MAJOR GENERAL JAMES SCOTT NEGLEY AND HIS DIVISION AT CHICKAMAUGA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other agency. (References to this study should include the forgoing statement.)

ABSTRACT
This thesis is a historical analysis of Major General James Negley and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. An examination of Negley, his actions, his major subordinate commanders, and the regiments of the division was conducted to provide a base with which to evaluate the principals during the Chickamauga Campaign of 1863. On 19 September, the division fought well as, and served to arrest a Confederate penetration of the Federal lines. The division was piecemealed into the fight on 20 September by brigade, and regiments. Negley ended up commanding fifty Federal artillery pieces on Snodgrass Hill and withdrew them to support the Union collapse upon Chattanooga. Negley was relieved after the battle, and charged with removing the artillery prematurely. He was acquitted of all charges during a subsequent court of inquiry; however, he never received another command.

The relief of Negley tarnished an otherwise solid performance by the division during the two day battle. This study analyzes Negley and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga and draws conclusions using the battle command competencies as a framework: seeing the enemy, seeing the terrain, knowing yourself, visualizing the battle, and seeing into the future.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On 9 January 1864, the President of the United States directed a Court of Inquiry to investigate the conduct of Major Generals A. McD. McCook, T. L. Crittenden, and James S. Negley, U.S. Volunteers, during the Battle of Chickamauga, 19 and 20 September 1863. The summer of 1863 had been a turning point in the War Between the States. Major General Ulysses S. Grant captured the Confederate citadel of Vicksburg in the West and the Army of Northern Virginia was defeated in the East at Gettysburg. Midway between the two, the Union Army of the Cumberland did not add to the Federal success, but instead delivered a beaten Army to Chattanooga, after the Battle of Chickamauga.¹

General Braxton Bragg and his Confederate Army of the Tennessee forced the Union Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Major General William S. Rosecrans, from the field of battle at Chickamauga; Bragg lost control of Chattanooga. Major General Thomas and the XIV Corps were the assigned commander and higher headquarters of Major General James S. Negley's Second Division during the near catastrophe for the Union. Negley did not fight his command as a whole, nor did he serve under Thomas' direct supervision for most of the battle.

Major General Negley found himself in Nashville, Tennessee, on 29 January 1864, seated before his Court of Inquiry defending his honor and performance of duty as a division commander in the Army of the Cumberland.² Recollections of fierce fighting soldiery, clashing armies and the heroic deeds of men, as well as self doubt surely raced through his mind as he pondered his predicament. He was not new to commanding in
war. He had a sizable record preceding the watershed Battle of Chickamauga. His mind must have turned anxious. Major General Negley questioned the first witness. What Major General Negley did not know at the time was that his fate was set. Regardless of the eventual not guilty findings of the court, Major General Negley never received another command.

This thesis will focus on the performance, actions, and decisions of Major General Negley, his commanders, and his division during the campaign and Battle of Chickamauga. Were his decisions and actions tactically sound and in the best interest of the Army of the Cumberland? Did the actions or inactions of his unit put in danger the already precarious position of the Army of the Cumberland? Was his action key to the Federal army's ability to defend Chattanooga?

As the product of a foundry is forged through heat and pressure, the leadership and ability of a general is forged through experience. Both, to some extent are dependent on pre-existing raw materials. Examination of the following questions is necessary in forming a basis to support the main research question. What were Major General Negley's leadership experiences, and in what manner did he perform prior to and during this battle? What did he do well and what did he do poorly? What were the characteristics of his subordinate units and in what manner did they perform prior to and during the Battle of Chickamauga. What were the relationships among: Major General Negley, his superiors, peers, and subordinates, and how did those relationships influence command? Was the performance of Major General Negley's division or his subordinates called into question prior to Chickamauga? What was the proximate cause of Major General Wood's consistent defamation of Negley's performance during the battle of

2
Chickamauga? Why did Major General Negley not command again after Chickamauga?

By answering the aforementioned questions, through an examination of primary and secondary source information, we can better understand the contributions and role of the Second Division, XIV Corps, Army of the Cumberland during the Battle of Chickamauga. germane to this research were the decisions made by the Second Division commander; and how they were nested with the other divisions, the corps and army.

Chapter 2 will look at how Private Negley became Major General Negley, a matter that is key to understanding what made the man. Although the pace of transformation was initially average (a Sergeant by the end of the Mexican American War), the interwar period of about thirteen years yielded a rapid rise to the rank of Captain in 1856. Negley became a Brigadier General in the First Brigade, the 18th Division, Pennsylvania Militia in 1859. With no wars during the latter period, and presumably few field exercises, it is hard to imagine that a hardened warrior-leader emerged.

In early 1861, brigade commander Negley joined an excursion under General Robert Patterson in Virginia. This campaign was short-lived and the term of enlistment of Negley's command expired less than a month after the operation started. This event certainly gave him a modicum of experience as a senior officer but does not give us an adequate basis upon which to judge his subsequent actions. After his command dissolved, he returned to Pennsylvania to raise another unit.

In the business of raising troops, Negley proved to be an adept manager and administrator. He exceeded his assigned quota of raising one regiment late in 1861; instead, he raised a brigade, which he deployed to join the Army of the Ohio at
Louisville. This led to his employment in battle and eventual promotion to division commander. What he learned and accomplished, as well as whom he might have impressed during the next several years bears great weight in the analysis of his performance during the Battle of Chickamauga. Examination will yield a trend, helpful in establishing his tactical methodology. Was Negley prone to adopt offensive or defensive posture? A brief examination of Negley’s role in the operations to destroy railroads in Georgia, the defense of Nashville and associated campaigns, and the Stone's River Campaign will be included here.

Chapter 3 will examine the units of the second division and their actions from 23 June 1863 through 16 August 1863. The sum of any command is figured in terms of its parts. The volunteer regiments that formed the Second Division, Army of the Cumberland at the battle of Chickamauga contained only one of the regiments that Negley brought into Kentucky in 1861, the 78th Pennsylvania. How long, in what capacity, and how well the brigades and regiments fought that composed Negley's division are elements that must be discovered and analyzed to determine the state of the division. By looking at the principal commanders and units' histories, the total of the Second Division can be better viewed in context with its component parts.

Another indicator of the performance of a unit can take the form of morale. The state of mind of an organization fluctuates, which translates often to its manner of performance. Admittedly, this is often hard to determine through historical analysis and insights. Reports generally reflect the more positive recollections. Assessing the morale of the troops by evaluating logistics support (how the army was equipped and fed) and battle performance, will offer this project some key insights.
The observed actions of Major General Negley's units will begin with the Second Division, Army of the Ohio. This unit was organized fifty-three miles from Louisville at Camp Nevin. Negley's brigade of four regiments was assigned under the Second Division as the Seventh Brigade. Brigadier General Negley commanded the Seventh Brigade. The 78th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment was the only unit from the original Seventh Brigade that was eventually integrated into Negley's Second Division, XIV Corps, Army of the Cumberland. The actions of Negley's command during this period will provide valuable data to analyze Negley and his unit's strengths and weaknesses.

This section will close with the Order of Battle of the Second Division, Army of the Cumberland in the summer of 1863, and a brief description of the unit's actions during the Tullahoma Campaign. This study will evaluate the these organizations as they moved over the mountains of eastern Tennessee, crossed the Tennessee River into Alabama and Georgia, fought in the Battle of Chickamauga and ended up defending Chattanooga:

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV Corps</td>
<td>MG George H. Thomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Division</td>
<td>MG James S. Negley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>BG John Beatty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Illinois</td>
<td>LTC Douglas Hapeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4Second Indiana</td>
<td>LTC William T.B. McIntire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th Indiana</td>
<td>COL George Humphrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Kentucky</td>
<td>COL Marion C. Taylor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second Brigade

COL Timothy R. Stanley
19th Illinois
LTC Alexander W. Raffen
11th Michigan
COL William L. Stoughton
69th Ohio
LTC Joseph H. Brigham
18th Ohio
LTC Charles H. Grosvenor

3rd Brigade

COL William Sirwell
3Seventh Indiana
LTC William D. Ward
21st Ohio
LTC Dwella M. Stoughton
74th Ohio
CPT Joseph Fisher
78th Pennsylvania
LTC Archibald Blakeley

Artillery

CPT Frederick Schultz
Bridges' Battery
CPT Lyman Bridges
M Battery 1st Ohio
CPT Frederick Schultz
G Battery 1st Ohio
CPT Alexander Marshall

Chapter 4 will focus on the actions of Negley's Division from 16 August to 19 September 1863. What did the Army expect as it entered this campaign, possibly joining a major enemy Army in battle, to seize key terrain? Did the Second Division commander have a clear understanding of the corps and army commanders' missions and intents? Did he understand how his actions related to adjacent units? The tail of the army was long. Terrain was difficult on the division's route of advance and direction of attack. Mutual support, from adjacent divisions, was not feasible at many points due to the broken and mountainous area of operations.10
16 August 1863 marked the beginning of the movement of the Army over the Cumberland Mountains. Negley, as part of Thomas' corps, moved his division to Crow Creek in preparation for the crossing of the Tennessee River. Negley's division crossed the river and continued to advance. As the Army of the Cumberland attempted to concentrate after passing through the Cumberland Mountains, the Second Division of the XIV Corps pushed toward Dug Gap where it gained contact with a superior enemy force on 10 September 1863. The Army of the Cumberland's inability to mass and support at this point put the division in a precarious position which could have caused the defeat of the Army. The Confederates, not pressing the attack on Negley's division, allowed the Federal forces to withdraw. Could this event have proven decisive to General Bragg in preventing the Army of the Cumberland from concentrating? Was Negley's decision to withdraw well founded and sound?

Saved from piecemeal destruction, the Army was concentrated in the vicinity of Chickamauga Creek by 19 September 1863. This, the first day of the battle, found two opposing armies fighting and developing the situation. Neither army had a clear picture of the other's dispositions in spite of their proximity. Densely forested terrain localized the fight to regiment and brigade level. The fight from the Union side took on a reactionary stance as forces arrayed and moved in a haphazard method. Task organization changes were frequent and the command structure became nebulous as the battle continued. What were the orders given to Negley and his units? Who gave them? What were, if any, the designs of his commanders? What did Negley know of their designs? How was the division postured to fight on 20 September 1863, the second day of the Battle of Chickamauga?
Chapter 5 focuses on the division's actions from 20 September to the occupation of Chattanooga. The second day found Negley moving his units to support the left flank of the Army. His units fought as part of other commands for the most part. He was unable to move his unit as a whole. As the Confederates mounted a belated, uncoordinated attack, Longstreet's corps passed through an opening in the Federal line, a position Negley's division had occupied not long before. How well were the brigades employed and did they contribute to the fight in a meaningful way? Negley found himself trying to make the best of a confusing and dynamic situation. He parceled out his division and attempted to carry out his many instructions. In what manner did his units perform when attached to other commands? What orders did Negley and other commanders give to his detached units? Was Negley operating within the intent of Rosecrans? Was Negley operating within the intent of Thomas? Were the tasks of the adjacent divisions nested?

At one point Negley was found guarding and employing a substantial artillery pool and trying to organize straggling forces from a variety of commands. Late afternoon of 20 September 1863 found Negley forming forces, around McFarland Gap, along the route of withdrawal for the Army of the Cumberland. Were his actions on this day in the best interest of the Army? Were his actions timely? Did Major General Negley have a clear picture of the battle and what needed to be accomplished? Which of his actions were proactive and which were reactive? How did his units perform?

The Army of the Cumberland broke contact and proceeded to defend Chattanooga. Major General Rosecrans removed Negley from command shortly after the defense was established. Negley was told to seek a Court of Inquiry. Was Major General
Negley identified as a scapegoat for a battle gone bad? By 14 October 1863, Major General Rosecrans thought Major General Negley's "usefulness in the Army is lost."  

Chapter 6 will analyze the battle and draw conclusions. By examining the performance of a division in battle, a dissection takes place that allows the military profession to review the factors that were key to the battle's outcome. Although this is not a scientific study, some analysis can be conducted to elucidate the cause and effect of a given action or series of actions. How well did Negley exercise the battle command competencies? What were the lessons learned? Can the insights of this battle provide us any contemporary lessons learned? How was command and control effective or ineffective at conveying the commander's mission and intent clearly?

There seem to be two views that can be formed from Major General Negley's performance as a division commander. One is that he was an average general whose contribution to the Battle of Chickamauga was characterized by poor decisions and inaction, making him in part responsible for the near rout of the Army. The other is that he was a solid commander and that his actions were sound and significant to the successful withdrawal of the Army of the Cumberland to Chattanooga and the subsequence defense of the city.

Through a historical analysis we hope to better clarify the role of the division and its commander during this battle. The analysis of actions will be based upon the tactics, techniques and procedures that were the doctrine of the Civil War. The correlation of forces, in relation to the terrain, will be also used to help analyze to unit actions. The esprit of the units will be determined from primary source diaries and letters and compiled to give a general indication of the state of the forces. Decision-making,
command, and control will be studied through the official orders, reports and correspondence of the units and their commanders.

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1Dr. W. G. Robertson et al., *Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga.* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1992), 47.


3Invitation to a Military Soiree for the PA Infantry, 22 February 1856, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. Captain Negley is indicated as one of the managers of this event.

4Pay Voucher, 16 August 1859, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. Brigadier General Negley was the commanding officer of the 1st Brigade 18th Division during encampment at Camp Braddock, Pennsylvania. Brigadier General James S. Negley, Commanding, signed the document.


6Ibid., Series III, vol.1, 358.

7Ibid., Series I, vol.4, 308.


10Ibid., 47-49. Major General Rosecrans' report describes the terrain while passing over the Cumberland Mountains.

11Ibid., 1009-1010.

12Ibid., 1006.
CHAPTER 2
NEGLEY BEFORE CHICKAMAUGA

James Scott Negley came to Civil War divisional command in an atypical manner. Many of his peers were graduates of the US Military Academy at West Point. However, Negley started his military career as an enlisted volunteer during the Mexican-American War. He remained tied to the Pennsylvania militia in the interwar years and subsequently catapulted to organizational level combat leadership during the Civil War. Although well known in his home state of Pennsylvania, he did not have a reputation among the regular officers before the Civil War. He would have to prove his worth given that he had no allies in the regular army. Initially, Negley served under Major General Robert Patterson and with Colonel George Thomas as a brigade commander in eastern Virginia during the summer of 1861.¹ As a brigade commander in the Army of the Ohio, he confirmed his good reputation with Major General George Thomas. He conducted a successful raid to Chattanooga in the summer of 1862, was responsible for the successful defense of Nashville in the fall of 1862, and fought well at Stones River. This chapter will focus on Negley's early life, career and postings in the Armies of the Department of Pennsylvania, Ohio and Cumberland through the 1863 Tullahoma campaign.

The Negley family, of Swiss descent, arrived and settled in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, near Philadelphia, in 1739. The family then moved to the Pittsburgh area in 1778 and began farming.² James Scott Negley was born to Jacob Negley, Jr. and Mary Ann Scott Negley on 22 December 1826 in East Liberty, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.³ The young man found himself immersed from his youth in the upper social class of the Pittsburgh area. His grandfather was the well-respected founder of the local Presbyterian
Church. Negley's clan was large and influential in the political, farming and business circles of the area.\textsuperscript{4} Orphaned at a very young age, the affluent Baum family raised and educated him in the public elementary and secondary schools of East Liberty.\textsuperscript{5} This educational opportunity might have been lost had he been required to work on his family's farm. Instead, during his formative years he gained a solid education in the classics, leavened with his love for nature. He made grades sufficient to gain acceptance to the Western Pennsylvania University, now known as the University of Pittsburgh. He graduated in 1846 but his academic discipline is unclear. It is logical to expect that his education had something to do with farming.\textsuperscript{6} He later styled himself a horticulturist, presumably his learned profession. William Shanks, a New York \textit{Herald} reporter, noted he had a great affinity for flora. "Negley is one of the most accomplished horticulturists in the country, and when in the field of war his leisure hours were devoted to the study of various fruits, flowers, and shrubs in which the Southern fields and woods abound. Many a march, long, tedious, exhausting, has been rendered delightful to his staff by interesting descriptive illustrations of the hidden beauties and virtues of fragrant flowers and repulsive weeds. I have known him to spend hours in explaining the properties of shrubs and wild-flowers which grew about his bivouac or headquarters, and he would on the march, frequently spring from the saddle to pluck a sensitive plant, that he might "point a moral" in showing how soon it, like life or fame, withered at the touch of death or disgrace."\textsuperscript{7} This trade is commonly associated with a keen sense of observation and understanding of terrain, its composition, and effects.\textsuperscript{8} As his service as a military officer unfolded, this interest in nature and its habitat would serve him well.
Negley's affinity for the military was evident during his college years. At age seventeen he became a member of the Duquesne Grays, infantry, and remained affiliated with them through his graduation from college in the spring of 1846. Several years of drilling provided a base of training that would serve him well in the Mexican War. His company mustered in as Company K, First Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers during that war. His unit activated in the summer of 1846, and Negley himself mustered into active service on 16 December 1846.

Generalissimo Santa Anna was fighting for the Mexican cause during the Mexican–American War. General Winfield Scott, fighting for the American side, conducted the amphibious assault on Vera Cruz, Mexico. Negley served as a private under Scott's command. During this period, the young private garnished an unusually keen understanding and appreciation for the rank and file soldier that would serve him well in the future. Negley was observant and displayed exceptional situational awareness. From his modest station as a private, it is evident that he was an observant student of terrain and fortifications, and clearly understood the broader picture of the tactical situation. Negley described the Mexican garrison at Puebla, "from my [Negley's] memory . . . the Court is a large square brick building . . . [with stables for] horses . . . quarters for soldiers . . . [and] a place for water . . . back of the fort ran a small stream, still higher are the forts [outposts] and the . . . garden affords the enemy good shelter . . . across the streets [three total] the Mexicans had erected fortifications of . . . stones and dirt . . . and good breastworks . . . and a thin brick wall, not cannon proof." From the firing line of a rifleman, Negley displayed, by today's lexicon, operational art through his ability to understand the operational objectives of General Scott and General Robert
Patterson and not confuse them with the tactical goals of his regiment. He even noted, in his correspondence, with some accuracy, the center of gravity of the Mexican army and the decisive point for the operation.  

A varied number of experiences shaped Negley during his service in the Mexican War. He served in the battles of Cerro Gordo, La Porta, and Puebla, attaining the rank of Sergeant on 1 June 1848, just before the war's end. Heroism and selfless service were two traits forged through his service in this war. Negley related the death of a friend as follows: "the Lancer ran him [Negley's friend Dave] through without stopping his horse, he rushed on me, he had his musket in his left hand (he saw me aiming) and fired, the ball grazed the bridge of my nose making it bleed freely . . . and burnt my face with powder . . . by this time the horses head was within 2 feet of the [Negley's] bayonet, I fired coolly . . . horse and rider both fell." Although wounded during the battle of Puebla, he continued to fight with his unit, which was outnumbered four to one. Private Negley relates with pride his commander's praise of his unit during this action, "Col Childs says he never saw such bravery displayed by soldiers before. He said the Devil could not drive the Pennsylvania Sentinels." Negley's politically connected uncle offered to use his influence to obtain his nephew's discharge in the summer of 1847; Negley refused the favor. Negley portrayed a very positive and patriotic attitude in his correspondence to family and friends. He was also concerned with soldier issues, like the timeliness of mail. This private's understanding of what it was like to be a soldier of the line, face fear, confront the death of a friend, and still maintain a positive attitude, would serve him well in the future.
The Mexican War experiences that so many of the Civil War generals had in common was a bit different for Negley. An officer's war is not the same as that of a private or sergeant and did not yield the same experiences or perspectives. Bravery under fire, discipline, understanding of troop morale, and situational awareness were James Scott Negley's lessons learned as a soldier. Although many officers serving during the war learned these same lessons, their lessons were likely tempered by the responsibility of their posts. Not having to struggle with the planning, disciplining and support of troops, Negley had the advantage of time and opportunity to reflect at a different level and focus.

The period between Negley's discharge after the Mexican War and his service in the Civil War found him employed in manufacturing and horticulture activities in the Pittsburgh area.\(^{21}\) It is clear that his livelihood centered on civilian employment. He seems to have been able to maintain his social status in the community and was affluent by the standards of the day. After his discharge from active service on 25 July 1848, Negley maintained his ties with the militia and the Eighteenth Pennsylvania Infantry Division. He continued his active military association and involvement throughout the interwar period. Obviously, Negley was proud of his service to the country and his business ventures did not adulterate his patriotism.

