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**NATO Enlargement: Operational Considerations for the
U.S. Combatant Commander?**

By

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is politically committed to pursuing an enlargement process that presents not only strategic-political challenges for the current members of the Alliance but also operational challenges for the U.S. Combatant Commander. While most of the strategic-political considerations are raised as part of NATO's programs for aspirant selection for membership, operational-military considerations are not fully assessed until after the membership decision is made.

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In order to best prepare for new NATO members and maintain the military strength of NATO, the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) should adopt an approach to enlargement using existing processes to preclude added resource requirements and duplication of effort. NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) program should be used as the first step in the process to identify aspirants and provide an initial assessment. Operational art considerations should then be used to further assess present capabilities within the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) process for the aspirants. This approach provides CINC USEUCOM with a current assessment of the military impact of new members entering NATO during the current round and also future rounds of NATO enlargement.

PREFACE

I was assigned as a strategic planner in the Plans and Policy Division of the International Military Staff (IMS) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium from October 1998 to October 2000. During that period, I personally observed the interaction

between NATO aspirants and Alliance members. I represented the IMS during Policy Coordination Group's formulation of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led Partnership for Peace (PfP) Operations (approved during the 1999 NATO Summit) and, during the Kosovo conflict; I provided weekly operational updates to PfP military representatives. I directly observed numerous high level military and political activities between Aspirant nations and Alliance members. I noted a clear disconnect between the strategic and operational levels of thought, and a lack of analysis and assessment of aspirant nations from an operational art perspective prior to the membership decision. Currently, there is a failure to apply operational art considerations in assessing the impact of enlargement prior to the decision on future NATO members. Thus, the purpose of my paper is to fill that void by providing a process for conducting continuous military capabilities analyses of aspirant nations to better prepare USEUCOM for the acceptance of new NATO members.

THESIS / INTRODUCTION

“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”
- Article 10 of NATO’s founding Treaty, 1949¹

Since its inception in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has remained committed to Article 10 of the Washington treaty and enlarged from its original twelve nations to the present configuration of nineteen nations (See Appendix A).² NATO admitted Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.³ NATO once again renewed the Alliance commitment to enlargement on 12 March 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were accepted. In addition, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, approved by NATO Heads of State and Government in April 1999, reaffirmed that the Alliance remains open to new members and plans to extend further invitations to new members in the future.⁴ This enlargement is a political reality that must be embraced from a military standpoint.

Strategic and political considerations are studied and analyzed in the process of selecting and preparing for past and future rounds of NATO enlargement. Although the decision on enlargement is a political one, that decision will entail opportunities for military input. The political priorities will possibly overshadow or offset military issues. Focused military assessments using operational art considerations, which are specifically linked to the possible results of enlargement, are not addressed in current military assessments and analyses until after the political decision on membership is made. This leaves the United States’ dual-hatted combatant commander, Commander in Chief (CINC) United States European Command (USEUCOM) / Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), with many unique challenges as new members enter the Alliance. Key

among these challenges is determining the military impact of nations who achieve membership. This paper will propose a method for developing such a determination.

The combatant commander, as CINC USEUCOM, has a defined geographic area of responsibility (AOR) consisting of eighty-nine nations, which is divided into five regions.⁵ This paper will focus on the combatant commander wearing his CINC USEUCOM hat with a fixed geographic area and a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) mandated Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) to address his AOR. Although he has divided the AOR into five regions, there is no clear differentiation between aspirant nations and other nations in his AOR.

Throughout this paper I will address some NATO programs, such as, the Membership Action Plan (MAP – See Appendix B)⁶ and the Partnership for Peace (PfP – See Appendix C)⁷ that aid CINC USEUCOM in setting apart (or categorizing) the nine aspirant nations from the other eighty nations in his theater of operation. In addition, I will propose a method for CINC USEUCOM to analyze and assess the capabilities of aspirant nations using operational art considerations, his existing TEP and other tools to prepare the U.S. military theater for the next and also future rounds of NATO enlargement.

