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THE ART OF WING LEADERSHIP:
EXPLORING THE INFLUENCES OF AIRCREW MORALE IN COMBAT

BY
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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.
About the Author

Major John J. Zentner was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, Loyola Marymount University in 1987. Graduating from Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training in 1988, he went on to fly the F-111F as a Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) at RAF Lakenheath. He flew 25 combat missions in the 1991 Gulf War and transitioned to the F-15E in 1992. Major Zentner served a tour at Nellis AFB in the 422d Test and Evaluation Squadron and an operational assignment in the 366th Air Expeditionary Wing, Mountain Home AFB. He is a senior navigator with 2000 flying hours and a graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons School. He has a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering from Loyola Marymount University, and a Master of Business Administration degree from the University of Phoenix. He is a graduate of the USAF Air Command and Staff College, and the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies. In July 2000, Major Zentner was assigned to the Seventh Air Force as an air campaign planner.
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they never complained. They patiently remained at my side, providing help and understanding throughout. Their sacrifices exemplify the best tradition of ‘the military family.’
Abstract

This study addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during air combat. This study answers the question: Is it possible to identify those characteristics of leadership that are able to sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses? First, the author defines aircrew morale as the enthusiasm and persistence of airmen to fly combat missions. Next, the author establishes a framework within which aircrew morale can be assessed in three historical case studies of air combat. The first case study is Adolf Galland and Jagdgeschwader 26 during the Battle of Britain. The second case study is Joseph Laughlin and the 362d Fighter Group during the invasion of France in the summer of 1944. The final case study is James McCarthy and the 43rd Strategic Wing during Operation LINEBACKER II. The author concludes that aircrew control over development of combat tactics was the most important element affecting morale. Morale was generally raised in each case study when the wing commander either displayed tactical innovation himself, or allowed his pilots or crews to become innovative. The author recommends that the USAF take steps to modify doctrine and professional military education curriculum to relate these findings to the combat air forces.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

I would describe the morale [of US troops] in the desert as adequate.

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson
May 1998

Leadership and Morale in Air Combat

The intensity of aerial combat often masks the brevity of the engagement under examination. The fighting spirit of the combatants must sustain them not only through the brief ‘life-or-death’ struggles in the air, but also through the more mundane, and more frequent, interludes. Wartime morale is shaped by the various elements to which airmen are exposed. Many have argued that the most powerful influence on aircrew morale, however, is the commander who leads them into battle. This work explores the relationship between air force wing commanders and their aircrew’s morale during combat in which significant losses are experienced.

Significance

The post-Cold War leveling-off of American defense spending, combined with sharp cuts in aircraft major weapon systems procurement could place the United States at a quantitative disadvantage against a future adversary. Technology has proven to be a qualitative improvement in combat capability, but aircrew morale has demonstrated in the

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2 A common theme throughout the literature of military morale is the importance of the leader. See Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 326.
past that it too has been a combat multiplier. For centuries, military commanders have realized that raising troop morale magnifies their combat potential. It stands to reasons that competent air force leaders will use every means at their disposal to capitalize on any advantage in war. This study addresses an issue that, in today’s US Air Force (USAF) at least, is either ignored or misunderstood.

Uncertainty is another reason that a specific focus on morale during attrition warfare is important. The US military has been both skillful and fortunate in mission execution during combat engagements in the past ten years. Losses of aircraft and friendly casualties have been extremely low even though aerial warfare has become the preferred means of American coercion. Although USAF leaders expected a far higher level of attrition in the Gulf War, nothing on the verge of attrition-style combat has been waged since Vietnam. However, no one can be certain that in the near future the US will not become engaged in much riskier scenarios that include significant combat losses. The will to sustain heavy losses rests with the political leaders and people of a democracy, yet the psychological burden of conducting this type of warfare is borne by combat leaders and their subordinates. Often, the time and circumstances surrounding combat are yielded to the enemy, but by trying to understand the consequences of attrition on morale future leaders may be prepared for the situation should it arise.

The inspiration for researching this topic comes from the author’s personal desire for knowledge on issues of leadership, especially in combat settings. The ambiguity of morale has always created a somewhat unsatisfying perception of the topic that was highlighted on a recent rotation to Southwest Asia. The comment in the epitaph at the

Notes
3 For example, in the Battle of Agincourt, King Henry V’s men were outnumbered three or four to one but used the combination of superior weapons (the longbow) and superior fighting spirit to defeat a greater French force. See Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 584, and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, “Alienation, Anomie, and Combat Effectiveness,” Air University Review 31 (September – October 1980): 26-27.
4 In fact, there is currently no USAF doctrine, regulation, manual, handbook, or pamphlet that addresses leadership, let alone morale. The only published guidance is found in two Air University handbooks that compile an eclectic group of leadership articles and command issues from more than one hundred independent sources. See Richard I. Lester, ed., AU-24: Concepts for Air Force Leadership, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, 1996.); Air Command and Staff College, AU-2: Guidelines for Command, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1995.)
5 The author participated in Air Expeditionary Force VII in South West Asia from Mar 98 to May 98 in support of OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH to enforce the United Nations imposed “No Fly Zone” in southern Iraq.
beginning of this chapter was made by a well-meaning US Senator after a trip to the area to assess US troop morale. Some of the deployed aircrew who read the senator’s remarks in the newspaper were on their third deployment to the desert in thirteen months. Issues of long-range strategic goals, ‘rules of engagement’, and high operations tempo all affected the morale of the deployed airmen. Senator Hutchinson’s perception of ‘adequate’ morale and that of the airmen involved was not the same. This research was undertaken as an opportunity to clarify morale for airmen, but soon expanded to considering the impact of “real” combat on the equation.

Existing Thoughts on Military Morale

Asking military commanders, historians, or psychologists about morale in combat situations is akin to the story of three blind men trying to describe an elephant. Each description is correct based on the individual perception, but each description is also wrong in the larger sense. The thousands of books and papers written on the subject of military morale span the spectrum of interest and depth. While they all touch on aspects of morale, some notable works stand out as hallmarks contributing to the body of knowledge regarding military morale.

Accounts relating to actual warfare offer some of the most riveting discussions on morale. As a primer on the most basic concept of morale, Leo Tolstoy’s classic War and Peace illustrates the importance of the “fighting spirit” of an army and its ability to increase combat power. Lord Moran dissected morale by studying the human capacity for courage in his World War I treatise The Anatomy of Courage. An engaging, though controversial, World War II treatment can be found in S.L.A. Marshall’s book, Men Against Fire. The unique circumstances of the maintenance of morale for bomber

Notes

6 The author is indebted to Dr. David R. Jones, M.D., instructor of Aviation Neuropsychiatry at the USAF Flight Surgeon’s School, who brought this analogy to the author’s attention. In the story, each blind man touches a different part of the elephant to gain knowledge about what it must be like. The man who touches the leg compares the elephant to a tree; the man who touches the side compares the elephant to a house; and the man who touches the truck compares the elephant to a snake.
7 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942.)
aircrew in World War II have been covered by Mark Wells in *Courage in Air Warfare* and Allan English in *The Cream of the Crop*. Issues of morale for jet fighter pilots in combat have been vividly recreated by Jack Broughton in his two works, *Thud Ridge* and *Going Downtown*. 

The more clinical and abstract viewpoints of psychologists and military theorists have contributed to understanding military morale as well. A well-researched study on the motivation of soldiers is presented by Anthony Kellett in *Combat Motivation*. J.F.C. Fuller’s exploration of the interaction of elements in combat relies heavily on morale and the moral domain of war in *The Foundation of the Science of War*. Finally, the seminal work by Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies*, stresses the importance of morale and cohesion in combat.

**The Missing Link**

This research will attempt to answer an overlooked question connecting the actions of the commander with the fighting spirit of the aircrew: Is it possible to identify those characteristics of leadership that show a noteworthy ability to sustain aircrew morale in combat with significant losses? For all the focus on morale across the years, very little has been written about the causal link between the actions of the combat leader and the level of morale in the unit. Most works focus on individual aspects of morale or on clinical treatment of combat stress reactions. Even less has been written about the specific issue of leadership’s impact on aircrew morale. Where these topics have intersected, the premise is rarely in an historical setting of high combat losses. To provide the maximum use for future air commanders, the discussion will focus at the practitioner’s level—that is, at a level of dialect and understanding that should be

**Notes**

comfortable to airmen.

**Methodology**

The approach to this topic will be an historical comparison of cases of air combat in units that have suffered heavy losses yet continued to function effectively. By studying the actions of the unit’s leader and the perception of morale among the unit’s aircrew in light of the context of the battle, it should be possible to identify some predominant actions that influenced overall morale. Similarities between cases will be scrutinized to determine if some actions can be prescribed universally to raise or sustain morale in aircrew.

The reason for approaching the study in this way is because historical air battles add flesh to the theoretical skeleton of the concepts of aircrew morale. Certainly the study of history cannot answer all the questions of why airmen in combat are motivated in particular ways, but it can provide a basis to make some general, and hopefully useful, observations. The findings of this research will attempt to synthesize these observations to provide future air commanders a guidepost for reasoned action. History provides lessons for warfighters. The challenge is finding the correct analogy. This study of history may be no substitute for personal experience, yet it may be the only tutor of its kind available for aspiring air force commanders. Honing leadership skills in combat is always necessary, but is sometimes very costly. Peacetime offers the best opportunity to consider issues of leadership that have been demonstrated by others in the laboratory of combat.

Other research has studied the effects of combat on morale. The emphasis of those works has been on preserving the fighting ability of the warrior in spite of the stresses of combat. This work will instead focus on the effects of leadership on morale. Colonel Dale O. Smith summarized the relationship between leadership, morale, and unit effectiveness in the *Air University Quarterly Review* in 1951. In general, good leadership will lead to good morale, which will lead to good performance, which will reinforce the perception of good leadership, which will lead to good morale, and so on.

**Notes**

Figure 1 illustrates this relationship. This research will focus on the mechanism that connects leadership to morale in this chain.

![Figure 1. Basic Relationship](image)

Three distinct areas will be covered to conduct this research and reach conclusions.

**Morale for Aviators**

Clarity must be the goal of any discussion. A workable definition of what morale is and how it is considered in the application of airpower must be established. Although morale may be an intangible quality, the scope of the topic needs to be bounded in order to frame the research and analysis. With this in mind, the concept of morale will be specifically stated in a manner that approaches common sense for airmen. In fact, this is one of the shortcomings of the current USAF approach to morale—it is too clinical.

**Three Case Studies**

The first case study will consider a German Luftwaffe fighter wing in the Battle of Britain in 1940. The replacement of a weak wing commander by a successful one will allow some comparative analysis of leadership styles between the two. Additionally, pilot morale during the evolution of the campaign will be considered in light of commander actions and the tactical and operational results achieved. Primary source information will be used where possible; however, extensive secondary source material will be used to fill in any apparent gaps where necessary.

The second case study will follow an American fighter group assigned to support General Patton’s Third Army as it broke-out from Normandy in the summer of 1944. Once again, a replacement of the group commander during this campaign will invite comparison of leadership styles. Extensive primary source material from the pilots and the replacing commander will provide the details necessary to discuss the morale implications of the leader’s actions. This material comes from unit histories and also
from questionnaires completed by surviving members of the unit and correspondence between them and the author.

The third case study will be a look at the morale of B-52 aircrew in a bomber wing flying over Hanoi during the LINEBACKER II operation of December of 1972. The wing commander remained the same throughout the brief operation; however, changes in tactics and the influence of higher headquarters allow a correlation of command actions to the resulting influence on aircrew morale. A mixture of primary and secondary sources will be used to describe the situation and to comment on the actual versus perceived level of morale. Once again, questionnaires and correspondence will be used to supplement unit histories.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

The analysis of events that took place in the three case studies will be explored in the final section of this research to draw conclusions and to answer the research question. Implications of the study will be addressed with an emphasis on their relevance to the application of airpower in general and the application of American airpower in particular. Additionally, recommendations will be given for the USAF to assist in future development of professional military education programs and operational doctrine as they apply to the connection between leadership and morale.

**Focus**

The focus of this research will be on the actions available to the unit leader and the resulting influence of those actions on aircrew morale. The decisions and actions taken by the commander will be evaluated without the benefit of hindsight. Realizing that no decision is made with perfect knowledge of its outcome, the choices that a commander made must be viewed in the context of the event and not manipulated by an historian’s lens.

**Limitations**

This is a wartime study of morale. The factors required to motivate aircrew in peacetime will not be identical to those that are paramount in combat. This work is
limited to the narrow realm of combat that includes suffering casualties in action. The considerations of morale by the commander under these circumstances may be different than those made by a commander participating in operations-other-than-war.

To facilitate formulation of useable conclusions, it will be necessary to compare combat units of approximately the same size and complexity. The units selected for the case studies were wing-size (60 – 120 aircraft and crews.) With this in mind, the lessons drawn from group or wing commanders may not be applicable to squadron or flight commanders in air forces today. The value of studying groups and wings is that they represent the largest air force units in which the leader is typically also a tactical warfighter. This perspective allows the wing commander to experience the issues of morale first-hand and still have the span of control to achieve an operationally significant effect on the overall success of a campaign. The quantity and quality of research material available also persuaded the author that more meaningful conclusions might be made from an analysis of cases involving these larger groups. These conclusions will contribute to the scarce literature available for the study of “mid-level” combat leadership.

The small number of case studies analyzed is also a limiting factor in this project. The practical length of this monograph limited the quantity of cases to explore. As a result, no statistical validity can be implied by the conclusions reached. It is worthwhile to repeat that the issues of morale and leadership addressed will provide some common-sense understanding of the topic for the practitioner. It is meant to add to the existing body of knowledge on the subject, not be the final word on it.

Along similar lines, the case studies themselves are not complete historical recounts of the events. A brief summary of the context of the battle and the key personalities involved is enough to provide a background for the morale issues explored. The bibliography provides the reader with references that cover the combat details and operational significance of the battles in more depth.

Finally, many of the primary sources used throughout this work contain personal recollections of aircrew who flew combat in these units. Total historical accuracy is not possible in these personal accounts, especially with regard to issues originating from outside the unit. The details most useful from these materials will be individual opinions
and perceptions of morale.

Assumptions

A central assumption of this work is that Western air forces are motivated by similar conditions. Also, while air combat experiences among the case studies under consideration are not identical, they do overlap in some areas that influence aircrew morale. These similarities are necessary to compare units of different nationality as well as units of the same nationality participating in different conflicts. This is not to say that the context of battle does not matter—it only implies that it is plausible that Western air combat units placed in the same context may react in similar ways.

It is also assumed in this research that aircrew are motivated and behave differently than ground elements of the same wing. Only an aircrew experiences the environment and dangers of aerial combat. This study does not consider the implications of commander decisions that affect the morale of support troops within an air unit unless those decisions affect the aviators as well.

Findings

The purpose of this research is to discover if it is possible to understand how some air force leaders kept aircrew morale high in spite of suffering heavy losses in combat. If possible, these results would be of real value to future commanders experiencing similar situations. The findings of this study could be used to augment current curriculum in Air Force professional military education schools such as the Air Command and Staff College or the Air War College. Of equal importance would be the persuasive value of such conclusions with civilian policy makers who are unfamiliar with military combat conditions. Future decisions by the national command authorities to use airpower at the grand strategic level would benefit from understanding that success includes morale as well as materiel.
Chapter 2

The Morale Problem

The art of war is subjected to many modifications by industrial and scientific progress. But one thing does not change--the heart of man. In the last analysis, success in battle is a matter of morale.

Colonel Ardant du Picq

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify what morale is and how it applies to airmen in battle. There is a wide range of definitions for morale. Each one is based on the perspective of the author who studied the topic. The impossibility of agreeing on one definition seems evident but it is necessary to choose one definition as a reference point for the remainder of this work. Fortunately, the last fifty years have produced some common themes on the issue. The approach taken in this study will combine the similarities of past authors with common sense and experience to produce a practical guide to conversing on morale. Once established, a closer examination will be made at the underlying physical and psychological factors that contribute to the definition.

It would be helpful to remember that the basis of this research is to view the link between leadership and morale. With that in mind, it is appropriate to begin with a discussion on leadership.

Who is the Leader?

Military leadership is challenging for several reasons. Commanders are selected because of the confidence that senior officers have in their ability, yet every episode of leadership is still essentially an experiment in group behavior. More an art form than a
science, most people will agree that leadership is the ability to influence others to behave in ways they might not ordinarily act in order to reach a group goal.\textsuperscript{18}

Although there are formal as well as informal leaders in every group, the focus of this combat study will remain on the formal leader.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, within a given chain of command, every commander (from the flight leader up through the national command authority) should not be considered a leader of men in combat. Clearly, the flight leader and the squadron commander are the most visible leaders of airmen. However, since the will to fight should not merely rest on personal loyalties to flight leaders, or squadron commanders, airmen also need leadership from a higher level.\textsuperscript{20} This higher level for airmen resides in the Group or Wing because the group and wing commanders still “exert” command and still “impart” unit identity on aircrew.\textsuperscript{21} These larger secondary groups will be considered in depth through the case study analysis yet to come.

**The Leader’s Role**

The primary responsibility of the combat leader must be mission accomplishment, for without that purpose, there is no need to have the group. The principal raw materials used to execute the mission are the people who will fly and fight, so the leader’s first step is to translate objectives received from higher command authorities into individually accepted goals for each of these aircrew.\textsuperscript{22} Of course that is easier said than done. It is the interaction of the human element in the context of battle that highlights morale as the passageway to victory for the commander. An effective leader must be able to decipher the riddle of morale if the mission is to be achieved.

**Notes**


\textsuperscript{19} Mark T. Diebolt, “A Study of Air Force Leadership and Morale” (Research Study, USAF Air Command and Staff College, 1971), 15. The issue of formal authority is clearly the case where military officers are placed in command billets, however, powerful influences can still emanate from informal leaders within the group.

\textsuperscript{20} Frederick J. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” in *Handbook of Military Psychology*, ed. Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), 468. Manning asserts that when fighting spirit is connected too closely to small group leaders, then that spirit will “wither” if the commander is killed. Therefore, a connection to larger group commanders (Group, Wing, Air Force) is needed, especially in heavy combat.

\textsuperscript{21} Kellett, 45. Kellett addresses these larger group leaders and illustrates that their level of command is different from the small “squad” leader but no less important to the motivation of the soldier. Others differentiate the larger ‘secondary’ groups from the small, personal ‘primary’ groups formed from daily contact.

\textsuperscript{22} Smith, 49. See also, Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 457-458, and Diebolt, 14.
Morale: The Definition

The terms morale and motivation are often used interchangeably when discussing why soldiers fight. Behavioral scientists specify that motivation consists of the cost-benefit rationale that soldiers make before taking action. The inputs to this analysis may be physical or psychological, but they are rooted in the way the soldier thinks. Morale, on the other hand, is not so much a process of reasoning, but an attitude or feeling. Common sense tells us that morale is likely to be an influence on motivation, but how much of one is left open to debate. The air force commander does not really need to concern himself with a highly academic debate on the issue. For him, it is enough to understand that the behavior of his aircrew is a manifestation of the intangible qualities of both morale and motivation. For the purposes of this research, the issue of motivation will be imbedded in the concept of morale. For example, if morale is considered high, it will also be assumed that motivation to accomplish the mission is positive. With that in mind, defining morale must at least consider that assumption. But first, the difference in perceptions of morale needs some elaboration.

Many Definitions

Not surprisingly, most attempts to clarify military morale have focused on soldiers and the two dimensional battlefield. Early 20th century instruction by the US Army defined morale as “that instinctive feeling of strength and superiority; that which at the outset gives a feeling of confidence and an assurance of victory through….unconquerable ability.” This was similar to the concept of morale discussed by J. C. Baynes in his studies of World War I: “A confident, resolute, willing, often self-sacrificing and courageous attitude of an individual to the functions or tasks demanded or expected of him by a group…” Later US Army doctrine de-emphasized the warrior aspect of morale but kept the emotional aspects intact: “Morale is defined as the mental,

Notes

23 Kellett, 6.
24 Diebolt, 19.
emotional, and spiritual state of the individual. It is how he feels.  

The USAF is more comfortable discussing factors that affect morale, rather than stating exactly what it is. As a result, the USAF has no doctrinal definition of morale. Instead, early Air Force manuals reflected a peacetime focus on ‘quality of life’ issues to frame discussion of morale. That tradition continues today with the periodic USAF Chief of Staff surveys that poll airmen on operations tempo and perceptions of the amenities they have available. The goal of those surveys is to show areas needing improvement so that steps can be taken to increase satisfaction and, supposedly, morale. 

Some within the USAF recognize that morale is more than just a laundry list of comforts. Major Walter A. Grady uses J.F.C. Fuller’s war theory to explain that morale is “the moral force [that] acts to translate desire into action.” Dr. David R. Jones, M.D., of the USAF Flight Surgeon’s School, teaches new Flight Surgeons that morale is an emotion that connects the individual to the group. Psychologist and organizational behavior specialists agree along similar lines. Morale is “composed of attitudes dealing with the confidence, enthusiasm, and zeal for persevering toward and attaining a goal.” These attitudes translate into determination to accomplish the mission. 

