IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY: THE CARIBBEAN
MILITARY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY: THE CARIBBEAN MILITARY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, by LTC Edmund E. Dillon, 1-92.

In the twenty-first century military organizations throughout the world are going through an identity crisis in a changing world as the international community is faced with the vagaries of major shifts in the security environment. This environment is characterized with complexities and changes as new security issues and challenges are brought to the fore. In this complex and challenging international security environment, the problem is that the military in the English-speaking Caribbean cannot continue doing business as usual. The military cannot continue to exist without a Caribbean identity, without a Caribbean mandate, without a Caribbean philosophy, and without a Caribbean doctrine. The primary research question is therefore: Can the military in the English-speaking Caribbean develop its own identity and redefine national security from a Caribbean perspective in the twenty-first century? This study examines the historical perspectives that shape the identity of the military, the international security environment that impact on the military, and the Caribbean security environment within which the military operates. Using a multidisciplinary approach, the study analyses the military within each of these criteria.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Today, on the threshold of the twenty-first century, military organizations are going through an identity crisis in a changing world as the international community continues to struggle with the vagaries of major shifts in the security environment. According to Ivelaw Griffith, Professor in the Political Science Department at Florida International University, international power is becoming increasingly multidimensional, international structures are becoming more complex, and the international security agenda is being redefined.[1] In this complex international security environment the military in the English speaking Caribbean cannot continue doing business as usual.

The military in the English speaking Caribbean cannot continue to exist without a Caribbean identity, without a Caribbean mandate, without a Caribbean philosophy, and without Caribbean doctrine. The military that evolved in the Caribbean emerged within a framework of British culture, British traditions, and British systems and structures. To a large extent, these aspects of the Caribbean military have remained unchanged in a changing international environment. Drawing from Immanuel Wallerstien's work on World System theory,[2] in which he described the economic relationship between the countries in the developed world (core) and the underdeveloped world (periphery), the relationship that exists between the Caribbean military and other militaries in the metropolitan countries can be described as a core-periphery military relationship.

The Caribbean military must develop new roles concomitant with a new identity in this changing environment. The identity of the military must be redefined to pursue new security missions, challenges, and issues within a Caribbean framework. Once an

identity and image can be shaped within a Caribbean framework, purposeful role and functions can be conducted by the military. It is therefore against this background that this thesis is pursuing the search for an identity for the Caribbean military and national security in the twenty-first century. This identity must be conducive to its development and alignment within the present international security environment. Although the English speaking countries in the Caribbean littoral will be mentioned, the research will focus on the case of Trinidad and Tobago. This country will be used as a benchmark, since it shares a similar history and culture with most of the other English speaking islands.

For the purpose of this research, the term Caribbean refers to the English speaking countries in the Caribbean littoral. These include Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadiens, Grenada, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. The common thread that runs through these countries is the fact that they were all subjected to European and North American influences during and after the period of colonial rule. While all these countries do not have military forces, those that possess them can trace their existence to predominantly British origins. Those that do not have military forces do have a paramilitary or police service that deals with security issues. These institutions can also trace their origin to Britain.

Primary Research Question

The focus of this research is to search for an identity for the Caribbean military that is concomitant with its national security role in the twenty-first century. To pursue

this, the following primary question will be considered: Can the military in the English speaking Caribbean develop its own identity and redefine national security from a Caribbean perspective in the twenty-first century?

In order to answer the primary question of this thesis, the following secondary questions must be researched:

1. How and why was the military created in the Caribbean? What are the antecedent factors that shaped the identity of the military? This question will examine the historical, political, and geostrategic factors that shaped the identity of the military.

2. What is the role of forces external to the Caribbean in shaping the identity of the military? This question will examine the geostrategic relationship from an economic, political and military standpoint.

3. What has national security meant for the Caribbean? Can national security be redefined from a Caribbean perspective, and what roles can the military play in this redefinition? This question requires an understanding of the national security policies and the use of the military in the Caribbean. It begs the further question; Who or what influences the formulation of national security policies in the Caribbean?

4. What is the nature of civil-military relations in the Caribbean, and what part can the civil authorities play in shaping the identity of the military? This question will focus on civilian control and its effect on the identity of military.

<u>Assumptions</u>

This research effort will be predicated on the following key assumptions:

1. The United States influence in the Caribbean will continue.

2. British influence will continue to decline.

3. The English speaking countries of the Caribbean will continue to exist in an atmosphere of cooperation and collaboration.

4. Security challenges will continue to exist that would require or demand the existence of military and paramilitary forces.

5. The identity of military organizations can be used as a guide to ensure some predictable patterns of behavior.

6. There is a direct relationship between identity and role.

Definitions

The following terms will be used in the research:

Caribbean Military: Refers to the military and paramilitary organizations of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean.

CARICOM: Refers to the Caribbean Community, an association of sixteen countries in the Caribbean littoral that was established in 1973.

Core Periphery Military Relationship: Refers to the relationships that exist between militaries in large metropolitan countries (the core) and those in underdeveloped countries (the periphery).

Limitations

The Caribbean military as an area of study is relatively new, and as such there is no vast amount of literature on the area of this research. Despite this lack of information I

still wish to proceed because the study is inherently important for the development of the Caribbean.

<div align="center">Delimitations</div>

The following delimitations will be imposed on the scope of the study:

1. The study will focus on the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean in general and Trinidad and Tobago in particular.

2. While the Caribbean as a region has been subjected to influences from several external sources, for the purpose of this study, consideration will be given to the British and United States relationships.

<div align="center">Benefits of the Study</div>

In the twenty-first century, the security agenda with respect to "new security challenges and issues" has appeared in every summit meeting of government leaders whether in Europe, North America, Latin America, or the Caribbean. In the Caribbean these security challenges continue to be viewed from traditional lenses that were manufactured within the core periphery relationship. This study proposes that the emerging security environment calls for a more proactive and informed approach. It requires that alternative and innovative paradigms be designed to confront the challenges of new security threats. It is therefore in an attempt to create this new paradigm that this research paper argues that the Caribbean military must develop an identity that has a mandate, a philosophy, and doctrine from within the Caribbean. The military must establish a social contract with the Caribbean people. Another intention of this paper is to

provide the framework for the establishment of a structured military integration scheme from within the Caribbean to treat with Caribbean security issues from a Caribbean perspective. The outcome of this research should therefore redound to the benefit of the military in the Caribbean and by extension the people of the Caribbean.

<u>Outline Summary</u>

The introduction has established the challenges to the military identity in the post-Cold War era from a global perspective looking at the international security environment in Europe, North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. In the aftermath of the Cold War several issues referred to, as new security challenges and issues have become the focus of discussion worldwide. These issues and challenges reflect not just changing threat perceptions, but also changing attitudes to the nature of security. The introduction is therefore an attempt to establish a nexus between these changing attitudes to the nature of security and the search for an identity of the military in the Caribbean in the present post- Cold War context.

This chapter looks at the historical perspective by examining the evolution of the military in the Caribbean and by analyzing how this evolution shaped its traditional role and identity. In this part it is intended to discern such questions as, Why and how the military in the Caribbean was created? and What was the given mandate, role, and function that shaped the initial identity? From this point an attempt will be made to establish the existence of what is termed "a core periphery military relationship" as an influential factor in the identity of the Caribbean military.

Chapter two focuses on the international environment and the role of the external powers in shaping the identity of the military within varying spatial and temporal periods. Using a Braudelian approach,[3] an examination of the effect of external powers on the Caribbean military will be viewed from diverse observation points in space, time, social order, and hierarchy. Within this framework it is intended to further develop the core periphery military relationship and show its influence during the colonial era, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War. In this section the question, What external forces and policies are influencing the image and functions of the military? will be addressed.

Chapter three addresses the Caribbean security environment and examines the relationship between national security, the international security environment, and the new identity of the military. The questions to be addressed here are: What has national security meant for the Caribbean? Can national security be redefined from a Caribbean perspective? and What is the mission of the military in this redefinition? In this chapter also, the focus of the enquiry will be on structural trends and transformation with particular emphasis on the economic and political dimensions. It will look at political behavior within the Caribbean as an indicator of attitude that influences the image and identity of the military. The views of the political leaders with respect to the military and security matters will be investigated. This political enquiry will be followed by an economic focus as regards to national development, national security, and military identity. To be sure, the economic relationship in terms of military assistance programs among the United States, United Kingdom, and the Caribbean will be examined. In particular, the state of the economy of the island nations of the Caribbean and the

challenge of maintaining a balance between military preparedness and economic necessity will be examined.

Chapter four will attempt a thorough analysis and assessment of the identity question with a view of suggesting alternative paths to developing a military with a Caribbean mandate and a Caribbean philosophy.

Before embarking on this search, however, it would be constructive to briefly reflect on the historical perspectives of the military in the English-speaking Caribbean. This reflection is necessary to understand the legacies that have shaped the military and the context within which the search for this identity is being conducted.

In order to understand the Caribbean military, therefore, it is important to go briefly into the historical antecedents that shaped and influenced the form and structure of this organization

Historical Background

Historically, the Caribbean as a region has been subjected to external influences throughout its existence. Regional force structure and dispositions have been affected by the historical relationships with extrahemispheric powers. Since the seventeenth century, Spanish, French, British, and Dutch projections of power were tied to colonial and mercantile interest in the Caribbean. This colonial relationship also shaped United States responses in the Caribbean as it took active steps to compete directly with European activities in the region.[4] For the purpose of this study, emphasis will be placed on the British and American projection of power in order to show the origin and perpetuation of the core periphery military relationship in the Caribbean.

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The tradition and culture of the military in the English Caribbean has its antecedence in the insertion of the British military in what was then referred to as the West Indies in the seventeenth century. According to Roger Norman Buckley, the first experience of regular British soldiers in the West Indies came in 1652, when a fleet under the command of Sir George Ayscue put into Carlisle Bay, Barbados.[5] This early insertion, however, must be understood within the context that English settlers preceded the English soldiers and together they shaped the social framework of the garrison. During this period it has been suggested that the English colonial society largely determined the role of the army. This social framework is a legacy that still has some bearing on the present institutions. By the middle of the seventeenth century, England had established permanent settlements in St. Kitts (1624), Barbados (1627), Nevis (1628), Montserrat and Antigua (1632), and Jamaica (1655).

The British garrison in the West Indies had a critically important function: the protection of the region's once profitable plantation-slave economies.[6] The manifestation of the protection is demonstrated in the structural legacy of this presence in the imposing fortification that can still be seen on top Brimstone Hill, St. Kitts; ruins at Prince Rupert Neck, Dominica; Shirley Heights, Antigua; and Fort George, Trinidad, to name a few. These structures are examples that testify to the central position of the West Indian colonies and the need to guard them well during that time. The other significant aspect of this function was in the repressive nature. The military's main function was to act as a repressive force to protect the planter class. This repressive nature was transmitted to the Caribbean military as will be explained later on in the paper.

The principal administrative units of the British West Indian Army comprised the Jamaica command and the Windward and Leeward Islands command. The former, which reported separately to London on the state of the command, included bases at Jamaica, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and Belize. The latter command, with its headquarters at Barbados, comprised camps at Antigua, Barbados, Guyana, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Tobago, and Trinidad.[7]

By the time the First World War ended in 1918, several Caribbean soldiers had served in the first British West Indian Regiment. Its first battalion served in the Cameroons campaign in 1914 and 1915 and the second battalion in the German East African campaign.[8] Up to the time of the Second World War, all troops in the British West Indies were under the North Caribbean Command with its headquarters in Jamaica or the South Caribbean Command with its headquarters in Trinidad.

Roger Norman Buckley also made a fundamental comparison that has bearing on the research topic. He stated that in contrast to the Britain's renowned Indian Army, precious little is known of the culture, traditions, achievements, significance, and peculiarities of the West Indian army. Unlike the Indian army, the West Indian garrison fails to conjure any old romantic notions and significance. It therefore lacked a reputation, image, and identity of its own. Roger Buckley described it as a phantom army lurking subliminally in British imperial history.

Historically, the civil-military relationship in the English-speaking Caribbean can be traced to as early as the seventeenth century where the system of dual control over the military was created over the army in Britain. Appointment and command were the prerogative of the monarch, and the powers to raise, discipline, and pay came under the

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civilian authority of Parliament. Even during this time Parliament was described as being parsimonious in dealing with the defense of the West Indies.[9] Parliament reacted to the military positively during periods of danger or panic, but once these were over, neglect was the order of the day. The prevalence of this attitude will be examined later on in the research.

