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The Best of All Worlds:
Full Spectrum Conflict, LIC, and the Transformation of the Army

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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"The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out."
-- B. H. Liddell Hart
Abstract of

The Best of All Worlds: Full Spectrum Conflict, LIC, and the Transformation of the Army

The findings of the paper’s research indicate that the U.S. Army has undertaken a sweeping transformation that promises to create a force that will be prepared for a broad range of low intensity conflict (LIC) missions without having created the necessary LIC doctrine, a training plan that will produce the leaders required, or a culture that is willing to embrace the mission. The American way of war and our historic aversion to low intensity conflict are players in this oversight. Recent events have forced an awakening in our Army. The need for transformation has been made apparent. Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovia, and Kosovo are cases in point. The Army’s efforts to adjust can be traced back to CSA Meyer and the High Technology Light Division (HTLD). General Franks addressed the growing need for transformation in the early nineties. By the Kosovo deployment in 1999, there were few demurrers to CSA Shinseki’s transformation. Although a grand ambition, the transformation force is being built without capstone doctrine. The new FMs, although very promising, have not been published and the efforts at Ft. Lewis to produce TTP are not synchronized with Ft. Leavenworth’s capstone doctrine. The education and training required to produce this network centric force is not yet clearly envisioned. Moreover, the
culture of the Army has not yet been transformed to embrace this bold new world. Time remains, but the Army must act fast.
When one takes a look at the history of our nation's Army, Liddell Hart's maxim rings true. Our land warfare leaders have always preferred large standing armies and have always prepared for the grand engagement – high intensity conflict. Missions at the lower end of the spectrum, although plentiful, have never been embraced as a core constituent of the Army's culture. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, it promises to expedite a revolution in military affairs in order to ensure that it is capable of transitioning – on short notice – across the full spectrum of conflict. Looked at in its historic context, the key word in this promise seems to be conflict (in the classical sense of the word); and the key focus seems to be a more mobile and more versatile, lethal platform. While the Army's great leap forward is not purported to be platform centric, one is left to wonder whether information dominance and advanced technology alone can change the culture of an organization. History would indicate that more is necessary. Unless the United States Army is willing to change the way it looks at itself and the way it prepares for its mission, it is unlikely to produce the full spectrum force – capable of operating at the lower end as well as the upper end – that our nation needs and deserves. As Carl von Clausewitz warns, "Nothing is more important in life than finding the right standpoint for seeing and judging events, and then adhering to it." At present, the Army is struggling to find the prescient high ground that will provide a panoptic view of the complexities of needed change. Consequently, we are undertaking a sweeping transformation of our Army that promises to create a force that will be prepared for a broad range of low intensity conflict (LIC) missions without the necessary LIC doctrine, a training plan that will produce the leaders required, or a culture that is willing to embrace the mission.

The American Way of War and Our Historic Aversion to LIC
Not surprisingly, America’s view of the proper role of its military goes back to the founding fathers. George Washington, trained by the British to fight the Indians, saw legitimacy in a large standing army. Forced by necessity to fight a tactical offensive and a strategic defensive during the Revolutionary War, he was compelled to rely on the militia and Fabian tactics, while working determinedly to build a Continental Army that would earn the respect of would be European allies. Although kept in the war by improvisation and unconventional warfare – asymmetric, partisan, and guerrilla warfare – conducted by General Green in the south, George Washington’s victory at Yorktown was the fulfillment of his desired (heavy) conventional (joint and combined) approach.

Even with America’s great early success in unconventional (lighter/lower intensity) operations, there was little interest in following up on the lessons learned. America’s Indian Wars – which ran from 1607-1890 – did not evidence a coherent low intensity doctrine. In fact, America’s primary military institution of the time (West Point) never studied the Indian wars. During this period, “the Army did not view the Indian Wars as ‘war,’ but as a bothersome and transitory nuisance.” In fact, the Army’s school at Ft. Leavenworth did not take a scholarly look at the Indian Wars until 1881. Our very Eurocentric view of the world ensured that we remained focused upon the European military vogue – large conventional forces fighting large conventional battles.

