RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN THE DIVISION XXI HEAVY BRIGADE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN THE DIVISION XXI HEAVY BRIGADE, by Chaplain Eric R. Keller, 93 pages.

Force XXI technology changes the war-fighting doctrine of the US Army. The new digital technology combined with changes in the design of the force structure created a new mechanized infantry or armor division. This division, called Division XXI, changes the religious support doctrine of the US Army’s chaplain corps. The problem is determining how religious support will change in a Division XXI heavy brigade during combat operations. The study began with a doctrinal review of the evolution of religious support from the Vietnam War to the present. It also presented an overview of the digital technology and the force redesign of the brigade combat team. The study continued with the presentation of three data sets: religious support lessons learned from the combat training centers under the AirLand Battle doctrine, religious support lessons learned from the digital training rotation at the National Training Center, and religious support lessons learned from the Fourth Infantry Division (Mechanized) Limited User Test at Fort Hood, Texas. The data was compared using four categories of religious support tasks: planning religious support during combat, synchronization of religious support, battlefield wandering, and survival on the battlefield. The data indicated religious support planning and execution under Division XXI are enhanced by the digital systems. The study concluded with proposed religious support doctrine for ministry teams assigned to a Division XXI heavy brigade combat team.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Every subject’s duty is the King’s, but every subject’s soul is his own. Therefore should every soldier in the wars do as every sick man in his bed-wash every mote out of his conscience; and dying so, death is to him advantage; or not dying, the time was blessedly lost wherein such preparation was gained; and in him that escapes, it were not sin to think that, making God so free an offer, he let him outlive that day to see his greatness and to teach others how they should prepare.¹

William Shakespeare, Henry V

War is insane. Combat is a brutal process where soldiers can become dehumanized, alienated, and lost. The United States Army gives the Chaplains’ Corps the mission of providing religious ministry for these soldiers during combat. This mission began in the Revolutionary War and continued through history until the present age. The Chief of Chaplain’s vision statement states, “The mission of the Army Chaplaincy is to provide religious support to America’s Army across the full spectrum of operations. We do this by assisting the Commander in ensuring the right of free exercise of religion and by providing spiritual, moral, and ethical leadership for the Army and its culture.”² To fulfill this mission, doctrine requires the Chaplaincy to assign chaplains down to battalion level, so they might provide religious support to soldiers within the battalion during times of war and peace. The full spectrum of conflict means the chaplain’s battalion might be on a peace enforcement mission, a peacekeeping mission, a humanitarian operation, or a full-scale combat. Recent changes in technology and doctrine assist the Army in conducting operations in the full spectrum of conflict. One of those changes is Force XXI.
Each time the United States Army changes the way it moves, shoots, and communicates; the chaplain must change as well. The United States Army is undergoing one such change now. The armored and mechanized infantry divisions are transforming into a new force structure that emphasizes a dispersed, digital force. Force XXI is changing the way soldiers fight in war; thus, the chaplain must change as well. This thesis asks the question; how will the chaplain perform the religious support mission in a Division XXI heavy brigade during high intensity combat operations? The answer to this question covers a wide range of issues, from doctrinal changes to new material requirements. As the other battlefield operating systems change the way they fight in a Force XXI structure, so will the chaplain change. The basic mission remains the same as before: the chaplain is to be at the right place, at the right time, for those soldiers who need him (or her) the most. Implied is the requirement to stay alive and unharmed while performing the religious support mission. This mission seems simple. However, as Clausewitz states, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

Religious Support in the full spectrum of conflict is no exception to this. This thesis explores the above question with all the implications of its answer.

Chapter 1 first defines the basic problem statement as well as the related doctrinal terminology so a common base is established. This definition provides the context, the scope, the evolution or background, and the importance of this problem of providing religious support in a Division XXI heavy brigade. Chapter 2 examines the evolution of religious support doctrine in three broad sweeps. First, it looks at the Vietnam War and how religious support was conducted in America’s last prolonged war. Then, it examines religious support as it evolved during the AirLand Battle doctrinal era, mainly in the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s. Finally, a brief discussion of the current Division XXI redesign is provided to establish the new context for religious support. Chapter 3 then provides the research methodology used in exploring the issue of providing religious support in a digital heavy brigade during combat operations. It discusses three data sets that come from the combat training centers and compares them using four categories found from tactical tasks performed in providing religious support during combat. The results of this are given in this chapter as well. Chapter 4 discusses in detail the possible conclusions that can be drawn from the data analysis as well as doctrinal concepts from the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School as it relates to religious support in a heavy brigade organized as a brigade combat team. The Army of Excellence religious support doctrine is compared to the Force XXI force structure and doctrine to determine if the current religious support doctrine needs modification. If a modification is apparent, the focus then shifts to showing how the Army of Excellence religious support doctrine might evolve into Force XXI religious support doctrine. These conclusions are then used as the backbone for the fifth chapter. Chapter 5 is the proposed doctrinal modification based on the conclusions from chapter 4. These modifications are for the Division XXI heavy maneuver brigade’s unit ministry teams religious support mission. Finally, possible avenues that need further study are given. The results, however, must answer the basic question posed earlier: How will a chaplain and chaplain assistant provide religious support in a Force XXI heavy brigade during high intensity combat? In other words: How will they be at the right place, at the right time, with those soldiers who need them the most as the brigade engages in high intensity conflict? However, first the basic
definitions of the various “pieces” must be understood before any in depth exploration of the problem.

Definitions of Key Terms

It is best to start with the simplest concept. The legal base of the chaplain in the Army is found in the United States Code, Title 10, Sections 3073, 3547, and 3581. The code gives the specific responsibilities and duties of a chaplain in addition to requiring commanders to provide for the religious needs of the soldiers in their command. Field Manual 101-5, *Operations*, provides a summary of what a chaplain is by stating the following, “The chaplain is a personal staff officer responsible for coordinating the religious assets and operations with the command. The chaplain is a confidential advisor to the commander for religious matters. A chaplain is located at every echelon of command from battalion through corps.” The chaplain is a non-combatant and does not carry a weapon in combat. Field Manual 101-5 then provides a long list of duties the chaplain is to perform, ranging from garrison type duties to combat related duties. The duties that relate to the issue at hand are the following: (1) translates operational plans into battlefield ministry priorities for religious support, (2) performs religious rites, sacraments, ordinances, services, and pastoral care and counseling to nurture the living, care for the causalities, and honor the dead, (3) develops and implements the commander’s religious support program, (4) advises the commander and staff, with the G5 (S5), of the impact of the faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in an area of operations, (5) advises the commander on the issues of religion, ethics, and morale (as affected by religion), including the religious needs of all assigned personnel, (6) exercises staff supervision and technical control over religious support throughout the command,
(7) provides liaison to indigenous religious leaders in close coordination with the G5 (S5), and (8) helps the commander ensure that all soldiers have the opportunity to exercise their religion.6

An ecclesiastical authority endorses each chaplain to perform the duties stated above and as such each chaplain is an ordained clergyperson assigned to the command. In combat, the chaplain’s duties become more complex. Generally speaking, the chaplain will move forward from a base of operations to conduct pastoral visits with soldiers on the front lines, both prior to and after combat. In addition, the chaplain provides care to wounded soldiers at an aid station during combat operations. The chaplain conducts worship for soldiers in combat or provide for worship for those soldiers outside of the chaplain’s particular ecclesiastical limits. If the battalion is conducting peace operations, the chaplain moves around the area of operations providing pastoral care to the soldiers. The major focus for a chaplain deployed with a battalion in an operational mission is caring for soldiers, being with them when they are under stress and exhaustion. In other words, the chaplain must learn the battle rhythm of the unit and be able to provide religious support to soldiers the best way possible.

The chaplain has an enlisted soldier to assist in the performance of the above duties. This soldier, the chaplain assistant, is tasked to provide a multitude of duties that assist the chaplain in combat. The chaplain assistant is a combatant and, thus, carries a weapon to provide security for the chaplain. Field Manual 16-1, Religious Support, is the current document that provides the doctrinal base for the chaplains’ corps. It states, “In combat, the chaplain assistant assists with battle fatigue prevention, identification, intervention, and care. The chaplain assistant assists with casualty care and provides
emergency religious support for wounded and dying soldiers on the battlefield. In addition, the chaplain assistant advises the chaplain on matters of soldier morale; serves as a link with enlisted soldiers; and performs administration and logistics tasks to support the religious support mission. The chaplain and chaplain assistant together comprise of a ministry team. Each battalion within a maneuver brigade has a ministry team. Thus, an armor or mechanized infantry battalion has one chaplain (normally a captain) and one chaplain assistant (normally a sergeant). This is called a unit ministry team or battalion ministry team. Field Manual 16-1 states, “The UMT (unit ministry team) deploys with the unit to provide religious support to all elements of the task force. When tactically feasible, based on the assessment of the situation, battalion UMTs move forward to provide religious support to all elements of the battalion: companies, platoons, squads, and teams.”

With this understanding of what a unit ministry team is, now it is necessary to understand what religious support is.

Religious support is a difficult term to define. Each chaplain has a slightly different understanding of what religious support is and how it should be executed. Doctrine does provide a definition of religious support. Field Manual 16-1 states, “Support given to soldiers, families, members of other services, retires, and authorized civilians which is designed to meet their religious needs and to facilitate the free exercise of religion.” Field Manual 16-1 amplifies this basic definition by also stating, “Religious activities of the MT include worship (services, rites, ceremonies, sacraments, and ordinances), pastoral care (visitation, ministry of presence, counseling, family life support, and care of wounded and dying soldiers), religious education, and spiritual fitness training.” These missions are hard to perform in combat. In summation, the unit
ministry team in a battalion is to provide religious support to the soldiers before, during, and after combat. This mission now needs development in the specific context of Division XXI armor or mechanized infantry brigade.

Evolutionary processes are complicated by definition. In order to define a concept, one must stop the process in midstride to take a snapshot of the concept. Of course, the concept will continue to evolve after the snapshot and hence is different than the definition provided with the snapshot. This is the danger of Force XXI. Force XXI is, “the process of continuous transformation to achieve America’s Army of the 21st century. The Force XXI process consists of a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments, Battle Lab Experiments, Advanced Technology Demonstrations, Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrations, and Functional Area Assessments which are providing insights into required changes in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, material, and soldiers.”¹¹ This process is still ongoing and will continue until the Army transforms itself to the Objective Force. The Force XXI concept is now expressed in terms of Division XXI or the Legacy Force. This is simply the Army of Excellence armor or mechanized infantry division transformed into the Force XXI structure. This thesis will examine this structure in detail later; however, it is useful to define some terms. Division XXI is a redesigned and digital version of the old heavy division in Army of Excellence. It “conducts distributed operations facilitated by information superiority to destroy enemy forces and seize and retain terrain.”¹² In other words, Division XXI fights over a larger area using modern, digital technology to command and control its forces. Digitization is “the application of information technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ digital information throughout the
battlespace. Moves digital data between combat platforms by adding seamless connectivity from the foxhole to the National Command Authority (NCA).” This means combat vehicles use computers and data transmitters to communicate with higher and lower an enhanced situational picture of the battlefield. The computers are hardened to withstand the rigors of war and are distributed down to an individual tank, fighting vehicle, and mobility platform. The digital process consists of various systems that provide connectivity with all of the battlefield operating systems so leaders at all levels have access to same information. The primary systems that affect the religious support mission are the Force XXI battle command-brigade and below (FBCB2), maneuver control system (MCS), and combat service support control system (CSSCS). The capabilities and characteristics of each system are amplified later; however, basic definitions of the systems are useful to understand now. The FBCB2 is “a battle command information system designed for units performing missions at the tactical level. FBCB2 integrates with each of the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) providing seamless battle command capability with increased battlefield operational capabilities . . . FBCB2 displays the relevant Situational Awareness (SA) environment. SA shows the user his location, the location of other friendly forces, observed enemy locations and all known battlefield obstacles.” It also provides navigational assistance with software designed to produce routes and directional information. The FBCB2 will transmit and receive overlays, operation orders, electronic mail messages, and other communication data. It is able to send instant fire support, medical evacuation, and even religious support requests in a preloaded format. The basic display is a 1:50,000 tactical map with the location of various friendly and enemy forces on it. Thus, overlays and routes can be
laid on the map and used for navigation and planning. The user can create overlays on it and transmit those overlays as needed. Finally, it serves as a “heads-up” device with providing warning of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks, enemy air and ground attacks, and any other threat on the battlefield. It is found on most of the vehicles in a brigade combat team and is (or will be) installed in every unit ministry team vehicles in the brigade combat team. MCS is the command and control system used by the commander and the staff to integrate data from the situational awareness picture as well as planning data from higher headquarters. It “improves the commander’s maneuver abilities by providing enhanced and timely information, assisting in the direction and synchronization of subordinate and supporting units, and aids in the identification, analysis, comparison and selection of courses of actions.”15 Finally, the CSSCS is the system used by the logistical operators to “collect CSS information from subordinate units and consolidates the information for the commander’s use in the decision making process. CSSCS assists in determining the current and projected capabilities of a force based on the availability of logistical support.”16

Redesign is the process of changing the force structure to match the capabilities of the digital enablers. In other words, redesign is changing how the division’s equipment, soldiers, and organization is structured. The redesigned force involved major changes in the number of soldiers assigned to the brigade and the organization of the subordinate units, especially in the combat service support organization. An example of redesign is the reduction of a maneuver battalion from four to three maneuver companies on the basis that digitization will provide a more lethal company. Thus, three can provide as much combat power with digital technology as four analog companies. Processes,
redesign and digital change have implications on religious support in Division XXI that is discussed in detail later in this thesis.

Scope of Research

The above definitions provide a common ground to begin the process of understanding religious support as it works within Division XXI. The assumption is changes in Division XXI imply there are changes in religious support within Division XXI. This is critical to understand because the mission of the unit ministry does not change. Just as chaplains from the Revolutionary War on provided pastoral care to soldiers in combat, so shall chaplains in Division XXI provide pastoral care to soldiers in combat. However, the methodology of providing religious support evolves with changes in the Army doctrine and technology. The modern Army does not line up three ranks deep to fire into the enemy with black powder muskets using warfighting doctrine from Napoleon’s era and the modern chaplain does not ride alongside the regiment by horseback. Yet, both the historical and the modern chaplain provided worship services to soldiers and cared for wounded soldiers. Religious support doctrine evolves as Army doctrine evolves. This complicated process involves the entire spectrum of religious support and is beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis is limited to religious support within the mechanized infantry and armor brigade combat team in a Division XXI structure. The brigade combat team is comprised of three maneuver battalions, an engineer battalion, an artillery battalion, forward support battalion, a headquarters and headquarters company, and assorted combat support and combat service support companies and platoons. The maneuver battalions along with the engineer battalion are organic to the brigade force structure. The other units have a habitual relationship with
the brigade and are attached to the brigade whenever the brigade goes to war or trains as a brigade for war. The maneuver battalions can be either mechanized infantry or armor. Normally, the maneuver battalions are further task organized with a mixture of infantry or armor companies. Table 1 is an example of the organization of a Division XXI Heavy Brigade during a recent National Training Center (NTC) rotation.17

Table 1. Task Organization for 1st Brigade Combat Team
4th Infantry Division for NTC 00-10

| 1-22 IN (M) | 3-66 AR | G/10 Cav (BDE Recon) |
| 1-4 AVN (-) (AHB) | 4-42 FA (DS) | 1-14 FA(-) (R) |
| 299 EN (-) | A/1-44 ADA (-) | A/104 MI (-) |
| 1/4 MP | 46 CM Co/2d CM | C/16 SIG (+) |
| 4 FSB (-) | 553rd CSB | |

The brigade task organization provides the context for this examination of religious support in a Division XXI heavy brigade and the changes in design, structure, and digitization will be explored in detail in a later chapter. The above structure also suggests several related questions to the original question given earlier. These questions are as follows:

1. How will a maneuver battalion ministry team conduct religious support in a Division XXI heavy brigade?

2. How will the combat support battalion ministry teams provide religious support in a Division XXI heavy brigade?

3. How will the combat service support battalion ministry teams provide religious support in a Division XXI heavy brigade?
Those questions are then examined within the context of digitization and redesign to discover if the Army of Excellence religious support doctrine needs modification with the Division XXI changes. Thus, the scope of research involves examining the religious support of battalion and brigade ministry teams within a Division XXI Armor Brigade Combat Team. The main reason for confining the scope of this thesis to this context is not to understate the importance of the other brigades in the Division XXI structure, but to highlight the complexity of applying religious support to the forward line.