Morale for Airmen 

The common theme throughout most of these classifications is that morale is an emotional feeling that motivates a person to behave as the group requires. It is the drive and eagerness to see a task through. It is also a feeling about how satisfying accomplishing the mission is to an individual. Dr. Frederick Manning is a military 

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28 David R. Jones, M.D., instructor of aviation neuropsychiatry at the USAF Flight Surgeon’s School, Interview with the author, 8 March 2000, Maxwell Air Force Base, telephone conversation. Dr. Jones was unaware of any specific definition of morale used by the USAF in the instruction of Flight Surgeons. Among other topics, Dr. Jones’ course teaches new Flight Surgeons how to recognize falling morale among aircrew and ways to improve it. 
31 Jones, interview with author, 8 March 2000.
psychologist who has specialized in morale for American soldier, but his work has also appeared in USAF journals. He is concise when he describes morale as, “the enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activity of that group.”

That definition can apply to an army platoon as easily as it can apply to a sales office in any business. To make it specific for pilots and aircrew flying in combat, Manning’s definition is adapted as follows:

Aircrew morale is the enthusiasm and persistence with which an aviator flies combat missions.

The simplicity of this statement should not belie the fact that although morale is relatively easy to define, it is very difficult to control. In fact, combat morale does not lend itself to “enhancement policies” that focus on easy fixes.

But now that morale is defined, how should it be studied? Undoubtedly, morale is affected by too many factors to list. Some factors are very important, while others are barely noticeable. Some factors can be evaluated, but others cannot. Here is where the ‘disconnect’ between ground-centric versions of morale and air-centric versions occurs. Invariably, past efforts to discuss morale have centered on discussions of soldiers and have focused on particular factors that are influential to their environment and psyche. It seems intuitive that at least some factors that are important to foot soldiers engaged in hand-to-hand combat are quite different from factors influencing a pilot flying overhead at 20,000 feet. The differences in morale for airmen lie not in the definition of the concept, but in the elements that contribute to fulfilling that definition.

Instead of travelling down the path of individual morale-influencing factors, the next section will establish a set of simple “components of morale” that are broad enough to take into account these individual factors. The purpose of classifying the components of morale is to understand more generally what issues affect morale and to

Notes
32 US Naval School of Aviation Medicine, “Psychological Factors in Morale,” (research report, US Naval School of Aviation Medicine, 1954), 2; quoted in Diebolt, 19.
33 Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 455.
34 Kellett, 336. Although Kellett is speaking about the futility of controlling motivation factors, this concept applies equally to those factors that leaders believe influence morale.
35 The concept of compartmentalizing individual factors of morale is widespread in the literature. The author will use a combination of components addressed by Colonel Dale O. Smith in “What is Morale” and Dr. Frederick J. Manning in “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps.”
provide a sounding board for the analysis of the leadership case studies later in this work.

**The Power of 3**

The armored warfare pioneer and military theorist J.F.C. Fuller proposed three elements basic to understanding the “science” of warfare: the physical, the moral, and the mental. Within these spheres the principles of war could be deduced in order to analyze their importance in a given context. Interestingly enough, the concept of morale can benefit from this reductionism as well. Psychologists and historians have analyzed military morale in the past in an effort to uncover the cause and effect relationships that exist. Several of them devised three dominant categories with which to study the individual factors at work.

A study commissioned by NATO in 1980 presented the conclusion that military morale consists of three dimensions: personal factors related to self-confidence, commitment to the group identity, and concern for the organization’s aims. Manning reached similar conclusions and labeled the three areas: individual factors, cohesion, and esprit de corps. Grady’s study of pilot’s motivation and morale looked at the moral domain from an airman’s perspective. He mentions the three areas of that domain: relationship to self, relationship to others, and relationship to absolutes. What all of these writers have in common is that they have separated the factors of morale into categories of individual needs, group relationships, and higher organizational identity. For the sake of consistency, these will be addressed as: individual needs, cohesion, and esprit de corps.

**Individual Needs**

The individual needs of any airman fall into two categories: physical needs and psychological needs. The physical needs consist of the various factors that keep the aviator in fighting condition and ready to meet the enemy. They include proper food, rest, clothing, shelter, training, and useful equipment (aircraft and weapons).

The psychological needs of airmen tend to center on the confidence in their

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**Notes**

37 Ibid., 456-461.
training and equipment. Ultimately, aircrew must feel that they have a ‘fighting chance’ of engaging the enemy on favorable terms and have a reasonable expectation of surviving the encounter. One of the best ways to build that confidence is for aircrew to experience success. The balancing of courage and fear in combat is assisted by measures that build confidence. Along with confidence, the airman needs to feel that his contribution to unit success is important. Typically this is derived when airmen know the unit’s objective and they understanding how their combat missions are helping to reach that goal.

The importance of these individual needs will vary among aircrew and situations, but a few observations have already been made about them. There are examples of soldiers with high morale fighting in horrific battle conditions where physical needs were neglected, to say the least. As long as a minimum standard of food, shelter, etc., are met, the satisfaction of physical needs tends to be evaluated by soldiers and airmen in relative terms. Of all the physical needs, however, the USAF recognizes that additional rest is the best way to offset sagging morale in times of stress. Even though physical needs tend to withstand the rigors of combat, careful attention must also be given to psychological needs in order to keep morale high. At all times, soldiers or airmen need to feel that they are contributing, that they have an objective, and that they can, and will, succeed.

Combat has a way of putting individual needs in perspective. No one disputes that “war is hell,” so many soldiers and airmen expect hardship to some degree. General Douglas MacArthur once said that, “morale is not necessarily destroyed by hardship, danger, or even calamity,” but when combat losses begin to mount, the psychological needs of the combatants once again come into play. The influence of combat losses on morale lies not so much in the quantity of losses as it does in the context of the loss. No one wants to die needlessly in battle. Morale is weakened if the soldier or airman feels

Notes
38 See Woodruff, 4; Smith, 48; and Diebolt, 26. Each writer emphasizes that ‘nothing succeeds like success.’
39 Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 460. Manning uses the term ‘relative deprivation’ to illustrate the fact that soldiers assess their physical needs based upon the conditions of the moment.
40 Jones, interview with author, 8 March 2000.
41 Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 460. Manning refers to these needs as: “a role, a goal, and self-confidence.”
that there is no “tangible return on the investment of lives.” Furthermore, morale is influenced by the perception that sacrifices are being made fairly throughout the unit. In short, with regard to preserving morale in the unit, the perception of the worth of the cause and a sense of shared sacrifice is every bit as important as the level of losses.

Cohesion

Cohesion is the bonding together of soldiers or airmen in such a way as to maintain commitment to each other and to the mission even when under stress. This bonding has been shown to be key to maintaining group morale. S.L.A. Marshall felt that cohesion played the crucial role in maintaining the fighting spirit of World War II soldiers. On both sides, the soldier’s perseverance reflected a commitment to the members of their unit rather than a conscious motivation for reasons of ideology or patriotism.

Cohesion is the by-product of activities among the group that reinforce common experiences. The activities can involve peacetime or combat settings, they can be either on or off-duty, and they can include either positive or negative outcomes. Unit traditions and military discipline also affect cohesion. The bottom line is that cohesion is generally raised when members of the group spend time together. Bonding of this type comes from frequent contact between members of what psychologists call the primary group.

Although cohesion is a powerful morale builder, the primary group involved is generally fairly small because it must allow frequent interaction between the members. In an air force setting, the primary group is a crew, a flight, or perhaps a squadron. Primary groups are those in which the members know the other members on a personal level. Field Marshal Montgomery referred to this as ‘comradeship.’

Cohesion among airmen is different than among soldiers. The number of airmen

Notes

43 Kellett, 268.
44 Diebolt, 24.
47 Dixon, 178.
in an air force is generally a small population of the total force size. The standardized training that pilots and aircrew complete is common among all members of their small career fields. The training is also quite lengthy. It takes approximately two years to train a pilot or navigator to be mission-ready. When new aircrew arrive in a unit, they already share an ingrained sense of similarity among the other crews. Throughout their careers, additional flying assignments reinforce this shared background. Even though newcomers to the squadron may have never met the other members, there is still a strong cohesive element in place. The shared background of flying activity does not need to have been in the presence of those in the primary group. Of course, additional activities that involve the new primary group strengthen cohesion even more. Grady’s research into the factors that motivated F-105 pilots in Vietnam could not discern cohesion as an influence among his pilot group. He suggested that perhaps cohesion was so strong within these aviators that it did not vary and so he could not measure its effect. The distinct possibility exists that groups of airmen, by nature, have high cohesive tendencies that are resistant to influence.

Combat has a remarkably positive impact on cohesion within armed forces. During wartime, morale in units has been noted to be higher in active combat areas than in areas of inactivity. That may be because the sense of mission is obviously apparent to the soldiers and airmen, but it also may be because combat is a tremendously powerful shared experience that strengthens cohesion. Witness the hundreds of World War II group organizations that exist after 50 years have elapsed. The experience of combat has united men in bonds that have lasted a lifetime.

**Esprit de Corps**

Esprit de corps is pride in, and devotion to, a formal organization beyond the primary group. Montgomery called this ‘regimental spirit’. The formal organizations that can contribute to esprit are generally larger units outside the primary group but to

**Notes**

48 Steven L. Havron, “Psychosocial Dimensions of Combat Readiness: Leadership, Morale, and Group Cohesion,” (Research Project, report no. 84-1195, USAF Air Command and Staff College, 1984), 10. See also Kellett, 46.
49 Grady, 51.
50 Smith, 43.
51 Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 458.
which the individual soldier or airman still belongs. The reputation of these groups can provide additional self-esteem and confidence. These groups provide a link between the primary groups and the overall national cause and are referred to as secondary groups.

The secondary group is an important factor in morale because identifying with the reputation of it provides a sense of power, valor, and indestructibility that can help offset fear. Morale hinges on the way that people deal with an internal loss of power, and identifying with a larger group is one way to counteract that. The secondary group also represents the link between primary group goals and the national cause. Although the factors of esprit may be weaker than cohesion and individual needs, they still provide some influence on morale.

Esprit is more important in combat than in peacetime. The effects of defeat on a small unit in combat can be damaging to unit morale, particularly when the primary group leader becomes a casualty. The secondary group serves as a source of identity but it is “large enough to escape sudden catastrophe at the hands of the enemy.” This psychological subtlety may not be a huge factor in maintaining morale, but it does provide some support.

Esprit in airmen is found by identifying with the group, wing, or perhaps the air division or air force to which the aircrew belongs. Unit histories tend to be too distant to provide a useful identity; but recent activities, and certainly current reputation, of these groups is the clearest influence on esprit for the aircrew. The evolving USAF operational concept of Air Expeditionary Forces may some day provide a source of esprit for American airmen who participate in them but this is a case in which esprit needs to be consciously propagated. Another peculiarity with aircrew concerning esprit is the possible connection between confidence in oneself and pride in the aircraft type that is flown. In some ways, aircrew identify with their equipment so strongly that they in fact draw support from members who belong to that larger group. For example, success by a

Notes

52 Kellett, 44.
53 Jones, interview with author, 8 March 2000.
54 Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 465.
55 Kellett, 260-1, 268.
57 Kellett, 322. Kellett feels that because esprit is focused on a group detached from daily activity, the effort to identify with that larger group would consist of communicating the reputation of (reasons for identifying with) the group.
wing that flies a particular aircraft type can produce pride and identity with aircrew of a
different wing that happen to fly the same aircraft.

**Maintaining Control**

When taken as a whole, the three elements of morale (individual needs, cohesion,
and esprit de corps) have one common theme—they each contribute to providing control
in stressful situations such as combat. In short, good morale indicates control from
within. 58 Control is important to the morale of anyone in combat, but aircrew are a
unique breed of warriors with regard to the issue of control. Flying aircraft is an
occupation that requires constant internal and external control. To lose control often
spells disaster. It is not surprising then that one of the characteristics of most pilots is that
they have controlling tendencies. 59 Understanding the pervasiveness of the need for
control is the key to understanding morale for aircrew.

The relationship of air force leaders with respect to maintaining morale now
comes more into focus. The hypothesis of this study is that air force leaders can best
contribute to the morale of airmen by taking steps to increase the real or perceived level
of control that aircrew have over the combat situation.

**Observations on Leadership**

The definition and components of morale established above seem to provide a
method for evaluating the influence of air force leaders on their aircrew in combat. The
remainder of this work will explore three historical case studies to do just that. Each case
study will describe the situation of the air campaign during a period in which losses were
heavy and illustrate the role played by the secondary group leader, (the wing
commander.) Following the case description, unit morale will be explored using the
three-component framework of individual needs, cohesion, and esprit de corps. The
focus of these case studies will be on issues pertaining to aircrew morale. To conclude
each study, observations will be made to highlight any actions taken by the unit

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58 Havron, 9.
[email copy received from USAF Flight Surgeon’s School], 5.
commander that may have influenced overall morale.
Chapter 3

Major Adolf Galland: Jagdgeschwader 26

*Only the spirit of attack borne in a brave heart will bring a success to any fighter aircraft, no matter how highly developed it may be.*

Adolf Galland

**Introduction**

Combat histories are full of examples of men who rose through the ranks due to their remarkable ability to achieve success in battle. Adolf Galland began his combat career as a lieutenant in the Condor Legion flying ground attack missions for the German Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War. Within the span of four years, his consistent skill in the air elevated him to the position of senior general of all fighter units in the Luftwaffe. Although he began his Luftwaffe service as an attack pilot, it was his success as a Bf-109 pilot and commander of Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wing) 26 (JG 26) in the Battle of Britain that gained him the reputation as Germany’s top fighter commander in the Second World War.

Talent at a junior rank does not always translate equally to command potential. Adolf Galland had the rare quality among combat leaders that elicited success from his men while epitomizing the example he wished them to follow. His aerial accomplishments were the envy of every German fighter pilot. His challenge in the summer of 1940 was no easy task: Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) was a formidable peer competitor. Heavy losses among his wing’s three groups and the sheer exhaustion of his pilots would take their toll. This chapter examines the role that Adolf Galland played in molding the combat morale of his pilots during the Luftwaffe’s first campaign failure of World War II—the Battle of Britain. A first look at the events surrounding the
Battle of Britain will place pilot morale in the proper context.

**Germany’s Battle for Britain**

After the string of German conquests stretching from Poland through Western Europe, the Luftwaffe was perceived as the most powerful air force in existence. Indeed, the operational lessons that Germany learned in Spain had played a crucial factor in the integration of airpower with both land and naval forces in the early campaigns of World War II. Of course, the one fact that was ignored by foreign intelligence experts as well as German strategists was the nature of the Luftwaffe’s power.

The Luftwaffe’s early preeminence within the Wehrmacht was due to Hitler’s vision of the offensive capabilities that the air force could bring to bear on the enemy. Naturally, the bomber received top priority and special prestige because it was the offensive attack weapon. The fighter force (jagdwaffe) was merely a subsidiary force designed to enable bomber and land force successes. The fighters were designed for three tasks: 1) Attacking enemy aircraft. 2) Protecting the Luftwaffe’s own air formations. 3) Providing home defense. This disparate relationship within the Luftwaffe created a misperception of the strategic strength of the air force. The strength of the Luftwaffe was in fact not found in the performance of its bombers, but in the cooperation and coordination of both fighters and bombers with the German army. Germany would find this out over time.

After Hitler defeated France, his next planned military goal was the conquest of the Soviet Union. However, before he could turn his attention fully to the east he needed to secure western Europe from harassment. Although Great Britain was at war with Germany, Hitler assumed that he could reach some kind of understanding with Prime Minister Churchill. The ease with which Germany rolled up France and the Low Countries must have played part in Hitler’s assessment of his coercive capabilities and

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**Notes**

60 Walter von Brauchitsch, Interrogated by 9th Air Force Air Prisoner of War Interrogation Unit, 20 August 1945, report number 94/1945, titled “The Role of the Luftwaffe in the War,” USAF HRA File number 533.619-5, p. 2. Oberst von Brauchitsch was Aide and Adjutant to Reichsmarschall Herman Goering during the war and provided comments to the allies during prisoner interrogations of the inner working of the Luftwaffe.

Hitler had never contemplated an all-out war with Britain. However, Hitler’s slow escalation of aircraft attacks against English shipping and finally the island itself ensured that Churchill would never acquiesce.

The lack of forethought given to war with the UK manifested itself in Hitler’s plans for the invasion of the island nation, codenamed Operation Sea-Lion. Germany’s military high command, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), embraced the invasion operation only half-heartedly. Hitler directed each branch of the military to develop plans for its contribution to an invasion force, but little overall coordination was imposed by the OKW. The result was a bizarre list of preconditions that each service claimed necessary.62 The Luftwaffe was singled out as the service upon which all possible invasion plans would rest. They would need to achieve total air supremacy over the invasion landing zone and English Channel if the invasion were to be successful.63

Goering had his first taste of failure in the eyes of Hitler when his Luftwaffe could not prevent the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk in May and June of 1940. Determined to redeem himself with Hitler, he accepted the Herculean task required of the Luftwaffe that would evolve into the Battle of Britain. The objectives set for the Luftwaffe varied over time. At first, the blockade of England by air attack of shipping was considered most important in order to isolate the UK from the rest of the world. Next, in preparation for the invasion force, air superiority was required over the landing zone and channel. This meant that coastal artillery and RAF fighter capabilities must be eliminated. Finally, the objective most difficult to achieve, the Luftwaffe was directed to force Britain to surrender through total air warfare.64 The wide range of air objectives reflected the inconsistency that transpired throughout the campaign.

Notes

62 Adolf Galland, The First and the Last, trans. Mervyn Savill (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), 20. The army asserted that the navy provide the necessary shipping, landing, and supply vessels; the navy demanded that the Luftwaffe provide total air supremacy over their fleet operations. In other words, the Luftwaffe was held responsible to get the operation underway.

63 Wilhelm Keitel, Field order directive signed by Feldmarschall Keitel, OKW Staff, 2 July 1940, USAF HRA file number 512.621 VII/21, p 1.

Counter-Sea Operations

In the course of the French campaign, the Luftwaffe attacked British merchant shipping and naval forces in an effort to prevent assistance from reaching the continent. After the last of the BEF retreated from Dunkirk and France signed the armistice, Hitler directed continued attacks against British shipping in order to keep pressure on the English while he held out for diplomatic efforts to secure a peace deal. The Battle of Britain can be thought to have entered its initial phase in this counter-sea campaign. Convoys were attacked through July although the focus of attacks against England would shift toward the end of the month—to the RAF fighters themselves.

German fighters were given the initial tasks of escorting bombers on the convoy raids. The German bombers were fairly successful in their convoy attacks and their supporting Bf-109 fighters achieved considerable success against the RAF fighters, whose formations and tactics were inferior to the Germans. These early victories led the Luftwaffe to believe that the RAF could be beaten in the air through attrition. Since air superiority was a decided necessity for the invasion, the emphasis thus shifted on 24 July to a massive offensive counter-air campaign of aerial combat pitting the superior Bf-109 against inferior RAF Hurricanes and near-equal RAF Spitfires. All that was required was to invite the RAF fighters to join the battle.

The Fighter Battle

During the last week of July, the RAF fighters rose to engage the Germans as soon as British radar indicated that aircraft were inbound. The Germans held the upper hand initially as the RAF fighters struggled to reach altitude where the dogfights would occur. The British had a steep learning curve during this period and relocated some of their coastal fighter bases further inland to allow more time to climb before tangling with the Germans. They were also more selective in choosing to do battle. Soon the Luftwaffe realized that the RAF would not rise to challenge formations devoid of bombers. Small formations of bombers were therefore mixed in with the Bf-109s as

Notes

65 Ibid., 13, 15. Also, see Adolf Galland, interrogated by A.D.I.(K) and U.S. Air Interrogation Unit, 15 August 1945, A.D.I.(K) report number 373/1945, titled “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm,” USAF HRA file number 512.619B-30, p 14.
66 Ibid., 13.
decoys to encourage RAF fighters to takeoff.\textsuperscript{67} By 12 August, the Luftwaffe concluded that the RAF was near its breaking point. The measured response from British fighters combined with the lack of German intelligence misled the attackers into thinking they were close to achieving air superiority.\textsuperscript{68} Unfortunately, the amount of fighting was too limited to make significant gains toward achieving air superiority. Anxious to secure the prerequisites for the invasion, Goering changed his focus as he launched a new operation.

**The Air Offensive - Adlerangriff**

Eagle Day, or Adlertag, began an expansion of the offensive counter-air campaign on 13 August. This was a concerted effort between both the German bomber arm and the fighter arm to destroy RAF fighters whether they remained on the ground or took to the air. The bombers targeted fighter airfields in southeastern England, as well as ground organizations and the radar sites. The fighters accompanied the bombers and destroyed as many British fighters as possible in the air.