Negley's military service during the interwar period entailed mainly drilling and social activities. This period also provided Negley with his first organizational level military experience. Although listed on a military soiree invitation bill as a Captain of Infantry in the Pennsylvania Volunteers in February 1856, his exact date of commissioning is unclear.\(^{22}\) Brigadier General Negley's first experience at brigade
command came in 1859. A political connection appears to account for his rapid rise from
captain to brigadier general. By the eve of the Civil War, Negley was in good standing
with Governor A. G. Curtin of Pennsylvania. Negley commanded the First Brigade of
the Eighteenth Division, Pennsylvania Volunteers and drilled his brigade in training
exercises around Pittsburgh during the summer of the same year.\(^\text{23}\) Another of his
activities during this time period included escorting President-elect Lincoln from arrival
to departure, during a visit to Pittsburgh, 14-16 February 1861.\(^\text{24}\)

The eve of the Civil War found James Scott Negley a relatively experienced
brigadier general of the Pennsylvania Militia. However, he was not familiar with combat
leadership as an officer. He was selected for command in part, it seems, because of his
social, administrative and interpersonal skills in organizing drills and events in Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania.\(^\text{25}\) This administrative acumen played a role in his elevation to
brigade command under General Robert Patterson in the Department of Pennsylvania.\(^\text{26}\)
Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania, displaying confidence in Negley's abilities, called on
him to form forces in Pittsburgh the day after the firing on Fort Sumter.\(^\text{27}\) Negley
organized and took command of two regiments of infantry from Pittsburgh, moved to
Lancaster, Pennsylvania on 29 April 1861, and immediately assumed command of Camp
Johnston. Here he awaited the necessary equipment for active field service and for orders
from General Patterson.\(^\text{28}\) Negley's responsiveness in mustering his troops so quickly had
a down side. While waiting for equipment to arrive, one third of his troops' term of
enlistment expired. This prematurely halted the Army of the Department of Pennsylvania
once campaigning finally began.
General Robert Patterson organized the Army of the Department of Pennsylvania into two divisions and was prepared for action by 16 June 1861. Brigadier General Negley, Pennsylvania Militia, commanded the Fifth Brigade in the 2nd Division of the Army. A fellow brigade commander in the 1st Division was Colonel George Thomas, an officer Negley would serve with and under in the Army of the Ohio and the Army of the Cumberland. Negley and Thomas fought together in the indecisive Battle of Falling Waters on 2 July 1861 against General Thomas J. Jackson. This offensive action encountered only moderate resistance, but provided Negley with his first experience of commanding a brigade in combat, a task he performed well. By 17 July 1861, Patterson's advance to the Shenandoah Valley to hold General J. E. Johnston at Martinsburg had stalled due to the expiration of the three-month terms of enlistment of eighteen of his Pennsylvania regiments. Negley and his soldiers returned home. He mustered out of Pennsylvania service on 20 July 1861.

The Secretary of War recalled Negley into service, this time as a US Volunteer. He was again appointed a brigade commander on 28 August 1861, and authorized to: "raise and organize two regiments of infantry to serve for three years or the war, provided you have them ready for marching orders in thirty days." This is the first indication that the War Department viewed Negley at as an adept officer, capable of independent action. As evidence of his efficiency and zeal, he exceeded his quota and raised a full brigade of three regiments of infantry, the 77th, 78th, and 79th Pennsylvania, and two batteries of artillery. Ordered to move his forces to Louisville, Kentucky, Negley linked up there with General William T. Sherman on 22 October 1861. Major General Alexander McD. McCook became Negley's division commander upon reorganization of
the Army of the Ohio. On 3 December 1861, Negley assumed command of the Seventh Brigade, 2nd Division, Army of the Ohio.33 Only two of his three Pennsylvania regiments remained assigned with him. His Pennsylvania troops were being broken up; familiarity with his subordinates began to erode. The practice of parceling out regiments as they arrived to the varied commands was common during the Civil War. This was a new dynamic for Negley, one he would face for the remainder of his service in the war.34

General Don Carlos Buell, Commander of the Army of the Ohio, was organizing his new forces during the next several months. Little activity occurred during this period except for the movement of the Union forces into southern Kentucky. Although it forced the withdrawal of General Thomas C. Hindman into Tennessee, no major engagement occurred.35 Camp Nevin, near current day Fort Knox, Kentucky, was Negley's station until February of 1862, when his brigade advanced to Franklin, Tennessee.36 Although they never had served together before, Negley must have had a good reputation with Major General Buell. Brigadier General Negley was entering a period of service in which Buell would entrust him with several independent commands.

Negley assumed his first independent command on 15 March 1862 when his brigade was detached from McCook's division and tasked to secure Columbia, Tennessee.37 This assignment precluded his involvement in the Battle of Shiloh, Tennessee, 6-7 April 1862. On 10 May 1862, Negley received orders to seize Rodgersville, Alabama, which was occupied by an enemy brigade.38 The decisive maneuver he displayed during this operation forced the withdrawal of General John Adams' brigade across the Tennessee River, without its' supply and ammunition trains.39 "After severe skirmishing, the enemy was driven, and finally escaped"40 Negley
displayed he was an adept and aggressive commander who required little supervision. Success and mission accomplishment would become routine for Negley and his command.

In a brilliant raid against Chattanooga, Tennessee, in early June 1862, Negley again executed an aggressive and masterful stroke against the Confederate forces in eastern Tennessee. The control of eastern Tennessee, specifically Chattanooga as its main rail hub, was paramount to sustaining the Confederate forces in the region and provided a direct route south for the Union; therefore it was a significant military objective. While General Buell was moving the majority of the Army of the Ohio back to Tennessee from Corinth, Mississippi, Negley, acting independently, attacked from Fayetteville, Tennessee, to Chattanooga, nearly capturing the city and securing a major strategic victory for the Union. Additionally, Negley's maneuver effectively turned General Kirby Smith from Knoxville, forcing him to reorient and move his forces to protect Chattanooga. Negley achieved unanticipated success in this attack. However, his forces were not adequate to exploit the situation. Although he successfully bombarded Chattanooga and secured a ferry crossing opposite the city, near Walden's Ridge, he stopped his attack when he received information of a Confederate force planning to cross the river near Stevenson and threaten Union forces at Fayetteville, Tennessee. Reinforcements were not available and the sizeable Confederate force under General Smith was closing from Knoxville, prepared to relieve the city. Negley withdrew and secured several road networks on the western side of the Tennessee River and positioned forces to influence the immediate crossing sites, guarding against a Confederate pursuit.
It was an opportunity lost; the capture of Chattanooga by the Union would probably have hastened the defeat of the Confederacy.

General Braxton Bragg, commander of Confederate forces in the region, began an offensive during August 1862 that would soon threaten the Union hold on Tennessee and Kentucky. One of Bragg's key bases for this operation would be Chattanooga, so recently threatened by Negley. Bragg was successful in getting some forces across the Tennessee River in early August 1862.\textsuperscript{45} For failing to adequately secure the crossing sites, Negley received a reprimand from Buell.\textsuperscript{46} Although Bragg was concentrating his Army at Chattanooga for two weeks, Buell sent no reinforcements to support Negley's independent brigade. Apparently, General Buell elected not to reinforce Negley's position, instead consolidating his forces around Nashville.\textsuperscript{47} It appears that the fault lies with both Negley and Buell. Negley, it seems, did not request reinforcements, and Buell did not array adequate forces, to hold the crossing sites. As General Buell was concentrating the Army of the Ohio, Negley's forces withdrew and assembled near Columbia, Tennessee, southwest of Nashville.\textsuperscript{48} As a result, the Confederates continued crossing the Tennessee River, unopposed. The majority of August found Negley's command, at its new location in Maury County, Tennessee, fighting skirmishes against the Confederate guerrilla forces of General S. R. Anderson near Kinderhook, Tennessee.\textsuperscript{49}

As Bragg continued his advance into Kentucky, Buell realized that he would have to move his army from Nashville and he entrusted Negley with a critical independent command. Although recently reprimanded by Buell, Negley assumed command of the 8th Division (Independent) and was assigned to defend Nashville, on 14 September
The remainder of the Army of the Ohio under Buell moved towards Louisville, Kentucky to counter the threats of Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith. In Buell's absence, Negley defended his position against numerous attacks. As noted in the 78th Pennsylvania's regimental history, "Nashville was practically in a state of siege, the enemy in considerable force hovering about it, intent upon its capture . . . The garrison was frequently attacked, and sharp fighting ensued." He must have felt as if he was fighting his own war, isolated and unsupported. This trend of independence of action is important to note. It fostered decisiveness and forced him to rely upon his own judgment and analysis. In keeping with his offensive, risk taking nature, in October he organized a spoiling attack upon enemy forces concentrating fifteen miles east of Nashville. This bold attack against Generals S.R Anderson and Nathan B. Forrest at La Vergne, Tennessee, was a complete success.

General Negley inspired and maintained the confidence of his men during the strenuous defense of Nashville. A member of his command relates the feelings of the soldiers during the defense of Nashville: "While besieged in this city [Nashville] affairs wore a gloomy aspect . . . surrounded by a vindictive enemy, resolutely determined to capture the capitol . . . compelled to fight for every mouthful of food we ate, the condition of the garrison [Negley's command] became every day more critical. Yet no one discouraged, and all were determined to stand by the city, with full faith that under the gallant Negley . . . it would be successfully held. Our expectations were not disappointed."

Missing the Battle of Perryville, Negley continued his gallant defense of Nashville until relieved by Major General William S. Rosecrans' main body of the Army,
in the middle of November 1862. Defeating every attack and holding the important base
was a herculean task, one that he energetically undertook.\textsuperscript{55} It was an essential task for
the Army of the Ohio. The loss of this city would have severely hindered the cause of the
Union in the western theater. The failure of Buell to deal a decisive blow to Bragg's
army at Perryville led to his subsequent relief and replacement by Major General William
Rosecrans. For his part, Negley had enjoyed great success and therefore retained his
division command.\textsuperscript{56} Rosecrans would soon consolidate the Army under more
centralized control. Negley's days as an independent commander were numbered; he
would now have to learn how to fight as part of a multiple division force.

After the Battle of Perryville, the Union and Confederate forces displaced to new
locations to refit and reorganize. Bragg's army withdrew to Knoxville. In November
1862, the Confederates moved on foot to Chattanooga, and then by rail to Tullahoma,
where Bragg established its headquarters.\textsuperscript{57} Half way between Bragg's new headquarters
and Nashville was the town of Murfreesboro. This town would draw Rosecrans and
Bragg into conflict on its outskirts. Bragg's Army of Tennessee deployed to positions
around Murfreesboro and held its positions there until 26 December 1862.

Major General Rosecrans reorganized the Army of the Ohio into the Army of the
Cumberland (temporally called the XIV Corps) upon assuming command on 24 October
1862.\textsuperscript{58} He concentrated the Army around Nashville by 4 November 1862, thus securing
his base of supply.\textsuperscript{59} Brigadier General Negley would loose his independence and his 8\textsuperscript{th}
Division became the 2nd Division of the Center Wing of the Army of the Cumberland,
under Major General George Thomas, Center Wing Commander.\textsuperscript{60} The other wings
(corps) were organized as follows: the Left Wing, commanded by Major General
Thomas Crittenden and the Right Wing, commanded by Major General Alexander
McCook. Although Thomas had been serving in the Army of the Ohio, most recently as
its second in command, Negley was an independent brigade and division commander the
majority of the past year, and was not familiar with serving as part of a corps size unit.
During the Battle of Falling Waters in the summer of 1861, Thomas and Negley were
peers; it was the last time they served closely together. Negley would now fight along
side a new group of peers through the Battle of Chickamauga. Thomas probably
respected his 2nd Division commander's ability. After all, Negley was a proven success
as evidenced by his actions at Chattanooga and Nashville. Negley's Division led the
Center Wing and became Thomas' center. Their next fight together would be at Stones
River.

Pressure was mounting for Union action in the western theater to relieve the
Confederate pressure in the eastern theater. Just two weeks after the Union defeat at
Fredericksburg, Virginia, on 25 December 1862, Rosecrans ordered an advance on
Murfreesboro by his newly refitted Army of the Cumberland. The Stones River
Campaign had begun. Negley's division led from the center of Thomas' Center Wing
during the advance to Murfreesboro. Leading for Thomas would become routine for the
2nd Division. During the initial march, on his own initiative, Negley abandoned his
planned camp for the evening and advanced to support General J. C. Davis on his left
flank when he heard the sound of heavy skirmishing. In his first division action
assigned to a corps-sized unit, it appears that Negley maintained his decisiveness, and
clearly appreciated the necessity of adjacent unit support.
By 30 December 1862, the Federal Army arrayed just to the northwest of Murfreesboro. Crittenden's wing led the movement on the north. Negley, of Thomas' wing, was in the advance on the south and formed the initial right flank of the army until McCook's wing moved into position on the right of Negley's division. General Negley then held the central lead position of the Center Wing, and the Army of the Cumberland. The Federal wings formed a line of battle around his division's base. Crittenden's wing was on the left and McCook's on the right. General Philip H. Sheridan tied into Negley's right flank as part of McCook's wing, and on his left flank was General John McAuley Palmer, of Crittenden's wing.

On the morning of 31 December, Negley's command fought bravely and prevented the Union lines from being broken in the center. After four hours of heavy fighting, Sheridan, on Negley's right flank, prematurely withdrew under heavy pressure due to ammunition shortages, leaving the 2nd Division nearly encircled. Seeing the withdrawal of Sheridan, the hopeful Confederates renewed their assault and nearly completed the encirclement of Negley's division, putting the Army of the Cumberland in peril. With great courage and skill, Negley's troops were able to retire while in contact and form a new defensive line to the rear. Negley's account of the action follows: "communication with General Rosecrans or Thomas was entirely cut off, and it was manifestly impossible for my command to hold the position without eventually making a hopeless, fruitless sacrifice of the whole division. To retire was but to cut our way through the ranks of the enemy. The order was given [by Negley] and manfully executed, driving back the enemy in front and checking his approaching column in our rear . . . frequently halting and charging the enemy under a withering fire of musketry."
Poor coordination between McCook and Thomas greatly contributed to the isolation of Negley's division. After continued fierce fighting throughout the day, the Federal troops found themselves pushed back nearly three miles in the south.

However, neither Rosecrans nor Bragg had accomplished his intent for the operation. Bragg's offensive spoiled the offensive plans of Rosecrans and forced the Union army to reconsolidate and establish a hasty defense. Bragg failed to capture his objective, control of the Nashville turnpike. Negley's holding of the Union center was key in this battle, and his actions prevented the defeat of the army on the first day of heavy action. On 1 January 1863, Negley served as a reserve in support of General McCook's Right Wing. Only minor action occurred while Negley served on the Union right. Thomas perceived the increase of Confederate forces opposing the center and ordered Negley to relocate in support the Center Wing.

The next day, he was back in the center of the defense with several other divisions, opposed by General John C. Breckinridge. Negley's division was instrumental in stopping the advance of the Confederates on the east side of Stones River, partly due to the masterful emplacement of artillery covering critical ford sites. In keeping with his proclivity towards the offensive, two of his brigades counterattacked across the river, captured four Southern guns, and seized the colors of the 26th Tennessee Regiment. The pursuit halted; Negley's units returned that evening to the west side of Stones River and assumed the same defensive positions they occupied that morning. Ordered to take command of the army's advance guard on 5 January, Negley pursued the Confederate forces to Murfreesboro. By attacking and dispersing Bragg's rear guard, the Second Division cleared the route for the Army of the Cumberland to move to and
occupy the city. In light of his valiant service at Stones River, Rosecrans recommended Negley for promotion to major general. The favorably considered recommendation resulted in Negley's promotion in March 1863.

Negley learned several important lessons during the Battle of Stones River. First, he learned the near catastrophic result of a break in the line of battle. Sheridan's uncoordinated withdrawal resulted in the near encirclement of the 2nd Division. The Army of the Cumberland was nearly defeated, and saved by the breakout of Negley's division. Secondly, he learned the importance of securing artillery and the ordering of its timely movement the hard way during the withdrawal. On 31 December, he had lost six guns to the enemy advance because they could not move quickly enough during the displacement. Lastly, Negley learned the importance of decisiveness. With no communications with his superiors during the encirclement, Negley chose the action he thought best and executed. It happened to be the right decision in this instance. He would certainly recall these experiences during the Battle of Chickamauga nine months later.

Between January and June 1863, the Army of the Cumberland again reorganized. The Center Wing became the XIV Corps under Thomas, and contained five divisions: 1st Division commanded by General Lovell H. Rousseau, 2nd Division commanded by General James S. Negley, 3rd Division commanded by General Speed S. Fry, 4th Division commanded by General James D. Morgan (on 8 June this unit became the 2nd Division of the Reserve Corps) and 5th Division commanded by General Joseph J. Reynolds. The Right Wing became the XX Corps, commanded by General Alexander McD. McCook, and had three divisions: 1st Division commanded by General Jefferson

26
C. Davis, 2nd Division commanded by General Richard W. Johnson and 3rd Division commanded by General Philip H. Sheridan. Crittenden's XXI Corps, formerly the Left Wing, also had three divisions: 1st Division commanded by General Thomas J. Wood, 2nd Division commanded by General John M. Palmer and 3rd Division commanded by General Samuel Beatty. In May a newly formed Cavalry Corps, commanded by General David S. Stanley, was organized into two divisions: the 1st Division under General Robert B. Mitchell and the 2nd Division under General John B. Turchin. On 8 June a Reserve Corps, commanded by General Gordon Granger, was formed of three divisions: 1st Division commanded by General Absalom Baird, 2nd Division commanded by General James D. Morgan and 3rd Division commanded by General Robert S. Granger.\textsuperscript{78}

For most of the first half of 1863, the Army of the Cumberland occupied itself with planning and building up logistics for an offensive to dislodge Bragg from Tennessee. Action during this period was small in scale and Negley remained in the Murfreesboro area. His division, bloodied during the battle at Stones River, focused on refitting, and Negley seemed to develop a more cautious attitude. Seemingly frustrated with the repeated inability of the army to exploit success and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy, he argued for a coordinated attack with the entire army, including the cooperation of General Ambrose E. Burnside's army in eastern Tennessee, to put pressure on the Confederates simultaneously.\textsuperscript{79} Limited excursions were not encouraging; piecemeal attacks during this period led to the surrender of several Federal brigades including one in XIV Corps. A June raid by Brigadier General Abel Streight against the Western and Atlantic Railroad resulted in the capture of his XIV Corps Provisional Brigade by General Nathan B. Forrest while attempting to reach and cut the railroad near
Rome, Georgia. General Earl Van Dorn's Confederate cavalry forced the surrender of another Federal brigade, under General John Coburn, at Thompson's Station, Tennessee. The failure of the Army of the Cumberland to deal a decisive blow to Bragg's army at Stones River left the task incomplete. By the end of June, another Union offensive commenced.

On 23 June 1863, Rosecrans would begin his attack on Bragg's army, marking the beginning of the Tullahoma Campaign. Negley would begin this campaign with a solid core of veteran regiments and experienced commanders. All but one of his regiments fought at Stones River and seven were under his command during the action. Negley had performed successfully during his division commands. At Nashville, he demonstrated the qualities of tactical patience, flexibility and sound judgment. Stones River illustrated Negley's teamwork, decisiveness and daring. Negley led a seasoned division, with confident leaders on the Tullahoma Campaign.

1 Alfred P. James, General James Scott Negley (Pittsburgh, PA: Western PA Historical Magazine, April 1931), 14:73.


3 James, General James Scott Negley, 70.

4 Warner, History of Allegheny County, 70. The Negley clan was large and very diverse. They all were associated with upper class society. The Mellon name became associated with the family at the marriage of Negley's aunt to Judge Thomas Mellon.

5 James, General James Scott Negley, 70. The Baum family papers are located in the Western Pennsylvania Historical Society and contain many letters and papers of James Scott Negley. Most of these that I have reviewed to date involve the Mexican War period. There is much more information on file but is not yet cataloged.

6 Ibid., 71.

8In common dictionary and encyclopedia reference the science of horticulture is associated with soil, plants, trees and vegetables.

9*Biographical Index of the American Congress, 1744-1949*, 1609.

10Alexander Negley to James Negley, 17 June 1847, at Company K, First Pennsylvania Infantry, Mexico, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA.

11James, *General James Scott Negley*, 70.

12James Scott Negley to Alexander Negley, 10 November 1847, from Jo Lappa, Mexico, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. A detailed sketch of the area of operations as well as terrain analysis was annotated in this letter, for the Battle of Puebla.

13Ibid.