Importance of Religious Support in Division XXI
Division XXI is a dispersed force scattering fewer soldiers over a larger area than the AOE division was. The mechanized infantry and the armor soldiers are more isolated than before, connected only with higher or lower command through digits. The lethality of the battlefield is unchanged. Soldiers will die or be hurt in combat. There are mental scars as well as physical deprivation that all soldiers must endure in combat, and the heavy brigade is the forward force in battle. The heavy brigade is deployable as a separate force in stability and support operations; while also capable of fighting high intensity combat as part of a larger division. The possibility of a brigade combat team being deployed overseas is great. The brigade combat team might have several different missions within a particular area of operations that encompasses the whole spectrum of conflict. For example, the engineer battalion might conduct humanitarian operations in a low threat area while the infantry task force might conduct a peace enforcement mission in a higher threat area. The brigade commander conducts these missions with the assistance of his or her staff. The chaplain (part of the commander’s staff) and chaplain assistant are charged with a sacred duty to care for the soldiers in the brigade combat
team and if they fail their mission, soldiers suffer. It is critical for the ministry team to provide religious support to soldiers under all operations. The unit ministry team can only do this if they understand the environment they are in. Field Manual 16-1 states,

> As lethality and intensity increase, religious support becomes more important to the soldier. Religious support demands greatly increase in situations of mass casualties, hasty burials, battle fatigue, and capture. UMTs provide encouragement, compassion, faith, and hope to soldiers experiencing shock, isolation, fear, and death. In the chaos and uncertainty of conflict and war, the chaplain is a reminder of the presence of God.18

The Army provides chaplains with equipment, an assistant, rank, and resources so the chaplain can perform the above mission for the commander. It is truly a sacred mission and one that cannot be understated. The Division XXI is a new force the Army will use to fight and win America’s wars and the ministry team will be a part of that force. The importance of the religious support mission is not questioned, but how that team will conduct religious support operations is in question due to the new Division XXI concept.

Summary

The new Division XXI force brings about change in doctrine, structure, organization, and material. These changes have implications for religious support on the battlefield. The critical question is whether religious support doctrine will need modification with the movement from AOE to Division XXI, and if so, what kinds of modifications to doctrine are needed. This thesis examines that question using the context of a Division XXI armor brigade combat team organized for the full spectrum of military operations. The analysis looks at the ministry teams throughout the brigade.

The two major parts of Division XXI, digitization and redesign are the two prisms used to focus the analysis. In other words, will the ministry teams within a Division XXI brigade combat team modify how they provide religious support to the soldiers as they
engage in combat operations? The answer to this question comes in multiple forms, for each battalion ministry team in the BCT has a different environment to work in. This means the maneuver battalion ministry team conducts the religious support mission differently than a field artillery battalion ministry team that is different from a forward support battalion ministry team. Whereas all of the ministry teams are examined, it is important to understand the limitations of this approach. The Force XXI process is an ongoing evolution, and this examination is only a “snapshot in time” of this ongoing process. With this understanding, it is logical to begin the examination with a review of the Force XXI process as it relates to religious support from its beginnings until the present.

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6. Ibid., 4-30 and 4-31.


8. Ibid., 1-4.

9. Ibid., 1-2.
10. Ibid., 1-4.


13. TRADOC Pam 525-78, 11.


16. Ibid., 3-21.

17. NTC, *1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), National Training Center Rotation 00-10, Final AAR,* (Fort Irwin: 27 August 2000).

18. Field Manual 16-1, 1-4 and 1-5.
CHAPTER 2

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT DOCTRINAL REVIEW

_O God of battles, steel my soldiers’ hearts, possess them not with fear! Take from them now the sense of reck’ning, if the opposed numbers pluck their hearts from them. Not today, O Lord, not today._

William Shakespeare, *Henry V*

Religious support in war has evolved from its’ early days in the American Revolution. The tactics, techniques, and procedures are vastly different from the ones early preachers used with the growing American Army. Yet, some aspects of religious support are timeless, as needed now as they were then. This chapter examines the growing doctrine of religious support. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a history of chaplain doctrine, for that task requires volumes of books. Instead, this chapter studies this in three broad sections. The doctrine during Vietnam is the starting point for this examination, since Vietnam lessons learned played a major factor in the current religious support doctrine. After a brief examination of formal and informal doctrine during the Vietnam conflict, the chapter moves to the AirLand Battle doctrine formulated in the 1980s and early 1990s. This doctrine was spelled out in several formal documents: AR 165-1, *Chaplain Activities in the United States Army*; FM 16-5, *The Chaplain*, (1977); FM 16-5, *Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations*, (1984); FM 16-1, *Religious Support Doctrine: the Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant*, (1989); and FM 16-1, *Religious Support Doctrine: the Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant*, (1995). The
final section of the chapter spells out the major doctrinal issues in the new Division XXI concept. This section looks at the digital systems, the redesign in the heavy division, and proposed doctrinal changes. These systems are examined within the context of several battlefield operating systems, the primary one being combat service support (CSS). The primary resources for this final section comes from the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) development of religious support doctrine for Force XXI, from the 4th Infantry Division Advance Warfighting Experiment (AWE), and from the training manuals developed for Fourth Infantry Division (Mechanized)’s recent conversion to Division XXI. Thus, the three sections: religious support in Vietnam, religious support in the AirLand Battle, and digital and redesign concepts in Division XXI help one understand the context of religious support in Division XXI.

Vietnam

Religious Support during the Vietnam War combined the stress of combat with the reality of a multifaceted war. A chaplain assigned to a support unit headquarters experienced a very different war compared to a chaplain assigned to a forward firebase. This section looks at several different aspects of the chaplaincy as it relates to the Vietnam conflict. The first is the chaplains’ assignment structure with the units sent to the Vietnam War. The second is the experiences of the chaplains and those soldiers who had contact with chaplains during their time overseas in Vietnam. Finally, the lessons learned for religious support is examined, especially as it relates to emerging religious support doctrine. The intent is not to provide a history of the chaplaincy in Vietnam, but
to examine how religious support was conducted in the last extended war fought by the US Army.

Chaplains were there from the beginning of the Army’s involvement in Vietnam. The early involvement of the Army was in advisory forces assigned to Vietnam in the early 1960s. The headquarters element of those forces, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was found in Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam. The first chaplains in Vietnam were assigned to the MACV to provide religious services, crisis counseling, and other religious sacraments to the soldiers in all of South Vietnam. The chaplains (both Roman Catholic and Protestant) would travel throughout South Vietnam to the various Army elements to provide religious services and then return to the MACV headquarters. The rationale behind this activity is to provide religious support to the greatest number of soldiers in country with the small number of chaplains assigned to MACV (total of four from 1961 to 1962). However, that changed with the first battalion level unit to arrive in South Vietnam, for it arrived with a chaplain assigned to the battalion.

The assignment policy of the Chief of Chaplains was patterned after the regimental system of World War II. Even though the Army reorganized into brigades with subordinate maneuver, combat support, and combat service support battalions task organized under the brigade headquarters, the chaplains were still assigned to the brigade headquarters. This was the same concept as the old regimental assignment policy where a regimental chaplain and several assistant regimental chaplains were assigned to the regimental headquarters. The assistant regimental chaplains were then sent to various subordinate battalions with a habitual relationship established between the assistant
The regimental chaplain and the subordinate battalion in the regiment. The brigade headquarters retained its brigade chaplain and several assistant brigade chaplains who then provided religious support to all of the units in the brigade. Thus, the first battalion units sent to Vietnam went with a chaplain assigned to provide religious support to the soldiers of that battalion. As larger units began to deploy to Vietnam, they also came with chaplains assigned with them. The official history of the chaplaincy in Vietnam describes the typical assignment pattern as follows:

There were 25 chaplains assigned to the “First Cav” at the height of its involvement in Vietnam. Two were at division headquarters—a division chaplain (lieutenant colonel), and an assistant or deputy division chaplain (major), three at division artillery—a division artillery chaplain (major), and two assistant chaplains (captain); three with support command—again, one major and two captains; three with the aviation group—also a major and two captains; four chaplains in each of the brigades—the senior chaplain in each brigade was a major and the other three were captains. All provided ministry to the battalions within the brigade with the captains attached (italics mine) to the battalions; and one each (captains) with the air cavalry squadron and the engineer battalion.

Thus, chaplains providing religious support to battalions were assigned to the brigade headquarters under the brigade chaplain and attached to the maneuver units. This means a battalion chaplain worked for brigade and thus brigade duties might take priority over battalion. This assignment policy took effect with the buildup and continued for the duration of the war. However, the complexity of the Vietnam War with various components of the US Army doing very different missions over a wide range of activities caused the chaplains to have very different training requirements.

The Vietnam War had soldiers doing missions over the full spectrum of conflict. This ranged from advisory missions and Special Forces activities to high intensity combat with combat units organized for heavy combat. Thus, soldiers might be found in secure
bases near or in urban areas, patrolling deep in the jungles of Vietnam, or living with the Vietnamese in their villages in rural areas. This wide range of activities created a challenge for a chaplaincy accustomed to training for traditional European war. Not only did the Vietnam environment provide a challenge, the new technology associated with the war provided a challenge. The advent of the helicopter and the air assault tactical concept created a new demand for the chaplain conducting religious support. Rather than drive from a secure rear area to the front aid station and provide religious support to the wounded, as was the model in World War II, the chaplain might be thrust deep in the jungle with company sized elements as they conduct search and destroy missions. The helicopter also promised rapid mobility for the chaplain to move from one area to the next. Thus, a chaplain assigned to a brigade headquarters might live in the brigade area, ride on resupply helicopters moving to forward firebases, visit with the soldiers assigned to the forward firebases, and return that same day. This increased the number of religious services the chaplain could conduct while increasing the number of soldiers exposed to the chaplain. However, there was a serious disadvantage to this methodology of visitation.

The chaplain who flew in and out of patrol bases ran the risk of alienating the very soldiers he was providing religious support for. The soldiers who must stay in the jungle and continue patrolling might resent the relative safety and comfort of the chaplain who could use the helicopter to leave the dangerous jungle.6 Many chaplains were aware of this dynamic and decided to live forward with soldiers. However, many times it was the option of the chaplain to do so, not necessarily the doctrinal answer. Doctrine as it existed, stated the chaplain did religious services and conducted ministry to wounded
soldiers at the aid stations. A doctrine that emphasizes a forward based chaplain would evolve later in the chaplaincy after Vietnam, mainly because of the experiences of the chaplains who served there.

The experiences of a battalion chaplain in Vietnam were as varied as any other soldier who served during that time. Many chaplains defined their own ministry regardless of assignment, denomination, or unit. The illustrations below show two aspects of religious support in war. These concepts are the need for chaplains to be forward and the inherent danger of providing a ministry of presence forward.

One illustration happened in 1968 during the battle of Hue. While the Marines were fighting in the city and experiencing tremendous casualties and combat stress symptoms, an Army chaplain assigned to the MACV headquarters element in Hue showed up with a .45-caliber pistol and a chaplain kit. This chaplain (a major) volunteered to serve with the Marines as they fought in the city. He began to conduct ministry to dying soldiers as they fell in battle. He would wander about the battle trying to go where he was needed the most. Eventually, he was killed under unknown circumstances. This example provides several lessons. Beyond the personal courage and selfless service of the chaplain, it shows the need for a forward deployed chaplain with combat troops as they fought. It also highlights the need for the chaplain to have strong situational awareness on the battlefield. Experiences like the above were found throughout the war in Vietnam. Soldiers would either praise the chaplain as one who would be with them during all conditions or would damn him as one who would live comfortably in the rear. However, a forward deployed chaplain assists soldiers in other ways rather than just casualty care as the next example shows.
Another illustration is a program designed by the chaplains of the 198th Infantry Brigade. They were concerned about the dehumanization the soldiers were experiencing towards the Vietnamese and wanted to prevent possible war crimes. They designed a program that brought infantry soldiers together with Vietnamese orphans so the Vietnamese would become more human. This program was brought about by battalion chaplains living with the soldiers they served. Because of that close contact, they were able to recognize the dehumanization process before it expressed itself on Vietnamese civilians and had enough credibility with the infantry to present the program.

Experiences like the two previously mentioned ones stayed with those chaplains who stayed on active duty after Vietnam and who directly influenced doctrinal development.

Post-Vietnam: 1975-1984

The office of the Chief of Chaplains conducted many surveys and lessons learned after the war so the hard learned experiences of the war were not lost. These lessons focused on two critical truths of the chaplaincy. The chaplain must conduct a visible and enduring ministry of presence with the soldiers in his (or her) assigned unit and the chaplain must have a strong battlefield sense. The advantages of a forward based chaplain conducting a strong ministry of presence are numerous. The chaplain veterans spoke of providing comfort to soldiers before, during, and after combat. This comfort expressed itself to caring for a wounded soldier at an aid station to talking with a soldier about personal forgiveness after a brutal firefight. However, for the chaplains to conduct a ministry of presence forward successfully, they must survive the harsh environment of a battlefield.
The chaplain veterans talked of the need for improved combat training, going on field training exercises with soldiers, and integrating better with the battalion staff. In other words, lessons learned indicated chaplains needed training in more realistic combat settings to function better on the battlefield. One critical issue was the survival skills of the chaplain. If the chaplain serves soldiers best from the front line and if the chaplain is to influence the lives of soldiers; then the chaplain must move on the battlefield successfully. He must not be a drain on scarce resources of the unit and a concern for the commanders. He must be able to understand the battle rhythm of the unit. This issue demanded a doctrinal solution. Thus, the lessons learned from Vietnam directly influenced the doctrinal development of the chaplaincy.

