The Role of the Maritime Defense Zone in the 21st Century

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**Abstract:**

Commander maritime Defense Zone Atlantic (MDZLAN) and Commander maritime Defense Zone Pacific (MDZPAC) asked CNA to study the evolving role of their commands in the 21st century. In particular, we were asked to look into the “new” mission of homeland defense and its relationship to the overseas missions that the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) is also involved with. This annotated briefing introduces the MDZ, naval coastal warfare (NCW), and the issues that prompted this study, and traces the history of the MDZ to understand how it got where it is today. Based on the background information, we analyze the characteristics and roles of MDZ and of NCW. The relationship between these two communities is central to our analysis. The new issue of homeland defense and the relationship between MDZ and the Coast Guard in that mission are explained, and some alternative directions for the future of MDZ are discussed.

**Subject terms:**

- Area Defense
- Homeland Defense
- MDZ (Maritime Defense Zone)
- Military Modernization
- Mission Profiles
- Missions
- NCW (Naval Coastal Warfare)
- Naval Operations
- 21st Century

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The Role of the Maritime Defense Zone in the 21st Century

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September 2000

Commander Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic (MDZLANT) and Commander Maritime Defense Zone Pacific (MDZPAC) asked CNA to study the evolving role of their commands in the 21st century. In particular, we were asked to look into the "new" mission of homeland defense and its relationship to the overseas missions that the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) is also involved with.
Outline

➢ Background
  ➢ Setting the stage
  ➢ History
➢ Naval coastal warfare forces and mission
➢ MDZ role and characteristics
➢ Homeland defense
➢ Alternatives
➢ Remaining issues

We begin this paper with some background.
First, we introduce the MDZ, naval coastal warfare (NCW), and the issues that prompted this study.
Then we trace the history of MDZ to understand how it got where it is today.
Based on the background information, we analyze the characteristics and roles of MDZ and of NCW. The relationship between these two communities is central to our analysis.
Then we turn to the new mission of homeland defense and explain the relationship between MDZ and the Coast Guard in that mission.
Finally, we lay out some alternative directions for the future of MDZ.
We close with some thoughts about unresolved issues that would benefit from further study.
In this section we set the stage for our study. We explain what the Maritime Defense Zones are, discuss the changes they are confronting, and go over the tasks performed by our study and the method we used to tackle those tasks.
What is (are) the MDZ?

- Third-echelon *Navy* commands
- Commanded by USCG 3-star area commanders
- Report to fleet CINCs
- Responsible for naval coastal warfare
- Long list of stakeholders
  - Amphibious Groups (PHIBGRUs)
  - Military Sealift Command (MSC)
  - Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
  - Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
  - Afloat prepositioning ships (APS)
  - Joint Rear Area Commander (JRAC)
  - Coast Guard
  - Nation?

Exactly what is the MDZ?

There are two Maritime Defense Zones: Atlantic and Pacific. They are active-duty commands that are jointly staffed by Navy and Coast Guard personnel. They are *Navy* commands under the command of the Coast Guard vice admirals who are the Coast Guard Atlantic and Pacific Area commanders.¹ The MDZ are third-echelon *Navy* commands that report to their respective fleet CINCs.

The MDZ are “responsible to their respective Fleet CINC for Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) operations.”² We’ll get into the definition of NCW later in the brief. We’ll also see that the meaning of the phrase “responsible for” is central to the issues we examined for this study.

The MDZ and NCW are involved with many stakeholders. The short list is on this slide. It includes commands involved with Marine and Army prepositioning ships and sealift, as well as the Joint Rear Area Coordinator in overseas operations, the Coast Guard, and, as we shall see, the nation itself.

¹ We italicize “Navy” for emphasis because, in the course of the study, we encountered many who thought of MDZ as a Coast Guard command with a few Navy personnel in it.

² NWP 3-10 (Rev.A), *Naval Coastal Warfare.*
Why MDZ?

- Integrates Navy and Coast Guard at operational level
  - For coastal defense of U.S.
  - For expeditionary missions
  - Focus on SPOEs and SPODs

The role of MDZ today is to provide an integrated Navy-Coast Guard approach to waterborne port defense and protection of critical infrastructure, high value sealift assets, and naval units. These tasks are applicable to both CONUS and OCONUS environments. MDZ focuses on the vulnerable end-nodes of the sea lines of communication: the seaports of embarkation and debarkation.

COMUSMDZLANT AND COMUSMDZPAC embody this integration at the operational, 3-star level.
MDZ chain of command (unactivated)

This chart shows the chain of command for MDZ when it is unactivated. Navy-blue boxes represent Navy command; sky-blue boxes are Coast Guard commands.

We also show SURFLANT and SURFPAC, who are type commanders for the Navy's naval coastal warfare (NCW) forces. Below the SURFCOMs are two of their direct reports, the PHIBGRUs and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Groups. The PHIBGRUs are the Immediate Superiors in Command (ISICs) of the NCW Groups. Navy NCW units and Coast Guard Port Security Units (PSUs) comprise the core NCW forces. Other forces, including the EOD units, also take part in NCW operations.

The MDZ coordinate extensively with SURFLANT and SURFPAC, the PHIBGRUs, and the NCW Groups. These relationships and the forces involved in performing NCW will be discussed in detail later in the brief.

With this brief background on the MDZ, we turn to the study they asked us to perform and the issues that prompted it.
### Confronting change

- In security environment
  - Threat
  - Location
- In interagency nature of operations
- In prominence of issue
  - Real-world force protection requirement
  - Change in NCW TYCOM and funding (reserve to active)
- In Unified Command Plan (implications of potential changes and USN response to changes)
  - JTF-Civil Support/Assigning USA
  - Combatant command of West Coast forces

The study was initiated to help the MDZ deal with the many changes confronting them. We divide those changes into four categories.

First are changes in the security environment, both in the types of threat and in the locations of those threats. The nature of the threat is changing, from the conventional (submarines, surface craft, aircraft) and unconventional (swimmers, swimmer delivery vehicles) threats anticipated when MDZ was established, to today’s menu of asymmetric threats, primarily weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, nuclear, and high explosive weapons.

Another change in the environment involves location. In recent years, at the direction of Congress and the President, DoD has invested resources in homeland defense/security. MDZ’s role in homeland defense must be reexamined. A further potential area of change is in Korea, where recent moves towards rapprochement are being watched with interest by all of DoD.

The nature of operations has also changed, from the traditional DoD-commanded warfare of Desert Storm, to the Operation Other than War (OOTW) typically involving numerous government and nongovernmental agencies. Homeland defense as well has a strong interagency character.

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1 Differences in terminology exist among Services and Departments; the Coast Guard uses the term “homeland security.” We will use the term “homeland defense,” because we are dealing with Navy commands for the most part in this paper.
Confronting change, continued

- In security environment
  - Threat
  - Location
- In interagency nature of operations
- In prominence of issue
  - Real-world force protection requirement
  - Change in NCW TYCOM and funding (reserve to active)
- In Unified Command Plan (implications of potential changes and USN response to changes)
  - JTF-Civil Support/Assigning USA
  - Combatant command of West Coast forces

A further change has seen the NCW mission assume new prominence. NCW assets have been in high demand by unified CINC s for real-world force protection. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) has also shown interest in using NCW forces for waterside force protection. Symptomatic of this new prominence is the transfer of type command for NCW forces from a reserve to an active type commander [from Commander Naval Surface Reserve Force (COMNAVSURFRESFOR) to the Commanders, Atlantic and Pacific Surface Forces].

Finally, the MDZ are anticipating changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) that may affect their organization. They may be affected by changes at the unified CINC level and by the Navy’s response to those changes. In particular, some have predicted that the United States will be assigned to a unified command and that a subunified command may be established to assume the homeland defense mission.

