ARMY INTELLIGENCE
PRINCIPLES
FOR USE IN
• POLICY
• CONCEPTS
• DOCTRINE
• TRAINING

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FORT MONROE VIRGINIA 23651

**Notes:** See TRADOC Bulletin 13 dated 28 March 1980

**Abstract:** Army intelligence operations are changing in divisions, corps, and above. Reorganization continues to provide multidiscipline intelligence collection and production. The changes outpace intelligence doctrine published in field manuals. This bulletin sets forth principles to follow until field manuals are ready.
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TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

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• POLICY • DOCTRINE • CONCEPTS • TRAINING

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This TRADOC BULLETIN is intended to provide timely, technical information on weapons, tactics, and training to commanders and others concerned with military training. It is not intended to supplant doctrinal publications, but to supplement "how-to-fight" material with data derived from tests, recent intelligence, and other sources.

TRAINERS' NOTE: This bulletin is designed to help trainers identify and extract needed information. Charts, illustrations, and other key data may be extracted for individual use.

Comments and recommendations are welcome and should be directed to the:

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NOTE: The words "he," "him," and "men," when used in this publication, represent both the masculine and feminine genders unless specifically stated.
I

INTRODUCTION

Army intelligence operations are changing in divisions, corps, and above. Reorganization continues to provide multidiscipline intelligence collection and production. The changes outpace intelligence doctrine published in field manuals. This bulletin sets forth principles to follow until field manuals are ready.
II
MISSION AND FORCE STRUCTURE

MISSION

Army intelligence operations provide user-oriented intelligence and operations security support.

The user intelligence includes indications and warning, target acquisition, situation assessment, planning, and threat analysis.

Army intelligence units usually work with intelligence units of other US services and Allies. They may, however, work on their own.

DESCRIPTION

Army intelligence must operate as one integrated system. Within the system, though, are several collection disciplines and functional, or working, areas. Figure 1 shows how the disciplines and working areas relate.

The X axis shows six sectors. Five are functional areas of intelligence: command control of intelligence activities, production, collection, counterintelligence, and support; the sixth is a category of activities associated functionally, and in some cases organizationally, with intelligence.

The Y axis shows three collection disciplines and one multidiscipline category. The disciplines are human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).

FORCE STRUCTURE

Intelligence staff sections are part of all command levels from battalion through HQDA. Military intelligence (MI) units are also in Reserve Components.

MI elements, sections, teams, and platoons form the basic building blocks of intelligence units.

MI companies and detachments are either single or multidiscipline. They may be organic to MI battalions or groups, or operate independently in special circumstances. Multidiscipline combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) companies are found in separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments.

MI battalions are single or multidiscipline. Their usual assignment is to an MI group; but they may operate independently. A multidiscipline CEWI battalion is found in each division.

MI field offices, resident offices, sites, operational bases, and independent teams also are in the force structure. Army field stations perform signal intelligence operations to satisfy strategic and tactical intelligence require-
Figure

HUMINT
C² of Army Intelligence Organizations
- Production data
- Terrain analysis
- Weather analysis

SIGINT
C² of Army Intelligence Organizations
- Production data base
- EW data base

IMINT
C² of Army Intelligence Organizations
- Production data base

MULTIDISCIPLINE
C² of Army Intelligence Organizations
- Estimates
- Threat analysis
- Studies, summaries, handbooks
- Intel Preparation Battlefi (IPB)
- Processing/analytical systems

Command control
Production
Figure 1 COMMAND AND CONTROL (C^2) OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

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<th>Defector/Materiel/Exploit</th>
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<td></td>
<td>EW data base</td>
<td>ELINT</td>
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<td>Army, Air Force, National Systems</td>
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<td>Estimates</td>
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<td>Surveillance, target acquisition systems, document systems</td>
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<td>MASINT (RADINT/OPTINT/E-O INT/NUCINT/ACINT)</td>
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<td>X AXIS</td>
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## Intelligence Organizations

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<td>ECM</td>
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<td>Commo</td>
<td>ECCM</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>ESM</td>
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<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Mapping</th>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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<th>Training OPFOR</th>
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<td>Base Support</td>
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<td>Resource Mgt</td>
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### Legend

- **ACINT**: Acoustical intelligence.
- **commo**: Communications.
- **COMINT**: Communications intelligence.
- **COMSEC**: Communications security.
- **ECCM**: Electronic counter-countermeasures.
- **ECM**: Electronic countermeasures.
- **ELINT**: Electronic intelligence.
- **ELSEC**: Electronic security.
- **E-O INT**: Electro-optical intelligence.
- **ESM**: Electronic warfare support measures.
- **EW**: Electronic warfare.
- **MASINT**: Measurement and signature intelligence.
- **NUCINT**: Nuclear intelligence.
- **OPFOR**: Opposing force program.
- **OPTINT**: Optical intelligence.
- **OPSEC**: Operations security.
- **PW**: Prisoners of war.
- **PHOTINT**: Photographic intelligence.
- **RADINT**: Radar intelligence.
- **TELENT**: Telemetry intelligence.
- **TEMPEST**: Investigations and studies of compromising emanations.
ments. Field stations, usually commanded by the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), are under the operational control of the National Security Agency (NSA); normally, manning is joint with other services.

