and a logistics platoon, the battalion has three organic special reconnaissance companies, each organized into a headquarters section and three special reconnaissance platoons. The 1st Company has three special engineer reconnaissance teams within its structure. The headquarters section is comprised of the company commander, a first lieutenant or captain, the supply sergeant, the jumpmaster, the company clerk, and a communication and transportation section. The deputy company commander is the company executive officer (XO), who is followed by the first platoon leader in the hierarchy within the company. The headquarters section plans and directs the company’s operation and training according to general directives the HDF units receive from the Training Department of the J-3 of the Joint Defense Staff and special instructions obtained from the battalion S3 shop. Since the company commander is personally responsible for training issues, he can be relatively flexible in determining how he wants to achieve the required objectives of combat readiness and preparedness of his company. Figure 3 in the appendix shows the current structure of a SRF Company (Peto 2000).

Special reconnaissance platoons are organized into three teams, which are the basic eight-strong elements of the SRF. Normally, teams are comprised of the team leader (an officer usually holding the rank of second lieutenant), his deputy, an NCO holding the rank of sergeant-sergeant first class, the radio operator (NCO), and five recon soldiers (enlisted) who may rank from private to sergeant. Depending on their assigned
missions, SRF teams can be augmented with chemical, engineer, medical, communications specialists of other branches, and/or interpreters (Sánta 2000).

The Special Reconnaissance Company of the 24th Reconnaissance Battalion

The 24th Reconnaissance Battalion is located in Eger in northeastern Hungary. The battalion is organized into three armored reconnaissance companies, equipped with BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, and one special reconnaissance company. The structure of the SRF company within the 24th Battalion is slightly different from that of the companies of the 34th Battalion, because the 24th is still structured the way the two former Hungarian SRF units used to be until their disbanding. Here, it is important to mention that until mid 1997, the HDF used to have five SRF companies organic to three independent reconnaissance battalions. Due to the poorly planned and ad hoc start of the restructuring of the armed forces, two of these battalions were disbanded, which resulted in the loss of three SRF companies. An additional SRF company of the 24th Battalion was disbanded one year after its establishment, which well showed the chaotic way the restructuring had begun.

The difference between the structure of the SRF company of the 24th Battalion and the structure of the companies of the 34th Battalion is that the SRF company of the 24th is organized into eight special reconnaissance teams instead of three platoons. The deputy commander of the company is the first teamleader, the second senior officer within the unit. All other positions are filled by NCOs and enlisted personnel (Sánta 2000).
The structure of the SRF company is shown in figure 4 in the appendix. Unlike the 34th Battalion, the 24th is working for only the division and its subordinate units. This means that it can be tasked with missions similar to those the 34th conducts, but its operational depth is determined by the intelligence needs of the division headquarters, which are normally much fewer than of those units collecting for the Army (Hungarian manual 700/0501 – “A Felderítő Deszantszázzad Alkalmazása” - The Employment of the Special Reconnaissance Company).

Selection

The number of enlisted positions available in the units determines the number of personnel accepted to SRF units. Units receive guidance from the General Directorate for Human Resources (J1) of the Joint Defense Staff, which regulates the number of contract positions that can be offered to applicants. Applicants must volunteer for parachute jumps and be willing to sign a two-year contract if accepted. They must go through a selection process, comprised of rigorous physical tests, psychological evaluation, a two-day flight medical examination, and a personal interview with unit representatives. During the selection process careful attention is paid to applicants with prior military experience in communications, marksmanship (sniper), explosives, and parachuting. After being selected, enlisted personnel have to serve a six-month probation period before their contracts are finalized (Rajz 2000).

Training

The training of SRF units focuses on both offensive and defensive operations generally including infantry and special reconnaissance operations. SRF units receive training that can be found nowhere else in the Hungarian Armed Forces. While the
training of other branches is repetitive, the training of SRF is progressive. Unlike before, SRF units no longer have conscripts, only professional and contract soldiers. This makes training more efficient in the long run by not wasting time and effort on conscripts who leave the Army soon after they serve their time. With contract soldiers, positions within teams and companies are filled permanently, which allows company commanders to rely on the growing experience of members of their units. This is extremely important in SRF teams, since the situation in any particular operation may require team members to be proficient in various areas of expertise.

SRF units require a combination of basic infantry and specialized skills training to achieve the required operational proficiency and readiness level. SRF training is designed to produce individuals and units that possess professional knowledge in tactics, techniques, and procedures of their unique profession, and are able to operate in diverse conditions. Training and education effectiveness comes from a permissive environment that encourages leadership and not only allows, but often requires personnel at all levels to make decisions and be innovative for the sake of mission accomplishment. This builds confidence and trust among team members and strengthens unit cohesion.

SRF training comprises three major areas: institutional training, unit level training, and joint training. Officers and NCOs receive mainly institutional training prior to their assignments to SRF units, while enlisted personnel are trained at the unit level by professional officers and NCOs. Officers and NCOs, together with enlisted soldiers, participate in joint training with coalition or allied forces.
Institutional Education

Officers

SRF officer cadets receive four years of education and training at the direction of the Reconnaissance Faculty of the "Zrínyi Miklós" National Defense University before they can take command positions. By the end of the second year, cadets acquire, among other things, thorough knowledge about doctrine, infantry, armored reconnaissance tactics, foreign armed forces and at least one foreign language (English, German, or French), communications, land navigation, and techniques of physical training. During the third academic year, those who volunteer and pass a series of rigorous physical and medical examinations receive specialized training in tactics and procedures of special reconnaissance. By the seventh semester the selected cadets have already completed parachute training, with a total of twenty-seven jumps, including static line and drogue-chute parachuting techniques. Parachute training is followed by mountain, amphibious, and summer and winter survival exercises, where cadets learn how to negotiate and operate on difficult terrain.

At the end of the fourth academic year and after their state examinations in July, which comprises both classroom and field examinations, the officer cadets are given their assignments to SRF units.

NCOs

NCO training is similar to what officer cadets receive and is conducted at the same location. It lasts for two years, during which cadets study basically the same subjects as officers, with the exception of general subjects, such as mathematics, physics, and geometry. The focus of training is on tactics, technical skills, leadership, and troop
training techniques, with a number of visits to active reconnaissance and SRF units to gain real life experience.

Beyond the above-mentioned education, other possibilities are open to officers and NCOs to improve their professional knowledge and preparedness. Personnel can enroll in courses in foreign countries, which, of course, requires language skills. Today, all officer cadets during their time in the Reconnaissance Faculty have to pass a basic level language examination in their personally chosen language. After their graduation all newly commissioned officers are sent to a ten-month English language course specializing in military expressions and terminology. At the end of the course, they all pass either an intermediate or advanced level state exam.

Foreign courses, depending on the unit’s personnel needs, are available to individuals who meet the physical, medical, and language requirements. Many officers and NCOs, therefore, have the chance to individually participate in different courses, mostly in the US. Some of the US schools from which SRF individuals have graduated include the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in San Antonio, Texas, the USMC infantry officer basic course (IOBC) in Quantico, Virginia, and the drill instructor school at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The knowledge and experience they bring back to their units further enhance the abilities of both the trainers and trainees.

Basic Training

The HDF has two training centers located at four training facilities that conduct basic training of conscripts. Basic training lasts 90 days and is divided into basic and preparative training periods. Like any other unit of the HDF, SRF no longer conduct basic training for their own personnel. Unlike other branches that might send their
soldiers to other units to receive specialty training, however, training for enlisted personnel in SRF units is conducted solely by the units themselves. Therefore, SRF training is different from other conventional units` training after the common 90-day basic training. All enlisted personnel must have at least three months of basic training completed before they can join SRF units, but the vast majority of enlisted soldiers have already been serving in SRF units for years. The following gives an overall description of training that enlisted men new to the service receive. Since basic training is not conducted in SRF units, enlisted personnel first receive familiarization training with the unit upon arrival. Following their introduction to the role, purpose, and daily activities of their respective units, soldiers enroll into follow-on training, para-training, and then specialty training.

Unit Level Training

Follow-On Training

During the three months of follow-on training soldiers learn how to use equipment organic to the unit, and familiarize themselves with the weapons and equipment used in special reconnaissance operations. This time is used to build teams and select personnel for different positions within the teams. This is the time when officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel assigned to the same teams come together and start training together for the first time, so that by the time the team is ready for parachute training, positions have already been in preparation for the next stage of the training cycle (Hungarian manual 581/237 - “Kiképzési program a mélységi felderítő alegységek katonái részére”- Training Program for Soldiers of Special Reconnaissance Units).
Parachute Training

The Hungarian SRF use three different methods of parachute insertion as part of their infiltration techniques: static line, drought-chute, and free-fall jumps. Static line jumps are the basic of all practical parachute training and used when jumps have to be conducted from low altitudes (600 to 2,400 feet).

Drought-chute jumps are conducted from the beginning of parachute training and from middle altitudes (2,400 to 6,000 feet). Here, a small stabilizing parachute is used to help soldiers maintain a stable position in the air while freefalling.

Experienced SRF personnel with adequate qualifications perform free-fall jumps. Two years ago, designated teams started High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) training to experience another infiltration method used by special operation capable units in many foreign militaries. Twice a year, the 34th Battalion sets up and conducts parachute training for SRF units. All SRF units come to the 34th to train their teams in airborne insertion in a centralized location in close proximity to a transport helicopter regiment that supports the training activities.

Training begins with a week-long ground preparation where individuals rehearse exit techniques, landing exercises, procedures in the air, safety procedures, and rigging of both the reserve and main parachutes. Following the preparation phase, a three-week parachute camp begins, where companies practice from dawn until that day’s tasks are done. Every company commander is responsible for the safe and effective training of his own men, using designated and qualified individuals from his unit as instructors. Companies work in conjunction with the regulations the 34th Battalion commander
issues. This commander has overall responsibility for the conduct of centralized parachute training. He uses his staff to coordinate and control activities of the companies.

As mentioned earlier, SRF training is progressive. Therefore, once the soldiers have acquired the required parachuting skills, they move forward and start to train in a more complex environment. This means that teams initially train alone to build team cohesion and focus on internal tasks, then later start training together with other teams to enhance intraforce operability. (Hungarian manual F/8 – “Szakutasítás az ejtoernyös kiképzés végrehajtására” – Special directive for the conduct of parachutist training)

Specialty Training

Following the annual parachute training cycle, SRF personnel are trained in their selected or assigned specialty fields. As already stated, team members must have adequate knowledge about each other’s specialty, therefore, besides basic infantry tactics, personnel of operational teams are trained in the areas of tactics and techniques of special reconnaissance, weapons handling, demolitions, communications, sniper techniques, medical procedures, weapons and equipment of foreign armies, geography and orienteering. Selected individuals also train in combat diving. Additionally, individuals are also trained in swimming, mountaineering, skiing, and hand-to-hand combat. (Hungarian manual 581/237, “Kiképzési program a mélységi felderítő alegységek katonái részére”- Training Program for Soldiers of Special Reconnaissance Units).

