THE CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC)

IN OPERATION *UPHOLD DEMOCRACY* (HAITI)

A Research Paper

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# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence to Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 Coup to Operation <em>Uphold Democracy</em></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIC CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition and Origins</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Joint Doctrine and the CMOC</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT OF THE CMOC IN HAITI</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh Hour Change in OPLANs</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thriving on Chaos: The CMOC and the HACC</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herding Wild Turkeys: The CMOC and the NGOs</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC Report Card: “A–”</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUSE AND EFFECT</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’ve Got a Secret: Compartmentalized Information</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who’s in Charge</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridging the ‘Culture Gap’</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Better</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

In a relatively short period of time, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) has grown in prominence and is now regarded in joint doctrine as the synergistic bridge which focuses the efforts of military and civilian organizations toward achieving a common unity of effort. Through the lessons learned and oral testimonies compiled by various joint staff, unified command, and US Army organizations, I was astounded to learn just how far we’ve come in so short a time, not only in formalizing the CMOC concept into doctrine, but also in developing an interagency planning process as a result of the planning shortcomings and lessons learned from some of the major military operations this decade. In hindsight, the CMOC was very effective during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Despite a slow start, due to the aggregate problem of incomplete planning, two CMOCs were tailored to quickly harness and coordinate the talents of over 400 civilian organizations in Haiti. Even during the Operation itself, the CMOC continued to evolve to best achieve the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander’s intent and mission objectives. In fact, the next CMOC structure may not even resemble the ones in Haiti, Rwanda, or Somalia. That’s perfectly acceptable, since joint doctrine doesn’t envision the CMOC concept to conform to a rigid structure. Rather, it must be flexibly tailored for each respective JTF mission. Although the body of knowledge regarding CMOCs is limited in scope and stems primarily from the Army’s civil affairs missions, it is rapidly expanding and evolving. The initial planning difficulties and cultural differences within the US
interagency invariably led to the creation of the keystone Joint Pub 3–08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. The joint staff should continue to emphasize the principles contained in this Joint Pub and foster the interagency planning process through exercises, interchanges, and active interface between the two diverse cultures, wherever possible. Two–way, continuous dialogue will enhance complete interagency planning and will eliminate the shortcomings experienced prior to Operation *Uphold Democracy*. Thus, the CMOC is here to stay and its codification into joint doctrine will ensure its viability.

First and foremost, I want to thank my faculty research advisor, Major Patty Seroka, whose valuable insights, wisdom, and research philosophy kept me focused. I also greatly appreciated the assistance of Dr. Mickey Schubert from the Joint History Office in the Pentagon for providing selected research materials. Thanks also to Dr. Bill McClintock, US Atlantic Command (USACOM) Command Historian, for answering tough organizational questions, providing valuable points of contacts, and for extracting transcripts of oral history interviews with several principal CMOC players. Finally, I also wish to thank Dr. Lon Seglie from Fort Leavenworth’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) for the Internet access to CALL documents, as well as for the three comprehensive volumes of Operation *Uphold Democracy* Army Lessons Learned. Their collective insights and comments to this endeavor challenged me to critically analyze the CMOC concept and to link first–hand observations to known facts regarding Operation *Uphold Democracy*.
Abstract

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti was a huge military operational success. The US–led, multinational effort of September, 1994 restored President Jean–Bertrand Aristide and his democratic government back to power. Six months later, having achieved its desired end state, the multinational force transferred full authority to the United Nations. Unlike Operations Restore Hope in Somalia and Support Hope in Rwanda, Uphold Democracy was not a purely humanitarian assistance mission. However, in all three, the CMOC was the principal contact between military forces and the myriad of civilian organizations assisting the relief effort. The proliferation of these organizations, combined with the growing number of worldwide military operations other than war (MOOTW), makes the CMOC a critical player in our conduct of operations. In Haiti, the CMOC evolved even further, bridging the gap between planning shortfalls and cultural differences. This paper seeks to determine the overall effectiveness of Haiti’s CMOCs.

Chapter 1 offers a brief historical evolution of the crisis that led to US involvement. Chapter 2 highlights the CMOC’s origins and its rapid ascension into current joint doctrine. Chapter 3 describes CMOC employment in Haiti and its relationship to the civilian organizations it served. Chapter 4 concludes with the central cause and effect problem of incomplete interagency planning, which resulted in degraded unity of effort.
Chapter 1

Evolution of a Crisis

Never again shall colonist or European set foot on this soil as master or
landowner. This shall henceforward be the foundation of our constitution.

—Jean–Jacques Dessalines
Former Slave and Haiti’s Founding Father

Haiti’s 193–year history as a country has been a turbulent one. Situated in the
Caribbean just southeast of Cuba, Haiti occupies the western one–third of the island of
Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Today, with a population of
approximately 6.5 million people in an area equivalent in size to the state of Maryland,
Haiti is the region’s poorest country. So what was the linkage to US interest in Haiti?

Independence to Democracy

Having achieved independence from France as a result of a slave revolt in 1804, the
Republic of Haiti became the first independent nation in all of Latin America. In fact,
besides Haiti, no other case exists where an enslaved people broke the bonds of slavery
and used military might to defeat a powerful colonial power.¹ But this independence
resulted in Haiti’s isolation in a world dominated by the European colonial powers of
England, France, and Spain and in a hemisphere governed by slave–holding societies.
Haiti was heavily ostracized by the European colonial powers and by the United States, all
of whom feared Haiti’s independence by slaves might spread to their holdings or shores. Furthermore, the revolution of 1804 destroyed much of Haiti’s agricultural infrastructure. Distrustful of the French, Haiti’s rebel leader and first President, General Jean–Jacques Dessalines, brought about an end to almost 300 years of colonial domination with a scorched–earth approach to battle.2

Following independence, Haiti soon found herself divided over the issue of market economic priorities. Socio–economic inequalities between the fair–skinned mulatto elite globalists and the majority of black peasant isolationists quickly replaced the previous inequalities of master versus slave. The new minority elite, educated and cultured in mercantilist practices and politics, insisted that the emerging peasantry produce commodities for an international market; however, the peasants (former slaves) preferred to be left alone to grow foodstuffs for themselves and for local markets.3 Perceived as an obstacle to international commerce by the elites, President Dessalines was assassinated in 1806. Thus began a long trend of violent deaths for Haitian leaders. In fact, of Haiti’s 36 heads of state up until President Aristide, only five lived to finish their terms, three of which were during the later US occupation of the 1900s.4