Even if this particular change doesn’t take place, the MDZ relationship with Joint Task Force (JTF) Civil Support is of interest. As MDZ and JTF-Civil Support evolve over the next few years, it will be necessary to clarify their roles and responsibilities for operations in defense of U.S. waterways, ports, and critical infrastructure.

Another change being considered for future UCPs would see West Coast naval forces transferred from Pacific Command to Joint Forces Command. If this happens, there will certainly be implications for the MDZ.
Our tasks

➢ Examine current missions
➢ Identify potential new homeland defense missions
➢ Assess whether MDZ is structured to accomplish its missions
➢ Document results

These were the tasks listed in our project plan. As usual, as the study unfolded, the tasks were modified. We did examine current missions, which included homeland defense.

Our central goal was to understand the nature of MDZ and of the missions, to draw conclusions about what MDZ is suited to do.

This briefing documents our results.
Our method

- Review historic documentation
- Interview stakeholders
  - In person
  - Via VTC
- Observe Exercise Seahawk 2000
- Cross-fertilization with related study
  - For OPNAV N51
  - To prepare for Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
  - Navy role in protecting U.S. ports against asymmetric threats

To gather information, we used three approaches: reading, talking to people, and observing an NCW exercise.

Thanks to the help of our points of contact at MDZLANT and MDZPAC, we have in our offices an extensive compilation of the memos, papers, and documents in MDZ history. We have, therefore, fairly exhaustive coverage of their past.

We gained information on current issues and problems by talking to many of the commands associated with the NCW and MDZ communities. A list of the commands we interviewed is on the next slide. Our goal was to understand the perspectives of the various stakeholders in MDZ and NCW. We spent time on the West Coast and in the Portsmouth-Norfolk area. We also conducted two VTCs with stakeholders who were unable to meet with us in person.

In addition, we attended an NCW exercise, Seahawk 2000, sponsored by MDZPAC. Here, we were able to observe NCW operations and most of the NCW unit types.

We were able to extend our resources by working with and on a related CNA study for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) on defense of U.S. ports.
The commands we interviewed are listed here.
History of the Maritime Defense Zones and Naval Coastal Warfare

The next section recounts the history of the MDZ and of NCW. It also discusses some themes emerging from that history.
Navy role in U.S. coastal defense

- Involvement is cyclical
  - Threat determined
  - Organization appointed to address threat
  - Threat diminishes
  - Funding for the organization disappears
- Two opposing views on the Navy’s role
  - Supporting the forward maritime strategy vs. protecting sea lines of communication
  - Both of these views are forward postures
  - Coastal defense takes a back seat.

In exploring the Navy’s role in the coastal defense of the United States, a pattern emerges. First, the Navy’s involvement is cyclical in nature. When a threat against the coastal United States is determined, such as the threat of Soviet submarines during the Cold War, an organization is appointed to address that threat. In the twentieth century, Naval Districts, Sea Frontiers, and finally, MDZ were stood up to oppose the threat perceived at the time. As the threat diminishes, however, the organizations set up against the threat begin to weaken, lose focus, and eventually lose funding.

Second, the Navy’s role has been split into two opposing views. One side supported the forward maritime strategy, while the other side supported protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Both sides agreed that the way to protect the United States was through a forward-deployed strategy: fighting the war over there or in the open ocean, instead of here on our own shores. Today’s strategy slogan for the Navy is again in this same vein: “Forward . . . From the Sea.” Coastal defense has always taken a back seat in the U.S. Navy.

Once again, civilian leaders have determined that a threat to the U.S. homeland exists today. Attention is focused on how to protect the United States and its territories from weapons of mass destruction, and the Navy is again exploring its role in U.S. coastal defense.

Navy's previous attempts

- Naval Districts, 1903-1980
  - Double-hatted commanders for Naval Yards and Districts
- Sea Frontiers, 1941-1970s
  - World War II
    - Report directly to Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet
    - Port Security mission assigned to USCG, now in DON
  - Harbor Defense Units activated for Korean War
    - Renamed Inshore Undersea Warfare units in 1963
    - Deploy to Vietnam
    - Active-duty force
  - Sea Frontiers abolished, role returned to Naval Districts
  - Districts abolished in 1980 (except Washington)

The Navy's first response to the demand for U.S. coastal defense in the 20th century was to give the commandants of Naval Yards a role in standing up and commanding Naval Districts. The Navy set up 15 Naval Districts for coastal defense in 1902. In preparing for the U.S. entry into World War I, the Naval District system was enhanced and brought under the control of the newly created Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Where possible, the commanders of Naval Yards and Naval Districts were double-hatted.

Just before the entry of the United States into WW II, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces were created and assigned to the CNO. The Coastal Frontier commander hat was added to the responsibilities of the Naval District Commandant/Naval Yard commander.

In 1941, Coastal Frontiers were renamed Sea Frontiers, assigned to 3- and 4-star admirals, and brought directly under the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet (COMINCH). Also in 1941 the Coast Guard, transferred to the Department of the Navy in late 1940, was assigned the mission of port security. After WW II, the threat to, and interest in, U.S. coastal security waned.

During the Korean War, harbor defense units were activated under the Sea Frontiers system to protect U.S. ports. In 1963, the harbor defense units were redesignated inshore undersea warfare units (IUWUs). Both active and reserve units were formed, and IUWUs served forward in Vietnam.

The Sea Frontiers were abolished in the 1970s, and responsibility for U.S. coastal defense was passed back to the Naval Districts. However, just a few years later, in 1980, the Navy abolished all of the Naval Districts except Naval District Washington. A study of the wartime role of the Coast Guard, directed by Congress, led in time to the birth of MDZ.
Creation of MDZ: 1984

- MDZ
  - Role was to coordinate Navy and Coast Guard forces for homeland defense against Soviet threat
  - Focused on U.S. ports and coastal sea control
    - Conducted countermine and ASW operations
- MDZ commands owned no assets
  - IUWUs were on their own
  - Mine warfare community had COOP
  - Coast Guard had other assets
- No NCW “community” as such

In 1984, decisions reached by the Navy-Coast Guard (NAVGARD) Board led to the creation of the MDZ. Its role was to coordinate the defense of the coastal United States during wartime, with both Navy and Coast Guard forces. MDZ, staffed by active Navy and Coast Guard personnel and augmented by reserve forces from both Services, focused on U.S. ports. It also was responsible for countermine and ASW operations in coastal areas—out to 200 nautical miles.

The MDZ commands owned no assets. The IUWUs had been transferred in the early 1980s to the reserve forces and the IUW Groups served as their ISIC, controlling their own planning and exercises. The IUW community was responsible for coastal defense missions in the United States and overseas. The standing up of MDZ transferred responsibility for CONUS IUW missions from the IUW community to MDZ.

Other Navy assets that MDZ could access included the mine warfare community’s craft of opportunity (COOP) for coastal minesweeping. In addition, reservists on Naval Academy Yard patrol craft and requisitioned commercial fishing boats performed limited offshore and harbor mine hunting and sweeping for CONUS ports that had no mine countermeasures capability.

The Coast Guard had patrol boats, cutters, and personnel that the MDZ could also access when it was activated.

Although MDZ and those it would coordinate conducted coastal warfare operations and planning, no NCW community yet existed.
Initial organization of MDZ

- Subordinate sectors
  - Coast Guard district commanders
  - Naval base commanders

In 1985, MDZLANT was established with subordinate sector commanders. These were of two types: Coast Guard district commanders and naval base commanders. In the MDZLANT AOR, there were six Coast Guard and two Navy sector commanders. Typically the sector commanders had reserve deputies from the other Service.

In January 1986, MDZPAC was established with seven subordinate sector commanders—five Coast Guard District commanders and two naval base commanders.
A Watershed for MDZ

➤ Desert Storm
  ➤ Both IUW and Coast Guard assets involved in Desert Storm
  ➤ Shortfalls in command and coordination for port security/harbor defense led to MDZ expeditionary role
  ➤ 1992: MDZ directed to form deployable Harbor Defense Command staff
  ➤ "The Way Ahead" studies

Both the IUW community and the Coast Guard sent forces into theater for Desert Shield/Storm. MDZ was not activated. Remember, it was viewed as purely a homeland defense force at that time, and it had to be activated by Presidential directive or a declaration of war.