In the early 1800s, Napoleon and the levee en mass captured the imagination of our military thinkers and became the standard by which American military men assessed preparation for war. The butchery of the American Civil War, taking its tactical basis from this period, did not alter our intransigent attachment to conventional European wisdom. With the success of Prussia during the Wars of German Unification, we continued to covet the military acumen of Europe.
However, the American public’s historic aversion to large standing Armies (the Republican antithesis to George Washington and the Federalists), ensured that we would not be allowed to actualize our military desires and would begin each of our wars from a standpoint of relative disadvantage. Moreover, our military’s commitment to high intensity combat ensured that we would enter each of our wars with a rather narrowly conceived doctrine resulting in inappropriate and inflexible tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). This was demonstrated during the Spanish American War in the Philippines when we struggled to come to terms with an enemy who would not follow the European rules of warfare. America’s military leaders continued to maintain the very ingenuous and anti-Clausewitzian view that “war was clean, independent of politics, and fought with big battalions.” World War I and World War II only served to ossify our emerging view of the American way of war. America had become committed to large forces, immense fire power, decisive engagements, quick victory (hopefully, with relatively low casualties), and a rapid return to the status quo ante bellum.

Even our poor showing in Vietnam failed to change our view concerning this doctrine. Demonstrating the self-satisfaction of General Johnson (CSA during the Vietnam War), we believed that any lieutenant of the infantry (trained to fight in high intensity conflict) could handle low intensity conflict. Almost unbelievably the lesson of Vietnam was not that we had need of new, wide-ranging, tactical doctrine, but rather that we must avoid those conflicts that do not lend themselves to our way of war. The sad fact of the matter is that from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam, “we never developed a body of useful doctrine” for low intensity conflict.

The Weinberger Doctrine did much to codify our reluctance to get engaged in LIC missions. However, the realities of America’s hegemonic status and the post Cold War environment have militated toward more, and not less, American involvement in LIC type
operations. Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Hersogovia, and Kosovo are cases in point. Rudyard Kipling’s “savage wars of peace” have quickly become the rule and not the exception.

**Awakening**

The changing environment has not gone unnoticed by the Army. Following our problems with Iran in 1980, the Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer, began to work on the creation of a High Technology Light Division (HTLD). This effort, although providing useful experience, died aborning. By 1993, the head of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, General Frederick M. Franks, recognized that the Army needed to change its doctrine to be consistent with the changing world. In the words of General Franks, “This new environment – this new era – requires a different posture for our nation and our Army, both physically and intellectually.” According to Franks, we were entering “a period requiring some bold adjustments in how we think about warfare, warfighting and the conduct of operations other than war.” General Franks foresight led to a significant revision of the Army’s fundamental war fighting manual, FM 100-5. Although much more joint and combined in its orientation, General Franks’ FM 100-5 would only serve to refine the existing Army. A major transformation of the Army would take a great deal more.

The 1990s, with its unprecedented number of deployments, gave the Army a great deal to think about. In each case, major adjustments had to be made to get to the crisis and to equip the soldiers on the point of the spear. The 1999 deployment to Albania/Kosovo demonstrated that the time for change was upon us. An augmented battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division was put on the ground with little more than their Kevlar vests to protect them from a host of would be assailants. Humvees, also lacking armor protection, arrived across time to cart them around. M1 tanks (which cannot be transported by C130 or C141) arrived much later, having taken the
long trip by ship and road march into the theater of operations. At this point, everyone seemed to agree with the CSA, General Eric K. Shinseki, that the transformation of the Army had to begin (tangibly) right now.\textsuperscript{13}