Following Dessalines’ assassination, Haiti was ruled by a succession of presidents who were either brutal despots or puppets of the mulatto elite. The elite occupied the coastal cities such as Port–au–Prince, the capital, to control Haiti’s export–oriented agriculture, domestic economy, and to pull the strings of government. The elites were content to allow a series of predominantly black generals vie for the Presidency, creating the appearance of black leadership by the descendants of the victorious slave uprising. At the bottom of the socio–economic ladder were the majority of the citizenry, the black
peasants, who lived mainly inland, metaphorically locked away from the coastal seats of power and commerce. These political and socio-economic structures remained intact well into the 20th century, and laid the framework for the humanitarian missions required for Operation Uphold Democracy.

By the dawn of the 20th century, Haiti, like many other Latin American countries, became increasingly linked to the United States. “Between 1870 and 1913, the US increased its share of the Haitian market from 30 to about 60 %.”\(^{5}\) So it was no mistake in 1914, following a Syrian plot which earlier leveled the presidential palace and after the lynching of President Sam, the US Marines arrived for what became a nineteen year occupation to ‘restore order.’ While Haiti’s economic infrastructure improved slightly, there was no change to the political violence. During that period, the US favored a Haitian presidency occupied by the mulatto elite versus the traditional black leaders. With the minority elite now in charge of the government, the stage was set for the emergence of President Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier, a black country doctor who rose to power in 1957, anointing himself ‘President–for–Life.’

With Duvalier’s emergence, the black middle class assumed political power. ‘Papa Doc’ embarked on a vigorous campaign denying monopolization of the state’s riches by the mulatto elite. He recruited the poor, illiterate and Blacks into a militia with which he waged his campaign. Ironically, despite its rapid degeneration into a brutal and murderous force, “the Duvalier militia was a genuine elevation of the poor Black majority for the first time in Haiti’s tortured history.”\(^{6}\) ‘Papa Doc’ ruled unchallenged until his death in 1971, when his son, Jean–Claude ‘Baby–Doc’ Duvalier succeeded him and maintained an authoritative grip on power until his own ouster in 1986.
The next five years until 1990 saw strong anti–Duvalier, pro–democratic reform movements. “In March 1987, a pro–democratic reform constitution was ratified in a referendum by 99% of the popular vote (with just under 50% turnout).” However, free and democratic elections were nullified by the military in November 1987. In fact, until early 1990, four separate military or military–selected governments put a halt to free and fair elections and democratic reform. Ultimately, pressure from within Haiti and from an international community losing patience with the military, led to the nation’s first free democratic elections of December 1990 which brought Jean–Bertrand Aristide, a Roman Catholic priest, to the Presidency with 67% of the popular vote. Essentially free of the characteristic violence of past elections, former President Jimmy Carter and international observers judged it as the freest and fairest election in Haiti’s history.

1991 Coup to Operation Uphold Democracy

President Aristide took office on February 7, 1991, the fifth anniversary of the Duvalier dictatorship, and appointed Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras as Commander–in–Chief of the Haitian military forces. While the December elections gave voice to the popular will, it did little to reduce the tensions between the Haitian people and the country’s powerful. The new Aristide government quickly reformed the institutions which allowed past abuses. Senior military officers were either replaced or forced to retire. The army grew anxious. It all culminated on September 29, 1991, when General Cedras led a coup against the government, forced President Aristide into exile, and became Haiti’s de facto leader. Two days later, the Organization of American States (OAS) was first to condemn Haiti, followed by the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly. Both demanded President Aristide’s restoration to power. On October 4, 1991, President Bush suspended foreign assistance to Haiti, prohibited US companies to make payments to the de facto regime, and froze its financial assets. On October 8, in an attempt to isolate the de facto regime, the OAS urged member states to freeze Haitian government assets and imposed a trade embargo, except for humanitarian assistance. By the end of 1991, with the embargo having some effect on Haiti, the Bush Administration grappled with an unintended consequence. It now had to contend with the immediate crisis of Haitian refugees fleeing the country by boats destined for the US.\textsuperscript{10} Throughout 1992, diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the crisis.

In February 1993, General Cedras allowed the UN and the OAS to place a small force of international human rights observers in Haiti, but little progress was made regarding the waves of political violence. By June 1993, with UN senior negotiators unable to convince General Cedras to step down, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution imposing a worldwide embargo on petroleum and arms shipments to Haiti. In July, 1993, General Cedras felt the pressure and met in New York with President Aristide to negotiate and sign the Governor’s Island Agreement. The agreement provided for Haiti’s return to democracy with President Aristide’s return to power on October 30, 1993. In September 1993, to help implement the Governor’s Island Agreement, the UNSC approved the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), a force comprised of 1300 international police monitors, military engineers, and training units. However, on October 11, just two weeks prior to the Agreement’s implementation, the USS \textit{Harlan County} was prevented from docking in Port–au–Prince.\textsuperscript{11} This ship was ferrying 200 US troops and technicians to Haiti, tasked to train the police and professionalize the army. Riots ensued
throughout Haiti and the rapid deterioration led to a temporary withdrawal of UN and OAS observers. Thus, the Governor’s Island Agreement was never implemented. The US and UN reimposed economic sanctions.

