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The way we organize our defense establishment is a crucial part of our national strategy, directly affecting our ability to wage war. Perceptions of a dangerous decline in our nation’s ability to wage war ultimately led to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. That legislation focused almost completely on how we organize to fight. The history of the American defense establishment provides a backdrop for the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and reveals general trends that may be appreciated and exploited by the contemporary strategist. The mechanics of how the intent of reorganization advocates was codified into law points to the most probable skills required for a future military strategist to pursue successful reorganization. Careful analysis of the GNA story points out some important aspects of its effect on the American military strategic culture. Not only did the resulting legislation have lasting effects on our military strategy, it produced real results in terms of our war winning capability in conflicts around the globe. In addition, the very process of creating and advocating the Goldwater-Nichols Act spotlighted particular skills required of the military strategist when pursuing such large bureaucratic change and revealed key considerations for internal military strategic review. What the military strategist of today may not realize is that he or she can be central to such a reorganizational process. Perhaps the most important utility of this analysis will be its applicability to the next major defense reorganization. With that in mind, it is incumbent on the military strategist of the new millennium to continue to question the status quo organization, while evaluating that organization against time-tested principles of military effectiveness. The military strategist must be involved in the process of change by clearly communicating his proposed organizational strategy in a manner that secures broad-based support from both internal and external audiences. Looking forward, this study finds that the most lucrative area of defense reorganization over the next decade will involve a combination of rationalizing staff to structure and promoting the regionalization of command in an interagency setting. Above all though, the enduring lesson of the Goldwater-Nichols era is that how we perform as a military will always be closely tied to how we organize to fight.
ORGANIZING TO FIGHT:
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AND THE MILITARY STRATEGIST

BY
MAJOR J SCOTT CHESNUT

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
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About the Author

Major Chesnut received his commission in the Air Force in 1982. After completion of Undergraduate Pilot Training in 1983, his first assignment was as a C-141 pilot at Charleston AFB, South Carolina. During that assignment, Major Chesnut was selected for a MAC/SAC exchange tour, flying FB-111s at Pease AFB, New Hampshire. In 1990, Major Chesnut returned to the C-141 cockpit as a Chief Pilot and Chief Evaluator at Norton AFB, California. He was assigned to the Pentagon in 1993, as a Legislative Liaison to the United States Congress. Major Chesnut is a Senior Pilot with over 3500 flying hours. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Technology from Arizona State University; a Master of Business Administration degree from Embry-Riddle University; and was a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College. In July 1997, Major Chesnut was assigned to Headquarters Air Mobility Command as the Assistant Chief of the Commander’s Staff Group.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to recognize several individuals who have been crucial to the successful completion of this study. I want to thank Professor James Corum for his supportive comments that helped channel my research, and Professor Dave Mets for his insightful challenges to my thought that molded the final product. I also wish to extend my sincere appreciation to Major Mark Conversino for his patience and thoughtful feedback during several “skull” sessions that gave this study its initial momentum.

Special recognition must go to several very busy professionals that had the kindness and devotion to submit to my sometimes rather lengthy interviews. Dr. Richard Kohn, author and educator at the University of North Carolina was extremely helpful in outlining resources and on-the-fly discussions. The Honorable James Locher, Mr. Archie Barrett, and General David Armstrong took time away from their intense Pentagon schedules to discuss policy with “some Major from Maxwell,” and in so doing, made major contributions to this study.

Last, but far from least, I want to express my sincere gratitude to my wife, Mindy, and my family for their loving support and patience during the many days and nights that I was preoccupied, or absent from our home. They were every bit a part of my success in completing this study.
ABSTRACT

The way we organize our defense establishment is a crucial part of our national strategy, directly affecting our ability to wage war. Perceptions of a dangerous decline in our nation’s ability to wage war ultimately led to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. That legislation focused almost completely on how we organize to fight. The history of the American defense establishment provides a backdrop for the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and reveals general trends that may be appreciated and exploited by the contemporary strategist. The “mechanics” of how the intent of reorganization advocates was codified into law points to the most probable skills required for a future military strategist to pursue successful reorganization. Careful analysis of the GNA “story” points out some important aspects of its effect on the American military strategic culture. Not only did the resulting legislation have lasting effects on our military strategy, it produced real results in terms of our “war winning” capability in conflicts around the globe. In addition, the very process of creating and advocating the Goldwater-Nichols Act spotlighted particular skills required of the military strategist when pursuing such large bureaucratic change and revealed key considerations for internal military strategic review. What the military strategist of today may not realize is that he or she can be central to such a reorganizational process. Perhaps the most important utility of this analysis will be its applicability to the next major defense reorganization. With that in mind, it is incumbent on the military strategist of the new millennium to continue to
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The way we organize our defense establishment is a crucial part of our national strategy. Our national defense strategy will determine, for the most part, how we wage war. And, in the words of one strategy expert, “It will do us no good to have an army, navy, air force, and marine corps, of whatever quality, if we have forgotten how to wage war.”

Yet, perceptions of a decline in our nation’s ability to wage war ultimately led to some of the most significant defense legislation of the later 20th century — the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. That legislation focused almost completely on how we organize to fight.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) has been hailed as “. . . one of the landmark laws of American history,” and derided as making “. . . a hash out of our defense structure.”

Whatever the particular sentiment, most are in agreement that the law had significant impact on how the United States military does business. More important to the military strategist though, is that the story behind GNA teaches not only how we have organized to fight in the past, but how we must continue to reorganize in the future to ensure optimal strategic effectiveness. What the military strategist of today may not realize is that he or she can be central to that reorganizational process.
The methodology used to uncover the pertinent lessons of American defense reorganization followed a process of ever-narrowing focus. Research for this paper began with a broad focus, surveying the entire history of the American military organization through a review of historical literature. That review found that the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II instituted a fundamental change in the way the American military organized. Accordingly, a more detailed analysis was made of the years since World War II. That analysis found that, essentially, all of the organizational changes made during that period led to a culmination in the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. With that in mind, the Goldwater-Nichols Act moved to center stage as the seminal case-study of defense reorganization in recent times.

In order to obtain in-depth information on the design and implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, several sources were pursued. The “architects” of the GNA were personally interviewed for this study, along with the Joint Staff historian and a former chief military historian. Data from these interviews was then correlated with information gleaned from symposium proceedings and numerous journal articles on the subject. Finally, the compiled data was analyzed for applicability to an primary audience of military strategists and projected in an attempt to foreshadow future organizational changes.

The literature search conducted for this paper included primary sources, secondary sources, and the public record. Primary sources included essays from both the military and civilian leaders involved in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Of the two sponsoring congressmen, Senator Goldwater is the only living sponsor. While attempts to interview him personally failed due to his poor health, his autobiographical remarks were reviewed. Secondary source material on military reorganization in general, and the GNA
in particular, is abundant. For the purposes of this study, representative secondary source views were cited. In addition, the text of the entire Goldwater-Nichols Act was obtained, reviewed, and cited throughout this paper.

Admittedly, the organization of large bureaucracies is not an exciting topic. Maybe that’s why James Locher observes that “we’ve [the defense establishment] never had a tradition of quality attention to organizational issues . . .” For that reason, perhaps the following concise list of ten reasons for exploring the Goldwater-Nichols Act story will be helpful:

1. How we organize is part of our strategy
2. High-ranking people spent a lot of “blood” on it
3. Shows how far service parochialism will go
4. Shows how administration can lose a war(s)
5. Shows how four-star generals can be driven to quit en-masse
6. It is the civil-military case study of the later 20th century
7. Demonstrates how to make BIG changes in American government
8. One of the best historical examples of military-congressional cooperation
9. It may be you that will be the next “reformer”
10. It frames the military’s strategic successes and failures of the last 50 years

Several important basic concepts will be referred to throughout this study. Therefore, a brief look at key definitions is in order. “Strategy” is commonly defined as the process of orchestrating the means to an end, the “means” may be further broken down into several elements. In military strategy, troops and weaponry come to mind immediately as essential elements of the “means.” What is many times overlooked is the particular style of organization employed in concert with the troops and weaponry. Webster’s defines the act of “organizing” as “to make into a whole with unified and coherent relationships.” In terms of defense reorganization the elements of “unification” and “coherence” become particularly central—and contentious. An important distinction drawn throughout this study is that how we organize is part of our strategy and how we organize varies.
The “American military strategic culture” refers to the community of military strategists and their characteristics in terms of skills, beliefs, and customs. The “military strategist” is typically an appropriately schooled officer, of field grade or above, with access to his organization’s decision-making process. Finally, the term “defense establishment” or “defense organization” will be used to refer to the entire chain of military command, from the National Command Authority (NCA), to the group of agencies that make up the Department of Defense (DoD): including the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the military secretaries and services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the unified and specified commands.

