Preparing for the Inevitable: NGO-Military Interactions in Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations

A Monograph
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This monograph seeks to determine if the U.S. Army adequately prepares company grade officers to interact successfully with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during humanitarian assistance and peace operations. It briefly analyzes the current operational environment and highlights that the U.S. Army is conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) more frequently than in previous years. The author examines the culture and numerical explosion of NGOs and discusses their presence and participation in future operations. Using doctrinal information and the historical case studies of operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, successful and unsuccessful NGO-military interactions are examined. The author emphasizes the positive correlation that historically exists between effective interactions and mission success. Based on operational experiences, the unique knowledge and skills required for successful interactions with NGOs at the company grade officer-level are determined. Using this information as a baseline, the army’s leader development system is analyzed and the author determines that the current system does not systematically prepare company grade officers for successful interactions with NGOs. In conclusion, recommendations are offered to improve company grade officer preparation for future operations.
ABSTRACT

PREPARING FOR THE INEVITABLE: NGO-MILITARY INTERACTIONS IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND PEACE OPERATIONS by MAJ Craig A. Osborne, U.S. Army, 74 pages.

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“We live in an age of ‘heavy peace’... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for strategic or humanitarian reasons – or just muddled impulses – we will not be able to resist them all.... We cannot enter upon such commitments under the assumption that they will be temporary and brief... We must stop pretending those challenges will disappear – that ‘something will turn-up’ – and prepare to meet them.”

– Ralph Peters
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Berlin wall in October of 1989 signaled the dawn of a new era in global politics. Before that event, the international community was largely divided along deeply held and politically opposed orientations sponsored by the two reigning superpowers. In the intervening decade, the specter of major theater war (MTW) diminished as the former Soviet Union steadily declined. The encouraging signs of cooperation between North Korea and South Korea and the firm control established over Iraq with no-fly zones and prepositioned equipment reinforce the notion that future conflicts will not resemble the previous models of global conflagration.

As the new century emerges, contemporary threats faced by the armed forces of the United States are more ambiguous and regionally focused than those found in the 20th century. Regional rivalries and conflicts over scarce resources may often create turbulence and lead to conflict in previously unimportant states. These current threats do not necessarily influence the balance of power in the international community, but world leaders are now taking a more active interest in the political strife, ethnic turmoil, and humanitarian issues found throughout the world. Arguably, the United States will show a greater interest in humanitarian issues and regional conflicts because the Soviet Union is no longer a viable superpower and the nation now has the luxury of increased attention to and participation in smaller-scale contingencies.

Today, the scope of army operations extends beyond conventional warfighting to encompass the full spectrum of operations. Humanitarian assistance and peace operations represent several points on the spectrum and are characterized as two of the
sixteen types of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).\textsuperscript{5} These operations, like other MOOTW, usually involve the use of assets and efforts of governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in a complementary fashion with the military usually supporting the other instruments of national power.\textsuperscript{6} These operations are not new to the United States and have been conducted frequently throughout the second half of the 20th century. Even fifty years ago, President Harry S. Truman understood the prevalence and use of humanitarian assistance and peace operations to support political efforts when he stated that, “...we should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and peacetime activities.”\textsuperscript{7}

What is new to the United States in the past eleven years is the pace, scope, and complexity of contingency operations. Since 1989, the U.S. Army’s participation in contingency operations has increased, on average, from once every four years to once every fourteen weeks.\textsuperscript{8} Although some critics question the use of military forces for humanitarian assistance and peace operations, President William J. Clinton believes that American citizens have a direct and increasing stake in the stability and prosperity of other states and the nation’s involvement in humanitarian assistance and peace operations is likely to continue.\textsuperscript{9} In the 1990s, both Republican and Democratic administrations deployed military forces for humanitarian assistance and peace operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, recently stated that the military will likely continue to deploy for those missions regardless of the President’s party affiliation.\textsuperscript{10}

Humanitarian assistance operations are not consistently defined in joint or army doctrine. \textit{Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War} defines them as operations that, “relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger,
or privation in countries or regions outside the United States.”

Humanitarian assistance can include both reactive tasks such as disaster relief or refugee assistance as well as proactive tasks such as humanitarian and civic assistance and civil support. Although not a required component, humanitarian assistance operations are usually conducted in concert with peace operations in a conflict region.

Similarly, there is no agreement on the definitions ascribed to peace operations. U.N., joint, and army doctrine list different definitions for the same term and consistency is found only in selected doctrinal publications. The United Nations General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, JP 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, and Field Manual (FM) 100-23 Peace Operations all list five distinct elements of peace operations: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peace Building, Peacekeeping, and Peace Enforcement. Although less specific, the joint definition encompasses these tasks through its definition of peace operations as the “umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process.”

Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building are generally considered tasks that specifically support diplomacy and have become increasingly important in furthering U.S. interests abroad. Peacekeeping is undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute and is designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an agreement and to support the diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Although not specifically addressed in the U.N. charter, they are generally accepted as fulfilling the provisions of Chapter VI of the charter and the U.N. has been the most frequent sponsor of classical peacekeeping activities. U.S. forces have participated in and supported both U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping
operations such as United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and non-U.N. sponsored operations including those conducted in the Sinai peninsula and in Beirut.\textsuperscript{19}

On the other hand, peace enforcement operations are the application of military force, or threat of its use, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions that are designed to maintain or restore peace and order in a specified region. These operations are usually conducted pursuant to an international authorization and are considered consistent with Chapter VII of the U.N. charter.\textsuperscript{20} Recent U.S. involvement in peace enforcement operations include Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The common thread linking all of the peace operations tasks is the desire to achieve a peaceful settlement among belligerent parties – earlier or later through diplomatic actions.\textsuperscript{21} In humanitarian assistance and peace operations, military forces are typically tasked to support the diplomatic instrument of power while simultaneously working with the informational and economic instruments.\textsuperscript{22} The employment of U.S. forces in both humanitarian and peace operations is consistent with the objectives of both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. By law, the U.S. Army defends the United States and its territories, supports national policies and objectives, and defeats nations responsible for aggression that endanger the security of the United States.\textsuperscript{23} Within that framework, the current administration believes that humanitarian assistance and peace operations support selected national policies and objectives and the nation conducts them with the intent to "prevent, contain, or resolve" regional conflicts that pose threats to national interests.\textsuperscript{24} Humanitarian assistance and peace operations help keep the daily tensions between nations and states below the level of war and maintain and promote American influence around the world.\textsuperscript{25}
In his National Security Strategy, President Clinton identifies enhancing America’s security, bolstering America’s economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights as the core security objectives. At first glance, humanitarian assistance and peace operations clearly support the promotion of democracy and human rights but appear to have only a tangential relationship to the remaining objectives. However, the Commander-in-Chief believes that they support all three objectives by stating that “every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, opening markets, and containing disease and hunger brings a sure return in security and long-term savings” (emphasis added). He elaborates this concept further by stating that as the nation promotes democracy and human rights abroad, the United States simultaneously advances the first two objectives.

Additionally, two of the nation’s three security interests are protected or supported through humanitarian assistance and peace operations – important interests such as those found in the Balkans and humanitarian interests as seen in the support given to East Timor. The National Military Strategy, most recently published by General John M. Shalikashvili in 1997, also sketches the promotion of peace and stability and the defeat of all adversaries as the two overriding military objectives. The deployment of U.S. forces can support the promotion of peace and stability around the world and it is continually viewed as a central task in the pursuit of national objectives.

Solutions to complex contingencies such as humanitarian assistance and peace operations rarely, if ever, rest solely within the capabilities and actions of any single agency – including the military. The security challenges that face world leaders today are increasingly complex and require the integrated skills and resources of many organizations. Both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy emphasize the importance of enhancing the effectiveness of complex operations by
integrating the assets and effects of other governmental agencies, nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations to achieve synergy in multiple and varied environments. President Clinton understood the necessity to integrate assets and efforts when he signed Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) in 1995.

This directive highlights and codifies the importance of interagency coordination across the various agencies of the U.S. government to achieve better effects in contingency operations. This is consistent with the concept of unified action and supports the desire to achieve unity of effort among several disparate organizations. Unity of effort, not only a fundamental of campaign plans but also a principle of MOOTW, can only be achieved through close and continuous coordination and cooperation. Effective interactions with other groups reduce costs, prevent duplication, lessen the friction of potential rivalries, and improve both short and long-term results. Integrated efforts also potentially reduce the length of time forces must be deployed in a specific region.