General Shinseki would not have our soldiers deploy on peace operations with so very little cover. Moreover, General Shinseki believed that he must be prepared to conduct full spectrum operations with a smaller (less expensive force). The five indicators of change identified by TRADOC and General Franks in 1993 – threats and unknown dangers, National Military Strategy, history and lessons learned, changing nature of war, and technology – all made their own salient case for the transformation.\textsuperscript{14}

**The Transformation**

General Shinseki surveyed the many flash points around the world and the array of missions the U.S. Army would likely be called upon to complete and formulated the following vision statement for the Army's transformation – "Soldiers on point for the nation transforming this, the most respected army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations."\textsuperscript{15} In accordance with this vision, General Shinseki highlighted seven comprehensive goals: the Army had to be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. These broad goals are made more complex, and not less, by Shinseki's "centerpiece"\textsuperscript{16} for the transformation – "soldiers and their families."\textsuperscript{17}

General Shinseki's approach, broad and all encompassing, seems (at least on the surface) to hinge upon deployability. The Army's transformation web site goes back time and again to this theme. General Shenseki appears to believe that responsiveness is the key to the program's overall success. He says:

> When ordered, we intend to get to trouble spots faster than our adversaries can complicate the crisis. Once there, we intend to leverage for de-escalation and a return to stability through our formidable presence. But if deterrence fails, we will be postured to
prosecute war with an intensity that wins at least cost to us and our allies and sends clear messages for all future crises.\textsuperscript{18}

While providing an overarching vision of the end state, the details of the needed doctrine beg the question – how do we get there? General Shinseki lays out the transformation in his campaign plan in three phases. In Phase I, he organizes, equips and makes ready the initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs).\textsuperscript{19} In Phase II, he targets an interim force of 6-8 brigade combat teams and a division headquarters. In Phase III, he establishes the objective force.\textsuperscript{20}

To a very high degree, the transformation of the Army is predicated upon emerging technology. Given that advances in technology are not assured, Shinseki’s time phased approach ensures needed coverage in the near term and invests now for technology breakthroughs in the far term (in technological terms, the next decade). This is accomplished by way of three forces – the legacy force, the interim force, and the objective force.\textsuperscript{21} As would be expected, the vision for the near term (interim force) is much clearer than the far term (objective force); however, these parallel axis must begin to converge by FY 2010. According to the plan, by FY 2015, “the art of the possible”\textsuperscript{22} will have become the science of the achievable and the U.S. Army will have “the ability to put a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a full division within 120 hours, and five divisions on the ground within 30 days.”\textsuperscript{23}

The focal point of this – the objective force – is the “future combat system (FCS).”\textsuperscript{24} This network centric system of systems will provide the platform for indirect fire, direct fire, mounted infantry, and sensors. Weighing only 20 tons, the ceramic composite FCS will use “star wars” type advancements – electromagnetic guns, directed energy weapons, precision missiles, networked fire control, and robotics. There are even plans for smart armor, force fields, and unmanned FCS platforms for direct fire, indirect fire, and sensor functions.\textsuperscript{25}
If the discussion of the transformation seems heavily focused upon the new technology and the new platform, it would logically have to be. How else will the Army’s leadership convince its own communities that it is safe to embark on such a bold move. Moreover, the technological leap necessary will not happen without a great deal of investment and focus. However, the Army’s effort to consciously create an RMA (the first ever to be orchestrated in this way) will hinge upon a great deal more than “star wars” technology. Shinseki’s own vision for the transformation emphasizes that the individual soldier (and his or her family) must be the centerpiece. This leads to the tougher issue of developing appropriate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures and the even subtler issue of shaping organizational culture.