The following analysis of the Goldwater-Nichols Act “story” will point out the clear significance of its effect on the American military strategic culture. It will endeavor to draw clear linkages between the U.S. defense organization, its role in strategy, and its pertinence to the military strategist. Not only will the Goldwater-Nichols Act be linked to lasting effects on our military strategy, it will be evaluated in terms of real results in “war winning” capability. The history of the American defense establishment will be reviewed, both to provide a backdrop for the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and to search for the existence of general trends that may be appreciated and exploited by the contemporary strategist. The “mechanics” of how the intent of reorganization advocates was codified into law will be highlighted, in order glean the most probable skills required for a future military strategist to pursue successful reorganization. The study will conclude by suggesting future organizational directions for the military strategist to pursue, tempered by a discussion of the expected context.
Notes

1 Arthur G.B. Metcalf, then Chairman of the United States Strategic Institute, foreword in General Victor Krulak’s *Organization for National Security.* (Cambridge, MA: United States Strategic Institute, 1983), xi.


33 John Lehman, then Secretary of the Navy, Ibid.
Chapter 2

Genesis of Goldwater-Nichols

At the dawn of the 20th century, two major factors begin to create tension in the defense structure; the professional soldier and the airplane. While the idea of a “schooled” military advisor had begun to creep slowly into the defense culture throughout the 19th century, it was not until the Upton Report of 1875 that the concept of a “professional soldier” was fully embraced. Samuel Huntington saw Upton as “the most influential younger officer in the work of Army reform.” His survey of several European militaries produced the following recommendations concerning officers:

- That the source of officers should be only from formal military schools or by promotion from the ranks following a qualifying examination
- That there be a high-level school to educate commanders and staff officers.
- That the overall general staff include only the highest quality officers.
- That there be periodic formal professional reports rendered on the qualifications of all officers.

The realization of the “professional officer” began to create a theoretical cleavage between the civilian and military elements of strategy. Although notable exceptions to this new model occurred, and continue to occur, for the most part the military officer became obliged to limit his advice to the purely military, while policy-making polarized into the civilian realm. Strategy, therefore, became more of a cooperative effort between two distinct government camps.
The exploitation of the airplane created yet another cleavage within the newly professional military. With the advent of airpower, the distinct division between land and sea was now routinely crossed in a third medium—the air. The fact that the combat airplane could operate over land or sea, and had to touch down somewhere, forced a certain level of cooperation among the three mediums, if only for deconfliction. As airpower began to blossom, it was soon apparent that air-land or air-sea campaigns showed promise. The Marine Corps even went a step further, developing “air-sea-land” campaign plans during the interwar period that would be crucial during World War II. While the organization of the defense establishment remained basically static during the early part of the 20th century, the awkward tension of the tripartite media continued to mount under the concurrent formation of a new civil-military relationship. The next major organizational change would occur in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

On December 11th, 1941, within days of the attack on Pearl, U.S. military commanders received approval from President Roosevelt to form “The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.” The arrangement reflected the sober realization that all three media of combat must work together in a time of crisis. Land, sea, and air were each represented, even though the “air forces” had not been officially recognized as a separate service. Though the official grouping of the “services” would contribute to several notable strategic accomplishments over the next few years, the spontaneous nature of this ad hoc arrangement produced flaws that would manifest themselves both during the war and for many years after.

In fact, JCS growing pains were immediate and pronounced. In many ways this “arranged marriage” of the services would serve to spotlight the worst parochial tendencies
of some of its members. General David Jones, in his seminal piece on defense disfunc-
tionality observes, “. . . to a great extent World War II was fought along service lines. . .
We won World War II despite our organizational handicaps, not because we were
smarter, but once again because we and our allies were bigger.” 8 Jones asserts that the
partial abandonment of beach landing forces by the Navy at Leyte Gulf was a “parochial
failure.” In perspective, the entire Pacific campaign was indeed the result of a Presiden-
tial reconciliation between competing “sea” and “land” campaigns—they did both! So
apparent were the tensions in this new defense arrangement that, even before the war had
ended, congressional hearings opened to explore proposals for a revamped defense estab-
lishment.

The Select Committee on Post War Military Policy began hearings on defense reor-
ganization April 24, 1944. 9 Government and military officials submitted at least “six
distinct though interdependent proposals.” 10 Primarily at issue, was the “routing” of
command lines from the President. Those command lines would establish “access” of
interested parties to the President, as well as the major “roles” within the defense estab-
lishment. Most seemed to agree on the need for a “Department of Defense” to replace
the archaic “War-Navy” department pairing. Significantly, Navy Secretary Frank Knox
broke with the “admirals” in his endorsement of the unification concept, paving the way
for the original hearings. However, his untimely death, just after the hearings were un-
derway, was followed by vehement resistance from his successors. 11 Navy objections
over the possible loss of land based aviation and the fleet Marine force continued to
plague the hearings; yet, tension appeared mostly over the “access” issue.
The Navy, having enjoyed decades as a co-equal cabinet member with the War Department, with direct access to the President, was loathe to dilute its status by placing any other entity in the command chain between it and the National Command Authority (NCA). For instance, when General J. Lawton Collins unveiled the official Army proposal in October 1945, that would establish an Armed Force Chief of Staff and would subordinate the Navy, the sea service wouldn’t have any of it. It is important to note that the Navy’s primary objection to the Collins Plan was the aspect of “overcentralization” in a “Chairman.” That line of objection would remain throughout the next fifty years, and beyond.12

As is many times the case in American government, the structure that was eventually codified in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) was, in fact, a compromise between all competing interests. The NSA established a small Office of the Secretary of Defense (with limited powers), emphasized a corporate body of the JCS (with no Chairman), and gave the JCS the authority to create unified commands and develop warfighting strategic plans. The new structure was weakly supported by legislative detail, but was seen by the President and senior Army and Air Force leaders as the beginning of an evolutionary process.

Within one year of NSA passage, the evolutionary process continued. In 1948, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum for the secretaries within his department, attaching a paper defining the functions of the armed forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on the policy embodied in the National Security Act, this was the first attempt at backing-up the legislative intent of the NSA by defining functions. President Truman described the occasion:

Secretary Forrestal labored unceasingly to overcome the long-standing rivalries that could not be swept away by an act of Congress. His chief problem was that of defining specific roles and missions of each branch of
the service and in determining budgetary allocations to carry out those functions. After a series of conferences within the Defense Department he submitted a new definition of functions to me and recommended that the new statement be substituted for the Executive Order which I had issued at the time the law was enacted. After studying his recommendations, I rescinded my original order and approved on March 27, 1948, the promulgation of the new statement of functions with minor modifications.\[^{13}\]

Critics of the Key West Agreement feel that it was a drop in the bucket that had little practical effect:

> The memorandum, popularly known as the Key West agreement, gave each of the three services a set of primary responsibilities, and each pledged to carry out certain functions to assist in the primary missions of the other services. But interservice disputes did not end. Because each of the three services had its own programs and doctrines to protect, none of them wanted to waste valuable budget money and resources on programs designed to aid their Pentagon rivals.\[^{14}\]

Although the effect of the Key West agreement may be debatable, it served to highlight many of the issues that would become central to arguments over reorganization in the years to come. One example is the issue of JCS command authority. Whereas the National Security Act of 1947 saw the Joint Chiefs of Staff as planners and advisers—not commanders—the 1948 Key West Agreement appended the NSA to allow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as executive agents for unified commands, a responsibility that allowed them to originate direct communication with the combat commands. Congress later rescinded that authority.\[^{15}\]