Based on recent operational experience, the presence of NGOs in future humanitarian assistance and peace operations is virtually assured. To be successful, U.S. Army leaders must interact with NGOs to achieve synergistic effects in execution. Joint doctrine categorizes these organizations as “major players” at the interagency table and emphasizes that coordination is merely a baseline requirement. Complete success can only be achieved through close liaison and integration and, to achieve synergy, it is important for army leaders to understand the culture, capabilities, and limitations of NGOs. Additionally, military successes in peace operations are frequently linked to the successes of NGOs. The collaboration between the U.S. Army and NGOs is not merely a happenstance action during a period of transition, but it is a fundamental characteristic of a new era – the interaction will occur.
The focus of this monograph is to determine if the U.S. Army adequately prepares company grade officers to successfully interact with NGOs during the conduct of humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Although NGOs may be present in any type of MOOTW, the author focuses only on the interactions that occur in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Leonardo V. Flor states that these operations are those in which NGOs are decisive to the success of the overall mission. In the following chapter, the author examines the numerical explosion and culture of NGOs and discusses their presence and participation in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Using historical case studies coupled with doctrinal information, the author highlights and examines the NGO-military interface. As a result of operational experiences, the author determines the unique knowledge and skills required for company grade officers to effectively interact with NGOs.

Once the unique knowledge and skills are identified, the author analyzes the U.S. Army’s leader development system to determine if company grade officers are properly equipped with the tools to ensure success in future operations. Leader development is essential when viewed in light of Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki’s employment vision of the future’s objective force. He foresees a responsive army that no longer conducts Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) before contingency deployments. Historically, these exercises have been the forum in which most humanitarian assistance and peace operations-related tasks have been trained. When these exercises are eliminated, the army’s leader development system must prepare leaders to successfully operate across the entire spectrum of operations with minimal pre-deployment training. In conclusion, recommendations are offered to improve the U.S. Army’s leader development system and enhance company grade officer preparation for future operations.
CHAPTER 2
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

“Not only do U.N., international organizations, and nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations not understand the military organization, we likewise do not understand them.”

– Operation Support Hope After Action Review

In order to develop better coordination mechanisms and achieve synergy in humanitarian assistance and peace operations, U.S. Army leaders must understand the nature and character of NGOs. Joint doctrine defines NGOs as:

“Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities.”

The term “private voluntary organizations” (PVOs) is nearly synonymous with NGOs and remains found throughout published doctrine. In short, U.S. Army references state that “NGOs” usually refer to non-U.S. organizations while “PVOs” indicate an organization that is based in the United States. Recently, the country of origin distinction has faded from use and NGOs has become the accepted term to encompass what published doctrine now describes as both NGOs and PVOs.

The doctrinal definition of NGOs is somewhat narrow and limits the inclusion to only those registered with the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), established in 1946, and those that conduct “humanitarian assistance activities.” NGOs view themselves in somewhat broader terms and one NGO consortium defines an NGO simply as any organization, national or international, “which is constituted separate from the government of the country in which they are formed.” Additionally,
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) defines them as tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations that work for international development and receive some portion of their revenue from the private sector. In this monograph, the broader definition will be used when referring to NGOs.

Originally formed by religious groups, NGOs now include peace, disarmament, environmental, development, and relief organizations. Additionally, human rights groups and humanitarian law organizations have recently swelled the NGO ranks and have gained significant political influence. NGOs are involved in diverse activities such as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. InterAction, an American-based consortium of over 150 NGOs operating in 185 countries, characterizes the NGO culture as independent, decentralized, committed, and hands-on. Philosophically, they are dedicated to empowering people at the lowest level of the social organization, addressing the root causes of conflict, and working toward an environment that can provide basic services commensurate with the responsibilities of a municipal government. They generally attempt to remain focused on grass-roots activities and provide significant aid directly to the thousands of people they encounter. Conversely, the majority of U.N. agencies work with the governments of affected countries.

Recently, NGOs have become big business. They assist over 250 million people annually and their worldwide contributions exceed $10 billion each year. These figures make NGOs, as a whole, larger contributors and executors of support activities than any single nation. They represent over 13% of all assistance provided worldwide and raised over $5.5 billion through private donations in 1997. The sheer number of lives they affect each year and the resources they provide enable NGOs to become significant actors in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Not only are their resources significant, but the actual number of registered NGOs has increased
exponentially in recent years. In the past decade, ECOSOC has witnessed a four-fold increase in member NGOs and there are currently 1997 NGOs registered in one of three levels of coordination with the council.57

Likewise, the actual number of NGOs present in humanitarian assistance and peace operations has increased significantly in the past decade. In 1991, 28 NGOs provided assistance to the Kurds in southern Turkey and northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort. NGO involvement in 1993 increased to 78 organizations in Somalia and over 100 NGOs in Cambodia. During the 1994 crisis in Rwanda, participation leapt to 170 organizations and involvement skyrocketed to over 400 NGOs in both Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of 1996.58 Most recently, over 200 NGOs swamped the Albanian capital city of Tirana in the spring of 1999 to assist Kosovar refugees.59

Although an inevitable nexus exists between the military and NGOs, fundamental differences exist; therefore, it is essential to understand the cultures of the two organizations. These differences highlight the need for specific military training to maximize the outcome of potential interactions in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. The U.S. Army frequently views these operations as secondary in importance to the traditional task of warfighting while NGOs often see those same missions as their primary reasons for existence.60 Additionally, the military focuses on quickly achieving political and military goals while most NGOs orient on providing both short and long-term humanitarian service. While these two goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they may conflict at times. Even when similar goals exist, the ways in which the organizations view situations may differ and they might react differently to the same conditions.61 Both cultures also have unique perspectives on how their goals should be pursued and frequently differ in their estimates of how long it will take to achieve success. Even within the NGO community itself, the interests, perspectives, and needs of local, regional, and international NGOs frequently differ.
The U.S. Army and the NGO community frequently hold misguided stereotypes of each other. Just as not all soldiers are “gun-toting cowboys” as seen by some NGOs, all NGO workers are not “bleeding hearts”. In most cases, both organizations are staffed with professionals. The majority of NGOs are dedicated, competent, and “worthy of support and admiration” and represent “professional humanitarian expertise.” As a group, NGOs possess tremendous levels of devotion to duty and selfless service. In these specific areas, NGO workers and military personnel are very similar.

As one might expect, the significant number of NGOs in the field leads to wide disparities in the professionalism, capabilities, resources, and expertise found among the various organizations – there is no such thing as a typical NGO. Not every NGO is competent, politically acceptable to the U.S. government, or useful to the U.S. Army in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. In fact, some NGOs have been guilty of wasting resources, acting corruptly, and lacking in professionalism – shortcomings that go largely unchecked by the international community.

There are no specific statutory links between the Department of Defense (DOD) and NGOs. They do not operate within the governmental hierarchy and the relationship between the U.S. Army and NGOs is best characterized as an unofficial partnership that is both situation and personality dependent. In fact, interpersonal relationships developed before and during operations are what dominate interagency operations. Ad hoc arrangements preserve the independence of NGOs and provide them certain advantages in terms of flexibility, but the same lack of structure hinders their continuity and ability to plan effectively.

NGOs in future operations will probably not have defined structures for controlling activities. Few normally accept taskings or directions from outside organizations and only a small minority coordinate their activities with others without a selfish need to do so. This is not necessarily due to blatant arrogance, but primarily
because they believe their courses of actions are most effective based on their intimate knowledge of the conflict area. NGOs also have coordination difficulties with each other. Unlike the military, NGO consortiums, when formed, are loosely composed ad hoc groupings in which no organization has any authority over another. When NGOs are deployed in the same region, they frequently compete with each other for scarce or politicized resources and their rivalries often fragment assistance efforts as seen in Haiti.

NGOs in a conflict region usually possess considerable information that can be essential to the success of a military operation. In fact, Chris Seiple terms NGOs, “the most critical source of information in operations.” Relief and development workers are frequently on the scene of conflict or disaster prior to the deployment of military forces, routinely operate in high-risk areas, and have a comprehensive understanding of the population, local cultures, regional practices, and the host nation government. They often feel that their credibility derives, at least in part, from being present during the worst days of a conflict, disaster, or famine. Although overhead imagery is a great technological advantage and can show the locations of people in an operation, human intelligence (HUMINT), overtly provided by NGOs, is often the only manner of collection that can provide insights into the attitudes and motivations of those same people.