**Transformational Doctrine**

As Ft. Lewis works to put together the IBCTs, the creators of doctrine at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas are working on capstone documents to guide the transformation. To the Army’s credit, it is leading the inter service initiative to align service doctrine with joint doctrine. FM 100-5 (Operations), the Army’s capstone document for operations, is being re-written and re-numbered. Following its revision, it will be numbered FM 3-0 (Operations) to coincide with the joint publication by the same number that describes the conduct of joint operations.²⁶

The new FM is intended to be a doctrinal bridge for the transformation of the Army. Conceptually, it is to be of equal use to the interim, objective, and legacy forces. FM 3-0 makes great strides to broaden the Army’s horizons. Its highlights include full spectrum operations, continued warfighting focus, a more offensive focus, a much greater joint and multinational focus, a new definition of the operational environment, a new battle command model, and continued stress upon the importance of soldiers, leaders, and the decisive role of the Army.²⁷
FM 3-0 describes an Army that moves more quickly, gets engaged earlier, and stays longer doing more things. In this way, the Army can shape, deter, and conduct decisive action earlier. This approach makes sense given our recent missions. Moreover, FM 3-0 greatly improves upon the importance of sustainment. Described as commander’s business, it is given a much more detailed treatment. Total asset visibility, a smaller logistical footprint, and technological enablers are highlighted.\textsuperscript{28}

The most troubling areas of the new document relate to battle command and training. This fluid, new, fast tempo approach is completely dependent upon leadership. According to FM 3-0, the Army must have adaptive, flexible leaders to execute the full spectrum mission. According to the plan, FM 22-100 (Leadership) and our training base will create leaders who can simultaneously understand and execute based upon near complete real-time informational awareness. According to the manual, the Army’s leaders for the transformational force will visualize, describe, direct, and lead our forces. While these descriptors are explained in terms of art and science, prescriptive definitions are science heavy and art light. Our leaders will never be computers and the simultaneous action required will likely be a matter of learned intuition and not prescribed science. The rather amorphous new operational framework – described as decisive, shaping, and sustaining with close, deep, and rear considerations – will require nothing short of operational genius.\textsuperscript{29}

Where LIC operations are concerned, FM 3-0 provides some very useful definitions and descriptions, but nothing in the way of specific guidance. This is not altogether inappropriate given that FM 3-7 (Stability Operations and Support Operations) is designed to provide the detail for SASO operations. FM 3-7 does provide more detail than FM 3-0. FM 3-7 provides a good conceptual framework that facilitates a “broad understanding.”\textsuperscript{30} It provides a good list of definitions, considerations, and imperatives for operations in the LIC environment. Helpful
points are given for planning. Safety and information operations are addressed. Helpful information concerning law and ROE is provided. Some guidance is given concerning force tailoring. But, where TTP is concerned, there is little meat on the bones. There is a discussion of methods to convert prisoners of war and a structure for NEO operations, but little else. FM 3-7 states that TTP will be provided in other Joint and Army regulations.31

According to MAJ Jack Murphy, the POC for I Corps’ Transformation Cell (at Ft. Lewis, Washington, where the IBCT is being created), the IBCT is progressing very nicely based upon the operations and organization document for the fielding. MAJ Murphy said that they were working on TTP for the transformation, but their focus had been at squad level and little had been done for higher echelons. He described the focus of the IBCT as “high end, small-scale contingencies”32 (like Kosovo). He said the IBCT will go through a warfighter this summer. According to MAJ Murphy, the warfighter itself will be a basic (legacy) warfighter scenario. MAJ Murphy commented that a full third of the training time was being dedicated to training soldiers to use the fully digitized equipment. He expressed pride and surprise in the great lethality of the new system. Overall, he described the TTP process as bottom up (squad level up) and center outwards (middle of the continuum, them moving up and down).33

According to LTC Mike Chura, Ft. Leavenworth (FM 3-7 project officer), the Army’s leadership is going slowly with the development of this doctrine. According to LTC Chura, TTP is developing for counterdrug and humanitarian operations, but is needed for peace operations like Kosovo. LTC Chura indicated that the Army is discussing a joint effort with the Marines, as the Marines revise their Small Wars Manual. As the author of the capstone document, he expressed his commitment to pull the pieces (of doctrine development) together. LTC Chura expressed concern that the equipment fielding might be allowed to slowly drive the doctrine process.34
This bottom up approach is no accident. It is embedded in the overall plan. The fielders of the interim brigades at Ft. Lewis, Washington, are supposed to be sending information (gleaned from their training) back to the doctrine writers at Ft. Leavenworth. This timing, equipment first and doctrine second, might appear anachronistic (and in opposition to concept based transformation).