With respect to Trinidad and Tobago the present military establishment has its roots in the early militia and volunteers established around 1797 after Sir Ralph Abercromby captured Trinidad from Spain for Britain. On 3 June 1879 the Legislative Council passed an Ordinance forming the Trinidad Light Infantry Volunteer Force that later became the Trinidad Regiment. The units of the Trinidad Regiment were active during the Second World War and remained so until they were disbanded by 1948. All that remained in terms of the military in Trinidad and Tobago up to 1962 was an office called the Naval and Military Department under the stewardship of a garrison quartermaster who looked after military cemeteries, guns, equipping the Cadet Corps, and Aide de Camp to the Governor.

National security of the English-speaking Caribbean up to 1962 was shaped and dictated by the British. In fact one may argue the very term "national security" might be a misnomer since it was not the security of Trinidad or the wider Caribbean that was being considered at the time but that of Britain. National security of the English-speaking Caribbean during the early years was defined from a British perspective. In defense matters, the objective of both the British Army and the slave-holding planter class was identical: to make the British Island secure in the midst of perilous forces of radical change that swirled about the West Indies.

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In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries national security had to do with protection of the whites from the slave population, while in the first half of the twentieth century the focus changed to external aggression against the British Empire during the first and second world wars. At that time British security issues became the Caribbean's security issues. This is evidenced by the Caribbean involvement as British forces during the two world wars.

By the middle of the twentieth century, the Caribbean landscape began to change in two significant ways. First, there was the establishment of American military bases in the Caribbean, and second, there was the formation of the third West India Regiment, which was followed by what can be described as the movements toward independence in the 1960s. Before going into the movements towards independence in the Caribbean that ushered in the establishment of the present military forces, a brief insight into the other external power, the United States presence in the Caribbean, will be examined.

According to Garcia Humberto Muniz and Jorge Rodriguez the United States possesses, both by geographical propinquity and historical tradition a legitimate interest in the Caribbean area.[10] Since the period of the American War of Independence, American and Caribbean security interests have been linked. The United States has viewed the Caribbean as a possible arena for subversion or larger conflict involving nonregional powers. That paradigm has remained from the War of Independence, through the Monroe Doctrine, to the Spanish-American War, the U-Boat campaign in both world wars, and finally, the cold war and the Cuban Missile Crisis.[11] The physical presence of the US military with the establishment of military bases in the Caribbean during the Second World War lends testimony to this relationship. The base agreement between the

British and the Americans saw the establishment of bases in Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Guyana, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Militarily, the 1960s in the Caribbean were preceded by one of the first attempt to establish a regional military force in the post-world war period. In 1958 there was an attempt to form the West Indian Federation and consequentially the third West Indian Regiment among the English-speaking Caribbean. This Force with its headquarters in Jamaica comprised soldiers from several Caribbean islands. The collapse of the Federation in 1962, however, also saw the breaking up of the West Indian Regiment and the move to independent status of several Caribbean states. It is therefore against this background that the military may be viewed in the Caribbean from 1962 to the present with respect to its identity and the influences that shaped the institutions.

The independence movement in the Caribbean started in the 1960s as a result of the breaking up of the federation. In 1962 Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago gained independence from Britain. According to Dr. Eric Williams, the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Britain, insisted at the time that a new independent country is expected, even required, to establish some sort of defense force.[12] Former British Prime Minister Sir Alexander Douglas Home also reiterated this view when he was asked a question on the main consideration for the grant of independence. He replied that it was essential that the country concerned have an efficient army--no matter how small, loyal to the legally elected government, and an efficient police force.[13]

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, like the other military organizations in the Caribbean, having evolved as a prerequisite for independence from Great Britain in 1962, emerged within the framework of the British culture, the British traditions, and

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British systems. Compared to the military in the Americas, the military in the English-speaking Caribbean did not have to fight any war of independence and as such there was no rallying cause that bound the people with the military from inception. The Caribbean military therefore evolved without a Caribbean philosophy, without a Caribbean mandate, and without a Caribbean identity.

Today, after thirty-eight-plus years, the Caribbean military continues to exist without a Caribbean identity. The military organizational structures, traditions, and systems are predominantly British although within recent times there has been an increase in United States influence in these areas. The military in the Caribbean has not developed its own culture, systems, and doctrine within a Caribbean framework. The military's role in national security is still blurred especially as we approach the twenty-first century when security is being redefined as being multidimensional in the international security environment.

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[1]Ivelaw L. Griffith, *"Drugs and World Politics: The Caribbean Dimension,"* *Round Table* 332 (October 1994): 419-31
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[2]Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century,* 63.

[3]Stephen Gill, ed., *Innovation and Transformation in International Relation Studies,* 90.

[4]Thomas H. Moorer and Georges A. Fauriol, *Caribbean Basin Security*, 21.

[5]Roger Norman Buckley, *The British Army in the West Indies,* xiii.

[6]Ibid., 44.

[7]Ibid.

[8]*Trinidad Guardian*, 22 February 1944, 1.

[9]Ibid., 49.

[10]Humberto Garcia Muniz and Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, "US Military Policy towards the Caribbean in the 1990s," 15.

[11]Written by General John Sheehan in the preface to the book by Ivelaw Griffith, *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century,* vi.

[12]Jan Knippers Black, *Area Hand Book for Trinidad and Tobago*, 254.

[13]Dion Phillips, *The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force: Origin, Structure, Training, Security and other Roles.*

CHAPTER TWO

THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Internationally, this study takes as its point of departure the year 1989 that marked

the beginning of a new era of accelerated and what some writers have argued as

unexpected and evolutionary changes. These spectacular changes, that were initiated with

the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War produced turbulence that

impacted on the Caribbean. These two activities are at the center of the search for new

identities in militaries throughout the world.

Ivelaw Griffith, political science professor and Caribbean affairs specialist at

Florida International University, suggested that the bipolar character of global military-

political power has been replaced by a reemerged multipolar system. He alluded to the

fact that Joseph Nye Jr. saw the distribution of power as "like a layer cake" with the top

(military) layer being largely unipolar, the economic middle layer tripolar, and the bottom

layer of transnational interdependence showing a diffusion of power.[1] At the international

level this new global structure has some bearing on the Caribbean in terms of its

relationship with the United States in that no longer is the relationship dependent on the

East-West factor. The beginning of a new era, however, was also manifested and

projected through other changing world conditions, such as globalization, the

technological revolution, and the growth of multinational and international organizations.

All these manifestations and projections have had some impact on national, regional, and

international security organizations.

In searching for this new identity, the international security environment cannot

be seen merely in terms of something out there. It must be looked at from a systemic

viewpoint. The international security environment should be seen as a network of interrelated organizations that share a common purpose. This purpose is discernible through the work of the international security community. Gregory D. Foster, a distinguished professor and director of research at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, described this as the community that encompasses the world's individual national security communities, as well as the entire contingent of supranational or transnational security organizations and activities.[2] It is in fact this community that it will be argued, shapes the core-periphery military relationship that this study explores.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the international system has been described as being multilayered with multiple actors--some regional, some "informal," and all relevant.[3] Jorge Dominguez, professor of International Affairs and director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, developed a model in which he distinguished three levels. He described these levels as global, regional, and informal with the United States pertinent to all three layers but the main protagonist at the global layer.[4] Using Dominguez's model this study agrees that at the international or global level the Caribbean sees a unipolar world with the United States as the only power that can maintain international peace and security through the deployment of military forces.

Historically the United States has demonstrated this capacity to intervene in the Caribbean by the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and Haiti in 1994. Today, however, no Caribbean country, with the exception of Cuba, anticipates a United States invasion. This has been attributed to the end of the Cold War, the overwhelming turn toward constitutional government in Latin America, and the confirmation of democratic practices in the English-speaking Caribbean. Most Latin

American and Caribbean countries now expect threats just from the regional and informal layers.[5]

At the regional layer of the international security system, the main features are disputes and rivalries among neighboring states.[6] Within the Caribbean there are the border issues concerning Venezuela and Guyana, Venezuela and Colombia, and Guatemala and Belize. These are not new problems but have their roots in history and colonialism. These problems have, however, resurfaced since the end of the Cold War. Also from a regional perspective the case of Cuba and Haiti and the security issues that they both present to the Caribbean have direct impact on the international security environment within the Caribbean region.

The informal level of the international security system calls attention to the role of private armies that roam unauthorized across interstate boundaries, most often, though not exclusively, associated with drug traffickers.[7] In the literature on Caribbean security issues, several writers have referred to these actors at this informal level as nonstate actors. It has been argued that they present the greatest threat to international and domestic order in the English-speaking Caribbean where countries are at risk at being overwhelmed by criminal forces operating at this layer. This informal international system moves weapons from the United States to its southern neighbors and transfers drugs and people from the Caribbean to the United States.[8]

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the main threat of communism from the security landscape and highlighted issues that were dormant during that period. Most militaries that evolved during the period of the Cold War were influenced and structured on different sides of the "iron curtain" within the

international security community, either in an anticommunism or a procommunism mode. Consequently some are now faced with the task of searching for new identities since the fall of communism. The military in the western hemisphere is no exception to this phenomenon.

The security concerns of the twenty-first century are no longer seen through the Cold War lens that emphasized the threat of Marxist-Leninist regimes, foreign subversion, or leftist guerrilla insurgencies. It can be argued that although such lens have not disappeared entirely, the Cold War has replaced these lens and created opportunities for new perspectives on security concerns and challenges. Today's security challenges are very different from those of the past. The end of the Cold War greatly reduced the danger of global nuclear war, but there are still real security problems, ranging from seemingly isolated conflicts often bred of ethnic or religious hatred that threaten to spread to the growing dangers of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.[9] General John J. Sheehan, retired Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command, suggested that security today means an economic and political response, with the military playing only a supporting role.[10]

Several analysts have suggested that the end of the global confrontation resulted in significant shifts in the pattern of conflicts in the Caribbean region, the perception of threats by security actors, and the thrust of security policies.[11] They have also argued that it is during this process of change that the 1990s witnessed a redefinition of security structures, policies, and strategic thinking. Security issues are now concerned with regional conflicts, participation in peacekeeping operations, drugs and arms trafficking, and terrorism. Jorge L. Dominguez stated that in Central America and the Caribbean

there have been intertwined changes at both the international and domestic levels regarding security issues.[12]

In the western hemisphere, security policies have changed dramatically in recent years. From Canada and the United States in the north to Argentina in the south, today's security policies are being focused on national priorities, with an increased emphasis on domestic threats. The new international security environment has led to shifting military strategies and priorities. The USA for example has shifted its military command structure in Latin America and the Caribbean while Cuba was forced to review its military, political, and economic dimensions, focusing on becoming more "Caribbeanized" in the process. From the international to the regional, those events have brought about changes in the military environment in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In Latin America, the militaries have begun to redefine their images and identities. On the security agenda, several new issues have emerged regarding how militaries can be employed in a cooperative manner with new democracies and regarding what should be the new missions for these militaries. Some analysts have suggested democracy and democratic consolidation, to alternative military missions in the post-Cold War period, are some of the major issues shaping the new identities of the military in Latin America.

Jorge Dominguez suggested, however, that there are some important international issues that remain unaffected both by Latin America's transformation and by the end of the Cold War in Europe. He referred to the fact that security disputes between some Latin American countries remain unresolved: the illegal trafficking of weapons, armies, goods,

drugs, and people across borders have created a host of new "informal " challenges to security throughout the hemisphere.[13]

Any discussion of the Caribbean military within the international security environment cannot be completed without the mention of the key actors at the international level. The Caribbean military has had no international posture, and any role played by the Caribbean in global strategy has in most cases been the role assigned by the various metropolitan powers. Over the years extraregional forces did most of the regional military posturing. According to Thomas H. Moorer and George A. Fauriol, regional force structure and dispositions have also been affected by the historical relationships with extrahemispheric powers.[14] Since the seventeenth century, Spanish, British, French, and Dutch projections of power were tied to colonial and mercantile interest in the Caribbean. In the past this colonial relationship also shaped United States diplomatic responses in the region. It was not until the 1920s that US military and political influence in the Caribbean effectively displaced the Europeans.[15]

Today the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands still have a small military presence in the region. It is therefore prudent that an examination of these relationships in this era be conducted in order to demonstrate the linkages to the military identity in the Caribbean.

In the Caribbean the most important external influence throughout the last century was the United States. This influence was not only transmitted in the political and economic arena but also in the military and or security environment. The United States policy toward the Caribbean has been described as being based on the United States national security defined in terms of strategic and economic concerns. The heart of the

policy was constant: deterring any hostile extra or intrahemispheric power from establishing a military or geopolitical presence perceived to threaten the continental United States. The Caribbean Sea, linking the mainland United States with the Antilles and Central America, became part of the general terrain of United States hemispheric security.[16]

During the Cold War while the United States focused on the security of the European continent, there were times when it had to shift its focus to the Caribbean area. The United States policy at this time featured two economic and security plans designed to confront the economic, social, and political conditions that might have led to communism in the Caribbean but also had impact on the military organizations. Each plan was in response to some action taken by countries in the Caribbean. The first was in response to Cuba when then President Kennedy proposed the Alliance for Progress in 1961. During this plan the United States counterinsurgency programs strengthened the local security forces of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. In 1963 Jamaica signed a military assistance agreement for equipment while Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana retained United States military installations on their territories.