14James Scott Negley to Alexander Negley, May 1847, from Castle La Porta, Mexico, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. Understands and articulates Santa Anna's retreat and disposition and the enemy's center of gravity being Puebla, the supply base for the Mexican Army. Negley states that starving the enemy and making him fight is the best option, rather than an all out hunt for a moving enemy.

15James, *General James Scott Negley*, 71.

16Ibid.

17James Scott Negley to Alexander Negley, May 1847, from Castle La Porta, Mexico, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. Negley was shot in the nose point blank, was burnt in the face. He responded with bayonet and coolly continued to fire. His unit apparently held the position and was commended by his commander.

18Ibid.

19Alexander Negley to James Negley, 17 June 1847, at Company K, First Pennsylvania Infantry, Mexico, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. Negley's uncle states that he will arrange for his discharge
through the Governor of Pennsylvania. This does not occur nor is pursued as best as can be determined.

20 James Scott Negley to Alexander Negley, 10 November 1847, from Jo Lappa, Mexico, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. In his several letters home he is very upbeat and positive in spite of being in fierce fighting and being wounded.

21 James, General James Scott Negley, 71. Negley was noted for his flowers and gardens.

22 Invitation to a Military Soiree for the PA Infantry, 22 February 1856, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. Captain Negley is indicated as one of the managers of this event.

23 Pay Voucher, 16 August 1859, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA. Brigadier General Negley was the commanding officer of the 1st Brigade 18th Division during encampment at Camp Braddock, Pennsylvania. This goes to indicate he was an experienced organizational leader prior to the civil war.

24 James, General James Scott Negley, 70. Negley commanded the activities supporting the escort and parade for President Elect Lincoln.

25 Notes 15, 16 and 17 bear evidence to support his competence in organizing and drilling. This requires administrative savvy.

26 James, General James Scott Negley, 72. Negley was placed in control of the Pittsburgh district by Governor Curtin and was charged with raising troops in that area. He was well received by the populace and was more successful than anticipated.


31 U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 70 vols. in 128 parts. (Washington D C:


34Negley would have only one of his PA Regiments in his division during the Chickamauga Campaign.

35Van Horne, *History or the Army of the Cumberland, Its Organizations, Campaigns, and Battles*, 65.

36Ibid., 66.


38Van Horne, *History or the Army of the Cumberland, Its Organizations, Campaigns, and Battles*, 131-132.


44Van Horne, *History or the Army of the Cumberland, Its Organizations, Campaigns, and Battles*, 132-133.


47Ibid., 355.
48 Ibid., part I, 842-843.


51 Ibid., 204.


57 Ibid., 807.

58 Van Horne, History or the Army of the Cumberland, Its Organizations, Campaigns, and Battles, 207.

59 Ibid., 208.

60 Welcher, The Union Army 1861-1865, Organization and Operations, Vol. 2: The Western Theater, 162. Thomas’ Center was renamed the XIV Corps on January 9, 1863 after the battle of Stones River.


62 Van Horne, History or the Army of the Cumberland, Its Organizations, Campaigns, and Battles, 219-220.


64 Van Horne, History or the Army of the Cumberland, Its Organizations, Campaigns, and Battles, 224.

66 Ibid., 406.

67 Ibid., 407-408.


69 O.R., Series 1, vol.20, part 1, 408.

70 Ibid., 816.

71 Van Horne, *History or the Army of the Cumberland, Its Organizations, Campaigns, and Battles*, 237.


73 Van Horne, *History or the Army of the Cumberland, Its Organizations, Campaigns, and Battles*, 249.

74 Ibid., 250.


77 Ibid., 238.


81 Ibid., 162.
CHAPTER 3

ARRAYED FOR THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

One third of Negley's Second Division, XIV Corps, Army of the Cumberland was new at the outset of the Tullahoma Campaign, and there was a significant change in the brigade level leadership. Although the majority of Negley's regiments remained the same, nearly sixty five percent, since Stones River, only Colonel Timothy R. Stanley's Second Brigade remained intact. During the Tullahoma campaign, Colonel William L. Stoughton temporarily commanded the Second Brigade until Colonel Stanley resumed command in late July. The First Brigade of the 2nd Division served with Negley only a short while at Stones River. Arriving late for the battle, on 3 January 1863, the First Brigade under General James G. Spears served with the division only five months; thereafter it served under General Gordon Granger's Reserve Corps. 1 The assignment and redesignation of General John Beatty's Second Brigade of the 1st Division to First Brigade 2nd Division occurred in early June 1863, and filled the void left by Spears' departure. 2 The Third Brigade retained its organization from Stones River and served with the 2nd Division under the command of General John F. Miller through the middle of June, when Colonel William Sirwell assumed command of the brigade. 3 Miller later received a brigade in McCook's Corps. 4

Only two weeks before the start of the Tullahoma Campaign, Negley found himself with the unfamiliar First Brigade and an untested Third Brigade commander. This chapter will examine the training and experience of the division's units and their commanders, and analyze the actions of the division during the Tullahoma Campaign, 23 June through 16 August 16 1863.
The brigades and regiments that comprised the Second Division, XIV Corps, Army of the Cumberland will be explored to form a basis with which to analyze their actions during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. The First Brigade organized as follows:

**First Brigade, Brigadier General John Beatty**

One Hundred-Fourth Illinois  
Forty-Second Indiana  
Eighty-Eighth Indiana  
Fifteenth Kentucky

Brigadier General John Beatty commanded the First Brigade during the Tullahoma Campaign and the Battle of Chickamauga. He was born near the town of Sandusky, Ohio, on 16 December 1828. Locally educated in the public schools of the area, he rose to a position of prominence in the community. He and his brother founded the Beatty Brothers Bank in 1854 and brother John was a presidential elector from Ohio in 1860. His patriotic character was inspired during the onset of Civil War in April 1861. He raised the companies of the 3rd Ohio Volunteer Infantry, became the regiment's commander, and was serving under General George B. McClellan in the western Virginia Campaign by 26 June 1861. By the early date of 9 July 1861, it is evident that Beatty envisioned the magnitude and protraction of the fledging Civil War: "I am not confident of a speedy termination of the War. These people [Confederates] are in the wrong, but have been made to believe they are in the right---that we [Union forces] are the invaders of their hearthstones . . . That they will fight with desperation, I have no doubt." Beatty
fought in the war until resigning his commission in January 1864, affording his brother the opportunity to fight for the Union while he tended the family banking business.\(^8\)

Newly promoted Colonel Beatty, transferred to Kentucky on 3 November 1861, participated in General Ormsby Mitchel's raid into Tennessee and Alabama and subsequently fought at Perryville in 1862.\(^9\) His first trial as a brigade commander came during the Battle of Stones River where he fought as the Second Brigade commander of Rousseau's First Division, Center Wing.\(^10\) During the fierce fighting of 31 December 1862, Beatty had his horse shot from under him, but he continued to fight gallantly; General McCook personally commended Beatty and his brigade for fighting so well during the battle.\(^11\) With the exception of the Third Ohio Infantry, this seasoned and tested brigade, as well as its commander, took their place as the First Brigade of the 2nd Division just a few weeks before Tullahoma and would continue in this capacity through the Chickamauga Campaign.

**One Hundred-Fourth Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Hapeman**

The Regiment organized at Ottawa, Illinois, and mustered into service 27 August 1862. Ordered to Louisville, Kentucky and assigned to service with the 12th Division, Army of the Ohio until November 1862, it comprised part of the Union garrison protecting the railroad town of Hartsville, Tennessee.\(^12\) General John Morgan's Confederate cavalry forces surrounded the unlucky 104th Regiment while at Hartsville, resulting in its surrender and capture on 7 December 1862. The press censured Colonel Absalom Moore, commander of the 104th Illinois, and a negative air surrounded the unit's performance.\(^13\) The paroled unit spent the next five months in Chicago, Illinois, performing duty as prisoners of war until officially exchanged in April 1863.\(^14\)
Ordered to Murfreesboro, Tennessee under Colonel Moore, their old commander, the regiment served in Beatty's brigade beginning on 8 June 1863.\textsuperscript{15} Charges were preferred against the commander by a subordinate officer for "ill will" in the regiment resulting in the convening of a court martial in late July, thus ending Moore's command.\textsuperscript{16} Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Hapeman replaced Colonel Moore after the Tullahoma campaign. As part of the First Brigade, Second Division throughout the remainder of the occupation of middle Tennessee, the Tullahoma Campaign and the Chickamauga Campaign, the unit performed well. The unit was involved in a fratricide incident with Reynolds' division during the Tullahoma Campaign near Hoover's Gap, and at Elk River skirmished admirably, but saw little action overall during this campaign.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Forty-Second Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel William T. B. McIntire}

Mustered into service at Evansville, Indiana, on 9 October 1861, the Forty-Second Indiana was ordered to Kentucky for duty and served as part of the Army of the Ohio until November 1862, and continued service in the redesignated Army of the Cumberland through the Chickamauga Campaign.\textsuperscript{18} The 42nd Indiana, as part of the 17th Brigade, participated in the capture of Decatur, Alabama and the Battle of Perryville under General Lovell H. Rousseau's 3rd Division of the First Corps, Army of the Ohio.\textsuperscript{19} Assigned to First Division, Right Wing, Army of the Cumberland from December 1862 to April 1863 the Forty-Second fought under the 2nd Brigade of General Jefferson C. Davis' division during the Battle of Stones River.\textsuperscript{20} Reassigned in April 1863, the 42nd Indiana remained a part of Beatty's brigade in Negley's division through the Battle of Chickamauga.
Assigned to Thomas' corps during the occupation of middle Tennessee until June 1863, the Regiment assembled and practiced its drill. A company commander of the 42nd Indiana noted, "The time spent at Murfreesboro was to good advantage. There . . . General Thomas, taught us corps drill in person." The day of 24 June 1863 saw the army breaking camp and beginning the march against Tullahoma and Bragg's Confederate Army. No major battle occurred during the Tullahoma Campaign for the 42nd Regiment, but during the movement: "there was not a mile . . . on this march that was not fought or skirmished over by some part of the brigade."^{22}

Eighty-Eighth Indiana, Colonel George Humphrey

The Eighty-Eighth Indiana entered service at Fort Wayne, Indiana on 29 August 1862 and received orders sending it to Louisville, Kentucky the same day. As part of the 17th Brigade of Rousseau's division, it fought alongside its sister from Indiana, the Forty-Second, at Perryville. Reassigned to Jefferson C. Davis' division in November 1862, it fought on the Union Right Wing during the Battle of Stones River. By April 1863, it was ordered to report to Beatty's brigade in the 2nd Division. The 88th Indiana served as part of Negley's division through the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns.^{23}

The regiment encountered only minor skirmishing during the Tullahoma Campaign.

Fifteenth Kentucky, Colonel Marion C. Taylor

Organized and attached to the Army of the Ohio at New Haven, Kentucky on 14 December 1861, the Fifteenth Kentucky Infantry served as part of the 17th Brigade until after the Battle of Perryville in the fall of 1862. The 15th Kentucky fought at Stones River as part of the 2nd Brigade of General J. C. Davis' division. The regiment served in
the First Brigade of Negley’s division from April 1863 through the Chickamauga
Campaign. As a part of Beatty’s brigade during the march to Tullahoma, the regiment
was engaged in skirmishing near Hoover’s Gap and encountered minor action at Elk
River.

The First Brigade had a solid record of performance through the summer of 1863.
Three fourths of the brigade had fought together for the majority of the war, Perryville
and Stones River being its two most recent large battles. The 104th Regiment was the
untested quarter of the brigade, and it had an unglamorous past. A mixture of
experienced and green troops provided a challenge for John Beatty. General Negley and
General Beatty were similar sorts; they were volunteer officers who had received no
formal military training. Their relationship did not seem strained and a mutual trust
appeared evident from the beginning of their service together; Beatty and Negley had
solid reputations in the army as sound leaders.

Second Brigade, Colonel William L. Stoughton, Colonel Timothy R. Stanley

Nineteenth Illinois

Eleventh Michigan

Eighteenth Ohio

Sixty-Ninth Ohio

Colonel Timothy R. Stanley began his military service in the Eighteenth Ohio
Infantry where he received his commission on 29 May 1861. A native of Hartford,
Connecticut, he moved in 1815 to Marietta, Ohio, where he served in the lower branch of
the Ohio General Assembly. The two years preceding the outbreak of the Civil War
found him serving as a Senator in the Ohio State Legislature. Stanley initially raised a
three month regiment, the 18th Ohio Volunteers, by the end of April 1861 at Parkersburg, Ohio. This regiment served its term of service as railroad guards for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Parkersburg, Ohio, and Charleston, West Virginia. Later he actively sought, and attained an appointment in the three year Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers as its colonel. Simeon Nash, Adjutant General of Ohio, and Ohio Governor William Dennison tried to rescind Stanley’s reappointment as colonel of the regiment in August of 1861, as it might have damaged the Republican prospects in the upcoming election; Stanley was a Republican. In addition, the Governor and Adjutant General of Ohio regarded Stanley as unqualified to hold the post, and held that Stanley had only acquired it by begging.

Stanley served with the 18th Ohio Infantry until promoted to command the 29th Brigade of Negley's Eighth Division during the defense of Nashville in the fall of 1862. His first major battle as a brigade commander came at Stones River; he performed gallantly and received a brevet to brigadier general for his actions during the fight. Stanley's old regimental mate, Colonel William L. Stoughton, routinely assumed command when aged Stanley, then 58 years old, became ill or wounded. Of note, this temporary replacement occurred during the Tullahoma Campaign and the afternoon of the battle on 20 September 1863. The two men had worked together for several years and the transition apparently had little negative effect on the brigade's performance.

**Nineteenth Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Raffen**

Organized from four separate Chicago companies mustered into Illinois state service at Camp Yates on 4 May 1861, the 19th Regiment formed from these companies on 17 June 1861 at Chicago. As the regiment completed a detail of provost and railroad...
guard duty in the Department of the Missouri, on 17 September 1861, a tragic railroad accident killed 129 of its number during a transfer for service in Washington, D. C. This tragedy resulted in the rescinding of their transfer orders and reassignment to the Eighth Brigade, Army of the Ohio in December 1861. Serving officially as unattached railroad guards, the 19th Regiment was under the direction of Negley during his expedition against Chattanooga in June 1862. As part of the 29th Brigade, the unit again served under Negley in the 8th Division, for the three month defense of Nashville in the fall of 1862.31

After the reorganization of the Army by Rosecrans in the fall of 1862, the 19th Illinois remained assigned to the 2nd Brigade of Negley's division through the Battle of Chickamauga. At Stones River, the Regiment performed well as part of the division, and on the final day of battle, participated with four of its sister regiments, in a daring attack on the Confederate right.32 The regiment, led by Zouave Officers, had a fierce reputation for close order bayonet charges, and they had trained in the French style drill for this purpose. A trooper of the regiment noted with pride: "Let me say right now that no regiment . . . of anywhere near equal size had any business with the 19th Illinois at close quarters . . . It was the only regiment in the whole army [Army of the Cumberland] drilled in the French bayonet drill . . . and this gave them a confidence nothing could shake."33 Little activity of note occurred with the 19th Regiment during the Tullahoma Campaign, they had to wait until Chickamauga to again test their ferocity.

Eleventh Michigan, Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Mudge

The Eleventh Michigan organized for service at White Pigeon, Michigan 24 September 1861. The regiment performed railroad guard duty for the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad until July 1862 and participated in several actions against Morgan's Confederate cavalry during the summer of 1862. Participating in Negley's defense of Nashville, in the fall of 1862, the formally unattached Eleventh Michigan served in the 29th Brigade, Eighth Division during this action. In November 1862, the 11th Michigan was assigned to the Second Brigade of Negley's 2nd Division where it would continue to serve through the Chickamauga Campaign. The regiment fought valiantly at Stones River and saw minimal action during the Tullahoma Campaign.

**Eighteenth Ohio, Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Grosvenor**

The Eighteenth Ohio formed between 16 August and 4 November 1861, commencing at Athens, and concluding at Camp Dennison, Ohio. Attached to the Eighth Brigade, Army of the Ohio through the summer of 1862, the regiment's assignments mainly entailed performing rail guard and provost duties at Elizabethtown and Bacon Creek, Kentucky. The Eleventh saw action against dismounted Confederate cavalry in August 1862 while securing a stockade; "Forrest . . . dismounted nine hundred of his men before making the attempt [attack on the 18th Ohio]. The Rebels were soon repulsed with the loss of about one hundred men without the loss of a man on our [18th Ohio] side." Assigned to defend Nashville from September through November 1862, the regiment became a part of the Twenty-Ninth Brigade, in Negley's Eighth Division. The regiment fought at Stones River under the Second Brigade of Negley's division, where it would remain assigned through the Chickamauga Campaign. During the march on Tullahoma, the regiment saw little action with the enemy.
Sixty-Ninth Ohio, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Brigham

The 69th Ohio Infantry was detached from Stanley's brigade after the Tullahoma Campaign and served as part of Colonel Daniel McCook's Second Brigade, Second Division, Reserve Corps until 21 September 1863. During Tullahoma, the regiment did not see much activity, other than marching; it did not engage in any battles of significance. Absent from the battle at Chickamauga, this regiment will not be examined in detail. It served at Cowan, Tennessee, throughout this period as rail guards, and had little enemy action in its area of operations.

The Second Brigade, the smallest in the division after Tullahoma, had been a part of Negley's division since the summer of 1862, and Stanley served as the brigade commander throughout that period. The brigade fought well during the defense of Nashville, and turned in a solid performance at Stones River; it was the most experienced in the division. Negley and Stanley were both politically active in their respective states, Pennsylvania and Ohio, were volunteer officers, and had received no formal military training. The Second Brigade entered the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns as a cohesive, tested and experienced unit.

Third Brigade, Colonel William Sirwell

Thirty-Seventh Indiana

Twenty-First Ohio

Seventy-Fourth Ohio

Seventy-Eighth Pennsylvania

Colonel William Sirwell began his association with the United States Army at birth, being born the son of the armorer at the Allegheny arsenal, Pennsylvania, on 20
August 1820. At age nineteen he began his affiliation with the Pennsylvania Militia, entering the service in 1839. He commanded four companies of the militia and served for ten years as the brigade inspector for Armstrong County, Pennsylvania. A brief stint in Iowa afforded him the opportunity to raise the first military company of the state in 1854. In 1855, he returned from Iowa and raised the first colored company of troops in the United States, called the Hannibal Guards, at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Settling in Kittanning, Pennsylvania that same year, he commanded the Brady Alpines, an infantry company, until the outbreak of the Civil War. His was the first company in Western Pennsylvania to offer its services to the United States at the outbreak of the Civil War.\textsuperscript{40} General Negley commanded Sirwell's troops while serving with General Robert Patterson's command in the spring of 1861; their superior-subordinate relationship continued until October of 1863. Sirwell commanded the Seventy-Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment from its formation in the summer of 1861 through the battle at Stones River. As a reward for his service during this battle, Colonel Sirwell became the Provost Marshall at Murfreesboro, and subsequently Third Brigade Commander, 2nd Division.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{Thirty-Seventh Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel William D. Ward}

The Thirty-Seventh Indiana mustered into service at Lawrenceburg, Indiana, 18 September 1861, and performed guard duty for the Army of the Ohio, at Salt River and Bacon Creek, Kentucky, until February 1862. The regiment then served with the Eighth Brigade, 3rd Division, Army of the Ohio and in the spring of 1862 participated in the capture of Huntsville and Decatur, Alabama. After a short period in the summer of 1862 as rail guards, the regiment moved to Nashville, and there fought under Negley's command during the fall of 1862, defending that city. Through the Chickamauga
Campaign of 1863, the Thirty-Seventh remained a part of Negley's division under the 3rd Brigade.\textsuperscript{42}

The 37th Indiana fought well during Stones River and participated in some skirmishing during the Tullahoma Campaign.

\textbf{Twenty-First Ohio, Lieutenant Colonel Dwella M. Stoughton, Major Archibald McMahan, Captain Charles H. Vantine}

Originally a three month regiment, on 19 September 1861, at Findley, Ohio, the Twenty-First Ohio Infantry was reorganized as a three year regiment and from there was assigned to General Thomas' command in the Army of the Ohio where it drilled and performed guard functions in Kentucky.\textsuperscript{43} Reassigned to the Ninth Brigade of General O. M. Mitchell's 3rd Division, Army of the Ohio, in December 1861, "the Twenty-First marched [in February 1862] on Bowling Green [Kentucky], driving the Rebels from that strong position."\textsuperscript{44} By late spring, the regiment actively participated in Mitchell's raids in northern Alabama, and played an instrumental role in the capture of Huntsville.\textsuperscript{45}

Lieutenant Colonel Dwella M. Stoughton, the commander, started the war as a first lieutenant in Company A of the regiment, but did not distinguish himself. However, the most noted of the officers in this command became Major McMahan. His performance of duty proved exemplary and he received commendations from Rosecrans and Negley; several for his unit's gallant performances at Nashville and Stones River, and one promoting him to major.\textsuperscript{46} This able officer commanded the 21st Ohio at Chickamauga on 20 September.