The year 1949 brought the first major legislative “revision” of the NSA. In that legislation, congress strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), established a non-voting JCS Chairman, increased the size of the joint staff, and “demoted” the services to non-cabinet status under the Defense Department. Whether the 1949 revision was the beginning of a long line of improvements to, or the first sign of an inevitable erosion of, the NSA depends on the analyst. Where one stood had much to do with where one sat. President Truman, in his memoirs notes that “on August 10, 1949, I signed into law the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, thus moving a step
nearer true unification of the armed forces. To me, the passage of the National Security Act and its strengthening amendments represented one of the outstanding achievements of my administration.16 Likewise, Historian Lawrence J. Korb saw the revision as the first in a series of attempts to remedy several “problems” in the defense structure and functions prescribed by the original NSA.17 On the other hand, Marine General Victor Krulak saw the revision as carefully orchestrated “back pedaling” from the original agreement, that had the intent of molding the defense structure toward the current President’s personal organizational agenda. In a like manner, Krulak saw subsequent legislation as “inverted” and “deranged,” laying the foundation for more rather than fewer problems.18

The President and Congress allowed the 1949 revision to stand over the next few years, but re-engaged the issue of defense organization in 1952. As one of the last acts of the Truman administration, the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett) was tasked to review the National Security Organization. The result of his review, in combination with the views of the new Eisenhower administration, produced the 1953 revision to the NSA. The new law “strengthened” the SECDEF by consolidating several defense functions under his direct control. The revisions also strengthened the chairman of the JCS by giving him more administrative control over the joint staff. However, the revision weakened the “perceived” power of the JCS to “command” the unified commanders in chief (CINCs) by clarifying the original “intent” of the NSA, that the JCS “did not exercise operational command, but played only an advisory and planning role.”19

The last major reorganization of the defense establishment, prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, occurred in 1958. The changes made in 1958, once again strengthened the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the chairman, at the expense of service autonomy. With regard to the JCS, the chairman was made a “voting member” and the commandant of the Marine Corps was included in the group.\textsuperscript{20} The act increased the allowed size of the joint staff (to 400), but expressly prohibited the JCS from functioning as an overall general staff and from exercising any executive authority. The OSD was further strengthened by redefining the secretary’s function as one of “direction, authority, and control” and by bestowing upon him new powers to reorganize elements of the Defense Department.\textsuperscript{21} An important action that took place in conjunction with the legislation was an OSD directive issued in December of that year specifying two distinct command chains that ran from the SECDEF. The first chain involved “support” of the armed forces, and it ran from the SECDEF through the service secretaries to the individual services. The second “operational” chain ran from the SECDEF through (implying transmission only) the Chairman of the JCS to the unified CINC\textsuperscript{s}. For the next twenty years following the 1958 changes, the defense establishment would remain virtually frozen in form and function.

Since the landmark National Security Act of 1947, the SECDEF’s authority had been continually enhanced, the role of the Chairman formalized, the joint staff expanded, and the chains of command clarified. Whether the evolution of the defense establishment during this period was positive or negative is open to debate. What is clear is that it did evolve significantly, causing a reshaping of the military strategic culture. Increasing war-fighter specialization resulted in the creation of a third independent service (USAF) and a fourth representative (USMC Commandant) on the JCS. That specialization also increased the need for unifying oversight, in the view of many lawmakers. That oversight,
however, meant the erosion of service autonomy, especially for the “historically autonomous” sea-services. The evolution of America’s civil-military relationship was reflected in the rapidly growing bureaucracy that legislators felt necessary to maintain “civilian control” over the most powerful military in the world. But, by the early 1980s, the most powerful military in the world was showing stress fractures that indicated an urgent need to address ever growing organizational tensions once again.

Two wars and several military operations that occurred during the period since World War II, highlighted weaknesses in the organizational structure of the U.S. defense establishment. Those weaknesses manifested themselves in the inefficient or ineffective application of military force. Significantly, that application usually involved a dysfunction that ran along the entire length of the command chain from the National Command Authority (NCA) to the troops in the field. Three examples most often cited are the Vietnam War, the “Desert One” rescue operation, and Grenada.

In Vietnam, the worst fears of the military services were realized. A newly empowered SECDEF (Robert McNamara) appeared to take on the role of “the man on horseback” that had always been associated with a “too-powerful” chairman. Ironically, “civilian control” seemed to be running amuck. To military leaders, perhaps the most infamous manifestation of this problem were the “Tuesday luncheons:”

The significant point is that no professional military man, not even the Chairman of the JCS, was present at these luncheons until late in 1967. This omission, whether by the deliberate intent or with the indifferent acquiescence of Secretary McNamara, was in my view a grave and flagrant example of his persistent refusal to accept the civilian-military partnership in the conduct of our military operations.22

In another incident that highlights the tension between OSD and the JCS during the Vietnam War, Mark Perry alleges that the JCS came perilously close to “mutiny.” In his book *Four Stars*, Perry tells of the shock and indignation felt by the joint chiefs after then
Secretary McNamara testified in August of 1967 that “America was winning the war in Vietnam.” He writes that the chiefs met in an unusual private session that same afternoon:

Facing his colleagues from a chair pulled in front of his desk, [JCS Chairman Earle G.] Wheeler said that he believed they should resign “en masse” during a press conference to be held the next morning. The Chiefs weren’t shocked; the idea had come up during informal discussions over a period of three months. Now, though, the talk was serious.23

Although Perry continues the story to describe how General Wheeler aborted the “mutiny” the next morning, the incident underlines serious flaws in the civil-military relationship at that time.

Unfortunately, lessons from the Vietnam war didn’t drive enough organizational change in time for the rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran, in 1980. Senator Barry Goldwater was involved in the congressional investigation into the aborted attempt. He recounts, “We . . . studied the Iran hostage rescue mission and found it plagued with planning, training, and organizational problems. . . It was an ad-hoc improvised operation from start to finish. That was because all four services wanted a piece of the action.”24

The Iranian hostage rescue attempt pointed out several weaknesses in the defense establishment. The Secretary of Defense apparently felt obliged to permit “equal representation” of the services rather than an “optimal” force mix. This resulted in the Marines flying their helicopters on a mission that was ultimately beyond their capacity. In Senator Goldwater’s words, “Air Force pilots were far better suited for the grueling six-hour flight because of their low altitude, long-range training and experience. The Marines were trained for short-range assaults.”25

The abortive hostage rescue also pointed to a vacuum in terms of joint doctrine. Former congressional staffer Archie Barrett recalls that joint “guidance” prior to the 1986 reorganization consisted mostly of what “not to do.” Joint publications were full of
“can’t do this and can’t do that.” The commander of Army forces involved in the operation echoed those sentiments about joint guidance:

   It was crazy. They never told me what they could do to help me. We might have had to shoot our way out of the embassy. Finally, I got my orders from Jimmy Carter. The President simply said I should use whatever force necessary to save the lives of the hostages. I didn’t need any more rules.27

The result of “equal parochialism” and fuzzy guidance, compounded by an unusually high level of secrecy among the services was one of the most well-publicized failures of the United States military since its inception.

In contrast, the American invasion of Grenada in October of 1983 was widely touted as an example of a military success. However, even in that instance the deep fissures between the services, that had grown from years of organizational neglect, were readily apparent. Service leaders had tacitly agreed to cooperate when the time came for war, but found that with the ever-shrinking timetables of modern contingency operations, meaningful cooperation just didn’t happen:

   It’s too late in exercises and actual operations to have misunderstandings or disagreements over doctrine. It’s too late in those situations to not be able to effectively employ all of your resources, which are always scarce, because you don’t have joint procedures and techniques to employ all of those systems along functional lines.28

Undoubtedly, the failures of Vietnam and Desert One weighed heavily on General David Jones’s mind during the spring of 1982. It was then, in an unprecedented move, that the Chairman took a stand by publishing an article in Armed Forces Journal that was highly critical of the current structure of the defense establishment.29 In his article he recounted problems with defense organization that dated back to World War II. General Jones called for a major reorganization of the defense establishment that incorporated three main changes. First, he suggested that the chairman’s role should be strengthened
by making him the principal advisor to the president on joint military matters, and by
giving him a deputy to handle part of the workload. Second, he advocated limiting “pa-
rochial” involvement of the services represented on the joint staff by creating a truly
“joint” staff that would work “independently” for the chairman. His third and final main
area of interest was the overall conduct of joint officer personnel policy. He advocated
broadening training in joint matters, expanding joint experience levels, and providing
incentives for joint duty. His recommendations sought to improve a widespread negative
image of joint duty and encourage top quality officers to participate in the joint staff.