The second plan, proposed by President Reagan in 1982 and called the Caribbean Basin Initiative, combined trade and security issues. The highpoint to the United States policy in the English-speaking Caribbean, however, was the intervention in Grenada 1983. This signaled a change in the United States policy toward the Caribbean that continues to have an impact on the military in contemporary times. Compared to previous covert operations in the English-speaking Caribbean, the Grenada invasion demonstrated

a clear involvement of the United States in the domestic politics of this area of the Caribbean.

During the Grenada crises the Caribbean military particularly those from the east Caribbean States and Barbados, were integrated into the United States regional military network. It was also at this time that the United States together with Britain and Canada encouraged the development of the Regional Security System (RSS). Today this system comprises Special Service Units from the police organizations of Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, and Barbados, and defence forces from Antigua-Barbuda and Barbados. Of importance also is the fact that around this time United States security assistance programs, such as the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the Foreign Military Sales Credit Program (FMSCP), and the economic Support Fund were fully extended to the members of the Regional Security System, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Additionally, the aftermath of the Grenada invasion also led to the staging of joint military training exercises code-named "Tradewind Exercise" which are conducted using the resources and tutelage of the United States military with Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana, Belize, Bahamas, and the countries that form the RSS. According to Humberto Garcia Muniz, Associate Researcher at the Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, and Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, Professor at the University of Puerto Rico, this started a process of regionalization of the security forces of the Caribbean under the direction of the United States to face the threat of instability in the region.[17]

Today the United States military is faced with sharply declining defense budgets in real terms. This is coupled with decommissioning of military units, base closures, and an overall transformation drive that has implication as to how the US military will continue to do business with the Caribbean military, especially in the area of military aid.

The tradition and culture of the military in the Caribbean has already been highlighted in chapter one with regards to Britain. However, a closer look at the interaction at the international level is important to the discourse. Although British influence in the Caribbean began to dwindle in the mid-twentieth century, Britain remains the traditional companion to the English-speaking Caribbean with regards to political, militarily, and legal institutions. In chapter one it was shown how Britain influenced the evolution of the military in the Caribbean in general and Trinidad and Tobago in particular during the early 1960s. It was in fact during this period that several Caribbean countries received their independence from Britain, and that British policy towards the region reflected the continuation of the long process of withdrawal that was initiated with the attempt to form the West Indian Federation in 1958. During the 1980s, however, there occurred a dramatic change or redefinition of British policies towards the Caribbean.[18] This policy has been described as selective reengagement in the region due to developmental consideration and political and security factors.

The British security interest in the region is related to the defense and internal security of the remaining British Dependent territories; the maintenance of freedom of navigation in the Caribbean in peace and in war; the continuation of traditional links with the security services of the English-speaking Caribbean; the use of the region as a

training area for naval forces; and the denial of the region as a center for the production and transhipment of illegal drugs destined for sale in Europe.[19]

Britain's security interest shapes its interaction in the Caribbean which is manifested throughout the region but more so in the eastern Caribbean and the support given to the Regional Security System. Following the independence of the small Associated States of the Caribbean, Britain concentrated on police training and promoting the establishment of paramilitary units within the various police forces. Additionally, Britain provides equipment and personnel to conduct naval training in several of the islands.

The single largest British commitment is to the Regional Security System, which was created in the aftermath of the Grenada revolution. A Memorandum of Understanding signed by Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St.Lucia, St.Vincent, and St. Kitts-Nevis provides for mutual assistance on request in several areas pertaining to national security. It is noteworthy to mention here that the RSS relies heavily on external support for its continued operation. In the mid-1980s there were joint United States-United Kingdom training teams assigned to the RSS. These teams conducted basic training including police, coast guard training, and paramilitary training. In 1993 there were some eighteen personnel on loan in the Eastern Caribbean. During this time Britain also contributed to the cost of maintaining the coast guard bases. In fact according to Paul Sutton, Professor at the University of Hull, England, the philosophy behind the system explicitly acknowledges the role of foreign forces in an acute situation.[20]

Britain's other commitments in the Caribbean are demonstrated in the nature of military assistance programs to the Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and

Tobago. These programs involve the training of military officers in Britain, troop exchanges, joint exercises, and the sale of military equipment. Britain has also provided assistance to the police services in some of these countries. For instance in Jamaica, Britain was instrumental in setting up the Constabulary Staff College, which trains Jamaican police officers. In the Bahamas the emphasis continues to be the development of the Coast Guard where the first two commanders were Royal Navy seconded officers. In Trinidad and Tobago, Britain continues to provide officer training at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and recently was instrumental in establishing the engineer battalion of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force in 1999.

Britain's involvement in the international security environment in the Caribbean will continue to focus on the security of the dependent territories, the war on drugs, and military assistance policies. Due to recent stringent government economic policies, however, the military assistance programs have been drastically curtailed. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, the cost of training one officer at the British military institution has become prohibitive; and as such, alternative avenues primarily in the United States that offers less costly programs are being considered. Britain, however, continues to exert some influence on the military in the Caribbean.

Another key actor in the international security environment within the Caribbean framework is Canada. Canada's military links with the Caribbean can be traced to the Second World War when as part of he British Empire, Canadian troops were stationed in British Honduras (Belize) and British Guiana (Guyana). After the Second World War and the subsequent independence of the Caribbean islands in the early 1960s, Canada established military interaction with the Caribbean. Canadian troops trained in jungle

warfare in several Caribbean countries, and Caribbean countries began to send officers to Canada for training.

Today, Canada maintains training and other linkages with the Caribbean military. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, officers from the defence force attend basic training, junior and senior staff training, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) attend military police and infantry training at Canadian military institutions. Canada's security interest in the Caribbean focuses on assistance to the military in combating the drug trade, economic assistance, and the problem of Haitian migrants to Canada. Although Canada's contribution to the military in the Caribbean is relatively small compared to Britain and the US, its limited interactions do have some bearing on the identity of the military in the Caribbean.

Notwithstanding the fact that this study focuses on the English-speaking Caribbean, the recent interaction between France through its Departments, within the Caribbean, requires some mention. Traditionally France is militarily present in the Caribbean to protect its interests and sovereignty in the region. This sovereignty includes the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe and Guyane on the South American mainland. It is noteworthy to mention that within recent times there has been a move by France to get involved in the economic, cultural, and military activities of the English-speaking Caribbean. France has applied for membership in the recently formed Association of Caribbean States and since 1995 it has had troop exchanges between Trinidad and Tobago, and Martinique and Guadeloupe. French military forces in the Caribbean are pursuing a policy of regional cooperation, which is conducted, on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis through its Departments in the Caribbean.

An interesting nontraditional actor in the Caribbean has appeared on the international scene as recent as the year 2000. There has been a noticeable presence of the Chinese in the Caribbean. In 2000 the Chinese Peoples Republic Army offered military courses and military equipment to the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. In fact the first TTDF officer to participate in Chinese training attended the Chinese Defence University in September 2000. The TTDF also received some military equipment from the Chinese government, a first in the history of the TTDF.

The international security environment is clearly changing, and as such the actors in this arena who have shaped or influenced the identity of the Caribbean military are also in the process of transformation. In contrast to the changes taking place in the present international environment, in the Caribbean, the structure of national security apparatus, including the military, has change relatively little to mirror the arena within which it exists. This international turbulence and changes being experienced in the security environment, therefore, makes this search for an identity in the Caribbean inevitable. What then is the situation in the Caribbean?

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[1]Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Caribbean Geopolitics and Geonarcotics: New Dynamics, Same Old Dilemma,* 2.

[2]Gregory D. Foster, *In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure.* 7.

[3]Jorge Dominguez, "The Americas: Found, and Lost Again," 125.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Linda D. Kozaryn, *Nation's Prosperity Llinked to Global Engagement,* 33.

[10]Ivelaw l. Griffith, *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century,* vii.

[11]Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Humberto Garcia Muniz, "Challenges to Peace and Security in the Post-Cold War Caribbean,"1.

[12]Jorge I. Dominguez, *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean,* 9.

[13]Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Americas: Found, and then Lost Again," 125.

[14]Thomas H. Moorer and Georges A. Fauriol, *Caribbean Basin Security*, 21.

[15]Ibid.,21.

[16]Jorge Rodriguez Muniz and Humberto Garcia Beruff, "U.S. Military Policy Toward the Caribbean in the 1990s," 17

[17]Ibid.,21.

[18]Paul Sutton, "Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean," 62

[19]Ibid.,63.

[20]Ibid.,67.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CARIBBEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In this chapter the focus will be on the Caribbean security landscape in order to assess how this environment has influenced the identity of the military in the past and at the same time to consider what the future holds for the creation of a new identity for the military. The emphasis will be on the examination of national security issues in order to determine how these issues relate to the international security environment and further, to establish a link to the creation of a new identity for the military in the Caribbean. The questions to be addressed here are: What has national security meant for the Caribbean? Can national security be redefined from a Caribbean perspective? and What is the possible mission of the military in this redefinition? These questions will be addressed by looking at national security within the parameters of structural trends and transformation from a historical, economic, political, and military dimension.

Before proceeding however, it is important to be reminded here that although the term Caribbean in this paper refers to the English-speaking islands, mention will be made of such countries as Haiti, Cuba, and others from Latin America in cases where they affect the security of the Caribbean in some way or the other. Additionally, while issues in the wider Caribbean will be mentioned, the case of Trinidad and Tobago in particular will be highlighted. It is therefore proposed to view the Caribbean from several dimensions.

Viewing the Caribbean from several dimensions is not a matter of choice but rather a necessity due to the diverse economic, political, and cultural nature of the islands. In this regard, James N. Rosenau, a university professor of International Affairs

at George Washington University, stated that, "The Caribbean reality at the end of the twentieth century is tantalizingly difficult to define. The region is like a prism with light passing through--whatever passes through is transformed . . . Nothing in the Caribbean is simple . . . Even the term 'Caribbean' can be subject to various political and geographical definitions."[1] In looking at the Caribbean security environment therefore, it is important to note that that the Caribbean cannot be viewed as a monolithic whole but as part of an international political, economic, and military system that provides the driving force for continuity and change.

As discussed earlier, the end of the Cold War has brought about a shift in the strategic importance of the Western hemisphere and the Caribbean as far as extraregional actors are concerned. Simultaneously, however, most of the regional actors are experiencing new threat perceptions and a general redefining of security issues and challenges. Professor Ivelaw Griffith stated that the contemporary security scene in the Caribbean is characterized by complexity, change, and challenge. "Complexity," he claimed, "arises from the fact that the region comprises small subordinate states that are vulnerable to a wide range of military, political, and economic actions by states near and far and within recent times to the dictates of non-state actors, some of whom wield more economic and political power than some states."[2]

Explanations of the Caribbean security environment require some review of pertinent history. It can be argued that, ever since Christopher Columbus stumbled on the Caribbean islands external forces have influenced the security of the islands. In fact Paul Sutton has suggested that the weight of history has been greater in the Caribbean than anywhere else in the developing world, and the colonial empress more enduring.[3] Even

today, in the twenty-first century there are still parts of the Caribbean that are closely

linked to Europe. For instance Bermuda has been a British colony for almost four

hundred years; Montserrat is still a British colony; Curacao a Dutch possession since

1634; Cuba and the Dominican Republic have experienced longer periods of Spanish

rule; and Martinique and Guadeloupe are still French departments. In several Caribbean

countries, the British monarch is still recognized as the Head of State but the local

governor general represents her domestically.

The colonial powers left distinct political cultures, formal administrative rules and

regulations, and national security policies that have given shape to political and military

life throughout the Caribbean. The colonial empress described by Sutton has not only

shaped distinctive political regimes, but it can also be added that it has affected the nature

of security organizations in the Caribbean. One can look for example at the

preponderance of military regimes in the Latin American countries in the last decade

compared to the democratic regimes found in the Caribbean and realize the significant

difference in philosophies, attitudes, and identity.

In focusing on the Caribbean as an international political system, Jorge I.

Dominguez argues that many aspects of the Caribbean's international experience have

long-standing historical roots, among them the presence of superpower military

hegemony, political and economic polycentricity, unauthorized international migration,

and the powerful violence of nonstate military forces.[4] Within this system, the Caribbean

has always been on the receiving end of attempts by major powers to impose

international models on the region to include not only political and economic patterns but

also military. All these have some bearing on the national security issues and challenges in the region, thus affecting the identity of the Caribbean military.

In this search for an identity for the Caribbean military, a causal relationship between the national security issues and challenges that exist in the region and the shape and structure of the military is a fundamental prerequisite. What then are these issues and challenges, and how are they interpreted in the Caribbean?