July of 1862 found the regiment brigaded under Negley's 7th Independent Brigade, and subsequently formed a part of the newly created 8th Division for the Union
defense of Nashville, occurring later in the same year. The 21st Ohio would fight as part of Third Brigade of Negley's 2nd Division from November 1862 through October 1863. The regiment fought bravely at Stones River and was key in executing a daring raid against Confederate forces serving under General Breckinridge. Scheduled for reorganization as a mounted force in April 1863, the horses did not materialize and the regiment remained on foot. While refitting at Murfreesboro in preparation for the Tullahoma Campaign, eight of the regiment's companies received the Colt revolving rifle and the other two companies received Enfield rifles. The new arms dramatically increased the rate of fire for the men of the 21st Ohio, which proved providential at Chickamauga.

The small skirmishes that occupied the regiment throughout the Tullahoma Campaign did not afford the men an adequate test of their new weaponry.

**Seventy-Fourth Ohio, Captain Joseph Fisher**

Organized at Xenia, Ohio, 5 October 1861 to 27 March 1862, by late April the Seventy-Fourth Ohio took the field at Nashville, where it drilled and conducted provost duty. It remained in service at Nashville during its siege by the Confederates in the fall of 1862. The 74th Ohio served with the Third Brigade of Negley's division from December 1862 to October 1863. The regiment fought gallantly during the Battle of Stones River, losing one hundred and fifty five men of the three hundred and eighty with which it entered battle. During the advance to Tullahoma on 23 June, the regiment saw action at Hoover's Gap.
Seventy-Eighth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Blakely

Organized at Camp Orr, near Kittanning, Pennsylvania, beginning on 14 August 1861, the regiment moved to Pittsburgh on 14 October 1861 and formed part of General Negley's Brigade. As part of the brigade, it moved to Louisville, Kentucky where it became a part of General Buell's Army of the Ohio. It served with Negley's 7th Independent Brigade on numerous expeditions and security operations through the summer of 1862. On 7 October 1862, during the defense of Nashville, the regiment assaulted General Anderson's Confederate forces at LaVergne, "routing the rebel force, capturing some men, with guns, stores, provisions . . . the Seventy-Eighth play[ed] a conspicuous part." Due to the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland in December 1862, the 78th Pennsylvania became a part of the Third Brigade of Negley's 2nd Division, where it remained until October 1863. In the desperate fight at Stones River, the regiment suffered the loss of one hundred ninety men killed and wounded, and was instrumental in the successful stand of the Second Division, on the first day of battle. During the Tullahoma Campaign, the regiment saw little action, with the exception of small-scale skirmishes.

The Third Brigade was the second most experienced unit in the division. The Third Brigade of the Second Division traced its lineage to Negley's independent 7th Brigade, Army of the Ohio. Two of the four regiments, the 78th Pennsylvania and 21st Ohio, formed the brigade commanded by Negley, and the other two regiments, the 37th Indiana and 74th Ohio, joined the unit at Nashville in the summer of 1862 after service as unattached rail guards and provost duty, respectively. Serving with Negley since the fall
of 1862, the third brigade performed well during the defense of Nashville and the Battle of Stones River. The only thing new about the brigade before Tullahoma and Chickamauga was its commander, Sirwell, and he had proven himself capable and gallant thus far. Intimately familiar with, and confident in, Colonel Sirwell, his new Third Brigade commander, Negley probably had little anxiety over the preparedness of the Third Brigade.

Artillery, Captain Frederick Schutz

Illinois Light, Bridges' Battery, Captain Lyman Bridges

The battery organized at Nashville, Tennessee, on 14 January 1863, from Company G, 19th Illinois Infantry and was attached to the Pioneer Brigade, Army of the Cumberland until June 1863. It served with Beatty's First Brigade, 2nd Division, from the end of June 1863 through the Chickamauga Campaign.54

First Ohio Light, M Battery, Captain Frederick Schutz

M Battery, First Regiment Ohio Light Artillery, organized at Camp Dennison, Ohio, on 3 December 1861. Assigned to the Army of the Ohio in December of 1861, the battery served as part of the Artillery Reserve, Army of the Ohio. Assigned to the Eighth Division in September 1862, the battery remained a part of Negley's division through October 1863.

First Ohio Light, G Battery, Captain Alexander Marshall

G Battery, First Regiment Ohio Light Artillery, organized near Cincinnati, Ohio, on 17 December 1861. Assigned to the Army of the Ohio in February of 1862, the battery served as the 5th Division Artillery and as part of the Artillery Reserve, Army of
the Ohio. Assigned to Negley's division in September 1862, the battery remained a part of his division through October 1863.\textsuperscript{55}

The units of the Second Division, as was typical, had a varied number of experiences on the eve of Tullahoma Campaign. The division would not fight a major battle together as a unit during this period, and would accomplish little drill and training prior to the commencement of the Chickamauga Campaign. Marches, skirmishing, and small unit actions occupied the division from late June through early July 1863. Refit and resupply were the hallmarks for most of July and the first half of August 1863, when the army began its march to Chattanooga on 16 August, by way of Chickamauga. The road to Chickamauga for the Second Division began at Murfreesboro on 23 June 1863.

General Rosecrans' prerequisites for commencing the advance on General Bragg's Confederate forces at Shelbyville and Tullahoma were first the establishment of a supply depot at Murfreesboro, and secondly the organization of an adequate cavalry force to protect his lines of communication and enable him to exploit success and pursue the enemy. Although scheduled to be part of the increased cavalry force, the 21st Ohio of Negley's division would not get its horses in time for the Tullahoma campaign, and it remained on foot through the battle at Chickamauga Creek. By 1 May 1863, the establishment and security of the supply depot was completed and the cavalry was minimally prepared on 15 June 1863.\textsuperscript{56}

The Federal plan for the advance on Bragg's forces was sound. Rosecrans enjoyed a numerical advantage during the operation; he had 56,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry to Bragg's 30,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry.\textsuperscript{57} Rosecrans' design to turn the Confederate forces west by maneuvering General David S. Stanley's Cavalry Corps and
the Reserve Corps of General Granger around the Confederate southern flank towards Shelbyville effectively deceived Bragg as to the Federal main effort. The main effort consisted of three infantry corps: in the south General McCook's XX Corps feinted around Liberty Gap, in the center General Thomas' XIV Corps moved through Hoover's Gap and on to Manchester, and to the north General Crittenden's XXI Corps advanced by way of Bradyville to Manchester.\textsuperscript{58}

Opposing the Union forces were two Confederate infantry corps and two cavalry corps. General William J. Hardee defended to the north and east around Wartrace and Fairfield, controlling the approaches from Liberty and Bellbuckle Gaps. To the south and west, General Leonidas Polk's Corps defended Shelbyville and the approaches from the west and Guy's Gap. The two infantry corps picketed the northeastern approaches while the cavalry corps of General Nathan B. Forrest and General Joseph Wheeler screened the west and northeast, respectively.\textsuperscript{59}

On 24 June, Negley's division commenced the attack as the reserve of the XIV Corps, and served as such until his commitment on 2 July to secure a ford and bridge on the Elk River.\textsuperscript{60} As the division traveled through Hoover's Gap on 26 June, it found the enemy's forces withdrawn from their forward positions at the mouth of the gap. Negley's task was to support the divisions of General Reynolds and Rousseau, as necessary. The first commitment of the division was piecemeal and only involved General Beatty's First Brigade.

As the soldiers of the 2nd Division began their movement through Hoover's Gap the sound of cannonading and musket fire from four miles distant caught their attention. Negley emplaced artillery to protect his infantrymen as they traversed the dangerous
defile, although cleared earlier by two other divisions. However, the first to march to the sound of the guns was the First Brigade. Negley, as directed by Thomas, ordered Beatty to support Colonel John T. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry near Hillsboro on 28 June. As the First Brigade began its foot march to render support, its commander anxiously hoped for little action. The next day Beatty's troops were tested by a charge of General Wheeler's cavalry to which the brigade responded by forming a battle line, advanced and forced the withdraw of the Confederate forces. Moving to link up with Negley's division that afternoon, Beatty's Brigade received heavy artillery fire and long-range musket fire from Reynolds' division. This fratricide incident resulted in no damage to either party, aside from it being an unnerving experience.

Reunited, Negley's division engaged in reconnaissance activities and prepared to resume the advance the next morning. Moving down Winchester Road, the division engaged in skirmishing and action with the enemy throughout the day on 1 July. The Confederate forces, driven back seven miles by the advance, took up positions on a ridge to the north side of Elk River overlooking a ford and controlling a bridge. That evening the division conducted a movement to contact with two regiments of the Third Brigade, to positively determine the disposition of the Confederate forces opposing them. The Confederate forces opposing Negley had "three pieces of artillery commanding the ford, supported by a strong force of cavalry and infantry." General Thomas ordered Negley to hold the ford and capture an adjacent bridge in order to distract and occupy the enemy, while the XIV Corps' remaining three divisions crossed the Elk River at another site to the north. The plan was a success; Negley captured the bridge and forced the enemy to abandon its resistance at the ford.
while maintaining constant pressure on the Confederates, thereby fixing them.64 All three brigades engaged the enemy forces throughout the day and were successful in holding their positions and keeping the enemy at bay. Throughout his operations in the Tullahoma Campaign, Negley effectively utilized two attached cavalry regiments from General Stanley's Division; they returned to their parent command on 3 July. This cavalry aided Negley in his reconnaissance and allowed for his informed employment of troops. The results of the campaign illustrate this point through the division's success: the divisional losses included two killed, five wounded and two missing, while the division captured sixty two of the enemy and killed an undetermined number while maintaining the initiative.65

Although no major battles occurred, the actions of the Tullahoma Campaign provided the 2nd Division its first opportunity to operate as a whole. Successful at all levels of the Army of the Cumberland, the campaign served to bolster morale and provided the Union forces with a feather in their caps.

The Army of the Cumberland now warranted a period of supply and refit. The effects of excessive heat, rain and mud had tired the horses and men throughout the campaign. Negley reflected on the movement of his division: "rain commenced falling, which continued . . . My march was rendered very slow and difficult in consequence of the roughness of the road, which was very badly cut up."66 The First Brigade commander reported on the condition of his men: "nearly 50 of my men have fallen down in the woods and along the roadside, utterly exhausted; quite a number of them were carried to the rear in a state of insensibility, from effects of the extreme heat."67 The Army
consolidated at Decherd, encamped and prepared for the pending advance on Chattanooga.

Arriving at Decherd on 7 July 1863, the division began its preparations for another campaign with great confidence. While camped at Decherd, Negley's troops must have felt they had the Confederates on the run. Beatty noted, "Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Tennesseans have deserted from the Southern army and are now wandering about in the mountains, endeavoring to get to their homes . . . My command has gathered up hundreds and the mountains and coves . . . are . . . full of them." colonel Stanley collected Confederate slaves at Huntsville, Alabama during the middle of July, and provided another boost for the troops morale: "General [Brevet] Stanley has returned . . . bringing with him about one thousand . . . negroes. This is a blow to the enemy in the right place. Deprived of slave labor, the [Confederate] whites will be compelled to send home [their soldiers]." Negley's division's spirits were high and they were ready to fight. In about a month they commenced their movement over the mountains to face Bragg's Confederate army.

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5Ibid., 27.

7 Ibid., 19.


16 Ibid., 304.


20 Ibid., 818.

22 Ibid., 186.


24 Ibid., 1204.


33 James Fenton Diary (Reminiscence), Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, IL.


35 Ibid., 1504.


41Ibid.


43Ibid., 1506.


45Ibid.

46Ibid., 149-150.


50Ibid., 148.

51Dyer, *A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion*, Part II. (Des Moines,

53 Ibid., 1032.


55 Ibid., 1485.


62 Ibid., 445.

63 Ibid., 443.

64 Ibid., 444.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., 442.

67 Ibid., 446.


69 Ibid., 303.
CHAPTER 4

16 AUGUST 1863 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1863

High spirits abounded in the Army of the Cumberland during the summer of 1863. Union forces defeated the Confederates at Gettysburg and captured Vicksburg, giving the Union the initiative in the east and control of the entire Mississippi river system in the west. The missing piece of the Union arch of victory remained Chattanooga; the keystone controlled by the Confederate States became the objective of the Army of the Cumberland in August of 1863.

General Negley's division began its move from camps at Decherd at 10:00 A.M. on 16 August. Well rested and supplied after the Tullahoma Campaign, the troops made an uneventful advance to the banks of Crow Creek, three miles from Stevenson, Alabama. Arriving on 21 August, the troops continued many of the administrative activities that occupied their time at Decherd. The brigade commanders busied themselves with interviewing applicants for commissions as officers in the new colored troop units and processing Confederate deserters.¹

The Second Division was the vanguard for the XIV Corps, and cut the trail over Sand and Lookout Mountains. After being encamped at Cave Springs, between Bridgeport and Stevenson, Alabama, for several days, Negley's division moved to his crossing site on 31 August and began crossing the Tennessee River at Caperton's Ferry on 1 September 1863.² The crossing of the division took all day, from 6:30 in the morning to 10:30 that night, but was unopposed. Stanley's Brigade led the crossing, followed by Sirwell's troops. Beatty, ordered to relieve one of Sheridan's brigades at Stevenson on 30 August, joined the division on the afternoon of 1 September and was the
last of the division to cross the river. The morning of 2 September found the troops marching to Bridgeport, Alabama, following the east bank of the river towards the army's bridge at Bridgeport, and encamping at Moore's Spring, Alabama, for the evening.³

The east bank of the Tennessee River crossing, at Bridgeport, proved to be a choke point for the XIV Corps. Negley, crowded out but Sheridan's command, found the camp location inadequate to support two divisions with water. In addition, the only food on the east bank was what he brought, enough for his command, but inadequate to supply Sheridan's troops who brought none of their own.⁴ The situation was soon redressed when General Thomas gave his lead division its marching orders: "You can see . . . that it is General Rosecrans' wish to seize Stevens' Gap at a point where the road through Johnson's Crook passes across Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove. Therefore, I want your division to move by the most direct route to where Johnson's Crook road turns off from the main Lookout Valley road."⁵

The Second Division marched on the road to Trenton, Georgia on the morning of 3 September. The troops had changed their direction of march to the southeast when they were opposite the Bridgeport crossing site. The terrain was difficult and Sand Mountain proved a challenge to quick movement. The route, found in ill repair, required the entire division to labor at making it passable for the trains. Sirwell's brigade preceded the division and constructed a 121 foot bridge near Warren's Mill, allowing for unhindered movement along the route. To accomplish this task the Seventy-Eighth Pennsylvania disassembled a sawmill, and from it constructed the bridge.⁶

A cautious and thorough movement of the division followed. The van of the division continued to be Sirwell's 3rd Brigade. Tasked to conduct a route reconnaissance
for the division, Sirwell organized two infantry regiments and a section of artillery for this purpose. The men started without their knapsacks, to lighten the load for the scouting mission, as the weather was hot and humid. The 78th Pennsylvania and 21st Ohio proceeded forward and captured an iron works along with assorted supplies and sundries at various mills during the advance, and the 78th Pennsylvania remained to secure the iron works while Sirwell continued to Trenton with the remainder of the brigade in the advance guard.

Negley reported the results of his reconnaissance on 5 September, to Thomas: "the most intelligent citizens [report] that reinforcements are arriving at Chattanooga; that extensive [enemy] preparations are being made to resist our [Federal] approach . . . The impression the enemy has of our movements is that our force was divided [in crossing the Tennessee River], diverging widely to flank on the north and south simultaneously; that Bragg was preparing to meet these wings in detail." No changes to the Federal plan resulted from the information in this report; the orders to the Second Division, of 3 September, stood as issued. Divided, the Federal army crossed Lookout Mountain, supporting the Confederate plan of attack.

A day later, on 6 September 1863, the division arrived on the southwestern side of Johnson Crook on Lookout Mountain. They had traveled thirty-four miles, repaired approximately thirteen miles of road and built one bridge. Beatty's First Brigade was the first to arrive at the foot of the mountain. The First Brigade commander immediately sent the Forty-Second Indiana up the mountain to clear enemy forces that might have been observing his moves, while the remainder of the division camping a few miles to the rear. On the military crest, facing west, Confederate pickets engaged the men of the 42nd
Regiment as they moved up the mountain, wounding one man in the leg. The Federal regiment returned to camp at the base of the mountain after the engagement. The situation developed by the Forty-Second required a more robust reconnaissance. The next morning, Beatty advanced up the mountain with his entire brigade and reached the summit without incident; evidently, the Confederate pickets withdrew to the east during the night or early morning.

The route up the mountain proved impracticable for trains and artillery, and again Negley employed the makeshift pioneers of Sirwell's brigade. By noon on 7 September, the Second and Third Brigades arrived on the summit without the divisional trains and artillery, the slope and rutted conditions of the road being too great for efficient movement of the wagons ascending the western slope. Sirwell deployed his command to the task of repairing the road up Lookout Mountain for two days. By the afternoon of 8 September, about thirty hours later, without accident, the road received the heavy trains and artillery of the division. The route repair conducted by the division would prove invaluable; the quick movement of follow on forces, using this trail, would save the division in a few days.

The mission of the division was to take Stevens' Gap. In his estimate of the situation, it appeared Negley was uncomfortable in descending the eastern slope of Lookout Mountain. McLemore's Cove, at the base of the mountain, is a sort of cul-de-sac with rolling terrain and he knew it would be difficult to quickly move troops over the mountain. The summit of Lookout Mountain could accommodate another division; two divisions then could descend the mountain simultaneously. Negley requested guidance from his corps commander as to the recommended method for securing the varied road
network at the base of Steven's and Cooper's Gaps; Thomas hastily rebuked him, and directed Negley to take Stevens Gap and not to worry about his exposed flank at Coopers Gap: "Your dispatch received. The general directs that you follow out instructions received, and take and hold Steven's Gap. The roads can be worked afterward." 13

Although he encountered no enemy forces during the day, Negley remained wary and disregarded what he apparently viewed as General Thomas' imprudent guidance. He ordered the First Brigade to seize and hold Coopers Gap, and he sent Colonel Stoughton's Eleventh Michigan to clear and seize Stevens' Gap simultaneously. The displacing Confederate cavalry had obstructed the later with several abatis. 14

Illustrative of a prudent commander, Negley did not want to deploy his entire division into McLemore's Cove from the same exit point. However, he did not press the important issue of security and mutually supporting divisions with his superior. By late afternoon on 9 September, Beatty, with his entire brigade, entered the cove via Coopers Gap and Negley moved the remainder of the division through Stevens Gap with Stanley in the van, resulting in a three mile front for the division. Colonel Stanley conducted an area reconnaissance east from the foot of the mountain and soon encountered a substantial Confederate cavalry screen. Negley's escort charged the cavalry force, assisting Stanley's brigade in driving the Confederate forces for three and one half miles. Feeling anxious, the command emplaced their pickets and camped for the evening in anticipation of moving on La Fayette in the morning, once Baird's division arrived in support. However, support did not arrive on the tenth.

Three things seemed to have greatly affected the ill advised decision for the Second Division to proceed as ordered towards La Fayette on the morning of 10

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September 1863. First, the health of General Negley possibly affected his judgment in a challenging situation. Secondly, the failure of Baird's troops to arrive as scheduled threw the operation out of synchronization. Lastly, two poor decisions of the leadership placed the unit at risk; failure of the corps and army commanders to readjust the plan based upon the new situation developing to their front, and to resource the advanced and isolated division with cavalry.

Tough marching and poor diet caught up with General Negley and manifested itself as a physical debilitation. During his stay in McLemores Cove on 10 September until the end of September the division commander was ill. Negley probably suffered from dysentery, which worsened throughout the campaign and left him greatly fatigued and dehydrated. He elected to remain in command against the recommendation of the corps surgeon who described his condition as an "inflammation of the bowls." To what degree his judgment and ability degraded is a point of speculation, but certainly, he operated with less efficiency. The normally cautious and judicious commander decided to move on Lafayette without his reinforcements at hand. This decision seems out of character for the normally prudent Negley. Pressure from his superiors and a belated linkup with Baird perhaps bore more weight upon the sick commander's judgment than it could handle.