Nevertheless, the above lessons did not become formal religious support doctrine for another decade. The doctrine used immediately after the Vietnam War (Field Manual 16-5, 1977) had very little written on combat operations. The focus was installation and chapel activities. The assignment policy was still with a brigade chaplain (major) with three or four assistant brigade chaplains (captains). Battalion chaplain activities rated one-half of a page in the field manual while brigade chaplain activities rated only a little more. The focus of religious support doctrine written on combat operations was on providing worship services for soldiers in the field. However, the doctrine did state, “Chaplains should recognize that the field is the normal environment for religious services in combat and in training. Because the troops cannot come to a chapel, the chaplain must go to them, wherever they are.” Many chaplains took this to heart and went to the field with their soldiers. However, many did not. Religious support doctrine did not require they do so. The minimum required was to provide worship services in the
field. Once this requirement was met, the chaplain would be within doctrine to leave the field. This deficient in religious support doctrine changed with the Army’s adoption of AirLand Battle doctrine. The chaplaincy produced a new field manual published in 1984 that made sweeping changes in the way chaplains conducted religious support in combat operations.

Post Vietnam: 1984 and AirLand Battle

The Army chaplaincy produced a new manual *The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations*, which changed the focus of the brigade and battalion chaplain. Whereas the previous field manual devoted very little space to combat operations, this was an entire manual on nothing but combat operations. It also introduced several new concepts for the chaplaincy that would assist the chaplain in fulfilling the mission of being with and serving soldiers. The field manual provided a new term, the unit ministry team. This team was defined as follows, “In smaller units the chaplain section is comprised of one chaplain and one chaplain assistant who together comprise of the ‘unit ministry team’.”

The front cover of the field manual dramatically shows this change. It pictures a chaplain and chaplain assistant in battle gear, holding a map, and looking out as if they were ready to move forward. In fact, this picture was symbolic of the new chaplain doctrine as it related to AirLand Battle, the concept of forward thrust. Forward thrust was defined as religious support that is pushed forward to the smallest, most advanced elements of the battlefield. With this came an organizational change whereby chaplains and chaplain assistants were assigned to battalions and not clustered at the brigade headquarters. Each unit ministry team was to move continuously among the forward elements, ministering to soldiers before, during, and after contact with
the enemy. This changed the combat duties of a chaplain extensively. Instead of the primary focus being worship services in the field, the chaplain and the assistant had a wide range of activities to provide care for soldiers. These activities became missions. They were (in a typical triune methodology) to nurture the living, to care for the casualties, and to honor the dead. The primary mission of the unit ministry team in general was to perform those three missions to soldiers during combat. The field manual went into detail about the tasks, standards, and conditions associated with the performance of the three aforementioned missions of the unit ministry team. The primary tasks centered around planning religious support, coordinating religious support with the unit, moving forward to the soldiers on the battlefield, and surviving the harsh conditions of the battlefield. These tasks focused on the combat skills needed by the unit ministry team. AirLand Battle completely changed the focus of the Army, and as just shown, the chaplaincy as well.

The chaplaincy quickly discovered the battle tasks in the field manual were difficult for the battalion and brigade unit ministry team to perform. One example of a difficult battle task is the one of planning. The combat, combat support, or combat service support used operation orders to conduct combat operations. The chaplaincy’s field manual called for the unit ministry team to be with soldiers before, during, and after the battle. It also described the unit ministry teams activities in relation to the phases of battle. By linking chaplain and chaplain assistant’s ministry with the different phases of battle, it created the concept of the religious support plan. For chaplains and their assistants to do this successfully, they needed an understanding of the process of combat planning done by the battalion or brigade staff. This tactical task along with
synchronization of the religious support plan with the other elements of the battalion was very difficult for chaplains and chaplain assistants to accomplish successfully. However, another critical task was found to be difficult for chaplains under this new doctrine.

In addition to the above tasks, the manual had the unit ministry team conducting ministry in a very aggressive fashion, moving forward to elements in contact to provide ministry. All battalion chaplains, whether they were with a transportation or field artillery battalion needed to move on the battlefield. The unit ministry team needed to move from the battalion aid station forward to fighting positions and then back again. There are several subtasks associated with this forward movement on the battlefield. This task meant the unit ministry team must be able to conduct mounted land navigation, link up successfully with the soldiers being visited, and return to the aid station without incident. However, the feedback from the National Training Center indicated many unit ministry teams wandered on the battlefield trying to link up with the forward elements. This battlefield wandering also increased the risk to the unit ministry team from enemy action or fratricide. The wandering also meant unit ministry teams wasted valuable time looking for units on the battlefield. In many instances, unit ministry teams struggled with all of the above tasks and simply remained immobile at the battalion aid station. This immobility was contrary to the new doctrine and this problem, along with the planning problem needed fixed.

The rationale for all of the above activity is given in a section that describes unit ministry team activity during reconstitution. It reads, “Normally, the assigned ministry team stays with the its unit through reconstitution because it has established an irreplaceable relationship (*forged under fire*) with the surviving unit’s member (italics
mine). Again, the early feedback from the National Training Centers indicated many chaplains struggled with task mentioned above. In fact, the feedback indicated a systemic problem with unit ministry teams and most of the implied or specified battle tasks found in FM 16-5 (1984). The implications of this systemic problem were many unit ministry teams would become causalities in a mid-to-high intensity conflict. The AirLand Battle doctrine of the Army combined with the forward thrust doctrine of the chaplain branch produced aggressiveness in the unit ministry teams as they performed ministry on the battlefield. This aggressiveness needed to be tempered with training, so unit ministry teams could survive on the battlefield. The next field manual produced by the chaplaincy began to address this problem.

AirLand Battle: 1989

The chaplaincy began to work with the problem of battlefield survival in two ways. First, they produced a new field manual *Religious Support Doctrine: The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant* in 1989 that provided detail on the “how” unit ministry teams could provide aggressive ministry forward. In addition, they began to assign chaplains to the combat training centers to observe and control the unit ministry teams as they rotated through the centers for training. Thus, the Joint Readiness Training Center, National Training Center, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center all received chaplain observer-controllers. The Joint Readiness Training Center had one major with one sergeant first class while the National Training Center had one major with one sergeant first class, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center had one major, one captain, and two sergeant first classes. The chaplain observer-controllers were to provide feedback to the chaplaincy on performance on the battlefield of the unit ministry teams as
well as doctrinal feedback. These two “fixes” were beginning to take effect both in the late eighties and early nineties.

The Field Manual 16-1 (1989) integrated all aspects of religious support, both installation and combat, into one manual. However, the installation material was about one-third as long as the material for combat ministry. This highlights the changes in religious support doctrine where combat ministry is now the focus of religious support. Field Manual 16-1 tried to provide more detail in religious support during combat by providing descriptive examples of religious support plans, religious estimates, and general Army warfighting doctrine. In the chapter, “Religious Support Mission in Combat,” it reads, “In the following sections, the religious support mission is explained for UMTs assigned to combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The doctrinal and operating principles of the religious support mission reflect tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for the UMT to successfully accomplish its religious support mission on the battlefield.”¹⁶ The basic doctrine, forward thrust, and its associated missions remained the same. The primary changes were in the synchronization of religious support with the phases of battle. The field manual went into detail on the doctrinal phases of both offensive and defensive missions and showed how a unit ministry team would work within each phase. The same aggressiveness with forward movement was retained. Another amplification was found in the religious support planning process.

The concept of the religious support plan was introduced for the unit ministry team. This was an intentional planning process conducted by the unit ministry team in combat to synchronize their efforts with the unit they were assigned to. For example, if a
unit ministry team assigned to a maneuver task force received an operations order for a movement to contact mission, they would then determine the best way to provide religious support for that mission. They were create a religious support plan and add it to the order. This process as well as the aggressive movement of the unit ministry team required heightened awareness of the battlefield. In other words, the unit ministry needed to learn the battle rhythm of their unit during combat. This process was difficult and the maxim of Clausewitz about the friction of battle applied to the attempts of the unit ministry teams to accomplish the religious support mission.

The Combat Training Centers used the chaplain and chaplain assistant observer-controllers to assist in the process of training unit ministry teams on the doctrinal missions found in Field Manual 16-1 (1989). The National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center used the chaplain to observe brigade chaplains; while, the chaplain assistants observed the battalion ministry teams. The Combat Maneuver Training Center used a chaplain (major) to observe the brigade; while, a chaplain (captain) observed the battalion task force ministry teams with the chaplain assistants. These observer-controllers recorded the performance of the ministry teams for the chaplain combat development office to further the doctrinal evolution of the chaplaincy. The unit ministry teams at the task force level generally showed the same issues. There was difficulty in synchronizing the religious support plan with the unit’s planning process; mainly because of the conflict between executing religious support and planning religious support. In addition, a serious problem arose with battlefield wandering. This tendency was noted at the Combat Maneuver Training Center where the majority of unit ministry teams were notionally killed during their rotation at the training center. Mines
strikes, enemy actions, or friendly fire would destroy the team while they wandered from one unit to another.\textsuperscript{18} This problem created the need for a revision of FM 16-1 to reflect the increasing complexity of the AirLand battlefield. Nonetheless, the Gulf War lessons learned revealed the usefulness of the basic forward thrust doctrine and its associated missions. The after-action reviews from the war indicated many unit ministry teams were successful in performing the doctrinal mission. The problems that arose involved the same issues discussed above; battlefield awareness and battlefield wandering.\textsuperscript{19} The chaplaincy needed an evolving religious support doctrine to resolve those issues.

Post Cold War and Gulf War: 1995

The Soviet threat disappeared in the early 1990s and after the Gulf War; Army doctrine began to change. Whereas the earlier doctrine focused on high intensity conflict with Soviet style tactics and equipment, the newer doctrine began to focus on a wide range of threats. This had an impact on religious support doctrine in that it focuses on both high and low intensity conflict. The monolithic threat was now diverse with a requirement for the chaplaincy to consider multiple scenarios in its doctrine. This complexity required an update to the 1989 field manual.

In 1995, the chaplaincy published its current doctrinal field manual, Field Manual 16-1, \textit{Religious Support}. This manual used the phases of deployment with religious support to talk of unit ministry activity in both installation and combat settings. As in the 1989 version, it also used the phases of battle to synchronize the religious support tasks of the unit ministry team. However, the 1995 field manual went into greater detail than the 1989 field manual. The 1995 field manual retained the three missions of religious
support in combat: nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor the dead. In addition, it retained the same aggressive religious support concept found in the two earlier versions of the field manual; the forward thrust doctrine, without using that name. The above missions required intentional planning on the battlefield and the 1995 field manual provided detailed guidance on religious support planning. Whereas the 1989 version used the religious support plan and gave brief instructions on constructing a religious support plan, this newer field manual used the religious support estimate. This incorporated religious support planning with the military decision-making process used by the tactical planners of the battalion or brigade. Thus, the unit ministry team was compelled to become very aware of the planning process of his or her assigned unit as well as have a detailed situational awareness of the battlefield. The requirement for this situational awareness now impacted both survival on the battlefield as well as planning religious support. The planning process now required the consideration of refugees, civilian-military interactions, widely dispersed units engaged in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities, and missions that no longer were characteristic of the high intensity combat. The religious support mission became very difficult to both plan and execute.

The unit ministry team now had a requirement to have situational awareness of his or hers unit environment; however, the difficulty of achieving that awareness increased. The writers of the field manual included two complex “how to” documents, the religious support estimate and the religious support annex. These documents highlight the complexity of the new battlefield with very detailed requirements of analysis of the religious support mission. The ministry team was now required to
conduct extensive planning using data from the command posts as well as data from higher headquarters. The ministry team that did not plan well ran the risk of becoming irrelevant to the mission. However, this complexity translated into the other religious support tasks as well. Synchronization of religious support, movement on the battlefield, and survival in a combat situation all increased in complexity.

The unit ministry team still retained the requirement to provide religious support to the soldiers in the unit. Since the various missions of the Army increased in complexity, the ability for the chaplain to visit soldiers forward became complicated. The soldiers assigned to the unit might have very different missions that required them to be widely dispersed. One element might be escorting a United Nations refugee convoy while another was engaged in urban conflict. The unit ministry not only had to plan carefully, they had to insure the proper synchronization occurred so they could move safely in their area of operations. Tactical movement became critical since a battalion or brigade might have a large area of operations with squad-sized elements dispersed throughout the area conducting a wide range of missions. All of the above considerations, increased complexity of the religious support mission combined with a wide spectrum of operations of their unit meant the unit ministry team had to become skilled in conducting religious support in a tactical environment. However, another consideration for religious support soon entered the Army’s environment.

Another aspect of the new environment that faced the unit ministry team is given early in the 1995 field manual, in a chapter appropriately titled, the “religious support environment.” It reads, “Although technology is rapidly advancing, the fundamental needs of soldiers have remained constant through the years. Soldiers are now, as always,
susceptible to the rigors of combat. Regardless of the Army’s increasing technological sophistication, soldiers continue to worry about themselves and their families. Fears about combat and survivability also remain.21 This statement brings the chaplaincy back to the basics of religious support, providing ministry forward to the soldiers in combat. As the digital age enters the Army and as the equipment becomes information focused, the current doctrine of the chaplaincy remains focused on the soldier.

The Digital Revolution: 1990s and Beyond
The Division XXI structure brought changes in both technology and internal divisional force structuring. The digital technology inherent in Division XXI requires a redesigning of the platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades in all of the battlefield operating systems. Thus, the technology and the force structure changes with Division XXI. These changes have doctrinal implications for the chaplaincy.

Division XXI Force Structure
The Division XXI structure appears to change little from the old Army of Excellence divisional force structure. However, there are significant changes. Beginning with the divisional headquarters, the command posts are organized differently than before. The division rear command post is now combined with the division main command post. Thus, the division rear command post is now called the sustainment cell and is located within the division main command post. The sustainment cell uses the digital technology to work with all combat service support units (from corps or theatre) found within the division sector. The division tactical command post is now smaller and more agile. Again, digital technology is used to create a smaller division tactical command post that moves around the divisional battlefield with more mobility than before, normally with the brigade that is the main effort of the division. The separate
battalions are somewhat different as well. The military intelligence battalion has the
capability to link with intelligence assets from national sources. It also receives the
unmanned aerial vehicles in a direct support relationship; creating better battlefield
awareness. Obviously the signal battalion would reflect the increased need for support
in the communications field with a more robust capability. The air defense artillery
battalion remains the same structurally, however it receives new equipment that reflects
the move from analog to digital. The chemical assets shrink in Division XXI with the
nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance assets going to the divisional cavalry
squadron along with the smoke and decontamination sections going to corps. The
divisional cavalry squadron increases in size with the addition of the nuclear, biological,
and chemical reconnaissance assets. The military police remain very similar to the Army
of Excellence structure. It too will reflect the digital modernization of the division with
new equipment and capabilities. The brigade structure, aviation, engineer, artillery,
support command, and the maneuver brigade all change radically. For example, the
engineer brigade headquarters is disbanded while the organic sapper battalion is
reassigned to the maneuver brigade headquarters. Because, it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to cover in detail all the changes in the Division XXI force structure, the focus will
be on the divisional support command and the maneuver brigade elements.

The focus mentioned above is due to the chaplains being a part of the combat
service support battlefield operating system, the ministry teams using the combat service
support systems to assist in conducting religious support, and the maneuver brigades
being on the forward edge of the battlefield area. This strong relationship between the
chaplains and the combat service support system means any Division XXI changes in that
system will impact the planning and execution of religious support. The maneuver brigade combat team consists of the combat elements of the brigade that locates at the forward line of battle. The religious support doctrine requires ministry teams move to the forward line to provide the ministry of presence. Since this is usually the most dangerous area of the battle, it is difficult for the ministry teams to accomplish this mission. Any changes in the way the combat units are structured and how they fight are important for the chaplaincy to understand so religious support doctrine can adapt to the changes. Hence, this thesis focuses on the redesign with the combat service support units and the maneuver units.