BACKGROUND

Napoleon once noted that he would rather fight alliances because they could not maintain political solidarity.⁸ The classic military thinkers, Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, also note the concept of attacking or disrupting alliances.⁹ Failure to provide prudent and proactive management of enlargement by Alliance members could increase not only Alliance political, but also its military vulnerabilities. Fortunately, the strength of NATO's military deterrence might have prevented potential adversaries from attempting to break the political solidarity of the NATO Alliance. The recent Kosovo conflict, although not an

attack against NATO, severely strained the Alliance's political solidarity. As the number of NATO members increases, its political solidarity may become more vulnerable to attack based on Napoleon's axiom. Therefore, since the Alliance is committed to enlargement, it must ensure that acceptance of new members does not weaken the very thread that has ensured its strength over the past 52 years – its military might.

While the original enlargement effort had the primary purpose of deterring aggression by the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact members, more recently efforts focus on the enhancement of overall European security and stability.¹⁰ While there are many political status perks that come with NATO membership, most aspirant nations are focused on gaining the security provided under the umbrella of NATO's Article 5 treaty commitment for the collective defense of Alliance members. Article 5 of the treaty states that, "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all of them."¹¹ Although recent NATO operations have been on the periphery of the Alliance involving Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO), such as NATO action in Bosnia and Kosovo, Collective Defense or NATO's Article 5 commitment continues to be the primary military basis for the Alliance.

The changing context of military operations by NATO must be fully realized and embraced by not only Alliance members, but also by aspirant nations. This change in military operations is most clearly delineated in terms of scale, cost tolerance, likelihood and duration.¹² The relative scale of operations has gone from large to generally small operations. During the cold war, NATO expected to be confronted with a requirement for extremely large (multiple Army) operations, whereas today, the scale ranges from small (battalion) to moderate (multi-corps level). The cost tolerance during the cold war in terms of both monetary and human costs was relatively high. Today, cost tolerance is

very low from a financial perspective when looking at the percentage of defense spending against total national budgets. From the human cost tolerance standpoint, the zero tolerance used during the Kosovo conflict is becoming an emerging trend. Finally, these post cold war crises are viewed with increasing frequency and longer duration than previously anticipated. These trends in military operations make the challenge of assessing potential future Alliance members more difficult.

Membership Action Plan

NATO provides aspirant nations with a process to develop their own capabilities as a step toward membership into the Alliance. That process is the Membership Action Plan (MAP). MAP was unveiled during the NATO's 1999 Washington Summit and gives credibility to NATO's enlargement process.¹³ To participate in this process, an aspirant nation must be a member of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and actively engaged in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). These programs are critical to the MAP as they aid aspirant nations in developing interoperability with NATO forces. The current MAP program participants include: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.¹⁴ NATO uses the MAP process to provide aspirants advice and feedback on their preparations for entry into the Alliance. However, participation in NATO's MAP process is not a guarantee for future membership for the nine PfP members currently participating in the program.¹⁵ The MAP process covers the development and future aspirant work on political and economic, defense/military, resource, security and legal issues.¹⁶ In sum, the MAP process prepares aspirants to attain strategic and political continuity with NATO, and provides USEUCOM with a method of identifying the aspirants and their military capabilities for assessment prior to their integration into the Alliance.

Engagement

The 2000 U.S. National Security Strategy summarizes the U.S. strategy of engagement as reaping, “significant benefits for our Nation – benefits that actively support our goals of security, prosperity, and democracy, yet always remain in consonance with our principles of protecting our national interests and advancing our values.”¹⁷ USEUCOM defines engagement as “Any non-coercive military activity undertaken with a foreign national with the intent to influence the strategic environment and advance U.S. National and theater interests.”¹⁸ European Command incorporates exercises and other bilateral interoperability opportunities into both the overall Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) and the individual TEP’s for nations in the European theater area of operations. Proactive military interaction (PMI) or engagement is directed through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). However, there are no specific forces apportioned for PMI activities. Mr. Paul Davenport of the USEUCOM J5 asserts that Engagement activities give the European Theater: “more democratic governments, increased stability, growing free-market economies, improved living standards, western-oriented militaries, improved human rights, better public health and more productive agriculture as well as the benefits of freedom.”¹⁹ USEUCOM’s vast theater of operations, encompassing eighty-nine nations, makes PMI a difficult challenge, which USEUCOM is tasked to accomplish. USEUCOM has begun to meet this challenge by developing PMI activities to aid in preparing for NATO enlargement.