Dr. Doug Johnson, one of the Army’s transformation experts at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, says this order of business is riddled with contradictions. Dr. Johnson describes the transformation process as high intensity combat (HIC) oriented with LIC equipment. He believes this leaves the force without the firepower for HIC or the doctrine for LIC.\textsuperscript{35} According to Dr. Johnson, the Army has years of LIC experience that could have resulted in needed doctrine and TTP. He says, “TTP is incredibly important to this process.”\textsuperscript{36} If the TTP had been codified in advance, the equipment could have been procured to meet the requirements of the TTP. As it is, the equipment purchased will have to be adjusted for the emerging TTP. Moreover, the plan has significant shortfalls. Dr. Johnson pointed to the lack of a medical evacuation vehicle for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) units and the lack of a viable ammo resupply plan as examples of the shortfalls. Overall, Dr. Johnson characterized the transformation as “a hollow concept.”\textsuperscript{37} Dr. Johnson said that a contractor could have been assigned to write the needed TTP based upon lessons learned (after action reviews [AARs] forwarded to Ft. Leavenworth from our training centers), but it is “almost too late”\textsuperscript{38} at this point to adjust in Dr. Johnson’s opinion (based upon equipment procurement for the IBCT).\textsuperscript{39}

The Army’s Training Centers

The Army’s training centers have provided a great opportunity to develop experience and refine TTP. Ultimately, the Army’s doctrine for the transformation (and LIC) will have to be
tested under the crucible of the national training centers. Of the three field training centers – the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) – the JRTC, the light training center, should have the lead in promulgating the emerging LIC doctrine. LTC Bill Brown, the Deputy Commander of the Operations Group at the JRTC, says they have not changed their operation (or adjusted scenarios) based upon the emerging doctrine. Rotations to the JRTC still focus upon movement to contact (MTC), military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), and defense. Over the past few years, they have added asymmetric missions like guerrilla warfare, biological weapons, and WMD. According to LTC Brown, the most valuable learning experiences for LIC are gleaned through the mission readiness evaluations (MREs) for deployments to places like Bosnia.40

In my experience as an observer controller (OC) at the CMTC in Hohenfels, Germany, the certification process for Bosnia provided the animus for a major change in mindset regarding LIC. The CMTC, a maneuver training center, encountered some resistance to LIC (operations other than war [OOTWA]) scenarios. The CMTC, seeing the need for this training in Europe, worked this issue hard, but struggled to get visiting maneuver commanders to concede the importance of this type training prior to a maneuver force on force operation. (We’re back to General Johnson’s view that if you can do HIC, you can certainly do LIC.) Nonetheless, the CMTC forced the issue with complex and well thought out (and well executed) LIC (OOTWA) scenarios. Units adjusted or were embarrassed by their lack of preparation or intensity.

During my deployments to the NTC (the heavy training center), I did not see this commitment to LIC. At the Army’s premier heavy maneuver combat center, HIC reigned supreme. Although a full spectrum graduated scenario is executed at the NTC, units tend to hand-wave the (soft) low end (of intensity) preferring to get to the meat of the matter (HIC).
was my impression that the NTC leadership more or less resigned themselves to this attitude. At the NTC, the Army’s timeless commitment to large-scale (HIC) operations is well entrenched.