A heated controversy began within the Luftwaffe during this period over the best fighter tactics to protect the bombers on these missions. The fighter pilots felt that the more freedom they had in formation keeping and maneuvering, the more successful they would be engaging the enemy. The bomber pilots felt that when the fighters flew beyond visual range of their escorts, the bombers became more vulnerable to attack. Four fighter missions were developed or refined as a result of the debate. The close escort mission strictly required fighters to maintain visual formation around the bombers. The detached escort mission allowed the fighters to follow the general routing of the bombers but with some freedom to engage enemy fighters. The free hunt, or freie jagd, mission was the traditional fighter pilot tactic of sweeping well ahead of the bombers and engaging the enemy before the bombers arrived. Finally, the fighter reception mission required that fighter escort arrive in time to meet the bombers as they left the target area. Each fighter unit would take turns conducting these tactics on various missions.

The weaknesses of German intelligence capabilities were highlighted again and again as the German OKW, Goering, and General Hans Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, failed to appreciate the actual effects that the new targeting was achieving on RAF

**Notes**

\textsuperscript{67} Galland, *The First and the Last*, 25.
fighter combat effectiveness. Goering himself intervened to impose tactics on the fighter and bomber commanders to minimize losses although no changes were really needed. Even though German bomber aircraft and aircrew losses were rising to uncomfortable levels, the RAF was reaching the breaking point by the beginning of September. However, the pressure that Goering was under to produce results by the 15 September invasion date caused him to doubt his commanders in the field. His own frustration at the lack of visible results, combined with the accidental bombing of London by a German bomber crew on the night of 24/25 August, allowed Goering to let Hitler make the most critical error of strategy in the battle thus far.

Demanding retaliation for the bombing of civilians in London, Churchill launched his own bombers against German cities after he perceived that Hitler has switched to a strategy of bombing the British capital. This move infuriated Hitler who responded by directing that his own air offensive shift its targeting focus once again, away from the collapsing RAF, and onto London itself.

**City Bombing**

Reprisal raids against London began on 7 September as the Luftwaffe, now under the personal command of Goering, launched massive raids against the city. The new targeting scheme also brought new risks since the large increase in bombers assembling

**Notes**

69 Hermann Goering, Directives issued by Reichsmarschall Goering, 15-19 August 1940, USAF HRA file number 512.621 VII/39 trans. by British Air Ministry, 20 August 1947, p 2-5. Goering specifies the number and type of escort fighters required for each bomber formation and the tactics necessary to follow the dive bombers through their attacks. He also directs personnel actions regarding the experience level of bomber crews. All these actions were directed to minimize losses while still focusing on the “first aim”—destruction of the RAF fighters.
70 Williamson Murray, *Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1983), 50. German bomber losses in August had been 339 (of all types) with a loss of 251 pilots killed, captured, or missing. See also, Deighton, 289-290. Between 24 August and 7 September, the RAF had 466 fighters lost or damaged but was able to offset that deficit with only 269 replacements. RAF pilot losses were more serious—231 lost, wounded, or missing. In any case, by 1 September the Germans were close to achieving air superiority.
71 Wilhelm Keitel, Field order directive signed by Feldmarschall Keitel, OKW Staff, 1 August 1940, USAF HRA file number 512.621 VII/21, p 9. Keitel confirms that the navy has set 15 September 1940 as the earliest date for the invasion and that Hitler will make a decision “8 or 14 days after the launching of the air offensive against Britain” which began on 13 August 1940. Accordingly, Hitler would have needed results from Goering’s Luftwaffe by 27 August at the latest to make a decision on the invasion. To make matters worse, General Alfred Jodl of the OKW Operations Staff (another advisor to Hitler) stated that the Luftwaffe should have achieved their goal within a week. See Alfred Jodl, Situation Report signed by General Jodl, OKW Staff, 13 August 1940, USAF HRA file number 512.621 VII/21, 12.
over the French coast were escorted by the same number of German fighters as before. The difficult job of fighter escort became that much more demanding for the Bf-109 pilots. The most critical weakness of the Bf-109 was its lack of range. Extra assembly time for the large air packages meant less aerial combat time for the German fighters. Because of the limited range of the fighters, virtually all bomber routing would become straight lines from Calais to London.

The RAF reacted to the shift in German targeting with surprise and relief. With RAF fighter units and bases able to reconstitute their strength after three weeks of relentless attack, the British formed an excellent counter-punch to the German raids on London. The predictability of German tactics combined with the diminished Luftwaffe fighter engagement times translated to increasing losses for the German bombers. In September alone, the German bombers lost or damaged on operations rose some 15% over the previous month. Goering was losing bombers and, more importantly, experienced crews faster than he could hope to replace them. The situation came to a head on 15 September when two successive German raids against London were repulsed by British fighters. This event coincided with Hitler’s decision that the invasion should be postponed indefinitely. Nonetheless, he directed the Luftwaffe to continue with air attacks against England.

**Fighter-Bomber Operations**

Goering held his fighter pilots personally to blame for the losses of Luftwaffe bombers. He often told his senior fighter commanders that a lack of aggressiveness and discipline, on the part of Bf-109 pilots in particular, was the reason for losing bombers over England. In an act of spite and frustration, Goering ordered that one-third of all fighters be converted into fighter-bombers (jabos) capable of carrying a 500 pound bomb. In his view, if the fighters were unable to protect his bombers then they must deliver the

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72 “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm,” 16.

73 British Air Ministry, “German Aircraft Losses: September 1939 – December 1940,” report by the Air Historical Branch, 10 January 1949, USAF HRA file number 512.621 VII/83, p. 12-13. This report was compiled from original records of the Quartermaster General’s Department of the German Air Ministry of aircraft losses throughout the war. In August and September, figures for bombers destroyed or damaged on operations were 310 and 358, respectively.

74 Alfred Jodl and Wilhelm Keitel, Field order directive initialed by General Jodl and Feldmarschall Keitel, OKW Staff, 14 September 1940, USAF HRA file number 512.621 VII/21, p 16.
The first jabo raids on London occurred on 20 September and met with very little RAF resistance. The British air defense stations identified the incoming aircraft as fighters and did not consider them, by themselves, to be a threat. It was not until the bombs they delivered on London detonated that the RAF fighters were scrambled to intercept the attackers. Subsequent jabo raids were not as successful at surprising the English. Although innovative as a new tactic, the jabo raids accomplished little since their payloads were insignificant and the untrained fighter pilots were very imprecise in their deliveries. The real effect of the jabo raids was to extend pressure on the British while the German bombers were reconfigured and their crews trained for night bombing operations.

Night Bombing

The prohibitive losses taken by German bombers during daylight attacks over England drove Goering to switch to night operations for these aircraft. Some night bombing attacks had been tried earlier in September, but after the 15 September losses, Goering stepped up the night missions. Night raids increased through October, and by 20 October, the Luftwaffe essentially flew bombers missions only at night while jabo attacks continued throughout the day. German fighters continued their escort duties by day, but deteriorating weather and the lack of night flying capability severely reduced their operational impact.

Forcing the Germans into primarily night bombing operations signaled to the British that their day fighters had thwarted the German plans for invasion. It was during this night phase of the Battle of Britain that the stalemate became obvious to both sides. When the failure of Operation Sea Lion became apparent, Hitler shifted his focus to the invasion of the Soviet Union. For the Luftwaffe, the Battle of Britain never officially ended. The emphasis devoted to it simply tapered off until such a time as Hitler considered an invasion once again possible. That possibility, however, never

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75 Galland, The First and the Last, 52.
materialized.

**JG 26 in the Battle of Britain**

JG 26 was composed of four separate combat flying organizations. Three groups (Gruppen), each containing three squadrons with a total of approximately 40 aircraft and pilots, formed the bulk of the combat power of the wing. Additionally, the wing staff had the capability to launch a very small flight (separate from the groups) of either two or four aircraft with their assigned pilots. The logistics of each group required that they be located at three separate bases in the Calais area during the Battle of Britain, with the wing staff co-located with Group 1 (I/JG 26.) Command and control was obviously more difficult with this multi-location arrangement, but it was not an insurmountable problem.

The wing commander (Kommodore) of JG 26 was Major Gotthardt Handrick when the wing began combat operations in the Battle of Britain on 24 July 1940. Handrick was an ineffective and indecisive combat commander by some accounts and took a rather passive role in leading his fighter pilots. Goering grew frustrated with the lack of aggressiveness of several of his fighter wing commanders and on 22 August he replaced Handrick with the very successful group commander of III/JG 26, Major Adolf Galland. Galland had already achieved 22 aerial victories by 15 August in operations during the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain. Galland commanded JG 26 through the remainder of the Battle of Britain.

The success of each German fighter wing was measured by the number of enemy aircraft claimed shot down compared to the losses that the wing itself suffered in the process. JG 26 had an impressive kill ratio during the Battle of Britain, as Table 1 demonstrates. Even more impressive is the fact that four of the wing’s fighter pilots (out

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**Notes**

78 Donald L. Caldwell, *The JG 26 War Diary: Volume One 1939-1942*, (London: Grub Street, 1996), 33. Handrick failed to maneuver his flight of Bf-109s in response to an imminent Hurricane attack in operations over Dunkirk in May. His inaction resulted in the shoot down of his wingman; See also p. 53. By 12 August 1940, Handrick’s staff flight was the only combat unit within JG 26 to have zero kills to its credit in the Battle of Britain. Handrick believed that he could effectively lead his wing on combat missions by taking off after the rest of the wing had launched, however, this position in the formation guaranteed that he would not encounter enemy fighters.


80 Caldwell, *The JG 26 War Diary*, 58.
of a total of approximately 150 pilots) claimed an astounding 31% of all kills. Of further interest is that Major Galland alone claimed 14% of the wing’s kills.

Table 1. JG 26 Kill Claims and Losses by Month (Jul-Oct 1940)

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<th></th>
<th>Jul 1940</th>
<th>Aug 1940</th>
<th>Sep 1940</th>
<th>Oct 1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kills Claimed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill Ratio</td>
<td>2.5 : 1</td>
<td>6 : 1</td>
<td>5.4 : 1</td>
<td>2.9 : 1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The aircraft assigned to the wing was the Bf-109 single engine fighter. The performance of the Bf-109 was superior to the British Hurricane in speed and maneuverability. The British Spitfire was a closer match. Although the Spitfire was 10 – 15 mph slower than the Bf-109, its turning capability was superior and in slower fights it could be a formidable opponent. Several variants of the Bf-109 remained with the wing throughout the battle. The earlier version Bf-109E-1, inadequately armed with four light machine guns, was generally flown by enlisted pilots. The modified Bf-109E-4 had increased lethality, with two of its light machine guns being replaced by two very effective wing cannons. The latest model of the Bf-109 was the E-4/N. It had an improved engine that gave the aircraft greater speed at high altitudes.

Pilot Morale within JG 26

For the purposes of this study, the focus on JG 26 pilot morale in the Battle of Britain is from July through the end of October when the battle reached its final, inconclusive stage. The perception of morale among the German fighter pilots during this time was that it was generally good. Toliver and Constable have stated that “there was no lack of stomach for further battle amongst any of the fighter pilots in all the

Notes

81 Ibid., 49-84. The individual pilot claims were: Galland - 36 kills, Schoepfel – 19 kills, Muencheberg – 13 kills, and Sprick – 12 kills.
82 Gerhard Schoepfel, questionnaire reply to author, 30 March 2000, facsimile transcript in the hand of Mr. Schoepfel,. As group commander of III/JG 26 during the Battle of Britain, Mr. Schoepfel believed that pilot morale was good. See also Feldwebel Seeger, of JG 2, questionnaire reply to author, 30 March 2000, facsimile transcript in the hand of Mr. Seeger.
Geschwader on the Channel Front,” even by the end of October.83 This positive outlook did not remain constant throughout the three-month period. In fact, several factors influenced the fighting spirit of the pilots in JG 26 during the Battle of Britain.

**Individual Needs**

Major Galland inherited a fully operational combat wing when he assumed command of JG 26 on 22 August. Food and living conditions varied among the different groups throughout the deployment on the channel coast, but there does not seem to be any emphasis in the various literature that discusses either of these two factors in terms of being important to the pilots.84

Rest, however, was an issue that did affect fighter pilot morale in JG 26. Many of the pilots were routinely flying three or four missions per day throughout the campaign.85 Such an effort was due to the facts that there was only ten minutes of loiter time over the objective area and the Luftwaffe lacked sufficient numbers of aircraft and pilots to maintain continual operations against the British.86 The heavy premium that Goering placed on bomber protection also drove the requirement for frequent fighter pilot missions to unrealistic expectations.87 Although Caldwell correctly states that “no JG 26 formation ever suffered such crippling losses that its combat efficiency dropped,”88 Galland himself recognized the manifest fatigue of his pilots. By the end of September, Galland noticed that, “the stamina of the superbly trained and experienced original [cadre of pilots] was down to a point where operational efficiency was being impaired.”89

In early August, the German fighter wing commanders had realized that the strain of combat operations would require giving the pilots a day off after every four or five days.90

**Notes**

84 Caldwell, *The JG 26 War Diary*, 47. Caldwell mentions that the men were initially housed either in tents or in billets in local towns, but no further discussion of either food or shelter requirements is made. Neither Galland, Bekker, nor Josef Priller (all authors of life in the fighter units) mention these factors either.
87 Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm,” 15. See also Bekker, 165. The general ratio of fighters-to-bombers on missions was 3:1. Bomber crews continued to push for a 5:1 ratio on select missions.
89 Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm,” 18.
90 Ibid., 15.
Although this policy might have been helpful in the earlier campaigns of 1940, the Battle of Britain soon required the maximum effort of every experienced pilot. The only real rest periods that became available were those days when operations were cancelled due to poor weather. Other than weather days, JG 26 received a total of only four rest days from mid-August through the end of October.\(^\text{91}\)

The Bf-109 aircraft was obviously a physical requirement for the pilots of JG 26. Although JG 26 losses during the Battle of Britain were fairly low, overall Bf-109 losses for the Luftwaffe during this time were 660 aircraft.\(^\text{92}\) If the conservative production figure of 125 fighters per month was valid, as Galland claims for Bf-109s in the beginning of 1940, then the overall replacement capability for the same period above would have been 625 airplanes.\(^\text{93}\) It is safe to assume that aircraft replacement for JG 26 was not a serious problem, and that JG 26 did not lose combat capability due to losses, in agreement with Caldwell’s assertion.

Training was not a significant detriment to morale for the JG 26 pilots engaged in the Battle of Britain. Most of the pilots had been experienced veterans of combat action over France, and some had even been active in the Luftwaffe in the Condor Legion, albeit not as part of JG 26. Sound training therefore should have translated into sound tactics throughout the Battle of Britain. This was not the case for several reasons. First, the Luftwaffe was, for the first time, participating in an air campaign without the synergy of the army or navy engaged simultaneously with the enemy. Secondly, tactics were directed by Goering, without an appreciation for the actual necessities of strategic air warfare, nor of the advantages and weaknesses of Luftwaffe aircraft.\(^\text{94}\) The third reason was that replacements arriving in JG 26 were “poorer quality” than the original pilots lost.\(^\text{95}\) Finally, although German tactics were initially superior to the RAF fighter units’, the British quickly learned to adapt their tactics to best offset the German strengths. This situation led to a conflict between the two significant psychological needs of the fighter pilots—confidence in their aircraft, and confidence in their tactics.

Notes
91 Caldwell, The JG 26 War Diary, 64, 67, 80.
92 British Air Ministry, “German Aircraft Losses: September 1939 – December 1940,” 11-14. Figure represents destroyed single engine fighters from July-November 1940.
93 Galland, The First and the Last, 14.
94 Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, 176.
95 Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm,” 18.
Perhaps the most significant psychological need of the JG 26 pilots that positively influenced morale was the confidence in their aircraft. The success of Bf-109s in the Condor Legion and the campaigns in the West, culminating in the Battle of France, confirmed the relative superiority of that aircraft to the pilots who would fly them in the Battle of Britain. Galland was convinced, after minor engagements with the RAF fighters at the end of the Battle of France, that although the RAF pilots were formidable opponents, the Bf-109 was superior to both the Hurricane and the Spitfire. His view was strengthened entering the Battle of Britain because the Bf-109 was undergoing modifications that would improve its firepower by adding two 20 mm cannons. The pilots of JG 26 shared Galland’s view in the confidence of their machines. Caldwell states that the pilots of JG 26 believed that their Bf-109s were the best single engine fighters in the world at that time. When JG 26 began receiving the new Bf-109E-4/N model on 7 September, morale in the units rose considerably. Even 60 years after the battle, a former JG 26 pilot related to the author that the arrival of the new Bf-109 within his group was a significant event that improved morale. Clearly, the airplane was a central part of pilot morale within JG 26.

The most significant psychological need of the JG 26 pilots that was not met was for confidence in headquarters-directed fighter tactics. The German fighter pilot at that time very much identified with the original fighter pilot’s objectives of the First World War, articulated by Baron Manfred von Richthofen: The mission of the fighter pilot is to find the enemy and shoot him down—“anything else is nonsense.” The group commander of III/JG 26 stated that the most important factor to maintaining good morale was the mission type being flown. Of the four fighter missions discussed already, only the fighter sweep mission was truly satisfying to the pilots because those missions generally yielded the most kills. Another JG 26 pilot was convinced that, “the sole

Notes

96 Ibid., 21.
97 Ibid., 13.
98 Caldwell, JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 16.
99 Schoepfel, questionnaire, 30 March 2000. Mr. Schoepfel credited the wing commander, Major Galland with having the new Bf-109s delivered.
100 Toliver and Constable, 105.
101 Schoepfel, questionnaire, 30 March 2000.
important factor [for pilot morale] was the single success of aerial battle. The close escort missions protecting the bombers were the most discouraging missions for the pilots. By flying in a non-maneuvering, defensive position on the wings of the bombers, the fighter pilots lost all of the advantages of the Bf-109 (speed and climbing/diving ability) and actually magnified the vulnerabilities of their aircraft (poor cockpit visibility, limited range, poor turning capability.) More than physical limitations, Galland claimed that fighting spirit was also affected when his pilots were tasked with close escort missions:

The worst disadvantage of this type of escort was not aerodynamic but lay in its deep contradiction of the basic function of fighter aircraft—to use speed and maneuverability to seek, find and destroy enemy aircraft, in this case, those of Fighter Command. The [Bf-109s] were bound to the bombers and could not leave until attacked, thus giving their opponent the advantage of surprise, initiative, superior altitude, greater speed, and above all fighting spirit, the aggressive attitude which marks all successful fighter pilots.

When the Battle of Britain exposed the Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber to heavy losses in the opening phases, Goering ordered that his fighters provide better escort for all bombers. He directed close escort tactics that in fact contributed to further heavy bomber losses. Goering misunderstood the tactical dilemma and blamed the fighter pilots for the losses. The fighter pilots felt like “chained dogs” when they were required to fly the close escort missions because they knew they were fighting at a disadvantage.

Goering further compromised pilot morale in September. Goering’s decision to refit one-third of all fighter wings as fighter-bombers had an equally damaging influence on the morale of JG 26. Not only did the pilots of JG 26 lose confidence in their aircraft, they also resented the new ‘bomber’ mission they were assigned. When the Bf-109 was flown as a jabo, it lost climb capability as well as speed and maneuverability. The pilots were eager to get rid of their bomb at the first chance in order to regain performance. They also knew that the small payload they were carrying and the inaccuracy with which

Notes

103 Johannes Naumann, questionnaire reply to author, 26 April 2000.
104 Caldwell, JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 60.
105 Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm,” 17.
106 Ibid., 15.
107 Caldwell, JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 60.
it was delivered did not have a significant effect on the enemy. Galland claimed that the fighter pilots did not like this mission and that requiring them to fly as jabos ruined their morale. The jabo pilots were ordered to fly an inferior machine, in a passive role, which ran contrary to their instinct. Caldwell believed that exhaustion rather than the jabo missions contributed toward sinking morale. He states that although the jabos carried bombs, once they released them, they were free to tend to the traditional fighter sweep tactics that they enjoyed. However, at least through the end of October, none of the JG 26 squadrons assigned on jabo missions claimed any air-to-air kills, which implies that their fighter pilot ‘measure of satisfaction’ (shooting down the enemy) was not met. In sum, the jabo missions added to difficulties with pilot morale at a time when it was becoming apparent that the Battle of Britain was not achieving its objectives.

Cohesion

Issues of cohesion within JG 26 are noticeably absent in the literature regarding the wing in the Battle of Britain. The common experiences that these fighter pilots had throughout the Battle of Britain may have helped bond them to one another, although it is uncertain whether or not this factor played much of a role in the overall morale of the wing. It could be argued that fighter pilots who experience high cohesion within their flights would risk their own lives to protect or assist a vulnerable comrade. If so, the author has been unable to find any mention of the sacrifice required of such commitment in any of the literature of this battle. Nevertheless, the absence of such details does not prove that cohesion in small, primary groups was not important in JG 26. It merely means that it is impossible to relay any conclusions regarding morale that were generated as a result of these influences.