In 1992, lessons learned in Desert Storm caused the NAVGARD board to direct the fleets to develop a small, deployable Harbor Defense Commander staff, sourced from the MDZ because of their expertise in NCW.1 This development was part of a broader movement that expanded MDZ responsibilities. With the end of the Cold War, MDZ's role was unclear and its future was in doubt. Both MDZ were directed by the CNO to initiate studies on the way ahead for MDZ. MDZLANT and MDZPAC concluded that MDZ should add an expeditionary role to its CONUS responsibilities. The two fleet CINCs concurred and recommended the new course to the NAVGARD Board, which also agreed on the new role for MDZ at its May 1993 meeting.

1. This was the Composite Naval Coastal Warfare Unit, reorganized as the Harbor Defense Command Unit, as described later in this paper.
1994 MOA between DON and DOT

- 1984 MOA creating MDZ revised to incorporate new expeditionary mission
- Preserves billets and link between USN and USCG
- Allows for peacetime activation of portion of MDZ
- Assigns N-85 as MDZ Program Requirements Officer

The expeditionary role for MDZ was formalized in a revision of the original MOA between DON and DOT. The new arrangement took advantage of the skills MDZ had developed in its CONUS assignment of “coordinating” or “managing” assets. It transferred MDZ’s experience with civilian entities and other military Services to an environment with host nations and overseas AORs.

The new MOA had two other, very practical effects. It preserved MDZ’s billets, and it maintained the operational link between the Navy and the Coast Guard embodied in the MDZ command.

The 1994 MOA also allowed for “peacetime activation of a portion of the organization to perform and coordinate dual-service operations.” Such activation would take place upon the agreement of the fleet CINC and the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

In other words, activation of MDZ was no longer a case of all or nothing. The President would not have to get involved to activate MDZ; it could be applied on a smaller scale to perform lesser missions as they arose.

This MOA also assigned N-85 as MDZ Program Requirements Officer; previously some funding for MDZ had come out of the fleet CINC’s hides, and some had come from various places around OPNAV. With N-85 as Program Requirements Officer, budgetary matters could be addressed expeditiously and in a uniform manner across fleets.
In 1994, MDZ renamed its sectors. Their new name—Maritime Defense Commands—reflected their expeditionary mission and their role in command and control of overseas missions.

As a force provider for the CINCs, each MARDEFCOM would "own" a Composite Naval Coastal Warfare Unit. A CNCWU included a Coast Guard reserve unit, a naval reserve unit, and active-duty members of both Services. A deployable element would be sourced from the CNCWU to serve as the Harbor Defense Commander in an OCONUS seaport of debarkation (SPOD). The MARDEFCOM was responsible for training and exercising all elements of the CNCWU and for deploying the HDC.
### 1996 MOA between MDZ and COMNAVSURFRESFOR

- CNCWUs transferred from MDZ to COMNAVSURFRESFOR
  - Renamed Harbor Defense Command Units (HDCUs)
- They joined units already under COMNAVSURFRESFOR:
  - Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Groups
    - MIUWUs
  - Inshore Boat Squadrons
    - Inshore Boat Units
- Coast Guard remains type commander of Port Security Units (PSUs)

In 1996, MDZ gave up its type command (TYCOM) responsibilities as the first step in realigning and streamlining the NCW community. It transferred the CNCWUs to the administrative control of Commander Naval Surface Reserve Force. The CNCWUs were renamed Harbor Defense Command Units (HDCUs) and formally commissioned as Naval Reserve units.

The HDCUs joined two other types of NCW units under COMNAVSURFRESFOR: the MIUWUs and the IBUs. As a result, all Navy NCW units were consolidated under a single type commander. The other part of the core NCW package, the Coast Guard’s Port Security Units, remained under the administrative control of the Coast Guard.
1998 MOA between COMNAVSURFRESFOR and SURFLANT/PAC

- Transfers administrative control of reserve NCW forces from reserve to active type commanders
- "Establishes direct fleet control of and access to the Reserve NCW force.....will serve as a model for similar future actions."
- NCW Groups created at the same time
- COMPHIBGRUs assigned as ISIC
  - Responsible for fitness reports

Having a reserve organization as TYCOM turned out to be an unworkable solution for the increasingly active NCW reserve units. Two years later, TYCOM responsibilities and administrative control (ADCON) of Navy NCW assets were transferred to Commander, Naval Surface Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVSURFLANT) and Commander, Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC). With this transfer, the NCW units now had an active command watching over their resource needs.

The transfer was effective 1 October 1998 and completed in October 1999. The MOA noted that the transfer would establish direct fleet control and access to the NCW force, and that it would serve as a model for similar future actions.

The various NCW units were consolidated into two NCW Groups, effective 1 October 1998. As a result, according to minutes of the NAVGARD board (22 April 1998), staff requirements were reduced from 368 to 208 billets.

SURFPAC and SURFLANT designated the Commanders of Amphibious Groups Two and Three as the ISICs for the NCW Groups. As ISICs, the PHIBGRUs perform various administrative functions and write fitness reports for the NCW Group commodores.
NCW Ties to MDZ Weaken

- Administrative chain of command transfers
- MDZ no longer owns Navy assets
- NCW Groups' focus centers on priorities of their ISICs
- Draft MOA on PSUs

With these changes, other Navy commands reacquired most expeditionary NCW responsibilities from the MDZ. On the West Coast, MDZPAC still does the deliberate planning for U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command. SURFPAC and the PHIBGRU, however, have assumed responsibility for resourcing, scheduling, and OCONUS exercise planning. On the East Coast, the same transfer has taken place; however, MDZLANT has no Major Theater War (MTW) planning responsibilities, and has less of a role in expeditionary NCW. MDZLANT does, however, have deliberate planning responsibilities for U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern Command.

Understandably, the NCW Groups' focus seems to have shifted to the force protection interests of their new ISICs.

MDZ's role is likely to be further limited as the Coast Guard PSUs become more closely integrated with the NCW Groups. The Coast Guard Area Commanders (the MDZs' Coast Guard hat) remain the PSUs' type commander, but a draft memorandum of agreement between SURFPAC and SURFLANT and the U.S. Coast Guard would tie the PSUs more closely to the NCW Group. With this integration, the PHIBGRUs would be able to coordinate all of the naval coastal warfare assets on expeditionary training opportunities without the need to call on the MDZ commands.

Specifically, the MOA mentions one of the additional duties of SURFPAC/LANT and their subordinate commands: "NCWGRUs have direct liaison authority (DRLAUTH) with Coast Guard PSUs for issues of doctrine and tactics and for coordination of training and scheduled exercise participation." The Area Commanders do retain scheduling authority, however.

Now that we've traced the history of the administrative structure of MDZ, we turn to the operational use of NCW forces and the role of MDZ in these operations.
Real-world NCW operations:
OCONUS

- Operations Uphold Democracy and Maintain Democracy, Haiti
- Vieques
- OCONUS exercises
  - Providing waterborne force protection and harbor defense/port security
  - Increasing demand for NCW participation by operational commanders

The Haitian operations represented the first use of the the partial activation capability established during the 1993-94 revisions on the expeditionary warfare role. MDZLAN T deployed one Harbor Defense Command Unit and two Port Security Units to this operation. MDZLAN T staff served as Harbor Defense Commander as well.

A second, recent use of NCW assets was in Vieques, Puerto Rico. MDZ was not directly involved in this mission. In a first phase, the Coast Guard carried out law enforcement and force protection operations using Coast Guard assets and Navy reserve Inshore Boat Units. Currently, NCW units provide force protection to Navy assets and are scheduled to do so into FY 01.