Information provided by NGOs also assists the military commander in maintaining security – not only a principle of war but also a principle of MOOTW. Security ensures that no hostile element operating in the area gains an advantage over the force that could endanger or compromise mission success. Information gained through contacts with NGOs can assist military forces in their efforts to continuously evaluate the attitudes and motivations of important players and is critical to predicting and preventing hostile action. Unfortunately, NGO members working closely with
military forces may also intentionally or inadvertently pass information to belligerents that may adversely affect the military mission.\textsuperscript{79}

In humanitarian assistance and peace operations, “intelligence” and “information” are synonymous terms. NGOs are wary of being used by the military as targeted sources of information because one of their key operating principles is the necessity to remain neutral in a conflict.\textsuperscript{80} They often believe that this attribute allows them to better perform their mission and many assert that providing information to a military force compromises that neutrality.\textsuperscript{81} If an NGO accepts protection provided by the U.S. Army, it might create the perception that NGO is pro-U.S. and lacks objectivity or neutrality. Consequently, many hesitate to accept any type of protection.\textsuperscript{82} Unfortunately, the security situation may deteriorate to a point that NGOs are forced to request or hire armed guards simply to continue providing relief assistance. Some NGOs may also distance themselves from the military based on unique organizational mandates or human rights beliefs.\textsuperscript{83}

NGOs also attempt to remain free from external political influence whereas the military is explicitly guided by political direction. Complete neutrality is difficult to achieve because NGOs routinely make “political statements” based on where they choose to provide relief. For example, NGOs abandoned the Bosnian town of Srebrenica and refused to operate in the area to draw international attention to alleged Serb atrocities committed there in the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{84} Additionally, NGOs frequently accept significant funding from national governments and international organizations such as the United Nations International Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF). Many governments prefer to support development and relief projects by passing funds to NGOs through national agencies similar to USAID because it is cheaper, more efficient, and they can effectively distance themselves from the operation.\textsuperscript{85}
Most NGOs depend on a combination of private contributions and public funds for continued operation and are critically aware of the need to maintain funding sources. NGO management teams understand the need to sustain positive relationships with funders and to fulfill their stated or assumed expectations. They are also aware of the competition for publicity, reputation, and the funds that normally follow. To garner the most charitable contributions, NGOs must make use of news events and media coverage to raise public awareness of their actions and many of their actions in a conflict region are based, at least in part, on the need for publicity and future support.

Operationally, NGOs most often employ centralized planning and decentralized execution. Many NGOs have a permanent central headquarters staff and a large number of short-term contract personnel who are hired for specific operations. They do not maintain large standing staffs, but can be expeditionary and are frequently able to respond quickly to developing conflicts. While professional NGOs make extensive efforts to avoid hiring unqualified people, they occasionally hire greater amounts of motivation than competence and participants may lack any operational experience. Consequently, the quality of NGO performance is highly dependent on the people they hire for a given operation. Additionally, since each NGO hires specifically on a mission basis, the organization assembled by a given NGO for one operation may have little in common with the same organization operating in another region at a later date. When deployed, NGO workers are expected to accomplish the objectives and goals of the central headquarters with only minimal guidance. Unfortunately, this autonomy is frequently seen by outside observers, including the U.S. Army, as a lack of accountability to a higher headquarters.

Finally, even the best NGOs are unable to plan or resource their operations as systematically or completely as the military. They often lack significant logistics capabilities and few NGOs are large enough to operate in several geographic areas or
accomplish multiple objectives simultaneously.\textsuperscript{95} While operating with limited resources individually, NGOs frequently see the military presence as a waste of valuable resources and view their own programs as better directed, more focused, and executed with a greater economy of effort than any military endeavor.\textsuperscript{96}

After examining the NGO culture and nature of involvement, it is clear that there are unique differences in the culture, capabilities, and limitations of the NGOs and the U.S. Army. Using historical examples and doctrinal information, the next chapter identifies how the NGO-military interaction is designed to occur and then discusses how it actually happens in humanitarian assistance and peace operations.
“What is the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOs and PVOs that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.”

– General John M. Shalikashvili

When examining interactions between the U.S. Army and NGOs in recent humanitarian assistance and peace operations, it is clear that positive interactions contribute to mission success while inadequate or conditional interactions contribute to extended deployments or incomplete mission accomplishment. Specific military experiences in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti support this assertion and demonstrate a direct correlation between effective coordination with NGOs and an increased chance of success in providing effective humanitarian assistance and stabilizing deteriorating situations.

In April of 1991, the U.N. passed Security Council Resolution (SCR) 688 condemning Iraqi oppression of the Kurdish people and appealed to the international community for humanitarian assistance. Following that authorization, President Bush initiated the deployment of U.S. forces to the conflict area and within two days of notification, several thousand military personnel were operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq. This operation, later named Operation Provide Comfort, was designed to stop the suffering and dying of refugees, stabilize the refugee camps, move the Kurds from the refugee camps in the Turkish mountains to camps around Zakho in northern
Iraq, and return the Kurds to their original towns and villages.  
This operation expanded from the initial humanitarian oriented objectives to also include protecting the Kurds from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s oppressive retributions.  
This operation was a watershed in NGO-military interactions and marked the first time that government agencies, NGOs, and the military worked closely together in support of a common goal.  
Operation Provide Comfort is viewed in both the military and NGO circles as an extremely successful operation and exhibited a high degree of unity of effort.

The mandate was to provide humanitarian assistance to the Somali people and to restore order to southern Somalia while the military established a safe and secure environment for NGOs to operate effectively.  
Although some NGOs had remained in Somalia through the two years of lawlessness preceding the deployment, military leaders made no attempt to contact any of the NGO representatives to obtain updated information either before or during the initial stages of the operation.  
A U.N. After Action Review (AAR) cited this oversight as a significant contributing factor to the operation’s overall failure.  
Various authors even posit that if the decision-makers had consulted with NGOs before deployment, the disaster leading to the eventual withdrawal of forces could have been avoided.

Throughout the operation, relations between the military and NGOs were strained as the U.S. military adopted a critical and authoritarian attitude towards the NGOs.  
Consequently, the military missed opportunities for effective coordination and suffered setbacks because of less than perfect information.  
Constraints to effective action in Somalia existed due to a “lack of knowledge of NGO operations and locations” and the “tendency of NGOs and organizations to do assessments without sharing information.”  
There was, according to the NGOs, a perception that the U.S. military
simply did not want to be bothered by the NGOs. This perception was reinforced when an American general officer bluntly stated, “I can’t stand the [double expletive] NGOs.” During an AAR sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU), Stuart Johnson bluntly stated, “We would have been better off if we had listened to the NGOs.”

In response to the political turmoil unfolding in Haiti in 1993, the U.S. deployed a joint task force (JTF) to the state with the goals of restoring order, ensuring the stability of the legitimate Aristide government, and then turning the operation over to the U.N. as soon as possible. In broad terms, Operation Support Democracy was viewed as a success in U.S. circles. This is certainly true when compared against the Somalia experience of the previous year, but the operation was not free from serious problems. The mutual ignorance of organizational cultures and capabilities contributed to interagency problems and unmet expectations. Afterwards, the NDU examined the operation and determined that tactical level planning was inadequate and success was achieved at higher than required costs. Additionally, faulty coordination mechanisms and a lack of familiarity with other agencies led to diffused NGO efforts and unneeded delays in providing valuable assistance in the troubled nation.

From a doctrinal perspective, the mechanism to achieve coordination and integration of efforts is the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). It serves as the focal point for official interaction and receives requests for support from civilian organizations. Since Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, all U.S. operations have fielded some form of CMOC and they have proven extremely useful as the mechanism to integrate the civilian and military aspects of an operation. Robert Oakley, the President’s Special Envoy for Somalia, indicated that the CMOC was a critical link in Somalia and helped, although incompletely, to “bridge the inevitable gaps between
According to Chris Seiple, the CMOC must become the main effort in humanitarian assistance and peace operations because it represents the military’s best chance to design and control its own exit strategy. The NGO community finds the CMOC useful because it avoids guesswork and provides them a single point of entry into the military system to coordinate their needs and it increases the chances of success for their endeavors. Operational lessons learned clearly show the important role that the CMOC plays in building consensus, providing focus, and achieving unity of effort among the participants. In fact, the absence of effective planning and coordination at the strategic and operational levels of command can be largely offset by the efforts of the CMOC in a conflict region.

The CMOC does not have an established structure and its size and composition vary according to the circumstances. It usually consists of between eight and ten people and must be conveniently located for access by non-military organizations. Additionally, the number of CMOCs supporting a given operation may vary based upon the circumstances and commanders can establish CMOCs at every level of command down to battalion level.

Civil affairs (CA) personnel are doctrinally responsible for the military’s interface with civilian agencies and are ideally suited and trained for CMOC duties. They provide the link between U.S. forces and the civilian organizations operating in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Historically, CA forces have performed tasks such as managing the distribution of relief supplies, advising and coordinating population care and controls, and helping transition many military efforts to the associated civilian agencies and NGOs to enable the military to exit the operation.

Unfortunately, qualified CA personnel are scarce and largely found in the reserve components (RC). There is only one active duty CA battalion in the army and its
mission is to provide rapid, short-duration CA support to combat commanders for operations that do not involve reserve mobilization. The only ways that reserve CA forces can be used are by relying on volunteers or through a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). Arguably, mobilization of RC personnel may be difficult if war is not imminent or declared.

CA forces also seem to communicate better with NGOs. In fact, NGO and U.N. organizational leaders have repeatedly commented on how well they work with CA forces and that they prefer to deal with them if given a choice. Well-trained CA teams lay at the heart of establishing a positive NGO-military relationship and can help maintain a two-way communication between organizations. Expert opinions indicate that CA personnel should continue to operate the CMOC and remain the primary group that interacts with NGOs.