Esprit de Corps

For the pilots of JG 26, there were two secondary groups that influenced overall morale: The fighter wing itself, and the political leadership embodied in Goering. The

Notes

108 Galland, The First and the Last, 53.
109 Ibid., 54. See also, Galland, “The Battle of Britain,” 28.
110 Caldwell, The JG 26 War Diary, 81.
111 Ibid., 80-84. The 3rd, 4th, and 9th squadrons only had one kill claim from 10 October, when they became fully operational, until 30 October. This kill was claimed by the 3rd squadron on 25 October, but it was during an escort mission and not a jabo mission.
influence of these two sources of support ultimately translated into esprit de corps and affected morale throughout the Battle of Britain. Of these two groups, wing reputation provided a positive boost to esprit de corps, while Goering’s impact was negative.

A special reputation was established for JG 26 even before the war. Originally, the wing was named with not only a numerical designation, but also after the name of a national hero, Leo Schlageter. During the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, Schlageter fought for German independence in the area and was executed by the French. The letter “S” was painted on each JG 26 aircraft and the pilots realized that “the name (Schlageter) was a special responsibility in the National tradition.” JG 26’s war reputation complemented that pride.

The reputation and successes of JG 26 had a significant influence on the esprit de corps of the fighter pilots. Esprit was strengthened by the successes of the wing in three areas: the outcome of the Battle of France, the number of air-to-air kill claims made, and the relative superiority of the wing in escort duties when compared with other fighter wings. The victory over the French gave the wing their first real “unit win” and provided the pilots with a tremendous sense of accomplishment. Accordingly, the successes in May and June contributed to very high morale throughout the wing at the beginning of the Battle of Britain. The pilots were very satisfied with their wing’s overall performance in France and the wing was honored by Hitler when asked to provide the combat air patrol mission overhead the armistice negotiations at Compeigne on 20 June. The Battle of Britain continued to bring recognition to JG 26.

Throughout the Battle of Britain, JG 26 had become a “premier” fighter unit with a total of 285 claimed victories at the cost of 56 pilots. The pilots were well aware of their successes and the relative standings of the other fighter wings. Indeed, after Goering replaced several fighter wing commanders in August with younger, more successful officers, a great competition among the wings began. All the pilots wanted to belong to the wing with the highest score. This competition motivated the JG 26 pilots

Notes

112 Naumann, questionnaire, 26 April 2000.
113 Ibid. See also, Schoepfel, questionnaire, 30 March 2000.
114 Caldwell, *The JG 26 War Diary*, 41.
115 Caldwell, *JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe*, 69-70. Figures cover operations from July through December.
to achieve great aerial victories, and by the end of the campaign, seven JG 26 pilots had been awarded the Knight’s Cross for their success.\textsuperscript{117}

The excellence in the wing also spread to its secondary role as bomber escorts. Although the pilots disliked the escort missions, they were regarded as the best wing for the job. Galland claimed that all the bomber wings would request JG 26’s protection on their raids. Early escort raids bear out the competence of the wing in the escort role.\textsuperscript{118} However, later escort missions in which bomber wings lost significant aircraft under the watch of JG 26 indicate that the performance level could vary dramatically.\textsuperscript{119} Even so, the early reputation as a good escort unit formed an opinion, at least in Galland’s mind, that the wing performed the best of any other fighter wing. This reputation may have encouraged the wing pilots to perform a mission to the best of their abilities even thought there was no love for the job.

Goering’s actions throughout the Battle of Britain drained pilot morale in at least two ways. First, Goering harshly criticized the valor and competence of all the Luftwaffe’s fighter pilots. He could not understand why his bombers were being shot down by the British. He assumed that his fighter pilots were failing in their duties to protect the bombers. Whatever his justification for drawing such conclusions, Goering made it a point to chastise the fighter pilots through their chain of command as well as directly. The fighter pilots and unit commanders were “deeply offended by the tone and by the manifest exaggeration of the accusations” that Goering made.\textsuperscript{120}

Secondly, Goering shifted the focus of the fighter missions frequently and without clarity of purpose. Whether issuing new tactics from Karinhall, or personally directing the shift from one phase of the operation to the next, the fighter pilots drew no confidence from his erratic taskings. In contrast, the fighter pilots felt that their aerial successes were leading the Luftwaffe and Germany to victory, only to have Goering change tactics and create unnecessary setbacks.\textsuperscript{121} The fighter pilots of JG 26, like the fighter pilots of other

Notes

\textsuperscript{117} Caldwell, \textit{JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe}, 70.
\textsuperscript{118} Caldwell, \textit{The JG 26 War Diary}, 56, 71.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 75.
\textsuperscript{120} Galland, “The Battle of Britain,” 28.
\textsuperscript{121} Wilhelm Goebel, to author, 30 March 2000, Facsimile transcript in the hand of Mr. Goebel. Mr. Goebel is the head of Germany’s Gemeinschaft der Jagdflieger (Fighter Pilot’s Association) and has previously interviewed many Luftwaffe fighter pilots from the Battle of Britain. See also Caldwell, \textit{JG 26 Top Guns of the Luftwaffe}, 41.
Luftwaffe wings, were being affected by Goering’s actions. These actions could not help but lower morale.

**Galland’s Influence on Morale**

In the words of one of his own men, Galland was a “tough commander,” but that was expected of him. “Galland was a soldier. He was clear. He was decisive. He was always ready. He was an outstanding flyer and an outstanding marksman. He had outstanding eyesight and was lightning-quick in his reactions and his decisions.”

Adolf Galland was a man of action and discipline. He did not care for the Luftwaffe political intrigue above his wing level. His skill as a fighter pilot was unquestionable. He cared for the well being of his men, yet he kept a firm hand on them at the same time. He demanded a great deal of his men and chastised them when their performance was below his standard. He emphasized efficiency over military ‘show,’ but he also expected the utmost in military bearing from the men of his wing. But where Galland demanded much from his men, he also provided the example that he wanted followed.

When Galland became the wing commander in August, his pilots were dissatisfied with themselves, the bombers, and above all, leadership. Although Galland could not change Goering’s mind with respect to the bomber escort mission, he did take immediate actions to improve pilot morale.

The first thing Major Galland did as the new Kommodore of JG 26 was to replace several ineffective group and squadron commanders with younger, more aggressive, and more successful (in terms of aerial engagements) officers in the wing. He also increased the wing staff flight from Handrick’s two-ship formation to a more lethal four-ship

**Notes**

123 Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm,” 43. Galland made it clear to his fighter pilots that he did not wish them to marry. He felt that none of them had any right to believe they would live through the war and it would be far better to leave a sorrowful sweetheart, rather than a grieving widow and children.
124 Caldwell, *JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe*, 32. As group commander of III/JG 26, Major Galland was not pleased with the success of his unit during the first week of the Battle of Britain, and made it clear to his pilots.
125 Toliver and Constable, 154. Galland send a highly critical letter to his higher command at Jafu 2, commenting on the lack of professionalism he encountered while visiting another base.
formation. Galland began leading all JG 26 packages that were of Geschwader-size with his new four-ship staff flight. He was not content to “lead from behind” as his predecessor had been. Instead, Galland became the example for his wing. He flew as often as possible and led the most difficult missions. He firmly believed that a leader of fighter pilots could “only receive full recognition if he asked nothing from his men that he was not prepared to do himself.”

The visible change in leadership styles was encouraging for his men but Galland’s greater quality was found in his tactical innovation.

The most immediate difficulty was with the escort mission requirements. Luftwaffe bomber crews wanted visible escorts on their raids, but Galland knew tying the fighters to a rigid formation would raise losses rather than prevent them. He developed a flexible escort system that allowed his pilots constantly to change altitude, airspeed, direction, and distance to the bombers during these close escort missions. The results were superior to those wings that were locked into static formations around the bombers. The fighter pilots, while not totally pleased with the escort role, realized that Galland’s method was “the best escort system possible.”

By the end of the Battle of Britain, JG 26 had gained a reputation as one of only two fighter wings that performed escort duties “with consistently low losses” to the bombers they were entrusted to protect. The pilots may not have enjoyed this duty, but they were successful at it, and they still were able to find and shoot down the enemy, if only in reduced quantities. Furthermore, because Galland met almost daily with the other wing commanders to accept mission assignments, he was able to ensure that close escort missions were interspersed with plenty of opportunity for fighter sweeps. The jabo mission assignments were another story altogether.

Once Goering was committed to reconfigure one-third of all fighter wings to pick up the fighter-bomber mission, Galland had to accept the decision. If morale among the fighter pilots was indeed greatly affected by this new mission, then Galland must bear part of the blame for that result. His pilots were clearly not enthusiastic about their new

Notes

126 Galland, The First and the Last, 31, 33.
127 Ibid., 35.
129 Ibid., 49.
aircraft modifications and tactics. Galland’s response to the situation was to develop a packaging concept that mixed the Bf-109 jabos in with the Bf-109 fighters in an effort to deceive the enemy and confound their intercept plans. This tactic slowed down the jabo losses but the pilots still felt as though they were “being wasted.” Galland missed three opportunities to boost morale with regard to the hated jabo mission. First, although pilots had some practice with cement bombs, Galland did not capitalize on training opportunities to improve the bombing accuracy of his pilots. Second, he could have disciplined those pilots who were prone to jettison their bombs at the first opportunity. Finally, he could have actually participated in the jabo missions instead of merely providing escort for them. Any of these actions might have conveyed to his pilots that the missions were important enough to warrant his attention. Instead, he simply let the pilot’s contempt for the mission remain unchecked. Most surprising with regard to Galland’s dismissive attitude toward the bombing mission was that he once was a ground attack pilot. He flew He 51s in Spain and, as recently as the Polish campaign in 1939, Galland had flown ground attack missions in the Hs 123. In essence, he violated his own dictum of not asking the men to do something that he himself was not prepared to do.

The most visible action that Adolf Galland took to raise the morale of his pilots was one that he never consciously had to focus on—his ability to shoot down enemy fighters. His ability to seek out RAF fighters and score victories was almost a daily occurrence. The high scoring competition that grew between Galland and Mölders was an inspiration to the pilots of JG 26. Galland stated that his victories were synonymous with his unit’s victories. Certainly, the pride that his fighter pilots took in the wing’s aerial victories was a barometer for overall morale. The jubilation that the pilots felt after Galland’s 40th victory is evidence of the high esprit de corps generated by his accomplishments. The rising scoreboard for the wing, coupled with the reputation of the wing for escort missions, was enough to convince the pilots that they were successful.

Notes

131 Ibid., 18.
132 Priller, 88.
133 Galland, The First and the Last, 45. Galland claimed that after the event, the wing was in the best of spirits.
Conclusions

Surprisingly, the level of German aircraft and pilot losses did not significantly lower morale throughout the Battle of Britain. The pilots expected war to be costly, but there were other issues that did sway morale. Galland knew that several demoralizing issues were beyond his ability to change. Even so, his record is mixed on purposefully taking action to raise morale. In the cases where he was able to boost morale, Galland increased the perception of control within his pilots. His implementation of escort tactics satisfied a deficient psychological need that brought greater mission success to each flight member. Additionally, his success in the air connected the individual pilots to the wing at large and created a sense of strength regardless of individual squadron or group successes.

Unfortunately, Galland did not see an opportunity to influence morale when he was forced to deal with fighter-bomber operations. This occurred despite having the attack background to lend credibility to the new mission. He was given the lemons, but in this case he could make no lemonade. This instance of low pilot morale leads one to speculate that tactics cannot be created in a vacuum. Instead, tactical development in combat must serve to attain a national objective; even if that objective is not widely embraced. The benefits of thoughtfully applying tactics to match objectives is obvious insofar as civil-military relations are concerned, but aircrew morale is also served well by such an approach.

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134 Ibid., 31.
Chapter 4

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Laughlin: 362nd Fighter Group

*But soldierly spirit as shown in actual combat, we must remember, is not merely a question of knowledge and skill; it is largely a question of character. [Character-training] and personal influence upon the men in the ranks are of the greatest importance, especially in time of war.*

Squadron Commander’s Manual  
1st Fighter Command, June 24, 1942

Introduction

When the United States mobilized for the Second World War its greatest strength was the vast quantity of war materiel it could send to the front. Much has been written of the tremendous production capability, but an equally important strategic reserve held by the United States was the quality of leaders that created and sustained front-line fighting power. The U.S. Army Air Force had its share of successful squadron and group leaders, but one would be hard pressed to find a more successful combat commander, who was also respected and loved by his men, than Lieutenant Colonel Joe Laughlin.

Culminating in his command of the 362d Fighter Group (FG), XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), IX Air Force, Laughlin encouraged and led his P-47 pilots from one end of France to the other in support of General George S. Patton’s Third Army in the Summer of 1944. The men of the 362d FG consistently faced German 40mm and 88mm anti-aircraft artillery as well as sporadic German fighter formations and small arms fire throughout the long summer. Losses of pilots and airplanes were high enough to warrant the group an unofficial nickname, “The 362d Suicide Outfit,” but the spirit of the fighter pilots was never in doubt under Laughlin’s leadership. This evaluation will review influences in pilot morale from the start of the invasion in June until Patton’s rapid
advance was slowed down at the end of October.

The Allied Invasion of France

The invasion of Italy by the Allies in September 1943 began the inevitable ground assault on the continent that would be necessary to defeat the German Wehrmacht. While fighting in Italy was fierce, it would not play the primary role in overrunning Germany. Instead, the Allied Eighth and Fifth Armies in Italy would divert as much German strength as possible from the main Anglo-American landing in Normandy, known as Operation OVERLORD.135

D-Day and the Breakout

As Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight Eisenhower orchestrated a large scale amphibious landing, airborne paratrooper assaults, a complex deception plan, and a persistent air interdiction operation to gain a foothold on the European continent, in northern France.

The focus of airpower on air interdiction missions was an attempt to isolate the intended beachhead from German reserves. By targeting the French railroad system well in advance, airpower helped reduce, but not eliminate, German re-supply. It was not thought possible to totally eliminate all German rail potential, but by severing the larger and more critical rail nodes and arteries, air interdiction would constrict reinforcement attempts and make the surviving lines of communication (LOC) vulnerable to future fighter-bomber attacks.136 The disruption of French rail operations began slowly in March, but built to a massive scale by D minus 30. The resulting effect on the operational capability of the rail system was significant by D-day. Overall rail traffic in France was reduced by 60 percent (from the 1 March 1944 amount) and, in the critical northern sector, to the east of the planned Normandy landings, rail traffic was reduced by 75 percent.137 The interdiction effort continued after the invasion on 6 June 1944, but the needs of supporting the assault force shifted airpower priorities. Once the beachhead was

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137 Ibid., 238.
secure, the massive logistical task began of building up sufficient men and supplies for the eventual breakout on 25 July 1944. During the next six weeks, the Germans stoutly resisted. Throughout this time, Allied airpower helped weaken enemy defenses through a variety of missions.

Immediately following the invasion, Allied air forces increased their focus on interdiction targeting and began bombing and strafing enemy motor transport of all kinds. The maintenance of air superiority proved relatively easy because the Allied fighters outnumbered German fighters by no less than five-to-one numerically, and a much greater margin in pilot quality. This benefit translated into Allied tactical aircraft focusing more on interdiction and ground support (close air support (CAS)) missions. German supplies became especially limited in Normandy as a result. The constant attacks on German trucks, rail cars, and equipment prevented the defenders from mounting a counter-offensive while the Allied build-up continued. Initial air operations continued to be flown from bases in England, but once the lodgment area in Normandy became secure, fighter groups were moved onto the French coast in order to generate more sorties and to allow more rapid employment when called upon by the ground units. The command arrangements under these moves changed quite fluidly.

Prior to the invasion, the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, commanded by General Carl Spaatz, retained operational control of the Eighth Air Force (AF) and administrative control of the Ninth AF. Operational control of Ninth AF was given to the Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Under this command structure, Spaatz was never eager to submit his “strategic” Eighth AF to the tactical application of airpower that was directed by General Eisenhower to support OVERLORD. In contrast, the Ninth AF commander, General Lewis Brereton, wholeheartedly devoted his tactical air force to support General Bradley’s U.S. First Army as it widened its hold on the Cotentin peninsula. As the ground lodgment grew, Bradley activated additional field armies; first the U.S. Third Army and then the U.S. Ninth Army. Brereton created complimentary Tactical Air Commands (TAC) (five to seven fighter groups each) to work in concert with the field armies. IX TAC would provide primary air support to the original U.S. First Army, XIX

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138 Keegan, 388.
TAC worked with the U.S. Third Army, and XXIX TAC supported the U.S. Ninth Army. While the TACs were not subordinate to the field armies, the TAC commanders were well aware of the special trust placed in them to assist the armies whenever possible. The British established a similar air-ground alignment system with their tactical air forces.

By the middle of July, Allied strength in Normandy had grown sufficiently strong that General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery launched Operation GOODWOOD, designed to capture the city of Caen. Although Montgomery’s British and Canadian forces were repulsed by the stubborn German defenders on 20 July, the U.S. First Army prepared to participate in its own offensive, Operation COBRA, designed to punch through German defenses near Saint Lô. The First Army breakout created a fissure in the German defensive line, and allowed the Allied torrent to sweep across France.

Third Army Operations

The U.S. Third Army began arriving in France on 6 July and was immediately included in the First Army’s plans for the impending offensive. When Operation COBRA achieved the planned breakthrough, General George Patton’s Third Army came into its own. On 1 August, the Third Army became fully operational. Its objective was to sweep south, through Avranches, then swing southwest through Rennes and Fougeres to capture Brest and open the Brittany ports. The rapid advance through Avranches led Patton to alter his objectives.

Once south of Avranches, Patton perceived that German defenses throughout France were quickly crumbling. Capitalizing on his rapid advance, Patton tasked his VIII Corps to assume responsibility for the original objective of clearing out resistance in Brittany. With his other three corps, Patton drove south and east in a race for the Seine and ultimately Germany. In a thirty-day period, Patton had driven to within 60 miles of the German border and had contributed to the defeat of the Germans at the Falaise Gap and to the liberation of Paris. The tremendous speed with which the Third Army captured ground was due in no small part to the air support provided by the XIX TAC.

Historian John Keegan described the air and ground teamwork of General O. P.

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140 Ibid., Introduction, p 1.
Weyland’s XIX TAC and Patton’s Third Army as the only true exercise in the blitzkrieg style of warfare achieved by any Western army in the Second World War. The nine fighter groups comprising the XIX TAC flew ground support and interdiction missions along the full depth of Patton’s army—some 350 miles at times. Of greatest significance to the armored divisions was the fighter-bomber tactic of “armored column cover” created by General Elwood Quesada of IX TAC and practiced throughout the Ninth AF. During daylight hours, a minimum of four fighter-bombers, usually P-47 Thunderbolts, flew cover over each of Patton’s advancing armored columns. These aircraft generally patrolled up to 35 miles ahead of the armored spearhead and were available for immediate close air support when directed from the Air Support Parties within each division. The ground commanders felt that this tactic stood out as the best method for integrating the advantages of airpower within the armored scheme of maneuver. Most pilots in Ninth AF agreed.

XIX TAC pilots who were not tasked with armored column cover flew either interdiction or fighter-sweep missions. In time, the need for missions dedicated to seeking out German fighters in the air decreased for two reasons. First, the fighting strength of the German Air Force dwindled in the face of overwhelming opposition. Second, as Allied advances forced the Germans out of forward positions, Luftwaffe squadrons began to relocate within Germany’s borders and they became much more defensive in nature. Interdiction missions continued to be frequently assigned to the fighter-bombers and medium bombers of Ninth AF. Preplanned attacks against fixed targets were only half of the interdiction effort. The other portion was classified as armed reconnaissance. Armed reconnaissance missions became synonymous with search and destroy tactics as pilots were given general target types and locations, but had discretion to attack any worthwhile enemy targets encountered. The XIX TAC’s fighter groups used interdiction targeting to great effect in one of the most unique applications of airpower in the war—screening the Third Army’s right flank. With the physical barrier of the Loire River to the south, General Weyland’s fighter-bombers harassed and

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141 Keegan, 406-407.
destroyed enemy ground and air formations before they had the opportunity to attack north and drive in Patton’s vulnerable flank. The security provided by this protection allowed the rapid advance of the Third Army.

362d Fighter Group Operations

On June 1, 1944, the 362d Fighter Group (FG) flew P-47 Thunderbolt aircraft from an airfield in southern England known as U.S. Army Air Force Station 412, Headcorn. It had been flying primarily escort missions since becoming operational on February 8, 1944; but as D-day drew closer, the group saw an increasing amount of ground attack missions. While in England, the 362d had been under the administrative control of XIX TAC. This would not change for the duration of the war. Operational control (OPCON), however, varied over time. While in England, the IX Fighter Command of Ninth AF exercised OPCON over the 362d. On 19 July, the group relocated to Lignerolles, France in Normandy and OPCON was transferred to IX TAC which was supporting the U.S. First Army. On 1 August, when the U.S. Third Army became operational, OPCON of the 362d was ultimately transferred to XIX TAC, which had also just activated. The group moved two more times prior to November. The next move was on 11 August to Rennes, France at the eastern end of the Brest peninsula. The third move on French soil was to an airfield near Reims on 23 September.