Division XXI Combat Service Support Structure
The support relationship between the maneuver battalions and the combat service support elements was changed drastically with Division XXI. Most of the support elements were moved from the maneuver battalions to the forward support battalions to free up the maneuver commanders from logistical planning. This means the maneuver battalions no longer have organic maintenance, supply distribution, and transportation elements in the battalion. The Army of Excellence concept of the support platoon and maintenance section is replaced with a new structure, the forward supply company. This company is under the control of the division support command, specifically in the forward support battalion. The forward support company was typically attached to a maneuver battalion in a habitual relationship. Thus, the typical forward support battalion contains three forward support companies, a medical company and a base support company. The forward support company contains all the combat service support functions (except medical). It has a captain commanding the company and a
support operations officer working logistical support for the battalion. This means the forward support battalion command post (typically in the brigade support area) provides technical supervision of the forward support company and works as the link between the division support command and the maneuver company.\textsuperscript{24}

The combat service support world also introduced a new concept, Just-In-Time-Logistics, which promises to provide logistical support on a timely fashion to the maneuver battalions. The focus is the removal of large supply depots on the battlefield, thus reducing the logistical footprint. The logistical planners use the new digital technology to provide supplies from a forward corps support group directly to the maneuver battalion using throughput support. This concept is dependent on the visibility of the supplies moving through the battlefield from a corps support group (forward) to a forward support company.\textsuperscript{25} This concept, logistical movement from the corps directly to battalions, has direct implications for the unit ministry team. For example, unit ministry teams assigned to support battalions located with the forward corps support group can use the logistical movement forward to provide reinforcing religious support to aid stations located at a brigade support area. These implications will be discussed in greater detail at a later chapter. Another concept that influences the unit ministry team is dispersion of subordinate warfighting units on the battlefield.

Division XXI Maneuver Battalions

The maneuver battalion in Division XXI loses a maneuver company and now has three mechanized infantry or armor companies. The loss of the logistical elements to the forward support company means the battalion is smaller and more mobile. The doctrinal belief is the maneuver battalion can disperse its elements around the battlefield while
maintaining visibility of the subordinate units through digital technology. This technology, the FBCB2 and MCS systems, is found on virtually all subordinate elements and provides an accurate picture of friendly units location. This enhanced situational awareness enables the commander to disperse forces and fight over a larger area with a rapid tempo. FKSM 71-2, the preliminary doctrinal field manual for the mechanized infantry and armor battalions, states in its preface, “A fully modernized battalion of the near future will be smaller, more lethal, agile, and survivable. It will generally operate in a larger battlespace and at a higher tempo than those of the past. Information technology, improved sensors, and extended range munitions will significantly alter many aspects of combat operations.”

This also has implications for the unit ministry team for the basic chaplain doctrine of providing ministry forward has not changed. For example, the unit ministry team must move over a farther area to visit soldiers who are more isolated than before under the AirLand Battle doctrine. Also, the maneuver battalion under Division XXI receives three level I aid stations, thus increasing the number of locations the battalion ministry team, must provide casualty care for. Other implications are discussed in detail in chapter four. Thus, two major changes in the Division XXI structure, the redesign of the CSS elements and the redesign of the maneuver elements are combined with the digital technology to make doctrinal changes in the way heavy divisions fight.

The war-fighting manuals are being rewritten to reflect this new reality. FKSM 71-1-1, the preliminary doctrinal field manual for the mechanized infantry and armor company commanders, summarizes the new doctrinal thinking,

Appliqué (part of the FBCB2) and other digital equipment enhance the sharing of friendly and enemy battlefield geometry and other vital information. This facilitates battle planning and generation of a common picture of the
battlefield. This consistent sharing of information via an Applique system gives the digitized co/tm commander a unique awareness of his own and known, or suspected, enemy locations in near real-time. This attendant increase in situation awareness provides him the information necessary to make quick decisions. Ultimately, the co/tm will develop increased lethality, survivability, and tempo.\textsuperscript{27}

This new technology combined with the new redesign might affect unit ministry team operations in both a negative and positive fashion. Whereas the technology enables the unit ministry teams to have better situational awareness as well as improved communication ability, it also requires extensive training to use the systems. In addition, while the redesigned logistical supply system enables unit ministry teams to move from the corps area to a battalion area on one convoy, it also moves supplies to a widely dispersed force on the battlefield. This increases the difficulty in providing religious support to the dispersed units. This difficulty is expressed in the emerging doctrine of religious support that introduces the concept of ministry of projection instead of ministry of presence. A later chapter will examine this development in greater detail.

Summary
This doctrinal overview of the chaplaincy war-fighting concepts has come a long way. The Vietnam War showed the need for chaplains to be forward with the soldiers to provide a ministry of presence. It also highlighted the problem of battlefield survival as the chaplain moves from one forward element to another. This need slowly became answered in the chaplain doctrine. Field Manual 16-5 (1977) did not speak much about combat operations, only gave brief, general directives for the chaplain to move to the field with soldiers and provide worship services. The focus was installation ministry and administrative support of that ministry. This changed radically with the advent of the AirLand Battle doctrine. As the Army changed its doctrine into a maneuver focused fluid
style of warfighting, the chaplaincy followed suit with its doctrine of forward thrust and the unit ministry team. Field Manual 16-5 (1984) provided the religious support doctrine adapted to the AirLand Battle doctrine. This doctrinal fix assigned one chaplain and one chaplain assistant to each maneuver battalion and required them to provide ministry to the most forward elements. This aggressive doctrine, however, produced some confusion during training exercises for the unit ministry teams. As they tried to execute this mission, they became simulated casualties or wandered the battlefield in an administrative mode. The doctrine needed to grow and provide better guidance for the chaplain.

This came with the 1989 version of FM 16-1 that provided guidance on religious support planning and linked religious support with the phase of battle. The focus on synchronization enabled unit ministry teams to survive better during simulated warfare at the combat training centers. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet threat called for a rewrite of the doctrine. FM 16-1 (1995), the current doctrine of the chaplaincy, provided more detailed guidance on religious support planning with the religious support estimate. The religious support estimate was modeled after the deliberate military decision-making process used by the tactical planners. The current field manual provided religious support doctrine in a systemic methodology, correlating religious support concepts with the phases of battle.

Finally, the emerging digital doctrine of the war-fighting battlefield operating systems was examined to highlight several major changes brought about by the Division XXI’s redesigning and modernizing forces. The new technology and the force structure redesign were presented to provide the backdrop for emerging religious support doctrine.
All of the above information is designed to provide the context for the further examination of the basic question asked at the beginning of this thesis: How will the chaplain perform the religious support mission in a Force XXI heavy brigade?

The answers to this question and the related questions that arose from it are found from the mud, desert, and heat of the combat training center rotations. The data from the training conducted at the combat training centers under AirLand Battle are presented. This is contrasted with the data from the digital rotations of the Fourth Infantry Division (Mechanized) as they trained at the National Training Center. Finally, the experiences and data from the Fourth Infantry Division (Mechanized) ministry teams as they participated in the redesign/modernize process at Fort Hood provide the third source of information. However, all of the data must be organized and presented in a coherent fashion, as the next chapter will show.

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1. Shakespeare, 78.


3. Ibid., 6.


5. Ackerman, 151.


8. Ackerman, 182.
9. Ibid., 222.


12. Ibid., 5.

13. Ibid., 4-6.

14. Ibid., 58.

15. US Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *National Training Center Trends* (Summary of lessons from Fiscal Year 94 to Fiscal Year 97, Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, Center for Army Lessons Learned, February 2001).


17. Ibid., 5-10.

18. Personal notes from CMTC rotations from June 1991 to June 1993 with 39 task forces and about 125 missions. All data is recorded on Harvard Graphic slides or on the original note cards used during the rotations.


21. Ibid., 2-1.


23. Ibid., 1-12.
24. FKSM 71-2, 10-1 thru 10-56.

25. COL (P) Vincent Boles, Notes from NTC Rotation 99-05 (Fort Hood: TX, 4th Infantry Division Support Command Commander, Feb 2000).

26. FKSM 71-2, i.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

For God doth know haw many, now in health, shall drop their blood in

approbation of what your reverence shall incite us to, therefore take heed how

you impawn out person, how you awake our sleeping sword of war.¹

William Shakespeare, *Henry V*

Research for determining effectiveness of religious support in a Force XXI environment is difficult at best. Several issues arise from such a project. First, the data is skimpy and varied. Data from the combat training center observer-controllers are as varied as the chaplain observer-controllers are. Some lessons learned are written in a narrative form while others are in bullet slides. Another issue is the limited number of divisions redesigning to Division XXI. As of this date, Fourth Infantry Division (Mechanized) is the only unit that is almost reorganized and modernized. Other organizations in the Army, such as the light forces and the new intermediate brigade will also use digital assets. However, the conversion process for the Army’s heavy forces from the Army of Excellence structure to the Division XXI structure is slow. Thus, the data is limited in scope to one division. The final issue is the use of the collected data for useful conclusions regarding religious support on the battlefield. The research methodology is difficult to determine since the focus of this thesis is determining how religious support will be conducted for a Division XXI heavy brigade, in essence, a
sociological study. This implies using the tools of social research. Triangulation of field research data sets was chosen to analyze the collected data for this study.

This chapter will discuss the method of data collection for this study. Each data set is then discussed, followed by the technique used to organize the information into a useful format. This format is comparing the data sets with four categories common to all of the data sets. This leads into a discussion of the research methodology, triangulation. Finally, the results of the data collection are given with brief descriptions of the unique aspects of each set given. For those scholars conducting field research, the manual, *Approaches to Social Research* states, “It is far better to let your research problem dictate your methodology than let your method override the substantive and theoretical focus of your research.” The following sections present the three data sets beginning with the earliest, the data from the AirLand Battle doctrine.

AirLand Battle Data Set
Combat Maneuver Training Center and National Training Center

The data from the combat training centers comes in many forms. First, there is the data collected by the author of this thesis. This data comes from thirty-one task force rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center from 1991 to 1993. The data is in two formats. There are the summaries of task force unit ministry team trends found on bullet slides used for transmission to the field force during chaplain training sessions. The commander of operations group determined a leaders training program that highlighted useful lessons learned would be created for units coming to train at Combat maneuver Training Center. The leaders training program was taught at Hohenfels (location of Combat Maneuver Training Center) or at the unit’s home station. The data used for this
thesis comes from several slide shows designed to give unit ministry teams at task force level an overview of lessons learned.

The other format of data collection is found on the original note cards used during the rotations. These note cards were organized in the basic plan, preparation, and execution format. In other words, the observations focused on the unit ministry teams ability to plan, prepare for, and execute religious support during a particular mission. In both of the formats, the missions covered a wide spectrum of combat scenarios. The majority are the traditional offensive or defensive missions against a Soviet style force in high intensity conflict. Examples of these missions are movement to contact, deliberate and hasty attacks, night attacks, hasty defense and defense in sector. However, there are other missions found in the data. The divisional cavalry squadrons and the armored cavalry squadrons would traditionally train with guard, screen, or recon missions. Finally, the transition at Combat Maneuver Training Center to a peacekeeping format created a small set of data on unit ministry teams at task force level working in a peacekeeping role. All of the above note cards create a large amount of raw data of unit ministry teams activity on a simulated battlefield in Europe.

Another source of data for this set is from the National Training Center. The National Training Center provides the Center for Army Lessons Learned observations and trends for units to use as they plan and conduct training. These trends are organized by battlefield operating system and normally are transmitted in the format of “sustain” and “needs emphasis.” Sustain means the unit was successfully in conducting whatever task was being performed. The observations in the trends chart use sustain to indicate the majority of units that trained there are successful in performing the task or tasks. Needs
emphasis refers to the tasks or tasks that are problematic to units when they train at National Training Center. The same format with the needs emphasis in the trends chart holds true as with the “sustain” format. A meta-analysis was conducted with the Center for Army Lessons Learned data using several keywords that relate to the religious support mission. The timeframe was from 1994 to 1998. Thus, data is accumulated from 1991 to 1998 under the AirLand Battle doctrine with the Army of Excellence. This data then highlights the changes that come in doctrine, force structure, and equipment as the heavy division transitions to Division XXI.

**The Second Set: The Digital Rotations at the National Training Center**

The second set of data comes from the recent rotations at the National Training Center of the Fourth Infantry Division (Mechanized) as it trained on the new digital equipment as well as the redesigned force structure. This data comes from two digital rotations, National Training Center rotation 99-05 (combat service support focused rotation) and National Training Center rotation 00-10 (fully digital rotation). This data comes in several formats. Mainly, it comes from the take home packages the trainers at the National Training Center send to the rotational unit to assist with home station training. The take-home packet is in after-action review format with detailed information on the unit’s performance. Interviews with the chaplain participants of National Training Center rotation 00-10 (the first completely digital rotation) are added to the set. In addition, the data comes from the thesis author’s notes and presentations from the combat service support focused digital rotation 99-05. This data focuses on unit ministry teams in the entire brigade combat team as well as unit ministry teams that were echelons above
brigade. However, all of the data that comes from the combat training centers are just half of what is needed.

The Third Set: The Fort Hood Digital Train Up

The final set of data comes from the training conducted at Fort Hood with the Fourth Infantry Division as it moved into the Division XXI structure. The data comes from several different sources. There is data that comes from the train-up for the digital rotations from the First Brigade Combat Teams Limited Use Test of the digital equipment. Specifically, the data comes from the training conducted for the National Training Center rotation 00-10 where civilian contractors combined with the soldiers of the First Brigade Combat Team conducted a series of field testing of the new equipment. Another source was the contractor training packets given to soldiers to train with the new digital enablers. For example, FBCB2 training was conducted with the acquisition of the FBCB2 system as well as whenever the software was upgraded on the FBCB2. The final sources of data from Fort Hood are the informal interviews with officers and enlisted from all the branches, especially chaplain, as they adapted to the digital environment. These sources all comprise the Fort Hood data set and with the two other data sets previously mentioned, form the basis for this analysis.

The three data sets mentioned above, the data from Combat Maneuver Training Center and the National Training Center rotations, the data from the National Training Center digital rotations, and the Fort Hood data are triangulated to determine what trends appear and how those trends might interact with the digital modernization and the divisional redesign. However, there are problems with the data that must be discussed.
Limitations of the Data Sets
First, the data sets do not match. The Combat Maneuver Training Center data collected from 1991 to 1993 was not collected with this thesis in mind. Consequently, it is sporadic in determining the issues identified from the doctrinal review. This problem is discussed in detail below with a possible method of organizing the observational data. However, this methodology will not match the trends from the later combat training center data sets. For example, the National Training Center rotations 99-05 and 00-10 provide information that is useful in answering the basic question of religious support for Division XXI. This data is not in the same format as the Combat Maneuver Training Center data since technology and data collection methodology changed since 1991-1993. Therefore, a method must be determined that can correlate the two data sets so trends can be determined. This too will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Singleton, Straits, and Straits refer to the above problem in their chapter on using available data for research. They write, “The use of several different measures of a given variable is always a good practice in social research. This is even more imperative in available-data research that uses indirect and approximate indicators.” This analysis fits that paradigm. The variable is religious support in a combat setting with the subsets of movement on the battlefield, analysis of operational planning by the unit, situational awareness of the enemy and friendly activities, and survival on the battlefield. It can certainly be said the three data sets used to look at the variable are both indirect and approximate. It is indirect in that all the observers did not have this variable in mind when the data was collected. The information was collected for other reasons, closely related to the variable, but not for correlation to the thesis question. The combat training
center’s focus is providing feedback to the rotational unit in order to improve home station training. Any conclusions drawn from that feedback for a systematic variable (such as religious support on the battlefield) is indirect. It is approximate because the variable and its subsets were not exactly defined for the data collection for all three sets. Therefore, the data must be correlated carefully to draw any conclusions. All of the above reasons are why this analysis must not be generalized into any conclusions beyond the specific answer to the thesis question.