Although the CMOC and CA personnel are the official mechanisms and actors responsible for NGO interactions, it is important to examine how the relationship has historically unfolded during contingency operations. In northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, the interactions did not occur as doctrine describes. Significant NGO-military interactions occurred at all levels of the operation and the minority of those encounters involved CA forces. Additionally, due to the shortage of CA personnel, basic branch officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) have operated CMOCs and performed duties doctrinally prescribed as those in the purview of civil affairs.

In Operation Provide Comfort, extensive interactions occurred between basic branch and Special Forces officers and the NGOs present. In one sector, “there was no time, or sufficient CA personnel, to set up even unofficial CMOCs” and meetings between people simply occurred out of an urgent necessity. This should not be viewed as just an anomaly because current doctrine specifically addresses the
possibility that leaders will have to interact with NGOs themselves if an effective CMOC has not yet been established in an operation.\textsuperscript{142} In another sector, a CMOC physically existed but it was not the primary site to achieve synergy with and eventual transition to civilian agencies.\textsuperscript{143}

Although CA units redeployed from Kuwait to northern Iraq to assume primary responsibility for NGO interactions, they did not arrive in Turkey until approximately three weeks after the start of the operation.\textsuperscript{144} Until the CA forces were established, Special Forces leaders, predominantly company grade officers, were “absolutely critical” in stabilizing the situation and establishing an initial rapport with the NGOs.\textsuperscript{145} Other company grade officers secured the refugee camps, provided continuous security for the NGOs, and constructed many of the facilities requested and used by NGOs.\textsuperscript{146} In addition to the primary CMOC, subordinate task forces established other CMOCs and staffed them with officers not specifically trained in civil affairs.\textsuperscript{147}

Once in theater, CA personnel performed admirably, had a clear understanding of the situation, and were critical to achieving unity of effort, but the fact remains that they were not initially present during a critical period.\textsuperscript{148} Interestingly, although they arrived three weeks into the operation, CA forces may have actually been more time-responsive to this operation than can normally be expected because they were already mobilized and deployed within the region.

The military arrived in theater before the NGOs and, as the NGOs arrived in country and began to search for their roles, untrained military leaders found it difficult to work with the different agencies. NGOs resented the military and its disciplined approach to the refugee situation and were annoyed at the seemingly overbearing security needs imposed on them by the military.\textsuperscript{149} The military was unfamiliar with any of the NGOs or their methods and were unsure of the role that they should play.\textsuperscript{150} One
leader remarked to the presence of NGOs, "Who are these freaks? I am an American trying to do my job."\textsuperscript{151}

With such a potential for misunderstanding and conflict, it is a credit to the personalities of the leaders involved that success was achieved. This has been attributed primarily to the personalities of the officers involved – a chance factor that was fortunately present. Positive changes in attitude and perspective did occur within both organizations but critical time was lost due to cultural misunderstandings and coordination was not fully achieved due to mutual ignorance.\textsuperscript{152} While the operation was deemed an overall success, it is clear that significant interactions with NGOs occurred at every level and most of the officers that dealt with NGOs had no unique training or understanding of the NGO culture or capabilities.

In Somalia, a similar pattern of company grade officer involvement with NGOs was seen. Unlike the situation in Iraq where NGOs were not operating in the area before the crisis, many NGOs were well established in Somalia before the introduction of U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{153} The United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) established a CMOC and organized southern Somalia into nine humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). This division allowed for both the distribution of food and the assignment of military areas of responsibility.\textsuperscript{154} The JTF also established a CMOC for the region and a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) in each sector while subordinate military commanders set-up additional CMOCs in their own sectors.\textsuperscript{155} With the extensive network of civil-military operations (CMO) structures present, there should have been a concomitant increase in the number of CA personnel deployed to Somalia. In fact, the opposite occurred.

While the existence of several established NGOs gave the mission a significant chance for success, the number of CA forces present was insufficient to provide an effective interface for coordination between the two organizations.\textsuperscript{156} The political
implications of activating reserve forces and the Marine Corps' belief that CA forces were not needed contributed to a limited CA presence. Only two of the nine sectors had qualified CA personnel staffing the HOCs while traditional combat forces staffed and supported the remaining seven HOCs and all nine of the sector CMOCs.

The primary CMOC in Somalia consisted of both CA and non-CA personnel. Military support to the NGOs in each sector was usually the responsibility of the local military commander and his supporting CMOC – staffed by members of his unit. One commander remarked that, “there was such a big learning curve...at the time, nobody knew how to do any of this stuff.” Although recognizing that current leaders are unfamiliar with the tasks, a Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) inquiry reinforced this notion and recommended that it is more effective to have sector HOCs and CMOCs staffed by local military forces to ensure they are responsive to the needs of the NGOs.

One foreign observer noted that the Americans failed to gain the respect of the NGO community in Somalia. NGOs frequently commented that the military used the CMOC to keep them at arm's length and the rigid personalities of the personnel operating the CMOCs and HOCs failed to connect with the NGO community. The majority of these people were basic branch officers and NCOs. Coordination was limited in the CMOCs and the military isolated itself from the NGO community. With little to no personal interaction, negative stereotypes were reinforced and they had detrimental effects on operations.

In Somalia, company grade officers routinely contacted and coordinated with the NGOs present. The initial mission was to ensure the adequate security for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and assist the NGOs. These broad missions included tasks such as providing security for NGOs, escorting convoys, assisting in humanitarian and civic assistance programs, providing technical assistance to NGO projects, and
confiscating weapons. Security for NGOs, for example, was usually coordinated through company grade officers and there were 585 potential points of security in Mogadishu alone. Additionally, patrols led by company grade officers escorted 70 convoys, used 700 vehicles, and moved 9000 metric tons of supplies for NGOs each month. The primary CMOC, operated by both CA and non-CA personnel, could not coordinate all of these events and it usually fell to the company commanders and platoon leaders to work out the details with the NGOs.

Arguably, the humanitarian mission in Somalia succeeded and some critics state that coordination between the military and the NGOs was, as a result, good enough. Although successful, there is no need to accept “good enough” when U.S. forces are deployed in conflict regions. Chris Seiple states that the entire effort in Somalia was reduced to one of ad hoc, tactical attempts to treat symptoms of a deeper-rooted problem. Unfortunately, the doctrinal experts tasked to focus the tactical efforts were in short supply and the bulk of tactical coordination fell to basic branch officers untrained in working with NGOs.

In Haiti, the coordination between deployed forces and the NGOs did not occur until after U.S. forces were on the ground. This is not necessarily a unique experience, but there was again an inadequate CA presence in theater. Army forces first concentrated in the capital city of Port-au-Prince while the marines occupied Cap-Haiten. Subsequently, the Second Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) relieved the marines in the Cap-Haiten sector. Once deployed, the JTF formed two CMOCs and, after the marines withdrew forces, the Second Brigade Fire Support Element (FSE) operated the CMOC in Cap-Haiten due to a lack of CA personnel.

Military participants recognized that more CA personnel were required for the operation, yet after the debacle in Somalia, American political leaders were wary of
conducting nation-building activities. No member of the FSE had any training in CMO or NGO interactions yet the Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) was tasked to lead the CMOC until reserve component CA personnel could arrive. When CA assets finally deployed, the FSE was augmented by only one CA lieutenant colonel and the most numerous group of soldiers assigned to the CMOC remained company grade field artillery officers.

Although the mission succeeded and was considered a success, better communication and coordination would have made the military more successful. For example, army forces could have been aware of the distribution problems that NGOs were experiencing and assisted in that endeavor. Instead, the CMOC was deemed a place where NGOs should have only limited access and meetings were held only once or twice a week and not properly integrated into the overall strategy. Although untrained in the culture of NGOs or CMOC operations, Haiti again illustrated that company grade officers can be called upon to interact with NGOs in humanitarian assistance and peace operations and adequate preparation can help ensure success.

Although the CMOC and CA personnel are the doctrinal foci of NGO interactions, doctrine itself does not limit interactions to only those areas. It continually refers to the importance of trained leaders at all levels in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. It is important that leaders understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction with other organizations. Because each leader’s actions can carry potentially significant political consequences, company grade officers need specialized training to excel in these operations. As doctrine indicates, regardless of the professionalism and success of structured organizations such as the CMOC, all it takes is one leader, acting improperly, to “poison the well” and cause dissension and uncoordinated efforts.
Many pundits state that tactical and field level operators do not need specialized training to interact with NGOs and reserve that type of training for only senior officers. Countering that idea in a Rand Corporation study, Jennifer Morrison Taw clearly states that, “It is at the field level that agencies’ ignorance of each other’s capabilities, limitations, objectives, and structures can lead to miscommunications, frustrated expectations, and missed opportunities.” Potential interactions at the tactical level include sharing of logistics databases and minefield information, providing communications, transportation, medical, and maintenance support, and the simultaneous operation of port and air facilities. Even battle captains of conventional force tactical operations centers (TOC) must be knowledgeable in how NGOs operate because the military force should be a supporting effort to the NGOs and other agencies.