As part of the unit level training, evaluation exercises are conducted after the specialty training phase is complete to evaluate the abilities and performance of the teams in accomplishing their various tasks in a simulated environment. Exercise planners, together with designated individuals from the headquarters section of the companies to
which the evaluated teams are organic, monitor the activities. Results are forwarded to
the battalion plans shops, where they are analyzed and graded based on the information
requirements previously issued by the S2 shop. These exercises also help SRF units to
prepare for the requirements of the recently implemented NATO standard Tactical and
Operational Evaluation (TACEVAL and OPEVAL) process. (Koltai, G3 Plans Officer,
Army Staff).

Last, but not least, physical training (PT) must be mentioned. PT is conducted
from the very first moment individuals join the SRF community. SRF units are extremely
demanding when it comes to physical endurance, since operations are often conducted
under extreme conditions. In fact, physical conditioning in SRF units is so intense that it
has become one of the most attractive challenges for volunteers. Part of this is the famous
hand-to-hand combat training, which is based on elements of Kyokushin karate and Judo,
the very basics of military hand-to-hand combat in most of the elite forces of the world.

Through the demanding challenges that carefully planned and conducted PT
offers, these individuals gain confidence and strengthen their esprit de corps, which
enables them to successfully handle situations where great stress is involved, for
example, night jumps or winter survival, including the crossing of icy rivers.

Multinational Training

It is the goal of the HDF to train units to operate--in case of need--according to
NATO combat procedures and methods. This is vitally important in units assigned to
NATO’s main and reaction forces. The best way Hungarian units can learn and use
NATO procedures is through participation in joint training with allied forces. The
Hungarian SRF have been conducting exchange visits to several similar foreign units,
including the French “Hussar” Regiment, the Belgian “Paracommando,” and the Italian “Folgore” 9th Airborne Assault Brigade. In addition to the exchange visits, the 1st Special Reconnaissance Company of the 34th Special Reconnaissance Battalion is assigned to Allied Command Europe Mobile Forces Land component AMF(L), subordinated to NATO’s Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF). Teams of the 1st Company, therefore, regularly exercise with allied forces taking part in annual exercises and visit airborne units.

The first joint exercise between the U.S. and Hungarian militaries was Exercise Combined Rescue ’95 held in July 1995 in Hungary. The exercise was a multinational PfP event, involving the 321st Special Tactics Squadron, elements of the British Royal Air Force from Mildenhall, Great Britain, and Hungarian troops with whom SRF teams of the 34th Battalion were deployed (Bergmann, 1995).

In March 1998, the 352nd Special Operations Group from Royal Air Force Base Mildenhall, England brought two MC-130P Combat Shadow aircraft and about 40 people for exercise Carpathian Exchange, held in Hungary. During the exercise Hungarian SRF personnel practiced loading and unloading airplanes to conduct daytime and nighttime jumps as part of their training with the US counterparts (Warman, 1998).

In 2000, two joint exercises were held on Hungarian soil, in which SRF teams deployed and exercised with US troops. The first was Exercise Ardent Ground 2000. Contrary to earlier plans, the Hungarian SRF teams were limited to playing only the role of the opposition force (OPFOR) after the British Special Air Service (SAS) teams, with whom the Hungarian teams were supposed to work, failed to participate in the exercise. Immediately following Ardent Ground 2000, American and Hungarian soldiers partnered
in Exercise Lariat Response, an emergency deployment readiness exercise that took place in Kecskemet, Hungary, from 22 to 26 June. Soldiers of the Army’s Southern European Task Force’s (SETAF) 173rd Airborne Brigade parachuted into Kecskemet Air Base on June 22. The airborne forces then headed to nearby Taborfalva Training Area for an air-assault training mission with Hungarian SRF units (Libby and Jackson 2000, 30).

Personnel

Hungarian SRF are made up of some of Hungary’s most dedicated individuals, coming from different backgrounds. Regardless of the hardships they must go through, they volunteer to be members of the special airborne family of SRF. These individuals are highly capable, mature, physically and mentally tough, motivated men with a great deal of integrity, flexibility, and determination, often with a long record of dedicated service behind them. As a result of the selection process, only the most capable individuals in terms of physical endurance, experience, and motivation are accepted.

Combat Equipment, Munitions, and Armament

The equipment and weaponry of the SRF include both Russian and Western made equipment. The 1st Company of the 34th Special Reconnaissance Battalion was recently given German communication equipment, but the main radio station is not mobile. This presents a challenge to the ability of the headquarter section to quickly reposition itself if needed. The following shows some of the main equipment and weapons the Hungarian SRF use, with Table 3 giving specifics about small arms:

Individual Weapons

1. AK-63D automatic assault rifle with PBS-1 silencer, and NSP-3 night vision rifle scope
2. KGP-9 submachine gun
3. SVD (Dragunov) sniper rifle with PSO-1 sight
4. Model P9R semiautomatic pistol

Team Equipment
1. R-392 short-range portable radio for internal communication.
2. R-394 and R-354 long-range, short wave, two-way portable radio for external communication operating with short burst radio signals.
3. HRM 7000 German-made, long-range, high frequency radio. This is to replace the old R-394/R-354 radios. Equipped with built-in encryption the HRM 7000 is easy to use. The workstation can be detached from the radio and taken to an observation post (OP) to be operated on the spot. This way messages can be directly sent to the controlling HQ.
4. MRP-4 locator detector set. Detects radio frequencies and gives direction of the strongest signal so SRF teams can locate radar sites and C2 nodes that operate with high frequency radio transmissions.
5. Radio signal transmitter and receiver for receiving and finding resupply container. Small device that has two parts: a transmitter that emits short radio signals, and the receiver that receives signals and locates the container with the transmitter mounted on it. Used in resupplying SRF teams once operating in depth.
6. Demolition kit including charger for remote detonation, electric fuses, attaching materials, and tools.
Company Assets

1. High frequency, long-range central radio station for external communication with teams on the ground.

2. Ural, ZIL and GAZ transport trucks and 4X4 jeeps.

3. G-9 square canopy high performance parachute. Approximately two years ago, free-fall qualified teams of the 34th Battalion received ten G-9 air-cell parachutes to train in High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) insertion. The G-9 is one of the world’s best performance parachutes with a 6.4 glide ratio (the parachute can glide 6.4 kilometers from the altitude of 1,000 meters). Practically, team members can glide 64 kilometers (40 miles) from 10,000 meters (30,000 feet).

4. RS 4/4 and RS 8/8 steerable, round canopy main parachutes. These are the primary parachutes the Hungarian SRF use. The difference between the 4/4 and the 8/8 versions are their size and speed. While the 4/4 is an older and bigger canopy with a 3 meters per second (10feet/second) speed of descent and a weight of 14.5 kilograms, the 8/8 is a bit smaller and quicker to turn, with a 5 meters per second (15 feet/second) speed of descent and 12 kilograms.

5. BE-8 reserve parachute. This is a small emergency parachute with an 8 meters per second (25feet/sec) rate of descent and 4.5 kilograms weigh.

Nonorganic Assets (Air Force)

1. AN-26 medium-range transport aircraft

2. AN-2 short-range transport/utility aircraft

3. MI-8TB HIP medium-range transport/utility helicopter

4. MI-17 HIP ground support/transport helicopter
5. MI-2 HOPLITE short-range utility helicopter (Szabados and Sánta, 2000).

Capabilities

Although Hungarian SRF do not have the official title of Special Forces, their tactics, equipment, training, and operating techniques make them special operations capable. The organization, strength, and equipment of teams are based on their missions and the characteristics of the operational area in which they must operate. Hungarian SRF units are currently capable of:

1. Deploying into specific locations within hostile territory or denied areas by means of land, water, or air delivery, as well as by stay behind methods.
2. Deploying at a relatively low cost and presenting a much lower profile than conventional forces.
3. Operating deep behind enemy lines and far from friendly forces for five-seven days without receiving external support.
4. Redeploying quickly within their area of operation (AO) to carry out additional tasks.
5. Conducting reconnaissance, special reconnaissance, battle damage assessment, sabotage, diversion, and direct action missions across the entire spectrum of military operations, day or night, and in all types of terrain.
6. Reporting accurate, reliable, and timely information.
7. Conducting hostage rescue, recovery, and combat search and rescue missions with minimal external support.
8. Being extracted by air or land or returning using evasion techniques.
9. Operating for an extended period of time in enemy-held territory by receiving air resupply using special air-droppable containers.

10. Preparing, rigging, and loading supplies made available by higher headquarters.

Limitations

Although their current organization and equipment provide the SRF certain capabilities, they also place limitations on these units, which determine how one should plan for the employment of the SR assets. These limitations are the following:

1. Light armament and equipment provides only limited self-defense capability. Once they make contact (raid, assault, sabotage), immediate extraction is necessary to avoid destruction of teams.

2. Teams cannot maintain continuous radio communication with controlling headquarters because of limitations of the batteries used for the radios, and possible enemy compromise due to enemy’s use of electronic transmission detection devices. Teams report only at scheduled times or when critical information must be reported. Frequency management of high frequency radios needs authorization from the higher headquarters.

3. Mobility of teams is limited to a slow movement on foot in the AO during reconnaissance.

4. Teams do not have intelligence production capability, and, therefore, rely on divisional or higher echelon intelligence products.

5. The medical capability of the teams is limited to basic individual first aid.

These SRF capabilities and limitations apply to wartime missions. In POs the capabilities may be used on a broader spectrum, because limitations may be less
restrictive, since, with very few exceptions, such as NATO`s Kosovo mission, military forces conduct their operations at the request and with the consent of all major parties to a dispute. Therefore, SRF operations can be more overt, and their communications assets that are of restricted use in wartime missions can be used without restrictions to support military actions in POs. Similarly, movement of SRF teams would not be restricted to only on-foot patrolling, which would increase the area of responsibility which teams could be assigned. Further, the time of employment could be significantly increased, with general support easily available from the headquarters of a peace contingent to which the special reconnaissance teams are subordinated. (Author’s personal experience and personnel of the 34th Battalion, including Major Antal Kiss, S3 plans officer; Captain Tibor Petho, Commander, 1st SRF Company; Lieutenant Gábor Sánta, deputy commander 1st SRF Company. Inquiries and information collection from these individuals were made and conducted throughout the research period via e-mail and telephone conversations with the author).