In wartime, the intelligence command is under the senior US Army component in theater. It operates in general support of combined and joint headquarters. Further, it must satisfy those requirements which corps cannot satisfy for themselves.

In peacetime, an intelligence command is subordinate to INSCOM, and is under operational control or in direct support of the senior US Army headquarters in theater.

In a theater of operations, or under certain unusual circumstances, an intelligence command may organize to direct and control echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence organizations.

MI groups are tailored for specific geographic areas and needs of supported commands. They perform single or multidiscipline missions.

- **Single discipline MI groups** assigned to INSCOM, and stationed in Continental United States (CONUS), perform single specific missions. Normally they are nondeployable; elements, though, may reinforce deployed MI units.

- **Multidiscipline MI groups** are assigned to INSCOM or to an intelligence command in a theater of operations. In peacetime, these groups are usually overseas. If stationed in CONUS, they usually conduct contingency missions, but stay ready for early deployment in the event of hostilities.

- **Multidiscipline CEWI groups** are found in corps. Army intelligence organizations include the US Army Intelligence and Security Command; tactical units organic to combat forces; and a number of other organizations—Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC), the Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA), the Medical Intelligence and Information Agency (MIIA), and INSCOM Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC).

The US Air Force Air Weather Service provides environmental support in accordance with Army and AF regulations. Air Force staff weather officers serve as members of the commander's special staff; the senior intelligence officer supervises them. Air Force weather teams are attached to CEWI groups and battalions operations center.
III
PRINCIPLES

ORGANIZING FOR WAR
 Intelligence organizations stay organized for war. Most echelons above
corps (EAC) intelligence organizations, however, have peacetime missions.
Though modified for those missions, they remain prepared for fast transition
from peace to wartime.

ORGANIZING FOR SUPPORT
 Intelligence organizations are tailored two ways to meet requirements of
the support command:
• **Regional tailoring** fits units to a specific geographic area. This
  provides an appropriate mix of linguistic skills, area expertise, proper
data base(s), and equipment.
• **Functional tailoring** provides appropriate mixes of collection,
  production, counterintelligence, and intelligence support abilities to
  meet needs of the supported command.

Most units are tailored for both region and function to support a
command, or otherwise accomplish a mission.

CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
 Transition from peace to war requires continuity of intelligence opera-
tions. To insure this continuity, and optimize production, intelligence
organizations usually are not held in reserve.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
 Intelligence organizations are organic, assigned, or attached; they may
also support a unit but stay under operational control of their next higher
headquarters. The table shows their operational missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONAL MISSIONS TABLE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Support (GS)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provides intelligence support to the organization as a whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Remains under operational control of the commander assigning the mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides the commander assigning the mission the most direct way to influence priorities of the intelligence effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responds to tasking, by priority, from commander assigning the mission, supported commanders, and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Support-Reinforcing (GS-R)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provides intelligence support to an organization, or area, by extending the capabilities of another intelligence unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Remains under the operational control of the commander assigning the mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Responds to tasking, by priority, from commander assigning the mission, reinforced unit, other supported commanders, and other organizations.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reinforcing (R)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Extends capabilities of another intelligence unit or staff section.</td>
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<td>• Remains under command of the commander assigning the mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Is under the operational control of the reinforced unit or staff section.</td>
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<td>• Responds to tasking, by priority, from reinforced unit or staff section, and commander assigning the mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Support (DS)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Dedicates intelligence support to a designated organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Coordinates that support with the supported organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Remains under the command of the commander assigning mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responds to tasking, by priority, from supported organization, commander assigning the mission, and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Control</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can be given to a supported organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The reason: when there is need for more control by the supported unit than direct support can give.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Attachment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• When attached, the intelligence organization is under the operational control of the commander of the unit to which attached, and responds to that commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The unit to which attached is responsible for administration and logistics support of the intelligence unit unless otherwise specified in the order of attachment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Operational Control (OPCON)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Director, National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CS), has SIGINT OPCON of dedicated strategic SIGINT collection units. He sets technical requirements for operation of the US SIGINT system; this includes SIGINT tactical forces assets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TECHNICAL SUPPORT

A technical communications channel connects levels in the intelligence structure. This channel must not override command guidance or assigned operational missions. Technical channels—

- Exchange SIGINT technical and target data, and human intelligence (HUMINT) and counter intelligence (CI) operational data.
- Provide national and other data.
- Rapidly disseminate intelligence information.
- Provide interface with other Army, US, and Allied intelligence requirements and capabilities.
- Provide specialized support or training.

COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FROM FORWARD EDGE OF THE BATTLE AREA (FEBA) TO NATIONAL LEVEL

Intelligence support to military forces in a theater involves coordination of intelligence activities from the FEBA to the national level:

- The Army must get intelligence through tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) in support of combat operations.
- National exploitation of tactical intelligence capabilities (NETCAP) provides essential information to the National Command Authority (NCA).
- Wartime ability requires peacetime exercise of TENCAP and NETCAP.

The first echelon where national and tactical systems meet is normally corps. However, some systems and intelligence operations may require interface at levels above corps; examples are multicorps and theater-wide systems and intelligence operations.

AREAS OF INFLUENCE, INTEREST, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY

Areas of influence and interest are shown in figures 2 and 3.

Areas of influence (figure 2)

They are the part of the battlefield where a commander must be able to acquire and attack targets with systems under his direction.

Commands in areas of influence are responsible for finding, targeting, and reporting on enemy forces there.

Areas of interest (figure 3)

They are the part of the battlefield that extends beyond an area of influence, but where you find enemy forces capable of affecting a commander's future operations.
Figure 2  AREAS OF INFLUENCE

CORPS

UP TO 150 KM

DIVISION

UP TO 70 KM

COMMANDERS MUST BE ABLE TO ACQUIRE AND ATTACK TARGETS IN THEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE

BRIGADE

UP TO 15 KM

BATTALION

UP TO 5 KM

FORWARD LINE OF FRIENDLY FORCES
Information from this area generally aids planning. Normally, each command echelon gets information about its area of interest from its next superior command.

Figure 3  AREAS OF INTEREST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 1,000 km</td>
<td>ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Up to 300 km</td>
<td>CORPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Up to 150 km</td>
<td>DIVISION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Up to 70 km</td>
<td>BRIGADE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Up to 15 km</td>
<td>BATTALION</td>
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AREAS OF INTEREST, WHERE ENEMY FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF AFFECTING FUTURE OPERATIONS, EXTEND BEYOND A COMMANDER'S AREA OF INFLUENCE.
Area of Counterintelligence Responsibility

Divisional area of counterintelligence responsibility extends from the FEBA to the division rear boundary.

The corps area extends from division rear boundary to the corps rear boundary.

The theater army commander, in coordination with host nation(s), has responsibility for rear area security of US forces behind corps rear boundaries.

Echelons below division usually are not assigned an area of counterintelligence responsibility. They receive CI support from divisional CEWI battalions.

COMMANDER—INTELLIGENCE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP

A senior intelligence staff officer (ACSI, DCSI, G2, S2) assists the commander. A staff section helps the intelligence officer perform his duties. Commanders define their intelligence needs and priorities to staff intelligence officers. Intelligence staff officers—

- Develop intelligence and collection for divisional units; pass requirements for support to superior headquarters.
- Evaluate intelligence information.
- Produce intelligence estimates and reports to meet the commander’s needs.

Commanders assign operational missions to assigned and attached intelligence units. The senior intelligence staff officer supervises assigned, attached, and supporting intelligence units.

Commanders and staff intelligence officers periodically refine collection tasking, then adjust intelligence priorities to meet needs. Intelligence and operations staff sections work together to insure meeting intelligence requirements, and that the right intelligence gets to those who need it.

OVERSIGHT

Commanders cannot delegate oversight responsibility. Senior intelligence officers are responsible for compliance with statutes, executive orders, directives, and regulations in all intelligence activity at their levels and each lower level. Intelligence commanders have oversight responsibility for all activity conducted by that organization. This holds regardless of operational control delegated by assignment or in operational missions to subordinate elements.
EMPLOYMENT OF COLLECTION DISCIPLINES

Intelligence collection is an integrated, multidiscipline effort. Each collection discipline—
- Takes advantage of strengths: substance, timeliness, resource efficiency, availability, and coverage for each situation.
- Contributes to multidiscipline operations through tip-off, cueing, expansion, and verification. Disciplines complement each other.
- Provides for backup to insure continuity.
- Counters enemy deception operations.
- Aids verification.

OTHER PRINCIPLES

Counterintelligence. These operations include foreign counterintelligence (FCI); personnel, physical, document, and signal security programs; and other operations security support.

Deception. Intelligence at each command level must resist enemy deception and contribute to friendly deception plans and operations.

Intentions. Intelligence evaluates enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions to identify probable enemy action.