To add more fuel to the growing sentiment for reorganization, General Edward C.
Meyer (then the Army Chief of Staff) followed the chairman’s article with his own essay,
published the following month in the same journal. Meyer’s article stressed that Gen-
eral Jones’ recommendations didn’t go far enough! Like Jones, he felt that the Chairman
should become the “primary advice provider” to the President and that the joint staff
should be “independently” operated. In addition, General Meyer advocated the creation
of a separate “National Military Advisory Council (NMAC)” composed of senior officers
that were not the service chiefs. The NMAC, in his view, would solve the problem of
“dual-hatting” of the JCS; a problem that he claimed led to overworked chiefs and a pa-
rochial outlook. He closed his article by taking on the issue of OSD micro-management,
recommending a decreased role for civilians, below the SECDEF level in “providing
military input on national security issues.”

After a more than twenty year hiatus, those two articles helped to set the congres-
sional machine back into motion on the issue of defense organization reform. It is per-
haps ironic that it took two military “insiders” to blow the whistle on their own organiza-
tion in order to get action. In the months following the Generals’ statements, the House
Armed Services Committee opened hearings into reorganization proposals. The words of the two active-duty Generals carried a lot of weight and were backed up by other witnesses. By the fall of 1982, the baton had been passed to a few hardworking congressional staff members that would run a reorganization marathon over the next four years.

Notes


6 The “political” nature of officers such as Mitchell, MacArthur, Pershing, and Powell has created numerous debates throughout the 20th century, concerning the validity of a “polar” view of civil-military affairs.

7 The “first” JCS was composed of the Chief of Staff for the President (Admiral W.D. Leahy), the Chief of Staff of the Army (General George C. Marshall), the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Ernest J. King), and the Chief of the Army Air Forces (Major General H.H. Arnold).


9 To put this date in perspective, World War II began in Europe on Sept. 1, 1939, when Germany attacked Poland, and ended on Sept. 2, 1945, with the formal surrender of Japan aboard the U.S. battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.


12 Most recently, Naval War College professor Colonel Mackubin T. Owens, Jr. warns in his December 1996 article that “ . . . the real concern here should be the potential for a powerful Chairman and a centralized Joint Staff to impose a single view on the Defense Establishment.” “Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year Retrospective,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, (December 1996), 48-53.


17 Lawrence J. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976), 17.

Notes

19 Senate Committee on Armed Services. Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), Locher report, 141.

20 Although the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 “technically” included the Commandant only “whenever matters concerning the Marine Corps were under consideration,” the Commandant has provided written justification during each year since 1958, to the extent that all defense matters concern him, thereby justifying his continual attendance.

21 James Locher, in Defense Organization (p52), asserts that the verbiage “direction, authority, and control” was the strongest phrase that Congress “knew how to write.” He further opines that this significant buttressing of the DoD may have been in response to the increased Soviet threat connected with the launching of Sputnik.


25 Ibid.

26 Archie Barrett, Dep. Asst. Secretary of the Army (House senior staffer on GNA) interviewed by author during visit to Washington D.C., 7 January 1997.

27 Colonel Charles Beckwith, quoted in Goldwater, 347.


Chapter 3

The Intent of Goldwater-Nichols

On the other side of the Potomac from General Jones’ Pentagon office were two important advocates who would, eventually, see to it that the changes the General envisioned were navigated through the national legislature and codified into law. In the House of Representatives there was Archie Barrett. Barrett, a retired Air Force Colonel, was the designated “organization guy” for the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) throughout the 1980s. It would be his tenacity coupled with the Chairman’s “firepower” that would get the ball rolling. In the Senate there was James Locher. Harvard educated, and well-studied on defense organization, Locher would be the “anchor man” on the final stretch of the GNA marathon. Each man had his own unique views on reorganization, but agreed on the major points, and most importantly, on the need for change.

When Archie Barrett joined the HASC in 1981, he found that nobody was particularly interested in the subject of reorganization. What did seem to interest many people was a string of recent military debacles and a “tremendous resentment of military waste.” Over the first few years of his tenure, several specific weaknesses in the organization of the defense establishment became clear.
First, was the apparent impotence of the CINCs. In the words of defense analysts of the time, “The National Security Act grants the CINCs full operational command over all forces assigned to them, but this authority is undermined by the influence that the individual military services retain.”\(^{32}\) Barrett found that, in most cases, the commanders of the Unified Commands would “respond” to their service components for a stated need, but were hesitant to actively “supervise” or direct them. Investigations into that particular weakness found that some commanders simply said “I’m not going to tell another service what to do.” He found that particular attitude prevailed in the organization “responsible” for the troops killed in the 1983 Beirut bombing incident.\(^ {33}\) Some reports indicate that the CINC responsible for Lebanon had “suggested” that security needed to be increased and “offered” to send a security team several months before the bombing occurred. As the report goes, “No one would tell the Marines how to run security, thank you”—the Marines turned him down.\(^ {34}\) In Barrett’s opinion, the CINCs “needed strengthening.” They needed to have full authority to establish their own command chains, control their own logistics, and use the forces under their command as they saw fit.

Second, was the apparent ineffectiveness of the chairman. Although the chairman had been the official JCS “spokesman” for quite some time, he was in effect “chained to the JCS” regarding his advice. In an effort to fairly represent the “corporate view” of the joint chiefs, the chairman often found himself “ducking questions in the National Security Council” because the JCS had no single stand on many issues.

Indeed, Barrett found that some of the best advice that the chairman had given to his civilian superiors came when he occasionally stated his own “opinion.” As Barrett saw
the “market value” of the Chairman’s advice continue to decline, he became convinced that he (the Chairman) needed “more power.” What Barrett envisioned was a chairman that was “influential enough that other members of the JCS would come to him [emphasis added].” He saw a Chairman whose personal advice would be enough “in his own right.” Such a chairman would take the corporate JCS view into consideration, but would have a “thank you very much” veto power.35

Doubters argued that, with an unprecedented level of military power vested in one man, the concept of civilian control of the military was in danger. However, reformers made a strong case that Barrett’s concept of a benevolent autocrat could be defined in such a way that it would enhance effectiveness without threatening original constitutional intent:

There is no reason for the American military machine to change from being a servant of the state to being its master just because it achieves the efficiency that has been eluding it for centuries . . . In fact, the servant will be a useful one, instead of one (as it is now) of dubious utility.36

Finally, Archie Barrett wanted to build a wall. He traced the need for such an organizational wall back to the 1958 amendments to the NSA, where two distinct command chains were delineated. Figure 1 shows the “legislated” or “de jure” structure of the defense establishment envisioned by legislators in 1958. Barrett uses the term “maintain” to describe the 1958 “support” branch and the term “employ” to describe the 1958 “operational branch.” He contended that this de jure structure had actually evolved to the de facto structure shown in Figure 2. Why? Because, in his words, “the services were never willing to go back to the organize-train-equip [function].” That de facto structure, where the services also involved themselves in “employment” issues, created a dominating flow of interest from the services that served to undermine the intended span of control that
had been given to the JCS and CINCs. To return the structure back to its original intent, Barrett had only to design legislation that would create the theoretical “wall” shown in Figure 3. His overriding theme to guide his actions was Max Weber’s concept of “channeling conflict into cooperation.” Barrett realized that conflict would always be a part of a large organization and that the “conflict” between the services could be healthy in many cases.

Figure 1 - De Jure Organizational Structure
Figure 2 - De Facto Organizational Structure

Figure 3 - Barrett's "Wall"
From his perspective on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), James Locher saw many of the same problems. Nevertheless, he attacked those problems from a slightly different angle. Unlike Barrett, Locher’s background had been all “civilian.” When he looked at the organization of the defense establishment, he saw it as a “corporation,” much as General Jones described the JCS in his groundbreaking article:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, if viewed as the military board of a government corporation, would provide some striking contrasts to organization and management principles followed in the private sector: [the] board consists of five directors, all insiders, four of whom simultaneously head line divisions . . . reports to the chief executive and a cabinet member . . . [and is] supported by a corporate staff which draws its officers from line divisions and turns over every two years . . . Board meets three times a week to address operational as well as policy matters, which normally are first reviewed by a four-layered committee system involving full participation of division staffs from the start . . .