Several authors have suggested that the strategic and ideological conflicts that were dominant in the Caribbean during the previous decades have been replaced with a wider definition of the security issues. Security has long been a highly contested concept with a multiplicity of definitions and usages, founded mostly on traditional realist theory.[5] This approach to security emphasizes the military variable, focuses on the state as the unit of analysis, and sees states as rational actors pursuing their national interest. On the other hand there is an opposing view of security that suggests threats can also materialize in the nonmilitary realm. This view argues that traditional concepts of security cannot deal with the transborder flow of narcotics, arms, money laundering, and immigrants. Richard J. Bloomfield, a former United States foreign service officer, whose career included assignments as Ambassador to Ecuador and Portugal, noted that depending on one's geographic location, interests, and prejudices, the new security threat roster may include drug trafficking and crime, illegal immigration, refugees, the destruction of the environment, destabilizing international capital movements, and loss of jobs due to the universal trend toward open markets.[6]

In defining the complexity of Caribbean security issues and challenges, this study, therefore, argues that security in this context must be defined within both the traditional

and nontraditional realms. This is primarily due to the fact that there are still traditional

threats, such as border claims between Venezuela and Guyana, and between Guatemala

and Belize, alongside nontraditional threats, such as migration, drugs and arms trafficking

and environmental matters. In his article titled "The State of the Region: Trends

Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security," Anthony T. Bryan noted that discussions on

the state of security have gone through an interesting evolution in the post-Cold War

period, namely the emphasis on the strong links between the range of development and

security concerns.[7] Several studies in the Caribbean, for instance, have alluded to threats

to economic security that are related to poverty and income equality or inequality, that

have disastrous effect on the small vulnerable societies of the Caribbean. Today,

according to Sutton, the vulnerability of Caribbean states has increased, and the

challenges to economic security, as well as its political consequences, are receiving

additional emphasis.[8]

Ivelaw Griffith sums up the security definition in an all-embracing term when he

noted "security . . . means the protection and preservation of a people's freedom from

external military attacks and coercion, freedom from internal subversion and from the

erosion of cherished political, economic and social values."[9]

Within the realm of nontraditional threats, the narcotics phenomenon is arguably

the most all-inclusive issue in the Caribbean. It involves not only the Caribbean countries

but also the core–periphery connection is evident as this scourge crosses borders in some

cases with some immunity. Roberto Marrero-Corletto identified the Italian Mafia

connection in the region; the Dutch connection through St. Maarten, Aruba, Bonaire, and

Curacao; the French connection through Martinique and Guadeloupe; and the Colombian

connection as external partners in the drug trade in the Caribbean.[10] The narcotics issue infringes on the political, economic, military, paramilitary, and sociocultural dimensions of the Caribbean societies. Ivelaw Griffith stated that the narcotics issue is not a one-dimensional matter but a phenomenon that is multidimensional, both in its main problems and in its consequences. He claimed that the nexus between drugs and security lies in the consequences and implications of drug operations for the protection and development of individuals and state and nonstate entities in the hemisphere.[11]

The security issues related to drug trafficking and the production of illegal narcotics in the Caribbean are manifested in their contribution to corruption, violent crimes, and money laundering among others. As far as production is concerned, in the Caribbean marijuana cultivation in Jamaica, Belize, the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago presents the major threat. This marijuana is produced both for local consumption and for external trading. In addition to supplying the external markets with "home-grown" marijuana, several countries, such as Jamaica, Belize, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts, United States, and United Kingdom Virgin Islands have been identified as transshipment points for Colombian cocaine, heroin, and marijuana destined to North America and Europe.[12] The transnational nature of the drug trade provides a difficult scenario for the Caribbean countries to fight against with their relatively limited resources. The level of threat is captured in a statement from a former prime minister of Belize, Manuel Esquivel, who once claimed that illegal drugs present a greater threat to his country's security than the territorial claims made by Guatemala.[13]

While drug trafficking and the production of illegal marijuana have been identified as a security threat to the islands of the Caribbean, these twin evils also contribute to economic, political, and social crises in the region. Anthony Bryan suggested that the failure of economic development strategies and the lack of viable economic alternatives have made the illegal narcotics business the most profitable sector of the Caribbean's informal economy.[14] The consequent effects on human development, as well as the political, military, and paramilitary institutions are alarming.

In terms of politics, the security threat is demonstrated through the corruption of government officials. Drug corruption not only undermines the credibility of governments, but it also impairs the ability of government agencies to protect the public interest.[15] Griffith pointed out that corruption had been unearthed in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. He also alluded to the fact that in addition to general government corruption there were the occasions where law enforcement officials in the police and defence forces, immigration and customs services, and internal revenue agencies were corrupted by the drug trade.

Trinidad and Tobago provided an example of this manifestation of the drug problem when in the early nineties there were widespread accusations about drug corruption in the police service. These accusations were made not by someone external to the service but by a very senior police officer, which brought a strong degree of legitimacy to bear on the allegation. In fact, so serious was the allegation that the government invited Britain's New Scotland Yard to investigate the report. In 1994 experts were brought in from the United Kingdom Customs Financial Investigation Branch, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs, the Royal Canadian

Mounted Police, and the French Technical and International Police. The fact that all these external agencies from the core countries were invited to investigate and prescribe remedies in the periphery was a clear indictment of the security and other government institutions in the country.

In the mid-1990s, Trinidad and Tobago was in the grip of a massive drug-related crisis characterized by violent crimes, corruption of police and government officials, money laundering, and social displacement of citizens. There is definitely a nexus between the corruption of law enforcement officials and the security environment. The military in Trinidad and Tobago has not been identified as being involved in the drug trade, but as an agent of the national security apparatus it has to work with, and alongside, the police service in the pursuance of its duties. This has an impact on the provision of military security for instance, because it creates a climate of mistrust, deception, and lack of coordination and cooperation between the various agencies in the national security ministry.

Today, the government has taken several steps to combat the drug menace in Trinidad and Tobago. Locally, laws have been passed to provide witness protection to those willing to testify against alleged drug dealers, to confiscate the proceeds from convicted drug dealers, to allow banking institutions to deal with money laundering, and so on. In the case of the military, the core–periphery relationship is evident again with the assistance of the United States in the fight against drugs in the Caribbean. The United States Maritime and Overflight Agreement commonly referred to as the Ship Riders Agreement, is a good example.

The agreement permits land and sea patrols by United States Coast Guard and Navy vessels, maritime searches, and seizures and arrest by United States law enforcement authorities within the national boundaries of the Caribbean countries that are party to the agreement. All that is required, for example, in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, is that a member of the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard rides on the United States Navy or Coast Guard ship during its excursion in territorial waters and more specifically that member is present during the arrest of the offenders. Similarly, the overflight clause allows a United States aircraft to overfly Caribbean countries and order suspect aircraft to land there. While most of the Caribbean countries have signed amended versions of the Ship Riders Agreement, and while most Caribbean countries cooperate with the United States, the Ship Riders Agreement caused both government and public hostility. It has been seen in some quarters to interfere with the national security and in particular the sovereignty of the islands. Trinidad and Tobago was one of the first countries to sign the Agreement, much to the dismay and criticism of other Caribbean islands.

According to Anthony T. Bryan, most Caribbean leaders are quite upset at the manner in which the United States is attempting to stem the flow of drugs through the region; and while they do not dispute the urgency of controlling the illegal traffic, they resent the US pressure over how to fight the trade.[16] The small countries of the region are in fact caught in a dilemma. While the United States places emphasis on the drug menace, from the Caribbean's perspective there are other urgent regional issues that require attention but at the same time the same Caribbean governments are ill equipped to deal with the situation without the help of the United States. It is trustworthy to note here

the fact that all the US requires is a ship rider to pursue and detain drug offenders. This speaks volumes for the capability and identity of the national defence forces. This action suggests that the national defence forces are either unable or incapable of policing their territorial waters. It is also this type of interaction that clearly affects the shaping of the identity of the military.

The demand for and transshipment of drugs have also led to the illegal flow of arms in the Caribbean. Regional and extra-regional actors have conducted both within the Caribbean and without the Caribbean illegal arms trafficking. Within recent times Caribbean countries have been featured in the Russian-Colombian drugs-weapons crime connection.[17] In 1997, United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reported the connection between offshore banks in Antigua and the Russian drugs mafia with respect to the shipment of illegal arms from Russia to Colombia.[18] There have also been illegal arms trafficking incidents reported in Jamaica and Antigua over the years.

Another implication of the trafficking of illegal drugs in the Caribbean is the pressure it places on the security forces of these small islands. An environment of violent crimes, corruption, money laundering and extortion to name a few in general characterizes drug trafficking and the drug trade. These entire situations occur simultaneously thereby making the security forces, the military and the police, battle on several fronts. They are therefore placed in a position to which they are ill equipped to deal with effectively.

International migration presents another nontraditional threat to the security of the Caribbean. Caribbean migration has been conceptualized in recent historical-structural theories as a labor migration that responds to the needs of capital accumulation in the

core of the world economy. Caribbean migration has been determined not only by capital accumulation but also by geopolitical relationships at the world-system level.[19] The combination of migration and geopolitics were evident in the policy of the United States toward the Caribbean, especially the reversal of the Cold War policies toward the Cuban refugees and the US intervention in Haiti. Both these cases have been linked to post-Cold War security strategies.

Although illegal migration is more prevalent in the case of Cuba and Haiti, the illegal movement of people across the Caribbean has implications for the security for both the sending and the receiving states. Drug traffickers, for instance, exploit both the legal and illegal movements of people and goods throughout the Caribbean. One Caribbean country that has more or less shaped its military to deal with this threat to its security is the Bahamas. The Bahamas, due to its geography, is extremely affected by illegal migration from Cuba and Haiti as the migrants make their way to the United States. As a consequence the Bahamas military is oriented towards maritime type operations and in particular prevention of smuggling and illegal movements of people. Within recent times immigration problems have also surfaced between the Dominican Republic and Antigua Barbuda and the Virgin islands. It is difficult to stop this migration problem that has traditionally been a safety valve for economic dislocation in the Caribbean.

On the opposite side of the migration pole is the recent policy of the United States, Britain, and Canada to deport convicted criminals who have completed their period of incarceration back to the Caribbean. Some of these criminals return to the Caribbean having "graduated" from highly sophisticated criminal actions in the United

States. Between 1993 and 1996, more than five thousand Jamaican deportees were returned to the island, most of them for drug- related crimes committed in the United States, Canada and Britain.[20] On their return to the Caribbean they use their "expert" knowledge to create havoc to the security of these small islands in the form of violent crimes, gang warfare, and narcotics-related activities. In some cases the deportees have no family or relatives in the country to which they have been deported, they have no linkages to the country since they have been living in the US from a very tender age. This policy has created an upsurge in sophisticated and violent crime that has implications for the military in the Caribbean.

Environmental concerns and issues of sustainable development are assuming increasing importance to the Caribbean.[21] In the broad definition of security these concerns are critical to the economic survival or economic security of many countries. The principal source of revenue for most countries in the Caribbean, the tourism sector, relies on an environment that regularly faces both man-made and natural disasters. It is no secret that the Caribbean islands are subjected to annual hurricanes and other storms coming across the Atlantic Ocean. In the recent past, some politicians have argued that hurricanes present a very serious threat to the economy and stability of the countries in the Caribbean. They have argued that hurricanes have caused more deaths and retarded the economy more than other identified threats. With respect to military identity, Trinidad and Tobago, due to its southernmost location, has not been affected by the onslaught of hurricanes, but the Defence Force has a small contingent force standing by to assist the other islands in case of destruction caused by natural disasters, such as hurricanes and

volcanic activities. This assistance was rendered effectively during hurricanes Hugo and Mitch, as well as the recent volcanic eruption in Montserrat.

Trinidad and Tobago, as one of the more industrialized nations in the Caribbean, provides a case in terms of industrial disaster under the environment threat to security. Trinidad and Tobago has a petroleum-based economy with heavy manufacturing activities especially at its Point Lisas Industrial Estate. There are oil refineries; ammonia, methanol, urea and cement plants; and a steel industry that produce direct reduced iron and steel. The threat to security in this environment stems from the fact that there exists a lack of effective preparation to deal with any real disaster in this arena. In general, there is a lack of environmental consciousness throughout the society. Any threat to the environment will not only affect the security of the country, but will include the military, which provides a readily available source of manpower at the disposal of the government.