Another recent example of NCW use was during Exercise Bright Star in Alexandria, Egypt. This exercise involved a combination of MPF, JLOTS, and MSC ships. Participating NCW assets included PSUs, IBUs, an HDCU, and a MIUWU. This is one of several recent exercises in which the NCW forces provided real-world force protection, while exercising their role in operational and concept plans. Others included Foal Eagle in Korea and Linked Seas in Portugal.

The demand for NCW participation in exercises seems to be growing. A recent coordinated message from CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT states that “…an increasing number of commanders are requesting participation of NCW assets in a variety of exercises.” [CINCPACFLT 172034Z May 00]
Real-world NCW operations: CONUS

> May 1999: NAVGARD Board consensus that no need existed to create a new CINC for homeland defense, as current MDZ structure worked well
> Fall 1999: PSUs deploy to Seattle, WA, to provide waterborne security for President and other members of World Trade Organization (WTO)

Just as MDZ's role in NCW seemed to be in question for expeditionary missions, interest in homeland defense was reawakened. Would MDZ return to this as its primary function?

In recent events, the Coast Guard and the Navy have looked to the MDZ command structure and/or naval coastal warfare assets to assist in homeland security operations. Last fall, the USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) of Seattle, Washington, requested PSUs to provide waterborne security for the President and other members of the World Trade Organization. According to interviewees, the COTP did not fully understand what he was asking for in making this request, as PSUs are considered expeditionary and maintain a substantial amount of firepower. In addition, personnel on PSUs are not trained in law enforcement and boarding tactics, and had to be quickly trained in these subjects for this CONUS event.

A CINCLANTFLT requirement was given to COMLANTAREA through the MDZ command structure to provide security at the International Naval Review (INR) 2000. CINCLANTFLT required a Harbor Defense Commander (HDC) for INR 2000. MDZLANT designated the COTP of New York as the HDC "to act as waterborne force protection officer for INR 2000." The activation took place as follows: CINCLANTFLT directed Second Fleet to transfer OPCON of NCW forces to MDZLANT, who transferred TACON of those forces to the HDC. This event marked the first time that MDZ was formally assigned OPCON of NCW forces to conduct a CONUS operation. Seven IBUs, two PSUs, and about 400 personnel from nine units participated in this operation.
Main themes

- Increasing cohesion of the NCW community
- Followed by increasing independence of the NCW community from MDZ
- Growing demand for NCW forces

In tracing the history of MDZ and NCW, we discern three main themes. First, we observe the consolidation of various Navy and Coast guard inshore and coastal units into an NCW community. Next, we see the NCW community becoming independent from the MDZ. Finally, we observe a growing demand for core NCW forces, both overseas and in the United States. This brings us to the present problem: defining the roles and missions of MDZ and of NCW forces.
Roles and missions

- What is naval coastal warfare?
  - NCW forces
  - NCW missions
- What is the MDZ role today?
- Coastal and command differences
- Exploration of homeland defense mission
- Alternatives

In this section, we examine the forces, roles, and missions of the commands that are central to our analysis. First, we look at the types and number of units that constitute the core NCW forces. Next, we list the missions those NCW forces perform.

Then we turn to MDZ and its stated role today.

We next consider some differences between the East Coast and West Coast MDZ and NCW Groups. We also look at differences between the MDZ and the PHIBGRUs, which both exercise authority over NCW.

We look briefly at the Coast Guard’s role and at the homeland defense mission in its latest manifestation.

Then we analyze some alternative ways to divide responsibilities among the commands involved in expeditionary NCW and homeland defense. We end with a recommendation.
This picture shows both core NCW assets (in boxes) and supporting forces that may be commanded by the Harbor Defense Commander (HDC) or Fleet Security Officer (FSO). An HDC would command a harbor defense/port security operation; an FSO would command an NCW operation directly supporting MPF, JLOTS, or other fleet assets. In most cases, the HDC/FSO would use an HDCU and its C2 assets to perform his mission, but for some seabased missions, an HDCU may not be necessary.

The picture also shows forces and commands that the HDC or FSO must coordinate with.

Core NCW assets are the Harbor Defense Command Unit (HDCU), the Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit (MIUWU), Port Security Unit (PSU), and Inshore Boat Unit (IBU).

The picture is basically the same overseas and in CONUS for HD/PS missions.
Core NCW forces (July 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit type</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>People per unit/rank of CO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>104 USNR/O-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Defense (Command) Unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37 USNR &amp; USCGR/O-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inshore Boat Unit</td>
<td>14 (each w/2 boats)</td>
<td>37 USNR/O-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Security Unit</td>
<td>6 (each w/6 boats)</td>
<td>140 USCGR/O-5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Coastal Warfare Group</td>
<td>2 (San Diego &amp; Williamsburg)</td>
<td>98 USNR &amp; USCGR/O-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Deployable strength 117 personnel.

This slide lists current numbers of the various units that make up the core NCW forces. The force totals about 4,000 billets. The vast majority are Selected Reserves, but each unit, with the exception of several HDCUs, has a cadre of full-time support personnel ("TARs," in Navy parlance).

These core NCW units make up only part of an NCW force package. Other units that may participate include Explosive Ordnance Disposal; Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit; Mine Countermeasures; Cutters; Patrol Boats; Visit, Board Search and Seize teams; vessel traffic systems; and maritime patrol aircraft.
Missions of unit types

- HDCU: C2 functions, host nation and rear area liaison, and intelligence support
- MIUWU: Inshore surveillance (surface and subsurface) and C4I
- IBU: Sensor deployment for MIUWUs, surface target classification/interdiction
- PSU: High-value asset protection, ashore unit security

This slide shows the missions of each of the unit types.

There are a few variations. Four of the HDCUs have Mobile Ashore Support Terminals (MASTs), which enable tactical- and theater-level C2 and intelligence support. The other five have less extensive communications equipment and can provide port and host nation liaison functions, limited C2, and staff to the Harbor Defense Commander. Each of the NCW groups also has a MAST for operating without an HDCU afloat. This MAST could also be deployed ashore with a non-equipped HDCU or the NCW Group Initial Response Team.
What are the missions of NCW?

- Harbor defense/Port security
- Protection of other high-value assets
- Waterside force protection support to
  - Special Operations Forces
  - MPF
  - JLOTs
- Chokepoint missions
- SSBN/SSN resupply (SCOOP)

According to NWP 3-10, the primary mission of NCW is:

"To protect strategic shipping and naval vessels operating within the inshore/coastal area, anchorages, and harbors, from bare beach to sophisticated port facilities, to ensure uninterrupted flow of strategic cargo and units to the combatant commander."

Specific manifestations of this mission are listed on this slide.

The first two listed are applicable to CONUS as well as OCONUS contingencies. On a day-to-day basis the Coast Guard is responsible for those missions in the United States.
Coast Guard capabilities and responsibilities

“The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for enforcement of Federal laws and International treaties and the security of U.S. ports and waterways.”

- Protects maritime defense borders of U.S.
  - During military outload operations, USCG is responsible for protecting harbors and ports
  - Coast Guard can request NCW assets for these operations

- Interagency Port Readiness Network
  - COTPs chair local Port Readiness Committees

The Coast Guard has the primary responsibility for the security and safety of U.S. ports. In the event of a terrorist incident in or around a U.S. port, the Coast Guard will activate command posts, security teams, incident management teams, and other necessary assets (such as strike teams trained and equipped to deal with industrial chemical spills). The Coast Guard will also coordinate with the FBI, the National Guard, and other appropriate U.S. federal, state, and local agencies and civil authorities.

During a military outload operation, the Coast Guard is responsible for protecting the harbors and the ports. The Coast Guard can request NCW assets to assist in these operations in times of war if there are assets available and not deployed overseas. The COTP is responsible for directing harbor patrols and surveillance, inspecting facilities, and enforcing cargo transfer safety regulations. The Coast Guard, in wartime, could also come under Navy command.