Operationally, studies indicate that collaboration and coordination occurs throughout the areas of operation between NGOs and small-unit military leaders. Unfortunately, a lack of training time, the most precious of resources, coupled with a prevailing attitude among some senior leaders that certain tasks are “out-of-their-lane” put junior officers at a marked disadvantage when they confront the realities of humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Due to a lack of adequate active duty CA forces, basic branch officers can expect to interact with NGOs in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Doctrine indicates that local problems and issues concerning coordination and differences in perspective are most effectively and often resolved by company grade officers and senior NCOs. NGOs that have participated in recent training exercises with the military support educating NCOs because they believe that NCOs are frequently the first military leader encountered in an area of operation and the initial interaction is critical to future success. Clearly, education and
training for NGO interactions should not be reserved solely for senior officers. Humanitarian assistance and peace operations involve company grade officers of all branches, but put a premium on logistics, transportation, intelligence, engineer, medical, legal, public affairs, and military police leaders in particular. Additionally, the composition of the CMOC itself is not limited to only CA personnel and often includes many officers from the basic branches.

As seen in historical examples and doctrinal excerpts, interactions with NGOs are not limited to CA personnel working at the CMOC. Even when adequate CA assets are deployed into a conflict region, company grade officers continually interact with NGOs throughout the conduct of patrols, escorts, and other routine events. As seen in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, the CMOC was not initially established and was undermanned in each operation. This condition required officers unfamiliar with NGOs or CMO to immediately assume responsibilities that led to significant NGO interactions. This chapter has also shown that poor coordination with NGOs can hinder mission accomplishment. Next, the author examines the knowledge and skills required for successful interactions and compares them with the current U.S. Army leader development system. This analysis will help determine if company grade officers are currently being equipped to successfully interact with NGOs in humanitarian assistance and peace operations.
“It’s the most difficult leadership experience I have ever had. Nothing quite prepares you for this.”

– General Eric K. Shinseki

discussing his experiences as the SFOR Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina

It is intuitively obvious that success in any operation is based, in part, on the match between mission requirements and the capabilities of the forces involved. Most leadership models indicate that knowledge and skills represent the most direct determinants of overt performance and current army doctrine states that leader development may be the single most important factor in achieving success in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. For most types of MOOTW, military leaders adapt their warfighting knowledge and skills to the situation; however, those skills are not always appropriate and certain knowledge and skills are more useful in MOOTW than in conventional warfighting. This chapter identifies the knowledge and skills that have historically led to successful NGO-military interactions.

In a skills-based model of leader development, a requisite understanding of the people with whom one is working supports the exercise of vital skills. Educational research supports this assertion and indicates that knowledge is needed on not only the tasks at hand and the organization that one is a part of, but also the people with whom one works. Company grade officers must develop a basic understanding of the tasks associated with humanitarian assistance and peace operations, the political implications and influences present in an operation, and the role that NGOs play in theater.
Specifically, they must also develop and sustain a base of knowledge about the culture, capabilities, and limitations of NGOs as well as the purpose and importance of mechanisms such as the CMOC. Military personnel often arrive in theater assuming that civilians are subordinate to the military and consequently spend the initial stages of an operation fighting the NGOs. In fact, some never stop sparring and fail to develop any cooperative relationships. This ignorance results in late or nonexistent planning for civil affairs, disenchanted NGOs, and a loss of unity of effort. Conversely, an increase in knowledge associated with NGOs and the CMOC is “bound to result in an increased unity of effort in theater.”

This knowledge and analysis of the salient characteristics of humanitarian assistance missions, peace operations, and NGOs is as critical to success in MOOTW as is a detailed analysis of military forces in a conventional operation. Effective leaders must learn about and grasp the NGO culture so that they can understand how and why NGOs think and act as they do. The understanding gained through knowledge leads to a sense of cooperation, collaborative legitimacy and respect for one another. An understanding of how vital the NGOs are to humanitarian assistance and peace operations will necessarily lead company grade officers to respect each participant and that attitude must be transmitted to all soldiers.

This precise and accurate knowledge must replace faulty mental models of NGOs and supplant any negative stereotypes. Experience indicates that cultural barriers are one of the biggest obstacles to effective NGO-military interactions. Understanding cultural differences is important and effective leaders must be flexible enough to adjust their leadership style and techniques to the people they lead. It is also important for company grade officers to develop a basic understanding of the expertise, capabilities, and limitations of major NGOs that are actually operating in a
conflict region. Leaders need to be able to distinguish between organizations, recognize their advantages and disadvantages, develop mutually beneficial relationships where feasible, and ensure that all efforts – military and civilian – are as complementary as possible.

Related to the knowledge gained in examining humanitarian assistance and peace operations, company grade officers must learn to operate in situations where they do not control everything or everyone around them. This mindset is usually at odds with aggressive military commanders but is indicative of the open-mindedness that must be present in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. There is a common military belief that somebody must always be in charge and that mindset is simply not appropriate or successful when dealing with NGOs. Army leaders are used to acting and making decisions independent of external players and the military leader development system seeks to instill in officers the desire to control a situation and impose a sense of order on it.

It is important to teach company grade officers that there are circumstances when it is best for the army not to be in charge. In many operations, the army is a supporting effort and junior leaders must understand where the military fits into the overall mission objectives. The very nature of being in charge may lead to mission creep and an assumption of tasks that are not mandated. With no coordination structures found below the CMOC, the same traits that cause leaders to seek out NGOs are also the same aggressive traits that cause friction between the organizations as leaders attempt to seize control of a situation. Leaders who try to force a structure and chain of command on an operation with NGOs can actually limit NGO involvement and, thereby, reduce collaborative efforts.
Another skill set that must be developed to enhance the NGO-military relationship is liaison skills. In fact, one author states that boundary-spanning activities such as liaison, negotiation, and mediation become preconditions for effective military leadership in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Liaison skills facilitate the exchange of information, help maintain personal contacts with other agencies, and enhance the success in MOOTW. Evidence indicates that although military forces and NGOs are disparate in culture, they will generally collaborate willingly if supported through effective liaison. Unity of effort is facilitated through liaison and it has been specifically identified in army doctrine as an expanded task during peace operations. Although liaison should not replace the organizational mechanisms designed to facilitate coordination and does not imply an attachment of an individual to an NGO for extended periods of time, it does provide a “face” to the military and supports a continuous linkage with NGOs in the conflict region.

Because of the important roles played by NGOs in humanitarian assistance and peace operations, their interests should be represented at every level. Continuous, effective liaison helps leaders maintain the needs and concerns of the NGOs in the fore of their minds. Liaison skills can also be used on a daily basis to seek out and make contact with NGOs who are reluctant to meet at the CMOC. Company grade officers aggressively making contact with NGOs can make them aware of the services available and benefits derived from coordination with the CMOC. This technique was very effective in Rwanda during Operation Support Hope. Finally, liaison skills do not only apply to humanitarian assistance and peace operations but can also be used in the conduct of conventional warfighting and multinational operations.

Negotiation and mediation skills are important for company grade officers in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Leaders need a conceptual
framework for these types of encounters and must be taught the skills to help them analyze and select appropriate courses of action when interacting with NGOs.\textsuperscript{217} These skills can also be used in the broader context of peace operations when dealing with belligerent forces.\textsuperscript{218} Although negotiation and mediation training is not focused on forcing NGOs to adopt specified courses of action, it does include, for example, activities such as bartering for the use of buildings, facilities, roads, and services that may be common resources in an operation.\textsuperscript{219} NGOs often attempt to pursue their own agendas in operations and leaders can encourage them to go where they are needed. Negotiation and mediation skills can also be used with NGOs to focus their deployment, help stem the flow of refugees into a region, conduct resettlement activities, and administer humanitarian relief through divisions of responsibilities.\textsuperscript{220}

These types of actions can easily be termed persuasion techniques and they share common components with coercive negotiations.\textsuperscript{221} In fact, negotiation is an exercise in persuasion.\textsuperscript{222} Company grade officers must present their views persuasively – not authoritatively – to NGOs to reach mutually beneficial agreements. The majority of data taken from a recent questionnaire of officers who have conducted peace operations indicate that negotiation and mediation training should begin at the company grade officer level because company commanders will conduct negotiations while deployed.\textsuperscript{223}

Finally, consensus building is an important skill in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Similar to negotiation and mediation, it is a skill specifically designed to build teams in situations where the leader does not control participant actions. Building teamwork and trust takes time and requires patience from all actors.\textsuperscript{224} Consensus building is painstakingly difficult but it helps achieve unity of effort – even at the tactical level – and consensus building begets cooperation.\textsuperscript{225} Army leaders dealing
with NGOs cannot rely on their rank or on the same leadership skills exhibited in military units to perform successfully.