Another problem with the data is the sparse numbers that are used. The first set consists of only thirty-one task force ministry teams that trained at Combat Maneuver Training Center from 1991 to 1993 and the National Training Center rotations from 1994 to 1998. The second set is the two digital rotations, National Training Center rotation 99-05 and National Training Center rotation 00-10 with the feedback provided from the ministry teams that participated in them. Finally, the third data set of the Fort Hood data from 1998 to 2000 of the digital experimentation and training at Fourth Infantry Division comes only from the ministry teams assigned to those units during that timeframe. The author recorded the last two data sets while in the field and thus all the limitations of fieldwork hold true. This sparse data makes it difficult to confirm validity of any conclusions drawn as it relates to the thesis question.

Methodology: Triangulation

However, all of the problems mentioned above do not negate the usefulness of the collected information. The early Combat Maneuver Training Center data provides a baseline of battlefield issues that can be used to compare the other two data sets. For example, battlefield wandering is a major problem found at the Combat Maneuver
Training Center with unit ministry teams as they tried to move forward and execute the forward thrust doctrine. The high number of chaplains and chaplain assistants that become lost at the Combat Maneuver Training Center confirms this trend. This trend is then used as a baseline when examining the data that comes from the National Training Center rotations. The combat training center’s data set is compared with the observations from the two digital rotations at the National Training Center to provide a comparison from similar training events in the combat training center environment. Finally, the first two data sets are examined with the Fort Hood data set that tries to answer the problem of movement on a dispersed battlefield. The conclusion of this analysis (perhaps it is easier for unit ministry teams to move with digital technology and redesigned structure) will be part of the answer to the original thesis question.

The Data Sets: Category Organization
The CMTC data was organized to look at four trends (or categories). The first is the ability of the chaplain to analyze a task force operations order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO) and produce a workable religious support plan. The definition of a workable religious support plan is one that enabled the unit ministry team to move forward and visit frontline soldiers before and after the battle as well as care for the wounded during the battle. The religious support plan would enhance the ministry by allowing the unit ministry team to be at the right place, at the right time, for those who need them the most. The judgment of success for a task force religious support plan was a subjective one made by the task force chaplain observer-controller. Related to the religious support plan was the unit ministry team’s ability to stay alive in the simulated combat environment of Combat Maneuver Training Center.
The combat training centers simulate battlefield effects to create artificial deaths of the soldiers being trained. Death can be caused by multiple factors, from the enemy overrunning the unit to a bad decision by the participant. The focus of this analysis is death that could be avoided by better tactical awareness. This was judged by the chaplain observer-controller as those times the unit ministry team was notionally killed by actions that could have been avoided with better battlefield awareness. For example, driving over a documented minefield, becoming a chemical severe casualty, or being killed by enemy reconnaissance are some ways a unit ministry team could die through inferior situational awareness. If the enemy destroyed the battalion aid station while the unit ministry team was with the wounded, that was considered a judgment call and was not counted as a notional kill. Tactical awareness is related to the third category.

The third category is battlefield wandering. Again, this was a subjective judgment by the chaplain observer-controller on when a unit ministry team wandered the battlefield driving from one element to another. Normally, it was obvious the unit ministry team was lost and usually confirmed verbally by the chaplain observer-controller. The reasons could be poor map reading, inability to conduct mounted land navigation or poor situational awareness of friendly units’ locations.

The final category was ability to synchronize the unit ministry teams religious support plan with the other elements of the task force. For example, the unit ministry team needed to coordinate with company first sergeants to link up with them during visitation to avoid battlefield wandering. Another example is the combat trains command post tracking the unit ministry team as it moves about the battlefield. It is difficult to separate the different criteria since they are closely related. For example, the unit
ministry team must extract from the task force operations order the logistical movement on the battlefield, so they could move with them safely. This means the unit ministry team must link up with the logistical element and work into their movement serial. The above actions prevent battlefield wandering as well as help keep them alive. Hence, the categories work together as a coherent system and the data analysis creates an artificial separation of them. However, to best use this data in answering the thesis questions, the separation must be made.

The second criterion is more difficult to organize. There are three subsets of this data. The first is the information from the digital National Training Center rotations, 99-05 and 00-10. This data is analyzed using the same four categories from the first criterion. Therefore, the rotational unit ministry teams are looked at while they used the digital equipment under a redesigned divisional structure. For example, the division support command ministry team might use digital technology to move corps support group’s ministry teams forward to the aid stations located at the brigade combat team’s support area. This enables the maneuver brigade chaplain to move the sapper unit ministry forward instead of rearward to cover the large number of wounded that go to the level two aid station at the brigade support area. This is all coordinated using digital technology and executed using convoys following the new doctrinal throughput concept. Thus, the battlefield wandering is reduced while the longevity of the ministry team is enhanced with convoy movement. This information came from the take home packets as well as interviews with the chaplains who participated in the rotations.

The second subset is trends recorded through Center for Army Lessons Learned from the combat training centers as it relates to religious support. The main issue with
this subset is consistency. Chaplain observer-controllers were not assigned to every combat training center for all of the years being analyzed. However, the National Training Center was the most consistent. This data is organized similar to the Combat Maneuver Training Center data with three broad categories being examined. Using the words from National Training Center, they are, “poor soldier skills, Religious Support not integrated into OPORD/FRAGOs, and too few Religious Support Plans in OPORDs.”

Again, this data fits into the overall set by being approximate to the Combat Maneuver Training Center and with the detailed data from the National Training Center rotations 99-05 and 00-10. This National Training Center data is combined with Fort Hood data for the final subset in this criterion.

The final subset, the Fort Hood data, is very dissimilar to the previous three. It examines the ability of one brigade combat team and its battalion ministry teams while they provide religious support in simulated combat conditions using the new digital tools as well as the redesigned force structure. The subset is very detailed and covers battlefield movement as well as access to tactical planning of the brigade, however, it is dissimilar because an observer-controller team did not observe at a combat training center. The author made the observations. The above criterion, along with the first criterion, is examined as they related to the third and final criterion.

The three criterions will provide a comparison of religious support in a heavy maneuver brigade under the AirLand Battle doctrine with the Army of Excellence with the full-spectrum operations with Division XXI. The criterion provides religious support issues or problems under AOE and possible solutions and/or problems with Division XXI. This data must then be used to examine the specifics of providing religious support
to a heavy brigade in Division XXI as well as providing religious support to its subordinate units. For example, a problem associated with the AirLand Battle rotations is battlefield wandering as defined above. However, observations from the digital rotations and the Fort Hood field problems show unit ministry teams rarely became lost due to the use of FBCB2 which showed current location and location of desired visitation site. Thus, part of the answer on how subordinate task force unit ministry teams might move on the battlefield is to use FBCB2 as a map (along with a analog map and overlay) and navigational tool. This common sense approach to digital navigation is then verified using the three criteria mentioned above. This example provides a foreshadowing of the fourth chapter of the thesis, the analysis of the data coupled with some possible conclusions. The fifth and final chapter will then answer the thesis questions as well as provide proposed doctrinal solutions to issues that have plagued the chaplaincy since Vietnam and before.

Results
This section is organized as follows: (1) data from Combat Maneuver Training Center, 1991 to 1993, (2) data from National Training Center summaries from 1994 to present, (3) data from National Training Center rotations 99-05 and 00-10 (in that order), (4) data from Ft Hood FBCB2 Limited User Test Exercise (IRONHORSE LIGHTNING-20 March to 21 April 1999), and (5) doctrinal concepts from the chaplaincy on future operations. Chapter 4 will present conclusions from the data while chapter 5 will then use the conclusions to offer possible doctrine for a maneuver brigade in a Division XXI structure. First, it is best to begin with the earliest data, the Combat Maneuver Training Center data from 1991 to 1993.
As mentioned earlier, the Combat Maneuver Training Center data is from personal notes taken during task force training. The simulated battles were traditional force on force with AirLand Battle doctrine being used by the friendly elements and Soviet style doctrine being used by the enemy. Thirty-one task force ministry teams were observed at these rotations. The chaplain observer-controller normally linked up with the task force ministry team prior to the task force’s tactical road march into the “war.” After this, the chaplain observer-controller normally watched the ministry team perform for three to four missions. These missions ranged from movement to contact to deliberate defense. The raw data was analyzed into the four categories (as mentioned earlier): (1) operations order analysis for extraction of pertinent information relating to the religious support mission, (2) battlefield wandering, (3) ministry team’s ability to synchronize religious support with other elements of the task force, and (4) survival of the ministry team. Table 2 below presents the results. The number shown in the boxes are number of task force ministry teams that failed to achieve satisfactory completion of the tasks. Total number of ministry teams is thirty-one.

Table 2. Combat Maneuver Training Center Results: 1991 to 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS FORCE</th>
<th>OPORD Analysis</th>
<th>Battlefield Wandering</th>
<th>Killed in Action</th>
<th>Synchronization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TASK FORCE</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Table 2 shows 22 task force ministry teams failed to extract data from the Task Force operation orders within the standards set by the chaplain observer-controller.
That is, twenty-two chaplains did not extract pertinent data from the operations order within twenty minutes and/or did not know how to read and understand the information in the task force operations order. Fourteen task force ministry teams became lost and wandered off course or went to the wrong location. Fourteen chaplains were “killed in action” in simulation by battlefield effects that were avoidable. Finally, twenty-one task force ministry teams failed to synchronize their efforts with other elements of the task force (e.g., Combat Train Command Post). This indicates task force ministry teams struggle with extracting information from operations order and with synchronizing their religious support mission with other elements in the task force. A lesser problem is battlefield wandering while any battlefield loss is one too many. These trends agree with the observations from the chaplain observer-controllers at the National Training Center.

National Training Center Data: AirLand Battle

The data from the National Training Center is not organized as the data from the Combat Maneuver Center. The observer-controllers would gather up the trends observed over a quarter and create a summary. This summary was then sent to the Center of Army Lessons Learned that published them as a summary. For example, National Training Center Trends, first and second quarters for fiscal year 1997 give the data in the format of summary paragraphs without numbers. Thus, this data set is provided the same way. The data is organized in summary fashion by fiscal year. Only the data that fits within the four categories used above is provided. Again, the format used by National Training Center is different than the Combat Maneuver Training Center format, yet the National Training Center information approximates the Combat Maneuver Training Center information. Each sentence below is under the heading of “needs emphasis” and is an
area observed that is problematic for the ministry teams. The data is not presented
verbatim as that would be too cumbersome, but is summarized to keep the focus of the
observations. The data is from fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 1998. Unless specifically
noted, unit ministry teams refers to both brigade and task force ministry teams.  

National Training Center DATA FOR RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
Fiscal Years 1994-1998

Fiscal Year 1994
  1. Chaplains show poor soldier skills.
  2. Unit Ministry Teams are not integrated into OPORD process.

Fiscal Year 1995
  1. Brigade Unit Ministry Teams did not adequately coordinate or control
     religious support assets on the battlefield.
  2. Unit Ministry Teams show poor soldier skills.
  3. Unit Ministry Teams not integrated into unit.

Fiscal Year 1996
  1. Brigade Ministry Teams struggled with synchronization of religious support
     assets on the battlefield.
  2. Unit Ministry Teams not integrated with unit.

Fiscal Year 1997
  1. Brigade Unit Ministry Teams not well integrated with orders process
2. Task Force Ministry Teams not integrated with medical planners for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).

3. Task Force Ministry Teams struggle with synchronization of religious support on the battlefield.


5. Ministry Teams showed poor soldier skills.


**Fiscal Year 1998**

1. Ministry Teams not integrated with MDMP.

2. Ministry Teams not synchronized with units.

The above data indicates some of the same issues as found at Combat Maneuver Training Center. The ministry teams struggled with synchronization of religious support with the other elements within the unit as well as with the orders process. Poor soldier skills indicated problems with both land navigation and survival skills. Finally, the ministry teams struggled with extracting religious support information from the operations order. This data coupled with the data from Combat Maneuver Training Center indicates systematic problems associated with planning and execution of religious support for armor and mechanized infantry ministry teams at both brigade and task force level. The next set of data, while different from both sets above, speaks to these systematic problems as well.
National Training Center Data: Digital Rotations

The next set of data comes from National Training Center rotations 99-05 and 00-10. This data is dissimilar from the other two sets in that most of it comes from the participants instead of from chaplain observer-controllers. Because of that, it is presented differently than above.

National Training Center rotations 99-05 focused on the digital systems associated with the combat service support functions. Thus, the units deployed to the National Training Center with the combat service support systems digitized while that tactical systems (other than MCS) were not. This complex rotation deployed elements from the Fourth Infantry Division (mechanized) since it was already redesigned into the Division XXI force structure and partially modernized with the digital systems. A maneuver brigade with four task forces (three heavy task forces and one light infantry task force) deployed to provide the combat force. The brigade combat team was redesigned with all of the associated “slice” elements so it was a large, robust force. The combat service support elements were deployed from Corps Support Group Forward (CSG (F)), the Fourth Infantry Division Support Command (DISCOM), the brigade’s forward support battalion and the maneuver battalion’s organic assets. Again, the redesigned force has three maneuver companies per battalion, the forward support battalion (FSB) organized into forward support companies (FSC), the division support battalion (DSB), and the DISCOM headquarters synchronizing all combat service support activity with the digital systems. The CSG (F) was a non digital reserve force. The deployed force structure was a mix of Division XXI (all elements but the CSG (F) and
the light infantry battalion) that used the emerging Division XXI doctrine to perform its missions.

The rotation was designed to provide observations on the combat service support digital systems along with the redesigned force structure. Thus, the logistical concept of “just-in-time” logistics applied. This meant supplies moved directly from the CSG (F) to the deployed forward support companies. Since the FSCs were task organized with the maneuver battalions (one FSC per battalion in a habitual relationship), that meant supply convoys left the CSG (F)’s assembly area and moved forward to the task force’s logistical release point (located forward in the battlefield). The DSB’s new role was to provide direct support to echelons above brigade force; however, in National Training Center 99-05, they provided backup support in case the CSG (F) was unable to complete its mission. The DISCOM sustainment cell synchronized the logistical effort of the brigade combat team. The National Training Center trainers replicated doctrinal distances and time in order to stress the logistical systems. Therefore a convoy leaving the CSG (F) had to wait in a holding area for several hours to replicate the time and distance. During that time, communication from the convoy commander with the logistical control nodes was tactical. There are a multitude of observations. Only those observations that affect the religious support mission of all the unit ministry teams deployed on this rotation are included in this analysis. The observations are from the author (except otherwise noted) who deployed with the DISCOM sustainment cell. It is organized by battlefield operating systems that have a unit ministry team working within it. For example, the maneuver system has the task force chaplains, aviation battalion chaplain, and the brigade chaplain within it.
National Training Center 99-05 Observations

Maneuver:

1. Task Force Chaplains (heavy) had three level one aid stations within each task force and could not provide religious support to all of them.