By February 1994, General Cedras allowed a small number of international monitors to return to Haiti, where they reported a dramatic increase in acts of political violence. The UNSC reacted by further tightening economic sanctions against Haiti, which led to a dire humanitarian crisis, heightened political tensions, and a mass exodus of “boat people” to the US. On June 21, 1994, the Pentagon announced the deployment of troops along the Haiti and Dominican Republic border under the command of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–120 to help improve the embargo’s effectiveness and to educate and prepare the Haitian people for the use of US and Multinational Forces (MNF) to return President Aristide to power.¹² To deal with the refugees, the US interdicted their boats at sea and processed them at a migrant facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Finally, on July 31, 1994, after two years of ineffective negotiations, the UNSC adopted Resolution 940 authorizing the establishment of a MNF under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use “all means necessary” to remove Haiti’s military–backed government, to restore the democratically–elected government, and to create a secure and stable environment.¹³ On September 7, General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), briefed President Clinton on what was to become Operation Uphold Democracy. On September 17, in a diplomatic effort to secure the uncontested landing of US and UN forces in Haiti, a delegation consisting of former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former CJCS Colin Powell, successfully convinced General Cedras to step down and leave Haiti. By the early hours of September 19, this progress
allowed US forces to transition from a forced entry operations plan (OPLAN 2370) which assumed strong resistance, to a permissive entry operations plan (OPLAN 2380) which assumed passive or no resistance. This last minute transition between OPLANs would later impact CMOC establishment. Supported by a force of 21,000 US troops, followed by several hundred troops and police monitors from 27 nations, President Aristide returned to power on October 15, 1994. By December 1994, US forces scaled back to 6,000 and the MNF eventually transferred full authority to the UN on March 31, 1995.

What is the CMOC then and how does it fit into the equation?

Notes

2 Ibid., 70–72.
3 Ibid., 74.
5 Farmer, 85.
7 Ibid., 21.
8 NACLA, 45. (Note: Edited by NACLA: North American Congress on Latin America; Individual chapter written by Kim Ives).
10 Ibid., 193.
11 Ibid., 216.
12 USACOM J–7, 9.
13 Ibid., 10.
14 Ibid., 12.
Chapter 2

Classic Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)

*While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations—other than war (MOOTW).*

—General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

Before we embark upon the effectiveness of the CMOC regarding Operation *Uphold Democracy* in Haiti, we must first familiarize ourselves with the definition and origins of the CMOC concept itself and how it rapidly became joint doctrine. The CMOC is a relatively new concept, with published information primarily limited to joint publications, US Army and unified command lessons learned, and personal testimonies of principal players. One thing is certain: CMOCs remain a ‘moving target,’ flexibly employed and tailored to meet the missions defined by the respective joint force commander (JFC). Bottom line: As MOOTWs increase, so will civilian organizations and CMOCs too!

**Definition and Origins**

With the growing preponderance of worldwide MOOTW and humanitarian assistance missions in this decade of the 1990s, the CMOC acronym rapidly emerged in the lexicon of civil affairs (CA) terminology. CMOC is conceptually defined as “the meeting place
between military forces, US government agencies (GOs), civilian authorities, involved international and regional organizations (IOs), non–governmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and the population”\textsuperscript{1} to request assistance, share information, and coordinate on how better to serve the humanitarian needs of the applicable indigenous population. Joint Pub 3–07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, probably provides the best definition for the two principal CMOC recipients: NGOs and PVOs. “NGOs refer to transnational organizations of private citizens, professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief).”\textsuperscript{2} Examples of NGOs include World Vision, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Rescue Committee. In contrast, “PVOs are private, normally US–based nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities.”\textsuperscript{3} An example of a PVO is InterAction. Finally, both IOs and GOs are two other categories of organizations coordinated by the CMOC. IOs include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). GOs include such US governmental organizations as State Department country teams, US Information Agency (USIA), and US Agency for International Development (USAID). To illustrate the extent of their collective involvement, during Operation *Uphold Democracy*, over 400 NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and GOs (hereafter referred to as simply NGOs) operated just in Haiti, with “90% of CMOC activity geared toward NGO requests for assistance to facilitate humanitarian assistance.”\textsuperscript{4} According to Mr. Jamie Arbuckle of the
Lester Pearson Peacekeeping Center regarding Somalia, “With over 100 staging locations and over 500 feeding sites, the military had an incredible challenge in dealing with the NGOs.” As such, with the increasing numbers of NGOs, CMOCs are the link to harness the divergent capabilities and conflicting agendas of each.

The CMOC originated during Operation Provide Comfort, the 1991 operation which provided humanitarian assistance to the northern Iraqi Kurds, and have since been employed with varying measures of success in Operations Restore Hope in Somalia, Support Hope in Rwanda, and Uphold Democracy in Haiti. In fact, in all three operations more than one CMOC was established and each was task–organized to fit the mission. For instance, with the CMOC as a liaison to coordinate military and civilian actions, JFCs can build unity of effort while gaining a greater understanding of NGO roles and how they influence mission accomplishment. Given our US National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which views America’s role in an international context to actively advance our interests both at home and abroad, future joint planning must account for the proliferation of NGOs. While they customarily operate outside of chains of command, NGOs collectively serve as huge force multipliers by reducing the military’s burden for humanitarian resources. With external resources of money and services available to NGOs, it is in the military’s best interest to foster good relations. Conversely, the military’s services to NGOs, in turn, decrease their overhead. Thus, despite the cultural differences between the military and civilians (which we’ll address later), the CMOC fosters greater cooperation in order to reach an endstate which fulfills our MOOTW objectives. As Ambassador Robert Oakley said regarding Somalia’s CMOC, “The center was an effective, innovative mechanism not only for operational coordination
but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian perceptions. By developing good personal relationships, the staffs were able to alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief communities. So how does the CMOC relate to current joint doctrine?

**Current Joint Doctrine and the CMOC**

Although CMOCs have only been used in their present form since Operation *Desert Storm*, joint doctrine has fully embraced the concept, as evidenced in several new joint publications. In fact, joint doctrine only recently drew the clear distinction between sustained combat operations and MOOTW operations.

Joint Pub 3–07 details the planning factors peculiar to MOOTW operations and the vital importance of NGOs. It heavily emphasizes unity of effort and consensus building, with the CMOC as the mechanism. Although it does not mandate a specific CMOC structure, it suggests an ideal CMOC representation with civil affairs teams at the core. Planning must also include providing communication links in the event that routine communications are disrupted, using NGOs for “information gathering” while avoiding unwitting counterintelligence compromises, and for the eventual transfer of responsibility to another agency such as the UN or an NGO, to include which systems may have to be left behind to support the ongoing effort.