Problems

Despite the unique capabilities of SRF that can be found in no other unit in the HDF, and the fact that SR units conduct intense training in familiarization with foreign militaries, these units have never been thought of as possible assets to be used independently or as an augmentation to conventional forces in POs. Although they are trained to conduct operational and strategic reconnaissance and are special operations capable, neither their knowledge nor their capabilities have ever been used to an optimum level in supporting military efforts protecting Hungary’s national interests. In fact, they have been somehow neglected. Although their special training and esprit de corps have
made them the real elite of the Hungarian Army, very few in the political or military leadership recognize the opportunities these units offer in peacetime. Military and political officials in key decision making positions do not seem to be aware of what these units are capable, therefore, no plans have been made for the employment of SRF in operations other than in wartime.

Today, the Hungarian Army has reached the point where it has only the 34th Battalion and one single SRF company left in the reconnaissance system. The 34th Reconnaissance Battalion is one of the very few Hungarian Army units that is manned exclusively with contract soldiers. Despite the pride of being a member of Hungary’s elite airborne unit and their devotion to the profession, the lack of real life mission opportunities and proper financial benefits is resulting, even among these soldiers, in a slow but steady loss of interest in staying in the Army. As an article of Honvédelem, the official website of the Hungarian Defense Forces, points out: “The Hungarian military of the future will be built on professional and contract soldiers. To this end it would be very important to solve the service related problems of this category of soldiers. It would be important because almost without exception these contract soldiers are serving in positions that could not be manned by conscripts” (Hungarian Ministry of Defense 2001, article 307).

The former system of working with only conscripts meant that much of the effort officers and NCOs had put into the training of personnel was lost immediately after the conscripts served their time and left the Army. Today, if attention is not paid to the issue of giving SRF personnel the chance to test themselves in real life scenarios, the personnel situation in the SRF units could soon become problematic.
According to an article in Népszabadság, a Hungarian daily newspaper, in 2000 the number of NCOs who left the Army was higher than the number of officers. Now that one of the main goals of its transformation is the establishment of a reliable NCO corps and the desired 1:3 officer-NCO ratio, together with a substantial enlisted corps replacing conscripts, the HDF cannot afford to lose a significant number of contract soldiers and NCOs with training and effort already invested in them.

An additional problem the SRF community is facing today is that the companies, with the exception of the 1st Special Reconnaissance Company of the 34th Battalion, which is at 100 percent strength, are at 65 percent strength or below. Although there are great numbers of volunteers wanting to join the SRF, selection criteria, including the thorough medical examination, greatly reduce the number of acceptable individuals. Besides, as anywhere else in the HDF, financial restraints further limit the Army’s ability to acquire NATO compatible equipment specific to SRF missions and to man all positions currently vacant in SRF units.

Because of the uniqueness of missions and tasks the SRF must conduct and be ready for, it is imperative that they continuously train to all of them. Techniques and procedures, such as rigging parachutes, operating radio equipment, measuring and setting up explosives, and night navigation, which should be automatic and second nature to SRF soldiers, can become rusty without adequate practice. The same applies to the ability to cooperate and work together with foreign forces. As the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms describes, the measure of a unit’s interoperability is its “ability to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together” (JP 1-02, 2000).
Although not as sophisticated as some of their Western counterparts, the Hungarian SRF can provide their specialized services to an international military body, and have proved their ability to accept services from them too. Despite their interoperability, currently available training opportunities and the allocated time for training are not enough to give all companies adequate time on the field to practice all missions with which they can be tasked. Therefore, the HDF leadership should remedy this problem by giving SRF additional opportunities to participate in international joint operations and exercises to make sure those capabilities will be kept practiced and employable anytime.

**Summary**

This chapter talked about the capabilities and limitations of SRF, as well as the problems they have yet to overcome. One can see that SRF are capable of carrying out their specific tasks independently or as part of a larger force to support the controlling commander’s decision making. Their means of delivery, training, and equipment enable SRF units to get to a designated operational area quickly and successfully operate in all kinds of military operations. Special training makes SRF units capable of operating in areas where conventional forces are restricted, such as mountains, and sensitive areas, where a larger unit cannot function without being noticed. Once deployed, SRF units can carry out their tasks independently and provide their HQ with timely, accurate, and reliable information on targets and forces designated to them, thus offering a great source of human intelligence (HUMINT). This is of vital importance in today’s arena of information dominance, where forces conducting various military operations, including POs, rely on sophisticated imagery, intelligence collecting systems, and technologies. Technological advantages are only useful against opponents with sophisticated systems.
against which those assets can be effectively employed. Simply organized and low-tech insurgent and guerilla groups fighting in the mountains or densely vegetated areas may present a problem to the effective use of modern technology.

Furthermore, the English language capability that SRF subunit leaders have enables units to cooperate with other allied military forces more effectively. The maturity and expertise of individuals, together with the high cohesion of units, are also great enablers, especially when deployed and operating in unknown areas or far from friendly forces. Concerning the Balkans, their regional awareness could be extremely useful while working in a multinational coalition, providing specific knowledge and expertise about the population, customs, and social background of the AO.

Finally, based on their ability to quickly deploy, SRF units represent a potential quick reaction force (QRF), a concept widely used in NATO militaries to rapidly react to a situation requiring immediate response from the national political and military authorities, such as Hungary’s participation in the Kosovo mission. SRF capabilities could and should be enhanced to keep and further improve SRF’s immediate reaction capability. However, this cannot be done without the support of the authorities.
CHAPTER FOUR

HUNGARIAN PEACE OPERATIONS

Hungary’s Participation in Peace Operations

Although the Cold War threat of a nuclear or global conflict of has been reduced to a minimum due to global political changes, countries all over the world, including Hungary, have had to face the problems of low intensity conflicts (LIC) in their neighborhood. Since most of these regions or countries have limited or no capability to restore peace and order on their own, the need for peacekeeping missions and foreign peacekeepers has increased significantly over the last decade. The crisis generated by the wars of Yugoslav succession are a perfect example of this trend. Hungary, therefore, based on its geographical proximity to the Balkans, still must face regional and subregional security threats of religious- and ethnic-based instability, organized crime, terrorism, and arms trafficking with only approximately 30 percent of its former military forces available. As compared with 155,700 in 1989, the HDF currently has 53,150 personnel and will only have 50,000--0.5 percent of the population--by 2005 (Simon 1992, Chapter 5). According to Hungary’s Principles of Security and Defense Policy, Hungary sees her security maintained most effectively as a member of NATO, and, assuming that all tasks will derive from this common defense, wishes to enjoy the benefits of collective defense (Hungarian Ministry of Defense 1999, 9).

Hungary with its democratic values considers participation in peacekeeping activities, whether under the auspices of the UN, OSCE, NATO, or other international organizations, as both a political and moral duty. The Security and Defense Principles of the Republic of Hungary state: “Hungary identifies itself with the principles of collective
security and defense of the Alliance. . . . It is further assigned to contribute to other jointly perceived allied missions, engage in peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out under the auspices of international organizations” (Hungarian Ministry of Defense 1999, 8). Further, Hungary’s active and effective participation in peacekeeping operations is an important national interest and a strategic aim to successfully complete its Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore, Hungary has accepted the obligations derived from Articles 42 and 43 of the UN Charter. This basically means that, upon request of the UN Security Council, Hungary will provide military forces within its capabilities to support international peacekeeping operations. In the emerging new European security arena, preventing conflicts and their spillover into other countries is now an increasingly important role. The civil wars in the Balkans have repeatedly shown Hungary that security in Europe cannot be taken for granted, therefore, more active participation in peacekeeping operations is required for both the stability of the southeastern European region and the security interests of Hungary (Kovács 1997, 9-11).

Derived from the Hungarian Constitution, high-level legal documents, including The National Defense Law, parliamentary resolutions on The Basic Principles of the Republic of Hungary's Security Policy and on The Principles of National Defense, as well as section XIV of the Governmental Program, which deals with national defense matters, task the HDF to have at their disposal units capable of accomplishing peacekeeping tasks. Consequently, Hungary, through numerous political decisions, changes in the constitution, and structural changes in the military, has been participating in various peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and observation missions since August 1988. The HDF established a peacekeeping force, the 88th Rapid Reaction (Airmobile)
Battalion (RRB), in October 1993 to give the military leadership means of conflict prevention and management, and the ability to perform peacekeeping functions. In the interests of modernizing the HDF and raising, as well as harmonizing, the domestic level of peacekeeping training, the task of the former Hungarian Peacekeeping Forces Training Centre was taken over by the 88th RRB in 1994, from which over 300 Hungarian military officers have served as observers in various UN missions. After Hungary accepted the obligations stipulated of Articles 42 and 43 of the UN Charter, its first peacekeeping force was established in the fall of 1994 on the basis of the 88th Battalion, and deployed in the fall of 1995. Those obligations stipulated that, on the request of the UN Security Council, Hungary would supply armed forces for the maintenance of international peace and security, in each case as per a separate agreement. Since then this unit has been participating in missions in, among others, Cyprus, Sinai, and the Balkans (Hungarian Ministry of Defense 1996, Chapters MFO, UNFICYP, and IFOR).

Bosnia--The Hungarian Engineer Contingent (HEC)

The outbreak of interethnic conflict in the Balkans in 1991 represented a new threat to European peace. At first the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) dealt with this problem. Hungary, due to its proximity, was naturally keen on bringing peace to the region, but could not participate in the UN mission with armed units, since that could have endangered the welfare of the Hungarian minority living in the conflict areas. Therefore, after NATO had become involved in peacemaking there, to help solve the urgent problem of providing protection to refugees and noncombatants in Croatia and Bosnia, Hungary allowed NATO AWACS airplanes to fly in Hungarian airspace and conduct monitoring missions. After the failure of UNPROFOR units to effectively protect
civilians and separate the warring parties, on 15 December 1995, UN Security Council Resolution 1031 authorized a peacemaking/peacekeeping mission in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the use of armed force to prevent armed conflict and maintain peace (United Nations, Chapter VII – Articles 39-51”). As a result, a 17,000-strong international Implementation Force (IFOR) was established between 5 and 20 December 1995 to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords. IFOR was operated and created by NATO, subordinating all UNPROFOR units already serving in Bosnia and Croatia.

In cooperation with IFOR, Hungary provided its territory and airspace for transit activities to nations requesting it, host nation support to forces stationed in Hungary, and force contribution, specifically a 416-person strong combat engineer contingent allocated to IFOR. Following its formation the unit was relocated to Croatia and subordinated to IFOR on 3 February 1996. On 21 December 1996, IFOR was replaced by a Stabilization Force (SFOR), of which the HEC remained a part with reduced strength (240 persons) due to the changing requirements of the mission. (Hungarian Ministry of Defense 1996, Chapter IFOR).