2. The light infantry chaplain was non-digital and struggled with synchronizing religious support with brigade ministry team.

3. The Brigade Chaplain had 7 ministry teams to provide casualty care for 16 level one and two aid stations.

4. Task Force chaplains were aggressive in moving forward to provide religious support to forward elements, yet struggled with communicating to the brigade chaplain.

5. Task Force chaplains attended all task force maneuver and CSS rehearsals and the order’s brief. This took out a significant time block from providing religious support forward.

6. Task Force chaplains displayed excellent soldier skills. The use of the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) by all ministry teams enabled strong land navigation skills.

7. Brigade Chaplain’s use of the MCS-P system enabled reliable communications with echelon above brigade ministry teams in the division rear area.

8. Brigade Chaplain showed strong leadership by successfully synchronizing the religious support assets on the battlefield.

9. Brigade Chaplain spent a significant amount of time coordinating and planning for each mission from the brigade command post’s plan tent.
10. Brigade and task force chaplain’s religious support information was including in the task force OPORDs.

11. Aviation Battalion Chaplain was located in the Aviation Support Area (ASA) near the Brigade Support Area (BSA) and was able to provide religious support to wounded brought to the aid station in the BSA.

12. All of the wounded in the brigade (other than return to duty) were brought to the level two aid station in the BSA managed by the medical company of the FSB.

13. Many of the forward level one aid stations in the task forces received little to no wounded during and after the battle while others were overwhelmed.

Combat Support

1. Engineer chaplain assistant (engineer chaplain did not deploy and his duties were replicated by his assistant) was able to provide care to wounded as directed by the brigade chaplain. This could be at a forward aid station or at the brigade support area.

2. The Field Artillery ministry team provided religious support strictly to the field artillery battalion with its organic aid station.

3. Both ministry teams provided aggressive religious support to forward elements before and after battles.

4. The brigade chaplain was able to synchronize both combat support ministry teams with the maneuver ministry teams.

5. Both combat support teams showed strong land navigation skills.

Combat Service Support:

1. DISCOM ministry team deployed to the DISCOM sustainment cell with FSB ministry team at BSA. The DSB ministry was with the DSB assembly area (DSA).
Unlike the AOE force structure, emerging doctrine at 99-05 had the DISCOM commander synchronizing support with the FSB with input from the maneuver brigade commander.

2. The CSG (F) deployed with the CSG ministry team and three battalion ministry teams assigned to the support battalions of the CSG. Because it was a reserve unit, each ministry team came for two weeks. Thus, the ministry teams were staggered in their deployment with the CSG ministry team and at least one battalion ministry deployed during combat operations.

3. The maneuver brigade chaplain focused on synchronizing religious support from the BSA forward while the DISCOM chaplain focused on religious support from the rear to the BSA.

4. The CSSCS provided reliable communicate with the CSG, FSB, and DSB ministry teams.

5. The MCS-P at the DISCOM sustainment cell provided reliable communication with the maneuver brigade chaplain at the brigade plans tent (which also had a MCS-P).

6. The logistical flow from the CSG forward to the task force’s FSC meant any ministry team moving forward from the CSG had a convoy to move with (see figure 1). The time element associated with the movement meant religious support planning had to be at least 24 to 36 hours from execution.

7. The brigade chaplain was able to provide the DISCOM chaplain warning orders (WARNO), OPORDS, and FRAGOs via the MCS-P.
8. The CSG (F) commander was willing to allow ministry teams from the CSG to move forward to the brigade combat team’s BSA for one mission cycle as long as the ministry team returned. There was no support relationship assigned for this and the deploying ministry teams had the same support relationship as the rest of the CSG’s elements.

9. All of the combat mission had at least one ministry team from the CSG (F) deploy forward with a convoy to the BSA, provide religious support to the aid station there, and deploy back on a following convoy. The DISCOM chaplain synchronized all
of this with the CSSCS and MCS-P with the brigade and the CSG ministry teams from the DISCOM sustainment cell.

The above observations provide a tremendous amount of information. As with the previous sets of data from Combat Maneuver Training Center and the National Training Center observations fiscal years 94-98, the observations are associated with the four categories given earlier in the chapter. The category of survival was not an issue since the ministry teams all survived the fighting except when the unit was overrun. The category associated with battlefield wandering was discussed as it related to use of the PLGR. The focus of the observations is found in the synchronization of the religious support assets and the use of operation orders. The general trend was the digital systems enabled better synchronization throughout the battle space by the brigade ministry team. Conclusions from this rotation will be discussed in chapter four. This rotation was followed the next year with National Training Center 00-10, the first fully digitized rotation.

A brigade combat team from Fourth Infantry Division with a substantial sustainment element from the Fourth Infantry DISCOM conducted National Training Center 00-10. The brigade deployed with two maneuver task forces (three companies per task force) as well as the organic engineer battalion, all of whom that were fully digitized. The field artillery battalion and the forward support battalion provided direct support and they were digital also. Finally, all of the associated slice elements, military police, air defense artillery, and others were equipped with the digital equipment. The definition of digital is most of the combat vehicles in addition to the command and control vehicles were equipped with FBCB2. Many of the other vehicles were equipped with FBCB2,
which included the brigade chaplain’s vehicle. Unfortunately, the battalion ministry
teams did not have FBCB2 in the vehicles, but had to rely on other element’s computers
(the final section on the Fort Hood training discusses this). The operations centers for all
units had MCS-P with the combat service support units have MCS-P and CSSCS. Of
course, the other digital systems were in the maneuver operation centers, however, those
systems have only an indirect influence on the ministry teams. All of the brigade and
battalion’s operation orders, overlays, and other operational data were transmitted over
the FBCB2 to all stations included in the unit’s net. The FBCB2 equipped vehicles
provided real time data on their own location and movement; thus, all of those friendly
elements were seen on the computer screen. Finally, the focus of the training was to test
the digital systems, so the civilian contractors who deployed with the brigade insured
most systems were functional. The data from this rotation comes from two primary
sources, the take home packet created by the National Training Center brigade
observer/control team and the results from the interviews with the participants. The
National Training Center packet made little reference to the ministry teams, but provided
a wealth of data on the digital systems.7 The chaplains, of course, focused on ministry
tasks while providing the feedback for this thesis. The data is organized into two
segments, the take home packet, and the interview results. As with the previous National
Training Center information, it is presented in sentence format without “verbatim”
transcripts. This data, along with the National Training Center 99-05 data, is the second
leg of the research triangle.
Interviews From 1st Brigade Combat Team Chaplains

Combat:

Brigade ministry team was new to unit (note: author left to attend CGSC) and unfamiliar with FBCB2. This meant a lack of train-up time with the system that hindered operations. FBCB2 in brigade chaplain’s vehicle was not updated with latest software fix given just before deployment, thus brigade ministry team did not use FBCB2.\textsuperscript{8}

Task Force ministry teams used FBCB2s located in the combat trains command post. They sent e-mail messages as situational updates, but since the issues mentioned above prevented any reply, stopped after first two missions.

Situation awareness of ministry teams was enhanced by digital access, but was sporadic due to lack of organic system in vehicle.

Task force ministry teams tried to use timelines to plan religious support, but struggled with synchronization of effort when situation changed. Lack of organic FBCB2 hindered synchronization.

Task Force ministry teams moved with other elements on the battlefield and did not get lost.

Combat Support

Field Artillery chaplain “did not have FBCB2 which left us out of the loop concerning OPORDs. They were all sent via FBCB2 and if you didn’t have that it was difficult to find a paper copy.”\textsuperscript{9}

Navigation with map and compass are still critical to insure a reliable backup to PLGR and FBCB2 if systems fail.
Coordination of services on the battlefield is critical to accomplish mission. “Without it, we will die and cause others to die.”\textsuperscript{10}

Link up is critical.

“Battletracking was of the utmost importance. We found that we did a better job of tracking then the battery commander. Therefore, we became an information piece to keep everyone alive.”\textsuperscript{11}

Engineer chaplain was unable to receive information via FBCB2 due to Brigade Ministry Team’s lack of workable system as well as training on its use.\textsuperscript{12}

Battlefield awareness was useful in assisting aid station’s survival. FBCB2 used to enhance battlefield awareness.

Land Navigation was excellent with PLGR & NVGs; still need to use map and compass.

**Combat Service Support**

FSB chaplain used the S1’s FBCB2 system to send reports and questions to the brigade chaplain. Lack of response and return of information was a source of confusion.\textsuperscript{13}

FBCB2 training proved to be very valuable and helped with messaging.

Training on PLGR and land navigation was valuable and more needs to be done. Map and compass still important.

In many ways, National Training Center rotation 00-10 as it relates to unit ministry teams operations using digital systems was not successful. It was, in essence, an analog rotation with a redesigned brigade combat team. The Fourth Infantry DISCOM ministry team did not deploy and the combat service battalion from the III Corps Support
Command was very unfamiliar to the digital changes. The brigade combat team only arrived to the unit days before the rotation and did not know much about the digital systems. The battalion ministry teams were very familiar with the digital environment and were able to provide data. The main lessons learned were on battlefield awareness and survival on the battlefield; both lessons showed FBCB2 enhanced those tasks. The best test of the digital system was before National Training Center 00-10 when the Fourth Infantry Division conducted a Limited User Test called Ironhorse Lightning.

Fort Hood Data: Digital Train Up

The contractors needed to continue with the development of the digital systems and arranged with the 4th Infantry Division to test the FBCB2 system in a field situation. The division used the 1st Brigade Combat team to test the system under a training plan that began in November and stretched to March. The capstone exercise was Ironhorse Lightning where force on force battles were conducted under realistic battlefield conditions. The brigade ministry team had a working FBCB2 system in the vehicle and received extensive training on its use. The battalion ministry teams did not have a system in their vehicles and were trained to use the system in the battalion combat service support command post. The brigade combat team was task organized with all the habitual slice elements and was fully digitized. The brigade main operations cell had full use of all digital systems with the civilian contractors replicating division, corps, and national command assets. The MCS-P, CSSCS, and FBCB2 were the main systems used by the ministry teams. The data is presented using the same format as above. The main difference is the lessons from the brigade chaplain and the task force chaplains.
Fort Hood Digital Train Up Observations

Combat

1. Brigade chaplain did not have a chaplain assistant and worked alone. This meant the brigade command post (Brigade TOC) had to track him for safety. This tracking was successful due to the FBCB2 and MCS-P. The chaplain’s FBCB2 presented an icon that was seen by personnel at the Brigade TOC on both the FBCB2 and MCS-P. Thus, when a real world emergency was reported to the TOC, they were able to locate and communicate with the brigade chaplain instantly.

2. The task force chaplains could use the technique noted above to link up with the brigade chaplain when such a link up was needed on the battlefield.

3. OPORDs, overlays, CSS data, and WARNOs were all sent digitally and received by the brigade chaplain on the FBCB2. The intensive amount of data being sent created a very slow download time and this download time influenced planning. Also, graphics, such as engineer obstacle overlay, were too larger for easy downloading.

4. Brigade chaplain was an able to use the unit locator on FBCB2 to find any size element on the battlefield and either go to them or send a message to them.

5. The brigade chaplain was able to join the FBCB2 net of subordinate units and perform as if a member of that unit.

6. The engineer battalion’s operation center was located with the brigade TOC and thus the engineer chaplain was able to provide coverage for the brigade when the brigade chaplain was hospitalized.
7. The combat support and combat service support chaplains were all able to communicate using FBCB2 with the brigade chaplain with reports, situation updates, and questions. The brigade chaplain could send coordinating instructions the same way.

8. The brigade chaplain was able to include religious support in the brigade orders and send the brigade CSS annex digitally to subordinate ministry teams.

9. The brigade chaplain was able to create religious support overlays on the FBCB2 and transmit them to subordinate ministry teams. While these overlays were not intended to provide control over the subordinate ministry teams, they were able to provide them with every location of every ministry by phase of battle. This assisted with coordination.

10. Link up procedures with company team first sergeants via FBCB2 was simplified and every link up was successful.

11. Every task force chaplain was able to track the battle using the medical platoon leader’s FBCB2 or any medical evacuation vehicle’s FBCB2 at any aid station. This meant the task force ministry team could move with any aid station and still receive accurate situational awareness.

12. Land navigation was enhanced with FBCB2. The brigade chaplain used the land navigation feature on the FBCB2 with a plastic overlay over the computer screen and followed his progress on the screen. This was difficult at night.

13. The tactical screen showed all friendly obstacles and enemy obstacles located and reported. This assisted with battlefield movement.
14. Task Force chaplains could use the FBCB2 or the CSSCS to determine supply convoys location and planned movement so the ministry teams could use the convoys to move on the battlefield.

**Combat Support**

1. Engineer ministry team was able to use systems at brigade TOC or engineer logistical command post to perform all of the tasks mentioned above.

2. Field artillery chaplain was able to move forward to firing batteries providing direct support to the maneuver battalions. This visitation, while important to the battery soldiers, created coordination problems with other ministry teams. These issues were ironed out on a face-to-face meeting with all of the ministry teams (planned, coordinated, and executed using FBCB2).

3. Both ministry teams were able to perform the task discussed above with the combat ministry teams.

4. Both ministry teams were able to coordinate and execute religious support from the brigade when the brigade chaplain was hospitalized.

**Combat Service Support**

1. The FSB chaplain was able to use the CSSCS, MCS-P, and the FBCB2 as needed using the systems located at the brigade support area’s command posts.

2. FSB chaplain was able to battle track at the BSA TOC using the FBCB2 and provide religious support to wounded moving to level 2 care.

3. FSB ministry team was able to move forward and visit CSS assets located at the Task Force Support Areas (TFSA) using FBCB2.
Much of the data collected during Ironhorse Lightning focused on the brigade chaplain’s operations. All of the data collected indicated the four categories used for this analysis: battlefield wandering, operation orders data extraction, synchronization of religious support, and battlefield survival were conducted successfully using the digital system, especially the FBCB2. The preliminary data from this train up showed most, if not all, of the associated tasks with the categories were simplified with the digital systems. These findings, along with the two National Training Center rotations discussed earlier, provide significant conclusions to how religious support with a heavy brigade will change with the digitized brigade combat team.

1. Shakespeare, 7.

2. Royce A Singleton, Bruce C. Straits, & Margaret Miller Straits, Approaches to Social Research (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 408.

3. Ibid., 369.


5. Personal notes by author, National Training Center Rotation 99-05, 17 Feb to 13 Mar 1999 (Fort Hood: TX, 1999).

6. US Department of the Army, National Training Center Brigade Observer-controller Team, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 00-10, Final AAR (Fort Irwin: CA, September 2000).


8. Chaplain (CPT) Chris Archer, 4-42 Artillery Chaplain, Fourth Infantry Division (mechanized), e-mail message to author, 29 September 2000.