As a “government corporation,” Locher saw solutions in terms of varying levels of centralization or decentralization and in terms of “balancing” branches of the corporate body. The “corporate” view framed his interest in bolstering “unity of command,” balancing power between the “maintenance” and “employment” sides, and streamlining the entire establishment.

The position of the Chairman (of the JCS) seemed to hold special interest for Locher, as it had for Barrett. The problem, as Locher saw it, was not that the President or SECDEF was hearing too many opinions, but that the opinions they were receiving from the chairman were “watered down.” Some observers felt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should just meet with their civilian leaders more often. However, as Locher saw it, bad advice given more often was still worthless. In strengthening the chairman’s position, James Locher saw the creation of a “cylinder” that would allow him the freedom to direct information to the NCA while constraining his powers to act autonomously in employing
forces. The chairman would be the principal military advisor, but not the only military advisor.40

Concerning the relationship of the military services to the joint command structure, James Locher saw “power centers.” In that regard, he saw the services as having an asymmetrical level of power that “overrode joint interests.” So imbalanced was this power, in Locher’s view, that he felt the services had “lost sight of the broader national interest” in pursuit of their own parochial gains. At the same time Locher, like Barrett, saw the value of each service’s unique outlook, and thus didn’t want to risk legislating away their perspectives. The trade-off solution was to attempt to increase the power of the joint structure to a level that was more on par with the services while capping service influence at the existing level.41

Locher also believed, as many critics did, that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had simply become too large and too involved in “tinkering.” When assessing the overall factors contributing to OSD micro-management of the military services, Locher surmised that, “. . . [one] cause may be that some of the OSD staffs, particularly in the research and engineering area, have become too large. Larger staff sizes often result in a weaker focus on principal responsibilities and major issues.”42 In addition, he felt that many of the functions that the OSD was involved in should rightfully be in a service “headquarters” instead. The proper focus of the OSD, according to Locher, was judicious oversight, policy review, resource acquisition, and crisis management. These particular views of the OSD even found the support of the Navy camp:

The Office of the Secretary of Defense staff is too large and bureaucratic, the chain of command has too many layers with too many uniformed bureaucrats. Some functions need shifting from OSD to JCS and the serv-
ices. The critical integrating and cross-service functions of OSD need strengthening.  

Although he felt that the OSD structure was an important target for change, Locher would reflect later that OSD cuts ended up in a group of issues that became “a bridge too far” for the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

The legislation that resulted from Barrett’s and Locher’s efforts produced a combined intent of both the Senate and the House that is clearly stated in the preamble of Public Law 99-433 (The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986), Section 3, “Policy”:

In enacting this Act, it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 401)--

(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
(2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
(4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
(5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
(6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
(7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
(8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Analysis of these eight provisions of intent shows a reasonable alignment with the agenda of the two primary congressional staff members involved. The first provision, to “strengthen civilian authority” is mainly an overarching theme for the legislation that is meant both to establish boundaries and to pacify fears of a “man on horseback” or “Prussian general staff.” Provision (2), “improving military advice” highlights the positive
aspect of straightening the chairman’s position, that both staffers advocated. Provisions (3) and (4), addressing the CINCs’ responsibility and authority, work in concert to correct Barrett’s perceived “impotence” of the unified CINC’s and Locher’s quest for “unity of command.”

Provision (5), while not one of either staffer’s main concerns, is certainly a secondary concern of each, and like provision (1), tends to be an overall theme of the legislation. Provision (6), concerning “efficient use of defense resources”, answers Barrett’s perception of “military waste” and Locher’s desire for “streamlining.” Provision (7) addresses the concerns of both “founding Generals” over joint staff officer quality, and indirectly speaks to Barrett’s intent to strengthen the office of the Chairman. Finally, provision (8) is a “catch-all” statement that re-emphasizes the general intent of the legislation to “make things better.”

Public Law 99-433, otherwise known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has six major subdivisions, 48 sections, and is approximately 82 pages long. Although the legislation is comprehensive, and redefines the entire defense structure, it is commonly interpreted as having only five major changes to the pre-legislation defense structure. According to an analysis by Chairman [General] John Shalikashvili, those five major changes are as follows:

- Made the Chairman the principal military advisor to the SECDEF, NSC, and President
- Created the position of Vice Chairman
- Clarified the authority of the Chairman over strategic planning
- Enhanced the powers of unified commanders over their service components
- Inaugurated the joint specialty officer (JSO) program and increased the value of joint assignments.
Overall, the original intent of General Jones and General Meyer in conjunction with congressional staffers Barrett and Locher appears to have been preserved in the final legislation. That the legislation was sponsored by the chairmen of both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, played no small part in the actual passage of the law. Implementation of the law is quite a different proposition, though. Over the next decade following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, advocates and critics alike would have several opportunities to witness the effect of the reorganization on the American military’s strategic culture, and ultimately on the military’s success or failure on the global battlefield.

Notes
31 The Honorable Archie D. Barrett, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), interviewed by author, January 8, 1997.
33 Barrett.
35 Barrett.
39 James Locher, former Asst. Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping (Goldwater senior staffer on GNA), interviewed by author during visit to Washington D.C., 8 Jan 1997
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
Notes

44 It is important to note that “Oddly enough, a historical example used by both sides in the JCS debate is the role of the German General Staff in World War II.” Historian John Nolan was joined by several scholars at the time in asserting “The German experience provides no sound model for reforming the current JCS structure.” It was an attractive analogy—but not a good one. See John M. Nolan, “JCS Reform and the Lessons of German History.” Parameters 14, no.3 (Autumn 1984): 12-20.
Organizing to Employ

The reorganization of the defense department legislated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act was merely the latest in a long evolutionary string of adjustments to how the defense establishment makes and carries out strategic decisions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act however, does stand out in terms of the clarity of its applicability to the strategic mechanism. Throughout America’s history, the President (or NCA) has always held the ultimate decision making authority. Whatever strategies are designed by whatever branches of government to reach some objective of national interest, the President always had the final word. Therefore, the rationalization of the strategy process embodied in the “new” strategy documents flowing from post-GNA reforms makes clear a process that has been de jure if not always de facto since our country’s origin.

Beginning with the National Security Strategy (NSS), dictated at the NCA level, current strategy documents flow logically to the National Military Strategy (NMS), and then to the strategies implicit in the deliberate plans of the unified “regional” commands. “As a result of the law, we have pioneered numerous planning documents, including a new national military strategy . . .” Arguably, before the organizational reforms of the late 20th century there was no single National Military Strategy—there were three or four. With Goldwater-Nichols there is a flow, a natural flow, that travels virtually unhindered
throughout the defense establishment. Depicted graphically, the flow resembles Figure 4. In short, planning requirements flow from the NCA down, strategies to meet those requirements flow back from the field up to the NCA, then execution of a particular strategy or strategies flows down the chain again. That efficient flow of defense decision-making is a key to “war winning” that had been under-emphasized for quite some time.

Figure 4. - Defense Decision-making Flow

Several specific areas of the Goldwater-Nichols Act contributed to the increase in “war winning” capability. Strengthening and centralizing control of the JCS, strengthening and empowering the CINCs, increasing joint officer quality, and redistributing planning functions all played a part. Significantly though, it was truly the synergistic effect of these changes, made in parallel that had the most impact on success.

The strengthening and centralization of JCS control had several integral elements that contributed incrementally to defense capability. By making the Chairman the principal advisor to the NCA, with “veto” power, he was lifted above the parochial fray to a higher perch that could survey the “big picture” of the U.S. military without a personal or
professional obligation to tint his view. The placement of the joint staff under his direct control followed that doctrine of objectivity and created a military staff body that was functionally “color blind” (in theory). The chairman and his staff were now in a position to recommend strategies that provided the best mix of capabilities that the United States had to offer.

From the SECDEF’s point of view, his job of managing and communicating with the military became much easier and more efficient. Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated in an interview,

I know each service wants to do its own thing, with its own authority. The fact is that [DoD] is difficult enough to run without going back to a system that, in my mind, served to weaken the civilian authority of the Secretary and the President in terms of their ability to interact with and use that organization. I think Goldwater-Nichols helped pull it together in a coherent fashion . . .

Cheney’s remarks appear to indicate some measure of success in regard to the stated intent of GNA legislation to “strengthen civilian authority.”