Kosovo (KFOR) Hungarian Guard and Security Contingent (HGSC)

Hungary became a member of NATO in April 1999. On 8 June 1999, soon after Hungary’s admission to NATO, former President of the Republic of Hungary Arpad Goncz said in his White House speech that:

“We are acting in accordance with our national interests and our obligations as allies in offering the greatest possible support to the international community acting for peace. We are urging a political, diplomatic settlement that will create lasting peaceful
conditions among the nations of the Yugoslav region and one that will ensure democratic development of Yugoslavia” (White House Press 1999).

Concerned about the lives of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, Hungary handled the Kosovo issue carefully, but was under pressure by NATO and the US military and political leadership to prove its loyalty as a new NATO member. Serious consideration was given to Hungary’s being an assembly area for a possible land invasion of Yugoslavia. Hungary opposed this plan, providing only its airspace to facilitate the air campaign against Yugoslavia. Furthermore, after UN Resolution 1244 had been approved, NATO requested Hungary to provide ground troops to participate in the mission of enforcing peace in Kosovo. Although Hungary’s participation in KFOR could be foreseen, it was still somewhat an ad hoc political decision. The Hungarian Parliament decided to commit the Hungarian Army to the peacemaking effort in Kosovo. Since the HDF did not have the financial means to establish and train the battalion-size contingent NATO had requested on 23 June 1999, the Ministry of Defence, announced the sale of its lands for up to 15 billion forints to cover the cost of the contingent for an estimated two years. To be able to fulfill NATO’s request for Hungary to participate in the mission in Kosovo, Hungary asked NATO for postponement of the modernization plans for the HDF, because the defense budget had to be reallocated. Although the Army had only one month to establish and send the Hungarian unit to Kosovo, the personnel for the 350-strong contingent was selected--mostly from the 5th Mechanized Infantry Brigade--and trained by mid-July. Some days later the contingent was sent to Kosovo and began to operate in theater on 20 July 1999 (Plater-Zyberk 26 June -- 9 July 1999, paragraphs 1-4)
The Hungarian Guard and Security Battalion in Kosovo has the mission of guarding and securing KFOR`s Main Headquarters (HQ) and a telecommunications center in Brussels Barracks in Pristina. It is subordinated to KFOR Headquarters (Main) Support Group. Augmenting the guard companies, a bomb disposal squad is included in the contingent to clear mines in the vicinity of the communication center, work started by British troops. As part of its weaponry the main equipment of the battalion is the 23 BTR-80A armored personnel carrier with mounted 30-millimeter guns. In addition, the unit uses 4x4 jeeps for transportation. Individual weapons include the AK-63 and SVD sniper rifles for self-defense and countersniper purposes. The battalion is composed of a headquarters platoon, one logistics company, and two guard companies (KFOR 1999, Hungary).

Lessons Learned Regarding Peace Operations

The following will show what shortfalls and lessons the HDF and NATO`s multinational forces have identified in preparing, training, and employing forces in POs. Firstly, Hungarian shortcomings experienced in the fields of preparing for and training troops in POs will be discussed. Due to restricted availability of official documents and information, experiences of members of the HDF with peacekeeping background, and the author’s personal knowledge will be used to augment official reports available from Major General Gyorössy, former Deputy Chief of Army Staff (today Chief of Army Staff) on the “Experiences and Recommendations concerning the Preparations and Execution of Crisis Management and Peace Support Operations.” The information derived from this documents is translated by the author from a copy of the original draft. Secondly, the study discusses Hungarian lessons from the Bosnia and Kosovo theaters.
Following the Hungarian lessons learned, shortcomings will be shown from the experiences of the multinational peacekeeping bodies (SFOR and KFOR) serving in Bosnia and Kosovo. Lastly, a brief summary of important lessons learned will be given.

**Human Resources (Hungary)**

Due to problems of medical status and physical abilities many of the personnel were not accepted and a great number of applicants had to repeatedly go through the examination process. Because of this, results were delayed, making the assignments of individuals to certain positions more difficult.

Carrying out logistics tasks was complicated due to the fact that, unlike the HEC, the KFOR GSC is neither included in the Order of Battle of the HDF nor does it have a unit identification code.

Selected personnel came from several different units. The soldiers and leaders assigned to subunits were unfamiliar with each other, therefore, the level of unit cohesion was low. The majority of the men, including personnel in leadership positions, encountered pieces of equipment, such as bullet-proof vests and hand grenades, for the first time during the preparation and training, which increased the time necessary for training.

Communications personnel were selected from those second term individuals who had already received training in the previous training period. Due to lack of time available, however, there were difficulties in the preparation and training of those additionally selected inexperienced individuals who had not received communication training as their second term counterparts had (Gyorössy 1999).
These problems relate to the problems of interoperability with other coalition forces. The selection and knowledge of the personnel of the Hungarian contingents proved to be insufficient to C3 activities and standing operating procedures used in the multinational peacekeeping forces.

Lessons Learned from the Theater

Bosnia (HEC)

Force protection is one of the planning considerations in POs. Force protection is supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs (JP 1-02 2000). Information is critically important to a peacekeeping force, not only for mission success, but also to protect the force (JP 3-07.3, 1999). At the beginning of the HEC’s participation in the rebuilding process in Bosnia, the Hungarian engineer unit had a designated protection force for security purposes, but no designated intelligence section (S2 shop) to collect and analyze information available about the AO in which the HEC had to work. After the protection force from the headquarters company (HHC) was taken from the HEC due to reductions in the force, the US Army Special Forces units provided close protection sections to the HEC for a short period of time. Without a designated S2 section, however, the contingent could not process information sent from Sarajevo SFOR HQ or the G2 shop of Multinational Division South West (MND SW), and, therefore, had no clear picture of the actual threat in the area of the work sites.

Force protection is the primary responsibility of the contingent commander, and cannot be neglected or left completely to other nations’ forces. This lesson was learned when an HEC bridge construction unit deployed to Doboj (in the Bosnian Serb Republic) without adequate self-defense capability to build a 157-meter bridge over the Bosna
River. The unit was very vulnerable and personnel were exposed to threats from the local Serbs. This was reported to the HEC headquarters, with a request for additional means of protection. The request was then forwarded up the chain of command. Finally the Hungarian Parliament gave permission to mount the organic weapons back on the turrets of the armored vehicles. No accidents were reported at Doboj, but it was pure luck no one attempted to attack the unit, since the Serb population has not been friendly toward Hungarian soldiers since the First World War. Analysis of the threat by a direct source, such as SRF, could have prevented the HEC from acting too late in the hopes that nothing would happen. Hope is not an instrument of force protection (Hornyacsek, 2000).

Bosnia (author)

Intelligence is another planning consideration in POs. As a part of my job in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I worked closely with the teams of the Spanish Legion (part of the Special Forces of the Spanish Army -- “Operaciones Especiales de la Legion”), which worked under the supervision of the S2 shop of the Spanish Brigade (SPABRI) to provide the G2 cell of the Multinational Division Southeast (MND SE) information on the local political, social, and economic life as indicators of future actions of the populace. In addition to this, special operations forces were extensively used in acquiring information on weapons smuggling, drug trafficking, and locations of persons indicted for war crimes, and in combating terrorism to prevent atrocities against refugees trying to return to their homes under a program of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
During my 13 months of service in Bosnia, I learned that these forces together with their special equipment, proved to be extremely beneficial to the international stabilization effort by:

1. Allowing commanders and political leaders to foresee possible reactions of the populace and their consequences to actions SFOR had initiated, such as the confiscation of weapons from the HVO (Hrvatska Vojska Obrasovanje), the Croatian Defense Council in 1998, or the dismissal of General Sopta, (former commander of HVO forces in Bosnia) for violating one of the regulations of the Dayton Peace Accords.

2. Combating terrorism to prevent hostile actions against returning refugees and others with non-Bosnian nationality, for example, NGO personnel and members of delegations.

3. Establishing initial liaison between G5 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) cells and the local populace.

4. Providing headquarters information on weapon smuggling and drug trafficking within their area of responsibility.

5. Locating and providing information on war criminals, leaders of organized criminal groups, extremist ethnic and religious groupings, and their connections.

**Lessons from IFOR/SFOR**

1. Counterintelligence (CI) and HUMINT assets are essential to support the force protection mission. Joint doctrine must continue to be developed to further refine the integration of CI and HUMINT into joint and combined operations. (LTC Perkins, CI and HUMINT Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence)
2. The land-based assets ranged from CI/HUMINT teams to dedicated SIGINT and electronic warfare (EW) units to Special Operations Forces (SOF). CI/HUMINT and SOF were also a valuable complement to the national and theater assets in that they could verify and obtain information.

3. Special Forces assisted UNPROFOR, NATO, and non-NATO forces and provided liaison with non-NATO forces and the former warring factions. They also assisted with surveying and monitoring the demarcation line and zone of separation and supported civil-military activities. The special forces liaison coordination elements assigned to NATO and coalition units supported integration of intelligence, operations, communications, close air support, and medical evacuations. The interface with NATO and non-NATO forces proved to be of great value to the IFOR operation.

4. Strategic to theater to tactical intelligence systems interoperability, as well as coalition intelligence interoperability, continues to be a problem. The proliferation of intelligence systems at all levels is also an issue. Multilevel security is a means to an end in solving many of the related issues (Wentz 1999, Chapter IV).

5. In Bosnia, USSOF was, for the most part, the single most effective HUMINT source of information to the conventional force commander. This resulted from the fact that SOF elements lived in the communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. SOF elements interacted daily with the population and maintained a more relaxed demeanor. Working in this manner, the teams not only gained valuable information but also assisted the locals to solve problems and maintained good rapport, a key element to the teams` force protection (Hawkins 2001).
Kosovo (KFOR HGSC)

As a consequence of the shortfalls originating from the mixed composition of the Hungarian Guard and Security Contingent the following deficiencies were experienced during the first year in theater:

1. Personnel were selected from several different units, therefore, cohesion within the contingent was low.
2. Command and control was problematic due to insufficiently trained personnel and lack of mission awareness, which caused gaps in understanding the mission.
3. Due to the ad hoc selection and little time available for familiarization with the details of the mission, personnel failed to completely understand the operating procedures within the contingent and the broader international mission (Kender, 2000).

Kosovo, Operation Allied Force

The overall quality and level of intelligence support provided during Operation Allied Force were far superior to that provided during the Gulf War. However, because the Serbs frequently dispersed their air defenses and shifted forces from one location to another, it was difficult for NATO to find, fix, and destroy them.