General Baird, ordered to join and move with Negley on 8 September, still had not arrived by the evening of the ninth. Apparently, wringing his hands in disgust that Negley had not waited for him on the west side of the mountain, and busying himself with reporting the supposed improprieties of the Second Division and the XIV Corps, Baird took his time closing the gap with the Second Division. In that the roads had
been cleared of enemy and repaired by the Second Division, it appears that Baird had no obvious reason for his tardiness. Thomas grew anxious and again on the ninth directed Baird to march as far as possible to effect the belated linkup with Negley. ¹⁷ He would finally arrive four days late, on 11 September.

Thomas had an accurate assessment painted for them by the Second Division by 9 September, but he did not forcefully make the point to his commander, that advancing would place the division a risk; Negley's division would end up going it alone. On 9 September 1863 at 1:30 P.M., Negley made the following report to his corps commander: "a rebel force of three or four divisions, including infantry, artillery and cavalry, moved up to Dug Gap, over Pigeon Ridge, last night . . . they are making preparations there to resist our advance."¹⁸ Thomas forwarded this report to Rosecrans the same evening; the plan did not change.

Pressured by Rosecrans to move quickly towards La Fayette, Thomas passed the order to Negley to move forward; it resulted in having over a quarter of the XIV Corps isolated and forward of the entire Army. ¹⁹ Thomas ordered Negley to march on La Fayette on the morning of 10 September. ²⁰ The mission sent to Negley was acknowledged 8:30 P.M. on the evening of 9 September: "Your order directing me to march to La Fayette to-marrow [sic] has just been received. I will start at 8:00 A.M."²¹ However, Negley delayed his advance in anticipation of the eminent arrival of Baird; but, after a two hour wait, he stepped off without him.

Negley requested cavalry to assist his reconnaissance efforts, and provide him adequate time to extricate himself from the precarious position of having his flanks unprotected before he ventured toward the east and Dug Gap. ²² His request denied,
Negley's Second Division, dutifully complied with the orders and employed a moving infantry skirmish line to mitigate the risk to the troops as they began movement on the morning of 10 September 1863 at about 10:00 A.M. The infantry skirmish line was a poor substitute for cavalry and considerably less effective as an advance or flank guard. The close proximity of the infantry skirmishers to the main body provided little warning time for the main body to react. Without mounted forces, this was the only alternative Negley had available.

The exposed Second Division faced at least a four to one disadvantage without Baird's division as they proceeded against the Confederates in McLemore's Cove. The situation worsened when early on 10 September, Negley's scouts reported the advance of Cleburne's, Cheatham's, and French's [sic] Confederate divisions near Lafayette, and that they overheard a southern colonel from Cheatham's division saying, "they expected to overwhelm and destroy some of our [Federal] advanced divisions." Penning a note to the tardy Baird early that same day, Negley forwarded the above report and added: "I would suggest, general [Baird], that you push forward your division within supporting distance." Negley badly needed Baird's reinforcements on the east side of Lookout Mountain.

Negley reported: "After passing Bailey's Crossroads my skirmishers were more or less engaged, until we arrived at the gorge leading to Dug Gap, where I halted the command for the purpose of ascertaining the position of the enemy in the gap." The situation had quickly developed; Negley's skirmishers engaged in pitched battle with their counterparts from the outset of the movement and throughout the day. Sirwell led the division in an advance guard role, the Twenty-First Ohio deployed as moving
skirmishers, as they proceeded east under observation and fire from the enemy. 26 Stanley followed in a slight echelon left protecting the division's northern flank. 27 Beatty followed the advance in reserve; his location during the move served to protect the trains as the division proceeded.

Once the lead two brigades of his division crossed the intersection at Davis’ house, the enemy situation became clear; he faced a strong force to the north, and to the east. As Sirwell's brigade passed the Davis Crossroads they continued to advance to the western mouth of Dug Gap were they encountered a sizeable force late in the evening of 10 September. Sirwell halted his command, "and reported to the general commanding [Negley] the presence of the enemy strongly posted in our front [Dug Gap]." 28 In response, Negley ordered a demonstration toward the west approach and into Dug Gap, which drove the enemy skirmishers through the pass and ended the daylong firefight in the east. 29

At about the same time, the Second Brigade took position just to the north and east of the Widow Davis' house, guarding a posting of the enemy in the direction of Catlett's Gap. Negley, with the brigade, countered the threat coming from Catlett's Gap with deception: "I immediately sent one regiment in the direction of this force, for the double purpose of reconnaissance and to compel the enemy to halt, under the impression that I would attack him." 30 Negley's enemy estimate now proved accurate, "I was confronted by Hill's corps of three divisions (twelve brigades) [east side of Dug Gap]; that Buckner's corps (eight brigades), also Forrest's division of cavalry, were three miles to my left [in McLemores Cove]." 31
As night quieted the exchange of shots, now certain of his precarious position, Negley ordered a 360 degree defense established around Davis Crossroads, encircling his trains. Intelligence indicated that the Confederates were planning an offensive for the morning of the eleventh. This, coupled with the absence of Baird's division, prompted Negley to obstruct the western end of the pass through Dug Gap and conduct a retrograde of Sirwell's pickets to the west side of Dug Gap. Initially, Sirwell remained in place, forward in Dug Gap, until early in the morning of 11 September. At 3:00 A.M., Negley ordered the Third Brigade to withdraw one half mile to the rear and tie in on Stanley's right, about 500 meters to the east of the Widow Davis' house, oriented to the east. The trains, brought up to the rear of Widow Davis' house, formed the center of the force, with Beatty's Brigade in the rear, as reserve. The division remained under arms for the night, emplaced rail breastworks and awaited the arrival of Baird.

The Army Commander soon shared in his subordinate's anxiety of the situation, when on the evening of the tenth, Thomas moved forward to personally assess and report the situation of the Second Division. Although verified reports of a large enemy force massing near Dug Gap came to his hands from several reliable sources, Thomas and Negley, the doubting Rosecrans only replied with disappointment that the division had not pushed farther.

Undoubtedly the tall corn in McLemore's Cove offered excellent concealment for Negley's troops and hindered the confederate reconnaissance efforts. Negley had indeed fixed the enemy advances by causing doubt as to his true situation, and bought his command a reprieve. By late afternoon, General Hindman, one of the opposing Confederate commanders, sent a situation report to general Bragg indicating his
uncertainty: "Whether the main body has moved or not I am yet unable to determine, but hope to learn tonight [10 September]. If it has, our attack ought and will be made. If it has not, my force will probably be insufficient, and I will be attacked in rear from Stevens Gap while attacking the column going east."\(^{36}\)

Baird's descent down Lookout Mountain took most of the day on 10 September and he finally arrived at its eastern base with the majority of his force by 9:00 P.M. Having received Negley's dispatch earlier, Baird proposed to Negley that the Second Division fall back on his position at Steven's Gap, that evening. At face, this appears to be a suitable plan. However, the Second Division tired and opposed by enemy skirmishers elected not to conduct the movement of the division trains over the rough terrain in the dark; it would have been herculean task. Instead, Negley chose to bring the fresh troops forward in the morning and execute a delay to Bailey's Crossroads near Missionary Ridge.\(^{37}\)

At 8:30 A.M. on 11 September, Baird finally reported to Negley for instructions, having brought two brigades of infantry with him. Negley quickly placed the fresh troops near Davis Crossroads and proceeded to survey the line with General Baird. Both commanders were aware that the sizeable force of Confederates, north of their position in the cove, posed the greatest threat. Baird's troops, subordinated to Negley's command, now provided Negley with the forces necessary to extricate the van of the XIV Corps from danger.\(^{38}\) He began the task by ordering the relief of Stanley and Sirwell by Scribner and Starkweather, respectively. The relief went smoothly but the enemy began to press, causing the Federal commander to accelerate the operation.\(^{39}\)
Soon after placing Baird's fresh troops, Negley learned from his pickets that the Confederates had breached most of the obstacles emplaced in Dug Gap, and enemy forces were advancing through the passes in Pigeon Mountain towards his division. Compounding the magnitude of the tactical problem, the van of General Buckner's Confederate corps had approached from the north to within two miles of Negley's position in McLemore's Cove, thereby exposing his position to a rapid advance from the north and east simultaneously; he viewed the threat from the north as the most dangerous. The fight commenced about noon, and an hour later, an uncoordinated general engagement ensued that occupied Negley's division on three sides, east, northeast, and north.

Negley began the withdrawal of his and Baird's division early in the afternoon, while under heavy fire from the Confederates pouring from the gaps in Pigeon Mountain. He decided to defend a position two and one half miles to the west where the terrain provided him the best advantage, and commenced the bounding movement with the divisional trains. Following the displacement of the trains, he bounded his forces to the rear successively. Baird's brigades, already in position on the first line of defense, assumed an over watch position to support the movements of the Second Division to the next defensive position to the rear. Beatty, with one regiment and a section of artillery, first to move after the trains, secured the lines of communication to Bailey's crossroads and quartered the final Federal position at this site. Stanley bounded to the rear of Starkweather's brigade on the division's northern flank. Sirwell bounded to the rear of Davis Crossroads and oriented east. Soon after Beatty got the trains off the road, Colonel Scribner's brigade, of Baird's division, displaced and fell in on Beatty's force to protect it,
arriving just in time to stem a charge of Confederate cavalry aimed at overwhelming the small detachment.\textsuperscript{42} Starkweather bounded his brigade to the rear and across Chickamauga Creek took up an overwatch position oriented to the northeast on Missionary Ridge, the third and final line of defense.\textsuperscript{43}

Stanley and Sirwell's brigades remained forward, west of the Chickamauga Creek, after the first bound and formed the second line. The enemy advance seemed to be gaining momentum and needed disrupted. The Confederate momentum faltered. The Nineteenth Illinois Infantry laid forward along the creek in ambush for the advancing enemy while Sirwell's brigade supported it to the rear. Stanley's brigade, furthest forward, checked Hindman's advance from the north, allowing Negley to focus his fires to the east, on the second line of defense.

The division commander positioned himself with his staff on a commanding rise along the second line near Sirwell's Brigade, twenty rods to the rear of Stanley, and Lieutenant S. P. Marsh, of the 11th Michigan, scaled a tree at this spot to provide the division commander with timely situation reports. By afternoon the Confederate push in the east gained momentum until Stanley changed orientation from the north and attacked into the Confederate flank to his southeast with canister from his artillery. It proved a skillful action for Stanley's covering force: "Presently [4:00 P.M., 11 September] the enemy's artillery appeared being pushed forward by hand. These were followed by several lines of infantry, closed en masse, and a terrific fire was opened on Negley's line . . . The action continued for some time, the enemy steadily advancing under a destructive fire from the Union troops, who in their protected position received little injury in return. When the enemy arrived within twenty rods the brigade fell back over the ridge . . . when
they reached the ridge . . . they were raked by a terrific fire by Sirwell's and [parts of] Beatty's Brigades, which caused them to recoil and seek shelter behind the ridge.\textsuperscript{44}

This attack triggered the ambush of the Nineteenth Illinois, and coupled with Stanley's attack, stymied the Confederate advance from the east.\textsuperscript{45} A soldier from the Nineteenth Illinois relates the fighting in the east: "The whole front was now covered with Confederate troops and they came yelling towards Company K . . . Our men were holding their fire until the Rebels got nearer, when a Rebel on horseback dashed ahead of the line in pursuit . . . and with his revolver pointed, said 'Surrender, you Yankee ___ ____ ____.' They were the last words he ever said, as horse and rider went to the ground. Both platoons gave them a volley, and they quit yelling and fell back from our front."\textsuperscript{46}

All this provided the precious time Negley needed to put his artillery in battery near Bailey's Crossroads on Missionary Ridge. The artillery raked the Confederates with fire while the remainder of the division displaced to their new defensive positions. A soldier of the 21st Ohio notes the effectiveness of the artillery: "The rebs [sic] were advancing in such force we were ordered back to support the artillery which had been placed in a most excellent position: 18 pieces. Our artillery had been massed in the edge of a cornfield comdg [sic] the whole valley . . . the rebs [sic] did not loose less than 6 to one . . . our artillery swept the plains and woods for about one and one half hours."\textsuperscript{47} Although less intense, the fight continued until evening and the Second Division breathed a sigh of relief. The Confederate forces retired to Dug Gap and Catlett's Gap that evening and the division remained in its defensive positions until 17 September 1863, allowing for the remainder of the XIV corps to array itself on the eastern side of Lookout Mountain.\textsuperscript{48}
The withdrawal under fire executed by Negley was a success. The division with its reinforcing brigades from Baird secured a strong position near Bailey's Crossroads to Steven's Gap. Losses were minimal and the trains saved. By placing himself in a key position to observe and coordinate the bounds of the brigades, Negley prevented a disaster for the XIV Corps.

The Battle at Davis Crossroads proved an opportunity lost for General Braxton Bragg and his Army of the Tennessee. Although Negley and his troops fought well, it is unlikely that they could have withstood a synchronized attack by the Confederates if it was executed on the tenth, or early in the morning of 11 September, before the arrival of Baird and his reinforcements at 8:30 A.M. At this point, the Confederates had a better than three to one advantage and Negley had inadequate forces to execute a delay over the terrain in McLemore's Cove. Upon the arrival of Baird's two brigades, the situation had changed. A delay was now plausible for the reinforced Federal division, as the calculus had changed. The Confederate forces were wise in choosing not to press the attack on Negley's troops while they were executing a delay; they would now need a six to one advantage, hypothetically. The battle provided the Federal Army with a premonition of defeat in detail, a caution to consolidate the Army of the Cumberland. By the evening of 17 September, the troops of the Army of the Cumberland were united and generally within supporting distance.

On the morning of 17 September, the Second Division marched from the west side of Lookout Mountain, northeast to Bird's Mill, near Owens' Ford, and camped for the night. The afternoon of the following day orders arrived, directing the relief of General Palmer's Division, positioned to the north of Negley, on his left. Palmer's troops took
positions the east of Crawfish Springs along the Chickamauga Creek from Glass's Mill to Owens Ford. The creek formed an irregular course and the defense was irregular.

A great deal of confusion took place during the relief. One and one half hours passed from receipt of the relief order to the arrival of Beatty's First Brigade and Stanley's Second Brigade to replace General Hazen and Colonel Grose's brigades of Palmer's division. 52 Apparently, a misunderstanding or miscommunication had taken place between the commands, and both of Palmer's commanders refused to relinquish their positions to Beatty and Stanley, stating they had received no such orders. Negley spoke to Hazen about the orders, but to no avail, so he rode to clarify the order with Rosecrans himself at the Army headquarters, near Crawfish Springs. However, the confusion compounded when Rosecrans ordered one brigade to Crawfish Springs and subsequently Thomas ordered the division to move in total to that place. After some marching, a countermanding order from Rosecrans again directed the relief of Palmer with two brigades, leaving the division spread along the west bank of West Chickamauga Creek, on a three and one half mile front from Crawfish Spring to Owens Ford. Palmer, when confronted at Rosecrans' headquarters near dusk by Major Lowrie, of Negley's staff, claimed that he passed the original order, but subsequently penned another just the same. 53

Weakened by illness and the stress associated with the confusing relief of Palmer's troops the division commander must have been more fatigued than even his troops. The marching and countermarching left the division utterly exhausted; it did not get in to the new position until daylight on 19 September. In the end, Sirwell's Third Brigade replaced Hazen, Beatty replaced Grose, and Stanley deployed near Crawfish
Springs.\textsuperscript{54} The division commander actively patrolled the line throughout the early morning, directing the emplacement of breastworks rather than resting.\textsuperscript{55} Once in position and the troops supplied, Negley ordered the majority of his trains north to Chattanooga, to secure their safety. The ammunition and ambulance trains remained with the division.\textsuperscript{56}

The now exhausted and lean division found battle early in the morning when Stanley and Beatty's skirmishers, and the 15th Kentucky engaged the Confederates pursuant to the Southern attack from the east side of Chickamauga Creek. The Second Brigade, now at Crawfish Springs, had emplaced the Nineteenth Illinois forward of the spring connecting with Beatty's troops. Stanley's command received poorly directed Confederate artillery fire from a battery on the east side of the river early in the morning: "Instantly the enemy opened us with a battery from the other side of Chickamauga River. . . I have often wondered why the enemy [Confederate batteries] did not depress the guns a few feet and sweep the troops that were marching around the spring."\textsuperscript{57} Colonel Stanley, not in direct contact, reinforced his sister brigade with the 18th Ohio Infantry and one section of Shultz's battery for the fight.\textsuperscript{58} After brisk firing throughout the morning from musket and artillery fire, Beatty repulsed the advance of his adversary by eleven that morning. Beatty reported: "We opened again on the advancing columns of the enemy, when they fell back precipitately."\textsuperscript{59} "Bridges battery now took positions in front of a fine brick house back from the spring, and replied to the Rebel battery."\textsuperscript{60} His artillery duel proved successful and the Confederate batteries of Cobb and Slocumb, in Breckinridge's division, withdrew.\textsuperscript{61}
Negley's division had served as a flank guard for the movement of McCook's corps to the north on the morning of 19 September, a task it performed brilliantly. No Confederate forces influenced the Federal XX Corps during its move. The Second Division joined the XX Corps once it closed on Crawfish Springs. Stanley took the lead, followed by Sirwell. Attached to McCook on the afternoon of the nineteenth, Negley quickly moved the main body of his force to link up with his new commander. Anticipating a fight, Negley ordered twenty extra rounds issued to the troops. Beatty's brigade could not assemble quickly because of the time necessary to recall his extensively deployed skirmishers and the need to replace the artillery's expended munitions, so Negley chose to move with the other brigades quickly and reform the division when practicable later in the evening.62

Stanley moved in the van, followed by Sirwell and Negley placed the division in position to the rear of General Sheridan's division, near Crawfish Springs, by order of McCook. At about 3:30 P.M., While still emplacing his forces, McCook countermanded his previous order to the division and directed Negley to move to the support of Thomas one half mile north of Widow Glenn's house. Expediently, the division marched at the double quick, moved north and was prepared for battle by late afternoon.63 Identifying a gap in the lines during the movement, Negley quickly informed Rosecrans, whose headquarters were nearby at Widow Glenn's House: "[through the gap] the enemy were moving, endangering General Thomas' right [southern] flank."64

A change of mission occurred before linking up with the XIV Corps. Negley's refined orders from Rosecrans were: "You will find the enemy over there [to the north east]," as he pointed toward the direction of Thomas.65 Expecting a fight, Negley
prudently bounded his division in the direction indicated by the Army commander and formed in total by 5:00 P.M. on the nineteenth.66 Instead of finding Thomas, the division instead encountered a sizeable force of the enemy already across La Fayette road, attacking from the east to the west. Stanley's brigade, the first positioned, was set on a ridge about one half mile north and slightly east of Rosecrans' Headquarters at the Widow Glenn's house, and oriented towards the Brotherton House. The Third Brigade, Sirwell's, took position to the south and east of the Second Brigade oriented on the La Fayette Road one quarter mile south of Brotherton House. The reserve, Beatty's Brigade took position to the rear of the forward brigades in the division.67

The woods obscured any view of the situation during the approach, but when the lead brigades of the division crested the ridge a clear field became visible. From the vantage point provided by the high ground now occupied by the division, Negley had commanding observation of the break in the Federal line that threatened the right of General Thomas.68 Confederate forces of Stewart's Confederate division had penetrated Van Cleve's line and occupied the Tanyard. Stanley pushed the Eleventh Michigan well forward of his brigade to develop the situation as he took position on the left.69 As the advance regiment passed General Rosecrans' position, near Lytle Hill, morale soared as the band played Red White and Blue, and the army commander yelled: "Make it warm for them, Michigan boys."70 The Second Brigade secured the high ground on Lytle Hill and Sirwell formed on the right of Stanley.71 The division held the commanding ground now and checked the advance of the Confederates. However, the precariousness of the moment still remained; the Union Army's line had been broken.
Negley quickly found Rosecrans and reported the status of the enemy and recommended holding the high ground and moving on the Confederate forces in the gap. Rosecrans replied: "That’s right, fight there, right there; push them hard." With his new orders in hand Negley placed the entire division artillery in battery on a hill near Stanley's brigade oriented to the northeast. Beatty's brigade moved from the west side to the crest of the hill, and with the artillery provided support for the subsequent advance of the Second and Third Brigades.

Remaining on the hill with the support force, Negley directed the advance of the brigades as they attacked to the east and north. In preparation for the advance, the artillery raked the immediate woods to the front and across the open field with canister. Stanley formed his three regiments in line of battle and attacked on line with the Third Brigade on his right. Sirwell placed the Thirty-Seventh Indiana to secure a section of his artillery on the southern spur of the high ground and attacked with two regiments in line. They initially encountered the enemy skirmishers and dealt with them handily.