The Latin American and Caribbean regions are suffering the consequences of environmental deterioration as they previously suffered the indiscriminate exploitation of the forest and mineral resources. Today these countries are adopting the idea of environmental security in the hope of recovering from the damage already done and of reorienting their policies.[22] The policies that are evolving propose cooperation among the private sector, the government, and the military in the defense of the environment. The case of the establishment of a Civilian Conservation Corps within the structure of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force is relevant here. Out of a need to protect the environment and to employ displaced youths, the military was tasked by the political directorate to come up with a plan to solve both matters. The Civilian Conservation Corps represents the effort of the Trinidad and Tobago military to deal with this problem.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to map out the Caribbean security environment, emphasizing the nontraditional threat to the security of the Caribbean islands. The discussion suggested that not the only traditional concerns threaten security, democracy, and the peaceful environment in the Caribbean but that nontraditional challenges and issues also exist alongside the struggle for national or regional interest. The present security environment in the Caribbean is therefore characterized by redefinition of missions and roles for the security forces rooted in a vision of an arena that is dominated by drug-related issues, environmental degradation, and illegal migration to name a few. The primary question remains, however, can the military find an identity within this scenario? This can only be answered through an analysis of the factors mentioned in the previous chapters.

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[1] James N. Rosenau, "Hurricanes are not the only Intruders: the Caribbean in an Era of Global Turbulence,"11.

[2] Ivelaw l Griffith, *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century*, 1.

[3] Paul Sutton, "Caribbean Politics: A Matter of Diversity," 78

[4] Jorge I. Dominguez, *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment*, 8.

[5] Ivelaw Griffith, "Security Collaboration and Confidence Building," 170

[6] Richard Bloomfield, "Security in the Greater Caribbean," 121.

[7] Anthony T. Bryan, "The State of the Region: Trends Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security," 33.

[8] Ibid., 34.

[9] Ivelaw Griffith, "Caribbean Manifestations of the Narcotics Phenomenon," 181

[10]Roberto Marrero-Corletto, "The New Caribbean Security Environment in the Caribbean," 464-466.

[11]Ivelaw Griffith, "Security Collaboration and Confidence Building in the Americas," 174.

[12]Ivelaw Griffith, "Caribbean Manifestations of the Narcotics Phenomenon," 184-185

[13]Ibid., 181.

[14]Anthony T. Bryan, "The State of the Region: Trends Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security," 47.

[15]Ivelaw Griffith, "Caribbean Manifestations of the Narcotics Phenomenon," 187.

[16]Anthony T. Bryan, "The State of the RegionTrends Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security," 46.

[17]Ivelaw Griffith, "Caribbean Geopolitics and Geonarcitics," 10.

[18]Ibid., 11.

[19]Ramon Grosfoguel, "The Geopolitics of Caribbean Migration," in *Security Problems and Policies in the Post-Cold War Caribbean*, 201.

[20]Ivelaw Griffith, "Caribbean Geopolitics and Geonarcotics: New Dynamics, Same Old Dilemma" in *Naval War College Review,* Washington, (Spring 1998): 47-67

[21]Anthony T. Bryan, 'The State of the Region: Trends Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security," 48.

[22]Instituto de Altos Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, Venezuela, "New Issues on the Regional Security Agenda for the Caribbean," 140.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

In this chapter an analysis of the Caribbean military will be pursued vigorously in an attempt to determine an identity that is concomitant within the present international security environment. Understanding how identities are constructed, what norms and practices accompany their reproduction, and how they construct each other sets the framework for this chapter. It is proposed to adopt a multidisciplinary approach, using history, geography, organizational management, sociology, international relations, and economics to analyze the military in the Caribbean within the core-periphery relationship established in the previous chapters. In this way it is hoped that valuable perspectives can be collected that can be used to formulate the military's organizational identity.

This analysis takes as its point of departure the historical perspectives, the international security environment, and the Caribbean security environment discussed in the earlier chapters as the factors that will shape and or influence the construction of the identity of the Caribbean military in the twenty-first century. The analysis will be conducted first by looking at the theoretical basis of identity with respect to organizations, as articulated in the management literature. In this regard the research offers a brief insight into the nature of organizational identity by projecting various views from the literature. Second, using this theoretical base, an examination will be pursued into how the military organization in the Caribbean in general, and Trinidad and Tobago in particular, can shape its own identity.

In the literature on organizational identity, several authors have traced the origins of the term identity, to the political theory of Harold D. Lasswell.[1] The literature suggests

that three broad assertions characterize organizational identity: it is related to all the social aspects of organizations; it is fundamental to the decision making in organizations; and a deep organizational structure exists, grounded in the perceptions of its individual members. These perceptions direct and shape the organization in a way that sustains a collective organizational identity.[2] While the question of identity in organization is an old construct in the organizational literature, it has become fundamental in current organizational life, especially given the present dynamic, complex, and turbulent environment, particularly the international security environment.

In reviewing the literature on organizational identity, most authors examine identity at a macro-organizational level taking Stuart Albert and David Whetten's 1985 definition of organizational identity as their analytical framework. Stuart Albert is an associate professor in the Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota, and David Whetten is the director at Brigham Young University Faculty Center for Organizational Leadership and Strategy. Albert and Whetten in their article titled "Organizational Identity" defined organizational identity as that which is central, distinctive, and enduring about an organization. It is a collectively held frame within which organizational members make sense of their wider world.[3] It has been described as the set of shared beliefs between top managers and stakeholders about the central, enduring, and distinctive characteristics of an organization. In the search for an identity and in the context of military organization the top managers are the senior officers and the stakeholders are the people, the government, and actors with particular interest in the international security environment. These are the entities that in fact influence the goals, missions, practices, values, and actions that contribute to shaping the organizations

identities. To this end Susanne G. Scott and Vicki R. Lane, in their article titled "A Stakeholder Approach to Organizational Identity," argued that organizational identity should be viewed as emerging from complex, dynamic, and reciprocal interactions between organizational members and organizational stakeholders.[4] Susanne G. Scott is an assistant professor of management at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, and Vicki R. Lane is an assistant professor of marketing at the University of Colorado at Denver.

Several authors have suggested that organizations must achieve legitimate status in their environments in order to guarantee resources and avoid claims that they are negligent, irrational, or unnecessary. This aspect is fundamental to the creation of an identity, especially within the political realm of justification for the maintenance of military organizations. The justification for the maintenance of the military, especially in small countries, like the Caribbean, are becoming more difficult in the present political and economic climate as the countries struggle to balance their budgets. Additionally, organizations must display congruence with the social norms and values incorporated in the larger social system.[5] In the case of military organizations this congruence must be demonstrated in the international security environment that is presently characterized by cooperation and collaboration.

In order to achieve legitimacy and congruence within the international security environment, military organizations, like most other organizations, must also consider the nexus between identity and image. In the organizational management literature, several authors have argued that there is a close reciprocal relationship between organizational identity and organizational image.[6] Identity reflects the perceptions of people within the

organization while image represents external appraisals of the organization. Furthermore both identity and image involve interactions and interrelationships between insiders and outsiders, or perhaps between the core and the periphery. It has thus been argued that construed external image is the key to the process of initiating changes in identity as it represents the medium through which members view their own organization. An important point made in the identity literature that is also crucial to the analysis is that organizational identity, instead of moving from organizational depths and origin, moves from a distinct origin towards a copy of images of dominating organizations. These aspects are important points in considering the core-periphery military relationship in the Caribbean.

Having examined the theoretical basis of identity in organization, the research can therefore consider the primary question whether the military in the English–speaking Caribbean can develop its own identity in the twenty-first century. In order to do so, however, consideration should first be given to the question as to how and why the military was created in the Caribbean. An analysis of the historical factors is therefore pertinent at this time.

The identity of the military in the English-speaking Caribbean evolved within the framework of British norms, culture, values, and traditions. This is the first manifestation of the core-periphery military relationship that continues to exist between the militaries in the metropolitan countries and those in the Caribbean. As mentioned before, unlike the military in some parts of the world, such as Europe, Africa, Asia, or the Americas, the military in the English-speaking Caribbean did not have to fight for the independence of their respective countries from colonial powers but were in fact born out of the

prerequisite or proviso handed down by the British government before independence was granted. This precondition therefore created an atmosphere for negotiation and accommodation in the initial establishment and identity of the military in these countries.

It is during this period of negotiation and accommodation that the reference point for this identity began with the reflection of the reality that was transmitted by the dominating British institutions. In the case of the English-speaking Caribbean the basic reality, the reference point was the British Army. Not only was this the reference point but also seconded British officers implemented and executed the command and control structure of most of the militaries. This was the case for instance with respect to the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force when it was conceived in 1962.

The negotiation between the Trinidad and Tobago government and the British government resulted in the formation of an element of land force called the Regiment and a maritime force called the Coast Guard. In March 1962, Earl Mountbatten, Chief of the UK military, paid a visit to discuss defense matters with the first Prime Minister at the time Dr. Eric Williams, who agreed to use the services of the UK military personnel to both plan and provide leadership for the defence force.[7] While Eric Williams wanted a national guard, the influence of the British held sway in the negotiations, and thus a Regiment was formed in accordance with the regimental system that existed in Britain. The British government's idea for the military in the Caribbean was not only as a perquisite for independence but at that time, since independence did not mean separation from the British Commonwealth, the structure of the military should also be conducive to the defence of the commonwealth. Additionally, Lord Mountbatten, the British negotiator, made it clear that unless Trinidad and Tobago had an adequate defence force,

it would not qualify for Commonwealth defence aid in the event of an attack. It was also necessary to obtain benefits from the United Nations.[8]

Thus in 1962 the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force was established, commanded, and trained by seconded British officers who shaped the organization based on their own British realities. To be even more precise, the first commanders were Lieutenant Colonel Pierce Gould, who came from the British Army, and Commander Peyton Jones from the British Navy. These gentlemen not only structured the land forces in accordance with the British Army and the maritime force with the British Navy, respectively, but also went as far as bringing culture, traditions, modus operandi, and even the interservice rivalries that existed between the British Navy and the British Army to the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment and the Coast Guard. These are aspects that remain part of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's identity up to today.

According to postmodernist thoughts on identity in organizations, the usual portrayal of identity within modernist tradition is one emphasizing the influence of origin and asserting that the sense of identity is held at a deep level in the cultural surround of an organization. In this traditional view the historical development of identity assumes the persistence of an essential identity despite changing events, times, and perceptions.[9] From a modernist perspective therefore, identity is seen as the center anchor that endures and preserves its distinctiveness, despite the need for organizational change. This contrast with the postmodernist view stated before, that organizational identity, instead of moving from organizational depths and origin, moves from a distinct origin towards a copy of images of dominating organizations. In the case of the military in the Caribbean, this historical development of identity is what endures and preserves the distinctiveness of the

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organizations and can be described as the permanent core of the organizational identity.

However, adopting a postmodernist view, that suggests that identity no longer holds a

distinct and persistent core of its own but becomes a reflection of the images of the

present moment, this thesis agrees that identity is not an enduring aspect and as such can

be subjected to changes. The question therefore is, How can a new identity be found

against this historical background?

This research posits that in order to develop this new identity the historical

development must be weighted against the contemporary international security

environment and the Caribbean security environment. Historical identity, it has been

argued, is susceptible to reinterpretation as organizations try to align their identities with

current images.[10] Therefore, any reinterpretation or redefinition of the identity of the

military in the English-speaking Caribbean must consider this identity within current

orientations. While the identity of the military is likely to depend on historical, cultural,

political, and social context, the reconstruction of the meaning of past events becomes

important in order to establish an alignment with current images in the international and

Caribbean security environments. This is to ensure that change is not merely for the sake

of changing, but must be pursued in order to be relevant to the desires and demands of the

present situation.

It is noteworthy to mention here that previous research into organizational

identity has revealed that organizations cannot construct just any arbitrarily chosen

identity because changes in identity are constrained within nonspecified, but nonetheless

moderating, environmental bounds.[11] The choices available are rigorously constrained by

the webs of understanding of practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail

in particular historical contexts. It is therefore to this end that the analysis will now focus on the question, What is the role of external forces in shaping the identity of the military in the English–speaking Caribbean? As mentioned in chapter one, this question will examine the geostrategic relationship from an economic, political, and military standpoint.

Traditionally the Caribbean as a region has been subjected to external influences in most aspects of its existence whether politics, economics, or security. The strength of this external connection to the core metropolitan states causes the countries of the region to look outward rather than inward, at times placing more emphasis on cooperation with Europe and North America than cooperation among themselves. This holds true especially with regards to security issues in the Caribbean. The Ship Rider Agreement mentioned in chapter two is an example of this attitude. Thus it is difficult at times to find a common identity and common Caribbean interest.

According to Mohammed Ayoob, professor of international relations at James Madison College, Michigan State University, the Third World has a multidimensional relationship with the international system. The most fundamental dimension of this relationship is a direct result of the Third World's weakness toward the two organizing principles of international social life, that is, the sovereign state and the international market.[12] This research posits that this vulnerability is manifested at the level at which the Caribbean countries and in the case of this research, the military institutions, interact with the international security environment.