Joint Pub 3–08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I*, is the joint doctrine governing interagency planning and the CMOC. Written after Operation *Uphold Democracy*, Joint Pub 3–08 formalized a planning process largely absent during the planning phase, as we’ll see later. Specifically, Joint Pub 3–08 recommends a CMOC composition, lists specific tasks, and addresses the military relationship to NGOs. As for
CMOC composition, it recommends including “organic operations, intelligence, civil affairs, logistics, communications elements, liaisons from Service and functional components and supporting infrastructure such as ports and airfields, representatives from USAID and their Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), State Department, country team and other US government representatives, military liaisons from participating countries, host country or local government agency representatives, and NGO, PVO, and IO representatives.”¹³ It further describes a dozen tasks CMOCs may be expected to perform: facilitate and coordinate JTF activities, other on–scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command; receive, validate, coordinate, and monitor requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support; coordinate responses to requests for military support with Service components; coordinate requests to NGOs for their support; coordinate with the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployed to the scene by USAID/OFDA; convene ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions which support NGO requirements (e.g. convoy escort and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers); convene follow–on assessment groups; provide situation reports regarding JTF operations, security, and other information for participants in the collective effort; chair port and airfield committee meetings for space and access–related issues; facilitate creation and organization of a logistics distribution system for food, water, and medical relief efforts; and finally, support civic action teams, as required.¹⁴ Lastly, Joint Pub 3–08 addresses a more in–depth military interface with NGOs and the critical importance of understanding and supporting their valid missions and concerns. For the first time a publication advises the military to be aware that certain NGOs view freedom of
access as the ideal working environment. NGOs value the freedom to operate without armed protection, while sanctioning the use of military force to support their efforts only as a last resort. In Somalia, for example, many NGOs were concerned their neutrality might be questioned if too closely associated with the military. As a result, a physically separate Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) was established apart from the CMOC to provide that critical link, although it still reported to the CMOC. While the HACC normally operates as a temporary body during an operation’s initial planning phase and often disbands once a CMOC is operational, the JTF structure was flexibly tailored to account for these NGO concerns by leaving the HACC in place. Joint Pub 3–08 further describes the necessity of educating NGOs on what they can realistically expect from the military. Among other things it states NGOs must know “capabilities and limitations of military forces; services (e.g. shelter, food, transport, communications, security) that the force will or will not provide; varying circumstances that preclude assistance; types and scope of assistance that are appropriate and authorized by US law; and lessons learned at the conclusion of interagency operations.”

Joint Pub 3–57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, rounds out the principal joint doctrinal documents which embrace the CMOC concept. It addresses the use of military CA assets in planning and conducting joint CA activities across the range of military operations. While its CMOC description and definition is less detailed than the two preceding publications, Joint Pub 3–57 offers two wiring diagrams on how best to organize civil military operations for combatant commanders, JFCs, or component commanders, as the situation dictates. The publication suggests commanders might even consider a Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF), “a US joint force
organization developed to meet a specific civil military operation contingency mission, supporting humanitarian or nation assistance operations of limited duration which helps establish US or multinational and military–to–civil links." In lieu of a JCMOTF, Joint Pub 3–57 says a CMOC acts as the JFC’s nerve center for civil military operations and coordination with other non–DoD agencies. While the names aren’t important, the JCMOTF and CMOC are offered as examples of ways to organize civil military operations given the situation.

In just six years, joint doctrine has fully embraced the CMOC concept. While the current joint publications offer the aforementioned common links seen in the basic CMOC, it has become sound doctrine—distilling the best parts of our collective lessons learned into a comprehensive database which is continually evolving. Thorough understanding of the basic doctrine is a prerequisite before prudently applying its key points to the given situation faced in the theater of operations. This will allow both planners and key players to create the most effective CMOC organization to fulfill mission requirements. Through several operational real–world experiences, CMOCs have been flexibly employed and specifically tailored in Somalia, Rwanda, and most recently, during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. As we’ll see, the CMOC got off to a slow start in Haiti due to the preceding incomplete planning process which did not fully incorporate the interagency. Once running, however, CMOC performance was admirable.

Notes

3 Ibid., GL–5.
Notes


5 Mr. Jamie Arbuckle, Address to ACSC AY97 Class, January 10, 1997. Mr. Arbuckle is a faculty member with the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Nova Scotia.

6 Joint Pub 3–08, III–16.


8 Joint Pub 3–08, III–16.


10 Ibid., IV–5.

11 Ibid., IV–3.

12 Ibid., IV–5.


14 Ibid., III–18–III–19.

15 Ibid., III–25.

16 Mrs. Julia Taft, Address to ACSC AY97 Class, January 10, 1997. Mrs. Taft is CEO and President of InterAction, a coalition of 150 US–based PVOs working internationally in the fields of development and humanitarian assistance.


19 Ibid., IV–4.
Chapter 3

Employment of the CMOC in Haiti

The CMOC in Haiti was a secure, warm, dry place to get a cup of coffee and it allowed for a two-way source of information that might just save your life or the lives of others.

—Jamie Arbuckle
Lester B. Pearson International Canadian Peacekeeping Training Centre
Address to ACSC, 10 Jan 97