Managing Change

Bryon E. Greenwald, in his article, “The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation,” identifies a number of key issues associated with successful management of change. Among these, he postulates that good timing, continuity, patronage, salesmanship, nonlinearity, and consensus-building combine to form the basis for successful (or unsuccessful) change. Where timing is concerned, it would appear that the timing is right for the Army’s move. Few would argue that new equipment and doctrine are not necessary for the changing world. However, change based purely upon technology will not result in needed change. History is replete with examples of better-led forces overcoming superior technology. Moreover, as Michael Howard says, “With inadequate thinking about operational requirements, the best technology and the biggest budget in the world will only produce vast quantities of obsolete equipment.”⁴¹ Alfred Thayer Mahan warned that in relative terms, reactionary attitudes pose the greater challenge when he said, “improvements of weapons [are] due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics [could be read doctrine and culture in our case] have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class.”⁴² Among the resisters of change, mid-grade officers were highlighted by Greenwald as having the most to lose from change. Likewise, branch cultures were cited as key resistors to change. Particularly change that would damage their relative position.⁴³

What is necessary to generate the energy to overcome this type of entrenched obscurantism? According to General Gordon Sullivan, the short answer is leadership – transformational leadership. General Sullivan says, “Transformational leadership requires a personal and very hands-on approach, taking and directing action, building the confidence
necessary for people to let go of today’s paradigm and move into the future.”

General Sullivan’s assessment leaves us with poignant questions. Where must this transformational leadership come from and in what new ways must it address the Army’s transformation?

**Transforming Leadership**

The easy answer is from all levels, but it must start at the top. Clearly, CSA Shinseki has made a strong case for the transformation. Many other general officers have supported his position in print; however, more is needed. If the culture of the Army is to change (change enough to alter attitudes concerning LIC and full spectrum missions), our leaders must inspire the formation to follow this new direction. This might be done in the same manner we have addressed recruiting campaigns or other initiatives (human relations) the Army has undertaken. Following this approach, movies (tapes and CDs) and command briefs should be distributed to each level. At every opportunity, senior leaders should visit the field and get on the stump for this movement. Every commander at every level should visit his or her troops in formations, in the field, or in conference and discuss the great merits of our transformational move.

And what might these merits be? The Army has the great opportunity to lead America into the future. As the shape of the world changes and our missions broaden and become more joint by nature, the Army, America’s oldest service, must demonstrate its maturity, and lead our services forward in this bold, brave, undertaking. We must be the vocal proponent for joint operations, the leading opponent of service parochialism, and the leader in the development of new service and joint doctrine. We must exploit our positive history with LIC and elevate its stature to that of HIC in full spectrum conflict.

In consonance with the complexities of LIC (and in contravention to past myopia), we must generate the doctrine necessary for the transformation. At present, we are working on the broad capstone doctrine. Moreover, we’re aligning our doctrine with the joint publications.
We're working with the Marines to align service doctrine. However, at the top levels of the Army, we need to do more.

Taking the lead for the Army, Leavenworth must wrap the joint effort more tightly. The efforts at Ft. Lewis, at the JRTC, and in the doctrine laboratories must be seamless during the transformation. The left hand must always know what the right hand is doing. As Dr. Johnson recommends, gray beards should be contracted to help create the TTP needed for the testing of the new equipment. (This TTP is most needed for LIC.) This TTP will drive the procurement of equipment (buy only what supports the mission) and it will enable the training centers to develop scenarios that encourage proficiency in the new mission areas.

Where training is concerned, a great deal of focus is needed upon leadership. Officers who will be capable of leading in the network centric environment – an environment where “simultaneous understanding and employment” are necessary – must be taught the requisite intuition. If the Army is to make these leaders a reality, we must learn to distinguish prescriptive science from intuitive art. Carl von Clausewitz, our principle military theorist, would certainly caution against the notion that prescriptive codes could ever lead to prescient spontaneity. The Clausewitzian model would necessitate the use of theory to properly analyze history to create a sort of proxy experience. By way of perceiving and imagining, there would be the needed learning. By way of maximizing “subrational intelligence,” we could discover “the hidden processes of intuitive judgement.” It would appear that without a very sophisticated revamping of our educational approach, lists and dogma will not create the genius the transformational force will need. Without these changes, it would make sense to program a computer with tenets, principles, and lists and let the machines do what they do best.