To clarify relationships and coordinate operations during mobilization of ports, the National Port Readiness Network was established in 1985 by an MOU among six federal agencies. In 1993, it was expanded to the current nine members: the Maritime Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Military Traffic Management Command, Military Sealift Command, MDZ, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command. The MOU also established Port Readiness Committees, chaired by COTPs, to help coordinate interagency efforts to ensure port readiness. The members include local representatives of the signatories to the MOU as well as the Port Authority and local law enforcement, among others. The PRCs also conduct exercises at the strategic ports of embarkation (SPOEs) to test the ability to maintain port output of strategic cargo to the combatant commanders.
As shown in this graphic representation for CONUS NCW operations, the MDZ task organization parallels the U.S. Coast Guard command structure. Under the MDZ organization, the two operational Coast Guard vice admirals – COMPACAREA and COMLANTAREA – are designated COMUSMDZPAC and COMUSMDZLANT. The MDZ AORs correspond to the USCG Areas.

Each MDZ is a third-echelon Navy command reporting to his respective Navy fleet commander-in-chief. MDZ is responsible for planning, coordinating, and conducting U.S. coastal defense. Each layer of the organization is parallel to a Coast Guard command. Under each of the two USCG vice admirals are the Coast Guard Districts, which, in time of MDZ activation, are the Maritime Defense Commands (MARDEFCOMs), a fourth-echelon Navy command.¹

Under the Coast Guard Districts are Captains of the Port, which are the equivalent of the Harbor Defense Commander (HDC), or fifth-echelon Navy command, when the MDZ command is activated.² The HDC/COTP requests assets to form an NCW force package, which could include USCG forces and non-deployed DoD forces, such as core NCW units and units of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). In addition, the HDC/COTP coordinates interagency support and local law enforcement agencies.

¹. However, the MARDEFCOM for San Diego is the Commander Navy Region Southwest.
². Do not confuse the Harbor Defense Commander in this case with the commanding officer of the Harbor Defense Command Unit (HDCU). The latter would report to the HDC/COTP.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coast Guard connection to Navy: Plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ MDZ commanders maintain concept plans (CONPLANs) that are tied with Coast Guard’s contingency plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ OPLAN 9700 series on the East Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ OPLAN 9800 series on the West Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ MDZLANT updating its coastal defense supporting plan to JFCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ CONPLAN for protection of SLOCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Implications for USCG reserve mobilization and planning staff under review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Plans will be exercised at district and port levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ MDZPAC pursuing similar initiatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The MDZ commanders maintain coastal defense concept plans (CONPLANs) that are tied to the Coast Guard’s contingency plans, the OPLAN 9700 series plans on the East Coast and 9800 series on the West Coast.

MDZLANT is updating its coastal defense supporting plan to Joint Forces Command’s CONPLAN for protection of SLOCs. Implications for Coast Guard reserve mobilization and planning staff are under review. Plans are also underway to exercise these plans at the district and eventually port levels.

MDZPAC is taking similar steps to revitalize its role in homeland defense as directed in the CINCPACFLT OPORD.
Homeland defense (security)

- Need assessment of threat and validated requirement for this “new” mission
- MDZ holds promise for meeting HD requirement for Navy
- Could support perceived need for more funding for core NCW community
- But where is line between Coast Guard and MDZ in performing this mission?

We turn now to the newly prominent issue of homeland defense or security. Cold War plans for homeland defense were “shrink-wrapped” and put on the shelf in the early 1990s. There are no validated requirements for this mission, and no threat assessment. It seems natural that MDZ would be the Navy’s lead for the homeland defense mission. This is their operational assignment in fleet CINC OPORDs and in Navy doctrine.

If a requirement for homeland defense is developed, it would be added to the current missions of the NCW community. Presumably, additional funding for core NCW forces would be needed.

But in our research on this topic, an important issue raised itself: Where is the line between the Coast Guard and the Navy command, MDZ, in performing this mission? There is no clear answer at this time.
MDZ role today

- Principle advisor to fleet CINCs in all matters affecting naval coastal warfare
- Coordinating authority for NCW
- Operational commander of NCW operations in CONUS
- Performs deliberate planning and exercise coordination

These are the functions assigned to MDZ in the fleet CINCs' OPORDs. MDZ's central function is to serve as the fleet CINCs' executive planning agent and coordinating authority for NCW. Exactly what does "coordinating authority" mean? The official definition in the DoD Dictionary (Joint Pub 1-02) is:

"A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations."

Remember that the MDZ commander is a third-echelon commander. He can raise NCW issues directly to the fleet CINC and serve as a spokesman for NCW. Note also that he combines responsibilities for CONUS and OCONUS missions, but his CONUS responsibilities are greater: in the United States he is the operational commander for NCW. For OCONUS operations, he is responsible only for deliberate planning and exercise coordination (and this assignment is under review, formally on the East Coast, and informally on the West Coast).
Coastal differences

- MDZ reflect their CINC’s missions
  - MDZPAC focused on expeditionary
    » Deliberate planning for Korea and SWA
    » Deputy MDZPAC is CTG 778.4
  - MDZLANT focused on CONUS
    » No overseas OPLANS
    » Recent requirement for INR 2000
    » Reinvigorating CONUS MDZ organization

- NCW Groups reflect their ISIC’s missions
  - NCW Group One focuses includes CENTCOM and Korea
  - NCW Group Two called on for real-world force protection in European theater
    » Also in TPFFD for Korea and SWA

Naturally, commands do not operate in a vacuum. Rather, they reflect the priorities of their superiors and hence, of their AORs. Between the two MDZ and between the NCW Groups we observed differences resulting from these influences.

MDZPAC, naturally, is focused on the expeditionary mission, just as CINCPACFLT is. It performs deliberate planning for two MTWs. Also, in a recent innovation, Deputy MDZPAC, a one-star Navy reservist, is designated as Commander Task Group 778.4 (Harbor Defense Commander to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea).

MDZLANT, in contrast, is increasingly focused on CONUS issues. CINCLANTFLT does not have an overseas MTW OPLAN, and perceptions of an increased asymmetric threat at home have directed efforts towards reinvigorating the homeland defense mission.1

Similarly, the NCW Groups have different focuses, which reflect the missions of their immediate superiors: the COMPHIBGRUs.

NCW Group One reflects COMPHIBGRU Three’s interest in CENTCOM as well as Korea, and in MPF and JLOT’s operations. NCW Group Two has supported its new ISIC in real-world waterborne force protection of exercises in the European theater. Core NCW forces from both fleets are identified in the OPLAN Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) documents for Korea and Southwest Asia.

1. MDZLANT does have planning responsibilities for CONPLANs in the AORs for which CINCLANTFLT is the primary force provider.
Command differences

- MDZ
  - Focused on sustainment
  - Focused on HD/PS
  - Have homeland defense mission
- PHIBGRUs
  - Focused on FSO/FPO
  - Focused on MPF/JLOTS
  - No homeland defense mission, but interest in waterside force protection

Here we list some of the differences between the MDZ and PHIBGRUs. The MDZ focus on the long-term mission of sustainment and embrace the harbor defense/port security model of NCW operations, which is tasked in both MTW OPLANs. They are operational commanders for homeland defense and look to harbor defense/port security as the way to carry out that mission.

The PHIBGRUs have a different approach. They are designated as Commanders Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF), and they are also involved in Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) operations. Consequently, they have embraced the Fleet Security Officer/Force Protection Officer model for NCW operations.