The focus of USEUCOM’s theater engagement planning process is to integrate all peacetime activity in its AOR to achieve national and theater level objectives. These theater engagement objectives include the promotion of peace and stability, and the defeat of adversaries. As part of the TEP process USEUCOM has developed methods

for capabilities assessment and analysis, and resource apportionment. This data is captured within USEUCOM's Country Strategic Factors Analysis (CSFA) and Theater Resource Apportionment Matrix (TRAM). However, these tools do not distinguish between nations in general and the aspirant nations in their assessments or analyses.

Some nations within the USEUCOM AOR have nation specific engagement plans that are focused toward U.S. theater engagement to that particular nation. Such plans for each aspirant would provide CINC USEUCOM with an initial step toward a more active approach to enlargement.

Enlargement Guidelines

The decision on which aspirant(s) will be selected for NATO membership is not yet determined, but it will be an issue for discussion during the next NATO summit in Prague 2002. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a general shift in the focus of NATO's military activities away from its Article 5 mission of collective defense looking more toward Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO). These missions have captured the attention of the Alliance and required the dedication of vast amount of Alliance resources. Potential new members will have to account for this shift by not only demonstrating that they can contribute to NATO's collective defense mission but also, by demonstrating that they can contribute to NATO's new Non-Article CRO.²⁰ Although strategic and political considerations for aspirant nations were thought to be generally clear; in reality, there remains room for debate. This debate complicates the issue for the theater commander to tailor the national TEPs of the potential new members and to focus his efforts.

Prior to the last round of enlargement in 1999, the United States legislative branch of government conducted congressional hearings to debate the key issues regarding the

United States position on NATO enlargement. The debate in the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on National Security generally supported this round of enlargement as it preserved the fundamental character of the NATO Alliance and American leadership therein.²¹ Similar debate took place in the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, whereby the Committee Chairman noted the importance of NATO enlargement and both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense testified as to the administration's support for enlarging the membership of NATO.²² Prior to the last round of NATO enlargement extensive political debate took place, as well as similar activity within U.S. military circles. Although the 1998 USEUCOM TEP highlights that the three aspirant nations (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) would soon enter the Alliance, a tailored approach to planning for their admission was not evident.

It is the firm conviction of the new U.S. administration, "that enlargement offers a critical and indispensable means to build a united, stable and democratic Europe, which remains a vital and enduring U.S. interest."²³ With this commitment to future NATO enlargement, USEUCOM must take an approach that will better prepare itself for the next round. USEUCOM cannot rely solely on the "current" TEP process to accommodate enlargement. Tailoring of the program is required to account for operational considerations of potential new members. Otherwise, the current program will fall short of the requirements necessary to meet the ultimate challenge of enlargement. The TEP process provides USEUCOM with a view toward aspirant nations' capabilities and limitations through mil-to-mil contacts and evaluations during PfP exercises. However, it does not incorporate a framework of operational considerations that can be used to better analyze and assess aspirant capabilities. Without such a framework or operational

template adapted into the TEP process, CINC USEUCOM could be caught standing flatfooted when the next members are accepted into the NATO Alliance.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although NATO has a MAP program to prepare aspirant nations for possible membership and the Alliance has demonstrated its commitment for continued enlargement, NATO's ultimate aim for that enlargement is not yet determined. In fact, NATO seems to be following the direction of Napoleon when he stated, "*on s'engage et puis on voit*," (One commits himself then sees where he is.)²⁴ Given this rather fuzzy end state for enlargement, but accepting the fact that enlargement will continue to occur within the Alliance, CINC USEUCOM must best prepare his command for that eventuality. Any possible USEUCOM approach to the issue of enlargement would probably require little or no duplication of effort and be conducted by the current staff resources available to the command. One such approach would be to group (categorize) existing USEUCOM TEP programs by aspirant nation and assess the aspirants within those TEP programs using the tools of operational art.

Joint Publication 3-0 characterizes operational art through fourteen fundamental elements ranging from synergy through termination.²⁵ USEUCOM's planning staff should consider these facets of operational art in the formulation of an approach to enlargement. This key consideration must not be lost. However, for the purpose of the analysis in this short essay, a simpler method will serve as our basis for analysis – the operational factors of space, time and force. Use of these basic factors will provide USEUCOM with a generic example to consider in their analyses and assessments of aspirant nations. While the two general missions of the Alliance may be affected differently by operational factors, the application of the factors will be the same.