Critics see some enhancement of the strategic dialogue as well, but view this development with caution. American historian Russell Weigley sees the recent evolution of the defense establishment as following a two-pronged military “campaign.”

. . . the Joint Chiefs campaigned consistently both to secure statutory authority for a military voice in deliberations on national policy and strategy, and through public pronouncements to influence policy-making in ways that will guard them against repetition of waging war under constraints against the application of overwhelming power that prevailed in Korea and Vietnam. The military’s first line of attack achieved at least partial fulfillment in the Goldwater-Nichols [Act] . . ., which gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the right of participation in deliberations of the National Security Council. The second line of attack has led to the public activities and pronouncements of General Powell.

A less controversial aspect of GNA, that was perhaps most visibly significant to “war winning,” was the strengthening and empowering of the CINCs. By doing so, the
GNA enhanced “unity of command,” rationalized the “employment” command chain, and in combination with the newly buttressed Chairman, “balanced” joint influence against the individual services.

Based on [Desert One] and Grenada, it was felt that there was a need for more jointness, and that what you needed to do to get that was to give to the operational commander, the theater commander, the real authority and responsibility for structuring the forces as he saw fit to meet particular contingencies. They have that authority now, they can structure things the way they want and create these joint task forces . . . and lo and behold they found out they work pretty good. I think that that’s what drove that and I think its worked out very well—and it’s getting better. . . . There’s no question that people understand that almost all operations in the future are going to be joint and many of them are going to be combined, and that you need to establish headquarters which are capable of controlling those operations and understanding them.48

Former Chairman Colin Powell saw the invasion of Panama as the first full test of this new element. Referring to that operation, he stated that,

. . . the [GNA] model was set: we had clear political guidance, there was a solid and well integrated plan, the CINC was in charge, and there was appropriate oversight from the Joint Chiefs and National Command Authorities. It was the model we used, scaled up, for Desert Shield and Desert Storm and it is the model still in use and working very well49

Former Defense Secretary Cheney had similar views on the “scaled up” effect of GNA reforms during Desert Storm. When asked whether the GNA was a significant aspect of Operation Desert Storm, he replied,

I think so, especially if you look at the way we functioned and the enormous authority that resided in [Commander-in-Chief Central Command, General] Norm Schwarzkopf. It was not perfect, obviously. You can go back and always find places where you might have been able to improve performance. But I think we had much clearer lines of authority in that operation, which avoided problems that had occurred previously—for example, in Grenada and in Lebanon in 1982 and, in fact, all the way back to World War II. We had a CINC, we had a unified command, and we had clear-cut lines of authority that ran from President [George] Bush to me through General Powell at my option out to the CINC in the field.50
The GNA emphasis on improving joint officer management was an important solution to historical officer “quality” problems. Joint officer management statutes were all the more critical to implement due to the increased importance of the joint staff in the reorganized defense structure. With those two elements, the synergistic design of GNA came fully into play. In order for the newly empowered Chairman to be effective in administering the strengthened unified commands, he required a top notch staff. Although each service approached “joint duty” with varying levels of interest prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the legislation created an offer that most couldn’t refuse—go joint or be “capped” at the Colonel (O-6) level. Post-GNA joint officer quality improved dramatically. Former Chairman Powell commented,

Goldwater-Nichols helped enormously. Since joint duty credit was now needed for advancement, we became a sought-after staff. . . The service Chiefs were very forthcoming in nominating their most able officers. . . More officers than ever have team warfare experience. This is good for the Nation and good for the Armed Forces.

Chairman Powell was not alone in his assessment of contemporary joint officer quality. A National War College study found several senior leaders that specifically praised this aspect of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms:

Everyone interviewed for this study agrees with General Powell on this issue and is convinced that Title IV provisions have improved the quality of the officers serving on the Joint Staff and their work. General Ehlert’s comments were representative: “We [the Marine Corps] used to send officers who were retiring to work on the Joint Staff—not since Goldwater-Nichols. Now we send our sharpest folks and so do the other services.”

With a strengthened command structure and a better quality staff, the final war winning ingredient involved a redistribution of defense planning functions. The redistribution contained four principal provisions:

- Required an annual National Security Strategy from the President
• Required Chairman to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans
• Required written SECDEF guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans
• Prescribed a role for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in assisting on contingency plans.

The results of this multi-layered approach have been mixed, but overall positive. James Locher, in his look back on the 10th anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act had these words:

> The Goldwater-Nichols Act has increased attention to both strategy making and contingency planning. The quality of strategy documents has varied, but in every case their value has been superior to their pre-Goldwater-Nichols predecessors. The new national strategy which envisioned fighting two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, provided a timely, thoughtful strategic response to the end of the cold war.\textsuperscript{52}

Even though most have praised Goldwater-Nichols’ results, not everyone has been completely satisfied. Historian Richard Kohn is representative of GNA critics. Kohn sees the Act as “a massive Rube Goldberg tinkering machine.” “It’s micromanagement raised to the level of legislation.” He feels that GNA “tinkering” had at least three significant problems. First, was the emphasis on top-level cooperation without a commensurate push for entry-level joint education to “learn [about] and accept the other services.” Second, he feels that the chairman has been made too strong “without a correlated strengthening of the OSD, which has grown weaker.” In his view, this has resulted in the Joint Staff “in many respects, controlling the Defense Department far beyond what the authors of Goldwater-Nichols would think proper, if they were to admit it . . .” Finally, Kohn believes that the empowerment of the CINC\textsuperscript{s} has unbalanced planning, programming, and budgeting perspectives to “privilege the near-term instead of the long-term.” With the OSD and services “locked” in a cold war paradigm, he fears that nobody is doing any “long range thinking.”\textsuperscript{53}
While the Goldwater-Nichols Act has not been a panacea for the defense establishment, its net positive effect upon the functionality of the military strategic culture and upon America’s war-winning capability is clear. The strengthened command structure, enhanced personnel policies and rationalized planning process made visible contributions to the military strategic process, and thus, have also had a direct effect on the ability of the military strategist to perform his or her mission. How we *organize to fight* makes a difference. An element of the GNA legacy that is not quite as visible, but is equally as important though, is how we *organize to organize.*

*Organizing to Organize*

The best intentions of all the generals, congressmen, staffers, and officers involved in the GNA would have gone for naught, if their ideas had not been codified into law. The story behind how Goldwater-Nichols Act concepts were actually realized uncovers the seldom discussed, but critically important issue of how we *organize to organize.* In other words, how did the military advocates of GNA see to it that their ideas about a new organization were not only heard, but embraced and incorporated. The GNA story involved effective communication, soliciting broad support, and overcoming bureaucratic inertia.

The contemporary military officer is usually well-schooled in the art of communication *within* the military: the same cannot said for the typical officer’s skills in *external* communication. Unfortunately, the military, unlike a private corporation, doesn’t have complete control over its own internal structure or operations. Therefore, *external communication is essential for internal change.* In cases such as the GNA, an officer with highly developed *external* communication skills becomes key to the process. General
David Jones was such an officer. Not only did he have an appreciation for directions he needed to communicate—he had a plan.

General Jones’ plan centered around first researching the problem, then publishing his findings, followed by effective liaison with Congress. For research, he turned to a respected expert on defense organization, William Brehm. Brehm was a former assistant Secretary of the Army, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and former head of legislative liaison for the Defense Department. He, in turn, formed a research staff composed of five retired admirals and generals. As General Jones relates, “The Brehm group put the story together so well that only the most hard-over opponents were unconvinced.”

Once the “story” had been researched, the next step was for the story to be told. Once again, skills in the publication of an article for a major journal are not typical to the contemporary officer. However, General Jones got his story across to both his internal and external audiences by submitting articles in an ever-growing list of journals. Starting with an “obscure magazine called Directors and Boards” he progressed to Armed Forces Journal, and within several months was the featured article in The New York Times Magazine.

With the publishing of my November article in the New York Times, it was time for me to pass the baton to Arch Barrett, Jim Locher, and the Congressional leaders. I had done the easy part by stirring the waters -- no pun intended. The hard part was yet to come.