The attack sharpened around dusk as the main Confederate force entered the fray near the woods bordering Brotherton Field to the west. After about an hour of fighting, the brigades of Stanley and Sirwell had forced the enemy back about one half mile to a wood line along the eastern side of Lafayette Road. As dusk, the Confederate forces mounted a counterattack against Stanley's brigade, now in a hasty defense. The advance faltered against the Union defense, the Confederates broke contact, and the front of the division quieted for the remainder of the evening.

Now in an exposed position, forward of the Union lines, dark had fallen on the fight and caused it to subside. About 8:00 P.M. Negley ordered the division to fall back
to the woods to the west of La Fayette Road and prepared a defense that would tie into
the flanks of the Federal line.\textsuperscript{78} On his left he linked with Brannan and to the south, he
coordinated with Davis. He placed two brigades on line overlooking Brotherton Field to
the east and one in reserve. Stanley formed to the north and Sirwell to the south, while
Beatty formed the reserve.

Although warranted, little rest occurred after the evening battle on 19 September.
Breast works, hastily established initially, improved throughout the night as the weary
troops labored under the supervision of their officers. General Negley had had no sleep
for nearly thirty six hours as he retired for three hours of much needed rest.

\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1] John Beatty, \textit{The Citizen Soldier, or Memoirs of a Volunteer} (Cincinnati, OH:
Wilstach, Baldwin and Co., 1879), 319-324.
\item[4] Ibid., 300.
\item[5] Ibid., 325. The order is dated 3 September.
\item[10] Ibid., 364.
\item[12] Ibid., 384.
\end{itemize}
Baird camped for the night at the western base of Lookout Mountain rather than advance to support Negley. Baird, already aware of his mission to support Negley, did not even send a courier up the mountain to contact Negley. He had received several dispatches from the Second Division on the condition of the roads, and their state of repair before this time. In addition, he knew of the enemy spot reports that Negley's reconnaissance had gathered. In light of all these issues, and the fact that Baird wrote a detailed report of troops that were foraging and using borrowed livestock rather than advancing, it is plausible that the proximate reason for Baird's failure to repair to Negley's command was negligence or dereliction in the performance of his duty.

Rosecrans appeared annoyed and anxious by the slow movement of the XIV Corps and did not appreciate the difficulty in moving over the poor road network. He failed to understand that this situation only compounded the tactical risk involved in his haste; the ability to reinforce with follow on troops was also impaired. Support was not able to react in time to assist the forward elements.

French's division was detailed in the report but was not part of the Confederate forces in that area. Still, the spot report proved very accurate.
Quartered, means to survey the ground and identify positions for the command's elements. In addition, the quartering party performs the function of guiding the units into position upon their arrival at the new location. This action greatly increases the speed and ability of a unit to occupy a new position.


43 Ibid., 272-273.


46 James Fenton Diary (Reminiscence), Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, IL.
In correlation of forces models used at the Command and General Staff College, and the infantry and the armor schools, the following ratios are accepted guides for like forces: 3:1 is necessary to attack a defending enemy, and 6:1 is necessary to attack a delaying force. While on 10 September the Confederate forces had adequate forces to achieve victory, it is doubtful that they would have had necessary forces to win against a delay on 11 September using these models.

\textsuperscript{47} Robert Sample Dilworth Journal (1 LT, I/21 OH), Confederate Research Center, Hill College, Hillsboro, TX.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{O.R.}, Series 1, vol. 30, part I, 328.

\textsuperscript{49} In correlation of forces models used at the Command and General Staff College, and the infantry and the armor schools, the following ratios are accepted guides for like forces: 3:1 is necessary to attack a defending enemy, and 6:1 is necessary to attack a delaying force. While on 10 September the Confederate forces had adequate forces to achieve victory, it is doubtful that they would have had necessary forces to win against a delay on 11 September using these models.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{O.R.}, Series 1, vol. 30, part I, 55.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 328.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 336.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 341.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 329.

\textsuperscript{57} James Fenton Diary (Reminiscence), Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, IL.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{O.R.}, Series 1, vol. 30, part I, 337.

\textsuperscript{59} Beatty, \textit{The Citizen Soldier, or Memoirs of a Volunteer} (Cincinnati, OH: Wilstach, Baldwin and Co., 1879), 333.

\textsuperscript{60} James Fenton Diary (Reminiscence), Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, IL.

\textsuperscript{61} Cast iron tablet on Alexander bridge road south of Helm Monument.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{O.R.}, Series 1, vol. 30, part I, 337.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 341-342.
64 Ibid., 359.
65 Ibid., 347.
66 Ibid., 359.
67 Ibid., 342.
68 Ibid., 359.
69 Ibid., 378.


72 Ibid., 347.
73 Ibid., 385.
74 Ibid., 378.
75 Ibid., 385.
76 Ibid., 347.
77 Ibid., 337.
78 Ibid., 57.
The performance of the Second Division, XIV Corps on the night of 19 September served to allay much anxiety within the army. Negley's attack reestablished and restored the integrity of the Union line and gave the Federals a perceived advantage "in respect of ground". The army commander and his corps commanders decided on defense as the preferred course of action for 20 September. General Thomas defended Kelley Field in the north as the Army main effort. Although Thomas had the majority of the forces available, he persistently requested his own Second Division to strengthen his left near the McDonald Crossroads.

General Negley's division did not fight the battle of 20 September as a whole. Instead the Brigades and in some cases regiments of the command were parceled into the fight at different times and at varied locations. This action occurred not by design, but rather as a matter of timing and circumstance in reacting to the Confederate actions and the orders of anxious Union commanders.

The activities of 19 September 1863, culminated with the men of the division preparing rudimentary breastworks in their final position, and this activity continued into the early hours of 20 September. Two brigades formed the defensive positions along the west side of Brotherton Field and one brigade formed the reserve. Stanley's brigade formed the left of Negley's line with Sirwell's brigade to the right and Beatty formed the reserve near Lytle Hill. General Negley left his line at 10:00 P.M. to meet with the senior army commanders at Rosecrans' headquarters, the Widow Glenn's house, where he remained until after midnight. Presumably, he was aware of the troop dispositions and
the plan to defend on 20 September. Based on the actions taken upon returning to his division, and of those on the morning of 20 September, Negley must have anticipated moving to the support of General Thomas on 20 September at some time.

Major James A. Lowrie, Negley’s senior aide, related the condition of his commander upon his return from the midnight meeting: "Had it not been for the important duties to be performed and the responsibility which rested on him, and had he not been sustained in some measure by the excitement engendered thereby, he would have been confined to his bed. He was considered so ill . . . [since 17 September] . . . he was advised by his medical director and other staff officers to ride in an ambulance." He did not ride in the ambulance, nor did he rest for but a few hours. The Second Division's medical director, Doctor Roswell G. Bogue, questioned Negley's ability to command: "This night [early morning on 20 September] he was much worn down from exposure, want of sleep, rest, and sickness, and was obliged to get what rest he could that night to enable him to be on duty . . . he slept in bivouac with the command. I think he labored during the day and evening all that he was physically able to endure. He arose on the morning of the 20th feeling very unwell . . . during the whole time he was really unable to be on duty."

Although debilitated, Negley remained in command, and continued to survey the line, conduct estimates, and issue instructions. Concerned with the possibility that the Confederates would mount a dawn attack on his position around the Brotherton Field, he dispatched an aide to survey the ground occupied by Sirwell and Stanley, assess the practicability of moving artillery over it, and ensured the troops were alert. Negley issued a "be prepared to move" mission: "orders were sent to the brigade commanders to
be in readiness to move to the left on shortest notice.” In addition, he released the 74th Ohio Infantry and a section of Marshall's battery, from rear guard duty and sent them back to the Third Brigade's control. Presumably, Negley anticipated action or the movement of his command.

By 7:00 A.M. Negley directed his topographical engineer, Lieutenant Ingraham, and ordnance officer, Captain James R. Hayden, to proceed on a route reconnaissance to the north and west to determine the best roads for movement, and the alternate routes for any roads discovered. Clearly, Negley anticipated congestion and confusion, and was attempting to mitigate it by increasing his options for movement. Before these two officers returned with their report, part of the division was already on the move to support Thomas.

The first activity of the brisk September morning for the Second Division entailed moving to the support of Thomas. At about 8:00 A.M., Captain J. P. Willard, of General Thomas' staff, arrived at Negley's position and relayed an urgent message from Thomas to the Second Division commander, "move at once to his [Thomas'] support.” Although no force was present to relieve his line along the west side of Brotherton Field, Negley immediately began the withdrawal of his troops. Suddenly a sharp engagement of his brigade skirmishers and the report of a large force massing to the front of Sirwell's brigade interrupted his plans. In response, Negley chose to execute two missions simultaneously, the one directing him to move to Thomas' support, and the defense against the imminent Confederate threat to his line near Brotherton Field.

The division reserve was not in contact and Negley apparently did not foresee a need to retain them as his reserve. Negley had sent Beatty's brigade north with Bridges'
battery, and stopped the movement of his other two brigades. The main bodies of Stanley's and Sirwell's brigades, minus a regiment of skirmishers, had already formed in column on the Glenn-Kelly road with their artillery limbered up, and prepared to march north, when General Rosecrans appeared. Riding down Lytle Hill at a gallop, Rosecrans first spied Captain Alfred L. Hough of Negley's staff, rode to his position and asked: "What troops are these . . . and what are they doing there?" Rosecrans was apparently not aware that Thomas had ordered the movement of Negley's division, irrespective of its replacement in the line, before this incident.

Captain Hough replied to Rosecrans' query: "General Negley's division . . . Going to join General Thomas." It appeared that Rosecrans was not aware of the message from Thomas ordering the immediate movement of the division and he immediately countermanded the decision. Thomas evidently had not understood that Wood's division had not yet relieved Negley. Rosecrans rode with the staff officer to General Negley and directed him, "to resume his former position until relieved," adding that General Wood had already been ordered to execute the relief. It was too late to recall the First brigade, so Negley immediately sent his staff to relay the change of mission to his other brigade commanders; Hough went to the Third Brigade, and Lowrie to the Second. Stanley's troops, who had just begun movement, stopped and redirected their column back into their former defensive position. The enemy had already advanced skirmishers to their previous position, and Stanley had to fight to regain his defensive line. By 8:30 A.M., the line was reestablished and the division divided. Negley's division would not reform in total until after the battle ended.
Major Lowrie, after passing the new orders to Stanley, rode to the southern portion of Dyer Field where he linked up with General Wood's troops, to guide them into position. The first to arrive was Colonel Harker of Wood's division, who commanded the northern, leftmost brigade. Lowrie guided the brigade commander to Stanley's location, and effected coordination with Brannan's troops on the left. Initially, some confusion surfaced when Colonel Harker stated he had orders to fill a gap on Brannan's right, but the situation remedied itself; there was no gap and the only thing to the right of Brannan was Stanley's Brigade. At about 9:00 A.M. Colonel Barnes' brigade, Wood's division arrived and linked up with Colonel Harker. Stanley handed over the battle to Harker at about 9:15 A.M. and formed his command to march north. Barnes and Harker together occupied the position formerly held by Stanley.15

Captain Hough, of Negley's Staff, introduced himself to Colonel Buell, commanding the right of Wood's line, near the north side of Lytle Hill in an effort to affect the speedy replacement of Sirwell's troops. However, when Hough asked Buell if he was to replace Negley's troops, he answered: "he was ordered to take this position [north ridge of Lytle Hill]." Buell occupied a position about four tenths of a mile to the rear of Sirwell's brigade delaying the replacement of Negley's division. Eventually, Buell received new orders, and he finally replaced Sirwell about 10:30 A.M.16 In the interim, Negley had moved with Stanley's troops around 9:00 A.M. Lieutenant Moody, of Negley's staff, passed new orders to Sirwell as Negley departed with the Second Brigade: "as soon as relieved, the brigade [Sirwell's Third Brigade] [is] to move in close column closed en masse to the left by a road running parallel with [Sirwell's] line of battle."17
By 9:00 A.M., "the roar of artillery and the rattle of volleys of musketry indicated that a warm engagement was going on to the left." Negley, busied himself trying to form his command and execute the relief in place with Wood's division, to join his First Brigade. It was too late; the enemy had already commenced to attack the Union left.

Beatty's Fight on the Federal left

John Beatty marched his command to the north, on the Glenn Kelly road, at 8:00 A.M. under orders from Negley to report to General Thomas. Upon reaching the XIV Corps commander Beatty received his instructions: "move to the extreme left of our line, form perpendicularly to the rear of General Baird's division, connecting with his left, and be in readiness to meet any force of the enemy attempting to turn General Baird's left." No sooner had Beatty occupied his position, to the west of La Fayette Road and Baird's troops, than he received a new order from Thomas. Captain Gaw, of Thomas' staff, rode forward to Beatty and directed him to reform his command about 500 meters to the north near McDonald's House, and to maintain contact with Baird.

Beatty, seeing the dangerous situation this would expose his command to, argued against the move because he could not man the interval that this action would create between himself and Baird. Captain Gaw silenced the objections by stating: "the order to advance was imperative; that [Beatty] would be supported by General Negley." Beatty could protest no further. As he began moving towards his new positions, almost immediately his regiments faced opposition from the enemy pickets.

From north to south, the First Brigade commander disposed his regiments along the La Fayette Road oriented towards the east and north. The Eighty-Eighth Indiana secured the left flank of the brigade without encountering resistance, and overwatched the
McDonald crossroads. In support, slightly to the south and rear was a section of Bridges' battery. To the south of the 88th Indiana Beatty placed the Forty-Second Indiana; fighting their way through enemy pickets they reached their position to the right of their sister regiment and oriented east, northeast. About 150 meters separated the 104th Illinois from the 88th Indiana. Advancing through the woods into a field, the 104th Illinois formed the attenuated center of the brigade, east of La Fayette Road, and oriented east. In support, the remaining section of Bridges' battery formed to the south and rear of the 104th Illinois, remaining on the west side of the road. Finally, the Fifteenth Kentucky advanced to the eastern side of the road and oriented east, perpendicular to Baird's division. However, the enemy pressure on the 15th Kentucky Regiment's right flank prevented them from tying in with Baird's troops.22

No sooner had the troops been placed than three Confederate brigades began their advance against Beatty's brigade at about 9:30 A.M. Sensing the urgency of the situation, Beatty sent his assistant adjutant, Captain King, to hasten forward General Negley and the rest of the Second Division. Negley, otherwise engaged with replacing his forces with those of Wood one mile to the south, could offer no assistance. Beatty related the situation he now faced on the left flank of the Federal line: "About this time [about 9:40 A.M.] a column of the enemy pressed into the interval between the [104th Illinois] and [42nd Indiana] and turned [north] with the evident design of capturing the latter."23 The 42nd Indiana was nearly encircled when the northern section of Bridges battery turned and opened on the flank of the advancing enemy with grape and canister, stemming the advance and forcing the Confederates back into the woods to regroup. The effective use
of artillery only bought a short reprieve for Beatty's brigade, but did allow the two northern regiments, the 88th and 42nd Indiana, to reform as one element.\(^{24}\)

Against the center and right of Beatty's brigade, the fight became more intense. Renewed pressure against the 104th Illinois and 15th Kentucky drove the Federal regiments, under heavy fire, to the western side of the La Fayette Road. Bridges' southern section, now a mere one hundred yards from the advancing enemy continued to fire bravely but could not cause the Confederates to slow. With all of their horses killed and every man wounded or dead, the southern section of Bridges' guns fell to the hands of the advancing foe. The remnants of the 104th Illinois and 15th Kentucky fell back to the northern edge of Kelly Field and were saved by the well placed artillery fire coming from near the Kelly House, plus the arrival of Stanley's Brigade, which temporarily checked the enemy's pursuit.\(^{25}\)

Having broken the Federal brigade in the center and on the right, the Confederates held the ground to the west of La Fayette Road and secured the road itself north from Kelly Field to McDonald's House. As a result, Thomas' left flank was extremely vulnerable. The two northern Indiana regiments broke and retired from the field to the north and west and finally rallied later in the afternoon near McFarland's Gap. Beatty would not see his two northern regiments again for nearly eight hours. With his two remaining regiments pushed to Kelly Field, their strength was now that of one. In forty minutes, 125 men were killed or wounded, and at least as many were driven from the field in the chaos. In total, the brigade would loose 310 in the battle and the use of two complete regiments for the remainder of the fight on 20 September, excluding the evening defense at McFarland Gap.\(^{26}\)
Stanley's Fight until early afternoon

Once relieved by Colonel Harker's brigade of Wood's division, Stanley formed his men on the Glenn-Kelly Road by 9:30 A.M., and prepared to move north. Stanley collected Shultz's battery, emplaced to his rear the night before, and arranged it in the trail of his column. General Negley, now moving with the Second Brigade commander, ordered Stanley to advance at about 9:45 A.M.: "push [your] regiments quickly into the woods to [your] right [Kelley field], to support the forces . . . engaged there." General Negley did not issue another order to Colonel Stanley that day.

The next twenty minutes must have seemed an eternity to the advancing Second Brigade. First, Stanley advanced to the southern end of Kelly Field and found it cluttered with artillery and infantry regiments not yet engaged, although the perimeter units were in contact with the enemy. A total of three times the aggressive brigade commander offered his services to commanders on the field, only to be told each time that his unit was needed further to the left. Finally, Stanley made contact with General Thomas in the course of his rounds and received "definitive and positive orders" from his corps commander: "advance to the support of Brig. Gen. [sic] John Beatty, commanding the First Brigade [Negley's], who [is] being hard pressed."

Stanley found his brother commander at about 10:00 A.M. trying to rally his broken forces on the west side of La Fayette Road, near the Kelly Barn. Beatty briefed Stanley on the enemy situation, and assisted him in placing the regiments in line of battle. To the west of the road, oriented north, the Eighteenth Ohio and Eleventh Michigan formed the first line of battle for the Second Brigade. While the first line formed its ranks, but before the Nineteenth Illinois established a second line to the rear of the first,
the enemy advanced in heavy force on the two forward Federal regiments. The heavy fire from these fresh troops checked the Confederate advance.\textsuperscript{29}

Seeing that the enemy had checked their advance, Stanley ordered the Nineteenth Illinois to close on his forward regiments. Once the move was completed, Stanley ordered his command to charge the Confederates, orienting to the north. Beatty followed the Second Brigade with the remnants of his command, the 104th Illinois and 15th Kentucky, to the right rear, along La Fayette Road, tying in with the Federal troops in Kelly Field. Stanley advanced on the Confederate brigade of Brigadier General Daniel Adams. Colonel Stanley remarked: "I ordered the line forward, which all responded with cheers of triumph, and the enemy fled in dismay, though several times our number. We [Second Brigade] thus drove them for a half mile or more, strewing the ground with killed and wounded, and taking a large number of prisoners. Among the latter were Brigadier-General Adams and one or two of his staff, who surrendered."\textsuperscript{30}

Negley had taken Shultz's Battery as the Second brigade moved into Kelly Field earlier that morning and left the Second Brigade with no artillery. Stanley advanced until Confederate guns firing into his line from the northeast raked him with devastating effect. Having no counter battery capability at hand, the Second Brigade withdrew a few hundred yards and formed a defensive line facing north. In the meantime, Beatty had formed a line to the rear of Stanley's, and to the west of Baird's division, with his remaining forces and an unknown "borrowed brigade", presumably to backstop Stanley.\textsuperscript{31} "Seeing the necessity for some support for a single line [Stanley's brigade] of such length so far advanced, I [Beatty] hastened to [the] rear and brought up three or four regiments which I found idle in the woods and formed a second line."\textsuperscript{32}
A fresh enemy attack soon reclaimed most of the ground Stanley had gained. After firing a few volleys, the Second Brigade began to fall back on the secondary line Beatty had formed only to find it had disappeared without firing a shot. Beatty remarked at the incident: "The three regiments which I had posted in its [Stanley's] rear to support it retired hastily without firing a shot." Stanley's brigade and the remnants of Beatty's force continued to conduct a fighting withdrawal to the west and established a defensive line to the north of Snodgrass Field, oriented to the east northeast, overwatching the Snodgrass-Savannah Road. On his right, Stanley found a battery of the Fourth U. S. Artillery positioned to support his new defense and two guns of Bridges' battery that were pushed off the field of battle to this spot. The Confederates continued to press sporadically.