The Alliance no longer has the massive Soviet War machine with the Warsaw Pact neighbors threatening its borders, however, new threats will arise and possibly create an asymmetric threat that has yet to be faced. Therefore, USEUCOM planners must evaluate potential new Alliance members as to what they bring to the fight or what possible military vulnerabilities they may present to an adversary. In essence, USEUCOM must adopt a process to continually analyze and assess aspirants' military capabilities and vulnerabilities prior to membership in the NATO Alliance.

Space

The operational factor of space is generally viewed as a physical dimension that encompasses land, sea, and airspace including outer space.²⁶ Space is an important operational factor to consider yet its overall effect depends on the factors of forces and time.²⁷ Two of five fundamental factors that Sun Tzu used to appraise warfare include weather and terrain.²⁸ These elements can roughly be interpreted as the operational factor space. Although numerous aspects of the operational art factor of space could be addressed in this analysis, I will only review the possible affects of bordering nations and sea access to illustrate how such a consideration could be applied to aspirant nations.

Nations that border an aspirant could include Alliance or PfP members, stable or unstable nations or potential Alliance adversaries. Aspirant nations with a border common to Alliance or PfP members could be viewed as having a space advantage. Of the nine MAP members there are seven that would fit in this category (Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

An aspirant nation with a border common to a NATO or PfP nation could ease land transit for force reinforcement or other aid from NATO nations. Support for overflight

rights by bordering NATO nations would facilitate air transit for either combat or transport aircraft. Aspirant nations that are not bordering a NATO or PfP nation could create complications for reinforcement or aid. Additionally, sharing borders with a NATO Ally or PfP nation may preclude border boundary disputes that often occur between nations. Although I have lumped the value of bordering NATO and PfP nations together, this may be misleading. The twenty-six PfP nations, although closely tied to the Alliance, are not required to adhere to the same Washington treaty commitments as the NATO members.²⁹ Therefore, when an aspirant shares a common border with a PfP nation, it may not necessarily have the same advantage as those aspirant nations that border an Alliance member.

Aspirants that border, potential adversarial nations, nations not embracing the democratic ideals of the Alliance, or nations struggling with internal security and unrest present added risks that should be considered by operational planners. While in today's world it is difficult to clearly define adversarial nations, they do exist and can be categorized as such after careful intelligence analysis. Risks presented to the combatant commander by the Alliance selecting aspirants with a hostile, unstable or undemocratic bordering nation create a higher potential for future conflict for the Alliance. As noted earlier, this conflict could be of either an Article 5 Collective Defense or Non-Article 5 CRO nature.

Aspirant nations that border neutral nations, may limit the available maneuver space for the possible employment of all (land, air or sea) friendly forces in a conflict. The border presence of a neutral nation would likewise inhibit a potential attacker's available maneuver space. However, this assumes that the attacker will honor the rights of the neutral border nation. Conversely, a neutral border nation may also serve as a buffer to

nations that may pose a threat to an aspirant nation. This buffer nation could slow or divert the attack by an aggressor nation and thereby enhance the opportunity for the potential NATO member to strengthen its own defense and incorporate other Alliance forces into that defense.

Aspirant nations that are land locked, such as Macedonia and Slovakia, obviously have little involvement in naval activities and focus their efforts primarily on land and air forces. Those littoral nations such as Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and even Slovenia could be counted on to have some military capability in all three modes of the military equation. This physical space aspect of sea access has an impact on interoperability requirements and military training programs. An aspirant nation with access to the sea may have a navy of some form, and that naval force presence will generate additional resource requirements for force training and equipment, and raise interoperability issues not required for a land locked aspirant.

Nations with sea access may play a role in future conflicts as they could impact on potential sea lines of communication (SLOC) for the Alliance or enable the Alliance members to disrupt or interdict the SLOC of an adversary. Additionally, this sea access may have a negative affect if the nation is primarily reliant on the sea for its commerce and trade. This may be a potential vulnerability. Once the SLOC are disrupted or interdicted, it could incapacitate the nation depending on its reliance on sea access for commerce and trade.