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

11. Chaplain (CPT) Brian Chepey, 229 Engineer Chaplain, Fourth Infantry Division (mechanized), e-mail message to author, 28 September 2000.


CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

We are but warriors for the working day, our gayness and our gilt are all besmirched with rainy marching in the painful field. There’s not a piece of feather in our host-Good argument, I hope, we will not fly- and time has worn us into slovenry. But by the mass, our hearts are in the trim.1

William Shakespeare, *Henry IV*

The armor task force chaplain decided to move forward from the battalion aid station to visit the site of the scout platoon. He told his assistant, a private first class, to get the vehicle ready to move forward. After a quick stop at the battalion combat trains command post to let them know he was moving forward, he began the journey. They drove by several clusters of vehicles, soldiers working furiously on obstacles prior to the enemy’s attack. The chaplain stopped by a couple of clusters, talking and joking with the soldiers working on the mines and wires. He continued forward, carefully threading his way through the emerging obstacle. He finally was through the wire, yet time was running out so he told the assistant to drive a little faster than normal. Eventually, the dirt and gravel trail came to a fork that caused them to stop and stare at a map. After some discussion and much head scratching, they decided to go right. Unknown to them, the assembly area for the scout platoon was to the right. It wouldn’t have made much different anyway, even if they went left, for the platoon left long ago for the security force fight. The ministry team continued on, moving slowly along the meandering trail until it began to move up an impossibly high and heavily wooded hill. The chaplain knew that was wrong. Again, the map and compass came out. They decided it was
hopeless to continue and noticed it was beginning to get dark. So they carefully moved back to where they came, knowing they had to get back to the battalion aid station before darkness completely fell. It was too late. The night vision goggles were unpacked and checked. Neither one of them was totally comfortable with the goggles, but they continued on in the darkness anyway. The jolt that struck their vehicle told them both the obstacle was in front of them. As they climbed out of their vehicle, they noticed the wire was wrapped around the wheel and the vehicle was now unserviceable. They went to call the battalion aid station, but no one answered the radio, for the radio frequency automatically changed before they hit the wire. They could only sit in their vehicle and hope someone missed them. No one did. The first ones to find them were the enemy recon elements that quietly killed them in the night.

The above story was actually a training rotation at the Combat Maneuver Training Center. The time was late November 1991 and the task force ministry team was training using the AirLand Battle doctrine. The ministry team had all assigned equipment, which was the best the Army had to offer in 1991. They trained hard prior to the rotation and knew the chaplain doctrine of Forward Thrust well. Yet they still “died.” The chaplain observer-controller noted the mistakes for the after-action review and moved on to the next mission.

The brigade chaplain was sitting in the brigade tactical operations cell (TOC) when the call came. A soldier assigned to one of the maneuver companies needed to go to the “rear” and talk with his wife about a Red Cross message. The hot Texas sun of Fort Hood baked him as he walked to his vehicle by the brigade plans tent. He cranked up the vehicle and reached over to turn on the FBCB2. He knew the company the soldier
was assigned to was in a defend mission to the north of the training area. He manipulated the map on the computer screen until he found the icon that represented the company. After he located it, he then continued to expand the icon until the First Sergeant company trains slowly became visible. He then sent a message on the FBCB2 to the NCOIC of the brigade TOC to let him know the brigade chaplain was leaving the area. The NCOIC saw the chaplain’s icon on his map and noted its departure. The chaplain was unsure of the best route to link up with the company trains. He stopped and manipulated the computer again to its navigation mode. After noting his exact location and the location of his destination, he created a quick route on a plastic sheet. He taped the sheet on the map screen and began to drive again. He followed his progress on the sheet as he moved. Friendly units, obstacles, and sighted enemy elements were all displayed on his computer screen like video game (just dustier than most games). As he approached his destination, he noticed the company trains icon began to move away from its old location. He slowly moved his vehicle cross country towards the moving icon. He finally sighted the company trains slowly making its way across the field. As he drove up, he saw a vehicle drive to him in the dark. It was night. The chaplain successfully located a soldier in the middle of the night in a moving column of vehicles during a mission. Other then chatting with his assistant, not a word was spoken until the first sergeant walked up to the vehicle. It was late winter at Fort Hood, Texas, in 2000. The brigade ministry team had all of its assigned equipment and it was the best the Army had to offer.

This chapter will discuss the conclusions of the data analysis presented in chapter three. The above stories provide realistic accounts that illustrate what the data seems to indicate. Religious support under the Division XXI is performed at a higher level of
proficiency than under the Army of Excellence structure. All four categories used in the
analysis are accomplished easier and faster using the digital systems. This chapter is
organized as follows: (1) a brief discussion on the implications of the data analysis as it
relates to the four categories used previously, (2) a presentation of some doctrinal work
done by the chaplaincy as it related to Force XXI, and (3) a critique of the current
religious support doctrinal speculation on Division XXI. The relationship between the
doctrinal speculation and the data analysis is the data provides a reality check for the
chaplaincy as it struggles with the transition into Force XXI. The critique is the results of
the reality check. The final chapter provides proposed doctrinal concepts for the
chaplaincy. However, it is best to begin with some conclusions from the data analysis to
provide the groundwork for the doctrinal analysis.

Conclusions From Data Results
The following conclusions are organized similar to the presentation of the data in
the preceding chapter. Each category is discussed under the headings of combat, combat
support, and combat service support. The implications of the data results are presented as
it relates to the research question of conducting religious support with a heavy brigade
combat team in a tactical setting. The Army of Excellence data is compared with the
Division XXI data to determine how religious support doctrine might transform. The
first elements to be looked at are those in the maneuver units, for they are the ones the
farthest forward in battle and thus the most vulnerable.

The religious support elements in the maneuver units are the ministry teams in the
battalion task forces and the brigade headquarters. These are the brigade ministry team,
the armor ministry teams and mechanized infantry ministry team. Of course, the
battalions are task organized into combinations of infantry and armor companies. The Army of Excellence data results indicated a serious problem in the four categories being examined. The aggressiveness demanded by the religious support doctrine meant a significant number of ministry teams were notionally killed while moving on the battlefield. The difficulty in coordinating religious support due to communication problems and unfamiliarity with the task organization of the unit meant ministry teams missed visitation opportunities as well as wandered the battlefield. Despite doctrine’s insistence that ministry teams needed to move with logistical convoys, chaplains routinely missed convoy movement due to ignorance or misinformation. Ministry teams labored to link up with subordinate elements for visitation. The ability to extract pertinent data from operation orders was also difficult due to the time involved. Whereas training on this task will eventually enable ministry teams to read and understand the language of the order, most do not have the time or the will to conduct such training at home station. All of the above factors meant ministry teams under religious support doctrine had significant difficult in providing aggressive religious support to the farthest forward elements. Either the ministry team tried and failed or did not try at all. Of course, there were ministry teams that were able to safely accomplish this ministry task with aggressive movement forward to the combat troops. These chaplains were able to be at the right place, at the right time, for those soldiers who needed them the most. However, the majority failed at that task, some of the time, most of the time, or all of the time. Lack of training, lack of resources, or lack of motivation are some of the reasons for this failure. Division XXI seems to solve some of those issues.
The data from the digital rotations and the Fort Hood training indicates the maneuver chaplains were better able to perform the tasks associated with the four categories. The first task of data extraction from operations orders is enhanced under digital organization. The FBCB2 is a critical part of the solution, for the system offers better information at times when the ministry teams needs it. The maneuver chaplains are able to use the FBCB2 to extract data at any time and thus were not dependent of operation centers for the information. This meant they could move on the battlefield and plan at the same time. This also means either chaplain or chaplain assistant can extract data from multiple sources wherever they are on the battlefield. The task force ministry team can access orders from all levels of command, from division to individual company and thus extract several layers of information. For example, the ministry team can download orders from the CSG (F), FSB at the BSA, and the Task Force order to extract information on a convoy moving from the CSG to the TFSA with another ministry team moving forward to provide reinforcing support. This digital enhancement not only assists the task force chaplain with data extraction, it assist the brigade chaplain also.

The brigade chaplain is able to communicate with all subordinate ministry teams as long as they have access to the FBCB2 system or the MC-P system. Since these systems are scattered throughout the task force elements, the brigade chaplain is able to send and receive messages during any phase of the battle. This communication is important for several reasons. The brigade chaplain is able to send and receive messages from division, corps, and any subordinate unit in between. The brigade ministry team can also download multiple layers of operations orders. As the brigade chaplain plans religious support, he or she can use multiple sources of information to create a religious
support plan that uses all available resources. As the division support command ministry team coordinates echelons above brigade support (with the division chaplain) so ministry teams in the rear can surge forward to assist with casualty care, the brigade chaplain is able to take that information and create a brigade religious support plan that provides religious support forward. Thus, the category of data extraction for religious support is enhanced with the Division XXI structure. Of course, this must be communicated to synchronize religious support throughout the battlefield with other elements in the brigade combat team.

Earlier, it was mentioned the brigade chaplain could communicate better with subordinate ministry teams using the digital systems. This enables the brigade ministry team to send coordinating message to other ministry teams, both within the brigade and echelons above brigade. This creates a synchronized effort. For example, the brigade chaplain can use the ministry teams sent forward from the CSG (F) by the division ministry team to provide casualty care at the level II treatment team at the BSA. Thus, when the wounded are sent to this treatment team for complex medical treatment, several chaplains and chaplain assistants are there to provide support. This means the brigade chaplain can use internal support (with the approval of the brigade and battalion commanders) to surge resources to the forward aid stations in the maneuver units. This surge must be synchronized at the task force level. That means the task force ministry teams must synchronize religious support within their task forces.

The old analog systems relied on paper operations orders, standing operations procedures, operational orders briefs, rehearsals, and FM radio for synchronization during combat. This meant the task force ministry teams were somewhat restricted in
how they planned and synchronized their religious support plan. Even if the task force chaplain was able to successfully extract data from the order and create a religious support plan, this plan was usually “locked in” when the order was published. Thus, the chaplain was always one mission behind or working long hours at a task force tactical operations center. This detracted from aggressive visitation forward to provide the ministry of presence to the soldiers on the line. The digital systems relieve the chaplain of this difficult choice of synchronized religious support or visitation forward more ineffectively.

The FBCB2 enables the task force chaplain to receive and send messages to any level of command. As mentioned earlier, the chaplain has access to tactical data from all levels with the FBCB2 to create a religious support plan. This plan is then sent forward and more importantly, is adjusted according to the tactical information that arrives via FBCB2. The task ministry team can then use multiple sources within the task force to move forward and visit with soldiers more effectively. As tactical data is updated, the task force chaplain can change the religious support plan to better fit the pastoral intent of visitation. In other words, if a company within the task force is having a difficult time, the task force chaplain is able to see that on the FBCB2, choose the best way and time to move to that company, communicate with all levels of command that changes in the plan, and execute the visitation. Of course, the task force ministry team must be able to move to the company without wandering around the battlefield or becoming a casualty in the process.

The digital system also assists with land navigation and situational awareness, thus the battlefield wandering is reduced significantly for the task force ministry team.
As shown earlier, the task force ministry teams struggled with this task under the analog systems in the Army of Excellence. This struggle is reduced with the advent of the digital environment. The data indicates ministry teams are able to move more effectively using the FBCB2 as a navigational tool. The particular technique for this was given previously in this thesis, however, it must be emphasized how useful the FBCB2 is here. The FBCB2 not only provides data for the ministry team to create the best and safest route for movement forward, it also shows the location of the destination. Thus, if the company moves for any reason, this movement is shown on the FBCB2. The ministry team can move forward and watch their progress on the computer screen. This situational awareness of all friendly elements (including battlefield obstacles) and the navigational tool assists in insuring the ministry will arrive quickly and safely. Thus, the two categories of battlefield wandering and survival are enhanced by the Division XXI systems.

The above analysis shows the Division XXI structure enables the ministry teams within the brigade combat team are able to provide religious support forward better than under the old Army of Excellence. This is also true with the combat support and combat service support ministry teams. All of the above tasks hold true with the combat support and combat service support ministry teams in their use of the digital systems. The following will only highlight some aspects of the improvements at they relate to the particular ministry of the combat support and combat service support ministry teams.

A major problem with the combat support chaplains (mainly field artillery and engineer) is their soldiers are scattering throughout the battlefield providing direct support to the combat units. Normally, The brigade chaplain uses these ministry teams to
reinforce casualty care ministry at either the BSA or with ambulance exchange points forward on the battlefield. The task force chaplains were responsible to cover the attached units to the task force. Realistically, this meant the attached soldiers went without religious care. The digital systems provide the situational awareness for the combat support ministry teams so they have access to their soldiers’ location, activity, and status. The FBCB2 then enables the chaplains to communicate with their units forward as well as with the other ministry teams in the brigade to coordinate visitation forward. Finally, the brigade chaplain is able to use those ministry teams (with brigade commander’s approval) to provide casualty care forward during combat with better coordination, synchronization, and control. All of this is also true of the combat service support chaplain at the BSA with some additional capabilities inherent in redesign.

The forward support chaplain at the BSA is charged with ministry to the soldiers both in the BSA and those providing support forward at the TFSAs. Also, the FSB ministry team is responsible for casualty care at the FSB treatment team (level II) in the BSA. The redesign creates a very large FSB of over 1000 soldiers scattered throughout the battlefield. However, most are concentrated at the BSA or at the TFSAs. The CSSCS, MCS-P, and the FBCB2 are systems that assist the FSB chaplain with visitation forward to the TFSA. Depending on the tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) of the unit, either the FSB ministry team or the task force ministry team covers the TFSA soldiers. Either way, the FSB ministry team has the capability to move forward in a coordinated fashion to visit those soldiers. Also, the FSB ministry is able to receive support from the rear to provide care for the wounded as they flow into the BSA. This support (previously discussed in this chapter) is coordinated with the brigade.
chaplain and the division support command chaplain so any ministry teams surged forward from echelons above brigade are received and used properly to enhance care for the wounded. Again, the enhancement mentioned above with the combat and combat support ministry teams are true for the FSB chaplain as well. This shows once again the Division XXI structure improves religious support in the brigade combat teams as provided by all of its internal and external ministry teams. Thus, the data points to how a brigade combat team ministry team and the ministry teams within the brigade might better perform religious support. This has implications with religious support doctrine in a Division XXI maneuver brigade.

Emerging Religious Support Concepts with Digital Environment

Doctrine can be defined as the summation of other’s experiences written to assist soldiers in warfighting at all levels. It is, “The concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. . . . Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army.”² In other words, the doctrinal speculation written about the Division XXI are the combined experiences of the Army chaplaincy combined with the digital environment of Force XXI to produce possible doctrinal solutions to tactical issues.

The United States Army Chaplain Center and School has a combat development center that works on future doctrine. As they work on doctrine, they produce a web page to gather the “fields” impressions on what the new doctrine should contain. These web-based notebooks contain doctrinal speculations on how religious support might be conducted under Division XXI. Also, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) also created a pamphlet that specifically examined religious support in Force
Finally, the professional magazine of the Army chaplaincy produced an essay speculating on how religious support will change with the new technology. These speculations are in essence, emerging religious support doctrine. The conclusions drawn from the data in this thesis can be compared with this material to determine if the speculations are on the right track. This section is organized in a basic trilogy with the three aforementioned sources presented in the order given above.