No PHIBGRU has a role in homeland defense. Each does have an interest in waterside force protection for U.S. Navy assets at home as well as abroad, but that interest does not encompass other strategic assets. In June 2000, COMPHIBGRU Three hosted a waterside security conference sponsored by OPNAV N34. The conference promoted the use of NCW assets for OCONUS and CONUS force protection.
Analysis

- Tasks
- Criteria
- Commands
- Matrices
  - PAC
  - LANT
- Overriding principle
- Conclusions

To analyze the current situation, we create a matrix containing the primary tasks in which MDZ is involved. We list criteria for performing each of the tasks. We list the commands that could most logically be assigned to perform the tasks. We will use these matrices to analyze some alternative ways to divide up the tasks amongst the commands. We present two matrices, one for each coast to reflect the different AORs and interests of their respective fleet CINCs.
Criteria

- Full-time billets
- Expertise
- Broad perspective
- Connected to operators
  - NCW community
  - Coast Guard

These are the criteria we use to evaluate the various commands that might be called upon to perform the tasks. They are: whether full-time billets are available to perform the tasks for the NCW mission, whether the command has the necessary expertise in naval coastal warfare, whether it has a broad perspective, and whether it is connected to the operators who perform the NCW mission. By "connected," we mean having geographic co-location, a shared knowledge base, and a common focus.
Tasks

- OCONUS
  - Deliberate planning for NCW
  - Exercise planning for NCW
- CONUS
  - Deliberate planning
  - Exercise planning
  - Operational control
- NCW exercise prioritization and scheduling
- NCW doctrine development

These are the primary tasks with which MDZ has some involvement. They include deliberate planning and exercise planning for OCONUS and CONUS NCW missions, operational control for CONUS missions, prioritization and scheduling of NCW exercises, and development of doctrine for naval coastal warfare.
Commands

- MDZ
- NCW Groups
- PHIBGRUs
- Coast Guard Areas

These are the commands that play a major role in naval coastal warfare. They form the horizontal axis of our matrix. The purpose of the matrices is to shed light on which commands meet the criteria required to perform planning, scheduling, and doctrine development for NCW forces on the East and West Coasts, as well as operational control in a CONUS mission.
## Pacific Fleet matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>MDZPAC</th>
<th>NCWGRU1</th>
<th>PHIBGRU3</th>
<th>PACAREA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS deliberate</td>
<td>Billets</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>planning</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>HD/PS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FSO/FPO</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS exercise</td>
<td>Connected to NCW</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>planning</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>HD/PS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FSO/FPO</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS planning</td>
<td>Billets</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connected to NCW</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connected to CG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>PSUs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS exercises</td>
<td>Connected to NCW</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connected to CG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PSUs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS OPCON</td>
<td>Assigned mission</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise scheduling</td>
<td>Broad perspective</td>
<td>No²</td>
<td>No³</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine development</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A "Yes" denotes that the criterion is met for the full spectrum of Navy and Coast Guard ocean NCW forces.
2. Narrow perspective since Deputy MDZPAC designated CTG 77.4.
3. Has parenchis-oped successive preference.

Here is the completed matrix for Pacific Fleet commands. The top part of the table covers OCONUS tasks; the middle deals with CONUS tasks; and the final section covers tasks common to both CONUS and OCONUS.

Some readers may disagree with one or two of our assessments, but we are confident that these differences of opinion will not ultimately affect our findings.
Atlantic Fleet matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>MDZLANT</th>
<th>NCWGRU2</th>
<th>PHIBGRU2</th>
<th>LANTAREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS deliberate planning</td>
<td>Billets</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>HD/PS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>FSO/FPO</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS exercise planning</td>
<td>Connected to NCW</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>HD/PS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FSO/FPO</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS planning</td>
<td>Billets</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connected to NCW</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connected to CG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PSUs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS exercises</td>
<td>Connected to NCW</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connected to CG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PSUs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS OPCON</td>
<td>Assigned mission</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise scheduling</td>
<td>Broad perspective</td>
<td>Maybe²</td>
<td>No³</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A "Yes" denotes that the criterion is met for the full spectrum of Navy and Coast Guard core NCW forces.
2. May have homeland focus.
3. Has perceived expeditionary preference.

Here is the completed matrix for the Atlantic Fleet commands.

The differences between the fleets are reflected in three places on the matrix.

- The Pacific Fleet is less focused on NCW for homeland defense in both exercises and in planning for CONUS.
- As a result, the Pacific Fleet may not have as broad a perspective as the Atlantic Fleet with regard to covering both expeditionary and homeland defense NCW.
- On the other hand, NCW Group Two, on the Atlantic side, does not have the expertise in deliberate planning that its Pacific Coast counterpart may have.
Analyzing alternatives: Caveats

- Depends on direction of CINCs
- All CINC's are involved
  - Overseas plus JFCOM
  - Stakeholder goes beyond NCC to unified CINC level
- Include TRANSCOM in discussion

Our analysis will be, of necessity, incomplete.
Ultimately, any new alternative must depend on the direction of the CINC's and their Navy components. All geographic CINC's and JFCOM (with its homeland defense responsibilities) must be involved. Due to the critical position of NCW at the border between the land and the sea—the concerns of unified CINC's, and not just Navy component commanders, must be addressed. In particular, it is important to include the functional CINC of the Transportation Command in the discussion.
Alternatives for future of MDZ

- Functional distribution of roles
  1. NCW/MDZ division of labor
  2. NCW and MDZ both retain role in CONUS and OCONUS
- Geographic split
  3. Informal geographic split
  4. Formal geographic split
- Elimination of formal bridge between Services
  5. MDZ deactivated

We take an initial stab at evaluating alternative divisions of responsibility among the commands involved in naval coastal warfare.

First we present five alternatives. The alternatives we consider can be split into three categories based on the division of labor for CONUS and OCONUS responsibilities.

- The first two alternatives represent a functional distribution of roles. Tasks are distributed to MDZ or to the NCW Group and its ISIC.
- Alternatives 3 and 4 represent a geographic split in responsibilities between the Atlantic and Pacific coast commands.
- The fifth alternative is the deactivation of MDZ.

For each alternative, we discuss some pros and cons, then highlight the proposed division of responsibilities on the matrix. The matrix allows us to systematically analyze the alternatives. To clarify our analysis, we combine the two matrices into a single combined picture, repeated for each alternative. We do not assign the tasks in the bottom, purple section because they are overarching responsibilities that must be accomplished at a higher level or by a cooperative effort involving all the commands.
Functional distribution of roles
Alternative 1: NCW/MDZ divide labor

- MDZ jettison OCONUS plans/ exercise role
- Role passes to NCW Group/CG Areas
- Both MDZ embrace homeland defense role
- PHIBGRU is ISIC of Navy NCW assets

Under the first alternative, the MDZ commands give up any role in expeditionary plans and exercises. That role passes to the NCW Groups for naval reserve NCW assets and to the Coast Guard Area staffs for Coast Guard NCW units. Under this alternative, both MDZ are exclusively concerned with homeland defense.

A variation of this alternative passes the OCONUS role to the PHIBGRUs. We do not consider this variation.
Alternative 1: Some pros and cons

- Pros
  - Command with operational expertise would also do deliberate and exercise planning
  - MDZPAC would refocus on the coastal defense of United States

- Cons
  - Additional personnel needed at NCW Groups
  - MDZ would lose direct access to NCW community
  - One command would no longer integrate CONUS and OCONUS coastal/harbor defense planning

Under this alternative, the commands with operational expertise overseas (the NCW Groups) would be responsible for deliberate and exercise planning for OCONUS NCW operations. The commands with operational expertise in CONUS, the MDZ, plan for CONUS NCW. Consequently, MDZPAC would refocus its efforts on homeland defense.

This alternative would require additional full-time support personnel at the NCW Groups to do the planning. However, the expertise in NCW resides in the reserves. Perhaps extended periods of active duty for special work would make available reservist expertise.

With this division of labor, the MDZ would lose its direct access to the NCW community, at least until requirements were formalized for NCW assets in homeland defense. This loss of access would also deprive them of information they would need to perform their CONUS planning and operational mission. And an honest broker would need to be involved in settling competing demands for resources between the two sets of commands.
### Combined matrix: Alternative 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>MDZ</th>
<th>NCWGRUs</th>
<th>PHIBGRUs</th>
<th>AREAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS deliberate planning</td>
<td>Billets</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

1. A "Yes" denotes that the criteria is met for the full spectrum of Navy and Coast Guard core NCW forces.
2. MDZPAC may have a more narrow perspective since its Deputy was designated CTO 7TH. MDZLANT may have a homeland defense focus.
3. Has non-expeditionary preference.