With the story told, the concepts that General Jones advocated then needed a broad base of support. What he encountered was not the dreaded “we-they” relationship with congress that many officers fear, but in fact a positive “we-we” dialog that was crucial to the project. Congressional staffer Archie Barrett, who Jones claims “single-handedly kept the subject alive for a major part of the four and a half years to enactment” was him-
self a retired Air Force colonel. James Locher, while not having any military connection, was nonetheless like-minded on reorganization and motivated enough to produce, what Jones termed “[an] outstanding study of the problems that convinced many.” Beyond congressional staff support, Jones and other GNA advocates garnered the support of several influential senators and congressmen, who in turn “were very helpful in keeping the White House out of the fray.” With a well-researched and publicized platform, backed up by support at all levels of government, the GNA eventually gained the impact needed to alter the momentum of the defense bureaucracy.

While the story of the external liaison required to effect Goldwater-Nichols is significant, the GNA legacy is also instructive on how we approach organizational issues within the military. Several observations emerge from the entire reorganization process that impact our military strategic culture. The experience teaches both the importance of questioning the status quo and of observing certain traditions.

If strategy is defined as orchestrating the means to an end, the “means” may be further broken down into several elements. In military strategy, troops and weaponry come to mind immediately as essential elements of the “means.” What is many times overlooked is the particular style of organization employed in concert with the troops and weaponry. Often, the organizational element is seen as a “given”—a “status quo” element that does not vary. Of course, the marked improvement of American military effectiveness in achieving specified “ends” in the post-GNA era speaks otherwise. Goldwater-Nichols enhancements to unity of command and the deliberate and crisis planning process have been apparent in the smooth execution of historically difficult tasks such as global logistics and coordinated execution. The important distinction drawn here is that
how we organize is part of our strategy and how we organize is variable. With that in mind, it is incumbent on the military strategist to periodically question the “status quo” organizational scheme and attempt to rationalize it against the changing contextual background.

The idea of “questioning the status quo” has some support from organizational expert Peter Drucker. Drucker believes in routinely “abandoning” the organization’s status quo in order to promote healthy change that corresponds with a changing strategic environment. “Without systematic and purposeful abandonment, an organization will be overtaken by events. It will squander its best resources on things it should never have been doing or should no longer do.” Additionally, Drucker emphasizes the importance of ensuring a sound organizational structure.

Few managers seem to recognize that the right organization structure is not performance itself, but rather a prerequisite of performance. The wrong structure is indeed a guarantee of nonperformance; it produces friction and frustration, puts the spotlight on wrong issues, and makes mountains out of trivia.

Whereas change is healthy in many areas of the military organization, observing certain established traditions may be equally as important to the military strategic culture. Many of the successes of the GNA centered around one of the most revered traditions in the U.S. military; the “Principles of War.” As General Victor Krulak stressed in his critique of the pre-GNA military organization,

. . . the principles of war are immutable [?], and are all present in the scheme of modern day military affairs. The principles of the offensive, mass, security, unity of command, maneuver, surprise and simplicity have governed the way forces have been organized to fight over the ages -- at Salamis, as at Trafalgar, Gettysburg and Normandy. The same principles will govern the organization for combat on the West German plain, in the Middle East, at the Panama Canal or in the thermonuclear face-off. Of these the most pertinent to this discussion are the principles of unity of
command and simplicity, both of which we violate in our current military system.\textsuperscript{61}

The GNA provisions for an empowered JCS chairman and clearly authoritative CINCs cut straight to the concept of “unity of command.”\textsuperscript{62} Likewise provisions for clarifying service roles and rationalizing the planning process definitely addressed “simplicity.” The lesson is that the US Armed Forces allowed those principles to be violated for many decades due either to neglect or to parochial agendas. Standards are available to the military strategist; whether they are heeded is a different story.

The foregoing analysis of the GNA “story” points out some important aspects of its effect on the American military strategic culture. Not only did the resulting legislation have lasting effects on our military strategy, it produced real results in terms of our “war winning” capability in conflicts around the globe. In addition, the very process of creating and advocating the Goldwater-Nichols Act spotlighted particular skills required of the military strategist when pursuing such large bureaucratic change and revealed key considerations for internal military strategic review. Since the history of the defense establishment implies continual evolutionary change, perhaps the most important element of the analysis will be its applicability to the next major defense reorganization.

Notes


\textsuperscript{47} Russell Weigley, “The American Military and the Principal of Civilian Control From McClellan to Powell,” \textit{The Journal of Military History}, no. 57 (October 93): 57.


Notes

50 Cheney, About Fighting and Winning Wars, 33 [emphasis added].


53 Richard Kohn, PhD, former Chief of Air Force History, interviewed by author, 10 April, 1997.


55 Ibid., 6.

56 Ibid., 4.

57 While the author recognizes that Goldwater-Nichols was not miracle cure to all military ills and that problems areas have continued to be apparent in some post-GNA operations, the focus of this study is on the benefits of organizational changes to the military, not on definitively quantifying or reconciling all post-GNA events with reference to the original legislation.

58 Although Drucker is a civilian consultant, his ideas on the strategic organization of large establishments have direct applicability to the strategic level of the military, and were cited frequently by staffer James Locher in Defense Organization: The Need for Change.


62 Whereas the Principles of War tend to be widely “revered” among the warfighters, many scholars argue that they are merely a foundation for further innovation. For instance, researchers James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson assert that “unity of effort” transcends “unity of command” and may be sufficient in place of “unity of command” in some scenarios. James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993) 11-12, 171.
Chapter 5

“Goldwater-Nichols II:” The Next Step

If defense reorganization is indeed evolutionary (as it appears from Chapter 2), then the question arises; “what is the next step?” General Edward Meyer, USA (Ret.) is not content to rest on the laurels of the GNA that he helped sponsor. Instead, he writes of a “Goldwater-Nichols II.” He emphasizes that “Goldwater-Nichols contributed materially to our success in Desert Storm. Further reform has the potential of contributing to [resolving] regional challenges today and those we will face tomorrow.” Many of the original framers of GNA agree that further change is needed. In order to determine a suggested course of action, this study will consolidate, categorize, and analyze the existing advocacies for change; then apply a normative judgment of the leading concepts; and finally, will suggest a mechanism for change tempered by lessons to date on “organizing to fight.”

A review of the recommendations for further change to the defense establishment finds at least twelve independent concepts that are advocated by one or more defense experts. Table 1, column 1, lists the twelve current concepts. Columns 2 through 4 categorize each concept in terms of its general subject area. Sorting the concepts by subject area allows some observations on relationships and overall emphasis.
Table 1 - Future Defense Reorganization Concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Procurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance of labor(^65)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of staff(^67)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolster JSO Program(^66)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of headquarters staffs(^68)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalization of staffs(^67)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilize military experience(^66)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on policy(^65)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component command review(^68)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalization(^69)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency functionality(^65)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase joint acquisition programs(^65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC’s own budget(^70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first group of concepts is generally made up of personnel actions. It is by far the largest group of positions and therefore appears to be the main focus of current concern. *Balance of labor* refers to a better division of tasks between the OSD, joint staff, and military departments; and includes a better definition of the relationship between OSD and the joint staff. *Size of staff* is a virtually unanimous complaint over the blossoming number of personnel in OSD primarily, and to some extent refers to the bloated size of the complete defense bureaucracy inside the Washington beltway. *Bolstering the Joint Staff Officer (JSO) program* is another common recommendation, the belief being that
the GNA reforms were either unreasonable or ineffectively implemented, or both. Integration of headquarters staffs refers to the idea of combining the service secretariat with the service’s military headquarters staff. The combined staff would supposedly allow the service chief to act as a “true” Chief of Staff for the Secretary and would reduce staff duplication. Rationalization of staffs is similar to the idea behind integration, but refers to the broader objective of eliminating duplication of functions across the entire defense establishment. Stabilizing military experience refers to the resolution of a common complaint concerning the negative effect of service-sponsored careerism on the tour length and turnover rate of senior officers. Focus on policy is a particular type of staff rationalization that seeks to rid the OSD and joint staff of direct management tasks that serve as distracters from their primary duty of formulating and evaluating policy. The issue of “focus on policy” bleeds over into the structural category due to its possible impact on entrenched ad hoc structures in the agencies involved. Component command review is another cross-category concept that urges a new study of the relationship of the regional service components to the unified commands.