Intuition, that instantaneous genius that Clausewitz talks about, is gleaned from repetitive experience. Consequently, using theory to fill in the gaps of history, for the purpose
of assimilating vicarious experience, will also require repetition. The process must begin in the basic course, be reinforced in the advanced course, and be brought to fruition at Command and General Staff College (CGSC). At the War College level, the process itself must be addressed and refined.

As well as leader development, the new TTP must be embedded in our corps training. LIC tasks must be added to our annual common task testing (CTT). Every unit must add LIC to its annual external evaluations (AEEs). The training centers – all of them (even the NTC) – must create and enforce realistic full spectrum (including mature LIC) scenarios (all the while passing lessons learned from AARs back to Leavenworth and thus back into the doctrine development loop). This transparent, interconnected process must not be interrupted. Ft. Lewis must continue to work future operations. Doctrine must continue to lean forward. The training centers must continue to test theory and feed results back into the loop. In the final analysis, the Army’s great leap forward must not result in a one time adjustment to meet emerging exigencies. It must result in a new culture and a new way of doing business. It must result in a cultural shift which embraces constant innovation. The Army of the information age must be as adaptive in its thinking as the networked information age is adaptive itself.

**Conclusion**

When looked at from the panoptic point of view, the Army is rightly addressing a needed shift in its paradigm. New doctrine is being addressed and new equipment is being developed. Additionally, it would appear that the Army is taking the lead concerning joint doctrine among the services. However, our altogether appropriate direction lacks the focus, intensity, and depth that will be required to transform the Army’s culture. Our leaders must sell a cultural transformation, our doctrine writers must envision the future, our training base must be prepared to grow the needed leaders, and our training centers must provide the challenging experience
that results in personal, unit, and cultural growth. This vital, self synchronizing, transparent, real
time system will be required if we are to exploit the network centric future (and not be exploited
by it). If the Army is content to create a dynamic new platform, we will simply wait in the hope
that the generations that follow, by way of their network centric upbringing, will have the
intuitive foresight to combine the elements of past and future knowledge. As General Sullivan
has often stated, hope is not a method. Waiting will certainly ensure that the Army of the near
term will be an anachronism and the Army of the future will be racing to catch up.

Unfortunately, in our business, when the Army falls behind, it is the country, our joint
commanders, and our service members who suffer for our lack of vision. Valiant adjustments
are needed, but there is still time. A transformational victory is in sight. Taking the prescient
high ground, the Army can take solace in Clausewitz’ promise that “once barriers – which in a
sense consist only in man’s ignorance of what is possible – are torn down, they are not so easily
set up again.”48 Removing the barriers of a deeply entrenched culture could be the Army’s great
legacy to our Nation’s future.

NOTES
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Chura, Mike. Ft. Leavenworth, FM 3-7 Project Officer. Telephone conversation with author, 6 April and 3 May 2001.


