NATO Enlargement

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Note:

Conclusions

About the Workshop

Background

The meeting focused on the following topics:

1. The guidelines and paths of NATO enlargement; how enlargement has occurred historically, how enlargement might occur through the EU/WEU path, and finally through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program.

2. The implications of NATO enlargement from the perspectives of the WEU Associated Partners Poland, Romania, and Lithuania;

3. and from the perspectives of Former Soviet Union (FSU) states Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

4. Finally the various aspects of how the Alliance needs to change to accommodate new members; what political adjustments, military command alterations, and military infrastructure changes would be necessary.

Guidelines and Paths of NATO Enlargement

Previous NATO enlargements have derived from different circumstances and reasons. After the initial decision to include the United States and Canada with the UK, France, and Benelux, the United States insisted that NATO also include Norway, Portugal, Denmark, and Italy because they shared common values and Iceland for geographic reasons. The Korean War provided the catalyst for the entrance of Greece and Turkey (Lisbon Conference 1952). When the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1955, Germany agreed to the following restrictions: to force levels of 495,000 troops and no weapons of mass destruction. When post-Franco Spain entered the Alliance in 1982 it refused to participate in the integrated military command, but sought membership to strengthen democracy and provide Spain with the opportunity to enter the European Economic Community (now European Union). In sum, previous enlargements have been driven by common values, geographic and defense requirements, and included restrictions on new members and special membership arrangements.
Future NATO enlargement is not likely to occur through the path of the European Union (EU) and its West European Union (WEU). The WEU has made efforts to project stability to Central and Eastern Europe. In 1992 it established a Consultation Forum and in 1994 a status of association was established with nine Associate Partner states: the Visegrad four, three Baltics, and Bulgaria and Romania. The prospects for WEU's enlargement are dependent on developments in other organizations, the EU and NATO. The EU has agreed that the next phase of enlargement should begin only after the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996 and that since all three organizations (EU, WEU, and NATO) must take into account the different requirements of each organization, that, in the long run, the European memberships of the three organizations should converge. In sum, the WEU has already drawn lines in Europe and will not precede NATO enlargement.

Future candidates for NATO enlargement are likely to be from among the 25 states participating in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program established in January 1994. While we do not know precisely what the Alliance will approve as necessary guidelines for enlargement (presently being developed in NATO's draft study directed by the 1 December 1994 North Atlantic Council), it is likely that they will include: active participation in North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership program, the successful performance of democratic political institutions, a free market economy, and respect for human rights. It is also likely that effective democratic control of the military as well as some minimal degree of military capability and NATO interoperability will be necessary conditions.

NATO's challenge, though, will be how to define and determine what constitutes effective democratic control of the military recognizing that each state has its own history, culture, and unique set of institutions. The current state of civil-military relations among those Central European (Visegrad) states frequently referred to as the most likely to first join NATO were examined according to the following four elements:

1. A clear division of authority between the president and government (prime minister and defense minister) in Constitutions, Amendments, or through Public Law. The Law should clearly establish who commands and controls the military and promotes senior military officers in peacetime, who holds emergency powers in crisis, and who has authority for the transition to war.

2. Parliamentary oversight of the military through control of the defense budget. Its role in deploying armed forces in emergency and war must be clear.

3. Peacetime government control of general staffs and military commanders through civilian defense ministries. Control should include preparation of the defense budget, access to intelligence, involvement in strategic planning, force structure development, arms acquisitions and deployments, and military promotions.

4. Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for the armed forces to be effective. Having come from the communist period when the military was often used as an instrument of external or internal oppression, society must perceive the military as being under effective national control. Military training levels and equipment must also be sufficient to protect the state.

If NATO deems these four conditions necessary for effective democratic control of the military, then most of the Visegrad states would not currently qualify. Though Central Europe has already made enormous progress in civil-military relations since the 1989 revolutions, it is clear that much work still
remains to be done.

WEU Associated Partner Perspectives

Poland wants full membership in NATO (Article 5), and considers itself a net producer (with 250,000 troops, active peacekeeping experience, and an extensive PFP program), not consumer of security. Initially, Poland viewed PFP with apprehension, but now views it with enthusiasm for its integrating and interoperability aspects. Self-differentiation has gone much further than originally planned. Lines are not being drawn in Europe; they already exist. Poland's problems with democratic control of its armed forces are a result of growing pains. If Poland is excluded from among NATO's first PFP entrants, it will continue to pursue active participation.

Romania entered the post-Cold War era with false expectations. Originally it believed that the CSCE process could replace the loss of the Warsaw Pact pillar. It has now changed its attitude and seeks inclusion in enlarged Western institutions: EU/WEU and NATO. Romania is a WEU Associated Partner, but sees NATO and the United States presence in Europe as indispensable for security. Romania wants the PFP process to be clarified. What criteria will be applied? Will admission be by individual, group, or so-called checkers approach? If Romania and Poland (the checkers ) the two most important states by population, armed forces, and geopolitical location became de jure members of NATO, Ukraine and the other Central European states would become de facto members of NATO.