According to the combined matrix, the three commands assigned new roles by Alternative 1 would have to overcome some deficiencies. First, with regard to planning and exercises for CONUS missions, MDZPAC would have to improve its "connection" to NCW. In accordance with our definition of "connected," MDZPAC does not share the same general location as the NCW Group; MDZPAC is in Alameda, while NCW Group 1 is located in San Diego. In addition, MDZPAC's knowledge base and focus on CONUS issues has weakened because it had, until recently, concentrated exclusively on expeditionary NCW.

Second, a similar concern can be found within the NCW Groups. NCW Group 1, on the Pacific Coast, would have greater expertise for OCONUS deliberate planning than its sister group on the Atlantic Coast. Meanwhile, NCW Groups simply do not have the billets to conduct OCONUS deliberate planning.

Finally, the Coast Guard Areas have neither the billets nor the expertise to conduct OCONUS planning for their NCW assets—the PSUs.
Functional distribution of roles
Alternative 2: MDZ give PHIBGRUs lead in OCONUS but retain role/concentrate on CONUS

- MDZ have lead in CONUS, PHIBGRUs support
- PHIBGRUs have lead in OCONUS, MDZ support

Under Alternative 2, the MDZ pass the lead in deliberate planning for OCONUS missions to the PHIBGRUs, but retain their role as NCW coordinating authority for the fleet CINCs. The MDZ concentrate on homeland defense.

In both CONUS and OCONUS theaters, the MDZ and the PHIBGRUs maintain a support relationship.
Alternative 2: Some pros and cons

> Pros
- Returns lead OCONUS role to overseas operator
- Maintains information flow between OCONUS and CONUS planners
- MDZPAC would refocus on coastal defense of U.S.

> Cons
- Still institutionalizes conflict between MDZ and PHIBGRU
- Neither PHIBGRU nor MDZ has broad perspective required to plan for breadth of NCW missions
- PHIBGRU is one of many customers for NCW

Alternative 2 is a less extreme version of Alternative 1. Rather than a strict division of labor, it represents a sharing of responsibility and a clear delineation of when each command is in the lead. The lead role for OCONUS planning is returned to an overseas operator, the PHIBGRU. (This observation holds true for the Atlantic side; however, Deputy MDZPAC’s designated role in Korea makes this point less compelling.) As in Alternative 1, MDZPAC refocuses on its CONUS responsibilities. Unlike Alternative 1, this alternative maintains the information flow between the CONUS and OCONUS planners.

However, the conflict between MDZ and the PHIBGRU/NCW Group still lurks in the splitting of responsibilities among the commands. A fight for scarce NCW resources could take place. In other words, no entity would embody both the expertise and the broad perspective needed. In addition, the PHIBGRU, as only one of numerous OCONUS customers for NCW, may be open in its ISIC role to charges of conflict of interest in its planning for NCW assets.
### Combined matrix: Alternative 2

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</table>

1. A “Yes” denotes that the criterion is met for the full spectrum of Navy and Coast Guard core NCW forces.
2. MDZPAC may have a more narrow perspective since its Deputy was designated CGT 78.4. MDZLANT may have a broader focus on NCW missions.
3. Has perceived excessively preference.

With this functional distribution of roles, our matrix again reveals issues that would need to be addressed. First, MDZPAC’s lead in CONUS issues may confront the same types of problems discussed in the analysis of Alternative 1. For example, MDZLANT is more “connected” to NCW for CONUS missions in both planning and in exercises.

As well, the PHIBGRUs, which would take the lead in OCONUS planning for NCW, have expertise in the FSO/FPO concept, but not in HD/PS. HD/PS expertise has resided in MDZ. The PHIBGRUs would have to take on and understand that particular role of the NCW Groups. Finally, the PHIBGRUs do not currently have the billets to conduct OCONUS deliberate planning for NCW.
Informal geographic split
Alternative 3: Status quo

- MDZ(PAC) retains deliberate planning/exercise responsibilities
- MDZLANT continues revitalization of CONUS plans/exercises
- NCW Groups look to their ISICs, the PHIBGRUs, for priorities

Alternative 3 is the status quo.
Alternative 3: Some pros and cons

- **Pros**
  - Continuity in a sea of change

- **Cons**
  - MDZPAC would continue to give low priority to coastal defense of United States
  - MDZLANT would have to fight for seat at table for OCONUS exercises
  - NCW Groups may focus on ISICs’ concerns at expense of other customers
  - Split in OCONUS responsibilities may cause problems
  - Conflict between MDZ and NCW remains

This alternative provides some continuity following a series of institutional changes, documented in an earlier section of this brief.

However, certain shortcomings would continue. MDZPAC would likely continue its focus on OCONUS issues. MDZLANT would have to struggle to remain informed about OCONUS exercises. The NCW Groups may focus on the force protection interests of their PHiBGru ISICs. The split between planners and operators for some OCONUS missions may cause cause problems in execution. Most importantly, the conflicts among the commands on both coasts would continue.
### Combined matrix: Alternative 3

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<tr>
<th>Task</th>
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</table>

1. A "Yes" denotes that the criteria is met for the full spectrum of Navy and Coast Guard core NCW forces.
2. MDZPAC may have a more narrow perspective as its Deputy was designated CIG 738.4. MDZLANT may have a homeland defense focus.
3. Has perceived expeditionary preference.

Under the status quo, the PHIBGRUs have the responsibility for OCONUS exercise planning for NCW, but have expertise in only the FSO/FPO concept. Therefore, the HD/PS mission could assume lesser importance in their planning. Meanwhile, MDZ, which has the task of OCONUS deliberate planning for NCW missions, has expertise in only the HD/PS concept, and not the FSO/FPO concept.

A secondary problem can be found in the coastal differences between the two MDZ commands. MDZPAC is not as connected to NCW as MDZLANT is, which could present problems in MDZPAC’s ability to conduct CONUS planning and exercises.
Formal geographic split
Alternative 4: Divide responsibilities along coastal lines

- Give lead in CONUS role to MDZLANT
  - MDZLANT would take lead in plans/exercises
- Give lead OCONUS role to MDZPAC
  - Essentially the status quo
- Each NCW Group answers to both MDZ commands and its PHIBGRU ISIC

Alternative 4 would further accentuate the split in emphasis between the two MDZ. It would formally give the lead in homeland defense to MDZLANT, and the lead in OCONUS deliberate planning to MDZPAC.
Alternative 4: Some pros and cons

➤ Pros
   — Institutionalizes the split
   — Allows each MDZ to focus on its geographic expertise

➤ Cons
   — Confusing set of command relationships
   — Force allocation problems

This alternative is included as the extreme example of geographic differences. It formalizes the split between MDZLANT and MDZPAC, allowing each to work on its geographic area of expertise.

Alternative 4 is ultimately unworkable. It sets up a confusing set of command relationships and creates huge force allocation problems. The alternative would have MDZPAC supporting all of the geographic unified CINCs, with the exception of any homeland defense responsibilities that may be assigned to JFCOM. And it would have both NCW Groups reporting to both MDZ commands as well as their own PHIBGRU—MDZPAC for OCONUS planning, MDZLANT for CONUS plans and operations, and the PHIBGRUs as ISICs and exercise planners.
Combined matrix\textsuperscript{1}: Alternative 4

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\textsuperscript{1} A “Yes” denotes that the criterion is met for the full spectrum of Navy and Coast Guard over NCW forces.
\textsuperscript{2} OPCON may have a more narrow perspective since its Deputy was designated CPO-B. MDZLANT may have a homeland defense focus.
\textsuperscript{3} Has perceived expeditionary preference.