Integrity. Base analyses, estimates, products, and recommendations on objective evaluation of observed and inferred hostile activity; allow no bias from preconceived friendly expectations, plans, desired findings, or policy preferences.

Independence. Design of intelligence abilities is for independence from any enemy attempt to deceive or hide activity. Design intelligence operations also to overcome enemy countermeasures; cover; weather; darkness; and battlefield environment of smoke, dust, and nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) contaminations.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). IPB analyzes enemy, weather, and terrain. IPB in peacetime is for potential conflict areas; it continues in combat to develop data on specific threat forces. IPB is a tool to relate changes in enemy doctrine and abilities to terrain and weather scenarios.

Net Assessment. Net assessment compares analyses—by intelligence and operations sections—of strengths, abilities, weaknesses, and intentions of enemy forces, with the operational ability of friendly forces. Both sections contribute information. A similar assessment projects scientific and technical (S&T) threats by S&T intelligence analysts, scientists, and engineers.

Dissemination vs Secrecy. Intelligence collectors and producers must disseminate exploitable information to users; at the same time, they must insure protection of sources and methods. Need for secrecy must be weighed against operational need.
Training. Intelligence training of units and individuals for wartime requires field training against potentially hostile targets operating with supported units. Use of technical intelligence channels must also be practiced.

Communications. Intelligence operations require dedicated communications for targeting and other time-sensitive traffic.
IV
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Associated Activities: Operational activities involved enough with Army intelligence to require consideration in any systems approach. There are two categories: those—

- Performed by non-MI organizations but which make a major contribution to the intelligence product. They include combat patrols, target acquisition, meteorology, mapping, charting, and geodesy.
- In which successful accomplishment is closely associated with intelligence activities and organizations. They include electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, counter-terrorism, and deception.

Collection: Gathering information from all available sources; supplying it to processing and analysis elements, and designated users.

Counterintelligence: Military intelligence for—

- Offensive actions to destroy or neutralize enemy foreign intelligence activities.
- Defensive actions for protection against multidisciplined foreign intelligence collection threats, subversion, and sabotage.

Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI): Intelligence operations to detect, counteract, and prevent espionage and other clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorist activities, and assassinations conducted for foreign powers, organizations, or persons. They do not include personnel, physical, document, or signal security programs.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT): Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance operations information from human sources.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): Locating, recognizing, identifying, and describing objects reproduced electronically by optical means, film electronic display devices, or other media including further processing for intelligence use.

Indications and Warning: Intelligence activities to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that are a threat to US or Allied military, political, or economic interests, or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of hostile actions or intentions, imminence of hostilities, serious insurgency, hostile reactions to US reconnaissance, terrorist attacks, and similar events.

Multidiscipline: The integrated use and direction of more than one operational discipline for—

- Collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.
- Counterintelligence.
National Exploitation of Tactical Capabilities (NETCAP):
Exploitation of tactical intelligence systems by the National Command
Authority in a high intensity conflict.

Operations Security (OPSEC): All actions a command takes to deny
the enemy information about friendly units and their operations.

Production: The conversion of information into finished intelligence
through integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all avail-
able data; the preparation of intelligence reports; and dissemination as
appropriate.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&T): Intelligence about
foreign developments in basic and applied scientific and technical research
and development. Included are engineering and production techniques, new
technology, weapon systems, and their abilities and characteristics.
Technical intelligence also includes exploitation of captured enemy
materiel and documents.

Signal Intelligence (SIGINT): A generic term covering communi-
cations, electronics, and telemetry intelligence.

Situation Assessments: Assessments of all data available to support
operations plans, orders, and decisionmaking. It normally requires support
from national agencies and national intelligence systems.

Strategic Intelligence: Intelligence required to formulate policy and
military plans at national and international levels. It differs from tactical
intelligence in level of use, but also may vary in scope and detail.

Support: Support needed by intelligence units is mainly of two kinds:
• Normal support required by any Army unit for personnel, logistics,
  communications, automation, and other matters.
• Unique support for proper functioning of intelligence units and
  systems.
  It includes specified intercept training, specified area training, logistics
  support for unique or one-of-a-kind systems, and excepted service personnel.

Tactical Intelligence: Foreign intelligence sponsored by the Secretary
of Defense and designed to respond to needs of military commanders in the
field, maintain the readiness of operating forces for combat operations, and
support planning and conduct of combat operations.

Target Acquisition: The detection, identification, and location of a
target in sufficient detail and time to permit effective employment of
weapons.
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP): Responsive exploitation of national intelligence systems by tactical forces.

Threat Analysis: Application of further analysis of finished intelligence products to focus on enemy threats to Army units, systems, and activities. Threat analysis examines enemy abilities in terms of tactics, doctrine, equipment, force structure, and materiel development.
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