As the fighting forced Stanley and Beatty back to their new position, the situation appeared frightful: "In the meantime the right wing of the army had been thrown back, and frightened soldiers and occasional shots were coming from the rear and right." In light of this, Beatty ordered Colonel Marion C. Taylor of the Fifteenth Kentucky to evacuate by hand some abandoned artillery pieces as the force withdrew. The regiment recovered five pieces and placed them on the northern left flank of Stanley's new line in an effort to overwatch the Federal left flank. With artillery on both flanks and the Second Brigade defending to the east, the Confederate advance finally halted in face of the Union fires from Lieutenant Smith's Battery I of the Fourth Artillery near Snodgrass House. By noon, the position on the left secured by Stanley's troops had held, and the Confederates ceased their assault. The price of the action, in part, included the loss of Stanley. A ball struck the brigade commander in the right shoulder while rallying his
men, forcing him to relinquish his command to Colonel William L. Stoughton of the Eleventh Michigan.\textsuperscript{38}

Stoughton, upon assuming command in the midst of battle, adjusted his line and placed the Eighteenth Ohio in position to support the battery of the Fourth U. S. Artillery and observe the movement of enemy forces between Snodgrass Hill and Kelly Field. After about an hour's respite, the Confederates again appeared to the brigade's front in small parties; Stoughton ordered an advance on the scattered enemy in Snodgrass Field and drove them to the south and east. The left of General Brannan's position, as the XIV Corps reserve, almost joined the right of the Second Brigade of Negley's Division near Snodgrass House at a ninety-degree angle.\textsuperscript{39} With the Eighteenth Ohio in advanced positions, Stoughton was able to maintain situational awareness and track any enemy movements around Snodgrass spur. For the next three hours, Stoughton's command anxiously awaited orders in their position. At about mid afternoon, still without orders, the situation worsened and he had to act unilaterally, as the Second Brigade had done for most of the day.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{Negley, the Artillery, and the Third Brigade on Snodgrass Hill}

Intentionally or not, General Thomas effectively separated Negley's division into its component brigades and deprived the command of any chance at unity of effort and command early on 20 September. To recap, Captain Willard's order from Thomas to Negley in the early morning caused the separation of Beatty's brigade, and a message from Thomas to Negley, delivered by Captain Gaw, of Thomas' staff, resulted in the unsynchronized, unsupported commitment of Stanley's brigade just before 10:00 A.M.
Sirwell's Third Brigade, still at Brotherton Field, continued the relief in place with Wood's division.

While Beatty and Stanley were fighting on the Federal left Negley began to collect Federal artillery around Snodgrass Hill in compliance with the instructions of General Thomas. During the movement to the Union left to join his First Brigade Negley, while traveling in the lead of Stanley's brigade, received orders redirecting his attention to the positioning of artillery on Snodgrass Hill by Captain Gaw, topographical engineer, on Thomas' staff. Thomas restated his order and reasons in his post battle report: "To prevent a repetition of this attack of the enemy on the left [Beatty's fight] I directed Captain Gaw . . . to go to the commanding officer of the troops on the left and rear of Baird [Negley, in the van of Stanley's brigade] and direct him to mass as much artillery on the slopes of Missionary Ridge, west of State Road [Lafayette Road] . . . as he could conveniently spare, supported by strong infantry, so as to sweep the ground to the left and rear of Baird's position."\(^{41}\)

Negley apparently did not get such a clear and concise message from the anxious orderly. With what he believed to be Thomas' intent, Negley departed from the lead of Stanley's brigade, with Shultz's battery in tow; now in receipt of his new instructions, he endeavored to carry them out to the best of his ability. Obviously, Negley must have had some anxiety about his new assignment. The only artillery immediately at his disposal was Shultz's battery, and Stanley's brigade was the only infantry at hand. Fortunately for the Union, Negley chose not to remove Stanley's troops to support the artillery as directed, and instead ordered them to the support of the Union troops in Kelley Field, and moved toward the west in order to position any guns he could find. Negley counted upon
the arrival of Sirwell's brigade to provide the infantry support; he would dispatch an orderly to send Sirwell his new orders once he reconnoitered a position. About one third of a mile to the west of Negley's position rose a piece of key terrain that controlled the entire area. This high ground is a spur of Missionary Ridge, called Horseshoe Ridge, which consists of several knolls; Snodgrass Hill is the eastern knoll. Negley chose the eastern hill to array the army's artillery: "I immediately took charge of all the batteries at this point [vicinity Snodgrass Hill] and massed them on the ridge, placing them in position supported by Sirwell's brigade when it arrived." 42

Major Lowrie, of Negley's staff, under the direction of his commander, left the meeting with Captain Gaw, to "collect all the batteries [he] could find and order them up on the ridge [Snodgrass Hill], facing south." 43 Shultz's battery first received the order and commenced movement to Snodgrass Hill, followed by Marshall's battery of Sirwell's brigade, and I Battery of the Fourth Artillery. 44 Evidently, Thomas was unaware that Captain Gaw had redirected Negley to take charge of the artillery; Thomas penned an order to Rosecrans an hour after Negley was tasked to secure the artillery, which illustrated a lack of situational awareness:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

Battlefield, September 20 1863—11 a. m.

Major-General Rosecrans,

Commanding Department of the Cumberland:

The enemy penetrated a short time since to the road leading to McDaniel's [McDonald's] house, and I fear they are trying to cut off our communication with Rossville through the hills behind the center of our army. I think, therefore, it is of the utmost importance that Negley's division be ordered to that point—the left of my line.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
If Rosecrans replied to this request in the affirmative, the message and any corroborating statements are not extant. Negley never received an order, which, if issued, would have countermanded that of an hour earlier. In addition, Negley had only three regiments under his command at this time, a fact Thomas was aware of; Beatty and Stanley had already committed their brigades to Thomas' left under his instructions. Negley, rallying the artillery, had no command to commit to the Union left; Thomas' had already used up the Second Division in a piecemeal fashion.

Negley, with only a solitary mounted orderly, quickly busied himself with his assigned task atop Snodgrass Hill. One of Thomas' escort officers recalled the scene about 10:15 A.M.: "[Negley] was busily engaged reorganizing some artillery . . . he seemed very composed and busily engaged." Negley established his headquarters at Snodgrass Cabin and placed in action all the artillery he could. With about fifty pieces of disorganized artillery in the area and initially operating without his staff the task must have seemed onerous.

By 11:00 A.M. Negley managed to place sixteen guns in battery around Snodgrass Hill. About six additional batteries formed a park to the rear of Negley's position. These guns remained out of action; men and material shortages prevented Negley from utilizing them. Upon a spur that juts to the northeast from Snodgrass Hill, Negley placed two guns of Bridges' battery and two guns of Lieutenant Smith's battery of the Fourth Artillery under the command of the latter; they oriented to the east and north. Bridges' section took position in the yard of the Snodgrass House, and to the east on the
spur itself was the section of the Fourth Artillery. On the ridge to the south of the
Snodgrass House Negley placed Shultz and Marshall's batteries oriented to the south and
east. Marshall was on the outer edge of the ridge in the woods atop Hill One, and Shultz
beyond Marshall on the crest of another rise to the southeast. Shultz's battery, placed
directly to the southeast of Marshall's battery, avoided the possibility of friendly fire on
his sister battery due to the differences in elevation between the two locations; therefore,
Marshall's guns could fire over those of Shultz. 47 From these positions, the artillery
would fight until early afternoon.

Throughout the positioning of the artillery, Confederate activity in the area had
become constant and the necessity for infantry to secure the artillery imperative. In the
meantime, Negley dispatched Captain Johnston, of his staff, to guide the Third Brigade to
his new position. Sirwell had arrived with his brigade at about 10:45 A.M., minus two
companies of skirmishers from the 74th Ohio left behind, and placed them on the eastern
slope of Snodgrass Hill. Negley had ordered Sirwell's brigade into position to support the
sixteen effective artillery pieces on the brow of the slope to its rear. The 78th
Pennsylvania, detailed from Sirwell's brigade, protected the six batteries Negley had
pooled to the rear of his position. 48 As a result, Sirwell had only two and one half
regiments of infantry to secure the pieces in battery around Snodgrass Hill.

The Federal view from Snodgrass Hill at about noon was not promising. To the
northeast the Confederate forces had pressed south, threatening to turn the Union left.
Unknown to Negley at the time, the Union forces forced back by the Confederate
advance in this direction were his own Second Brigade and the remnants of the First
Brigade. As noted earlier in the description of Stanley's fight, well placed fires from the
ad hoc battery of Lieutenant Smith's Fourth Artillery, containing two guns from Bridges' Battery, checked the advancing enemy from their position on the spur northeast of Snodgrass House. In addition, Negley had ordered a regiment of Sirwell's brigade to move forward and protect the artillery at this location. Captain Johnston related the scene: "There appeared small squads of the First [and Second] Brigade falling back on the ridge in confusion. An officer in command reported to you [Negley] 'the enemy were moving around on your left; that they counted 7 stand of colors across the road in that direction.' You immediately made disposition of the Third Brigade so as to cover the left." Lieutenant Smith, of the artillery battery, recorded the events of the fight after he had reported to Negley: "placed by [Negley] with other batteries and some infantry, near a hospital [Brannan's], on a ridge from which we could sweep the valley in rear of our front line [Thomas' line on Kelley Field], which was then hotly engaged . . . our front being changed from time to time to meet the different attacks of the enemy . . . Before noon part of our front line broke [Stanley and Beatty's troops] and was rallied on the hill which we occupied." Captain Bridges with four abandoned pieces of artillery found the two guns Negley had emplaced near Brannan's hospital after the engagement. Bridges joined Lieutenant Temple, who was in command of the two-gun section, and with the four serviceable guns found on the field, reformed his battery. There were now twenty pieces of artillery in battery around Snodgrass Hill.

To the southeast, near Brotherton Field, General Wood had just completed the relief of Sirwell's brigade when he received orders to move out of line, and to the left. The gap in the line created by General Wood's movement provided an opportunity to the Confederates, in the person of General Bushrod Johnston. The Confederates began to
pour through the gap created by the displacing Union division and severed the Federal army in the center. As the Confederates continued to press to the northwest, they nearly cut off General Thomas's main body, still on Kelly Field. The only Union force available to prevent the advancing Confederates from attacking Thomas's command in rear was Negley's Third Brigade and two batteries of artillery. Shultz's battery bore the brunt of this fight: "About [noon] I was attacked by the enemy, whereupon I opened fire with the whole battery, thereby holding the enemy in check, and sustained a loss of 4 men wounded . . . 8 horses killed . . . and expended 240 rounds of ammunition, 75 rounds canister and balance shell."^52

For nearly three hours, from about 10:15 A. M. to about 2:15 P. M., Negley energetically defended his position upon Snodgrass Hill against enemy attacks from the north, east and south, knowing that his force was not adequate to hold the position without reinforcement. Accordingly, Negley took several actions to remedy his perceived vulnerability. First, he dispatched Captain Wilson of Beatty's staff at about 11:00 A.M. to direct Beatty to bring his remaining forces to Snodgrass Hill and support the defense of this location. Wilson had initially served to guide Negley to Beatty's position on the Federal left in the morning. It was during Stanley's fight when Beatty received the order, and he was busily assisting Colonel Stanley's fight by forming a second line of defense and did not comply with the directive. As it happened, the second line refused to fight and Beatty's remnants withdrew from the field with Stanley's troops to a point north of Snodgrass Hill.^53

Upon viewing the Confederates continuing to pour through the Federal center, secondly, Negley sent Lieutenant Moody and Captain Hough of his staff on divergent
paths at about 1:30 P.M., with directions to contact General Rosecrans, describe the situation and state that unless reinforced the position could not be held. Both accomplished their task and returned; Moody was the first to reach Rosecrans and deliver Negley's message. Moody reported what he saw as he traveled south:

On my way I met hundreds of men going to the rear, and the farther I went to the right [south] the more stragglers I met. The woods were literally filled with disorganized bodies of troops. The enemy's shot and shell were coming thick and fast, their infantry rushing forward with yell after yell. Across the open field [Dyer Field] I could see General Rosecrans, alone, his staff and escort, with drawn sabers, endeavoring to check the avalanche of panic-stricken men that were fleeing before the desperate onset of the enemy. It was plainly to be seen that the right had given way.  

Upon reaching Rosecrans Moody passed the message and received the following response: "I can't help him; it is too late." Running into Hough while returning to Negley, Moody continued on his way to pass the disheartening message to his commander.

Negley received the message from Rosecrans, via Moody, by 2:00 P.M. The response from Rosecrans had the effect of authorizing Negley to withdraw from the hill as he saw fit. Negley had forwarded his recommendation to the army commander by stating that his position was untenable without reinforcements. Rosecrans, by not stating otherwise, implied that withdrawal from Snodgrass Hill by Negley was authorized. Confirming the report of Moody, Negley next heard Hough's report: "I delivered your message, and he [Rosecrans] replied that he had just sent you word that he could not help it. I returned by the same route I had taken gone, but found myself cut off and the enemy in possession of the top of the ridge at a point [location of South Carolina monument] a little to the right [southeast] of the ravine at the foot of the wooded hill [Snodgrass] I left
It must have been clear to Negley that Rosecrans did not intend him to hold the Snodgrass Hill position any longer and that his position became more precarious by the moment. With about fifty pieces of artillery in his command and less than a brigade of infantry to support it Negley probably realized that if not evacuated the artillery might soon be lost to the enemy who was only a few hundred yards distant. In addition, Rosecrans himself and the southern portion of the army were withdrawing from the field.

The situation only worsened when General Brannan, positioned to Negley's right and rear, began requesting assistance from Negley to strengthen his line. While arraying his brigade in response to enemy activity, Sirwell meet General Brannan on Snodgrass Hill. Sirwell reported: "Here I was solicited by General Brannan to leave a regiment to support one of his [Brannan's] batteries. I detached the Twenty-First Ohio for that purpose." Negley concurred with the request; his largest and best equipped unit, 525 men strong, armed with the Colt Revolving Rifle, was attached to Brannan by 2:15 P.M. The regiment would fight as part of Brannan's command for the remainder of the day; abandoned on the field when Brannan withdrew his command, it was eventually captured later in the evening.

Negley decided that the best course of action was to withdraw his command to the next piece of defensible ground. With no hope of reinforcement, over fifty pieces of artillery under his command, and only one and one half effective regiments of infantry, Negley left the Snodgrass Hill area at about 2:15 P.M. Of his total two and one half regiments of infantry, one of those regiments guarded the ineffective artillery pool in the rear. The 78th Pennsylvania had been placed about one and one quarter mile west of Snodgrass House for the guard mission; it overwatched several passes in the hilly terrain.
Negley ordered all the batteries under his command to withdraw, except one, to the west of his position along the ridge. Negley retained only the battery of the Fourth Artillery near Snodgrass House and Shultz's battery on the South Carolina monument hill, southeast of Snodgrass Hill, with the Thirty-Seventh Indiana in support. Lieutenant Moody, assisting his commander, recalled Negley's statement: "You [Negley] then, after strenuous efforts to collect troops . . . remarked that to save the army from rout that there must be a new line formed."  

Negley's first task was to determine where to array the command. Negley dispatched Captain Hough to conduct a reconnaissance to the west in order to determine a new location for the emplacement of the artillery. He witnessed the Army of the Cumberland evacuating northward along the Dry Valley road to Chattanooga; this implied that the new line secure the next pass to Chattanooga. Shultz and the 37th Indiana formed the rear guard for the initial movement and the column proceeded west.

Simultaneously, Major Lowrie, of Negley's staff, conducting a reconnaissance, determined a trail to the northwest was most practicable and forwarded the report to Negley. Concurrently, Negley rode to the west along Horseshoe ridge: "I rode forward to the crest of the ridge over which the right wing and center were retiring, to get a position for artillery, when I was met by a strong column of the enemy, who pressed forward between me and the troops on my left [Brannan] . . . reliable information reached me that a force of enemy's cavalry was moving from our right to our rear, and a column of infantry on our front and left." Faced with these facts, Negley came to the following conclusion: "I deemed it vitally important to secure the safety of the artillery, which appeared to be threatened with immediate capture by a large force of the enemy."
There was no time for reflection, and accordingly the commander acted decisively in choosing his new position. The new position chosen was McFarland Gap, about two miles northwest of Negley's current location. By 2:45 P.M., the column changed direction and moved northward. Shultz and the 37th Indiana withdrew from their position on Snodgrass Hill and followed the rear of the column by 2:30 P.M. Major Lowrie, by Negley's order, assumed control of the rear guard after orchestrating the movement of the artillery column northward along a trail over the ridge, to McFarland Gap. Upon reaching the gap, remnants of Beatty's brigade, the 88th and 42nd Indiana, broken and cut off earlier in the morning, were collected and began to form the new defensive line. The tail of the artillery cleared the Snodgrass Hill location about the same time as General James B. Steedman's division moved into position along Horseshoe Ridge, about 2:45 P.M. As Negley moved towards McFarland Gap, General Thomas arrived at the Snodgrass House; in the confusion of battle they had just missed each other.

The Second Brigade on Snodgrass Hill

As Negley's artillery column moved to the rear of the Second Brigade's position, about a quarter mile northwest of Snodgrass Hill, the Confederates mounted a vigorous assault on the eastern knob of Snodgrass Hill attracting Stoughton's attention. Negley, having just withdrawn Shultz's battery and the 37th Indiana from the hill's eastern spur, left it undefended except for a few troops on Brannan's left. The Confederate troops had successfully captured the crest of the hill, invoking action from the Second Brigade. Acting unilaterally, Stoughton immediately ordered the Eleventh Michigan and Nineteenth Illinois to the support of Brannan's exposed left flank at around 2:15 P.M.
"These regiments advanced at the double-quick and charged upon the enemy, driving them from the hill [Snodgrass Hill]."

Stoughton assumed command of the eastern knob of Snodgrass Hill for the remainder of the afternoon. He collected what stragglers he could and reinforced his line. He placed the Nineteenth Illinois on the right and the Eleventh Michigan on the left, and commenced building rudimentary breastworks. In reserve, he retained the Eighteenth Ohio. After several hours of fierce fighting the issue was still not settled: "As fast as their ranks were thinned by our [Second Brigade's] fire they were filled up by fresh troops. They [the Confederates] pressed forward and charged up our lines, firing across our breastworks, and planted their colors within 100 feet of our own. A dense cloud of smoke enveloped our lines, and in some places the position of the foes could only be known by the flash of his guns."

Sensing the urgency of the situation, Stoughton ordered forward his reserve. Rallying all the men he could, Stoughton ordered a charge, and the Confederate line broke under the advance of the Second Brigade, its colors falling to the ground. Now low on ammunition, the brigade scavenged cartridges from their fallen comrades and resumed their defensive line. The line held, and by 7:30 P.M. Stoughton began retired his command to McFarland Gap under orders from General Brannan.

The Twenty-First Ohio on Snodgrass Hill

When General Brannan received the 21st Ohio from Sirwell's command at about 2:00 P.M. he ordered it into position on his right flank. Several knolls form Horseshoe Ridge, and the one furthest to the west became the position of the 21st Ohio. As soon as they occupied their new position on Brannan's right, the regiment began receiving fire
from enemy skirmishers. Lieutenant Colonel Dwella M. Stoughton commanded the regiment until he received a severe wound at 2:30 P.M.; Major A. McMahan then assumed command of the regiment for a while until he became wounded and passed the command to Captain Vantine. Vantine remained in command throughout the remainder of the day until he fled with a small portion of the command, avoiding subsequent capture with the main body of the regiment.65

The regiment fought gallantly and probably offered the last Federal resistance on Horseshoe Ridge. Heavy fighting ensued from the start and the rapid-fire capability of the Colt Revolving Rifle proved effective against the advancing Confederate regiments. At about 2:15 P.M. elements of General Steedman's division arrived on the ridge, relieving the pressure from the enemy for about an hour. Although forced back, Steedman's troops continued in the general engagement along Horseshoe Ridge, and the 21st Ohio fought back and forth over the same ground. In the end, the regiment exhausted all of its ammunition, fixed bayonets and continued to fight hand to hand. By 6:00 P.M., the remainder of the forces on the ridge were withdrawn. Soon after this time, surrounded by an overwhelming enemy force and without ammunition the regiment surrendered to the enemy. Half their numbers were lost in this engagement. Two hundred and forty-three men of the regiment were lost during the battle.66

Actions at McFarland Gap and Rossville Gap

Almost simultaneously several events occurred around mid afternoon on 20 September: Negley evacuated the artillery to McFarland Gap, Granger arrived with the Reserve Corps, and Stanley secured Snodgrass Hill. It appears that none of the principals involved had situational awareness of the others' activities before execution. No one, it
appeared had actual command of the events on Horseshoe Ridge. As infantry arrived to reinforce and thrust against the Confederate assault on Horseshoe Ridge, the artillery train, which could have provided considerable assistance to the infantry, was led off the ridge to a position far to the rear.