Eleventh Hour Change in OPLANs

On September 17, 1994, US diplomatic efforts by former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former CJCS Colin Powell, successfully convinced General Cedras to step down and leave Haiti. This allowed US forces to transition from the forced entry contingency operations plan (OPLAN 2370), to the permissive entry operations plan (OPLAN 2380) in the early hours of September 19, 1994, the day Operation Uphold Democracy commenced. On September 17, 1994, US diplomatic efforts by former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former CJCS Colin Powell, successfully convinced General Cedras to step down and leave Haiti. This allowed US forces to transition from the forced entry contingency operations plan (OPLAN 2370), to the permissive entry operations plan (OPLAN 2380) in the early hours of September 19, 1994, the day Operation Uphold Democracy commenced.1 Months earlier, US Atlantic Command (USACOM) planners initiated the deliberate planning process which yielded OPLAN 2370, the forced entry plan which would allow the military to: “neutralize Haitian armed forces and police in order to protect US citizens and interests, designated Haitians, and third country nationals; restore civil order; conduct nation assistance to stabilize the internal situation; and assist in the transition to a democratic government in Haiti.”2 Established under the operational command of Joint Task Force (JTF)–180 and the XVIII Airborne Corps, the country’s
most experienced and largest contingency headquarters at Ft. Bragg, NC, OPLAN 2370 was envisioned to last about 45 days before transitioning to the US Forces in Haiti (USFORHAITI) commander. By June, USACOM planners began to focus on an alternate plan. The planners assumed the de facto military government had departed and the UN was being asked to restore order. Since this alternate permissive entry plan (OPLAN 2380) was envisioned to last a minimum of 179 days and focused heavily on nation–building and humanitarian assistance, JTF–190 was activated for planning on July 27 under the 10th Mountain Division of Ft. Drum, NY, uniquely equipped and organized for MOOTW missions. By August 29th, OPLAN 2380 received approval by the JCS and on September 8 a CJCS Alert Order was forwarded to USACOM approving both OPLANs 2370 and 2380 for execution. Because OPLAN development entails compartmentalized security procedures, few outside of national security channels were brought into the planning process until the final weeks. Although the Carter mission of September 17 succeeded in eliminating armed resistance, the multiplicity and momentum of two OPLANs resulted in essentially two brigades of CA teams for several weeks, one tied to the forced entry OPLAN and the other to humanitarian assistance. To the outside observer, USACOM’s transition between OPLANs was transparent. But according to the JTF–180 J–3 Civil Affairs officer, “when the plan drastically changed, now you’ve got to unsnarl where all the equipment is, all the vehicles in the airborne drop plans, and everything else.” How did this last minute transition affect CMOC establishment?
Thriving on Chaos: The CMOC and the HACC

According to the 10th Mountain Division’s Port-au-Prince CMOC Director, the transition between OPLANs had an enormous effect on Civil Affairs for the follow-on JTF–190. "We had several weeks of confusion trying to make up our own policy, not violate the law and facilitate the actions for the Task Force Commanders."

In essence, aircraft flow to Haiti required merging the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) of the two OPLANs, delaying the integration of both military and civilian CA support. Even for JTF–180, with the confusing airflow they had no way of tracking the location of the remainder of the staff element who were to stand up the CMOC in the Joint Operations Center of the JTF Headquarters (HQ) building in Port-au-Prince. Located next to the Military Police, the Engineers, and all the people it would need to deal with, the CMOC was ideally situated. The ‘forced entry’ CA brigade, already in the flow and accustomed to working with combat commanders, dislocated civilians, and the population in a hostile environment, was reorganized and combined with the ‘permissive entry’ CA brigade. Eventually, activities began to sort out and three days after the peaceful entry commenced, the CMOC itself stood up and began functioning.

Comprised of 12 officers and 11 enlisted, the CMOC’s basic organization was somewhat tailored to take into account certain NGOs’ concerns about working too closely with the military, just as Joint Pub 3–08 now addresses. As such, a HACC was established, manned by four officers, two enlisted members and 12 linguists. Coordination with the NGOs was facilitated by keeping the HACC under the CMOC’s control, but physically locating it away from military operations centers. In addition to other functions performed for the JTF HQ, the CMOC’s primary function was to process NGO requests for support sent
over from the HACC. The NGOs needed a place to come in and interface with the military, get information about the tactical situation and the military’s plans, and to be able to come in and quickly input requests for assistance. According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), to instill trust and to demonstrate to the Haitian people what a democratic government could provide, “90% of the CMOC’s activities in Haiti involved facilitating humanitarian assistance, and the HACC was the clearing house for organizations requesting assistance. Remotely locating the HACC prevented NGOs from inundating the HQ. Despite repeated direction to contact only the HACC, many organizations called directly into the CMOC with requests.” Perhaps these direct calls was a testament that CMOC doctrine had sunk into the collective NGO psyche after Somalia and Rwanda. Today, Joint Pub 3–08 says the HACC is normally a temporary body which operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes.

Along with the CMOC in Port–au–Prince, a second CMOC and HACC was established along the northern coast of Haiti in the city of Cap–Haitian. The Cap–Haitian operation was manned by six officers and ten enlisted and, like the larger CMOC to the south, arranged for military transportation and security to and from the NGOs’ food, clothing, and medical storage sites. “Whenever possible, the CMOC provided transportation upon the basis of ‘opportune lift,’ arranging transportation for organizations using excess carrying capacity on MNF and UNMIH helicopters, landing craft utilities (LCUs), and trucks.” Flexibility was also demonstrated in Haiti when the CMOC developed a city assessment team concept to assess the needs of both small, remote villages as well as urban populated areas. However, due to the stringent JTF–190
force protection requirements of two vehicle convoys and two persons per vehicle, CA teams were often unable to meet their assessments in a timely manner. Here again, the CMOC remedied the situation by devising a CA mission tracking system which utilized scarce transportation assets and avoided duplication of effort. Along with providing humanitarian assistance, both CMOCs worked hard to instill trust in the Haitian people.

From the outset, both OPLANs called for restrained military civic action and limited involvement in humanitarian assistance. Criteria for the conduct of both were centered around three questions: 1) Will it gain support for the legitimate government?; 2) Will it benefit a cross section of the people and not just the elite?; and 3) Can the system US forces leave in place sustain it? The intent was always to avoid encouraging rising expectations by the indigenous population. “We are into what they call not quite nation building but we are doing limited humanitarian assistance. It’s tied to emergency humanitarian assistance such as electricity, water, purification of drinking water, and the supply of drinking water.” Even from a USACOM perspective, the guidance stated not to get into massive rebuilding projects. “All the way through, our intention was clearly limit and control military civic action very tightly. Support to humanitarian assistance would be done strictly through the NGOs, through the CMOC, coordinated by the HACC, and worked in very close coordination with OFDA.” But during execution, the USACOM Commander–in–Chief (CINCACOM) expanded humanitarian assistance beyond the scope of military planning, which gained local public support for US forces and media attention. For NGOs, media attention is often the lifeline which attracts funding, since a growing number of NGOs are often competing for the same scarce resources. As such, with the military attracting media attention, and the NGOs in need of
that attention, a symbiotic relationship formed as a by–product as time went on. Perhaps General Shalikashvili summed it up best, “What’s the relationship between a just–arrived military force and the NGOs and PVOs that might have been working in a crisis–torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful, and if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.”19

Unfortunately, this unity of effort should have been fostered during the initial planning process, but in reality it didn’t transpire until after the operation had begun. This planning shortfall prior to Haiti, along with the previous lessons learned in Somalia and Rwanda, was the catalyst for Joint Pub 3–08, which just recently institutionalized the importance of the CMOC and interagency planning into doctrine.