Time

A factor most closely related to space is the operational factor of time. Time is the most precious factor that a commander has at his disposal, for once time is lost, it can never be recaptured.³⁰ As the modern technological advances have significantly

increased the pace of conflict, it has shortened the time for conflict management and planning for conflict resolution. Prudent military analysis and assessment of aspirants' capabilities will save this most critical commodity. Thus, time is the primary consideration that should persuade our theater commander to adopt the thesis of this paper. If the USEUCOM commander and his staff take an adaptive approach to the NATO enlargement issue through the grouping of their TEP and by applying basic operational art fundamentals to those TEPs, they will save valuable analysis and assessment time when the political decision on the next NATO members occurs. By categorization of TEP, I am referring to putting the USEUCOM's TEP for specific nations into a special category that would include the USEUCOM's national TEP for all NATO aspirant nations. Thoughtful analysis and planning in preparation for the arrival of potential new NATO members will aid CINC USEUCOM in integrating those aspirant nations into his theater plans once the membership decision is made.

The timing of the acceptance of new members into the Alliance demonstrates that there is a basic art of regulating the occurrence of an event to achieve the most desirable results of that event. The current interrelationship between aspirant nations and nations who either border them or have shared a long history with them could impact on the timing of their selection. Although NATO has stated that these relations will not have an impact on timing of their selection process, in reality such issues cannot be ignored and should be openly debated. For example, Russians of all political backgrounds are inexorably opposed to NATO membership for the Baltic Republics.³¹ This current view by Russia is not surprising considering its ties to the Baltic Republics. Therefore, USEUCOM must closely assess the possible military repercussions of a NATO decision

to accept one or more Baltic aspirants into the NATO Alliance, when it may heighten tension with Russia.

Time generally benefits the defender and inhibits the attacker. This occurs because as the attacker continues the offensive, his force diminishes. However, as the attacker gains territory, that space gained becomes a trade off for time.³² Therefore, time should be considered when reviewing the accessibility to the aspirant. The physical geography (space) of an aspirant impacts on the operational factor of time. For the defense of the new member we should consider the time it would take to move Alliance forces through bordering nations and into an aspirant's territory to provide support in accordance with NATO's collective defensive mission. Additionally, while NATO members are coming to the aid of an aspirant, the attacking adversary is gaining space within the aspirant's territory. Therefore, the adversary gains space as the new aspirant awaits reinforcement or aid in the defense. Also, upon arrival in the new member nation, the physical geography (space) of a nation will affect the time it takes to mass those friendly forces for the defense.

The time necessary for movement of the new member's forces through the physical environment (space) to support the defense of another NATO nation must be considered. If a new member borders a NATO nation and its forces are to be incorporated into that Ally's defense, the time required to move the new member's force must be taken into account.

Time required for an aspirant nation to mobilize, train and move its forces to support either NATO's Article 5 Collective Defense or Non-Article 5 CRO missions must be understood. A nation that does not possess the capability to rapidly mobilize, train and deploy its forces may require additional support from other Alliance members to bring it

up to the NATO standard. As a participant in the MAP, aspirants strive to meet NATO standards. Although meeting NATO standards is one of the primary benchmarks within the MAP, political considerations may override military standards and they may not be fully realized upon entrance into the Alliance. However, since the next round of enlargement will be the first to have the opportunity to take complete advantage of the MAP process, aspirants could actually meet all the standards. Regardless of whether the aspirants will or will not meet those benchmarks prior to membership, a thorough assessment of each aspirant's force will save time and help prepare the theater commander to gain a full understanding and formulate a truer expectation of aspirant's force capabilities to incorporate them into his battle plans.

Force

The operational factor of force comprises a number of ingredients that "are physical in character, such as the number of personnel, weapons and equipment, physical mobility, firepower, command organization, logistics, and quality of weapons and equipment."³³ The force of an aspirant nation can readily be viewed through the sheer physical number of forces available. However, basic numbers do not provide us with a full understanding of the true capability of that force. For example, an aspirant may have an extremely large force numerically, but if that force is inadequately trained, poorly led and improperly equipped, it may be more of a detriment than an asset to the overall military might of that nation. Conversely, a force properly trained, led and equipped would be an asset to the Alliance and a force multiplier that is better prepared to support the Alliance during either Collective Defense or Non-Article 5 CRO missions. The same considerations regarding training, equipment and leadership can be applied to an aspirant with a small force.