Two current concepts appear to be purely structural. Regionalization refers to the notion that the current increase in regional contingencies calls for the decentralization of the national security apparatus, placing more responsibility in the hands of senior leaders in the field such as ambassadors and department representatives. Interagency functionality is a related concept that stresses the need for better coordination between the DOD and other governmental agencies (such as CIA, State Department, and USAID) in the execution of national level operations.
The final general category of concepts is procurement. The more popular of the two concepts in this category is increased joint acquisition programs. Many experts agree that the relatively recent formation of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the accompanying Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) are a step and the right direction, and should be supported and formalized in further legislation. The concept of a CINC’s own budget is touted as a minority view, but nevertheless brings up the important issue of effectively translating the warfighters’ immediate needs into the more parochial service budget programs.

By comparing this current list of concepts with the history of American defense organization (presented in Chapter 2), several observations may be made. First, the fundamental emphasis of a reorganization under these concepts differs markedly from the original Goldwater-Nichols Act. Where the emphasis in the GNA was on structural and command reforms, these twelve concepts primarily emphasize personnel staffing changes. A possible rationale for this condition would hearken back to James Locher’s explanation of some earlier concepts that were “a bridge too far.” Indeed given the choice between the complementary objectives of restructuring or restaffing; restructuring would present the “nearer” bridge, if only because restaffing involves the more painful process of job cuts and mass transfers. The reality though, is that any significant restructure will dictate an eventual tailoring of the staff complement to fit that structure. For that reason, this group of reorganizational concepts might be best described as “rationalizing staff to structure.”

Second, the two purely structural concepts presented appear complementary. Advocates of regionalization typically frame their argument by referring to an interagency ap-
approach to executing regional operations. Although regional advocates stress decentralization from the national level, they tend to favor centralization at the regional level. Perhaps the synthesis of these ideas would be the formal creation of regional interagency bodies that could exploit the regional expertise of several national security organizations while simultaneously ensuring effective coordination. “Interagency regionalization” might aptly characterize a consolidated structural approach.

Reconciliation of the two procurement concepts produces a third observation. Namely, that the process of matching warfighter requirements to service programs remains a problem. While formalizing the JROC and JWCA will certainly enhance communication between the two basic arms of the DoD, such joint boards are merely a patch on a far-from-perfect organizational paradigm. Here, the division of the services from the CINCs creates more problems than it solves. The solution will not be easy to find; making the concept of an effective change in joint procurement still “a bridge too far.” Table 2 further consolidates the twelve concepts under three grand reorganization themes.
Table 2 - Grand Reorganizational Themes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rationalize Staff to Structure</th>
<th>Interagency Regionalization</th>
<th>Joint Procurement: A Bridge Too Far?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance of labor</td>
<td>Focus on policy</td>
<td>Increase joint acquisition programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of staff</td>
<td>Component command review</td>
<td>CINC’s own budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolster JSO Program</td>
<td>Regionalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of headquarters staffs</td>
<td>Interagency functionality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalization of staffs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilize military experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component command review</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency functionality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A fourth and final observation concerns the alignment of these concepts with observed historical trends. The history of American military organization leading up to the Goldwater-Nichols Act (presented in Chapter 2) reveals several common threads. For instance the progression from separate War and Navy departments to a corporate JCS body, and then to a single cabinet member implies a trend toward rationalization of advice. In a like manner, the birth of the professional soldier in the late nineteenth century sparked a trend toward the polarization of civil-military roles. More recently, the increased operational activity of the geographic CINCs betrays a trend away from the centralized functional emphasis of “the great white fleet” towards a geographic rather than functional orientation that incorporates decentralized execution. Post-cold war “drawdowns” and chronic national budget difficulties are responsible for the continuing trend.
toward *leaner organizations*, while *joint operability* remains one of the strongest threads running the length and breadth of our military organizational story.

When each of the trends implied in Chapter 2 of this study are compared to each of the twelve concepts presented for future reorganization, the apparent alignment is remarkable. Table 3 displays that apparent alignment. This observation further supports the conclusion that *changes in the organization of the defense establishment tend to be evolutionary and incremental*. 
### Table 3 - Alignment of Concepts with Trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Historical Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance of labor</td>
<td>Leaner organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolster JSO Program</td>
<td>Rationalization of advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of headquarters staffs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilize military experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalization of staffs</td>
<td>Polarization of civil-military roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on policy</td>
<td>Decentralized execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component command review</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalization</td>
<td>Geographic vs. functional orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency functionality</td>
<td>Joint operability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase joint acquisition programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC’s own budget</td>
<td>[no corresponding historical trend]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So where do these grand objectives for reorganization lead, and what does this all mean to the military strategist and the American military strategic culture? This study argues that these objectives may lead to a security paradigm for the new millennium, and that the “battle plan” for the military strategist is clear. History suggests that our defense organization will evolve, with or without significant military input. The record of Gold-
water-Nichols shows that it is advantageous for the military strategist to be intimately involved in the process. Given that sentiment, two more cautionary notes are in order.

The GNA story suggests that the level of centralization is extremely important. Two corollary propositions bear this out. The first is that when elements of a corporate body split, strategic decisions centralize at the next level up. During World War II the corporate body of the JCS could not agree on a consolidated Pacific strategy. The strategic decision to pursue a two pronged compromise strategy centralized at the next level up—the president. Today, hopefully, that type of abdication of military strategy would be unthinkable. Keep in mind, however, that the existence of a National Military Strategy document is a very recent occurrence.

The second corollary involves the dark side of centralization. That is, that centralization implies power. For instance, when James Locher was asked why former Navy Secretary Lehman claimed GNA would make “a hash out of our defense structure,” he answered that “he [Lehman] wanted to decentralize down to his level and centralize below his level.” The implication was that the secretary wished to retain his current level of relative organizational power. To a certain extent, that is understandable; but if misplaced, that desire for power serves only as a significant obstacle to healthy organizational evolution. As Deputy Secretary of Defense John White puts it, “arguments about changes in the relative power or influence of institutions miss the point.” With a healthy respect for the appropriate level of centralization the military strategist will be better armed in the reorganizational battle.

Also important is the notion that personalities count. The American military strategic culture tends to view the defense organization as a machine. In that light, a certain
structure is expected to dictate certain leadership behaviors, and certain inputs are expected to produce predictable outputs. The GNA epilogue teaches otherwise. When asked whether there is indeed better civilian control under GNA, joint staff historian General David Armstrong replied, “civilian control totally depends on personality—a weak SECDEF will have weak control.” Former JCS Chairman Colin Powell points out “What the Chairman ultimately possesses is influence, not authority, and only that influence which the Secretary gives him...It is a system designed by Goldwater-Nichols but one executed by human beings who have confidence in each other.” With these thoughts in mind, variations in the styles of leadership within the defense organization are not as alarming as they would seem if viewed as an “irregular” output from the “machine.”

The reorganizational battle plan is clear. How we organize is important because it is part of our military strategy, and how we organize directly effects our war-winning capability. Therefore, it is incumbent on the military strategist of the new millennium to continue to question the status quo organization, while evaluating that organization against time-tested principles of military effectiveness. The military strategist must be involved in the process of change by clearly communicating his proposed organizational strategy in a manner that secures broad-based support from both internal and external audiences. Only in that way, will the strategist stand a chance of affecting the very real momentum of the vast American defense bureaucracy. In conclusion, I submit that the most lucrative area of defense reorganization over the next decade will involve a combination of rationalizing staff to structure and promoting the regionalization of command in an interagency
setting. Above all, the enduring lesson of the Goldwater-Nichols era is that how we perform as a military is closely tied to how we organize to fight.

Notes

64 James Locher, William Brehm, Archie Barrett, and Senator Sam Nunn have each submitted recent arguments for further reorganization.
66 Advocated by Archie Barrett, Dep. Asst. Secretary of the Army (House senior staffer on GNA), interviewed by author during visit to Washington D.C., 7 January 1997.
71 Christopher Allan Yuknis, in his article, “The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment,” (Essays on Strategy, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1993) uses the term “calcification” to describe the formation and entrenchment of “unintended” extensions of an agency that, over time, are considered to be part of the original structure. His critique suggests that these “calcifications” should be dissolved and removed in order to return the structure of the particular agency to its original design.
72 James Locher, former Asst. Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping (Goldwater senior staffer on GNA), interviewed by author during visit to Washington D.C., 8 Jan 1997.
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