While deployed, there is more of a need for consensus building and less of an emphasis on hierarchical decision making.\textsuperscript{226} Military leaders must realize that they do not have all of the answers and should be prepared to accept alternate courses of action, exhibit humility towards other organizations, and show flexibility towards non-military ways of doing business.\textsuperscript{227} Consensus-style decision making should be instilled in company grade officers and refined throughout their development to assist in dealing with situations in which the military is a supporting effort in the operation. Consensus building can only be achieved by developing an understanding of each agency’s capabilities and limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a capability.\textsuperscript{228}

In accordance with joint doctrine, the military prepares its leaders for MOOTW through both professional military education (PME) and the training of individuals, staffs, and units in exercises and operational assignments.\textsuperscript{229} The army leader development system is similar, yet adds a third pillar to the joint model entitled “self-development.”\textsuperscript{230} If the U.S. Army is adequately preparing company grade officers for the challenges of interacting with NGOs in humanitarian assistance and peace operations, the training should be found in these three areas.

From a PME perspective, there is limited leader development for company grade officers. General (Retired) Maxwell Thurman asserted that the military education system does not prepare officers for operations or equip them with the in-depth knowledge that an officer needs to successfully interact with other agencies.\textsuperscript{231} This sentiment is echoed by Jennifer Morrison Taw who states that, “Officers are not adequately educated about other agencies’ missions or capabilities.”\textsuperscript{232} As a company grade officer
progresses through the officer basic course (OBC) and captain’s career courses (CCC), there are no tasks associated with gaining knowledge on the conduct of humanitarian assistance and peace operations or the culture, capabilities, and limitations of NGOs. References to NGOs in the programs of instruction (POI) are simply absent. Additionally, there is no instruction regarding situations in which the military is in a supporting effort during an operation. The notion that junior officers should not seek to control a situation is virtually heretical.

Captains attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas do receive some ancillary instruction on NGOs. The CAS3 POI allocates 54 minutes of general instruction explaining the purpose and format of the Civil-Military Operations estimate. This estimate is not geared specifically towards NGOs but they are included as one of the estimate components. The CAS3 staff group leader also provides a one-hour lecture on the civil-military aspects of recent military operations. Again, this lecture does not focus on NGOs or their unique culture, capabilities, and limitations, but includes them as one of many factors to be considered in both MTW and MOOTW. CAS3 instructors are not required to have any experience or specific training to teach this block of instruction and many staff group leaders have no first-hand experience with NGOs at any level.

Finally, CAS3 students participate in a 29.5-hour planning and paper-based contingency operation simulation replicating a brigade combat team deployment to Honduras. Again, this exercise mentions NGOs in the CMO annex provided but does not focus on any aspect of NGO participation. Overall, from an institutional pillar perspective, company grade officers do not receive any focused instruction on the culture, capabilities, limitations, or the importance of NGOs to the success of
humanitarian assistance and peace operations at any time in their professional military education.

Liaison skills also receive minimal attention at the PME institutions. There are no specific tasks or training events associated with this skill set at any level for company grade officers and are only referred to when discussing combat coordination or multinational operations. Generic liaison requirements, techniques, and a list of liaison officer qualifications are found in army doctrine but no instruction covers the importance or uniqueness of the tasks required to conduct successful liaison with NGOs.

Similarly, negotiation and mediation skills are not specifically trained or developed through any institutional instruction. At the OBC, recently commissioned lieutenants are trained to “brief to inform, persuade, or direct,” but its focus is on preparing and delivering a formal briefing in which the officer controls the situation. It does not specifically address spontaneous or casual encounters with NGOs and the techniques required to enhance the effectiveness of those interactions. Citing a lack of negotiation and mediation skills in leader development, joint doctrine acknowledges that, “too many officers have had to develop this skill through on-the-job training.” Additionally, a U.N. study also found military leaders untrained in negotiation skills.

Finally, consensus building is marginally covered during leadership instruction at each of the PME institutions, but is couched in terms of the participating leadership style. This style encourages input from subordinates when determining an appropriate course of action but does not refer to circumstances when a leader does not control the situation. While similar principles may exist in working with both subordinates and NGO members, there are distinct differences and consensus building with NGOs is not specifically addressed.
In operational assignments, there is no systematic incorporation of NGOs into unit training at any level. The most successful integration of NGOs into training exercises has been at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) located in both the United States and Europe. NGO members, or role players representing them, are frequently found in MRX that prepare forces for peace operations; however, they are rarely seen otherwise in tactical training events. In fact, some MRX for peace operations do not include NGOs although their presence is known and interactions are anticipated. For example, situational training exercises (STX) conducted at Fort Hood to prepare the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) for deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1997 did not include any tasks related to NGOs. In general, unless a commander knows his or her unit will deploy to a humanitarian assistance or peace operation, he or she usually focuses on conventional warfighting missions and excludes interagency operations or MOOTW from the list of tasks to be trained during an exercise.

When present, CTC rotations provide some leaders first-hand experiences in dealing with NGOs, but this contact is limited. Planning with NGOs rarely occurs below the brigade level and company grade officers interact with NGOs, if at all, only two to three times in the entire exercise. Happenstance interactions do occur in the maneuver area but, as represented, have limited impact on the outcome of an operation. Additionally, the observer controllers (O/Cs) assigned to the officers interacting with the NGOs usually receive no training to help them properly evaluate the performance and provide effective feedback to the leader being observed.

Exercises at the CTC are routinely touted as realistic but NGO representation is insufficient. For example, preparations for deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina currently include representation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) in the maneuver area. While these organizations are important, none of them are NGOs. They are international organizations and have a somewhat different culture and orientation than NGOs. Furthermore, many organizations replicate the presence of NGOs by training soldiers to role-play these important actors. For example, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division trained its soldiers as role players to assist in the deployment preparation of its 1st Brigade for deployment. While better than notional representation of NGOs, role players do not adequately demonstrate the mindset and culture of NGOs in a theater of operations.

While interaction with NGOs is sometimes represented in MRXs, liaison, negotiation and mediation, and consensus building skills are not developed or reinforced at the army’s training centers. These skills are not included in the training plans and there is no plan to evaluate and enhance the skills exhibited by the company grade officers that are training. Additionally, even if those skills were included in the training plan, O/Cs are not currently trained to assist their counterparts in refining and developing those skills.

The third and final pillar of army leader development is self-development. Defined as the process used to enhance previously acquired skills, knowledge, and experience, its goal is to increase the leader’s readiness and potential for positions of greater responsibility. It is designed to be a collaborative process between the leader, the first-line leader, and the immediate commander. While all three individuals have roles to play, the burden of responsibility is clearly placed on the individual. Army doctrine indicates that self-development for junior personnel should be very structured and generally narrow in focus, but there is a consistent lack of structure or focus in any
aspect. There is currently no institutional guidance that identifies the tasks that should be developed through self-study and the most recent Military Qualifications Standards (MQS) manual for company grade officers lacks any reference to NGOs.

Self-development and leader involvement in it has been a localized phenomenon in the army and is highly dependent on the interests and skills of the respective leaders. Each leader can develop his or her own study program concerning topics that are of interest or use to them and commanders within the same organization can guide their subordinate leaders in divergent directions. The only guidance provided to the army, as an institution, for self-development is the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Professional Reading List. Most recently published in July of 2000, General Shinseki presented the list as a guide for professional development with the words,

“We can never spend too much time thinking about our profession. There is no better way to develop the sure knowledge and confidence required of America’s most demanding occupation than a disciplined, focused commitment to a personal course of reading and study.”

Unfortunately, the Chief of Staff did not recommend any books that deal with any MOOTW or the presence of NGOs in future operations. Similarly, if company grade officers look to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s recommended reading list to enhance his or her preparation for future operations, they will find that none of the Chairman’s 29 books are MOOTW or NGO-related. Therefore, despite the rhetoric stressing the importance of self-development, there is no guidance that would lead company grade officers to pursue knowledge on any of the knowledge and skills deemed important to ensure success in future operations.

After more than 30 years of military training and a deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, General William Crouch remarked, “I was on my own. I’d certainly never been trained for something like this.” This lack of leader development is not unique to
General Crouch but represents a systemic deficiency in the army’s leader development system. The U.S. Army simply remains focused on the conduct of MTW and neglects to prepare company grade officers in any of the three pillars of leader development for effective interaction with NGOs in future operations. With the deficiencies noted, recommendations in the following chapter are designed to enhance the training of company grade officers in preparation for humanitarian assistance and peace operations.
“We are working on producing leaders for change, not just leaders who are doctrinally capable and competent leaders for warfighting, but leaders also for all kinds of missions that we are asked to be able to do today across the full spectrum.”257

— Secretary Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army

The U.S. Army’s leader development system must be designed to meet current and future realities. Continuing to develop leaders in a conceptual system that does not adequately address the environment the army expects to operate in is irresponsible. U.S. forces are expected to operate across the full spectrum of conflict and must possess the knowledge and skills to operate at any point on the spectrum.258 Without a trained force, the nation either invites failure or succeeds at a greater cost.