The specific type of force that an aspirant brings to the Alliance is also a consideration. If a nation has relatively strong combat forces but, its combat support and /or combat service support forces are weak or nonexistent, then that nation may not be as prepared to conduct the type of operations presently facing NATO or future Non-Article 5 CRO. For example, a nation with four light infantry divisions but, little or no military police, logistics support, civil affairs, engineer, helicopter or medical support assets would require significant support from other Alliance nations. Additionally, as the new European strategic environment evolves, the requirement for forces that are trained in peace enforcement rather than traditional warfighting missions will increase. Thus, this training requirement for aspirants' combat forces could be addressed as a force consideration.

NATO has numerous exercises scheduled each year with Partner nations in which USEUCOM is a participant. Additionally, USEUCOM conducts bilateral exercises with PfP nations. These exercises support the training of NATO PfP forces. These exercises, in combination with aspirant nations' internal training programs and the individual and unit training conducted at PfP training centers, focus not only on traditional warfighting but, also peace enforcement and other similar operations encompassed in Non-Article 5 CRO. Although NATO conducts assessments of aspirants' forces, more thorough assessments of those forces should be undertaken in terms of both their training status and military capabilities. These assessments could be accomplished through the current processes established within USEUCOM via the TEP process. Currently, there are no specific discriminators within USEUCOM TEP to differentiate NATO aspirants and other PfP members. An active program to incorporate a more thorough assessment of the capabilities of aspirant forces within the current TEP could help prepare USEUCOM for the training challenge once those aspirant forces enter the Alliance.

The NATO Alliance has, throughout its fifty-two years of existence, established standards for both equipment and doctrine. Even with rigid standardization programs, interoperability within the Alliance remains a challenge. This standardization challenge is amplified significantly when applied to aspirant forces. While aspirant nations, as a part of the MAP, attempt to train their forces and adapt their equipment to NATO requirements, they still may need significant time to become fully compliant. Therefore, we should thoroughly evaluate aspirant forces on their ability to meet NATO standards and identify interoperability challenges we would face, should a specific aspirant become a NATO member.

I have only touched on some of the operational considerations that could be used to analyze and assess NATO aspirants' capabilities. The factors of space, time and force should serve as an example of the type of operational art fundamentals that should be addressed within USEUCOM's TEP process to better prepare it for future rounds of NATO enlargement.

CONCLUSION

NATO will continue to pursue enlargement in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, and that enlargement will be based primarily on political expediency generated by members of the Alliance. Although CINC USEUCOM will not have the capability to influence the final decision on the entrance of new members, he should, however, develop an approach to prepare his command for the military transition of new members into his theater planning. Since the decision for the next round of enlargement will be considered during the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, Czech Republic, expeditious action should be taken on developing and adopting an approach to enlargement.

I recommend that USEUCOM adopt an approach that uses the existing programs and processes to prevent duplication of effort and additional resource requirements. Such an approach would use the information from the current MAP program to clearly identify potential new NATO members and provide an initial assessment of their military capabilities.³⁴ With a clear identification of the aspirants and an initial assessment provided through the MAP, USEUCOM should next group, by aspirant nation, the national plans that have been developed through TEP process and create plans for those aspirants where they are not yet developed. These individual engagement plans must be prepared by conducting an assessment of the nations' military capabilities taking full account of the type of operational art considerations provided in this paper. Through the application of these engagement plans, USEUCOM will have a complete military assessment of aspirants' capabilities well before the political decision on membership is made. Although the NATO membership decision is almost solely based on political considerations and the military has no veto authority, it can only be better prepared to deal with a *fait accompli*. Therefore this recommendation provides USEUCOM with an adaptive approach toward the next round of NATO enlargement within the constructs of existing programs and it can readily be updated and applied to future rounds of NATO enlargement.

APPENDIX A

Nineteen Member Nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Belgium

Italy

Canada

Luxembourg

Czech Republic

Netherlands

Denmark

Norway

France

Portugal

Germany

Poland

Greece

Spain

Hungary

Turkey

Iceland

United States

United Kingdom

APPENDIX B

Nine Nations participating in the Membership Action Plan

Albania

Bulgaria

Macedonia

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

APPENDIX C

Twenty-six Members of the Partnership for Peace

Albania	Georgia	Romania
Armenia	Ireland	Russia
Austria	Kazakhstan	Slovakia
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Slovenia
Belarus	Latvia	Sweden
Bulgaria	Lithuania	Turkmenistan
Croatia	Macedonia	Ukraine
Estonia	Malta	Uzbekistan
Finland	Moldova	

ENDNOTES

¹ Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty quoted from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Handbook. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998), 398.