The original commander of the 362d FG was Colonel Morton D. Magoffin. He led the group from its activation in March, 1943 until he was shot down near Falaise, France on August 10, 1944. Magoffin had been a difficult commander in the eyes of many of the young fighter pilots. He was a West Point graduate with an overbearing personality; in their eyes, his focus on mission accomplishment was often at the expense of compassion for his pilots. Many of the men grew to resent his demeaning approach

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146 56 years after the fact, stories from various former 362d pilots still recount missions where Colonel Magoffin led flights but displayed little “wingman” consideration--running several wingmen out of fuel before they reached their home base, and then taking a cavalier attitude about it later in the officer’s club. Also, episodes of Magoffin taking his flight through heavy flak for no apparent reason convinced some
to discipline. On one occasion, he made three experienced pilots sprint around the
airfield perimeter for failing to salute him. In another episode, Magoffin came upon a
group of men lining up for the chow hall “too early.” As punishment, he gave them close
order drill and then made the men wait in formation until the rest of the group had been
served. Still, Magoffin achieved a solid combat record and he shared the same dangers
as the rest of his men. Before he was shot down and captured, he was credited with five
aerial victories and became one of only three “aces” in the 362d. When Magoffin was
shot down, the group ‘flying exec’, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Laughlin, became the
group commander, remaining so until the end of the war.

Apart from the group headquarters, the combat power of the 362d FG rested in
three squadrons: the 377th, the 378th, and the 379th Fighter Squadrons. Each squadron
was authorized 32 P-47 aircraft and 36 pilots. The maintenance sections of each
squadron repaired and serviced an increasing number of battle damaged aircraft once
ground attack missions became routine. With sustained battle damage rates, either 12 or
16 aircraft per squadron could consistently be ready to fly on any given mission. The
group had the capacity for two full-strength missions per day (roughly 96 sorties) but on
some occasions a third mission could be launched.

The P-47, affectionately referred to as “The Jug”, was originally designed as a
pursuit aircraft and had only a 200-mile range without external fuel tanks. With external
tanks, its range increased to 350 miles, but this was still much less than the 600-mile
range of the P-51 Mustang with external tanks. However, the sturdy construction of

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men that he was not concerned with their safety. See John L. Hill, questionnaire reply to author, 23 April
2000, John M. Baloga, questionnaire reply to author, 12 April 2000, and Robert W. Campbell,
questionnaire reply to author, 1 May 2000. Other pilots in the group responded better to Colonel
Magoffin’s tough leadership style and had no second thoughts about flying with him. See, Joseph Z. Matte,
questionnaire reply to author, 8 May 2000, and Arthur Wildern, Interview with author, 4 May 2000,
Montgomery, Alabama, telephone conversation.

149 Ibid., 24.
the 26th Statistical Control Unit, USAF HRA file number 168.6005-85, p 8. Fighter groups were allocated
96 aircraft and 108 pilots.
151 Ibid., 8. Actual numbers of aircraft and pilots on hand varied, but in general, an average of 18 aircraft
per squadron were mission-capable (operational for combat) on any given day, although pilot availability
was much greater. Pilot availability averaged 27 pilots per squadron on any given day, for a crew ratio of
1.5 pilots-to-aircraft.
the P-47 lent itself to ground attack missions much more so than the lightweight Mustang. All in all, the P-47 was regarded by XIX TAC as an exceptional aircraft for low altitude operations even though it remained a very capable fighter in air-to-air combat.\footnote{153} In addition to .50 caliber ammunition, a normal P-47 weapons load included either one or two 500-pound general purpose bombs. For special missions, however, the P-47s could also be fitted to carry 1000-pound general purpose bombs, 250-pound fragmentary bombs, 100-pound white phosphorous bombs, napalm, or air-to-ground rockets. When employed in the ground support role, the flexibility in weapon loads was one of the aircraft’s greatest advantages.

In the summer of 1944, the pilots of the 362d FG performed missions across the full spectrum of operations tasked to tactical air forces: air superiority, interdiction, and close air support. Most American fighter groups arrived in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) with minimal, or no, ground attack experience.\footnote{154} The 362d FG was typical of groups that expected to be flying pursuit missions when they arrived in the ETO, but quickly realized that they needed to be experts in the ground attack role.\footnote{155}

Early 362d FG support for Operation OVERLORD included escorting C-47s towing gliders and flying sweep or beach patrol missions. Within days, however, the group was flying armed reconnaissance and fixed-target interdiction sorties against a variety of rail targets, motorized transports, bridges, and troops and equipment in the open. 362d pilots attacked targets throughout the Cherbourg peninsula and across most of northern France as the Allied armies built-up for the COBRA breakout. On 25 July, the group joined over 3000 Allied aircraft in a concentrated attack on the Saint Lô – Periers highway that opened the door for the Allied onslaught.\footnote{156}

Although 12 June marked the first true CAS mission flown by the 362d FG, the majority of close air support would take place after linking with General Patton’s Third

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\footnote{153} Ibid., Notes on Organization, Tactics, and Technique, p 2-3. See also Jacobs, 250.
\footnote{154} Jacobs, 263. Limited training in the States was part of the problem. The other part was the early preponderance of escort (air-to-air) missions flown in England by fighter groups that would be flying primarily air-to-ground missions later in the summer of 1944.
\footnote{155} Damon F. Rarey, ed., *Laughter and Tears: A Combat Pilot’s Sketchbook of World War II Squadron Life*, (Santa Rosa, CA: Vision Books Int’l, 1996) 94. See also, *Mogin’s Maulers*, 445-446. In the spring of 1944, select pilots were sent to Italy to observe ground attack operations and later disseminate techniques to the group.
\footnote{156} “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 July 1944 – 31 July 1944,” 3-4. See also “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” The Background, in Brief, 2.
Army on 1 August. Once Patton broke through at Avranches, the 362d FG spent the next month alternating between interdiction and armored column cover missions. During that time, the group played a key role in supporting the VIII Corps’ assault and reduction of the Brest peninsula. Further to the east, group pilots flew direct support missions for Third Army operations that cut off Hitler’s failed attempt to strike a counter-offensive from Falaise to Avranches. In spite of the numerous ground support missions flown, August was also a successful month for aerial victories in the group. 24 enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air, with two additional probably destroyed, and two damaged. The majority of future enemy aircraft kills for the group would be achieved through ground attack.

Once Brest fell, on 18 September, the group devoted its primary attention eastward to armored column cover and interdiction. Soon after completing their work in Brittany, the 362d relocated near Reims, and began routinely flying missions into Germany. Interdiction of rail lines and close air support for ground units continued to be the mainstay of the group’s tasks, however, the rapid advance of Patton’s army slowed to a crawl. Patton found his first major obstacle in the Moselle River and Germany’s Westwall defensive line. From mid-September through mid November, the front moved very little. Coincidentally, the weather began deteriorating in October and 362d pilots often had to revert to armed reconnaissance missions rather than their preplanned ones. Several notably successful missions occurred amidst the intermittent weather when the group bombed and strafed two crowded German airfields, destroyed six locks across a canal near Saarebourg, and saved an infantry division by bombing the dam at Dieuze.

Early on, the pilots of the 362d Fighter Group earned a reputation for carrying out difficult missions regardless of the cost. By September, XIX TAC was referring to the

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157 “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 August 1944 – 31 August 1944,” USAF HRA file number GP-362-HI(FI) August, 1944, 2.
159 “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 September 1944 – 30 September 1944,” USAF HRA file number GP-362-HI(FI) September, 1944, 3. 7000 German soldiers in the city of Brest surrendered immediately after pilots from the 379th FS completed their bombing run on 18 September.
160 “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 October 1944 – 31 October 1944,” USAF HRA file number GP-362-HI(FI) October, 1944, 2-4. The two airfield attacks destroyed 15 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed an additional 8, and damaged 6. The Dieuze dam required the pilots to bomb only the gates of the sluice so
group pilots as the “fire-eating fighter-bombers of the 362d” due to their tenacity and skill.\textsuperscript{161} Table 2 illustrates the number of missions flown by the 362d FG from June through October and its corresponding losses.

| Table 2. 362d Fighter Group Attrition by Month (Jun-Oct 1944) |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | Jun 1944 | Jul 1944 | Aug 1944 | Sep 1944 | Oct 1944 |
| Sorties         | 1515     | 1175     | 1511     | 1208     | 1079     |
| A/C             | 30       | 9        | 13       | 2        | 5        |
| Losses          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Pilot Losees    | 27       | 7        | 13       | 2        | 5        |
| Casualty %      | 1.78     | .59      | .86      | .16      | .46      |

Source: “362d Fighter Group OPREP Reports, April 1944 – May 1945,” USAF HRA file number GP-362-SU-OP-S(FI), April 1944-May 1945. Note: Casualty percentage is based on pilots missing-in-action or killed-in-action compared to number of sorties flown per month.

When compared to other P-47 groups in Ninth AF, the 362d FG suffered slightly higher than average losses.\textsuperscript{162} However, their pilots had become well respected throughout the Ninth AF. The group had already earned a Presidential Unit Citation for its successful contribution to defeating the Germans at Brest. Their aerial combat record from June through October stood at 49 enemy aircraft destroyed, two probably destroyed, and 11 damaged.\textsuperscript{163} Additionally, at the end of 1944, Ninth AF chose their nine best target-killing pilots—four of those selected were from the 362d Fighter Group, one of whom was named the best overall fighter-bomber pilot.\textsuperscript{164} The most satisfying recognition of

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as not to let all the water out at once. Pilots from the 378\textsuperscript{th} and 379\textsuperscript{th} FS successfully carried out the mission.

\textsuperscript{161} “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” Air Operations, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{162} “Commanding General Ninth Air Force, Statistical Data,” combat crew casualty report prepared by 26\textsuperscript{th} Statistical Unit, [March 1945], USAF HRA file number 168.6005-87. For the period Jul-Oct 1944, average P-47 pilot attrition was .475%. In the same time period, 362d FG attrition was .518%, approximately 10% higher than average.

\textsuperscript{163} “362d Fighter Group OPREP Reports, April 1944 – May 1945.” In addition to the 49-2-11 aerial record, the 362d claimed 28-8-10 enemy aircraft on the ground. Ninth AF did not count aircraft destroyed on the ground toward overall “ace status” although Eighth AF pilots were able to claim ground “kills.”

\textsuperscript{164} Gianneschi, 162. Those chosen were: Frank Peppers, 362d HQ (top bridge buster; best overall fighter-bomber pilot), Kent C. Geyer, 377\textsuperscript{th} FS (top rail line cutter), Wilfred B. Crutchfield, 378\textsuperscript{th} FS (top rail car
all, however, came from the ground commanders of the Third Army. General Patton himself called Lieutenant Colonel Laughlin to congratulate his group after the successful attack on the Dieuze dam.\textsuperscript{165} By 1 November, the fighter pilots of the 362d Fighter Group formed a premier combat unit by any standard.

**Pilot Morale within the 362d Fighter Group**

In this work, attempts to qualify or understand morale within the 362d FG during the June – October period rely primarily on reviewing personal recollections of group pilots as well as examining the abort rates of aircraft on missions. The abort rates for this period were in line with the rest of Ninth AF, which suggests that men were not looking for excuses not to fly missions.\textsuperscript{166} In fact, a common feeling of the pilots was that they wanted to fly “missions, missions, and more missions!”\textsuperscript{167} The responses from many of the surviving pilots of the 362d FG all indicate that morale during the summer of 1944 was exceptionally high.\textsuperscript{168} This assessment is evident after reviewing the factors influencing morale at the time.

**Individual Needs**

Confidence. That quality was the most significant characteristic of the men of the 362d FG during the summer of 1944. Simply put, confidence kept pilot morale high in the face of daunting losses. A young 21 year old pilot who arrived in the group during

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boster), and Carroll A. Peterson, 379\textsuperscript{th} FS (top artillery buster.) The five remaining categories were fielded by pilots from the remaining 17 fighter groups. See also, Robert B. Searl, interview by author, 29 March 2000, telephone, Montgomery, Alabama.\textsuperscript{165} Joseph L. Laughlin, interview by author, 20 March 2000, telephone, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB. Lt. Col Laughlin received a phone call the night of 20 October 1944, the date of the Dieuze dam bombing. It was General Patton in a very good mood calling to congratulate his group for the fine work. After a few moments, General Patton told Laughlin that someone else wanted to speak to him—General Carl Spaatz came on the line to offer his appreciation as well. Both men were in exceptionally high spirits that evening.\textsuperscript{166} “362d Fighter Group OPREP Reports, April 1944 – May 1945.” The overall abort rate (including weather, mechanical and other causes) for the 362d FG during this period was 2.6\%. The overall abort rate during this same period for all P-47s in Ninth AF was also 2.6\%. See “Statistical Summary, Ninth Air Force Operations, 16 Oct 1943 – 8 May 1945.”\textsuperscript{167} Gianneschi, 448.\textsuperscript{168} The author sent 38 pilots from the 362d FG a set of questions asking for perceptions of morale and leadership during the summer of 1944. Of those, 30 pilots were either interviewed or returned to the author answers to those questions. 20 of these pilots were present in the group during the transition period when Lt Col Laughlin took command. The remaining 10 pilots arrived later or were shot down prior to Lt Col Laughlin becoming the group commander.
the summer echoed the feelings of many; “We all thought we had the world right under our thumb!” The physical and psychological needs of these fighter pilots were few in number, but the influence of those factors contributed greatly to the high level of morale.

The two most important physical needs of the pilots were their aircraft and the training to use it correctly. P-47 combat losses and battle damage affected each squadron at different times but the group as a whole never lost the ability to sustain combat operations. Replacement delivery and in-theater repair of the group’s P-47s was satisfactory for the pace of operations. According to Ninth AF records, the replacement rate of P-47s grew faster than operational losses. By the end of the war, Ninth AF had gained 2,766 P-47s for replacement purposes, against 2,105 losses. In the tactical units, P-47 fighter groups had at least an 80% operational rate for their aircraft from June through October 1944.

The availability of training opportunities was not initially a morale factor for the pilots of the 362d. However, by the end of the summer, many of the original cadre of pilots had been shot down or were rotating back to the U.S. after completing their tour. The apparent lack of training for new pilots discouraged at least a few of the pilots, old and new. New replacement pilots stopped off for 30 days of “in-theater” training in England enroute to their front-line unit, but they were still very “green” on their initial combat missions. Other than that, training opportunities were virtually non-existent. Some quasi-training missions were attempted while the group was operating in Brittany but these were few and far between. Combat missions would rectify the deficiency in training, but at a high price.

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169 Paul O’Dell, questionnaire reply to author, April 2000.
170 Sherwin G. Desens, questionnaire reply to author, 29 April 2000.
171 “Statistical Summary, Ninth Air Force Operations, 16 Oct 1943 – 8 May 1945,” 7-8. July 1944 was one exception, when the operational rate fell to 74%.
172 The rotation policy was not consistent during this time. The rotation policy before the invasion was based on number of combat hours flown. As D-day approached, all rotations were cancelled until further notice. By October, the older pilots with over 100 combat missions began rotating back to the ‘zone of the interior’ for 30 days leave. These pilots generally did not return to their original combat units. Some became flight instructors in the States, while others were shifted to the Pacific theater at the end of their leave.
173 Desens, questionnaire, 29 April 2000.
174 Searl, interview with author, 29 March 2000. New pilots were sometimes allowed a few missions against less lethal targets in Brittany. One island in particular just off the coast near Saint Mihel was used in this way. The Germans held out for many weeks but the 362d missions against them there were not “credited” toward combat rotation missions.
The other physical needs of the 362d pilots were not very significant in terms of morale. Food and shelter were adequate, at least in relative terms. The pilots always felt that however bad living conditions were for them, the soldiers they were supporting had it even worse. The one interesting comment about living conditions is that they continued to improve for the group as they made their first three moves in France. From field conditions in Normandy, to vacated German barracks in Rennes, to a lavish chateau near Reims, each move incrementally raised the standard of living with a corresponding boost to morale. It seemed that as long as physical needs remained static or improved, morale followed suit. Subsequent experience demonstrated that lowering the standard of living likewise damaged morale.

Neither was rest a detriment to morale throughout the summer. In the five-month period under consideration, the group’s daily sortie rate only surged above 100 aircraft on ten days. Replacement aircraft and pilots were arriving monthly, and most pilots felt that they had plenty of rest between missions. Additionally, once Paris was liberated, the pilots of the 362d were given three-day passes to visit Paris; and in some cases, R&R was authorized to London as well. Undoubtedly, poor weather conditions drove the flying schedule as much as mission requirements. While cancelled flights due to weather may have provided some additional rest for pilots, it also lowered individual morale for those eager to fly.

The satisfaction of psychological needs can be broken down into the pilot’s confidence in tactics and confidence in their aircraft. Both of these areas rate high. The evolution of tactics in the group was never formalized, nor was there ever a blatant need

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176 “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 September 1944 – 30 September 1944,” 5. The chateau was a welcome change to the living conditions up to that point. Although a great boost to pilot morale at the time, in November the 362d FG moved again to field conditions amid rain, mud and cold at which time morale dropped temporarily due to the stark change in amenities. See, O’Dell, questionnaire, April 2000. Also, Barensfeld, questionnaire, 31 March 2000, and Robert J. Racine, questionnaire reply to author, April 2000.
177 “362d Fighter Group OPREP Reports,” April 1944 – May 1945. These days were June: 7, 14, 17, 24. July: 8, 26, 30. August: 8, 9, 22.
178 Francis A. Connor, questionnaire reply to author, 27 March 2000. Also, Robert D. McKee, questionnaire reply to author, 20 March 2000; Robert A. Mower, questionnaire reply to author, April 2000; A David Childs, questionnaire reply to author, April 2000.
179 Clifford R. Saari, questionnaire reply to author, April 2000. See also “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 June 1944 – 30 June 1944,” 2.
to make significant changes to existing tactics. The tactics brought back from the Mediterranean theater served as a baseline from which individual flight leaders could deviate to suit the needs of missions into France. No one in particular took credit for changing tactics. Changes were simply made as experience showed the way to success. Morale was certainly sustained knowing that the progression of these tactics was leading toward victory.

Tactics were continually improved as new weapons and new missions were created. Low altitude tactics were created to deal with the inclement weather and anti-aircraft artillery. High altitude dive bombing methods were developed. New weapons types were loaded and tested in combat. Safe-escape maneuvers were designed to avoid one’s own bomb fragmentation pattern after weapons release. The results of these and other successful tactics were beneficial to pilot morale throughout the war. In the words of one group pilot, “The interactions between the overhead supporting fighters and the controllers on the ground, innovating as necessary to minimize or eliminate German resistance in front of the tank columns, was truly awesome and inspiring.” Tactical improvement was a shared responsibility of the flight leaders in each squadron; dissemination of what worked and what did not was accomplished in the normal mission debriefing analysis.

Much of the confidence in these improving tactics was linked directly to the pilot’s confidence in the P-47 itself. The P-47 was “rated the best attack aircraft in the world” by some pilots of the 362d FG. Other more reserved comments still recognized the P-47 as the right aircraft for the job they were given. The men had good reason to believe in their aircraft. It was an outstanding platform for carrying a great deal of firepower to the enemy and was recognized by all authorities as the best fighter-bomber of the war.

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180 Joseph Laughlin, interview by author, 8 June 2000, telephone, Montgomery, Alabama. There were no tactics meetings held in the group; however, Laughlin placed experienced pilots from other combat-tested fighter groups equally throughout his squadrons. Captains Peppers, Fuchs, and Bailey were examples of men who had merged into the 362d FG and brought with them tactics from the 56th FG and the RAF Eagle Squadrons.
182 Campbell, questionnaire, 1 May 2000.
184 Jacobs, 250.
Cohesion

According to the majority of pilots in the 362d FG, cohesion was not considered a very important part of maintaining their fighting spirit. Bonding between pilots and other members of the squadrons obviously took place, but these bonds did not encourage the fighter pilots to fly missions that they otherwise would not have flown. Rather than increasing the pilot’s enthusiasm to fly missions, cohesion became linked to the intensity with which they attacked the enemy. When some pilots experienced the loss of a comrade due to enemy fire, they vented their sorrow and anger at future gunners who would “dare” to open fire on the P-47s.\(^{185}\) The creation of close bonds did not motivate men to fly their missions, but enemy actions that destroyed these bonds had an influence on performance.