During Operation Allied Force, shortcomings were evident in both operations security (OPSEC) and communications security (COMSEC). There is some evidence that these were exploited by the Serbs. Poor operations and communications security procedures reduced the effectiveness of NATO air strikes and increased the risk to NATO forces (DoD 2000, Chapter V, 55 and 73).
Lessons from the KFOR UK Contingent

There is a need for the UK and its Allies and partners to improve capabilities in the following areas: readiness, deployability and sustainment, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), close combat/force protection capability, and satellite and tactical communications.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

The need for an improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability is a clear requirement for ground operations. Using collection methods, commanders on the ground should be supplied with information and intelligence as quickly as possible, ideally using the latest digital technology. Options are being looked at to deliver such a capability as part of both the land digitization and joint ISR programs. It is also necessary to provide forces with much more extensive night vision technology, for general surveillance purposes, situational awareness, and weapon sights.

Close Combat and Force Protection Capability

The Kosovo campaign has highlighted the requirement for greater attention to force protection and close combat capability. Had the UK forces been required to mount an opposed entry operation, there would have been an emphasis on infantry operations, given the difficult terrain. This sort of operation would have been ideally suited to the light and mobile forces as part of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (Secretary of State for Defense of the United Kingdom 2000, Chapter 8,).

Summary

From the lessons learned discussed in this chapter the following operational shortcomings are revealed at both national and international levels:
1. The Hungarian military does not have a cohesive and designated force that could immediately respond to an international request for Hungary to participate in POs.

2. The selection of individuals, therefore, is an ad hoc process and is primarily based on the willingness of volunteers to deploy abroad. Thus, Hungarian peacekeepers can only participate in operations with the low-cohesiveness and limited training such units allow.

3. Units at battalion strength need adequate logistics, which is difficult due to the artificial organization of units without official unit designation numbers.

4. Lack of adequate S2 sections in the Hungarian contingents limits the ability to analyze information and hinders force protection measures.

5. Command and control, as well as strategic/operational/tactical intelligence system interoperability, proved to be a problem within the coalition in POs.

6. Special operations capable units have been extremely beneficial to the efforts of joint operations by verifying and obtaining information necessary to safely carry out PO missions.

7. NATO and coalition combined operations lack adequate interoperability and effectiveness of C2 and ISR activities in POs.

One can see that, according to the lessons from different POs, special capabilities to support joint and coalition operations are welcomed and greatly valued in the theater. Despite the fact that special operation capabilities are available to the Hungarian military leadership, it does not use special operations capable units to improve cooperation among different military and civilian organizations in theater, although this could conceivably further enhance success and effectiveness of POs. The next chapter, therefore, will
provide an analysis of what and how SRF could be used and contribute to Hungarian interoperability and to the overall efforts of POs.
CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS

The previous chapters talked about the special ties that connect Hungary to its neighbors, especially to the South-Slav countries in the Balkans, and about how Hungary is trying to influence regional stability to promote peace and protect its own national interests in the region. It was shown that, as part of these efforts, Hungary is involved in various POs, paying special attention to the Balkans and its conflicts, by which Hungary has been greatly affected during the last decade. Given the nature and the complexity of the Balkans, it is obvious that, since a long-term self-sustaining settlement for the territorial disputes within the southeastern European region is not yet in sight, Hungarian forces, together with other militaries participating in the stabilization process, will most probably remain in the Balkan theater in the foreseeable future. The study also identified some of the shortfalls the Hungarian and multinational peacekeeping forces have been facing, including internal and external shortcomings that have negative effects on the interoperability of Hungarian forces with NATO and other allied forces.

Against this backdrop, the third chapter talked about the composition, structure, training, capabilities, limitations, and equipment of the current Hungarian Special Reconnaissance Forces to identify the areas and tasks in which they could contribute to POs, particularly in regards to their potential for improving the interoperability of Hungarian forces with NATO. Researching and examining these areas illuminated some of the problems the Hungarian SRF encounter. These are an important part of the thesis, since they identify potential areas for improvements and corrections that are beyond an SRF unit’s authority to initiate, but could, nonetheless, further enhance SRF capabilities.
This chapter will provide a comparative analysis and will answer the secondary questions presented in the introduction. Finally it will conclude with recommendations on the employment of SRF in POs.

**What Can SRF Do That Other Forces Cannot Do in Peace Operations?**

In answering this question, one has to look at the capabilities of SRF units compared to conventional unit capabilities in their performance in different types of POs. There are many activities involved in conducting POs in which both conventional and special reconnaissance forces can participate, but the differences within those tasks originate from the difference in the very nature of those units. For example, reconnaissance is an activity both forces conduct in any military operation, but the objects and purposes of the reconnaissance activities can be very different from each other. While SRF units are able to surveil or reconnoiter highly sensitive targets and remain undetected due to their specialized training in stealth infiltration and reconnaissance methods, conventional ground units conduct only normal reconnaissance activities, such as route, area, and engineer reconnaissance. Targets could also have different meanings to strategic and operational level commanders, and could also be too politically sensitive to be dealt with by a large conventional force that does not have “plausible deniability.” Another example is escorting convoys. While conventional forces escort convoys regularly in POs, they normally are not tasked with escorting special convoys, for example, military delegations and hazardous materials, where special procedures to successfully protect convoy members or materiel require skills beyond those of conscripts with only ordinary training. These tasks are normally given to specially trained and selected units or personnel. Table 3 shows a comparison in
capabilities of conventional and SRF units in POs, with the “X” indicating the possession of capability. Table 3 also indicates that there are missions that SRF are incapable of performing. However, in missions such as the security of a BZ or DMZ and the inspection of facilities, although SRF units cannot be used alone, they could support conventional forces.

What SRF Capabilities Can Enhance Hungary’s Interoperability with NATO Peacekeepers?

According to “Reform 2000-2010,” a publication of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, among the Alliance capabilities, the following requirements, approved during NATO’s Washington summit held in April 2000, have significant importance:
deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; the capability of effective engagement, survivability of units and infrastructure; and command and control and communication (C3) (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Hungary 2001, article 275).

Since the primary roles of these forces are reconnaissance and special reconnaissance, the study highlights the HUMINT aspect of interoperability. There are four areas in which, based on their capabilities, Hungarian SRF units could enhance Hungary’s interoperability with NATO: deployability, assistance in precision engagements of targets, command and control and communications, and ISR.
Table 3: Comparison of conventional and SRF capabilities in peace operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>SRF</th>
<th>Conventional Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Action</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Post-strike reconnaissance (BDA)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Targeting acquisition</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Area assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Designate and secure sites (LZ/DZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating terrorism (Counter-terrorism)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underwater Operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collateral Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Escorting VIPs and special convoys</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support of war crimes investigations and detentions of PIFWCs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sniper/anti sniper operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support to elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Demining operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training Host Nation security forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct PSYOPs</td>
<td>X**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR/CSAR</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct NEO</td>
<td>X**</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison &amp; linguistic support to Host Nation or NATO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery and protection of humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manning checkpoints</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation and mediation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of facilities</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization and disarmament</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowed control and incident management</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interposition between parties to the conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducting force-on-force operations with synchronized air, ground and special operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing the buffer or demilitarized zone (BZ/DMZ)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Represents limited ability to conduct such mission
** Represents the ability to support such mission

Source: JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations
Deployability

This requirement is the very essence of getting to the theater of operations quickly, and is a capability upon which NATO puts great emphasis. The examples of joint exercises mentioned in the second chapter showed that SRF are capable of being deployed by allied or coalition air assets and, because of their high readiness status and light nature, can be moved into the theater more rapidly than any other HDF ground element. Conventional forces are more robust and require adequate logistics to operate for even a short period of time. The time consuming procedures of logistical support further increase their time to deploy and relocate. Because of their size these units are difficult to relocate, and once on the move they are slow to stop.

SRF are categorized as immediate reaction forces based on their long history of being the first to be employed. Unlike conventional forces, SRF units are light and have a very flexible organization that allows them to swiftly change their operational structure to best suit the mission. Because of their flexibility and lightness, they are also very quick to deploy without difficult logistical preparations or procedures. Deploying first into the theater, SRF can provide follow-on forces with precious initial intelligence reports prior to their deployment, establish liaison with local or multinational forces, conduct area assessments, or assist conventional forces in their entry operations by providing last-minute situation reports about the AO. Once deployed, SRF units can receive resupply from the air, therefore, they would not be bound to ground logistics to remain effectively operational. Once in the AO, based on their size and equipment, these units are agile, capable of repositioning by means of ground, land, or water transportation. This provides
commanders the capability to be proactive and take the initiative, employing intelligence assets swiftly throughout the theater to learn about the opponents’ intentions, rather than simply reacting.

**Assisting Precision Engagements of Targets**

This is a critical element of conducting POs, where ROEs are much more restrictive than in a high-intensity conflict in order to reduce collateral damage to avoid negative political ramifications. SRF have the capability to engage or facilitate the engagement of preselected high value targets, especially in areas where conventional forces could not operate covertly and would be subject to unnecessary casualties, which, in itself, could jeopardize the mission. The training and capabilities of SRF units enable them to independently engage specific targets or directly support engagements, directing air strikes or other ground delivery methods. As *Joint Vision 2010* predicts, long-range precision capability is emerging as a key factor in future warfare. For this, however, one must have all-weather precision weapons and timely, accurate targeting information. Hungarian SRF do not possess sophisticated targeting devices yet, but have the capability and the equipment to provide air and ground elements carrying out strategic strikes with data on the precise location and distance of preselected targets.

During both the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts precision munitions and smart bombs were extensively used to mitigate damage to nonmilitary targets and increase the effectiveness of engagements. Targeting those munitions, however, is a very difficult task because the weapons require precise and the most up-to-date information. The target must be identified, with its position precisely known, in order for the arriving munition to hit it with accuracy (JP 3-09.1 1991).
Although Hungarian SRF forces have not been used in providing terminal
guidance for precision munitions, they are trained in using laser target ranging devices
and battle damage assessment (BDA). They could be easily trained in using laser target
ranging and designating devices that are used by several NATO allies for terminal
guidance for air strikes.

In summary, SRF are a potential asset for either national or multinational
commands. They can actively and effectively conduct target designation and
identification in all weather and terrain, strengthening and enhancing their capability of
ground target acquisition.

Command and Control and Communications

This requirement continues to be a problem within coalition forces in general, and
the Hungarian peacekeeping contingents are no exception. The majority of the Hungarian
ground forces still uses Russian-made communications equipment that is incompatible
with its NATO counterparts. With those radios they can maintain reliable
communications only among their own units, but must rely on other nations’
communication assets for intracommand transmissions. The SRF are equipped with the
HRM 7000 radio system, which is NATO compatible, has its own encryption system, and
is more secure and accurate in transmitting radio messages than its Russian-made
predecessors, the R-354 and R-394 radios. With the system’s highly mobile transmitters
SRF units can provide secure and more reliable communications between both the
national and multinational commands and the Hungarian forces.
ISR

These are the areas of HUMINT that were highlighted in the lessons learned as weak points within NATO’s and the coalition peacekeeping forces’ interoperability. This includes Hungary, which has not employed forces that could effectively contribute to NATO’s intelligence collection efforts to assist the overall mission of any PO. Organized, equipped, and trained specifically for these tasks, Hungarian SRF units could be of great support in multinational POs regarding ISR, especially in the Balkans, where, because of Hungary’s geographical location in the region, and SRF cultural and sociopolitical awareness, they could be extremely beneficial to military planners for operations in the area.