The research therefore draws from the world system critique of the current international order, which provides the philosophical foundation, on which much of the

dependency literature, and consequently the core–periphery model is based, to help analyze the situation.[13] Within this body of literature the authors point out the lack of attention given to security in regions, such as the Caribbean. In fact several studies have alluded to the lack of attention given to military security in the Caribbean. This research finds that that the new challenges and issues present in the international security environment have not changed the vulnerability and dependency questions in the Caribbean especially with respect to security.

According to Ivelaw Griffith, vulnerability is a multidimensional phenomenon. States are considered to be vulnerable because of geographic, political, military, and economic factors that compromise their security.[14] While Ivelaw Griffith pointed out that there are both subjective and objective aspects of vulnerability, it is the latter that is considered pertinent to this analysis. The objective aspect of vulnerability relates to military, geographic, economic, and organizational difficulties, such as populations and militaries too small to meet security needs.

This research suggests that it is this vulnerability dilemma that has created the setting for the role of external forces to shape the identity of the military in the Caribbean. Considering the economic and military limitations as elements of this vulnerability, in the present international security environment, the militaries in the English-speaking Caribbean will find it difficult to develop an identity in the absence of these factors. There is therefore a need to strive for balance between identity and alliance. This need must also be examined in terms of capabilities, intent, and political will on the part of Caribbean societies and their political leadership.

From the historical discourse it is evident that the security dependency syndrome

that has been created by the core-periphery relationship cannot be easily dispelled

especially from the minds of the politicians who see security as something to be provided

by a "big brother." This was shown quite clearly in the case of Trinidad and Tobago in

the midnineties during an incident in the Gulf of Paria between Trinidad and Tobago and

Venezuela. The Trinidad and Tobago Minister of Foreign Affairs, suggested that

Venezuela must remember that Trinidad and Tobago have "friends" up north to come to

its assistance, an obvious reference to the United States. There was no mention

whatsoever about the role of the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard in this incident, but

rather an immediate reliance on the external power, in this case the United States.

Obviously comments, such as these coming from such high officer do have an effect on

the morale and image of the force. If the state did not consider its armed forces with

respect to an external aggression but does so only whenever there is internal threat to the

stability of the country such as industrial strike for instance, then the military is perceived

as a repressive force by the society and not one prepared to protect the sovereignty of the

country. This action certainly affects the identity of the military as it did in the case of

Trinidad and Tobago. Drawing from the theoretical work on identity in organization it

can be seen that identity can be shaped by the reciprocal interactions between major

stakeholders, in this case the government of Trinidad and Tobago and the United States

military.

Historically, also, the image of the military in the Caribbean as seen from the

position of external powers has been manifested in the assignments allocated to the

Caribbean military during joint interaction. For instance during the Second World War

the members of the then Commonwealth Caribbean Forces who served with the British Army were assigned the job to guard prisoners in the North African campaign. Several years later this constabulary image of the Caribbean military is again repeated by the United States. In 1983 during the United States intervention in Grenada, the Caribbean troops who were allowed to enter the theatre of operation, only after the US military had secured the area, were given a similar task, to guard prisoners. Also, as recent as 1994, during operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the first task given to the CARICOM Battalion was to guard the port facilities at the capital city. The image of the military in the English-speaking Caribbean has not changed over time, as the military is still perceived as a type of constabulary force. Stakeholders hold this image both in the domestic political setting and in the international security environment. These stakeholders can be identified as the respective governments in the Caribbean and the United States, respectively.

Today, the United States remains the key player in the Caribbean. Thus any tangible influence from external sources on the identity of the military in the Caribbean will come from the United States. The US influence has traditionally been through economic, political and security measures. From the *US National Security Strategy* and the *US National Military Strategies* published in December 1999, the thrust of US regional military policy is to promote the institutionalization of democratic civil-military relations, to orient the strategic gaze of Latin American and Caribbean militaries toward external, multinational cooperative security, peacekeeping efforts, and peacemaking missions. The idea, here, according to Paul G. Buchanan, a senior lecturer in politics and Latin American Studies at the University of Auckland, is so that countries in the

hemisphere can incorporate into their national military doctrine the notions of cooperative as opposed to collective security arrangements.[15]

Buchanan also suggested that the influence of the US on the militaries in the region can be seen through such measures as senior official counterpart visits, bilateral and multilateral training exercises, and assistance at a variety of levels, from noncommissioned officer and enlisted specialist technical training to search and rescue exercises. Additionally, US initiative has created institutional forums, such as the Defence Ministers of the Americas, and the Conference of American Armies, that bring the head of each country's military together to discuss a common theme. These forums help place security issues on the regional security agenda and in so doing shape the formulation of national policies in the respective countries and by extension the orientation and identity of the military to deal with the security issues.

Economic power relations have also gone through changes that have affected the international security environment. These changes in economic relationships are manifested in the formation of trading blocks throughout the world. The effect of these alliances on the military in the Caribbean is seen in the loss of economic assistance, the curtailment of training opportunities and foreign investment. In the present regional environment the United States has reevaluated its policies toward the Caribbean in the aftermath of the Cold War, which has resulted in the reduction and reallocation of aid, preferential trade, consolidation of diplomatic presence, and shifting of US military strategic alliance from Atlantic Command to Southern Command. These actions not only meant reduced International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) assistance, and arms supplies and sales under the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS), but also

removed the image of the Caribbean as holding pride of place under Atlantic Command to being subsumed with the wider Latin American neighbors under Southern Command.

The fragile economies of the Caribbean societies are such that military expenditure does not occupy any noticeable portion of the national budget. Thus the practice has been to rely on military aid programs to offset this inadequacy. This reliance, especially in the present international security environment, has led to an organizational identity that can be defined in keeping with the organizational literature, as a process of internal and external persuasion by which the interests of the government in the Caribbean are merged with the interest of the US, resulting in the creation of an identity based on those interest. This aspect is most visible when the questions about national security are raised in the research.

In this search for an identity, the research formulated the questions, What is the meaning of national security to the Caribbean? and How can this be redefined from a Caribbean perspective? National security has been called an elastic term that has been stretched at times to cover a multitude of different issues and activities.[16] National security denotes protection of the nation's people and territories against physical assault. In contemporary times, however, national security has acquired a broader meaning covering the protection of vital economic and political interests. In the case of the Caribbean the protection of these interests as well as defence against direct physical aggression, have historically been assigned to external assistance. It is felt therefore that an understanding of national security is fundamental to the shaping of the identity of the military in the Caribbean.

Using history as the starting point once again, it has been demonstrated that as far back as the British insertion into the West Indies the national security policies of the islands were influenced and shaped through external interpretations. Today, even as new challenges and issues are projected in the domestic and international security atmosphere, the question as to what is emphasized in the national security agenda is still subjected to outside influence. David G. Haglund, professor of political studies and department head at Queen's University, Canada, in his discussion on the center–periphery debate in international relations, suggested that there are still some arguments that the security problems of the periphery will sooner or later become the problems of the center.[17] There is therefore an ongoing interaction between the core and the periphery with regards to the security issues, but this research will posit that it is an unbalanced interaction in which there is a dominating side that influences the other.

According to Kalam Shahed, a colonel in the Bangladeshi Army, a Graduate Fellow of the Queen's Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Canada, national security can be interpreted to span the full sociopolitical spectrum. It can be about both states and their societies in that it encompasses the latter's cultural and economic levels of development, social stratification, and modes of economic and political organization. Security might also embrace the regional and international environment in which the country interacts with the rest of the world.[18] The Caribbean offers a prime example of the formulation of national security through interaction with the rest of the world especially the United States.

Several authors writing about national security issues in the Caribbean have pointed out the fact that the issues that are placed on the front burner in these islands are

in most cases determined by the United States policies towards the Caribbean. The case of illegal drugs trafficking provides a good example. In the US publication titled "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," it is stated that the principal concerns in the hemisphere are transnational in nature, such as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, and illegal firearms trafficking.[19] These issues form the basis of interaction between the US and the Caribbean on security matters. In fact economic, political, and security-related assistance packages are determined based on the islands security policies toward the issues mentioned in the US publication mentioned above.

While it is argued that in the Caribbean and from a Caribbean perspective, there are more pertinent issues that affect the national security of the countries, the dominating influence the US plays is an important part in the formulating of what is foremost in national security policies. Thus while issues such as poverty, natural disaster, environmental degradation, and economic underperformance, present serious security implications for the small states, in order to receive international support to deal with these issues that form the basis of identity and image, they must align with the issues as proclaimed by the US in the international security environment.

In the present security environment, it is common understanding that to receive military aid from the US, the request stands a better chance of being approved if it is tied to the illegal drug issue, which is at the forefront of American policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. This obviously has relevance in the determination of the identity of the military in the Caribbean, since as already established, the security forces must be oriented to deal with whatever issues are stated in the policy. In view of this relationship

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the appropriate question here may be stated as follows: Can national security be redefined from a Caribbean perspective? To answer this question this research turns to sociological perspectives as an analytical tool.

The security environments in which states are embedded are in part cultural and institutional, rather than material. The cultural environment affects not only the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states' identity.[20] Several analysts suggested that there are at least three layers to the international cultural environments in which national security policies are made. These are the layer of formal institutions or security regimes, the existence of a world political culture that includes elements like rules of sovereignty and international law, and a transnational political discourse carried by such international social movements like Greenpeace and Amnesty International.[21] The Caribbean countries are not immune to the affairs of other states because factors, such as geography, history, culture, and language, cause countries to interact with one another. It is thus the dynamics of these interactions that have an effect on the national security affairs of these countries.

In the Caribbean, this research argues that national security policies are made predominantly in the first and second layers, where the formal institutions are the various government agencies and the world political culture is that which is determined based on what is contemporary in terms of sovereignty and international law. For instance during the Cold War, national security was seen against the background of the East-West confrontation, while currently it reflects the policies of the dominating hegemony. From a cultural perspective, therefore, this thesis argues that national security policies in the Caribbean are reflective of the states quest for survival in the international environment.

The quest for survival, with regards to the Caribbean countries, forms part of the national interest that shapes or influences their behavior in the international environment. It is in this pursuit for survival that the determination of national security policies is influenced by external sources. These external sources also shape the identity of security institutions that are required to deal with issues driven by these policies.

The above discourse has demonstrated the link between the identity of the military and national security and the link between the formulation of national security policies and the various influences both in the domestic and the international environment. In order to come to some conclusion on the questions with regards to national security, however, an understanding of the civil-military relations and the part civil authorities play in shaping the identity of the military will be discussed.

The genesis of civil-military relations in the English-speaking Caribbean can be traced to the Westminster system of government it inherited from Britain. The dominance of the civil authorities could be explained, to a large extent, from the perspective of the historical, British philosophical and cultural military background, and the cultural foundation of the Caribbean societies in general. The fact that most officers from the Caribbean military are sent to either the United Kingdom or the United States for training ensures that they are ideologically and culturally groomed into accepting that the balance of power rests with the civilian authorities. Civil-military relations in Trinidad and Tobago can be used as an example to illustrate the activities inherent in such relationships.

In Trinidad and Tobago control of the military lies with the civilian executive, and this control is manifested through the composition and execution of the Defence Council.

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The Defence Council is the legally authorized body that is responsible under the general authority of the Minister of National Security, who is in fact the chairman of the council. The other members are the Chief of Defence Staff and two other cabinet ministers selected by the Prime Minister.

The Defence Council has command and administrative authority and is the policy-making body for the Force. In this regard it also has the power to define any such duties, above and beyond the defence of Trinidad and Tobago. Additionally, with reference to command and administration, the Council has the authority to dictate the order of precedence and command within the ranks of the Defence Force. It must be pointed out, however, that notwithstanding the authority of the Defence Council, the concentrated authority to control and direct the force are generally obtained under the general authority of the minister. Nevertheless during the life span of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, the Defence Council has largely been a reactive instead of a proactive unit. The council in the main reacts to enquiries that evolved from within the ranks of the force and has seldom been the originator of any policy directives for the proper administration of the force.

The structure of civil-military relations depicted above in the case of Trinidad and Tobago demonstrates the influence of the civilian authorities on the identity of the military. In democracies, such as Trinidad and Tobago and the wider English-speaking Caribbean, political involvement in the role and functions of the military is obvious and structured and is executed through various systems, such as allocation of budgetary resources, legislation, investigation, personnel actions in terms of promotion and recruiting, and administrative control at the ministerial level. Thus in the search for an

identity, the Caribbean military will be shaped within the framework of the national assessment of the international arena, the political guidance and the strategic environment in which the institutions of governance operate, and the cultural and sociological context of the existing civil-military relationship.