3 Ibid.


8 Ibid.


12 Ibid.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. Currently available technology will be used to create a lighter and more lethal (in terms of light forces) force that can be used right away in places like Kosovo. Off the shelf technology will be utilized to create a BDE that requires half the lift, half the CSS, and half the cost of a heavy BDE. The light armored vehicle (LAV) III has been selected for this force and will serve as the platform for these dragoons (an old operational concept) to perform their varied missions. The interim BDEs have five mission requirements: (1) complement light forces for small-scale contingencies and crisis response (stability and support operations [SASO]); (2) complement mechanized and light infantry forces in a major regional contingency; (3) operate as an integral part of a light or mechanized division task force for full-spectrum operations; (4) reduce the overall logistics footprint through its combat service support concept; and, (5) provide options to meet an urgent need that is not currently available. The first two of these BDEs, being put together at Ft. Lewis, Washington, should be fielded in late 2001. The following six will be fielded between 2001 and 2010 (when the first objective BDE will be fielded). The first two divisions to be transformed will be the 2nd Division (AR) and the 25th Division (INF). These interim forces (equipped with the LAV III) will be C-130 and C-141 deliverable. They will provide the protection and firepower our peacekeepers need right now. Additionally, they will employ the network centric technology that will ensure the informational dominance that industry has been promising.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid. The legacy force, meant to provide the heavy armor that would be needed for a near term conventional fight (consists of III Corps, 4th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment – heavy forces), will continue to be upgraded to ensure it is the most lethal heavy force in the world. The interim force is referred to both as a “stopgap force” and a “leap-ahead force.” Currently available technology will be used to create a lighter and more lethal (in terms of light forces) force that can be used right away in places like Kosovo. The interim force will buy time for the technological breakthroughs necessary to make the objective force possible. The objective force is heavily dependent upon the development of the “future combat system (FCS).” The FCS is designed (on the scientist chalkboard) to weigh 70% less and be 50% smaller than the Abrams tank while being even more lethal.

22 Ibid. Betting a great deal on the come, the Army will spend $8.5 billion a year through FY 2007 to make this technology possible (in theory, forcing an RMA). The first of these vehicles will be manufactured in FY 2006. Production will begin in FY 2008 and the first unit will receive its FCS in FY 2010. The Army plans to equip two OBCs in FY 2011, three OBCs each year from 2012 through FY 2030 (one of the three will go to the NG), and two OBCs in FY 2031 (62 objective combat brigades in all).

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 LTC Mike Chura, Ft. Leavenworth, FM 3-7 Project Officer, telephone conversation with author, 6 April 2001.


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


31 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 LTC Mike Chura, Ft. Leavenworth, FM 3-7 Project Officer, telephone conversation with author, 3 May 2001.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


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14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: An assessment of the "transformed" Army's ability to perform LIC.

15. Abstract: The findings of the paper’s research indicate that the U.S. Army has undertaken a sweeping transformation that promises to create a force that will be prepared for a broad range of low intensity conflict (LIC) missions without having created the necessary LIC doctrine, a training plan that will produce the leaders required, or a culture that is willing to embrace the mission. The American way of war and our historic aversion to low intensity conflict are players in this oversight. Recent events have forced an awakening in our Army. The need for transformation has been made apparent. Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovia, and Kosovo are cases in point. The Army’s efforts to adjust can be traced back to CSA Meyer and the High Technology Light Division (HTLD). General Franks addressed the growing need for transformation in the early nineties. By the Kosovo deployment in 1999, there were few demurrers to CSA Shinseki’s transformation. CSA Shinseki, in order to be prepared near term while preparing for the long term, has laid out a campaign plan for the transformation in three phases. In Phase I, he organizes, equips and makes ready the initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs). In Phase II, he targets an interim force of 5-8 brigade combat teams and a division headquarters. In Phase III, he establishes the objective force. The first interim brigades are scheduled to be deployed later this year. They will provide the protection and firepower our peacekeepers need right now. Additionally, they will employ the network centric technology that will ensure the informational dominance that industry has been promising. Meanwhile, the Army will invest 8.5 billion dollars a year through Fy 2007 to make the technology possible for the objective force. The first of the objective force vehicles will be manufactured in FY 2006. The objective force (materially anyway) is predicated upon "the art of the possible." Although a grand ambition, the transformation force is being built without capstone doctrine. The new FMs, although very promising, have not been published and the efforts at Ft. Lewis to produce TTP are not synchronized with Ft. Leavenworth's capstone doctrine. The education and training required to produce this network centric force is not yet clearly envisioned. Moreover, the culture of the Army has not yet been transformed to embrace this bold new world. Time remains, but the Army must act fast.

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