Unfortunately, the army’s systematic PME for company grade officers remains overly focused on preparing for MTW.259 To adequately prepare for future MOOTW, the leader development system must be revised.260 Although current doctrine and operational AARs clearly state that units selected for humanitarian assistance and peace operations should have several weeks of pre-deployment training, employment options or emerging crises may preclude any specific mission preparation.261 Additionally, General Shinseki envisions force employment options worldwide without relying on any pre-deployment training. Even when sufficient training time exists, a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report indicated that the majority of available time is used to execute the unit’s deployment SOP.262 Leaders who have a solid foundation in MOOTW can largely overcome the lack of pre-deployment training for an operation.263
The U.S. Army needs to develop general principles of interacting with NGOs and that knowledge should be imparted to all officers at each PME institution. In a classroom environment, leaders should learn about the unique aspects of humanitarian assistance and peace operations and actively consider how best to adapt their warfighting skills to successfully interact with NGOs and achieve synergistic effects.\textsuperscript{264} Concomitantly, leaders must also develop an understanding of the political implications of those operations. A proactive education process for company grade officers will help them develop an attitude of trust and respect between themselves and the NGOs.\textsuperscript{265} Education and teamwork based on an understanding and awareness of each other’s missions, strengths, weaknesses, and outlooks mitigates the inherent friction in interagency operations.\textsuperscript{266} Without an educational base that is institutionalized in the army, knowledge gained through practical experience may leave an organization when personnel leave their current posts.\textsuperscript{267} A continued and focused education program at all levels should assuage this problem.

The most pressing tasks for the army are not changes in procedures, doctrine, force structure, or organization, but in attitudes and dispelling inappropriate stereotypes.\textsuperscript{268} Training should focus on the basic tasks and responsibilities of the CMOC and CA personnel as well as the need to use NGOs as force multipliers.\textsuperscript{269} Education should also include case studies of recent operations and present different perspectives of the same operation.\textsuperscript{270} Leaders should actively pursue NGO AARs from recent operations to gain an understanding and appreciation of the complexities faced by the NGOs in action – from their perspectives. For example, lessons learned from Operation Restore Hope may be perceived quite differently when viewed from a purely army perspective vice an NGO perspective.
NGO lessons learned from various operations should also be incorporated into the curriculum at each level of education. An Army War College study recently indicated that the mindset of listening to other organizations during the planning and execution of operations does not appear to be institutionalized within the army.271 Over time, the use of case studies and the introduction of different perspectives will help develop leaders who are receptive to alternative definitions of a problem and are more receptive to examining multiple courses of action.272 This cognitive tension helps create a greater tolerance for ambiguity and allows junior leaders to view themselves as not the only solution to an operation but as one of many components required for success.273

Additional leadership skills need to be added to FM 22-100 Leadership to accurately reflect the complex environment found at all levels of an operation. FM 100-23 Peace Operations extends the scope of battle command to include, “the inevitable coexistence of both hierarchical and non-hierarchical organizations…in peace operations, both military, interagency, multinational, and NGOs.”274 Education and training need to emphasize the cooperation required to work and operate with diverse organizations that military leaders do not control.275 Consistent with the concept of “not being in charge,” there are many civilian methodologies focused on leading voluntary organizations that can be useful in preparing company grade officers to interact with NGOs. For example, “How to Lead Without Being in Charge” is a program designed to teach interpersonal skills focused on moving forward organizations that do not have authoritative or hierarchical relationships with each other.

As indicated in the previous chapter, company grade officers require liaison, negotiation and mediation, and consensus building skills during humanitarian assistance and peace operations.276 In an academic environment, conceptual foundations for these tasks can be developed and refined through formal instruction and role playing
exercises. These techniques must be drilled first in the institutional environment and then practiced in scenario-driven exercises in garrison and during training exercises.\textsuperscript{277} As these skills are refined, it is also important to train the O/Cs who will evaluate these skills. Many models and developmental programs for introducing and enhancing these skills already exist in the fields of social psychology, international relations, and management.\textsuperscript{278} Unfortunately, too many officers have had to develop these skills through on-the-job trial and error because they are not developed in the current PME system.\textsuperscript{279}

Interestingly, senior officers frequently receive instruction and practice in these skills by interacting with corporate trainers, but it is apparent that company grade officers also require this training.\textsuperscript{280} Educational research indicates that it takes most people seven to ten years to acquire a refined set of skills for complex tasks such as negotiation and mediation.\textsuperscript{281} Exposure and development of these skills must not only occur at the company grade officer-level because they are required in the current operational environment, but also because several years of training is required to develop senior officers who are effective negotiators.

NGO representatives should be present at each service school that prepares company grade officers for assignment and their views should be incorporated into both school curricula and doctrine development.\textsuperscript{282} These representatives do not necessarily need to be permanently assigned to the faculty at every training location, but the army should develop a contractual relationship in which experienced NGO leaders instruct officers at different phases of each course. One location that deserves permanent NGO representation is the CAS3 at Fort Leavenworth due to the continuous course rotation and integration of all branches. This representation can be achieved with a sharing of
resources with the Command and General Staff Officers Course as they are both located in the same building.

From an operational assignment perspective, NGO participation in collective training must clearly continue and then expand in scope. Physically meeting and working together can help overcome the parochialism frequently found in the two cultures. The army should integrate NGOs into all CTC rotations and plan for the NGO-military interaction at all levels when developing training objectives. The presence of NGOs in some form and quantity should be a persistent characteristic of training and not merely a module program added on to an already planned event. This idea supports the “train as you fight” training principle and various scenarios should be developed that begin with NGOs already operating in the region and the military then introduced into the conflict. With the exception of Operation Provide Comfort, NGOs have preceded the introduction of military forces in all humanitarian assistance and peace operations. This sequence would cause army leaders to seek coordination with NGOs and understand that they are but one piece of the entire picture. Additionally, training scenarios can build up to and then build down from conventional warfighting. In other words, interacting with NGOs is not just a separate task but is now a condition of the current operational environment; therefore, their presence should be a condition found in pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict training opportunities.

Actual members of the relief community must be present in these training exercises. Clearly, NGO resources to support this commitment are limited and the military would have to financially and administratively support this involvement to some extent. Soldiers who role-play NGO members in training events do not adequately understand or represent the mindset and culture of the NGOs. They may know their
roles as NGO workers but usually lack operational experience and can not adequately mentor company grade officers.

Within units, commanders must integrate aspects of the full spectrum of operations into unit Officer Professional Development (OPD) programs. In order to better train his junior officers to cope with the unique challenges of NGO interactions and the demands found in peace operations, one brigade commander conducts STXs during OPD sessions. Staff training must also ensure that NGOs are not ignored in any aspect of operational planning. Current tables of organization and equipment (TO&E) do not provide for CA officers below the division level, but commanders can task officers within their units to monitor specific NGO activities. These officers can ensure that specific NGO perspectives are represented in operations, fellow officers understand the culture of that particular NGO, and information is maintained that will assist in the execution of a contingency operation, if required. InterAction publishes situation reports of the activities, locations, and points of contacts of all associate NGOs throughout the world and these documents and associated AARs can be maintained at battalion-level for all NGOs operating in expected areas of employment.

From a self-development perspective, the former MQS system should be revised and updated with tasks that include interaction with NGOs in future operations. This would help focus the self-development efforts of both individual officers and their commanders and enable them to better prepare for future operations. Additionally, professional reading lists must be updated to include books about MOOTW and the interaction of various agencies, including NGOs, in past and future operations.

Leader development can also be enhanced through low-cost techniques available through basic technology. For example, producing important materials on CD-ROM and other digital media can augment training activities now conducted by
This would provide an even wider distribution of important materials and help focus unit commanders when developing OPD programs within units. Traditional handbooks can also augment focused instruction and is a relatively inexpensive supplement to training. There are clearly too many NGOs for company grade officers to understand them all. Consequently, the desire to understand specific organizations can be focused on the most significant NGOs that conduct widespread, sustained, and technically sound work in a conflict region. For example, approximately 20 U.S. and European NGOs receive 75% of all the public funds spent by NGOs in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. These organizations should be the focus of the education effort.