The US Army Chaplain Center and School houses the combat development office of the Army chaplaincy. As mentioned before, the combat development office publishes “notebooks” that ask for notes from the field on particular issues that relate to combat development. Three such notebooks are titled, “Division UMT: Religious Support for the 21st Century, Chaplaincy’s Army After Next Concept of Support, and Contingency Force UMT: Religious Support for the 21st Century.” The notebook that directly refers to the Division XXI issues speaks on the impact of technology and religious support. The notebook refers to the reality of the dispersed battlefield with the greater tempo and agility of Division XXI operations. It calls for enhanced leadership, communication, synchronization, and control of religious support assets by the division chaplain. This happens through the new technology as stated by the notebook, “Technology can provide additional means to plan, coordinate, and execute RS to address these demands but the personal delivery of RS by the UMT will be imperative.” The conclusions drawn from this study substantiate this. The digital technology enables the division chaplain, brigade chaplain, and battalion chaplains, to plan, coordinate, and execute religious support on the battlefield. More importantly, the digital technology assists ministry teams at all levels to provide religious support forward to soldiers on the battlefield. In fact, the
Division XXI concept enables ministry teams to provide this support better than the Army of Excellence. This improvement in providing religious support is upheld by the doctrinal development of the chaplaincy and retains the critical task of ministry of presence. The data shows this doctrine to be realistic. Later, the report reads, “Information literacy requirements for all UMTs will increase. Information operations and command and control in a digitized division are required capabilities of future UMT training.” This issue of training is also reflected in the data, for the ministry teams that used the FBCB2 best were those trained to do so. National Training Center 00-10 showed the results of an untrained brigade ministry team trying to communicate and plan with digital technology. The attempts failed and religious support suffered. This document reflects ideas found in a similar document, the TRADOC produced pamphlet on religious support in Force XXI.

In 1997, TRADOC published a pamphlet that tried to predict how religious support would change in Force XXI. This pamphlet was a general document that focused on the big picture of religious support Army-wide. However, some ideas are useful in comparing with the data to determine if the pamphlet offers a realistic picture. The pamphlet (TRADOC Pam 525-78) states,

Comprehensive RS will include the use of current and future digitized systems, audio and video equipment, communications equipment, and virtual reality to provide worship services, denominational services and pastoral care, and coordination with other staff sections. Digitized RS will not replace the requirement for “hands-on” ministry. Just like the doctrinal notes from the combat development web page, this pamphlet also emphasizes the need for ministry teams to use the digital technology to move forward on the battlefield. It also states clearly the need for ministry teams to use this technology to
enhance ministry of presence by better providing personal visitation forward. Whereas it later mentions the possibility that virtual reality and holographic projection might be used for ministry, it still emphasizes personal ministry. This is a realistic belief substantiated by the data from this thesis. The last section of the pamphlet states firmly the following, “The future battlefield requires UMTs to be even more intentional about ‘hands-on’ RS.” Digital technology in the Division XXI structure improves this and assists the ministry team in keeping with its historic mission.

The final document is an essay written for the Army chaplaincy in its professional magazine. The focus of the article is speculation on how religious support can be delivered on an empty battlefield. The writer discusses the reality of soldier dispersion under Division XXI with the digital technology and attempts to determine how religious support doctrine could adjust to the empty battlefield. His thesis is many soldiers will be beyond the physical presence of a ministry team due to dispersion and fast tempo. His solution is the use of technology to substitute for physical presence of the ministry team. The writer states, “The direct administering of religious support to all units in the force will have to include support means other than face-to-face ministry.” This refers to using holographic projections to provide emergency support to a soldier on the battlefield. The ministry teams would use this technology to project themselves forward in virtual reality form to a soldier and perform whatever religious ministry is called for. Later he writes, “Techniques and procedures for accomplishing these tasks on the empty battlefield, under emergency conditions, may digress from the principle of having a ‘ministry of presence’ to a ‘ministry of projection’ (nearness).” While not addressing the desirability of
substituting this projected image in the place of a live ministry team, the evidence shows this is not the case in Division XXI.

Critique of Speculative Digital Religious Support Concepts

The data from the digital rotations and Fort Hood training do not support the idea of ministry of projection replacing ministry of presence. In other words, the dispersal of troops and fast tempo do not preclude the ministry teams from providing a ministry of presence because technology enables the ministry team to keep up with both tempo and dispersal. As shown earlier in this thesis, the ministry teams are able to use such tools as FBCB2 and CSSCS to move forward to soldiers on the battlefield. Since the heavy brigade is the norm for the empty battlefield, the data shows replacing ministry of presence with ministry of projection is an unneeded concept. The usefulness of video technology and enhanced communications (even holographs) is undeniable, for synchronization and coordination are improved by such technology. But, there is no need to substitute the physical presence of a chaplain with a projected image of a chaplain to a soldier dying on the battlefield.

The conclusions drawn from the data would support the first two writings that spoke of the need for a personal presence forward. Neither one of the musings indicated how this presences would be accomplished, but merely indicated the need. The digital rotations along with the Fort Hood data showed religious support with a digital brigade combat team under Division XXI is able to fulfill the intent behind ministry of presence. In other words, the conclusions drawn from the data indicate the line of thinking that reinforces the need for a chaplain and a chaplain assistant to move aggressively forward to visit soldiers in combat with a digital unit should continue to progress.
This chapter addressed how religious support in a heavy brigade under Division XXI might occur with the digital environment and the resigned force structure. The data indicates that planning religious support using the digital technology is superior than with technology from the Army of Excellence. It also showed some possible ways ministry teams at all levels might use this technology to move on the battlefield. Finally, it served as a reality check on some doctrinal concepts being presented by the chaplaincy. The final concept to be discussed is some ideas on future doctrine with a heavy brigade in a digital division.

1. Shakespeare, 86.


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid., 10.


CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDED DOCTRINE

…but grow like savages--as soldiers will, that nothing do but meditate on blood-to swearing and stern looks, diffused attire, and everything else that seems unnatural. Which to reduce into our former favor you are assembled; and my speech entreats that I may know the let why gentle peace should not expel these inconveniences and bless us with her former qualities.1

William Shakespeare, Henry V

This thesis began with the sentence; war is insane. It is insane and the chaplain and chaplain assistant are charged with assisting in keeping soldiers sane in an insane environment. This means an aggressive movement forward to insure the soldiers receive the care they need when they need it the most. In others words, to insure the ministry team is at the right place, at the right time, for those soldiers who need them the most. It also means they stay healthy while doing that. The future Division XXI structure is almost ready for real-world missions with all that they bring. The digital technology and the dispersed battlefield mean soldiers will be more isolated than before, reduced to a small crew of soldiers looking at icons on a computer screen. The tempo is fast because the situational awareness of friendly and enemy elements is better and the risks of surprise and fratricide are reduced. The ministry teams within a heavy brigade combat team face a reality of war that can be devastating if total war should come. Thus, the religious support doctrine must address both the reality and promise of digital technology in a Division XXI structure. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to write doctrine for the chaplaincy, for the combat development office at the US Army Chaplain Center and School are charged with that project. However, there are some doctrinal concepts that
might assist them with doctrinal development as it relates to a heavy brigade in Division XXI. By giving these concepts, this chapter will also answer the question spoke of in the beginning of this thesis; how will ministry teams within a Division XXI heavy brigade provide religious support?

**Possible Doctrinal Concepts**

Division XXI means a dispersed force using digital technology to improve situational awareness to better perform their wartime mission. The ministry teams do the same using digital technology to improve synchronization, communication, and execution of religious support. As mentioned earlier, battalion chaplains in the task forces, combat support battalions and combat service support battalions can use the FBCB2 to plan, coordinate, and execute religious support on the battlefield. An example follows: A task force chaplain can be at a forward aid station with wounded while the task force is briefing the operations order at the Task Force command post. Thus, the chaplain misses the brief and must wait a significant amount of time for the paper order to arrive at his or her location. The ministry team (chaplain or chaplain assistant) can download the operations order (both task force and brigade) with overlays on the FBCB2 and take the needed notes while the other member of the ministry teams finishes working with the wounded. Using the data from the FBCB2 and while still on the system, the chaplain can create a religious support plan to support the upcoming operation. This informal religious support plan is then sent to all of the command posts and the brigade chaplain. The ministry team then sends a message via FBCB2 to the company element first on the religious support plan for visitation. Later, the ministry team uses the situational awareness from the FBCB2 as well as the communication capabilities to move
to that unit or link up with another element moving to the unit. In other words, the digital environment enables the task force ministry team to be aggressive in its visitation forward.

The above concept means the “Forward Thrust” doctrine of the AirLand Battle is still a useful part of the digital religious support doctrine. All ministry teams can use the digital technology to overcome the problems of tempo and dispersion to move aggressively forward and provide the ministry of presence to soldiers. In fact, this doctrinal concept must be highlighted by the chaplaincy in its training, for the digital isolation requires aggressive hands-on ministry. The intense training requirement for digital train-up is offset by the high payoff of increased credibility with the combat soldier. This aggressiveness is also synchronized and orchestrated by the brigade ministry team using the digital technology.

The brigade chaplain, by virtue of his or her access to all of the digital systems in the brigade combat team command post, must coordinate all religious support activity in the brigade area of operations. This is further complicated with assets being moved forward from the division via logistical convoys from corps and division ministry teams. Digital technology enables this with situational awareness and communication capability. As with the battalion ministry teams, the brigade ministry team would use the same techniques to plan, prepare, and execute religious support in the brigade combat team. The primary difference with the brigade chaplain is the coordination of religious support with the echelons above brigade. As previously mentioned, the brigade chaplain can coordinate the ministry teams moving forward from the rear to go to the level II aid station at the BSA. This masses religious support at the “hub” of casualty evacuation at
the FSB medical company. This means the FSB ministry team is not overwhelmed by mass casualties, but can place ministry teams surged forward where they can be most useful. After the surge, the ministry teams then return to the rear via the returning logistical convoys. This is one example of how a brigade chaplain can use digital technology to synchronize religious support activities to enable task force ministry teams to move forward instead of backward to the BSA.

The enhanced battlefield situational awareness on the FBCB2 allows the brigade ministry team to not only plan better, but to communicate those plans better. This communication is not only with the electronic mailing capabilities in the tactical Internet, but with the face-to-face encounters with individual task force chaplains. The brigade ministry team can move forward (using same techniques as the task force chaplains) to personally meet and visit with the battalion chaplains. This means all of the ministry teams within the brigade combat team can move forward to provide the ministry of presence with the soldiers who need it the most. Again, Division XXI ministry teams can not only retain the “Forward Thrust” doctrine, but plan, prepare, and execute this doctrine better than before.

Summary

This thesis examined the question of how religious support might be planned, prepared, and executed in a Division XXI maneuver brigade combat team by the ministry teams within the brigade. The thesis discussed the previous development of religious support doctrine beginning with the Vietnam War era and concluding with the current doctrinal manual of the chaplaincy. This doctrinal development highlighted the need for doctrine to grow and change as the environment around it grows and changes. Also, the
review of doctrine showed the strong need for chaplains and chaplain assistant to move forward to soldiers on the battlefield. This need, reinforced by after action reviews from soldiers who experienced combat, was a driving force for the religious support doctrine. The current religious support doctrine, basically an adaptation of AirLand Battle doctrine, was presented to show the problems ministry teams in a heavy brigade combat team were experiencing in tactical situations in moving forward. These problems were underlined with the examination of the data from the combat training centers.

The next step was to examine the religious support data from the combat training centers. The research methodology chosen came from the field of social research, the triangulation method. Essentially, three sets of data were compared as they interacted with four categories of religious support in a tactical setting. The three sets, the data from the AirLand Battle era, the experimental digital rotations at the National Training Center, and the digital train up at Fort Hood with the Fourth Infantry Division (mechanized), were discussed in relation to four categories that were problematic with religious support execution. The four categories, extraction of tactical data for religious support planning, synchronization of the religious support plan with other elements in the unit, movement on the battlefield, and survival of the ministry team on the battlefield, were found to be very difficult for the majority of the ministry teams in a heavy brigade combat team to accomplish. However, the preliminary data from the digital rotations and the train-up at Fort Hood indicated the four categories were successfully completed by the majority of the ministry teams within the brigade combat team, especially when compared with the analog rotations. Thus, the ability for ministry teams to provide timely and accurate religious support is enhanced with the digital technology, even with the dispersed
elements of a Division XXI force structure. This means chaplains and chaplain assistants can still be aggressive in providing religious support forward to the soldiers on the battlefield.

The data results with the conclusions drawn from the data were then compared with the speculative doctrine emerging from the chaplaincy. There seems to be two separate ideas with the doctrinal ideas as it relates to religious support forward during combat. One idea reinforces the need for personal visitation of ministry with soldiers in combat, especially with the dispersed and impersonal nature of the digital war. The second idea was to use technology to project the image of the chaplain forward to soldiers under emergency situations to provide religious support in a hologram. The later idea bases this departure from the traditional ministry of presence with the belief the digital environment precludes the ministry teams from being able to personally care for all of the soldiers within their unit. This thesis refutes this idea and reinforces the former concept. The digital technology would seem to offset the disadvantages of the new force structure and emerging doctrine of Division XXI. However, this is only a preliminary conclusion based on very early digital data.

**Future Research**

It is obvious that much needs to be done in this realm of religious support. As the heavy divisions begin to transition to the Division XXI force structure and as tactical doctrine for this structure begins to emerge; so must the chaplaincy continue to explore how ministry teams will provide religious support in this new environment. New data will come from training rotations at the combat training centers as well as new data from real deployments of digital brigades. The first heavy brigade in 4th Infantry Division
(mechanized) is soon to transition to a fully operational and deployable brigade combat team with all of its elements digitized. This brigade, as well as the others that will follow it, will provide a wealth of information on religious support in a tactical setting. The chaplaincy must use this data to continue working on the emerging religious support doctrine to insure soldiers receive care and comfort during war.

It is best to conclude this thesis with a brief quote from a soldier in war. This soldier belongs to another army, the British Army and is fighting in a different war, World War I. However, the complaint he gives is eternal and one the United States chaplaincy in the twenty-first century must always consider. He writes,

For the Anglican regimental chaplains we had little respect. If they had shown one-tenth the courage, endurance, and other human qualities that the regimental doctors showed, we agreed, the British Expeditionary Force might well have started a religious revival. But they had not, being under orders to avoid getting mixed up with the fighting and to stay behind with the transport…The colonel in one battalion I served with got rid of four new Anglican chaplains in four months; finally he applied for a Roman Catholic, alleging a change of faith for the men under his command. For the Roman Catholic chaplains were not only permitted to visit posts of danger, but definitely enjoined to be wherever the fighting was, so that they could give extreme unction to the dying.  

The above quote serves as an example of the best and the worst the chaplaincy can do for the soldiers it serves. It also serves as a warning to the chaplaincy as it evolves with the Army towards the Objective Force. May the Creator of all guide the chaplaincy as it continues its service to the soldiers that surrounds them.

1. Shakespeare, 112.

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Author’s Notes

Personal notes by author from Combat Maneuver Training Center rotations from June 1991 to June 1993. Recorded on Harvard Graphic slides or on the original note cards used during the rotations.


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