What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Employing SRF in Peace Operations?

The employment of SRF in POs have both advantages and disadvantages regarding military and political issues. Deploying units to POs presents challenging tasks to political and military decision makers of participating countries. In determining whether Hungary should employ SRF in POs, one must examine the pros and cons of engaging those forces in operations in low intensity conflicts. The areas to examine are many, ranging from political considerations to basic military matters, such as logistical support, subordination of forces in the AO, or the temporary excuse of these forces from their regular home defense duties. Table 4 shows the possible political and military advantages and disadvantages of SRF forces employed in POs.
Table 4: Advantages and Disadvantages of Employing SRF in Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quick reaction capability</td>
<td>Possible negative political ramifications from neighboring countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional mission capabilities</td>
<td>Additional tasks to controlling headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases the overall effectiveness of the HDF in POs.</td>
<td>Drives national military intelligence assets from home soil for the time of deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotes Hungary’s international prestige and consent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requires minimal logistical support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops national operational and strategic reconnaissance capabilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides additional HUMINT assets in POs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can support PSYOP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can serve as operational reserve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional force protection measures to both national and multinational forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides on-the-job training for SRF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps to evaluate SRF operational and tactical abilities in the operational theater.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No need for special service agreement to serve abroad because of professional and contract statuses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases good morale within SRF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Juhász, György, Colonel, Hungary. Chief of G-5, HDF Army Staff. 2000. Interview by the author via electronic mail, October-December; author)

**What Developments Could be Pursued to Further Improve SRF Capabilities?**

**Seeking Cooperation**

In such a sensitive and protected area as SOF, one cannot speak of developing cooperation with all potential partners, mostly because of the reluctance on the part of some partners to share their knowledge, experience, and technology. It is rather an unwritten rule that every country selects a strategic partner(s) in this field, which helps the respective nations broaden their strides in mutual confidence building. Such a pattern of cooperation, conducted on the basis of bilateral agreements, is typical for the majority of NATO nations. It could be, therefore, a task for the leadership of the HDF and the
political elite to make a decision on selecting such strategic partners for Hungarian SRF units.

Potentially there are at least two directions for such cooperation for Hungary--the Anglo-American and German. In fact, Hungary has already established practical military cooperation with different NATO countries, in whose efforts Hungarian SRF units have been actively participating. However, the various exercises involved mostly conventional units, which SRF units only supported, and contacts with other special forces units have not gone beyond exchange visits. Therefore, real value regarding exchange of experiences in the field of special operations has not been achieved.

Now, that Hungary is a full member of NATO and is equally responsible with its allies for promoting the effectiveness of the collective defense of the Alliance, the Hungarian military leadership could seek cooperation with the United States Army Special Forces and the German Special Operations Command, and deepen its existing relations with the British SAS. Areas of focus could be common training, exchange visits of commanders, and joint exercises of their respective special operations capable units to further improve the interoperability of both personnel and operational procedures.

As part of the international military education program (IMET), Hungarian SRF officers have been sent to the US Army Ranger School in Fort Benning, Georgia since 1993. Similar to this program, effort ought to be made to send SRF NCOs and company grade officers to participate in the training and selection program at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Having SRF personnel attend courses that are held specifically for special operations personnel would increase and promote the SRF’s ability to cooperate with NATO SOF in future peace or traditional
war operations. For better cooperation, the establishment of so-called “sister unit”
relations between elements of allied special operations and SRF units could be another
step toward enhanced interoperability. As with the US, special bilateral military
agreements could be established--or existing agreements extended--with Germany and
Great Britain. These activities could help Hungarian SRF practice command and control
and standing operating procedures (SOP) used by their NATO counterparts, further
improving their ability to conduct joint missions under both national and coalition
command.

Developing SRF

As discussed in Chapter Three, the Hungarian SRF are capable of operating with
both national and allied forces in POs. However, SRF, like any other forces, still could
improve in certain areas in order to be able to best meet the demanding and changing
requirements of today’s challenging military tasks, especially in the sensitive areas of
POs. Based on the comments of Hungarian SMEs currently in SRF positions and the
author’s personal expertise, the areas to be developed to increase SRF capabilities and
effectiveness are: weaponry, mission specific equipment, and training.

Unfortunately, the solution requires more than just good intentions. Budgetary
restraints continue to be a great obstacle impeding rapid development of HDF ground
forces. The Hungarian Ministry of Defense (MoD), according to the accepted target force
goals, has prioritized the development of its military toward effectively fitting into
NATO’s collective defense structure and joining its integrated air defense system.
Accordingly, the main focus of development will be upgrades in the following areas:
avionics, air traffic control, radar systems, command and control, reconnaissance systems, and surveillance systems.

Another priority field is the upgrade of tactical units and command and control equipment, especially NATO compatible radios. With the reconnaissance systems being in fifth place on the priority list, the fact that first priority goes to developing avionics, air defense, and C2I capabilities, such as the procurement of 24 F-16 fighter airplanes, radar systems, the MISTRAL air defense missile complexes, and the identification friend or foe (IFF) system, leaves other areas with limited funds available for technological investments. Table 5 illustrates the expenditure-strength comparison between the HDF land and air components, using data on the authorized strength and expenditures of both services in 1999 (U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration 1995, 161-174).

Table 5: Expenditure-strength comparison between the land and air components of the HDF in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Expense budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Forces</td>
<td>24,304</td>
<td>19,578.6 billion HUF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>12,435</td>
<td>16,778.6 billion HUF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>1.954 : 1</td>
<td>1.166 : 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: National Defense ‘99, MoD, Hungary)

Such priorities undeniably delay the development of ground forces, including SRF. However, there are possible ways to take action using Hungarian national sources in support of SRF, and with it the HDF intelligence system. According to the head of the financial and budgetary service of the Hungarian MoD, Brigadier General Oszkár Berényi, the defense budget has risen from 164.051 billion forints to 189.4 billion in 2000, and 236 billion in 2001, and will rise to 261 billion in 2002. Next year’s budget
will be nearly 1.6 times greater than it was in 1999, with, however, the total number of personnel of the HDF reduced by another 10 percent (Hungarian Ministry of Defense 2001, article 412). Therefore, one could assume that in upcoming years the Hungarian MoD will be able to allocate more money to the HDF for procurement purposes than before, including procurement of reconnaissance specific equipment. The following will give an overview of areas that could be developed and modified to increase SRF capabilities, should the funds be allocated.

**Weapons**

One can see that the missions and tasks of the SRF vary from those that require firepower and striking capability direct actions (DA) to those that need precision in engaging targets in close quarter battles (CQB). Teams likely to engage unfriendly forces or objects must have firepower to carry out DA and CSAR, or support non-combatant evacuation operations successfully. Concerning precision engagements, although SRF teams use the reliable Russian-made SVD sniper rifles, they are ineffective with their four-power sights to engage targets at ranges over 800 meters. Effective sniper teams can assist SRF infiltration operations, conduct reconnaissance, support security of BZ/ZOS, provide backup for CQB and counterterrorism operations, and observe and destroy specific high value targets of belligerent forces, such as radar and C4I equipment, surveillance systems, parked aircraft, ammunition and fuel storage facilities, light armored vehicles, and air defense pieces. Another tactical consideration is to equip teams so they will be able to defend themselves once they make contact with an opposing force superior in numbers. An SRF team carries assault rifles and submachine guns without adequate firepower to stand up against lightly armored opponents or bunkered positions if
those are prepared for an engagement. The recommendation, therefore, is to equip SRF teams with more modern sniping weapons, such as the Hungarian-made 12.7-millimeter Gepard M2 medium sniper rifle, light machine guns, and light disposable rocket launchers, such as the US light antitank weapon (LAW) or the Russian RPG-18. These weapons are light enough to be carried and to deploy with and would provide SRF teams with sufficient firepower and more effectiveness in accomplishing their tasks.

**Equipment**

Lessons learned from Bosnia showed that, within the coalition, nations used their own communication systems to maintain radio communications and had difficulties communicating with one another, since there were no common communication systems established below division level for command and control security. In today’s information age the secured and uninterrupted flow of information and the ability to instantly analyze it are the cornerstones of successful operations. It is, therefore, not good enough to be “only” able to communicate with allied forces, since radio transmissions can jeopardize missions, as they did during the air campaign against Yugoslavia, where coalition radio communications were monitored and intercepted by the Yugoslav Army, resulting in loss of effectiveness of the ability to achieve surprise. Keeping this in mind, a great breakthrough could be achieved in communications security and effectiveness if SRF companies were equipped with mobile satellite communications systems and capable of producing intelligence. With this technological development, SRF could provide the controlling headquarters with immediate and processed intelligence data, reducing the time spent on analyzing information. This would not only solve the problem of providing the controlling commander with timely, accurate, and secure information,
but also give Hungarian SRF the capability of conducting and supporting national or allied information operations from any theater in the world, thus providing a missing link to effective national and coalition operations in terms of C3 and ISR operations.

Training

As pointed out in chapter three, Hungarian SRF teams do not have adequate medical capability other than providing basic medical aid. The high risk involved in their missions, however, would require teams to be able treat casualties on the spot, since during deployment these units operate far from friendly forces without immediate medical support available, should emergencies occur. Equipping and training SRF teams to perform medical procedures beyond basic treatment could further enhance their survivability, thus promoting their ability to provide assistance to either allied forces or the host nation in POs.

Organization

With the augmentation of weapons mentioned earlier, SRF teams, with their current strength and structure, should have enough firepower to carry out tasks more accurately and lethally, while maintaining their ability to defend themselves. However, in order for the teams to employ their sniper assets more beneficially to themselves and the mission, two-man sniper teams should be established in each team instead of having one man operating alone. Having sniper teams consist of a sniper equipped with the 12.7-millimeter Gepard sniper rifle and a spotter would increase operational effectiveness and survivability of SRF teams with a stand-off capability, reducing the chance for the enemy to interfere with or jeopardize their mission. Sniper teams would not only be effective against selected targets, but also provide covering support for team members as they
closed upon their targets. They also would greatly contribute to gathering initial information on specific targets well before SRF teams begin their operation against them, thus increasing their security and situational awareness.