The military should establish an internship program with major NGOs to help expose company grade officers to the culture and operations of different agencies. If the army is to promote U.S. policy worldwide, leaders must be at ease with the other organizations found in the conflict region. This familiarity derives more from experience than from an academic environment, although both are beneficial. Conceptually, the program would be similar to the current Training-with-Industry (TWI) program executed by combat service support branches. Each participant would work with a designated NGO for three to six months and the target groups for this program should be, in order, combat service support officers, combat support officers, and combat arms officers. Currently, most army officers spend almost their entire careers within the confines of military organizations and they fail to gain an appreciation of other agencies' cultures. The insights gained by an internship program would be diffused throughout the army as more officers participate in the program and NGO perspectives would eventually be more widely understood.
Although a relatively new concept to the U.S. Army, internships have been successful in other militaries. For example, the Irish army pays infantry captains to work with one of many international relief agencies for three months and has witnessed a great response rate for the program.\textsuperscript{295} Within the U.S. Army, one West Point cadet spent the summer of 1998 in Africa working with the American Refugee Committee (ARC). Upon conclusion, both the NGO and the cadet viewed the experience as positive and felt the better understanding of organizational cultures would be beneficial in the future.\textsuperscript{296}

The army should encourage the publication of important articles authored by NGO members in its professional journals.\textsuperscript{297} These articles should challenge the conventional military mindset and broaden the perspectives of company grade officers. Currently, the army publishes relatively few documents on humanitarian assistance missions, peace operations, and NGOs. When found, they are usually seen in journals written primarily for senior officers. Fighting and winning wars is quite properly the primary focus of the army, but there is a danger if it is perceived to be the only legitimate function.\textsuperscript{298} As Ralph Peters states,

“One way or another, we will go. Deployments will be unpredictable, often surprising. And we frequently will be unprepared for the mission, partly because of the sudden force of circumstances but also because our military is determined to be unprepared for missions it does not want, as if the lack of preparedness might prevent our going. We are like children who refuse to get dressed for school.”\textsuperscript{299}

To the indignation of some and the support of others, the civilian leadership of the nation will continue to commit the army to both humanitarian assistance and peace operations because such actions support both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.
Although military doctrine indicates that success in these types of operations is based in large measure on the performance of junior leaders, the army fails to systematically prepare company grade officers to interact with NGOs in these operations. Continuing this ad hoc approach to preparation courts disaster. Although the army has been relatively successful in both types of operations in recent memory, these responses have not been ideal. The success of future NGO-military interactions should not depend on the emergence of a few individuals who, although untrained, happen to be present in an operation.

Future operations will be more effective if leaders at all levels are better prepared to face the environment. There will rarely be time to gather the right mix of trained personnel in the desired numbers and form a team specifically trained to conduct humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki indicate that the frequency and duration of SSC operations leave neither the time nor the forces for overly specialized units or reorganization and preparation for specific missions. The army must institutionalize a familiarity with the NGO community through the leader development system and not leave crucial preparation decisions to conscientious commanders at various levels. Although training time is limited and many warfighting-focused leaders object to diluting training with MOOTW tasks, preparation for interacting with NGOs in humanitarian assistance and peace operations is an accurate reflection of the current operational requirements.

In published statements, the objective force will provide the nation with an army that is able to operate throughout the spectrum of conflict and its versatility will be magnified through the “training and leadership of our high quality men and women.” In reality, the army continues to approach each humanitarian assistance and peace operation as an exception and does little routine preparation for such contingencies. It is time for the army to “get dressed for school” and prepare its company grade officers...
for the NGO-military interaction – an interaction it acknowledges is both critical to success and inevitable.
ENDNOTES

3 Smaller-scale contingencies are not defined in current joint or army doctrine, but are referred to in the National Security Strategy as operations that “encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, and reinforcing key allies.” William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999), 18.
5 JP 3-0 lists only eight types of MOOTW: arms control, combating terrorism, Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations, nation assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, civil support operations, peace operations, and support to insurgencies. In accordance with JP 3-0, humanitarian assistance is conducted as a task under civil support operations. JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, however, adds enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, and strikes and raids to the eight standard MOOTW types found in JP 3-0.
6 U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3-0, V-1.
8 Caldera and Shinseki, xi.
9 Clinton, National Security Strategy, 1.
16 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23, 2. Preventive diplomacy is the deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Peacemaking is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement that end disputes and resolve the issues that led to conflict. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, primarily diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict.
22 Ibid, V-1.
23 Caldera and Shinseki, 2.
According to the National Security Strategy, U.S. interests fall into three categories: vital, important, and humanitarian and other interests.


U.S. Department of Defense, *JP 3-0*, II-1 and V-2. Principles for Operations Other Than War are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Current army doctrine does not recognize the existence of principles of MOOTW and remains steadfastly adhered to the nine principles of war: objective, offense, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. Unity of command is the principle of war must closely aligned with unity of effort.


Company grade officers are defined as officers in the ranks of Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, and Captain.


Caldera and Shinseki, 15-17.


Ibid.


Davidson et al., 5-6.

Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, eds., *NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.), 75.

Air Land Sea Application Center, *FM 100-23-1*, 2-11.
54 Weiss and Gordenker, *NGOs, the UN & Global Governance*, 74.
60 Lange, 107.
65 Eyre, 15.
69 Eyre, 19.
71 Ibid, I-9 and Weiss and Gordenker, 78.
74 Eyre, 18.
77 Lanious, 5. In the last decade, more aid workers have died in war torn areas than have soldiers.
81 Davidson et al., 6.
83 Air Land Sea Application Center, *FM 100-22-1*, 3-10.
84 Author’s personal experience after multiple conversations with NGO workers while deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina during SFOR operations in 1997.
86 Eyre, 16.
87 Ibid, 18.
89 Lanious, 4.
90 Eyre, 19.
91 Taw and Peters, 11.
92 Eyre, 19.
93 Ibid.
94 Lanious, 4.
103 Davidson et al., 1.
108 Flor, 30.
109 Lanious, 8. For example, NGO advised the U.S. leadership to deploy no more than 3500 troops to Somalia and avoid the difficult region of Mogadishu. The deployment stirred emotions in the populace and among the warlords and attacks against relief workers actually increased when the military arrived. Additionally, NGOs accurately predicted that a phased entry into the country would only accelerate the looting in areas not yet occupied and hinder relief efforts in the short-term. This was immediately seen as the technicals in Baidoa took a final opportunity to reign with impunity as marines arrived in Mogadishu.
111 Swindle, 7; Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship*, 117; and Kieseker, 68.
112 Air Land Sea Application Center, *FM 100-23-1*, J-6 and J-7.
117 Lute, 22.

121 U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3-07.3, I-15. Other organizations are similar in nature to the CMOC such as the U.N. deployed On-Site Operations Center in Somalia and the Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.


127 Hennessy, 17.


130 Davis, 18 and 32.

131 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-8, 2-19.


140 Taw, 36.


144 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23, 41 and Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operations Other Than War Volume I – Humanitarian Assistance: CALL Newsletter 92-6 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 1992), 14.

145 Hinson, 7

146 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Humanitarian Assistance, 19 and 24 and U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23-1, J-2.


148 Hinson, 7.

149 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Humanitarian Assistance, 18.


152 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Humanitarian Assistance, 18.

153 Fishel, 191.
Allard, 24. Sectors were called HRS instead of military sectors to emphasize the humanitarian nature of the mission in Somalia.


Fishel, 202.

Swindle, 8 and Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship, 112.

Swindle, 8.

Davies, 38.


Dworken, 3.

Kieseker, 68-73.

Taw, 36.

Duff, 23.

Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship, 118.


Dworken, 21.

Ibid, 25.

Ibid, 21.

Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship, 100.

Fishel, 227.

Hayes and Wheatley, 40.

Davis, 49.

Bolton, 15.


Taw, 18.

Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship, 182.

Ibid, 55.

Tony Cucolo, “Grunty Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers,” Parameters XXIX, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 113.


Allard, 40.


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Olsen and Davis, 2.


260 Taw and Peters, xiii.
262 Taw, Persselin, and Leed, 40.
265 Martin, 18 and U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23, 38.
266 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 2-19.
269 Swindle, 14.
270 LaMon, 6.
273 Thomas F. Greco, “Unity of Effort in Peace Operations” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 42.
274 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23, 43.
278 Shamir and Ben-Ari, 36.
280 Olsen and Davis, 3.
282 Greco, 41.
283 Nagl and Young, 34.
284 Ibid.
285 Doll, 21.
286 Lanious, 3.
287 Taw, Persselin, and Leed, 38.
289 LaMon, 13.
290 Weiss and Gordenker, 68-69.
292 Swan, 40.
293 Shamir and Ben-Ari, 38.
295 Kieseker, 75. From an army of 11,000, over 120 officers applied for the limited positions.
297 Swan, 10.
298 Chayes and Raach, 7.
299 Peters, 74.
300 Taw, Persselin, and Leed, x-xi.
302 Taw, Morrison, and Leed, 6.
303 Swan, 31.
304 Caldera and Shinseki, 16.
305 Ibid, xiii.
306 Taw, Morrison, and Leed, 62.
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