Lithuania feels that history has demonstrated that the Baltic states lack the essentials to independently safeguard their national security and sovereignty. That is why Lithuania has made a clear choice to join NATO and EU/WEU, and to develop good-neighbor relations. The main external threats to Lithuania derive from instability in Russia (and in Kaliningrad) and in the CIS. Russia should have no veto on NATO enlargement. If Lithuania is excluded from the first NATO expansion, it would need political and psychological reassurance, perhaps in the form of a different commitment such as associate membership status. If such an arrangement is not found, then enlargement will reduce rather than improve European security. In this regard, Lithuania welcomed the 1993 Copenhagen Summit of the EU Council which recognized that the E membership of associated states was an objective and the December 1994 Esse Summit which adopted a pre-accession strategy. Lithuania expects NATO to make a similar decision.

Former Soviet Union Perspectives

Russia opposes NATO enlargement. The Russian participant portrayed NATO enlargement as potentially very explosive to Russian society, equating it to the mistakes made in the Cuban missile crisis. Russia sees NATO as a militarist organization and needs the following from NATO to soften the impact: (1) time guarantees (e.g., no new members before the year 2000); (2) enlargement should not border Russia; (3) no nuclear weapons can be deployed in Central Europe; (4) no forward deployments of military forces; and (5) NATO should provide Russia with a strategic treaty.

Ukraine wanted sovereignty and neutrality when under the USSR. After disintegration, Ukraine did not join the CBS (May 1992), but did join NACC. Ukraine's 1993 Military Doctrine modified its former neutrality to new conditions and declared its intention of joining Western institutions. Hence, Ukraine criticizes the WEU's (6+3) Associated Partner program as too exclusive and applauds PFP as inclusive (Ukraine was one of the program's first signatories). Ukraine's main concern is that it might become a buffer between the CBS and NATO. Hence, Ukraine would like NATO to broaden from a defense to collective security organization; and NATO's relations with
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Russia to remain cordial so that Russia is not isolated. Russia’s demands forbidding NATO expansion to Ukraine and the Baltic states are a negative process.

Belarus was neutral last year, but is now solidly under Russia's influence and closely follows the CBS. This change is not due to NATO enlargement, but to the fact that Russia is in the process of revival and Belarus naturally falls within Russia's sphere of influence. Belarus renegotiated its May 1993 treaty with Russia and is the litmus test of Russia's policies in the Near Abroad. PFP is a multi-speed arrangement; for Central Europe PFP is a route to membership and can provide an open door to Russia and Belarus. Democratic values should remain the basic criteria for PFP; hence, PFP should not be blind to violations in Russia and Belarus.

How the Alliance Needs to Change

Political dimensions of NATO enlargement include the need to: (1) forge a new trans-Atlantic bargain (e.g., Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)); (2) focus on NATO's five southern members (e.g., Mediterranean initiative); (3) organize relations with those partners not in the first wave of enlargement (e.g., NACC allows political cooperation and PAP military cooperation under Article 4); and (4) deal with the likely new problems created by enlargement. Aspects of NATO enlargement involve not just protection, but also common values and the political motivation of belonging to the West. Further enlargement will be part of building a new security structure, but must not lead to NATO's dilution. New members cannot blackball other new members (they must transcend the animosities resulting from post-World War I Threonine and Saint German treaties).

Military dimensions of NATO enlargement require that any new member should have full rights (e.g., Article 4 out-of-area coalition operations and Article 5 collective defense obligations). NATO's Strategic Concept provides guidance for NATO's enlargement. We must expect minor military contingencies or ethnic problems and can assume long warning times and pre-conflict stages to allow political negotiation. Because NATO has smaller active duty forces with rapid reaction forces, this creates different requirements for: mobilization of reserves, dispersion of military forces, and coordinating forces by the integrated military structure. NATO must look at new adaptations for headquarters, simplify command structures (perhaps along the lines of CJTF), re-examine theater air defenses and ballistic missile defenses, and begin to modify Defense Planning Questionnaires (DPQ) for partners for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations.

Defense program requirements of NATO enlargement are significant because Article 5 commitments require corresponding partner commitments and NATO must avoid hollow political commitments. If NATO enlarges to include the four Visegrad states, it will take about twenty years in steady step-by-step efforts to upgrade new member forces. (It took between 1975-1995 to achieve Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability RSI for NATO forces.) If NATO helps the new members upgrade their forces (at burden sharing rates of 50-50), the first ten-year costs are estimated to be on the order of $35 billion. Because new-member forces were in the Warsaw Pact, they will be difficult to harmonize with NATO. Hence, NATO must aim to operate its forces side-by-side with partners, rather than intermeshing with them. In addition, not only do NATO forces need to be restructured for out-of-area force projection. Costs could escalate if we decide that we need to deploy POMCUS sets, COBs, air bases, ground reception facilities, and training sites, and base small combat forces on the territory of new members.
INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM

A. Report Title: NATO Enlargement

B. DATE Report Downloaded From the Internet: 10/03/01

C. Report's Point of Contact: (Name, Organization, Address, Office Symbol, & Ph #): National Defense University Press
   Institute for National Strategic Studies
   Washington, DC 20001

D. Currently Applicable Classification Level: Unclassified

E. Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release

F. The foregoing information was compiled and provided by:
   DTIC-OCA, Initials: __VM__ Preparation Date 10/03/01

The foregoing information should exactly correspond to the Title, Report Number, and the Date on
the accompanying report document. If there are mismatches, or other questions, contact the
above OCA Representative for resolution.