Expanding on the case of Trinidad and Tobago, the Defence Force has been in existence for the past thirty-eight years, yet there is no strategic planning system that incorporates a national security strategy with the military strategy, which would in turn determine the force structure, identity, roles, and functions. Like most other Caribbean countries, there is no written TTDF doctrine, there is no TTDF manual of military law, and there is no TTDF consistent military philosophy. What exists is a confused identity that consists of different perspectives based on an absence of strategic direction, and the various exposures and knowledge gained at the many external institutions. In the absence of doctrine, for example, the focus of operational training, is determined by whoever is the commander on the ground and his method is mostly consistent with whichever foreign school he attended. The TTDF still refers to the British manual of military law as the authority in several legal matters, such as court-martial procedures, notwithstanding the fact that the country has been a Republic since 1976. While the intention here is not to re-invent the wheel, in the formation of an identity there are some salient products that establish the framework of this identity, and these product must be derived from within the organization. Building on the core–periphery military relationship, a page can be taken from the United States Joint Strategic Planning System and amend it within the Caribbean environment accordingly.

The formulation of an identity of the military in the English–speaking Caribbean must therefore be forged within a political, social, cultural, and international security framework. In developing this organizational identity it is therefore imperative that the impact and influence of the main actors on the organization are considered. In the political dimension the primary actor must be the government of the various Caribbean countries who must take up the challenges presented to them in the formulation of national security policy. While it has been suggested that civilians address their concerns about the domestic distribution of power before they consider the structure of the international system,[22] it is envisaged that the myriad of challenges and issues facing governments in the region with respect to the international security environment would allow for simultaneous actions in both spheres.

The military in the English-speaking Caribbean, like other militaries of the world, must be looked at as the institution responsible for the management of legal violence in support of the defence of the nation either from a threat to the territorial integrity, the threat of violence or from an undesired external influence, such as the powerful drug cartels for instance. The safety and territorial integrity of the countries in the Caribbean are linked directly to the survival of these states and the institution most prepared to protect this geographic territory is the military. The military must be projected as the first bastion to the defense of the homeland. There must also be a secondary role such as the support for law enforcement and disaster relief agencies when not tasked in the primary role.

This research posits that the major determinant here is political will. Political will has been defined by Ivelaw Griffith as largely a function of domestic politics, affected by

the regional and international environments.[23] Once the political will has been established, another consideration is the alignment of the policy within the sociocultural dimensions of the country and the international security environment.

Several analysts have suggested in the international security literature that the philosophy being expressed in the twenty-first century is based on cooperation and collaboration. In this sense, in order for the identity of the military in the Caribbean to achieve congruence and legitimacy within the international settings, there must be the acceptance that there will be some level of participation with larger forces in the arena. This therefore means that participation with the US is encouraged. How this participation occurs is another question. Should this participation be firstly within the Caribbean and secondly within the international environment? What is there for the military if it develops broader Caribbean identification? What is the geostrategic advantage to be achieved? These and other questions must be considered by decision makers in the search for the identity of the military in the English-speaking Caribbean.

In response to these questions, however, this research proposes that due to inadequate economic and military resources the Caribbean military needs to strengthen its organizational capabilities through formation of alliances. In this regard the Regional Security System, that is presently in existence between the East Caribbean states, provides a working model. Although several adjustments and changes are required to make this system acceptable to the wider Caribbean, it nevertheless is a good starting point to shaping the identity of the Caribbean military within the international security environment.

With respect to the second question, if the military in the Caribbean develops a broader Caribbean identity through alliance formation, it would present a different image to the rest of the world, and also it would be in congruence with the international security environment in terms of cooperation and collaboration. In regard to the question on geostrategic advantage, the military in the Caribbean would be able to speak with one voice and as such would not be subsumed under the present arrangement within Southern Command among the other Latin American partners.

To change the identity of the military in the Caribbean, one of the most fundamental sources of problems is that posed by the organizational cultures. This has been defined as the persistent, patterned ways of thinking that distinguished organizations from one another.[24] The organizational culture of both the civilian directorate and the military organizations are factors that impact on the creating of a new identity. The external-looking culture of the civilian authority, for instance, must be refocused to the internal dimension, particularly in respect to defining pertinent security issues and challenges. Military culture has been described as the sum of the intellectual, professional, and traditional values of an officer corps; it plays a central role in how that officer corps assesses the external environment and how it analyzes the possible response that it might make based on this analysis.[25] It is therefore suggested here that there must be an alignment between the military and the civilian culture, or perhaps it might be better stated that the civilian-military relations must be aligned toward the same goals and objectives.

The organizational literature suggested that experience has shown that personalities, systems, and procedures are factors that determine whether or not

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organizations change their identities or structures to what has been described as enduring and distinctive. Considering that identities both generate and shape interest and that many national security interest depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others,[26] this thesis proposes that there are certain imperatives that must be considered in this search for an identity for the military in the Caribbean.

The first imperative is a redefinition or reconceptualization of security from within the philosophy of the Caribbean. Though this is not an easy task, it is not an impossible one either. The world continues to change dramatically and perhaps materially with regards to the security environment, and as such, the Caribbean cannot exist in a changing strategic environment with unchanged security policies and structures. It is therefore important that national assessments of the international arena be conducted since these have a crucial effect on whether military organizations change successfully. The creation of an identity would thus be dependent on the political guidance and strategic framework within which the institutions operate.

The second imperative is to shape the identity of the military in the Caribbean through a well-defined force structure. Having decided what are the issues and challenges that affect the Caribbean, a process of organizational design should then occur. This organizational design should be related to the issues and challenges and should form the basis for the creation of the identity of the military. In this regard it is proposed to draw from the core-periphery relationship and adopt relevant aspect of a methodology used by the US military in its force development process.[27] In this model both the civil authorities and the military work together to design and shape the structure and identity of the military.

The third imperative, which overlaps the previous ones, is the consideration of the international security environment. In the Caribbean there have been intertwined changes at both the international and domestic levels regarding security issues in what Jorge I. Dominguez referred to as an intermestic transformation in the Caribbean.[28] The international security environment is the universal set within which the actors must function. It is therefore fundamental that an understanding of the political, economic, and security dynamics be understood in the shaping of the identity of the military in the Caribbean.

In this chapter an analysis of the Caribbean military was conducted using a multidisciplinary approach, to determine whether or not the military in the Caribbean can develop a new identity. The analysis employed the organizational literature to gain an understanding about how identities are constructed and what norms and practices accompany their reproduction. Having established this framework, the research acknowledged that the issues that construct identities in complex organizations such as the military transcend several planes, all of which must be considered in the creation of an identity for the military in the English-speaking Caribbean.

This analysis suggests that the identity of the military in the Caribbean can be created within a political, cultural, and international security framework. While external forces affect all countries, the question about sovereignty is still relevant to the idea about national interest. This national interest in the case of the Caribbean countries is a matter of survival which refers to the very existence of the countries in the international security environment. It has been argued that nation states must interact in the international system to protect and promote their vital interests. In this regard the Caribbean countries

must accept their place in the international sphere to provide the structure for diplomatic,

economic, and military interaction thus eliminating the image of an international guard

force or a domestic constabulary force.

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[2] William L. Johnson, Annabel M. Johnson, and Felix Heimberg. "A Primary and Second Order Component Analysis of the Organizational Identification Questionaire," in *Education and Psychological Measurement*, 59, no.1 (February 1999): 159

[3] Susan G. Scott and Vicki R. Lane. "A Stakeholder Approach to Organizational Identity" in *Academy of Management Review*, 25, no.1 (January 2000): 43-62

[4] Ibid., 43-62

[5] Andrew D. Brown, "Organization Studies and Identity: Towards a Research Agenda" in *Human Relations* 54, no.1 (January 2001): 113

[6] Dennis A. Gioia and Majken Schultz, "Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Instability" in *The Academy of Management Review*, 25 (January 2000): 63-81.

[7] Dion Phillips, "The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force: Origin, Structure, Training, Security and Other Roles," 13

[8] Ibid., 14

[9] Dennis A. Gioia and Majken Schultz, "Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Instability," 63-81.

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[12] Mohamed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament,* 1.

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[16]Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, and Michael J Mazarr, *American National Security,* 3.

[17]David G. Haglund, *The Centre-Periphery Debate in International Security*, 3.

[18]Kalam Shahed, "Ethnicity and Security in the Third World," in *The Centre-Periphery Debate in International Security.* 171.

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[21]Ibid., 34

[22]Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II," 187.

[23]Ivelaw Griffith, "Security Collaboration and Confidence Building in the Americas," 184.

[24]Gregory Foster, *In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure,* 23.

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[28]Jorge I. Dominguez, "Security, Peace, and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Challenges for the Post-Cold War Era," 9.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The search for an identity for the military in the English-speaking Caribbean in the twenty-first century is both relevant and timely given the dynamics in the present international security environment. In this environment, military organizations in Europe, Africa, Asia, North America, and Latin America, are experiencing identity crises as the world continues to struggle with the vagaries of the international security settings. The prevailing international security atmosphere is characterized as being complex, challenging, and multidimensional. In such a dynamic environment, the military in the Caribbean cannot continue going about its business as usual.

Today, the Caribbean countries belong to an international subsystem whose structures have changed and whose norms are evolving.[1] The military organizational structures, and systems are reflected in a mix between the traditional British norms and the emerging United States influence. After thirty-nine years, for instance, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force has not developed its own culture, systems, and doctrine within a Caribbean framework. The military as an institution cannot remain unchanged in such a changing world and thus adaptation to the evolving security situation becomes imperative in the twenty-first century. The identity and the image of the military must be redefined within the long standing core-periphery relationship that exist between the United States as the dominating influence in the area and the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean.

It is therefore within this framework that this thesis started out with the primary research question: Can the military in the English -speaking Caribbean develop its own

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identity and redefine national security from a Caribbean perspective in the twenty-first century? The research sought to provide answers to this query by examining four secondary questions: How and why was the military created in the Caribbean? What is the role of forces external to the Caribbean in shaping the identity of the military? What has national security meant for the Caribbean? and What is the nature of civil-military relations in the Caribbean? To answer these questions the research considered the historical antecedents, the international security environment, and the Caribbean security environment utilizing a multidisciplinary approach. In this methodology, the research used history, geography, organizational management, sociology, international relations, and economics to analyze the military in the Caribbean.

As the twenty-first century unfolds the Caribbean countries must become responsible for their own security. Thus the creation of an identity to enhance this responsibility is fundamental to the existence of the military in the Caribbean. As the world continues to change dramatically, Caribbean countries need to redefine and reconceptualize national security from a Caribbean perspective. National security for the countries of the Caribbean must be based on the multiplicity of issues that are pertinent to the region; it must be addressed from an understanding of the political, economic, and security dynamics that characterize the Caribbean security environment. Assessments of the international arena therefore become a fundamental exercise in determining how issues are dealt with from a security standpoint. While some issues can be addressed on a national or perhaps a regional scale, there are those that will have to be dealt with at the international or global level. It is thus the manner in which these security issues are acted

upon that will influence the identity of the military in the Caribbean in the twenty-first century.

The world today, consist of interdependence, a world where all things are connected, overlap and interact, therefore it is difficult for the military in the Caribbean to develop an identity without the influence of other actors in the environment in which it exist and function. Organizational theorists argue that organizations often look to other well-established and successful organizations during their development. This thesis suggests therefore that the purpose is not to reinvent the wheel in the Caribbean, but to adopt relevant procedures and structures that have been tested and proven to be successful. While this study acknowledges the importance of the origins and the foundations of the identity of the military in the English-speaking Caribbean, particularly the influence of the British and the Americans, the complexities and challenges that exist in today's international security environment strongly suggest that a new identity must be created for the military from a Caribbean's perspective, if the Caribbean is to become responsible for its own security.

The identity of the military that evolves must not be left to chance but as a result of a systemic process. In this regard the Caribbean countries must begin by determining what are their national interests. It has been noted that all states have core or vital interests, and the most readily seen are the basic survival interests of the nation-state--its territory, its people, and its sovereignty. A country that is unable to exercise effective control over its territory and its peoples, relatively free from the intrusion of other nation-states into its internal affairs, is lacking in this critical element of sovereignty.[2] It is thus imperative that in the creation of this identity, the capability to control territory, the

ability to protect and or defend the sovereignty of the Caribbean countries must be an inherent characteristic of this military identity.

Once again, using the case of Trinidad and Tobago as an example, the procedure should begin with knowledge about the national interests of the state. For Trinidad and Tobago, like most small countries, these are security, survival, territorial integrity, political stability, and economic stability. Considering that countries must interact in the international system to protect and promote its important interests, Trinidad and Tobago should therefore establish its national objectives, which are the activities and outcomes that it should pursue to promote, protect, or retain its interests.[3] Having established the national objectives, the political directorate then executes its decision-making process.