**Herding Wild Turkeys: The CMOC and the NGOs**

Over 400 NGOs operated in Haiti, and it became a big challenge for the CMOC to continually focus unity of effort. As pointed out by a JTF–180 sergeant major in charge of his division’s civil affairs coordination, “there’s just an inordinate amount of groups, small groups down there, and they don’t like to talk to anybody.”20 Some NGOs were as small as a husband and wife team with no funding, while some 150 larger, registered organizations were already in Haiti prior to the Operation.21 When asked how he collectively handled these organizations, the 10th Mountain Division’s Port–au–Prince CMOC Director stated, “It’s a little bit like herding turkeys. You know, have you ever seen someone trying to get a group of turkeys or chickens into one corner of a barnyard? You get them over to one side, and you wave your hands, and they react individually in a helter skelter way.”22
Complicating this relationship has been the NGOs’ innate desire to remain detached from occupying military organizations for fear they’ll be viewed as a tool of the occupying country’s instruments of power. In Haiti, most of the NGOs were highly motivated to do what’s right, but “they didn’t want to see the guns on any of our soldiers and they had great reservations about being around us in uniform. In fact, we had to take the guns off and put them away before we met them because of that. However, when their warehouses were being looted and they felt personally threatened, they cried the loudest for military support, and safety, and guns.”23 In Haiti, a military participant noted, “We were viewed with complete suspicion by NGOs because they were concerned about compromising their neutrality.”24 During an ACSC lecture, Mrs. Julia Taft noted the importance of striking a balance between NGO neutrality and military protection, especially in light of the recent Red Cross murders in Chechnya.25 The bottom line is these perceptions perpetuated out of the unfamiliarity with each other’s culture and could have been better addressed during the initial planning process as we’ll see.

**CMOC Report Card: “A–”**

Overall, the CMOC concept worked quite well in Haiti. Despite initial growing pains, due primarily to inadequate military planning and a lack of unity of effort, the CMOC (and the HACC) successfully coordinated the humanitarian assistance activities of some 400 NGOs. When asked how well the CMOC concept worked, a JTF–180 CA troop replied, “Great. I don’t see how they could do business any other way, and if they were doing business any other way, I’d hazard to say they weren’t doing business. Briefings were conducted every four hours to bring everybody up to speed on what’s going on.”26 As
time went on in Haiti, the CMOC (via the HACC) indeed became not only a secure, warm, dry place to get a cup of coffee, but a place to swap potentially lifesaving information. Although the CMOCs in Haiti contributed to a successful unity of effort, it’s hard to imagine an incomplete planning process occurred, virtually devoid of interagency planning. How then did the CMOC bridge the cause and effect gap for the NGOs it served? Could it ever happen this way again?

Notes

1 USACOM J–7, 12.
3 Ibid., LtC Gordon C. Bonham, JTF–180 J–5, Director of Plans Interview aboard USS MOUNT WHITNEY on 12 Oct 94, 10.
4 Ibid., 10.
5 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions: Haiti D–20 to D+40 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, December, 1994), xvi.
6 XVIII Airborne Corps Command Historian, Interview with LtC Edward Anderson, JTF–180 J–3, 302.
7 USACOM Command Historian, Uphold Democracy Oral History Interview with Col James Gulick, CMOC Director, JTF–190 on 11 Oct 94, 2.
8 XVIII Airborne Corps Command Historian, Interview with LtC Edward Anderson, JTF–180 J–3, 303.
9 Ibid., 306.
10 CALL, D–20 to D+40, 199.
11 XVIII Airborne Corps Command Historian, Interview with LtC Edward Anderson, JTF–180 J–3, 293.
12 CALL, Volume III, 161.
14 Ibid., 161–162.
15 CALL, D–20 to D+40, 195.
17 USACOM Command Historian, Uphold Democracy Oral History Interview with Col James Gulick, CMOC Director, JTF–190 on 11 Oct 94, 4.
Notes

20 XVIII Airborne Corps Command Historian, *Interview with Sergeant Major Harold G. Beverage, Jr., JTF–180 G–5 for 82d Airborne Division*, 129.
22 USACOM Command Historian, *Uphold Democracy Oral History Interview with Col James Gulick, CMOC Director, JTF–190* on 11 Oct 94, 10.
23 Ibid., 10.
25 Mrs. Julia Taft, Address to ACSC AY97 Class, January 10, 1997. Mrs. Taft is CEO and President of InterAction, a coalition of 150 US–based PVOs working internationally in the fields of development and humanitarian assistance.
26 XVIII Airborne Corps Command Historian, *Interview with Sergeant Major Harold G. Beverage, Jr., JTF–180 G–5 for 82d Airborne Division*, 125.
27 Mr. Jamie Arbuckle, Address to ACSC AY97 Class, January 10, 1997. Mr. Arbuckle is a faculty member with the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Nova Scotia.
Chapter 4

Cause and Effect

_Haiti is a benchmark, not a template, for OOTW use lessons learned in planning future operations. Successful execution requires early engagement by total government team._

—CAPT James McClane, USN
USACOM Briefing to 1995 Joint Operations Symposium
Lessons Learned from Operation _Uphold Democracy_

Overall, Operation _Uphold Democracy_ was a huge success from a military operational standpoint. The US led, multinational effort of September, 1994 restored President Aristide and his democratic government back to power in October, 1994, a clearly defined and achievable objective. By December, 1994, US forces scaled back from the original 21,000 to 6,000, and the MNF eventually transferred full authority to the UN by March, 1995. Thus, the US achieved its desired end state, or what it wanted the political, military, and economic environments to resemble at the end of its involvement, then transferred authority to the UN. Regarding civil military operations, this area too realized many successes once the Operation was underway. Although Haiti was different from Somalia and Rwanda since humanitarian assistance and NGO support was not the main military focus, the military did apply many lessons learned from its previous CMOC experiences of the early 1990s. Additionally, many CA personnel in Haiti had previous experience in Somalia, making their learning curves much shorter as they ‘compared
However, apart from the last minute change in OPLANs, the relative unfamiliarity between the military and the civilians in Operation *Uphold Democracy* stemmed from the following three broad problem areas which were directly or indirectly *caused* by the central issue of *incomplete military planning*: compartmentalized military planning, command and control arrangements, and cultural barriers. In all cases, the *effect* was a *degraded unity of effort* between the military and the government’s interagency. Thus, CMOCs became the bridge both linking dissimilar cultures and ensuring an eventual unity of effort which was clearly absent during planning.