Nevertheless, bonding throughout the squadrons took place on informal levels. Softball games, swimming, and basketball games were all activities in which both flyers and non-flyers participated. The officers had a rudimentary version of an officer’s club at most locations and trips into the local villages as well as opportunities for hunting were available to any interested pilot.\(^{186}\) The most common experience of all the group pilots was combat flying. However, squadron schedulers did not make an effort to keep the same flight leads and wingmen together in formations.\(^{187}\) Friendships formed in the squadron as much from individual choices as from any forced living or flying arrangements. In the case of the 362d FG pilots, building cohesion did not require any special emphasis. One pilot stated simply that, “[cohesion] kinda [sic] took care of itself.”\(^{188}\)

The benefits of pilot bonding are difficult to assess in this situation. As far as flying combat missions, comradeship was not a driving factor once the parachute was strapped on. A 377th FS pilot recalled that they were “individual pilots” who looked only

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185 Arthur P. Wildern, interview with author, 4 May 2000, telephone, Montgomery, Alabama. Mr. Wildern lost a good friend to flak in the summer of 1944. After that, he treated each mission much more seriously and his fighting intensity rose as a result. See also, “362nd Fighter Group Unit History, 1 October 1944 – 31 October 1944,” 1-2. Many of the pilots held a “personal grudge” against the AA gunners and took extra efforts to silence them. Majors Beeson and Kline of the 378th FS were singled out as excelling in this type of operation.


187 Hill, questionnaire, 23 April 2000. See also, O’Dell, questionnaire, April 2000.

188 Campbell, questionnaire, 1 May 2000.
to their flight leaders for supervision. The real role that cohesion played was as a stabilizing influence on morale during non-flying activities. The worst that could have happened was for morale to erode on a daily basis as a result of isolated pilots who did not interact with each other. At best then, cohesion is built through daily contact and acts to prevent or slow down the decay of pilot morale under normal combat conditions. The 362d pilot’s experience with cohesion fits into the latter case.

**Esprit de Corps**

Esprit de corps was a positive component of pilot morale in the 362d FG. Most of the pilots considered themselves fortunate to be part of such an elite organization and they understood that the group was making “a sizable contribution toward the advance of American armies through France.” The Army Air Force at that time had an active public relations office throughout the ETO, and it was not difficult to spread the reputation of a successful group such as the 362d. Some pilots who did not have frequent personal contact with the group commander felt that the group was a “remote” entity, but the majority of pilots identified with the reputation of the group regardless of how often they interacted with the commander.

There were, in fact, two larger (secondary) groups that generated esprit among the pilots: the 362d FG and the U.S. Third Army. To say that esprit carried the men into battle is going too far, but their morale was certainly bolstered after each unit success story. The conscious steps taken by the group public affairs office to document and publicize particularly dangerous or successful missions helped to unify the pilots above the squadron level. For instance, the group published a periodic newsletter in order to spread the positive message of the unit’s accomplishments. Successes ran one after the other and provided a seemingly constant source of strength and mission identity during the summer of 1944. Many pilots felt that the 362d FG was a premier (if not the premier) fighter-bomber unit in Ninth AF. The simple satisfaction of destroying thousands of targets each month contributed to this feeling, but two specific missions stood out as the most publicized. The first was a group mission to Brest on 25 August on which they

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189 O’Dell, questionnaire, April 2000.
successfully attacked multiple naval vessels in the harbor and sank a German light cruiser. The second mission was on 20 October when the 378th FS and 379th FS bombed the dam on the River Seille, at Dieuze. The successful results of these missions were broadcast on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio and also made several British and American newspapers.

The army was no less inspirational for the pilots. Ground attack missions were difficult and costly for the 362d in terms of pilots and aircraft, yet the connection that the pilots felt to the soldiers in the field was vivid. Third Army and XIX TAC kept the 362d updated on the results of their missions, and the positive feedback certainly helped build this identity with the ground forces. “We were Patton’s right flank!” was a common rallying theme. The speed at which Patton advanced convinced the pilots that they were helping to win the war. The pride that these men felt was certainly justified. On several occasions, XIX TAC or Third Army would specifically call on the 362d to perform a difficult mission. The destruction of the dam at Dieuze was one such occasion.

Joe Laughlin’s Influence on Morale

Joe Laughlin may have only assumed command of the 362d FG on 10 August, but his presence in the group was felt much earlier. Laughlin was the 379th FS commander when the group arrived in the ETO and moved up to become the Deputy Group Commander (or Flying Executive Officer) in April. In addition to being very familiar with the men of the 379th FS, he got to know many of the men in the 377th FS and 378th FS when he began flying with those units from April onwards. Laughlin was described by his men as a fair, even-tempered, personable leader who was an exceptionally talented pilot. Even though Joe Laughlin scored the first aerial victory for the group against a

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193 Ibid., 4.
194 Baloga, questionnaire, 12 April 2000. See also, Ashford, questionnaire, 21 April 2000.
195 Searl, interview by author, 29 March 2000.
196 Every questionnaire, letter, or interview received by the author reinforced this assessment. These sentiments were expressed most strongly by the original pilots of the group who had also served under the previous group commander. The newer pilots who arrived after Colonel Magoffin was shot down agreed
Me-109 in February, it was his skill in bombing and strafing that most impressed his men.\footnote{197}

The group pilots generally felt that their morale during the spring and early summer of 1944 was at least “good” under the leadership of the first group commander, Colonel Magoffin.\footnote{198} However, most pilots agreed that after Laughlin assumed command in August, morale became even better. The increase in morale was attributed to the men identifying more closely with Laughlin than they had with Magoffin. Laughlin got to know the men on a personal level and made them feel that he was looking out for them.\footnote{199} Of course, Laughlin could not know all the men equally well, but the pervasive attitude among the pilots was that he tried. Other than being well respected as the group commander, Laughlin took specific actions that subsequently raised pilot morale in several key areas.

Most pilots felt that Laughlin provided all the logistical necessities possible, but one item stands out. When the group moved near Reims, the pilots believed it was Joe Laughlin’s personal intervention that allowed all of the group pilots to live in the comfortable chateau. Even 56 years later, the pilots remember those accommodations as the best they had during the war. Some referred to it as, “the Park Avenue of all quarters.”\footnote{200} The rest and leave policy that the group enjoyed throughout the later part of 1944 was also attributed to Laughlin’s actions. He somehow managed to obtain a worn-out B-26 bomber and a C-47 cargo plane that became part of the group. These aircraft were modified for troop transport and were flown by group pilots to drop off and pick up men from the 362d FG who traveled to London and Paris on short leaves.

Laughlin also was connected to some of the confidence-building actions that kept pilot morale high. In the area of confidence in their aircraft, group pilots felt that their aircraft were more combat capable than others in the XIX TAC. After Laughlin took over the group, the P-47Ds in the 362d FG received some modifications: a bubble canopy improved visibility and increased survivability during a bailout, and an upgraded

\textbf{Notes}

that Laughlin was a very likable commander although some of them did not have much personal experience with him at the time. See, O’Dell, questionnaire, April 2000.
\footnote{197} Searl, interview by author, 29 March 2000.
\footnote{198} Some did rate morale as “fair” during this time, but indicated a sharp improvement after August. See, Hill, questionnaire, 23 April 2000.
\footnote{199} See McKee, questionnaire, 20 March 2000; Barensfeld, questionnaire, 31 March 2000.
propeller, referred to as a “paddle prop,” made the P-47 a much more stable dive-bombing platform.\(^{201}\) The pilots credited Laughlin with the early conversion of the group’s airplanes, although the modifications were initiated above the group level.\(^{202}\) In addition to the physical improvements to the aircraft in the group, Laughlin presided over the evolution in combat tactics. He was one of the initial pilots who traveled to Italy and flew ground support missions in 12\(^{th}\) AF in the winter and spring of 1944. He shared those lessons learned with the group upon his return; thereafter, he was recognized as one of the most competent ground attack pilots in the group. When he took command of the 362d in August, his leadership style encouraged the necessary progression of tactical development among each of the squadrons. During this time, tactical innovation was the result of each pilot gaining experience and possessing the freedom to make appropriate changes.

None of the pilots could recall any influence that Laughlin had on the individual cohesion in the squadrons, but his actions were more evident in building group esprit de corps. Laughlin personally participated in the two most publicized group success stories. On the day of the Brest harbor attack, Laughlin flew two separate missions with the 378\(^{th}\) FS and the 377\(^{th}\) FS and scored two hits on the German light cruiser.\(^{203}\) He was ultimately given credit for sinking it. On the second of the highly publicized missions, Laughlin planned and led the attack on the dam at Dieuze.\(^{204}\) While it was unclear whether his 1000-pound bomb caused the break in the sluice gate that successfully drained the dam, the unit history indicates that his bomb was delivered closest to the desired impact point. Each of these missions helped to build the strong reputation that the 362d FG enjoyed from June through October.

Laughlin also was the focal point for connecting the group with the Third Army. He made sure that operational updates and army commendations were continually passed to the pilots; this, in turn, helped those pilots to understand their part in the greater operation. In sum, Laughlin’s credentials as a great bomber and his focus on supporting the army demonstrated to his men what was important to winning the war. Whether this

Notes

200 Hill, questionnaire, 23 April 2000.
201 Laughlin, interview by author, 8 June 2000.
202 Ibid.
203 “362\(^{nd}\) Fighter Group Unit History, 1 August 1944 – 31 August 1944,” 5.
leadership style was Joe Laughlin’s key influence on pilot morale, they at least appreciated it as a contributing factor.

Conclusions

The fighting spirit of the pilots of the 362d Fighter Group was largely the result of their superior individual commitment to the war effort and their mission. Their confidence in success was the primary reason that morale remained high. When Joe Laughlin took command in August, pilot morale improved for a number of reasons. First, the pilots began to clearly see that the end of the war was in sight as soon as Patton’s army gained momentum. Second, the men felt that the new commander cared at least as much about them as he did the mission. Finally, but most importantly, the pilots were satisfied that the tactics they were using were appropriate. They were effectively destroying the enemy and they felt they were winning the war. Losses in this context were acceptable.

Laughlin’s influence on the level of pilot morale can be narrowed down to one area: he established an atmosphere that encouraged tactical excellence. His individual accomplishments contributed to that atmosphere, but he also nurtured his pilots to create their own success. The residual perception, in the minds of the pilots, was that they were masters of their domain; they credit Laughlin’s leadership for making the difference. Laughlin modestly said that he “just did what came naturally, and was lucky if it came out right.” In actuality, Laughlin allowed his pilots to assume as much control over their own success as possible: the result was a very motivated group of pilots.

Notes

204 “362nd Fighter Group Unit History, 1 October 1944 – 31 October 1944,” 4.
205 Searl, interview by author, 29 Mar 2000.
206 Joseph L. Laughlin, correspondence with the author, 15 March 2000, e-mail, Montgomery, Alabama.
Chapter 5

Colonel James R. McCarthy: 43rd Strategic Wing

The degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side. These demands, so far as they are known, would show what efforts each must make; but they seldom are fully known—which may be one reason why both sides do not exert themselves to the same degree.

Carl von Clausewitz

Introduction

In December 1972, U.S. bombers and tactical aircraft launched a brief, but massive, air campaign throughout North Vietnam, with special emphasis on targets in the key cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. The operation, known as LINEBACKER II, was the last major attempt to compel the North Vietnamese government to reach terms of a peace settlement with the governments of the United States and South Vietnam. After eight years of American air operations in Southeast Asia (SEA), the eleven days of intense bombing during LINEBACKER II finally signaled the end of the war for America.

Until recently, the tendency has been to generalize the various U.S. airpower missions in Vietnam as inappropriate for combating the type of war waged by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. LINEBACKER II, however, was a unique application of airpower in Vietnam. The strategic, operational, and tactical considerations of using B-52s in a series of sustained and overwhelming attacks against the North Vietnamese heartland changed the scope of the war overnight. This section explores the implications of that change on the morale of B-52 aircrew in the 43rd Strategic Wing (SW), flying

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those missions from Andersen AFB, Guam. Colonel James R. McCarthy assumed command of the wing on 1 December 1972, just in time for LINEBACKER II to begin. Faced with an awesome responsibility, and paradoxically limited authority, Colonel McCarthy led his wing to success in spite of severe challenges.

**The End of the Vietnam War: U.S. Withdrawal**

After President Richard Nixon became president in January 1969, he began fulfilling his campaign promise of reducing the American presence in South Vietnam with an eye toward gradual withdrawal from the war. The concept known as ‘Vietnamization’ was begun in an effort to reduce U.S. troops in the South and replace them with trained South Vietnamese soldiers who could combat the North Vietnamese on their own. Complementing this strategy were efforts to negotiate a peace settlement that would provide the U.S. “peace with honor.”208 As American soldiers began redeploying home, American airpower became an increasingly important part of the remaining military force available to the president. In April 1972, with only 69,000 Americans remaining in South Vietnam, North Vietnam launched a full-scale conventional invasion across the Demilitarized Zone. The American response to the ‘Easter Offensive’ was to commit USAF and USN aircraft in an interdiction and close air support campaign designed to isolate the North Vietnamese and provide relief to the South Vietnamese Army, which was losing the defensive battle.

Several months of American bombing turned the tide for South Vietnam. Interdiction and close air support missions weakened the striking power of the North’s attack and brought them back to the negotiation table. By the end of the summer, the South had regrouped and re-captured much of the territory that was lost in April. On 22 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed a cessation of bombing north of 20 degrees latitude in North Vietnam and an apparent peace deal was at hand.209 As happened on numerous other occasions, the North used this respite to reconstitute its forces; and by 6 November, enemy supplies were again flowing south to re-equip the

**Notes**

208 Ibid., 148. Nixon proposed a peace settlement that would see the removal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam, a prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange, and a cease fire throughout Vietnam.

Peace talks began to deteriorate through November; and on 13 December, the North Vietnamese negotiators once again walked out of the peace conference in Paris. This time President Nixon’s reaction was swift and overwhelming. On 15 December, under direction from the president, the JCS ordered CINCPAC (Commander in Chief of Pacific Command) and CINCSAC (Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command, SAC) to “prepare a 3-day maximum effort by B-52s and TACAIR against essential military and war supporting targets in the heavily defended Hanoi and Haiphong areas.” The bombing campaign would ultimately last through December and become Operation LINEBACKER II. Its objective was to weaken the will of the North Vietnamese leadership and force them back to the negotiating table.

**SAC Operations in SEA**

The B-52 is well remembered for its successful strategic bombing missions during LINEBACKER II; however, SAC had been flying B-52s for years in interdiction and close air support roles in South Vietnam. The 43rd SW and 72nd SW(Provisional) on Guam and the 307th SW at U-Tapao, Thailand at one time held over half of the United States’ B-52 force. Together, these assets complimented 7th Air Force tactical fighters, bombers, and support aircraft and the Pacific Fleet’s naval aviation assets in ongoing operations in South Vietnam and the surrounding border areas. From 1968-1971, SAC bombers supported ground forces by interdicting enemy troops and supplies that were flowing into South Vietnam. As one of the theater’s only all-weather attack platforms, B-52s, with their six-man crews, could operate in conditions of heavy cloud cover, day or night. Capitalizing on these capabilities, and the large bomb load of the airplane, the commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) relied upon SAC to plan B-52 operations on a daily basis.

The 307th SW at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Air Field in Thailand and the 43rd SW

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**Notes**

210 Ibid., 14.
212 “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 19.
213 The crew consisted of an aircraft commander (pilot), a co-pilot, a radar navigator (bombardier), a navigator, an electronic warfare officer, and a tail gunner. All were officers except the enlisted gunner.
at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, consisted of the older B-52D aircraft. The “D” model was not equipped with power assisted flight controls, and when fully loaded, was a challenge for its pilots to fly.\textsuperscript{214} The D model did possess two strong assets in the conventional combat role. First, its electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment used to degrade the effectiveness of enemy radar guided surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) was the most sophisticated in the SAC inventory. Second, the D model could carry up to 108 five-hundred pound general purpose bombs.\textsuperscript{215} In addition, the B-52Ds assigned at U-Tapao could reach their targets in and around Vietnam in only two hours instead of the six-to-seven hours required for the Guam based aircraft. The 72\textsuperscript{nd} SW(P) stationed at Andersen AFB, Guam, had B-52G aircraft. The “G” model was newer than the D model, was easier to fly, and had more fuel-efficient engines. It had, however, two significant drawbacks. First, its ECM suite had not received the same upgraded jamming transmitters as the D models had.\textsuperscript{216} Only half of the G models that would be assigned to the 72\textsuperscript{nd} would eventually have the more powerful ECM equipment. Second, the G model was not modified to carry as many conventional bombs as the D model. The G could carry only 27 seven-hundred-and-fifty-pound general purpose bombs.\textsuperscript{217}

The chain of command for the B-52 wings operating in SEA was an unusual arrangement in an unusual war. B-52s were considered national assets because of their primacy in SAC’s nuclear deterrent role. Therefore, SAC headquarters did not want to lose control of these aircraft in a war that had seen its share of aircraft attrition over the years. Breaking a central tenet of American airpower employment, (centralized control/decentralized execution), CINCSAC retained operational and tactical control of the B-52s fighting the war in Vietnam. The chain of command thus went from the National Command Authority, to the JCS, to CINCSAC, to 8\textsuperscript{th} Air Force, to the Air Divisions (57\textsuperscript{th} AD at Andersen, and 17\textsuperscript{th} AD at U-Tapao), to the operational wings. The normal combat link to the commander of Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and the USAF.

Notes
\textsuperscript{216} “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 60.
command in theater (PACAF) was missing.

Perhaps the greatest organizational difference between SAC units and the tactical air units of 7th AF was the policy concerning aircrew rotation and the definition of a combat tour. In 7th AF, the fighter pilots, weapon systems officers, and electronic warfare officers arrived in the theater for a permanent change of station (PCS) assignment. Generally, the length of the tour was one year for these aviators at which time they would receive credit for a “remote” combat assignment. After that year was up, crews were rotated back to stateside units for normal assignments.

SAC aircrew had a mixed bag of assignment classifications in SEA. Only a few crews were rotated to Guam and U-Tapao for PCS assignments. Most arrived at these locations on temporary duty (TDY) orders that stated the length of the TDY was not to exceed 179 days. While this was a shorter tour than their fighter counterparts, these SAC crews were at a distinct disadvantage. For one thing, TDY SAC crews could not receive credit for a remote assignment. The minimum number of days in theater needed to receive remote credit was 180 days. This meant that SAC crews returning to the States after a TDY were just as likely to be ordered back to SEA as someone who had never gone in the first place. Although most SAC crews did not stay in SEA for the full 179 days, the general cycle became 120 days in theater, followed by one month back in the U.S., followed by a return to SEA for another 120 days and so on. The specialized core of D model crews were hardest hit by this policy because they had no opportunity to “train out of” the D model and into a stateside “H” model. By the spring of 1973, some SAC crews had spent over a thousand days TDY in the SEA theater.

ARC LIGHT and BULLET SHOT

ARC LIGHT was the generic name given in 1965 to B-52 bombing missions that attacked enemy forces in South Vietnam. B-52s and their crews were “fragged” for

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217 Ibid., 90.
219 B-52s Over Hanoi, 13.
ARC LIGHT sorties routinely until the war ended in August, 1973. Some ARC LIGHT missions actually crossed into the southern portion of North Vietnam, but the main characteristic of ARC LIGHT missions was that they were expected to be low risk to the aircrew. Because they usually were low risk, these missions were low payoff. In other words, the significance of mission success was rarely apparent to the crews. Aircrew sarcastically asserted that the real objectives of these missions were to “bomb monkeys” and “make toothpicks”; however, the official objectives invariably directed crews to “bomb suspected truck parks” or “disrupt suspected troop concentrations.”

BULLET SHOT was the name given to the systematic increase of B-52s deployed to SEA during 1972 and 1973. The U.S. observed that in early 1972 the North had stepped up its infiltration of troops into South Vietnam, and the NCA responded by increasing the number of heavy bombers sent to Thailand and Guam. In February, the first additional B-52 arrived in theater; and by December, both bases were saturated with bombers and crews. 200 B-52s and 348 crews were split between the two bases, with Andersen AFB carrying the majority of both. Andersen was originally built to support three thousand personnel, but it swelled to over ten thousand.

LINEBACKER I

Seeking a preemptive blow against the growing strength of the South Vietnamese Army, North Vietnam launched an armored invasion into South Vietnam on 30 March 1972. For the first time in the long war, North Vietnam fought an American-style battle designed to achieve a decisive victory. While initially catching the defending South Vietnamese Army off guard, the North’s strategy proved vulnerable to U.S. airpower. Interdiction and close air support missions by tactical aircraft and B-52s successfully blunted the offensive and gave the South time to launch a counteroffensive.

Initially called Operation FREEDOM TRAIN, the American air attacks into North Vietnam became known by its more familiar name, LINEBACKER I.

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220 In this context, the term “fragged” refers to the daily mission order that outlined each unit’s required combat role for the day. Typically each combat wing did not see the overall mission flow for all assets in the theater—they merely were issued a ‘fragment’ of the complete order containing their aircraft tasking.