Considering the advantages of employing sniper teams at the team level, it is highly recommended that in the future SRF teams be augmented with two-man sniper teams having the flexibility to operate independently from their respective SRF teams. Sniper teams could begin to form up and practice using their SOP and weapons, the 7.62-millimeter SVD sniper rifle, until they receive their new weapons. This would contribute to their achieving operational readiness. Upon receiving the 12.7-millimeter rifles, the teams will have already acquired the knowledge and SOPs of sniper team operations necessary to start training with their new weapons.

**How Could SRF be Used in Peace Operations?**

**General**

Under the new regional security conditions, the importance of employing special operations capable units has not only increased as compared to the Cold War period, but has also gained a new dimension. First of all, the scope of the tasks and roles of special operations capable forces has increased in the last ten years. Apart from traditional "war" missions which include both operations in support of friendly regular forces at corps or higher levels (deep reconnaissance, raids, covert monitoring of objects in the enemy's rear) and independent combat operations (sabotage, destroying fixed objects of strategic significance), increasing attention is being given to tasks classified as operations other than war (OOTW). These tasks, besides counter insurgency operations, can be part of military assistance programs (training), combating of organized crime, certain counter-
terrorist activities, psychological warfare, and tasks associated with POs. Within the framework of these latter operations are included such missions as escorting political delegations and negotiation teams, detaining war criminals, and establishing relations with the population of crisis areas.

Following NATO’s adoption of the 1991 New Strategic Concept of the Alliance, a greater emphasis was put on the development of immediate and quick reaction forces. Further development of special operations capable forces, to include gradual adjustments for operating in low-intensity conflict environments, has become a natural consequence of acquiring increased expeditionary operation capability. The following examples illustrate the trend: the creation of German Special Operations Command (Kommando Spezialkrafte -- KSK) in 1996, expanding the Belgian Paracommando regiment to the size of a brigade, and the addition of another company to the Dutch commando battalion. Further in the USA, despite reductions of defense spending and force levels, the special operations budget even grew slightly. A very significant example of appreciating the importance of special operations is certainly the 1997 nomination of Commander-in-Chief US Special Operations Command General J. Shelton to the post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (Piatkowski 1998, Chapter II).

Based on the example of the escalating situation in Kosovo, despite the international political and military efforts to stop Albanian guerilla attacks on Serb civilians and police forces in the buffer zone, it is possible that in the near future peace operations may have a more robust mandate to effectively keep or make peace. Now that KFOR, supporting the implementation of the UN’s resolution, seems to have become an obstacle in the way of the independence for which the nationalist Kosovar Albanians are
fighting, it is very possible that KFOR forces will be targeted by Albanian guerillas (Anderson 2001, Page A14). According to Jane's Intelligence editor Alex Standish, it can only be a matter of time before the Balkan powder-keg explodes once more--with more than 50,000 international troops and police liable to be caught in the crossfire. (Standish 2001). Hungarian forces currently serving in the Balkan theater could, therefore, possibly be exposed to that threat, where both national and coalition commanders would have to use their ISR assets more intensively to enhance force protection and gain advantage over hostile forces. The use of locals as information sources would provide these commanders with a great intelligence advantage, and Hungarian SRF would be an ideal means for exploiting this source.

Recommendations for Employing SRF in PO

Course of Action One

The current Hungarian SRF structure, organization, capabilities, and limitations, enable them to be used under national command as an augmentation force to the national contingent to increase its operational capabilities and provide additional force protection. This is of great importance, especially if the political and military leadership is planning to increase Hungary’s involvement in high tension areas, such as the Golan Heights. As General Ferenc Végh, former Hungarian Chief of Defense Staff, stated in a Jane’s Defense Weekly interview on 18 February 1998: “We are taking part in so-called blue-helmet missions under UN leadership, for example together with Austria in Cyprus, and we would like to increase our engagement at the Golan Heights” (Mader 1998).

SRF units can be of great value in supporting national command authorities in their decision making to best employ their peacekeeping troops as well as in providing
additional intelligence necessary for successful force protection. As an augmentation force, SRF teams could be deployed with the peace contingents to perform missions best suited for the mission profile of the supported units. Besides their ability to support HUMINT and surveillance operations, they could also serve as special operations capable components to perform additional tasks for which the supported units have no capabilities, such as conducting rescue operations in complex terrain, combating terrorism, assisting antidrug operations, intercepting weapons smuggling, et cetera. On request, these teams could also be used to support coalition forces serving as liaison coordination elements between the participating host-nation, national commands, and coalition command, should the situation dictate such measures, but could still remain under national control. With their compatible communication equipment and language capabilities SRF teams could serve as important operating links between friendly forces. Colonel Hawkins, who was one of the SMEs interviewed by the author to collect additional information on the role and importance of special operations capable forces in POs, stated that the USSOF routinely attach Special Forces liaison coordination elements to the HQ of coalition higher echelons to enhance communication and thus interoperability between the coalition elements. (Hawkins 2001). Similarly to this, Hungarian SRF could also be attached to peacekeeping HQs to enhance interoperability between the Hungarian contingent and main HQ of peacekeeping forces. The current organization allows SRF units to detach teams from their structure and attach them to peacekeeping forces. Based on the number of Hungarian peacekeeping contingents currently deployed in peace operations at company or above strength, four SRF teams could be deployed at any time augmenting national contingents at least for nine months.
Experiences from Bosnia show that for special operations capable units such as the Spanish Special Forces, six-month deployments proved to be inadequate, since the time for effective operations was not enough to allow teams to become familiar with the sociopolitical and military situation in their respective area of responsibility (AOR). Out of their six months, the teams could only use four effectively, because it normally took one month to obtain adequate knowledge about their AOR and go through the hand-over process with their predecessors, and another month to “in-process” the new teams deploying into the AOR. Therefore, it is recommended that SRF teams deploy for at least nine months. This way, one can achieve overlapping support with experienced teams providing assistance to the new contingents rotating into the theater, which is always one of the most vulnerable times of operations. Once the leadership and the personnel of the fresh contingents are settled in and become used to the environment, the SRF teams can be rotated. With this method, a total of eight SRF teams could be exercised and evaluated in one and a half years while operating in a multinational environment in real operational theaters.

Course of Action Two

Course of Action Two offers a different, promising approach to the question of employing Hungarian SRF in POs. In this concept an SRF company could be designated as a standby, special operations capable, light augmentation force ready to deploy into PO theaters as a quick reaction force (QRF) to provide additional mission capabilities to, and augment multinational peacekeeping/peace enforcement forces. A company-size QRF composed of SRF personnel and their equipment, could encounter similar size or smaller light infantry forces. SRF could use their organic sniper assets to provide further
security to the reaction force, capable of using both conventional infantry and special operations techniques. The SRF unit could be put under coalition command to support the overall mission, rather than subordinated to one particular contingent, which would also make command and control easier and its response time shorter. A SRF company could deploy with its headquarters section and six to eight teams, out of which two could operate in the AOR, conducting HUMINT missions in support of the QRF and its controlling command to provide timely and accurate information on the development of situations to which the QRF has to respond. The rest of the company could be in a standby status ready to respond to any emergencies, be they CSAR/SAR, CBT, CQB, or other task dictated by the situation within the AOR. This way the capabilities of the company could be used effectively to support coalition operations in the theater. Rotation of teams could be coordinated and controlled by the company headquarters to make sure balanced tasking is achieved during deployment. This mode of employment, however, could be hazardous to these unique soldiers who cannot be replaced easily. In addition to the hazard of casualties, their employment requires SRF to have a very good appreciation of combined operations and SOP, since, as a QRF, they could be used to support any of the contingents within the multinational coalition force.

Possible ways to acquire additional experience by seeking deepening cooperation with special operations capable forces and establishing “sister-unit” type relations were previously mentioned. This could be a very effective way to develop Hungarian SRF combined operational procedures until a decision is made to employ them in POs to augment mission capabilities of conventional units, or as a QRF. One could argue that SRF could be employed in POs without being involved in long and time-consuming
“sister-unit” relations with similar type allied forces. However, one should not forget that, as this study has pointed out, one of the recurring problems of peace operations NATO conducted as a coalition, specifically in the Balkans, was lack of knowledge about each other’ SOP, which hindered effective C2 and ISR activities.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Having discussed the historical events of the first half of the twentieth century that still influence current Hungarian policy making and national security strategy, the study described Hungary’s political, economic, and sociopolitical interests in the Southeastern European region. Next the study discussed how the Hungarian military has been playing an important role in the stabilization process in the region, being involved in the peacekeeping efforts with two battalion-sized contingents, and gave a thorough description of Hungarian SRF, including their structure, missions, equipment, and capabilities. The thesis then examined the capabilities of Hungarian SRF and conventional units in POs to identify the capability gaps SRF units could possible fill, using lessons learned from both the national and multinational military bodies currently serving in Bosnia and Kosovo. Using the results of the search for shortfalls in capabilities and the knowledge about Hungarian SRF, the study arrived at the analysis, which answered the secondary questions and concluded with recommendations regarding the use of Hungarian SRF in POs, and their possible future development.

Interoperability

The study pointed out that the alliance capability areas, such as deployability, precision engagement, C3, and ISR, which were approved during NATO’s Washington summit, held in April 2000, and prioritized by the Hungarian Ministry of Defense as requirements for its Armed Forces to meet NATO interoperability standards, could be improved by the employment of SRF units in POs. Current SRF structure and capabilities enable them to efficiently operate independently or together with conventional forces in
POs. Their experience, equipment, training, and structure allow SRF to operate with NATO forces and, as the analysis has indicated, in light of the Hungarian and NATO capability gaps and shortcomings observed in the Bosnian and Kosovo theaters, be beneficial to the overall effort of POs by filling those capability gaps in the fields of C3, ISR, engagement of high value targets, and deployability. The analysis pointed out that among the areas of interoperability that Hungary wishes to improve are: HUMINT/ISR, C3, deployability, and precision engagement of targets.

HUMINT/ISR

Today, when leading NATO countries more and more depend on technological advantages over a conventional adversary, one must not forget that in POs peacekeeping forces are likely to face asymmetrical threats rather than a well-defined and predictable conventional force. Therefore, one should never totally depend on the advantages of technological superiority. HUMINT still plays an undeniably important role in intelligence collection, and offers commanders a very reliable solution for acquiring accurate and timely information on a potential adversary. HUMINT can also be used to confirm information collected by other intelligence gathering systems or assist those systems in their operations. The SRF’s ability to provide an additional HUMINT source to PO missions could be of great importance to the overall intelligence collection efforts of peacekeeping missions in today’s arena of information dominance, where forces, conducting various military operations, mostly rely on sophisticated imagery, intelligence collecting systems, and technologies that, according to the lessons learned, need to be augmented in many cases to obtain more accurate, more timely, and first-hand intelligence on both symmetrical and asymmetrical enemies that more and more
characterize today’s POs. Hungarian SRF, representing HUMINT, therefore, could be a valuable asset in the hands of commanders making decisions often under difficult and politically sensitive circumstances, where, providing intelligence, SRF units could be of great value in supporting both national and international command authorities to best employ their peacekeeping troops and conduct successful force protection operations.