**I’ve Got a Secret: Compartmentalized Information**

Joint Pub 3–08 was a *major* milestone in our collective attempt to improve interagency coordination. Arguably, had its principles been completely thought out and well understood by planners prior to Operation *Uphold Democracy*, the issue of compartmentalization may have been avoided. Compartmentalized information during the initial planning stages of a top secret forced–entry OPLAN is standard procedure from an operations security (OPSEC) perspective. However, this had the adverse effect of limiting participation in some areas of planning, most notably for the permissive entry plan (OPLAN 2380) that later emerged. The withholding of information “turned out to be a real killer, because as soon as the plan was compartmentalized and the number of people that could be brought into it was drastically limited, then basically you didn’t have the option of being able to go to various agencies and sit down and talk with people. We’ve got to do something about this compartmentalization crap because it does nothing but hinder planning.”

Essentially, planners were preparing for civil military operations
without talking with their civilian counterparts. Not until the end of July, when JTF–190’s permissive entry OPLAN began development, had there been much interaction between military and civilian agencies. “USCOM’s planning until that time had been tightly compartmentalized and confined to the military operation. USCOM planners knew they needed to coordinate with civilian agencies, but they were precluded from doing so by security concerns. Compartmentalization of these two planning processes was carried on far too long— until the final weeks.” Not only that but “USCOM was very reluctant to do the interagency coordination piece for us,” according to the JTF–180 J–3 civil affairs officer. “USCOM had the theory that an action transferred was an action completed. In other words, they would identify a point of contact for the JTF–180 staff to deal with at the interagency. It was our commander’s position that USCOM needed to be more proactive in the interagency environment, and to get answers for us as JTF–180, and then later when JTF–190 stood up.” When later asked how interagency planning went, he responded, “It sucked!” The direct effect of compartmentalization was a delay in CMOC establishment due to so much initial confusion on the ground in Haiti. Again, “with the confusing airflow we, of course, had no way of tracking where the remainder of the staff element was that was going to stand up the CMOC.” Eventually, everything fell into place, “but interagency discussions were not carried through to the operational level and linkages between the strategic and operational levels were deficient. While strategic planning took place under NSC leadership, concrete decisions were postponed to the last minute, so policy guidance could not be communicated effectively to the operational level commanders. The latter felt they lacked the go–ahead to develop an integrated OPLAN with clear, attainable objectives, and adequate lead time to complete the planning
coordination process.” Had Joint Pub 3–08 been available, USACOM planners might have been more appreciative of the many talents and assets which NGOs ‘bring to the table.’ This compartmentalization ultimately led to incomplete planning, which delayed civil affairs assessment team and CMOC deployment.

The issue of compartmentalization may not be as problematic today with our established doctrinal basis for interagency operations via Joint Pub 3–08. While some information must still be tightly controlled, planners must prudently weigh the risks of compromise with too many planners read–in versus running the risk of incomplete interagency coordination. However, once the CMOCs were up and running, they were tailored by the JFC to overcome the deficiencies caused by compartmented information.

**Who’s in Charge**

Incomplete military planning and unfamiliarity in working with each other also resulted in an ambiguous command and control relationship. In July of 1994, USACOM was basically of the opinion that the Joint Staff or ASD/SOLIC [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts] should take responsibility for running the interagency. “It was very obvious that nobody really wanted to touch that potato. They [USACOM] had no expertise in dealing with the interagency. Anyway, the long and short of it was, that finally the only agency that ever really grabbed the bull by the horns and ran with it was the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J–5 [Plans].” Thus, with USACOM’s reluctance to engage with the interagency, it is little wonder command and control was so confused. Furthermore, USACOM was either slow or did not provide responses to some of the following interagency–related questions or requests from
subordinates: Give us a detailed list of the [NGOs] that are functioning in the country. Tell us who they have in the country. Who is their senior point of contact? How do we contact them? What are their telephone numbers? What kind of communications capability do they have? What kind of transportation capability do they have? What are their problems? Because much of this information was unknown when US forces arrived, the military was unaware of the degree of NGO and other civilian presence already in Haiti. Ironically, the military was essentially last to arrive, as many NGOs and other organizations had been in Haiti for some time, even years in some cases. The military noted the absence of anybody in charge of the overall operation, not to mention a clear decision–making hierarchy. Thus, the military recognized the need for an operational–level commander to coordinate and direct the agencies and forces involved. For example, “the JFC was not in charge of the civilians, other than to insure the safety of those he knew about. The Ambassador, on the other hand, was swept up in a myriad of events not directly related to the military mission. Neither the JFC nor the Ambassador had total command of the situation. The Haitian operation worked because they coordinated and cooperated well enough to get things done.” Here again, with proper interagency coordination the CMOC could have been up and running and instrumental in bridging the chain of command gap. As the 10th Mountain’s CMOC Director pointed out, “I think we could have done a better job as far as the terrain analysis for the commanders; that’s working in conjunction with the intel folks.” An ambiguous chain of command also resulted in the failure to know what communications capabilities existed in Haiti, for example. This directly impacted the CMOC, which had to communicate with many NGOs and other organizations outside of the military. Due to the previous embargo, the Haitian
phone system fell into disrepair and alternate means were unavailable. The 10th Mountain CMOC Director stated, “I should have brought my own communications equipment. We should have had the Motorola radios with us. Communication has been an absolute nightmare. Thanks to the DART, they had three [radios] that we were able to use.”

As a bottom line, planners must communicate clearly defined command arrangements with all participants, especially the interagency and country teams. The CMOC (and HACC) could have been harnessed more effectively in Haiti to help bridge that gap. Since Operation Uphold Democracy, Joint Pub 3–08 was written, integrating the collective lessons learned from Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti and translating them into a more in–depth doctrine on the interagency planning process. Furthermore, CMOCs work, and its doctrine and interagency planning must be fully incorporated into all planning process stages to ensure all current and future OPLANs, as well as applicable MOOTW concept plans (CONPLANS), aim toward a total unity of effort.