221 B-52s Over Hanoi, 13.

222 Ibid., 15. Figures given by the 8th AF commander, General Johnson. Andersen AFB had 155 B-52s by December, 1972 with the remaining 50 aircraft at U-Tapao.
LINEBACKER targeting emphasized interdiction of enemy rail, roads, and war materiel from as far north as the Chinese buffer zone throughout the length of the country. The combination of severing bridges, rail lines, and major roads took time, but eventually U.S. interdiction efforts slowed the resupply of enemy troops on the front. The mining of North Vietnamese harbors and attacks on power supply and petroleum storage targets added to the physical effects of the campaign. By the middle of September, the North was ready to resume negotiations and South Vietnam appeared in a position to defend itself once again.

In the renewed period of peace talks, American aircraft ceased bombing north of 20 degrees latitude, but ARC LIGHT and LINEBACKER I missions still continued through the fall. During this time, SAC aircrew assumed a higher risk posture when headquarters designated certain sorties into North Vietnam as “Press On” missions. This meant that aircrew could not abort these missions for reasons of hostile action or aircraft malfunction. It was in this context that the first B-52 was lost to enemy action on 22 November 1972 to a SAM. The enemy may have been weakened, but was clearly not beaten. The success of LINEBACKER I was in doubt when North Vietnamese negotiators walked out of talks in Paris on 13 December.

**LINEBACKER II**

President Nixon once again used airpower to bring the North Vietnamese back to the peace talks when he launched LINEBACKER II on 18 December 1972. For the next 12 days, B-52s and other fighter-bombers relentlessly attacked North Vietnam. The two main differences between previous operations and those conducted during LINEBACKER II were the intensity and the location of the attacks. The intensity was unique because B-52s became the central weapons platform. Up to 120 B-52s were launched in daily attack packages. Dozens of air-to-air F-4s, fighter-bombers, and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) assets were also tied into this packaging concept.

The location of most of LINEBACKER II targets was in and around the two

**Notes**

223 Eschmann, 11.
224 “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 15.
225 A one-day stand down was granted for Christmas day, so the total number of ‘bombing days’ was 11.
largest cities in North Vietnam: Hanoi and Haiphong. These two cities had enjoyed a relative sanctuary from the war up to this point, but President Nixon wanted to intensify the psychological effect of massive bomber strikes in his new campaign.\textsuperscript{226} The types of targets selected were not significantly different from those struck during LINEBACKER I. However, by bringing the war home to North Vietnam in its heartland, the President wanted to achieve strategic effects rather than the operational effect interdiction normally produced.

The outcome of the LINEBACKER II bombing missions was largely successful for the limited objectives that the President sought. Ultimately, this series of attacks had the goal of forcing the North Vietnamese back to the peace conference. Underpinning such a return was the prerequisite that the enemy’s will to continue fighting must be weakened and that a quick settlement in Paris was essential. The bombings accomplished just that. The agreement reached in January 1973 substantially met the American offer of October 1972 and peace finally was “at hand.”

\textbf{43rd Strategic Wing Operations in Linebacker II}

B-52 crews from the two squadrons of the 43rd SW (the 60th Bomb Squadron, and the 63rd Bomb Squadron (P)) struck a variety of targets during LINEBACKER II. These included military storage areas, rail yards, warehousing compounds, railroad repair facilities, power plants, SAM sites, and SAM support facilities in Hanoi and Haiphong. In the brief bombing operations, North Vietnam launched every SA-2 SAM and AAA piece they could fire at the B-52s. One estimate put North Vietnamese SAM launches at 884.\textsuperscript{227} How many were actually launched at 43rd SW aircrew will never be known, but every B-52 lost in LINEBACKER II was due to successful enemy SAM attacks.

Of the three B-52 wings in SEA, the 43rd Strategic Wing suffered the least number of aircraft losses during the LINEBACKER II operation. The three wings flew a total of 729 sorties in the campaign, and 15 aircraft were shot down as the result of enemy SAM launches. The 2 percent loss rate was less than the original SAC

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\textsuperscript{226} Targets in Haiphong were struck in April 1972 by B-52s but only very briefly. The target set was petroleum storage and the intent was to destroy it before it could reach the front.

\textsuperscript{227} “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 315. This figure was based on Air Force Special Communications Center signals intelligence collected during the operation.
headquarters estimates given prior to the beginning of LINEBACKER II.\textsuperscript{228} Even so, with the relative absence of combat losses prior to December, B-52 crews viewed the sudden spike in attrition with alarm. The greatest number of losses occurred in the first three days of bombing when missions repeated the same ingress/egress routings and attack times for each wave of B-52s.\textsuperscript{229}

Compounding the redundant mission planning flaws, the weakness in the G model ECM capabilities became obvious to all who noticed that 66 percent of the losses in the first three days had been G models. SAC directed both Andersen wings to cease LINEBACKER II missions on 21 and 22 December while an evaluation of the losses was made. An impromptu tactics review conference was held by 43\textsuperscript{rd} SW and 72\textsuperscript{nd} SW(P) aircrew and recommendations were forwarded to SAC for approval and testing. Although the 43\textsuperscript{rd} SW flew missions again on 23 December, it was not until 26 December that a complete integration of new tactics was introduced when all three wings once again flew LINEBACKER II missions.

The single mission on 26 December was historic. 33 B-52Ds from Andersen took part in a total package of 120 B-52s launched from the two bases. This massive formation of aircraft overwhelmed the North Vietnamese defenders by striking targets in Hanoi and Haiphong within a single 15 minute window, from multiple attack headings.\textsuperscript{230} Two B-52s were lost on the attack, but neither was from the 43\textsuperscript{rd} SW. In the final three days of LINEBACKER II operations the 43\textsuperscript{rd} SW lost only one additional aircraft. These later B-52 attacks were met by ineffective SAM resistance; and, ironically, American air superiority was achieved just as the NCA terminated the bombing campaign.

Table 3 presents the overall mission summary for the 43\textsuperscript{rd} SW during the 11 days of bombing. Four factors restricted the 43\textsuperscript{rd} SW from launching more sorties that its sister wings. First, the 43\textsuperscript{rd} only had 53 aircraft (and 52 crews) compared to 99 G models (and 149 crews) in the 72\textsuperscript{nd} SW(P).\textsuperscript{231} Second, the average 12 hour mission duration for

Notes
\textsuperscript{228} James R. McCarthy, questionnaire reply to author, 4 April 2000. See also “Linebacker II: A View from the Rock,” 7-6. The predicted loss rate due to enemy defenses was between three and five percent. Colonel McCarthy’s own personal opinion was that losses might be as high as 10 percent. Other unnamed senior officers thought the loss rate could reach 15 to 20 percent during LINEBACKER II.
\textsuperscript{229} “Chronology of SAC Participation in LINEBACKER II,” 69-135. 9 B-52s were lost by the third day: three aircraft on 18 December, and six aircraft on 20 December.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 222.
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., 29.
43rd crews meant that they could not generate as many daily sorties as their contemporaries at U-Tapao. Third, the 43rd SW had to ‘stand-down’ for three days of LINEBACKER II missions at the direction of SAC. Finally, on 23 December, the 43rd SW was ordered to transfer 22 B-52D crews to U-Tapao to replace losses and provide some relief to the overworked crews of the 307th SW.

### Table 3. 43rd Strategic Wing Sortie Summary during LINEBACKER II: 18 – 29 December 1972

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<tr>
<th>December:</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
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<tr>
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The combined level of effort was 170 sorties for the 43rd SW, 219 sorties for the 72nd SW(P), and 340 sorties for the 307th SW. The 43rd SW sustained a 1.2 percent loss rate compared to 2.7 percent for the 72nd SW(P), and 2.1 percent for the 307th SW. Overall, the 43rd SW successfully attacked a variety of military targets in and around North Vietnam’s two major cities and contributed to the success that LINEBACKER II achieved. The wing was no more influential than the other two B-52 wings participating in these attacks, but each wing faced its own difficulties sustaining combat effectiveness. Wing leaders struggled to balance the management of such large organizations against the human elements of aircrew morale. Morale was certainly a complex factor in the combat success of the 43rd.

### Aircrew Morale within the 43rd Strategic Wing

There are many myths surrounding the morale of the bomber crews on Guam during LINEBACKER II. Stories of mutinies against leadership, raucous behavior at the Officer’s Club, and crews refusing to fly combat missions have been significantly

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232 Ibid., 59-313.
Perhaps the rowdy behavior at the O’Club was more fact than fiction; however, lack of communication in the wings was the biggest contributor to misreading actual events. The two wings at Andersen were too large to be effectively led using the standard Air Force wing/squadron template. In reality, the crews at Andersen were professional airmen and carried out the orders given to them, just as they had time and again on previous missions. DNIF (duty not involving flying) rates, measured by airmen reporting to the hospital, rose from an average of 35 per day before 18 December to 65 per day during LINEBACKER II. With more than twelve hundred crewmembers at Andersen, the DNIF rate did not affect combat capability, and was not alarmingly high considering the shift to high tempo operations. Regarding outright refusals to fly, only one B-52 crewmember, a pilot at U-Tapao, was relieved of flying duties for disobeying a direct order to fly combat. This author could find no information of how many aircrew were classified as ‘conscientious objectors’ at Andersen during the time although some 43rd SW aircrew pointed out that those cases did exist. Evaluating morale in the 43rd SW during this time is therefore no simple task.

Aircrew morale in the 43rd SW during LINEBACKER II must be evaluated in context before evaluating the various influences present. The 43rd SW was not an ordinary combat unit fighting an ordinary war. The best way to understand the wing’s character is to realize that it was a huge TDY organization with members “on loan” from multiple units back in the States. Only a few staff personnel were permanently assigned. For the rest, the novelty of being TDY had worn off long ago.

By 15 December 1972, BULLET SHOT had inflated the 43rd SW to the size of more than three normal stateside B-52 wings. Approximately 325 individual crewmembers were assigned to the wing, although it is difficult to ascertain the specific number of crews assigned at any one time because it continually changed. New crews arrived daily, while others transferred to U-Tapao, and still others deployed back to the

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235 Ibid., 837.

236 Jack C. Hawley, questionnaire reply to author, 28 April 2000. See also William F. Stocker, interview by author, 16 April 2000, telephone, Montgomery, Alabama.
U.S. in unpredictable patterns. Both of the other B-52 wings experienced this same SAC personnel policy that undermined unit cohesion and esprit de corps. Each crew became somewhat of an island unto itself throughout the turmoil of rapid re-assignment. Many aircrew did not know the name of their TDY squadron commander or wing commander and would not have recognized either of them in a crowd.

The pattern of previous bombing operations also shaped the morale for B-52 crews as they began the LINEBACKER II campaign. Most aircrew felt that their participation in ARC LIGHT missions during the fall of 1972 was meaningless. One aircraft commander described those missions as “practice bleeding” because the crews had grown weary of bombing insignificant targets under heavy political restrictions. This attitude was not confined to the 43rd SW. A co-pilot in the 72nd SW(P) also “felt [they] weren’t getting much accomplished.”

The general consensus of aircrew morale prior to LINEBACKER II was that it was quite low in the 43rd SW. Boredom and lack of motivation were common, especially among the crews that had been on several other SEA TDYs in recent months. Even official correspondence between the 57th Air Division and 8th Air Force recognized that “in many cases among [the] crews, enthusiasm has diminished.” When LINEBACKER II began, morale improved immediately for most wing aircrew.

The initial aircrew response to being told that B-52s were finally going to hit targets in Hanoi and Haiphong was a mixture of apprehension and approval. Captain Gerald T. Horiuchi summed up the overwhelming sentiment of aircrew in the 43rd SW when he said the attacks were, “long overdue and something that needed to be done. Go in, kick ass, and get it over with. The guys were anxious, nervous, even scared, but morale, I think, was generally high.” After three days of LINEBACKER II bombing, morale fell sharply due to heavy losses; but crews were still motivated to fly, even if SAC headquarters was not. The historic 26 December mission brought about with a rise in

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237 Hawley, questionnaire, 28 April 2000.
238 Ed Wildeboor, questionnaire reply to the author, 26 April 2000.
240 Gerald T. Horiuchi, questionnaire reply to author, 24 April 2000. For a similar appreciation also see, James M. Short, questionnaire reply to author, 12 May 2000.
morale that buoyed aircrew spirits through the end of the campaign.

Since the rise and fall of morale over the brief period of LINEBACKER II was noticeable, evaluating the trend in morale may be as instructive as attempts to measure the subjective level of fighting spirit at any one time. The three elements of aircrew morale that follow will consider both of these aspects.

**Individual Needs**

The physical needs of food, clothing, and shelter did not detract from overall aircrew morale within the 43rd SW. Although overcrowding was a problem, the aircrew had air conditioned quarters which most other personnel at Andersen, living in tents or “tin city,” would have been happy to have. The issue of rest affected aircrew in various ways. Some crews flew only one LINEBACKER II mission while others flew four or five. In addition to LINEBACKER II sorties, the 43rd SW was concurrently tasked to fly ARC LIGHT missions in South Vietnam. On flying days, the crew’s average duty day was 24 to 26 hours long. They immediately went into crew-rest after completing their debriefing, and most crews had at least one day off between missions. A routine developed in which aircrew would fly, land, drink, and sleep in what seemed a constant cycle. One of the recommendations that aircrew made after LINEBACKER II was to establish “crew rotation and R/R [rest and recreation] on a scheduled basis [in order to] maintain crew morale.” Rest did not impair the morale of the aircrew, but it was a growing concern. Equipment and training had slightly more influence on aircrew morale.

One of the planning assumptions made by SAC in the initial planning stages for LINEBACKER II was that no increases in spare aircraft or additional equipment would be needed. Although that assumption was based on a three-day maximum effort, by 21 December SAC began flying in replacement aircraft and crews to offset the losses. Some aircrew were concerned that LINEBACKER II could not continue at the loss rate of the

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241 Hawley, questionnaire, 28 April 2000.
first three days and felt that losses at the time were high. SAC replacement efforts brought 10 additional B-52Ds to Andersen and U-Tapao by 25 December. When considering the much lower loss rate after 22 December, aircrew concerns did in fact subside as the bombing campaign continued.

Training was a morale issue for all members of the wing. Some crews were barely proficient at flying the D model. Although the wing flew the older B-52Ds, the home units of some TDY crews flew G or H models. To prepare them for their assignment to the 43rd SW, those aircrew attended a two week “upgrade” training program before arriving in-theater in order to be qualified to fly the D. From a morale standpoint, these crews had a difficult time fitting in. After LINEBACKER II, a SAC staff visit to SEA found that,

“G” crews locked into the “D” package have major attitude problems. They generally feel like orphans both at home and while TDY. They are also concerned about the problems of upgrading.

There were no aircrew comments made concerning this problem during LINEBACKER II; however, this attitude was likely to have existed before, during, and after the December bombing missions. The equitable opportunity for training is a valid concern for aircrew morale, as is the concept of ‘training like you intend to fight.’

Normal training given to B-52 crews in the U.S. prepared them for the nuclear attack role. That training focused on single-ship, low altitude penetration of Soviet Union air defenses with a particular emphasis on avoiding early warning and SAM radar detection. When B-52 crews arrived in SEA the tactics directed from SAC did not mirror what crews had trained for. Instead, the tactics called for high altitude bombing by B-52s in three-ship “cells.” SAC assessed the low altitude AAA threat to be much higher than North Vietnamese SAMs and also believed that the mutual ECM coverage of three B-52s would mitigate the SAM threat. The abandonment of previous training directly affected aircrew confidence in the tactics ordered from headquarters and severely lowered

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244 Bill Beavers, questionnaire reply to author, 25 April 2000. Also, Roger A. Klingbeil, questionnaire reply to author, 27 April 2000.
245 “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 154.
246 SAC/DOTN and SAC/DOXTB, “Operations Staff Visit with B-52 Aircrew Members TDY to SEAsia,” n.d., photocopied memorandum to Major General Allen provided to author by William F. Stocker. In addition to leading several LINEBACKER II missions, Major Stocker traveled to SEA from 25 June – 13 July 1973 to update aircrew on future SAC presence in the area.
The two psychological needs of 43rd SW aircrew (confidence in tactics, and confidence in equipment) were inseparably linked. B-52 crews did not specifically address their confidence in the aircraft itself, but rather in the combination of the bomber and the tactics. 43rd SW crew confidence in tactics was low after the first three nights of LINEBACKER II. Two tactical errors were repeated on each of the first three nights: First, wave after wave of B-52s attacked the same targets, from high altitude, along similar ground tracks. This predictability gave the North Vietnamese defenders a much higher probability of damaging the B-52s in formation. Second, each B-52 was required to execute a 45-degree bank turn to reverse course immediately after weapons release. This turn not only reduced B-52 ECM transmitter antenna coverage against the SAMS, but also turned the B-52s into 100 knot headwinds that kept the aircraft within range of the SAM operators for longer periods. Aircrew attributed low morale to these faulty tactics.

The difficulty with rectifying the tactical problems was not a lack of imagination, but rather, the inherent delay caused by SAC planners locking-out changes to the daily missions 42 hours before they were executed. As a rule, the further removed (in distance and hierarchy) the tactical decision-makers are from the crews flying the missions, the less flexibility there will be in the planning process. In this case, 43rd SW aircrew morale suffered due to poor tactics and their physical loss of control with regard to improving the situation. During the stand-down of 21 December, aircrew did recommend changes to tactics that SAC accepted and incorporated as quickly as they could.

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247 John S. Sherman, questionnaire reply to author, 9 May 2000. Although Captain Sherman flew with the 72nd SW(P), his opinion of SAC training is relevant. He stated, “I believed that the on-the-shelf plans (that we trained for) should have been employed vs. [sic] the high altitude bombing (that we hadn’t been trained to do).”

248 The ALT-28 transmitter antennas on the bottom of the B-52 are fixed and rotate their jamming patterns as the aircraft is maneuvered. The most predictable coverage possible is when the aircraft is straight and level.

249 Horiuchi, questionnaire, 24 April 2000. This opinion was shared by members of each of the three B-52 wings. For 307th SW, see, Dwight A. Moore, questionnaire reply to author, 26 April 2000. For 72nd SW(P), see, Wildeboor, questionnaire, 26 April 2000.

250 Harry Cordes to James R. McCarthy, n.d., USAF HRA file number K416.04-13, 77/05/12-78/01/04, V-12. Letter from General Cordes, SAC/DCS for Intelligence, explaining the decision making process at SAC during LINEBACKER II mission planning. To graphically depict the time consuming process, staff planners had to draw a 20 foot long time line to illustrate all the specific actions necessary to produce one day’s mission. See also, “Linebacker II: A View from the Rock,” 4-7.
could into future mission plans. Not surprisingly, these changes brought about a dramatic rise in morale throughout the end of LINEBACKER II. In fact, the new tactics may have done more to raise morale than any other factor. When the last LINEBACKER II mission briefing began on 29 December, the 43rd SW Commander could tell that morale was at an all time high,

As the crews filed into the briefing room, I could sense their rising level of confidence. We were closing in for the kill, and they knew it….I had crews who had just landed hours earlier from the previous night’s mission ask to be put in the line up [sic]…..One crew even went so far as to file an Inspector General complaint. Their argument was that they, being a less experienced crew, needed the mission for crew proficiency more than the old heads.251

Changing tactics directly led to fewer losses as LINEBACKER II came to a close. The perception of success balanced against bearable losses finally gave 43rd SW crews confidence that they could defeat the enemy.

Cohesion

The level at which 43rd SW aircrew most closely bonded with was that of their own six-man crew. With few exceptions, those bonds were formed well before LINEBACKER II began. Since crews always deployed from their home-station together, once in-theater they could focus on specific mission details, rather than having to work through new crew coordination techniques with unknown personalities.

The closeness of most crews is evident even today. Several of the 43rd SW aircrew who commented that they kept the same crew throughout LINEBACKER II also listed, by name and crew position, the other members of the crew. It is clear that they were a singular fighting instrument. The cohesion between crewmembers in the 43rd improved morale in at least two ways. First, there are examples of individual crew members that were DNIF just before LINEBACKER II who, upon notification that LINEBACKER II was about to begin, demanded that the flight surgeon restore them to flying status because they did not want their crew “going North” without them.252 Second, some crews were willing to fly aircraft with known malfunctions just so they could get their first mission over Hanoi. In those cases, the enthusiasm to fly was a

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251 “Linebacker II: A View from the Rock,” 6-36, 6-37.
conscious effort to battle the “war of nerves” felt by those waiting to participate. 253

Esprit de Corps

The ad hoc nature of the 43rd SW, with its two bomb squadrons, did not lend itself to provide a secondary group identity for the aircrew that flew within it. The aircrew merely were there TDY and did not view themselves as being part of any unit other than their home squadron or wing. As a matter of fact, when questioned about unit losses during LINEBACKER II, many aircrew reflected, not on losses from the 43rd SW, but on the losses of B-52s from their home units. 254

There are a few reasons why this secondary group identity may not have formed. First, the transient nature of the wing did not encourage new members to invest much effort to belong to it. Second, most aircrew did not interact with squadron and group leaders. Third, the wing had no visible history or reputation upon which to build. The net result was two-fold. Crews never broke the secondary bonds established with their permanent unit back home. Even more serious though, the crews viewed many of the officers in authority, outside their own crew, as detached and unsupportive. The absence of a secondary group left the crews isolated. It is difficult to determine if strong esprit de corps among the aircrew would have improved morale dramatically. What it may have offered was stability throughout the wing when losses began to rise and before new tactics improved morale.