The army's chief of staff had reinforced Negley's decision to evacuate the artillery. General Garfield, Rosecrans' chief of staff, passed Negley as the artillery train was leaving Horseshoe Ridge headed for McFarland Gap. Garfield issued the following instructions to Negley as they passed: "I sent word to him [Negley] to cover the retreat of trains through Rossville." At this point, Negley must have been reassured that his decision to evacuate the artillery was sound.

Negley reached McFarland Gap with the van of his column around 3:45 P.M., and quickly began to assess the situation and take action. The scene was one of masses of stragglers and wagons congested along the road with no apparent unit integrity. Colonel John G. Parkhurst, Thomas' provost marshal and commander of the 9th Michigan, was the senior man upon Negley's arrival. When confronted by Negley, Parkhurst informed the general: "General Crittenden had passed some hours before, and ordered him [Parkhurst], with all the troops, to fall back to Chattanooga." Negley replied that this was inexpedient: "the troops must be immediately reorganized and prepared to march to the front." With the artillery safely removed from imminent danger Negley assumed command and proceeded to rally and organize as many men as possible to rejoin the fight and protect the retreat as Garfield had directed.

About the same time, Generals Jefferson C. Davis and Philip Sheridan arrived at McFarland Gap; Sheridan had some 1500 of his command remaining. Negley called the
commanders together, and jointly they developed a course of action based upon their assessments of the situation. "It was determined as advisable to proceed to Rossville, to prevent the enemy from obtaining the crossroads, and from there General Sheridan would move to the support of General Thomas, via La Fayette road." General Davis performed the task of organizing units into companies for the move; Sheridan proceeded to Rossville with the remnants of his command. Negley had just learned Thomas was still on the field, so he attempted to contact him for instructions, but because of the presence of enemy cavalry in force along his route, he was unsuccessful.

After his failed attempt to reach Thomas, Negley returned to where he had left General Davis to organize some men. Negley and Davis formed 1500 men into units and proceeded south with the new command to reinforce Thomas, via the Dry Valley road. Leaving at about 5:30 P.M., they marched south for nearly two and one half miles attempting to find Thomas. Apparently disoriented, the party finally gave up the effort and returned by 7:00 P.M. after traveling to within one and one half miles of the Widow Glenn's house with no contact.

Negley now took pause to notice the deplorable state of the men continuing to form around McFarland Gap. Accordingly, he dispatched Lieutenant Moody to Chattanooga to obtain provisions and guide them back to the future position of defense, at Rossville Gap. Lieutenant Hough, at Negley's direction, also rode to Rosecrans' position at Chattanooga. Charged with reporting the facts as Negley knew them to the army commander, Hough related his experience upon finding Rosecrans in the telegraph office at Chattanooga: "[Hough] discovered him crying, despairing, and even seeking spiritual comfort from the priest . . . he [Rosecrans] showed the want of one requisite of a
great military commander, firmness and self reliance under adverse circumstances. He [Rosecrans] told me to return with all haste and tell Genl. [sic] Negley to preserve order until Genl. [sic] Thomas reached him." Hough did not return until after midnight, finding Negley in position at Rossville Gap.

The day had ended with the Army of the Cumberland capable of making stand at Chattanooga. With nearly 6,000 troops gathered near the Rossville Gap, Negley manned a defensive position at the gap and received General Thomas' troops as they left the field during the evening of 20 September. The exhausted and still ill Negley had organized three divisions worth of stragglers, provided for provisioning of the forces at Rossville, evacuated much of the army's artillery to Chattanooga, and defended against a probable Confederate pursuit of Thomas' retiring troops at Rossville Gap.

Rosecrans continued to defend at Rossville Gap throughout the day on 21 September 1863. Negley's division, now reconstituted, manned the center of the Union line at the gap itself. Slight skirmishing took place throughout the day, but the Confederates did not press an attack. By the evening of 21 September, Rosecrans had ordered the Army of the Cumberland to withdraw within the fortifications of Chattanooga. The move occurred without incident, and the Second Division occupied new positions on the perimeter of the city in preparation for a deliberate defense.

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2Ibid., 338.
10 *O.R.*, Series 1, vol. 30, part I, 251,355. Captain Willard reported that he left General Thomas with the order before the arrival of Rosecrans at Thomas' position on the morning of 20 September. Thomas reported that Willard indeed went to Negley ordering him to move to his support before Rosecrans had arrived at Kelly Field. This action was done without authority or communication with the Army headquarters and caused the initial separation of the brigades in Negley's division.

11 Ibid., 348.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 378.

14 Ibid., 338.

15 Ibid. 338, 840.

16 Ibid., 360.

17 Ibid., 1011.

18 Ibid., 338.

19 Ibid., 367.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.


26 Ibid., 172.

27 Ibid., 378.

28 Ibid., 379.

29 Ibid.


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 369.

33 Ibid., 379.

34 Ibid., 369.

35 Ibid., 379-380,1011. The brigade was not aware that the guns of Bridges battery were at this location.

36 Ibid., 369.

37 Ibid., 370.

38 Ibid., 381.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 O.R., Series 1, vol. 30, part I, 251,330,338,348,356,1011,1021,1026,1033,1036. All of these references bear witness to the orders sent by Captain Gaw from General
Thomas to Negley. No exact testimony from Captain Gaw is available, nor do any of the 
witnesses to the incident remember the exact directions. General Thomas' post battle 
report will be the one referenced in the body of the thesis. Although his intent seems 
clear as written after the incident, the author would like to note that not one of Negley's 
subordinates or other parties relayed any information to substantiate the claims of 
General Thomas that the order was misunderstood. Negley most likely chose a position 
about 400 yards farther to the south, Snodgrass Hill, than was intended by Thomas. This 
could explain why Negley reported that Gaw directed him to orient to the south once 
upon the high ground. If Negley had chosen a position about a quarter mile further north 
his orientation south would have supported Thomas' intent. In that the battle was furious 
and constant, and that Negley did not know Baird's disposition upon receipt of the order 
to emplace the artillery, it is reasonable to assume that Thomas's report is accurate and 
Negley chose a position not intended by the corps commander.

42 Ibid., 330.
43 Ibid., 338.
44 Ibid., 338, 438.
45 Ibid., 139.
46 Ibid., 1028.
47 Ibid., 330, 342-343, 361, 385, 1011.
48 Ibid., 330, 385.
49 Ibid., 343.
50 Ibid., 330, 438.
51 Ibid., 354.
52 Ibid., 383.
53 Beatty, *The Citizen Soldier, or Memoirs of a Volunteer* (Cincinnati, OH: 
54 *O.R.*, Series 1, vol. 30, part I, 330, 349, 361. The quote is from page 361.
55 Ibid., 361.
56 Ibid., 349.
57 Ibid., 385.

58 Ibid., 361.

59 Ibid., 349.

60 Ibid., 331,361.

61 Ibid., 331,339,361,383,387.

62 Ibid., 381.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., 381-382.

65 Ibid., 388-390,394-395.

66 Ibid., 172,394-395.

67 Ibid., 141.

68 Ibid., 265,331.

69 Ibid., 265, 331,349.

70 Ibid., 331,349, 362.

71 Ibid., 143.

72 Ibid., 362.


CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The outcome of the Battle of Chickamauga continues to be a subject of debate in many intellectual circles to this day. With nearly equal losses in both the Confederate and Federal armies, the Union pushed from the battlefield, and the South losing Chattanooga, the statistical data only serves to fuel a partisan debate. In 1890, twenty-seven years after the battle, a news correspondent related a story about the debate. General Boynton, head of the Chickamauga Association, had published a pro-Union account of the battle in the papers, which was held as fact in the majority of the U.S. Congress. Congress was appropriating $250,000 for the purchase of the battlefield park at this time. In response to Boynton's claims, Captain R. F. Powell, a former Confederate officer of Georgia, had the following to say:

General Boynton, a very pretty writer, has a very nice romance, which he calls fact, published in the Washington army paper, claiming the battle of Chickamauga as a great 'Union victory,' says the objective point was Chattanooga, and Rosecrans got there first . . . That reminds me of the little boy who ran home with another boy after him, his face scratched, his cloths torn, his hair standing on end, and, in fact, bearing all the marks of a boy who had been soundly thrashed...His brother said to him, 'Why, Ned, what is the matter? What are you running for?' Says Ned: 'Now Bud, do you recon I'm goin' to let that Jones boy hit me the last lick and beat me to the house, too? No, I aint.'

During a recent staff ride to the battlefield, conducted in February 2001, a group of professional historians and army officers, who had studied the events of the battle, often expressed differing views, thus illustrating the debate is still unsettled. This student of the battle does not pretend to have any clearer insight into the matter, nor does he plan to deliver any new, incontrovertible proof on this subject. However, through the study of General Negley, the subject of this paper, perhaps a clearer perspective concerning the
actions of his command and their consequences is available; at the least, he provided us
some valuable insights into battle command, its competencies, leadership and judgment.
It is my view that the value of this study is in gaining an understanding of command, as
exercised by a division commander in battle; the attainment of specific nuggets of
knowledge is only of secondary importance, and a byproduct of this study. First, I will
summarize the cogent events that affected Negley, post Chickamauga; then I will analyze
his performance using battle command as a framework; finally, I will draw conclusions
on his leadership abilities.

The terrific loss of life and the failure of the Federal army to destroy Bragg's
Confederate army garnered criticism from the outset. Several courts of inquiry were
convened to look into persons who might have contributed in the slightest, to the less
than stellar performance by the Army of the Cumberland. The introduction to this thesis
left General Negley and the court beginning to question his first witness, and the
remaining chapters have examined the life and actions of Negley and his division through
the battle of Chickamauga. In the words of General Rosecrans, as he communicated to
Washington, we can see his thoughts on Negley, and Negley's subsequent relief:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 14, 1863.

Brig, Gen. Lorenzo Thomas,
Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: Herewith I transmit a special report by Major-General
Negley, with accompanying documents, explanatory of the reasons why he left
his position on the field of Chickamauga, on the 20th, so early in the day, without
orders and without being driven off, while the troops in front and to the left of the
position held their ground.

The general has always been an active, energetic, and efficient
commander, and displayed very good judgment in the affair at Widow Davis'
house in front of Stevens' Gap, where he was attacked by a superior force of the enemy, and successfully extricated his train and command from a precarious position.

But an impression that he left the field on Sunday without orders or necessity having made its way through the army, and statements having appeared in the official reports of general officers appearing to support the impression, I gave General Negley leave to submit this special report on the subject. From a careful perusal of that and the accompanying papers, it seems that he acted according to his best judgment under the circumstances of the case.

But satisfied that his usefulness in this army is lost, at least until these facts can be developed by a Court of Inquiry, I have given him a leave of absence for thirty days, and advised him after this report goes in to ask for a court of inquiry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General, Commanding.

Negley never again commanded after this relief. Although he was absolved of any wrong doing by his court of inquiry, and he attempted to gain another command from his former superior, George Thomas, it did not come to pass. After nearly a year of inactivity, Negley returned to his beloved Pittsburgh and finally resigned his commission in January of 1865. His service to the nation continued in the form of politics and veteran affairs. He served in the United States House of Representatives as republican during four sessions of congress: 4 March 1869 to 3 March 1875, and 4 March 1885 to 3 March 1887. For ten years between 1874 and 1888, Negley served on the board of managers of the National Home for the Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. From 1888 until his death on August 7, 1901, Negley was actively involved in railroading interests. James S. Negley died in Plainfield, New Jersey, and is interred at Allegheny Cemetery, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

From here, the writer will briefly shape some of the trends into a framework and draw some conclusions. The study of Major General James Scott Negley, USV, and his
division during the prelude to and the Chickamauga Campaign is germane to gaining insights into the five battle command competencies and their relevance to present circumstances. The framework for this examination comprises the competencies themselves: seeing the enemy, seeing the terrain, seeing yourself, visualizing the battle, and seeing into the future.  

First, let's examine Negley's ability to "see the enemy." During the defense of Nashville in 1862, Negley scouted for and determined that General Forrest had massed forces at La Vergne, Tennessee, in preparation for action against his attenuated defense of the city; this triggered Negley to conduct a spoiling attack. During the battle at Stones River, Negley and his division nearly became encircled, due to his adjacent unit retiring, and he conducted a fighting withdrawal to his own lines in the Union center. During the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns the division commander clearly understood the worth and necessity of reconnaissance. He had, and used, cavalry during Tullahoma with success; he gained and maintained contact with the enemy at Elk River, and fixed the Confederates by not allowing them to break contact while the main body of his corps moved to the north. Much of his correspondence and reports noted enemy dispositions and estimated the probable enemy action as he crossed Lookout Mountain; 10 and 11 September showed that Negley correctly estimated the enemy situations. At Dug Gap, 10-12 September, the lack of detailed cavalry required the division to utilize dismounted infantry regiments to accomplish the reconnaissance missions. Prodded to proceed by his superiors at Dug Gap, Negley mitigated his risk throughout the battle by determining the enemy situation before acting; through pickets, patrols, spies, observation posts and reconnaissance in force, Negley always kept his focus on the enemy.
At Chickamauga the trend continued, arguably with success. The first day of the battle, 19 September, found Negley's Division performing a flank guard, a reconnaissance and security mission for McCook's corps early in the day, including a fight at Glass Mill, and an evening movement to contact that transitioned into a hasty attack at the Brotherton Farm, finally culminating in a defense. No action on the nineteenth dissuaded Negley from ensuring his pickets were forward in anticipation of an enemy attack during the night, although the enemy had withdrawn to the east. On 20 September, Negley, through scouts and his own eyes, viewed the Confederate push through the center and around the left of the Federal defense. He predicted continued overwhelming enemy pushes on Horseshoe Ridge and accordingly evacuated his artillery pool from Snodgrass Hill. He saw the enemy objective and withdrew before the foe could gain the spoils he had charge to protect.

Given that Negley had a history of extremely successful independent commands, had saved his division from encirclement at Stones River, was not decisively engaged at Dug Gap, recovered over 50 pieces of artillery from the field of battle on 20 September, and defended successfully at Rossville, it is reasonable to conclude that Negley displayed the 'seeing the enemy' competency in an above average manner. His division routinely performed well, in large part, due to its commander's grasp of the enemy situation.

"Seeing the terrain" came easy to the division commander. As a horticulturalist, Negley had a natural affinity for nature and its complexion. Detailed analysis of his area of interest constantly occupied his thoughts. As a private in the Mexican War, he drew a detailed sketch of the terrain around the castle at Jolappa. As an independent brigade commander in 1862, during a demonstration on Chattanooga, he sent detailed terrain
analysis back to his superiors, including notes on routes and trafficability. Crossing the Tennessee River and moving over Lookout Mountain during the summer of 1863 again illustrated Negley's focus on terrain and road networks. He repaired routes, built bridges, delivered rates of movement, and recommended routes to his higher commander. When he descended Lookout Mountain to the east, he dispatched his First Brigade to clear Cooper's Gap; this showed that Negley appreciated the terrain and the points from which he would be vulnerable in McLemore's Cove. The division topographical engineer usually accompanied the advance guard of the division or was detached to provide Negley with critical information, like routes and trafficability. On 20 September 1863, this very action occurred; however, overcome by events, the commander never finalized his terrain analysis before the battle on the twentieth. Snodgrass Hill became his artillery position; it was the dominant terrain in the area. He chose McFarland Gap to initially form a second line of defense for the army and subsequently Rossville Gap; both of these positions were excellent points for a defense.

Negley understood terrain and its effects on military action. In the "seeing the terrain" battle command competency Negley displayed extraordinary talent.

"Commissary Negley," as he was affectionately named by his troops, maintained his division superbly. In seeing himself, Negley understood and acted upon the premise of preparing thoroughly. A disciplinarian who drilled frequently, Negley familiarized himself with the strengths and weaknesses of his subordinates in this manner. He knew his command and its capabilities. He made a concerted effort to provide ample supplies and food to his men. Of importance always, the arming and resupply of his troops took priority. On 19 September, he issued extra ammunition to his men in anticipation of a
fight. The forty extra rounds he issued to the 21st Ohio, for example, and his support of Sirwell's choice of this regiment to support Brannan in large measure illustrated his familiarity with the capabilities of his command. In evacuating artillery from Snodgrass Hill Negley displayed an understanding of the requirements of moving such a large pool of guns, with limited horsepower, over rough terrain: in this action he estimated the capabilities of the men correctly because all the artillery made the move. Once at Rossville he immediately requisitioned provisions for the starving, dehydrated and exhausted men of the army; he realized the men could not defend unless supplied. In short, Negley knew his command and their capabilities.

However, Negley stumbled a bit when it came to understanding his own personal capacities to deal with fatigue and illness. Although he was very sick, and probably dehydrated, he chose to remain in command. This decision was not sound; certainly, his condition affected his ability to exercise the requisite judgment necessary in battle. By not ensuring he had adequate sleep and rest, he put at risk his command and those assigned him, as well as adjacent units, or others that depended on his faculties in time of crisis. Given these conditions, it is hard to estimate what he was capable of doing vice what he did. It seems reasonable to assume that his actions would have been under less scrutiny, and more daring, had he had a healthy constitution during the battle.

In the "seeing yourself" competency Negley was both brilliant, in regards to his subordinates, and extremely poor in self awareness. This garners the general an overall average rating in this area. Personal judgment in a division commander, the man in charge on the gridiron, cannot be overvalued; Negley should have relinquished command until fit.
Admittedly, Negley's ability to "visualize the battle" is hard to assess from an operational perspective. However, study of Negley's actions at Dug Gap and Chickamauga at the division level clearly indicate that he somewhat successfully visualized the battles of Dug Gap and 19-20 September as they affected his troops and his adjacent units. This competency is tied, inextricability to "seeing into the future."

Therefore, we will evaluate his actions in this aspect of battle command by combining it with the last competency.

"Seeing into the future," the last competency, is often assessed in terms of correct or incorrect decisions, but it is also viewed in terms of probabilities. Dug Gap again illustrated Negley's insight. He realized that destruction was imminent unless he withdrew from his exposed position in McLemore's Cove; he also realized he could not do it without reinforcement from Baird. In the case of Negley's division of 20 September, his decision to leave Snodgrass Hill might have been premature when looking through the historical mirror. Nevertheless, the probability of the Confederates encircling General Thomas at Kelly Field was great; Negley went with what he saw, and what he viewed as the army commander's intent. The likely odds were for the Confederates; Negley attempted to influence the outcome of the battle by securing the artillery of the Army of the Cumberland against enemy capture. Right or wrong, Negley attempted to see into the future. Arguably, he did a good job, he secured a second line of defense for the army, and the artillery he evacuated was critical to the eventual defense of Chattanooga. 

As it ended, Negley made a solid assessment of the outcome of the tactical fight at Chickamauga; he "visualized the battle" accurately. The army reformed at Rossville
rather than continue its retirement to Chattanooga on the evening of 20 September. The Federal forces did not hold Snodgrass Hill. He visualized all of these events and proactively took action to mitigate loss. An above average ability to "see into the future" was one of Negley's traits.

The timelessness of understanding and applying the battle command competencies as a leader and troop commander offers contemporary leaders an opportunity to assess the actions of past leaders through the historical analysis process and apply the lessons learned to current and future conflicts. Negley and his division at the battle of Chickamauga offer an interesting case study to this end.

In respect to leadership, Negley's men and subordinate officers respected him. He consistently remained calm, composed and cool under the most taxing of circumstances. This indicates a clear and determined mind. Superiors of Negley generally held him in high regard and appreciated his capabilities as a brigade and division commander. Frequently, Negley had conducted independent operations as a brigade and division commander; this shows he had the respect and trust of his superiors. Although not an examined part of this study, he seemed to have a less than positive relationship with his peers. Charges by Generals Wood and Brannan after the battle of Chickamauga go toward illustrating this point. These peer relationships are worthy of further study, and may provide some insight as to the reasons for Negley's relief from command. In addition, a study of this sort may discover the reason he would never command again.9

Throughout this study, I have found, as did the court of inquiry, that General Negley performed in the best interest of the Army of the Cumberland. Not all historians hold this opinion. In particular, Peter Cozzen's *This Terrible Sound*, published in 1996,
claims that Negley lost his will to fight on Snodgrass Hill, and that this resulted in the premature withdraw of the artillery, thereby jeopardizing the army. The results of this analysis did not support that view.

I will close with a brief excerpt from the finding of the court of inquiry: "General Negley exhibited throughout the day [20 September 1863] and the following night great activity and zeal in the discharge of his duties, and the Court do not find in the evidence before them any ground of censure."1

5. James Scott Negley to Alexander Negley, 10 November 1847, from Jo Lappa, Mexico, Baum family papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA.
7. Ibid., 343.
8. These statements are in passim of chapters three and four of this thesis.
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