**Bridging the ‘Culture Gap’**

Cultural and operational differences between the military and civilian organizations made effective interagency planning extremely difficult. In Haiti, the mutual ignorance of counterpart culture, missions, capabilities, limitations, and expectations, led to many initial misperceptions which the CMOC later rectified in its facilitator role. For example, near the Cap–Haitian CMOC, the land and water force commanders coordinated responsibilities. “We had our tents pitched next to each other, but the third tent was missing—the civilian USAID tent. There was no one to answer our questions about civilian assistance capabilities for 30 days into the operation. As commanders, we knew
we were going into a ‘fourth world’ nation, but we didn’t know the limits of our civilian agencies. We were ignorant about what the other agencies were doing.”

Thus, along with incomplete military planning, initial military forces were unaware of their civilian counterpart capabilities. Similarly, this unfamiliarity led to unrealistically high military expectations from the outset. For example, during a recent workshop on interagency planning regarding Haiti, one workshop participant noted three assumptions underlined military planning for the Operation, and none were correct: 1) lifting the embargo would result in an immediate inflow of money; 2) NGOs would immediately undertake massive nation–building activities; and 3) money would flow once the US was on the ground.”

Essentially, the military incorrectly assumed the civilians would respond to the Operation just as they would.

Fortunately for the NGOs and the military, prior shortcomings in the interagency planning process were quickly balanced by the CMOC, as well as both the military and civilians who took the initiative to seek out their counterparts. “NGOs don’t know how to work together, so frequently their efforts wind up being duplicative. They don’t have any sense of the way the military would go into problem solving. So it tends to be a revelation to them when they see that, jeez, there is a fairly easy way you can centralize, orchestrate, pool resources. They are usually flabbergasted that there’s an ability to get a read on what the region actually needs.”

The CMOC and HACC bridged those gaps. Even when NGOs’ expectations of military capabilities and transportation were inaccurate or unrealistic, CMOC personnel quickly clarified actual capabilities. For example, although NGOs acted with the best of intentions, they often overlooked the fact that diverting assets from military functions often disrupted military missions.”

To better
facilitate coordination and understanding of military capabilities, the CMOC established a liaison office, while an after-action observation suggested a training package highlighting military capabilities, limitations, and common misperceptions be made available for NGO review.17

Along with these training packages, better interagency planning could be facilitated by integrating CMOC and interagency doctrine into the various services schools. During the interagency planning workshop, participants also believed gaming exercises would allow both the military and civilians to see how their counterparts respond to various MOOTW scenarios. “Military and [NGO] participants recognized they were mutually ignorant about each other and the ways they do business.”18 Exercises are an important first step toward opening dialogues and establishing contacts, as described in Joint Pub 3–08.

Perhaps the 10th Mountain’s CMOC Director summarized it best, “I think we should have had a better understanding of the infrastructure of the NGOs. I think we should have had a staffing that aligned us with the NGOs prior to hitting the ground. We had a list of names. We had a list of addresses. We had some phone numbers. But it would have been better if we’d made some universal connections prior to arrival. There’s no substitute for the interpersonal relationship. Once we work it into the NGOs that they can trust us, we are able to do our jobs.”19

**How Better**

Unity of effort by the *entire* government team is a necessity beginning at the top with the President and echoing down through all levels of command. The inherent nature of interagency coordination requires both commanders and planners evaluate all instruments
of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ those elements toward the stated objective. Although incomplete military planning resulted in degraded unity of effort, this cause and effect relationship in Haiti was minimized through the efforts of the CMOC. Interestingly, on December 28, 1994 in his Commander’s Intent statement, Major General Joseph W. Kinzer, UNMIH commander stated, “I see interagency cooperation and unity of effort as the keys to successful overall mission accomplishment. Bottom Line: We will use the talents of the entire force in mission accomplishment.”

For future engagements, military planners must focus their efforts on military planning’s enabling capabilities which best contributes to national security policy, such as the CMOC and HACC, while embracing a previously unfamiliar interagency process. While Operation Uphold Democracy was indeed a benchmark for OOTW use lessons learned from previous operations, Haiti compiled her own lessons learned, generating the most sweeping doctrinal leaps regarding interagency participation—Joint Pub 3–08. In spite of the planning shortfalls, the CMOC was the great facilitator which guided the disparate organizations with competing priorities and procedures toward a shared vision. With CMOC and interagency doctrine now firmly rooted, Haiti’s lessons learned will certainly translate into both better planning processes and more efficient CMOCs in future military operations around the world.

Notes

1 XVIII Airborne Corps Command Historian, Interview with Sergeant Major Harold G. Beverage, Jr., JTF–180 G–5 for 82d Airborne Division, 130.
3 NDU INSS, 32.
Notes

5 Ibid., 303.
6 NDU INSS, 35.
7 XVIII Airborne Corps Command Historian, Interview with LtC Edward Anderson, JTF–180 J–3, 300.
8 Ibid., 299.
9 NDU INSS, 43.
10 NDU INSS, 55.
11 USACOM Command Historian, Uphold Democracy Oral History Interview with Col James Gulick, CMOC Director, JTF–190 on 11 Oct 94, 5.
12 Ibid., 5.
13 NDU INSS, 38.
14 Ibid., 38–39.
15 XVIII Airborne Corps Command Historian, Interview with Sergeant Major Harold G. Beverage, Jr., JTF–180 G–5 for 82d Airborne Division, 130.
17 Ibid., 148.
18 NDU INSS, 59.
19 USACOM Command Historian, Uphold Democracy Oral History Interview with Col James Gulick, CMOC Director, JTF–190 on 11 Oct 94, 11.
**Glossary**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACOM</td>
<td>United States Atlantic Command (also USACOM)</td>
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<td>ACSC</td>
<td>Air Command and Staff College</td>
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<td>ASD/SOLIC</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CINCACOM</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
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<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<td>INSS</td>
<td>Institute for National Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>JARR</td>
<td>Joint After Action Report</td>
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<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>LCU</td>
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<td>National Defense University</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non–Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>Organization of American States</td>
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Bibliography


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