The political decision making system and that exist in Trinidad and Tobago must therefore consider the national policies and programs that should be designed to attain the specific objectives through policy statements which may represent a broad course of action or intent. Policy in this case should represent the "ways" (methods or patterns of action) and programs should represent the "means" (available resources) of the national security strategy.[4] These policy statements and programs with respect to the national interests of security and survival for instance, should be reflected in the form of a national security strategy that combines the interests and programs with the role of the military. In order for this process to be successful, however, political will is fundamental in addition to national will and national direction. In this regard national direction, which is a function of the government, is very important. It gives meaning, purpose, and sustainment to policies, commitments, and programs.[5] It is therefore recommended that

Trinidad and Tobago can be used as a model that utilizes this system, whereby purposeful role and identity could be created for the military from within the Caribbean.

Recommendations

This thesis recommends the following precepts as a guide to the creation of an identity for the military in the English-speaking Caribbean:

1. Strategy, policy, objectives, and programs must be nested in the national interests, which must be determined from a Caribbean perspective. This process will ensure that a redefinition and reconceptualization of security from within the Caribbean philosophy and with a Caribbean mandate occur. It will also ensure that a strategic-driven integrated approach is developed.

2. There should be debates and discussions that engage all the principal actors in the government with respect to the role of the military and the other instruments of national power. In this regard the initiative must come from the minister of national security who must own the strategy. This is required to give the strategy the necessary impact on resource allocation to bring it to fruition. This is particularly important because in the small countries in the Caribbean there will no doubt be a gap between strategy and resources.

3. The strengthening of organizational capabilities through the formation of alliances, firstly within the Caribbean and secondly in the international security environment. Consideration to strengthen the existing Regional Security System with much more Caribbean rather than external initiatives is encouraged. The new goal of

regional security is to convert geopolitical lines into regional vectors that link the common interests of the Caribbean region.[6]

4. The civilian-military relationship must be aligned toward the same goals and objectives. The military strategy must be nested in the strategy, policy and objectives determined by the political authority. In this regard the external-looking culture of the civilian authority must be refocused to the internal dimension, particularly in respect to defining pertinent security issues and challenges that affect the Caribbean.

5. The military must be prepared to change and adapt to the changing international security environment while retaining and making use of the British and American core values that historically provided the foundation for the military in the Caribbean,.

6. This venture will require enormous leadership and political will. Political is the fuel that can drive the engine that will pursue the creation of this military identity. Thus it is imperative that the military authorities contribute to convincing the political authority about the necessity for the creation of this identity. It is recommended that this be done through dialogue, the formation of joint civilian and military committees or the presentation of research papers outlining the importance of such a venture.

<u>Contribution to the Body of Literature</u>

In the Caribbean the literature on the military and national security is relatively limited. While there are several books, articles, and research papers in respect to security issues in the Caribbean, few deal specifically with the military in any great detail. This study therefore is an attempt to fill this vacuum. This study attempts to move beyond a

simple case study of the Caribbean military by including theories of international

relations, organizational management, sociology, geography, and economics into its

methodology. In so doing it has contributed to the body of literature in these respective

areas.

The research makes a significant contribution to the understanding of new ways to

examine the military in the Caribbean by combining the core-periphery relationship as

theorized by Immanuel Wallerstein and the analytical approach presented by Fernand

Braudel. Additionally, the research has provided the framework for further study in the

area of Caribbean military and national security.

This study has charted new ways to examine the military in the English-speaking

Caribbean and simultaneously recommend policy and strategic options for the

government institutions and agencies that can influence the creation of an identity of the

military. This thesis posits that the Caribbean military can create an identity with a

Caribbean mandate, and with a Caribbean philosophy in the twenty-first century.

In closing part of a quotation taken off the wall of the Jefferson Memorial in

Washington D.C., USA is applicable:

> As new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and names and
> opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must
> advance also to keep pace with the times.

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[1]Jorge I. Dominguez, " The Power, the Pirates, and International Norms and Institutions," 80.

[2]LTC Ted Davis, Robert H. Dorf, and LTC Robert D. Walz, "A Brief Introduction to Concepts and Approaches in the Study of Strategy," in *C500 Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting*, United States Command and General Staff College, Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, L1-A-4.

[3]Ibid., L1-A-6.

[4]Ibid., L1-A-7.

[5]Ibid., L1-A-11.

[6]Instituto de Altos Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, Venezuela, "New Issues on the Regional Security Agenda for the Caribbean," 135.

APPENDIX A

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review of the proposed subject can be divided into the following area of research: historical perspective on the evolution of the military, national security and civil-military relations in the Caribbean, the international security environment, and issues and challenges in the Caribbean security environment.

The research will focus on the British and American relationships with the military in the Caribbean in order to show how these relationships have influenced and shaped the present identities in what is described as the core periphery military relationship.

The evolution of the military in the English speaking Caribbean with specific reference to Trinidad and Tobago has been sourced from several books. Roger Norman Buckley provides a comprehensive account in his book, *The British Army in the West Indies,* 1998. This book traces the involvement of the British military in the West Indies. The book gives an account of the early formation and structures of the military in the Caribbean. Buckley looked at the antecedent factors found in the evolution of the military, especially the manner in which the garrison affected, and was itself affected by the Caribbean social, political, and economic landscape. Buckley also traces the civil-military relationship in the Caribbean to as early as the seventeenth century where the system of dual control over the military was created over the army in Britain.

With respect to the TTDF, Stewart Hilton Edwards' book, *Lengthening Shadows: Birth and Revolt of the Trinidad Army,* Imprint Caribbean Press, 1982, is useful to the

research. The book gives an account of how the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force was formed. Hilton Edwards was one of the British officers who were seconded from the British Army to assist in the establishment of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. Hilton Edwards gives a very personal account of his experiences in the early days of the Force that are very useful for the research.

The evolution of the military in Trinidad and Tobago is also sourced from the book: *Area Handbook for Trinidad and Tobago,* published by Jan Knippers Black in 1976. This volume was one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area Studies of the American University. The book looks at basic facts about the social, economic, political and military institutions and practices of Trinidad and Tobago. In the area of national defense the book traces the establishment of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force from the visit of Lord Louis Mountbatten, chief of the United Kingdom Defence Staff to the development of the mission, organization and control of the Force. Dr. Dion Phillips writing in the *Caribbean Quarterly,* volume 43,. no. 3, September 1997 gives an updated account of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. The article restates the origin of the TTDF and shows that it is not merely concerned with domestic instability but with several other roles, including narcotic interdiction, search and rescue, and disaster operations. These two items about the evolution of the TTDF provide evidence on the British influence in the development of the TTDF and how its identity was shaped and evolved.

According to Garcia Humberto Muniz and Jorge Rodriguez, writing in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* May 1994, volume 533, the United States possesses both by geographical propinquity and historical tradition, a

legitimate interest in the Caribbean area. In fact it has been argued that ever since the United States attained its independence in 1783, one of its basic security concerns has been the defense of its frontiers. This is evidenced in the United States foreign policy principle of the Monroe Doctrine, and the physical presence of the United States military with the establishment of military bases in the Caribbean during the Second World War. The base agreement between the British and the Americans saw the establishment of bases in Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Guyana, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. Today, the base agreements have expired and several new security assistance mechanisms are in place. These new mechanisms have implications for the research topic.

Peter J. Katzenstein edited the book *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, 1995, Columbia University Press, stated that the cold war made relatively unproblematic some of the cultural factors affecting national security. With the end of the cold war, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Issues dealing with norms, identities and culture are becoming more salient. This book offers a sociologist perspective on the politics of national security. It argues that actors who respond to cultural factors define security interests. The book raises several questions that are pertinent to the research. What kinds of power and security do states seek and for what purposes? Do the meanings that states and other political actors attach to power and security help to explain their behavior and their identity?

In the book titled *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post Cold War Era,* 1998, edited by Jorge I. Dominguez, it was suggested that the prospects for peace and security in the Americas and the Caribbean

improved as the cold war ended. Jorge I Dominguez stated in chapter one that the concern over peace and security links the United States and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. New security issues, such as nonstate violence, facilitate drug trafficking from Latin America and the Caribbean into the United States.

Another book that impacts on the research is *Security Problems and Policies in the Post Cold War Caribbean,* International Political Economy Series, edited by Timothy M. Shaw, MacMillan Press, 1996. This Book examines several new security issues that challenge the Caribbean military. The book has various chapters dealing with new threats to the security of the countries. To deal with these new threats and challenges the military in the Caribbean must review its position and seek an identity to suit this new environment.

Ivelaw Griffith's book titled *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the Twenty-first[t] Century* Mc Nair Papers number 54, published in October 1996 by the Institution for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, provides relevant information on the area of research. The book examines events that defined Unites States and Caribbean relationship during the later years of the Cold War. He focuses on the impact of the cold war on United States-Caribbean security relationship and the Caribbean responses designed to balance cooperation in areas of mutual interest while protecting their sovereignty.

Caribbean Basin Security by Thomas H. Moorer and Georges A. Fauriol, published in the Washington Papers, no. 104, volume 9, by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, George Washington University, 1985, offers some historical perspectives on the United States-Caribbean relationship mainly during the Cold War.

The authors emphasized the neglect of the Caribbean and the ability of the United States to misperceive the importance of the region and to understand the process of change that was taking place.

The book *Contemporary Security and Strategy* edited by Craig A. Snyder, published in 1999, contributes to the research in several ways. The book loaded with a battery of authors, takes as it point of departure the changes in strategic and security studies brought about by the end of the Cold War. The contributors sought to broaden the focus of the study of security away from the purely military aspect of strategic studies to include the non-military issues of security such as the environment, human rights and the movement of people across international border. The book moves beyond the realist analysis that has come to dominate the field of security studies and addresses the underlying continuities of new approaches. It also explores a deepening of the agenda of security studies by examining security from the societal or individual level up to the regional or global level.

The relevance of the book to the research is evident in the questions put forward by the editor, Craig Snyder, under the subhead "Redefining Security." For Snyder, in order for security studies to continue to be relevant it needs to question three broad issues: security as a goal; the means of pursuing security; and the relation between security and domestic affairs. He further alluded that while security is important, the question remains how much security is needed and also, are there national interests that are equally important at the very basic level? What good is security if there is no food, arable land or drinkable water in a country? It is clear that most of these questions and the manner in which the authors treat the relevant issues are pertinent to the discourse in the

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research concerning the complexity and challenges facing the Caribbean military in the search for a new identity.

American National Security, published by Amos A. Jordan, William J Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, in 1999, provides a contemporary perspective on national security and the changing security environment. The book addresses national security issues that exist in the what it described as a complex and multidimensional international security environment. The book is very relevant to the research because it not only examines national security issues but also addresses how the United States must restructure its military strategy and forces so that they are in line with budgetary trends, and the evolving nature of the international environment.

Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, edited by Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman, published by Cambridge University Press, 1997, explores the nature of, and conditions for, theoretical innovation in International Studies. The book provides a methodology for the research paper through the work of Fernand Braudel. Braudel and others posited an integral and historical approach to social explanation and the need to apply this approach to contemporary problems and debates. In the article by Eric Helleiner "Braudelian Reflections on Economic Globalization: the Historian as Pioneer," the research noted that any social phenomenon must be analyzed from the perspective of various observation points along four axes which are space, time, social orders, and hierarchy.

APPENDIX B

RESEARCH METHOD

In order to search for the identity of the Caribbean military and national security in the twenty-first century, is proposed to adopt a multidisciplinary approach, using history, geography, sociology, international relations, organizational management, and economics to analyze the military in the Caribbean. In this way it is hoped that valuable perspectives can be collected that can be used to examine the military's organizational identity and image. Understanding how identities are constructed, what norms and practices accompany their reproduction, and how they construct each other is an important part of the research.

Before attempting to engage in any problem-solving analysis of the current lack of identity of the military in the Caribbean, this study will conduct a critical analysis of the situation to form an opinion for its existence. This study proposes to locate an explanation for this situation within the historic conception of the world systems methodology. The study posits that there exists a "core periphery military relationship" among Britain, USA, and the Caribbean. A vigorous effort will therefore be made to understand this military morphology in terms of "world system" theory by showing how military patterns and identities within countries in the Caribbean have been shaped by the global processes that produce and reproduce the hierarchical world system of the sort Wallerstein and others have posited. Additionally it is proposed to include a Braudelian approach utilizing the set of analytical tools developed by Fernand Braudel that looked at social phenomenon from the perspective of various observations points along four distinct axes. These axes represent space, time, social order, and hierarchy.

In this multidisciplinary approach the research will look to history for an explanation about the evolution of the military in the English-speaking Caribbean; to geography for an understanding of the geopolitical forces that influence the identity of the military; to sociology for the personalities and cultural factors that impact on the military; to organizational management for theories about the creation of organizational identity; to international relations to look at the relationships between militaries in the international security environment; and to economics to understand the constraints that affect the identity of the military in the Caribbean. This multidisciplinary methodology will be conducted against the background of the core-periphery relationship that exists between the military in the Caribbean and those from the larger metropolitan countries, such as United States and United Kingdom.

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