James McCarthy’s Influence on Morale

Colonel James McCarthy became commander of the 43rd SW after holding several other command positions in SEA. He was a command pilot who had previously served two combat tours in Vietnam in 1965 and 1968 before returning in March 1972 to assist with the BULLET SHOT and ARC LIGHT operations at Andersen. Between

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252 Horiuchi, questionnaire, 24 April 2000.
253 Steve Kovich, questionnaire reply to author, 28 April 2000. His crew had been performing “manned spare” duty for the first few days of the campaign. The “bar talk” from crews returning from missions began to make them all a bit nervous. Kovich knew that his crew needed a combat mission under their belt to settle their nerves and so, once they were on the schedule, he elected to fly his B-52 even though it had lost an alternator on the ground.
254 Horiuchi, questionnaire, 24 April 2000, and Hawley, questionnaire, 28 April 2000. A poorly worded question by the author could also be responsible for this confusion.
March and December 1972, McCarthy moved three times in-theater to become the 310th SW Commander at U-Tapao, the 4104th Refueling Squadron Commander at Korat, and back to Guam to become the 43rd SW Vice Commander. While at U-Tapao, McCarthy’s KC-135 wing and the B-52 crews of the 307th SW participated in LINEBACKER I. This was his first exposure to employing B-52s in North Vietnam. His second was leading the 43rd SW in LINEBACKER II.

McCarthy took command of the 43rd SW not only when aircrew morale was low due to ARC LIGHT missions, but also at a time when the wing workload was extremely high because of the crowding that BULLET SHOT had created. The leadership challenge that Colonel McCarthy faced during LINEBACKER II consisted of several elements. As a wing commander, SAC held McCarthy personally responsible for the success or failure of his unit in the largest use of American bombers since World War II. However, his authority in the operation was not commensurate with that level of responsibility. SAC headquarters retained absolute control. The pressure that McCarthy felt was great indeed. During LINEBACKER II, he worked 20 hours each day in order to coordinate with 8th AF and SAC for the upcoming missions, while simultaneously tending to the time-constrained flight planning needs of the crews. The stress may have contributed to his poor health at the time. He contracted pneumonia in mid-December, and the condition worsened throughout LINEBACKER II.

McCarthy’s influences, both positive and negative, on aircrew morale during LINEBACKER II were indirect. Most crews considered the wing staff detached from daily combat operations and viewed the wing as an administrative tool used to coordinate combat power, not to employ it. McCarthy provided essential logistical support for the crews, but was not a combat crewmember himself. His major interaction with LINEBACKER crews was at the mission briefings, but even there it was a brief appearance. Working behind the scenes, however, McCarthy helped organize and support the single most important morale issue influencing aircrew—the change in combat tactics.

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256 Ibid., p 4, 9.
McCarthy’s previous exposure to fighter operations and LINEBACKER I bomber operations convinced him that the key to negating the North Vietnamese SAM threat was to keep B-52 cells (three plane formations) tightly together to maximize mutual ECM protection. When he learned at the first LINEBACKER II debrief that some crews were breaking formation to defend against SAM launches he issued an unpopular verbal order to his pilots, “Anyone who broke formation to dodge SAMs would be court-martialed.” He later followed this up with a written order that each aircraft commander had to sign. Although crews initially protested, they would later come to conclude that, “the integral cell of three mutually supporting aircraft is the best defense against existing threats,” and further that, “maneuvering up to the release [of bombs] places self protection above bombs on the target. This is not acceptable.” Keeping the B-52 cells together was in fact an effective tactic that contributed to the low loss rate of 43rd SW aircraft. Colonel McCarthy also supported other tactical changes.

On 21 December, during the SAC stand-down at Andersen, staffs from the 43rd SW and the 72nd SW spent the afternoon “talking to crews and asking for their ideas on how to improve tactics.” McCarthy also distributed a 3-section questionnaire to each of his crews on the 21st, the purpose of which was, “to get [aircrew’s] ideas on how to improve Compression type missions.” The recommendations from the crews included varying attack headings, decreasing the large turn after the target, varying bomber altitudes, and shortening the attack window. It is unclear where the genesis of the tactics changes originated; however, Colonel McCarthy supported these recommendations and, together with the 72nd SW(P) Commander, forwarded 43rd SW inputs to 8th AF and then

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257 Ibid., 5.
258 Ibid., 6.
260 “Briefing for General Johnson: How B-52 crews would plan an attack against the Hanoi/Haiphong complex were such attacks again necessary,” 21 Feb 73, USAF HRA file number K416.04-13, 72/12/01-73/04/25, V-13, p 5-7. Aircrew were tasked to draw up lessons learned from LINEBACKER II to present to the 8th AF Commander.
261 “Linebacker II: A View from the Rock,” 4-6. See also, B-52s Over Hanoi, 104-105.
Some of the changes were incorporated for the missions flown on 23 December, but all of the new tactics were used on the missions flown on 26 December. Although McCarthy did not have the authority on his own to change tactics of this significance, he did “go to bat” for his crews by arguing for these changes to SAC. The improved tactics raised morale as soon as the crews saw they were being used.

Even though morale climbed with the introduction of new tactics, crews did not attribute the changes to Colonel McCarthy’s actions. The perception of McCarthy’s influence on the life of the aircrew was skewed by poor communication throughout the wing. In general, three areas related to aircrew esprit de corps were damaged because of the 43rd SW command structure. First, the crews did not have access to Colonel McCarthy on a frequent basis because of the size and complexity of 43rd SW operations already discussed. Aside from specific administrative action, McCarthy’s greatest contact was with aircraft commanders. Second, Colonel McCarthy could not contribute to the reputation of his combat wing in the traditional sense—‘setting the example’ in battle by piloting an aircraft. Wing commanders in SAC at the time were not members of a combat crew. Third, even though McCarthy flew as the Airborne Mission Commander (ABC) on 19 December, and again on the massive attack on 26 December, he flew in the ‘seventh’ seat onboard; one normally occupied by an instructor pilot or evaluator on training missions. The ABC was not a novel duty in SAC, but for LINEBACKER II it was mandated to be filled by a ‘full colonel’ who was responsible

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263 The unit history of the 307th SW at U-Tapao states that Colonel Bill Brown, the Vice Wing Commander, initiated his own tactics conference on 20 December 1972 and submitted recommendations to 8th AF afterward. The 43rd SW tactics reviews occurred either simultaneously or shortly after 8th AF received the recommendations from U-Tapao. See, “History of 307th Strategic Wing, October – December 1972, Volume 1,” USAF HRA file number K-WG-307-HI, Oct – Dec 1972, V-1, p 51.

264 B-52s Over Hanoi, 128. The aircrew viewed the changes with relief during the briefing for 26 December.

265 Those few crewmembers that did have frequent contact with McCarthy recognized his positive involvement with regard to supporting the crews with tactics changes and providing beer for mission debriefs. See William F. Stocker, questionnaire, 11 May 2000. Also mentioned is the fact that McCarthy tried to meet as many aircrew returning from missions as possible, but that mission briefings provided the most common contact with the crews.

266 Robert A. Clement, “A Fourth of July in December: A B-52 Navigator’s Perspective of Linebacker II,” (research report, USAF Air Command and Staff College, 1984), 25. On 17 December, only pilots could attend the initial announcement briefing that LINEBACKER II was about to begin. See also “Linebacker II: A View from the Rock,” 5-5. Even small social engagements such as Christmas Eve dinner tended to include only aircraft commanders. Colonel McCarthy and SAC viewed the aircraft commander as a link in the chain of command.
for the success or failure of that mission. SAC, however, frowned on letting the wing commanders fill that role for security reasons. It reflects a high sense of mission dedication that Colonel McCarthy twice convinced the 8th AF Commander to allow him to fly these missions even though the flight surgeon strongly protested the decision based on his medical condition. Although McCarthy felt that a commander must share the dangers that he asked his men to endure, the crews looked at it differently. They viewed the ABC as an outsider who might interfere with mission accomplishment as much as contribute to its success. Rather than build a bond between the wing and its individual crews, the ABC role proved to be a source of friction and lowered morale.\textsuperscript{267}

### Conclusion

The efforts of the 43\textsuperscript{rd} SW contributed to the success of LINEBACKER II. The personnel who participated in the historic event can proudly claim that their actions helped lead to the release of the American POWs and to the subsequent end of the Vietnam War. The 43\textsuperscript{rd} SW history states that, “the Wing [did] not lose a mission due to low morale” during LINEBACKER II. In fact, morale was quite high. It is instructive then to look at what caused the noticeable lowering of morale after the third night’s missions. Losses alone might have contributed to this drop however an equal number of wing losses occurred after 26 December when morale remained high. The only difference between the beginning and the end of LINEBACKER II was that the aircrew believed they had more control of the environment because SAC planners had followed their tactical recommendations. Their confidence was high as a result.

Colonel McCarthy’s actions during the period in which tactics changed allowed his aircrew a forum for voicing their opinions. The 43\textsuperscript{rd} crews ultimately felt vindicated once they realized that their ideas were being heeded, but they did not recognize that McCarthy’s support for their ideas was equally as important as the ideas themselves. Instead, the SAC wing structure, inappropriate for operations in SEA, created a block between the crews and wing staff that prevented the normal promotion of esprit de corps. Poor communication, lack of ‘rumor control’, and low visibility of the wing commander

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\textsuperscript{267} Beavers, questionnaire, 25 April 2000. The crews from both Andersen wings shared this sentiment. See also, Joe Bynum, questionnaire reply to author, 27 April 2000, and Sherman, questionnaire, 9 May 2000.
contributed to this problem. In the end, a sense of esprit de corps may not have increased mission effectiveness, but it would have increased enthusiasm for flying the missions during those periods when aircrew expressed doubts about the wisdom of their chain of command.
Chapter 6

Conclusions

While fighting is a physical act, its direction is a mental process. The better your strategy, the easier you will gain the upper hand, and the less it will cost you.

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart

Leadership Revisited

There are two issues that confront the military commander. One is the management of the organization with which he has been entrusted. The other is the leadership required to motivate his charges. Management of the unit deals with the administration and logistics of war—how to feed, house, and supply the force. In theory it is very simple to understand what physical items are required to sustain the troops, given the nature of the engagement and resources available. Leadership, however, is never easy to quantify. It is such a complex human endeavor that it can never be reduced to mathematical formulae or prescriptive regulation. There are as many approaches to perfecting leadership as there are human souls devoted to its attainment. It is with this appreciation that any analysis of leadership must be addressed. Yet even though there are unique aspects of each of the previous case studies, there are also some common threads that run through them.

This chapter will identify the elements of morale that carried the most weight with the aircrew and then tie in actions similarly taken by their commanders that helped the crews maintain high morale despite suffering losses. These similar actions may point toward areas that future wing commanders may consider worthy of special attention when they find themselves in combat situations. In any case, the implications of
addressing aircrew morale as it relates to airpower employment will be summarized and a few recommendations made to the USAF in particular.

**Similarities in Aircrew Morale**

Of the three general areas that contributed to aircrew morale, (individual needs, cohesion, and esprit de corps), the satisfaction of individual needs stands out as the most important with regard to maintaining high morale. Cohesion, as it related to motivating aircrew to fly, was irrelevant for both German and American fighter pilots, and only slightly influential when it came to B-52 crews. Even esprit de corps, which was strong in the first two cases, was not singled out by the pilots as a paramount cause of their motivation. Esprit was totally lacking in the case of the 43rd SW, so it could not have had any influence on the periods of high morale for those bomber crews.

Looking further into the category of individual needs the two subsets (physical needs and psychological needs) are not equally as important. Physical needs for these airmen were always kept at least at Manning’s minimum acceptable level; but in the case of the 362d FG, a trend was noticed. When conditions improved over time, morale improved; but when conditions declined over time, morale generally suffered. Both JG 26 and the 43rd SW displayed no significant changes in physical needs over the periods studied.

Psychological needs were clearly more important influences on aircrew morale than any other category. The confidence that sprung from valid training and the perceived superiority of their aircraft kept aircrew enthusiasm high. Since ‘tactics’ is the process of matching training and equipment against a particular opposing capability, it is not difficult to see that for the aircrew, the influence of tactics during these three air campaigns had a direct impact on morale. During the Battle of Britain, the air-to-air success of JG 26 pilots was a result of innovation and standardization of tactics created within the wing. The initially high fighting spirit of these pilots only dropped once the close escort and jabo missions were dictated by Goering. Even so, after the wing improvised new tactics for escorting bombers, morale stabilized. The jabo missions, however, led to the most dramatic decrease in morale because the wing chose not to develop tactics commensurate with the new role. In Manning’s own terms, the jabo
pilots had neither a “goal” nor “self-confidence.”

The P-47 pilots of the 362d FG had a more consistent experience with tactics. Although they arrived in Europe thinking they would be employed in the pursuit role, they quickly adjusted to ground attack missions. The squadrons not only sought experience from the veterans of the Italian campaign, but they also measured success primarily by the number of enemy ground positions destroyed. Aerial victories became a secondary measure of success. The validity of their close air support tactics was reinforced by the rapid advance of the army they were assigned to assist. The wide variety of missions tasked to the group led very naturally to a flexible attitude toward employing airpower. With this perspective, they developed new tactics as the situation warranted.

The B-52 crews of the 43rd SW displayed the most noticeable correlation between morale and the selection of tactics. The apparent inflexibility of tactics during the first three days of bombing lowered crew morale because they did not believe that losses needed to be as high as they were. The distant imposition of these tactics further alienated the crews who were risking their lives to complete the missions. Once the tactics recommended by the aircrew were reflected in the later missions of the campaign, crew morale once again became high.

**Morale, Wing Leadership, and Combat**

The wing commander holds a unique position in combat. He is close enough to his individual pilots and aircrew that he understands their concerns on a personal level. Nevertheless, he is also an important link to higher headquarters and must understand the greater part that his unit plays in meeting national goals. In general, his job is to satisfy headquarters’ requirements by executing his management and leadership responsibilities. The motivation of his people becomes a prime leadership concern in this endeavor and maintaining high morale is an obvious necessity. If, as it seems from these three case studies, aircrew morale is primarily concerned with the tactics used to fly combat missions, then a wing commander must be involved in that discussion. In fact, each of the three commanders studied had an influence on aircrew morale via tactics.

Adolf Galland was the ‘father’ of most of the improvements in tactics within JG
26. By developing his own close escort tactics and amply demonstrating his successful air-to-air tactics throughout the wing, he helped to sustain the morale of his men. However, the deficiency in jabo tactics was also directly attributable to Galland. He never accepted Goering’s objectives for the jabos; therefore, he placed little emphasis on succeeding at the mission. Instead, he formed tactics that helped to protect the Bf-109 jabos on their attacks rather than demanding tactics that helped those pilots place bombs-on-target. Since the mission was not deemed worthwhile, his pilots grew frustrated with the tactics and morale declined.

The pilots of the 362d FG had fewer complaints with tactics than the other two units under consideration. It is, therefore, not as obvious to evaluate Joe Laughlin’s influence on the evolution of tactics. He was, however, one of the pilots who traveled to Italy to learn ground attack tactics and returned to England to pass on the lessons learned. In this regard, Laughlin was one of the progenitors of all 362d FG ‘ground attack’ tactics. His direct involvement in the attacks on ships in the Brest harbor and on the Dieuze dam demonstrated how closely he was connected with executing new tactics in the group as the war progressed.

James McCarthy found his previous B-52 experience while at U-Tapao a valuable asset in the fostering of new tactics from within the 43rd SW. In addition to emphasizing the importance of three-ship cell integrity in degrading SAM effectiveness, he also was responsible for the tactics review sessions held during the LINEBACKER II stand-down period. He saw the value in the aircrew recommendations and used his influence with higher headquarters to argue for those tactical improvements in future missions. The incorporation of these changes added to the complexity of future missions but also significantly raised aircrew morale.

Lessons for the Commander

The purpose of this study was to attempt to identify characteristics of wing leaders that were able to sustain aircrew morale in spite of heavy losses in combat. Each of the three commanders studied had different individual characteristics and leadership styles and it became obvious that no all-inclusive analysis could be made. Even so, one
behavioral characteristic did stand out: a wing commander must be flexible enough to encourage tactical innovation in combat if he wishes to maintain a high level of aircrew morale, regardless of how heavy losses may be. This effort allows the pilots and aircrew under his command to exercise additional control over the combat situation. It appears likely that as combat losses increase, this level of control must also increase, or else morale will slip.

Based on the three case studies, there are two paths that wing commanders can take toward improving tactics. One method is the personal involvement of the wing commander in creating new tactics himself. This may be the most responsive method to achieve results (as with JG 26,) but it requires that the commander possess excellent tactical awareness and a reputation that translates to mission success and aircrew acceptance. The second method is to rely on the individual squadrons and aircrew in the wing to design new tactics. Fostering this approach may be most appropriate when aircrew morale is already weakened (as with the 43rd SW) and the commander wishes to raise the perception of control among the crews. Neither method is necessarily preferred and, in some cases, a combination of the two will be most useful, as it was with the 362d FG.

**Implications for Airpower**

Based on the morale areas addressed in this study, there are four implications for airpower employment in future conflicts. First, morale affects airmen differently than soldiers. General Marshall indicated that cohesion was a paramount concern for soldiers in World War II. For airmen though, cohesion hardly matters at all. All that really matters to create the enthusiasm within the airman to fly missions is the means (aircraft) to execute the mission and a confidence in his ability to succeed.
Second, morale is an issue affected by the context of the operation. Although the definition of morale does not change, the context of combat versus operations-other-than-war will influence the issues most important to airmen. It is not accurate to say that tactical innovation equally influences aircrew morale in conventional battle settings as it does to patrolling “No Fly Zones.” This distinction becomes relevant across the broad spectrum of the utility of airpower.

Third, aircraft and aircrew losses do not necessarily destroy aircrew morale. In only two cases (JG 26 and 43rd SW) were losses mentioned in connection with reduced morale, and both of those instances occurred during periods of poor or slow tactical innovation. The issue of losses becomes important when tactics are not responding to the environment. Otherwise, losses are generally acceptable as long as success is being achieved.

Finally, wing commanders will sometimes need to innovate in combat for missions that their units have not trained for in peacetime. Such was the case for Galland, Laughlin, and McCarthy. The commander, therefore, must possess an expert knowledge of the missions, technologies, and limitations of the aircraft and personnel in his unit. This will be necessary to evaluate mission success in light of old and new tactics. It may seem an obvious statement, but the wing commander should be a competent crewmember in the aircraft assigned to the unit.

**Recommendations for the USAF**

To conclude this work, there are several recommendations that can benefit the USAF with regard to the issue of morale and wing commander responsibilities. The two areas affected are doctrine and the professional military education (PME) system.

**USAF Doctrine**

Since the Air Force has recently taken a renewed interest in doctrine, it should consider addressing the following issues in the next revision of basic (AFDD 1) and operational level (AFDD 2 Series) documents:

1) Define morale. Basic Air Force doctrine needs to clarify the meaning of morale and then spread its meaning throughout the service. As a suggestion,
Manning’s general definition is simple and is applicable to all areas of the Air Force, in times of peace or war.

2) Create a doctrine document for command. Current operational doctrine focuses on Air Force missions but should also include special volumes for such areas as command. This effort would need to consolidate the various commander regulations and pamphlets that currently exist, and also address the morale issues discussed in this study.

Military Education

The PME system in the USAF is the crucible for discussions concerning leadership issues. The Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and various ‘commander’ schools are all appropriate venues to look into aircrew morale and the role of the wing commander in combat. Currently, the USAF uses the Leader-Follower-Situation (L-F-S) model to discuss the role that the commander plays in a unit. This approach encourages leaders to consider their followers and the context of the situation in order to choose an appropriate leadership style. This study recommends three changes to studying leadership within the PME system:

1) If the USAF continues to use the L-F-S model in its curricula, it should place more emphasis on the leader’s ability to alter the situation with which he is faced, rather than assuming it is static. For example, in this study of combat morale, the situation is changed when new tactics are introduced. This would de-emphasize the USAF’s current focus—suggesting that its leaders can change their personality or style to suit a situation. Instead, it is more likely that a person’s personality does not change simply because he becomes a commander. The real focus should lie on the ability of commanders to change the situation in such a way to motivate their followers and still accomplish the mission. All commanders should be innovators, or at least be able to draw innovation out of their subordinates and implement it as appropriate.

2) ACSC and AWC should encourage research into morale-related topics, especially as they relate to combat scenarios across the spectrum of war. These topics should specifically address the influences on Air Force
personnel.

3) Finally, the USAF Group Commander and Wing Commander courses should include instruction specifically designed to consider morale in various settings. A focus on morale in multiple career fields and conditions would expose future commanders to the issues that really generate enthusiasm for mission accomplishment.
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