² See Appendix A for Alliance members.

³ “NATO Fact Sheets: NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP)”, 6 September 2000. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm/>>, [27 April 2001].

⁴ NATO Press Release NAC-S (99) 65 –24 April 1999”, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, 23 April 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm/>> [27 April 2001].

⁵ USEUCOM’s five regions include: Western Europe and NATO, Central Europe, New Independent States, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Sahara Africa.

⁶ “The MAP was established during the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and provides for concrete feedback and advice from NATO to aspiring countries on their own preparations directed at achieving membership.” “NATO Fact Sheets: NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP)”, September 6, 2000, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm/>> [27 April 2001]. See Appendix B for MAP members.

⁷ “The PfP aims at enhancing respective peace keeping abilities and capabilities through joint planning, training, and exercises, and by so doing increasing interoperability of Partner country’s military forces with those of NATO.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Handbook. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998), 86-7. See Appendix C for PfP members.

⁸ Congress, House, Committee on National Security, United States Policy regarding NATO expansion: Hearing before the Committee on National Security, 105th Cong, 1st sess., 17 July 1997, 1.

⁹ Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass & Company LTD. 1996), 45.

¹⁰ “NATO Press Release NAC-S (99) 65 –24 April 1999” The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, 23 April 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm/>> [27 April 2001].

¹¹ Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty quoted from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Handbook. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998), 396.

¹² David A. Ochmanek, NATO’s Future: Implications for U.S. Military Capabilities and Posture, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 16.

¹³ Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, “Next Steps in NATO Enlargement: The View from Brussels” Remarks to NATO Enlargement Conference, Fort McNair, VA: 6 April 2001, 5.

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- ¹⁴ “NATO Fact Sheets: NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP)”, September 6, 2000, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm/>> [27 April 2001].
- ¹⁵ “NATO Fact Sheets: NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP)”, September 6, 2000, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm/>> [27 April 2001].
- ¹⁶ “NATO Press Release NAC-S (99) 66 – 24 April 1999”, Membership Action Plan (MAP), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm/>> [27 April 2001].
- ¹⁷ U.S. President, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2000), 7.
- ¹⁸ Lt Col Kreighbaum, “Understanding and Valuing Engagement (PMI) as a USEUCOM Mission”, Point Paper S-1, USEUCOM J-5S, (Stuttgart, Germany: 8 March 2001), 1.
- ¹⁹ Paul Davenport, “Engagement A Relevant Strategy, or Expensive Relic”, USEUCOM Point Paper P, USEUCOM J5P, (Stuttgart, Germany: March 2001), 3.
- ²⁰ F. Stephen Larrabee, NATO’s Adaptation and Transformation: Key Challenges, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999), 6.
- ²¹ Congress, House, Committee on National Security, United States Policy regarding NATO expansion: Hearing before the Committee on National Security, 105th Cong, 1st sess., 17 July 1997, 1.
- ²² Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, The Administration proposal on NATO Enlargement: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 105th Cong, 1st sess., 23 April 1997, 3.
- ²³ Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, “Next Steps in NATO Enlargement: The View from Brussels” Remarks to NATO Enlargement Conference, Fort McNair, VA: 6 April 2001, 5.
- ²⁴ Stephen Blank. NATO After Enlargement: new challenges, new forces. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 2.
- ²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington DC: 1 February 1995), III-10.
- ²⁶ Milan N. Vego, NWC 1004, Operational Warfare (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2000), 33.
- ²⁷ Milan N. Vego, NWC 1004, Operational Warfare (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2000), 42.
- ²⁸ Sun Tzu (trans. Samuel B. Griffith), Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 62.
- ²⁹ “The PfP retains its own separate identity within the flexible framework provided by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and maintains its own basic elements and procedures.” NATO Handbook. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998), 88. See Appendix C for members of PfP.
- ³⁰ Milan N. Vego, NWC 1004, Operational Warfare (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2000), 47.
- ³¹ Charles Heyman, ed., Jane’s World Armies (Surry, UK: Janes’s Information Group, 1999), Estonia, 1.
- ³² Milan N. Vego, NWC 1004, Operational Warfare (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2000), 85.
- ³³ Milan N. Vego, NWC 1004, Operational Warfare (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2000), 59.
- ³⁴ See Appendix B for members of the MAP.

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