**Command and Control and Communications**

In the field of command, control, and communications, the most common problems were OPSEC and COMSEC, which have been highlighted in the lessons learned from the peacekeeping theaters as shortcomings in the operations of the multinational peacekeeping forces. The analysis demonstrated that Hungarian SRF units could be effectively employed to improve and increase the overall effectiveness of Hungarian participation in terms of these problem areas. SRF use NATO compatible communications equipment that allow them to operate throughout the AO with secure radio communications in support of either the national or coalition forces. Their radio equipment also enables SRF units to serve as liaison coordination elements in coalition headquarters to support intra-force operations between Hungarian and coalition forces.

**Deployability**

The SRF’s means of delivery, training, and equipment enable SRF units to get to their designated operational area quickly and support national or coalition operations. To reach their designated AO from their home base, SRF, based on their training, can use either national or allied means of air delivery. Special training enable SRF units to operate in areas where conventional forces are restricted, such as mountains, and in sensitive areas, where the existence of larger units is obvious and could hinder
operational success. In addition to these advantages, based on their ability to quickly deploy, SRF units represent a potential QRF. The employment of Hungarian SRF to support POs would not only be beneficial to the overall peacekeeping missions, but would also enhance cooperation between Hungarian and Allied forces in the theater, further improving their ability to operate together more effectively.

Assisting Precision Engagement of Targets

SRF have the capability to engage or facilitate the engagement of pre-selected high value targets, especially in areas where conventional forces could not operate covertly and would be subject to unnecessary casualties, which, in itself, could jeopardize the mission. The training and capabilities of SRF units enable them to independently engage specific targets or directly support engagements, directing air strikes or other ground delivery methods to support POs as it is envisaged in Joint Vision 2010, which states that long-range precision capability is emerging as a key factor in future warfare.

Employment of SRF

The study recommended the use of SRF units as augmentation force to conventional forces to augment the overall capabilities of the deploying units. In one version, SRF teams could be deployed together with Hungarian peace contingents to perform missions best suited for the mission profile of the supported units, enhancing intelligence collection and force protection. If needed, these teams could also be used to support coalition forces serving as liaison coordination elements between the participating host-nation, national, and coalition commands. The second recommendation suggested the employment of an SRF company as a QRF to provide additional quick
reaction capability to the controlling commander in the theater to encounter any small-scale hostile actions endangering the safety of peacekeeping personnel or materiel.

Conclusion

The study, having collected evidence summarized in this chapter, identified capabilities of Hungarian SRF and shortcomings in interoperability within the multinational coalition forces, and answered the secondary questions of the thesis, has presented sufficient evidences to answer the thesis question, “Would use of SRF units improve Hungary’s interoperability with NATO in peacekeeping operations?” Based on the facts and evidences this study has found, the conclusion of the research is that the use of Hungarian SRF in POs could indeed improve Hungary’s interoperability with NATO forces.

Closing

With additional capabilities brought to peacekeeping theaters, Hungary could not only improve its interoperability with its NATO allies, but also further promote its national prestige, increasing its influence in the stabilization process of the Southeastern European region, thereby enhancing Hungary’s participation in NATO in general, and interest in the Balkans specifically. In addition to the political advantages Hungary could gain by employing SRF units in POs, there is another advantage from which the HDF could benefit. Having a designated immediately deployable SRF unit to support future or present NATO and UN led operations, the HDF would be able to test and improve their strategic reconnaissance assets and their capabilities in real life scenarios, which cannot be accomplished as effectively in exercises or simulations.
Lastly, the employment of SRF in POs would greatly contribute to preserving the high morale within the SRF community by providing them an additional opportunity to exercise their profession under increased multinational attention and real life circumstances.

**Recommendations for Further Studies**

This study has researched the employment of Hungarian SRF and their effect on the interoperability of the HDF with NATO in POs. During the research, the study touched upon areas where SRF could be improved or developed in order for them to further enhance their cooperation with other allied special operations or conventional forces, including organization of SRF units, weapons, equipment, and command and control issues. In order for the Hungarian SRF to achieve greater success and effectiveness in future operations, additional research is needed in the areas of equipping and subordinating the force. These include issues of weapon selections, procurement of equipment, force structure, and, importantly, the question of, To what level of command the SRF should be subordinated? to allow SRF to achieve maximum operational flexibility and effectiveness. All these areas require study in order to ensure that all aspects of SRF procedures and operations are considered using the most current information and data about Hungarian SRF. This is necessary to make sure that these unique and valuable forces will meet the requirements and challenges of both national and NATO operations in the fast developing new security environment of the twenty-first century.
Figure 4. The Subordination of SRF Units. Source: Touring the Army, document of the Army Staff of the HDF.

Figure 5. The Structure of the 34th Recon Battalion
Figure 6. Special Reconnaissance Company structure (34th Battalion).

Figure 7. The Structure of the Special Reconnaissance Company of the 24th Recon Battalion.
APPENDIX B

TABLES

Table 6. Data of Small Arms Used by SRF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small arms</th>
<th>P9R pistol</th>
<th>KGP-9 submachine gun</th>
<th>AK-63D assault rifle</th>
<th>SVD sniper rifle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Made by</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire mode</td>
<td>Semiautomatic</td>
<td>Selective semi- or fully automatic</td>
<td>Selective semi- or fully automatic</td>
<td>Semiautomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine capacity</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective range(m)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1300 w scope, 800 w/o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition type</td>
<td>9x19-mm para FMJ</td>
<td>9x19-mm para FMJ</td>
<td>7.72x39-mm Tracer, incendiary, armor piercing</td>
<td>7.62x54R-mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Double action</td>
<td>Used in CQB</td>
<td>Folded stock for parachute jumps; equipped with night sight and silencer</td>
<td>Integral, infrared detection aid. Illuminated rangefinder reticle. Night sight.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. MI-8 Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mi-8 Hip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong> - transport and assault helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max. range</strong> – 1200 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heighth</strong> – 5.65 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main rotor diameter</strong> - 21.30 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powerplant</strong> - 2 Klimov TV2-117A turboshaft engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crew</strong> - 2-3 with flight technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armament</strong> - 55mm unguided rockets, 250kg bombs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8. MI-17 Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mi-17 Hip</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong> - transport and assault helicopter</td>
<td><strong>Max. speed</strong> - 250 km/h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max. range</strong> - 950 km</td>
<td><strong>Length</strong> – 21.30 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heigth</strong> - 4.75 m</td>
<td><strong>Service ceiling</strong> - 5000 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main rotor diameter</strong> - 21.30 m</td>
<td><strong>Tail rotor diameter</strong> - 3.90 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powerplant</strong> - 2 Klimov TV3-117MT turboshafts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crew</strong> – 2-3 with flight technician</td>
<td><strong>In service</strong> - 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armament</strong> - 55m unguided rockets, 250 kg bombs, AT-2 missiles, 12.7mm mach. gun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. MI-2 Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mi-2 Hoplite</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong> - light utility helicopter</td>
<td><strong>Max. speed</strong> - 210 km/h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max. range</strong> - 797 km</td>
<td><strong>Length</strong> - 17.42 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heigth</strong> - 3.75 m</td>
<td><strong>Service ceiling</strong> - 4000 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main rotor diameter</strong> - 14.50 m</td>
<td><strong>Tail rotor diameter</strong> - 2.70 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powerplant</strong> - 2 Klimov GTD-350 turboshafts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crew</strong> – 1</td>
<td><strong>In service</strong> - 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armament</strong> – none</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCE LIST


Coombs, Howard, Major, Canada. 2001. CGSC student. Interview by the author, March. Fort Leavenworth, KS.


Hungarian Defense Forces, Defense Staff. 581/237 *Kiképzési program a mélységi felderítő alegységek katonái részére.* (Training Program for Soldiers of Special Reconnaissance Unit), Budapest.

Hungarian Defense Forces, Defense Staff. F/7 *Felderítő szakutasítás.* (Reconnaissance Directives), Budapest.

Hungarian Defense Forces, Defense Staff. 700/0501 *A Felderítő Deszantszázzad Alkalmazása.* (The employment of the Special Reconnaissance Company), Budapest.

Hungarian Defense Forces, Defense Staff. 700/0314 *A különleges rendeltetésű felderítő zászlóalj alkalmazásának elvei.* (The methods of employing the Special Reconnaissance Battalion), Budapest.

Hungarian Defense Forces, Defense Staff. F/8 *Szakutasítás az ejtoernyos kiképzés végrehajtására.* (Instruction for conducting parachutist training), Budapest.

Hungarian Defense Forces. “Zrínyi Miklós” Hungarian National Defense University, Budapest:


Rajz, Attila, Major, Hungary. 2000. S-3, 34th Reconnaissance Battalion, Szolnok, Hungary. Interview by the author via telephone and e-mail, November-December, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library  
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
   250 Gibbon Ave.  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

2. Defense Technical Information Center/OCA  
   8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944  
   Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

3. Embassy of the Republic of Hungary

4. LTC Mark Beattie  
   DJMO  
   USACGSC  
   1 Reynolds Ave  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

5. Dr. Harold S. Orenstein  
   CADD  
   USACGSC  
   1 Reynolds Ave  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

6. LTC Jody Prescott  
   MLO  
   USACGSC  
   1 Reynolds Ave  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314
1. Certification Date: 1 June 2001

2. Thesis Author: Captain Arnold Koltai

3. Thesis Title: The Hungarian Army Special Reconnaissance Forces in Peace Operations

4. Thesis Committee Members

Signatures:


5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

   A   B   C   D   E   F   X                               SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

   EXAMPLE
   Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)
   Direct Military Support (10) / Chapter 3 / 12
   Critical Technology (3) / Section 4 / 31
   Administrative Operational Use (7) / Chapter 2 / 13-32

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)
________________________________________ / ______________________ / ______________
________________________________________ / ______________________ / ______________
________________________________________ / ______________________ / ______________
________________________________________ / ______________________ / ______________
________________________________________ / ______________________ / ______________

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: ________________________________
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. **Foreign Government Information.** Protection of foreign information.

2. **Proprietary Information.** Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

3. **Critical Technology.** Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. **Test and Evaluation.** Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.

5. **Contractor Performance Evaluation.** Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.

6. **Premature Dissemination.** Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. **Administrative/Operational Use.** Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. **Software Documentation.** Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. **Specific Authority.** Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. **Direct Military Support.** To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).