This matrix looks identical to the matrix for Alternative 3. It represents something fundamentally different, however: the top black box—for OCONUS deliberate planning—belongs only to MDZPAC. And the CONUS black box belongs only to MDZLANT.

According to the matrix, MDZPAC, in taking over all OCONUS deliberate planning for the NCW mission, has two areas that would need improvement. The first is that it would have to expand its expertise on NCW missions to include the FSO/FPO concept used by NCW forces OCONUS in order to work out the differences between the FSO/FPO and HD/PS concepts. To gain that expertise would necessitate better relations between the two major users of NCW, the MDZ and the PHIBGRUs. The problem is MDZPAC is not “connected” to the NCW Groups. That connection is critical to maintaining the knowledge base needed to conduct deliberate planning for OCONUS NCW missions.

The same shortcoming for exercise planning described earlier, with the PHIBGRU having expertise in the FSO/FPO concept only, pertains in this alternative as well.

Finally, MDZLANT would be responsible for only the CONUS mission. According to the matrix, it meets the criteria to perform these tasks.
Elimination of formal bridge between Services
Alternative 5: Stand down MDZ

- USCG in charge of homeland security
- NCW Groups/PHIBGRUs take OCONUS role
- MDZ deactivated

Alternative 5 embodies the most dramatic change. It would give the CONUS role in homeland defense to the Coast Guard, and the OCONUS role in expeditionary NCW to the NCW Groups/PHIBGRUs.

MDZ would be deactivated.
Alternative 5: Some pros

➤ Save resources devoted to this never fully activated command structure
➤ Clean split of responsibilities
➤ Coast Guard already has ties to Navy that would enable access to resources when needed
➤ Coast Guard has responsibilities for defense of coastal U.S. anyway
➤ Threat to U.S. coasts and ports has not been assessed

We discuss here some of the arguments for standing down MDZ. First, eliminating the command structure would save the resources devoted to it. This alternative also cleanly splits responsibilities between the Services, giving expeditionary missions to the Navy and homeland missions to the Coast Guard. It eliminates the hybrid MDZ.

The Navy and Coast Guard already have established procedures in peacetime to call upon each other when help is needed. And in wartime, Title 14 of the U.S. Code makes provision for transferring the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Defense “to operate as a service in the Navy.” [Title 14, USC, Section III]

As mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard has statutory responsibility for defense of the coastal United States.

Finally, a current threat to U.S. coastal regions and ports has not been formally assessed, and formal requirements to defend against any such threat do not now exist.
Alternative 5: Some cons during peacetime

- Navy and Coast Guard lose operational command relationship
- Navy loses direct access to Coast Guard forces
- Senior Coast Guard officers lose familiarity with Navy/joint defense lexicon and operational procedures
- Lose advocate for Navy-Coast Guard interoperability
- Eliminates joint organization that can respond to Congressional concerns regarding U.S. coastal defense

Many cons also exist, arguing against eliminating MDZ. On this page we discuss what would be lost in peacetime if MDZ were eliminated. First, this alternative would do away with the command relationship embodied in MDZ—the day-to-day link between the two operational commanders of Coast Guard forces and the Navy’s fleet CINCs.

While the Navy has some informal links to access Coast Guard forces, those links are not institutionalized and therefore not guaranteed. Thus, direct access to Coast Guard forces would be lost.

Without MDZ, Coast Guard leaders, as well as other officers assigned to the commands, would lose the familiarity with DoD terminology and procedures that allow them to communicate easily and immediately with the other armed Services and the joint world. Integration of the Coast Guard into the larger defense community would suffer.

Jointness also would suffer in that a senior advocate for interoperability between the Navy and the Coast Guard would be lost.

Finally, disestablishing MDZ would do away with an existing Navy command that was originally set up to conduct U.S. coastal defense and that can respond to Congressional demands for the revitalization of homeland defense today.
Alternative 5: Some cons during hostilities

- Navy and Coast Guard lose operational command relationship
- COTP loses DoD authority during chaotic and confusing contingencies
- Navy loses direct access to Coast Guard forces
- Navy loses direct access to Coast Guard CONUS communications system

In time of hostilities, the informal links currently enjoyed between the Coast Guard and the Navy may not be sufficient, at the operational level and below. At the port level, the COTP would lose the “cachet of legitimacy” conferred by his Navy Harbor Defense Commander hat. In a time of chaos and confusion, such as a WMD attack, this hat gives the COTP instant credibility with members of the other armed Services. It also serves the COTP well during an MTW of long duration, when a preponderance of the nation’s sustainment resources are flowing through a small number of ports and sustained attention to defense of those ports is needed.

Although statutory provisions exist for transferring the Coast Guard to the Navy in wartime, this arrangement would likely be less than optimum. It would mean transferring the entire Coast Guard, administrative baggage and all, to the Navy, when what the Navy really needs is the Coast Guard’s operational forces only. MDZ makes such a streamlined transfer of forces possible.

If the wholesale transfer of the Coast Guard to DoD does not take place, the Navy’s ability to command Coast Guard forces and use the Coast Guard communications network would be piecemeal and harder to obtain without MDZ. The ability to partially activate MDZ in the absence of full-scale war makes the potential transfer of Coast Guard forces seamless and easy to effect. For Coast Guard forces, the MDZ command structure precludes confusion about reporting chains when MDZ is activated, as it maintains the usual Coast Guard chain of command.

From the Coast Guard perspective, eliminating MDZ would mean the loss of a formalized structure that allows access to Navy forces without going outside the Service.
Combined matrix\(^1\): Alternative 5

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Task</th>
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<td>Connected to CG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS OPCON</td>
<td>Assigned mission</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise scheduling</td>
<td>Broad perspective</td>
<td>No(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine development</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Strategic Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A “Yes” denotes that the criterion is met for the full spectrum of Navy and Coast Guard core NCW forces.
2. MDCPAC may have a more narrow perspective since its Deputy was designated CTO 778.4. MDLANT may have a homeland defense bias.
3. Has remained equivocally preferences.

If the decision is made to pass the protection of U.S. coasts solely to the Coast Guard, some issues would need to be resolved. According to our matrix, the Coast Guard Areas would have difficulty in fulfilling both the CONUS planning and exercise functions for NCW. The Coast Guard Areas do not have the billets needed to conduct CONUS NCW planning. In addition, they are not connected to NCW operators in terms of geographic location (on the Pacific side), or in a shared knowledge base or common focus. Also, the Coast Guard has not been formally assigned this mission at this time. Civilian leadership is needed in determining what direction the Coast Guard should take regarding homeland defense and security. The Coast Guard’s role needs to be known before homeland defense is assigned to it.

Our matrix also points out that the PHIBGRUs and the NCW Groups do not now have the billets to take on OCONUS deliberate planning for NCW. In addition, on the Atlantic side, neither the PHIBGRU nor the NCW Group has expertise in planning for the range of OCONUS NCW.
Overriding principle: Cooperation is crucial to meet range of requirements

- MDZ and IUW community often at odds
- Stakeholders adamant in their views about the alternatives
- NCW forces becoming “low density in high demand”
- MDZ could play important (3-star) role in raising NCW issues
- Homeland requirements yet to be determined

The matrices show us that no one command is positioned to meet all the criteria to perform needed tasks for NCW. Rather, several commands each meet some of the criteria. This finding means that cooperation is needed.

Close coordination and cooperation are crucial to meet the range of requirements—both CONUS and OCONUS—for NCW resources.

In the past, MDZ and the IUW community have often been at odds. We gleaned this both from our interviews and from the documentation in the files.

With NCW forces—almost all of which are in the reserves—in high demand, cooperation becomes increasingly important so that energies may go toward meeting requirements rather than wrangling amongst the stakeholders.

COMUSMDZLANT and COMUSMDZPAC should be seen as important voices for NCW issues at the three-star level. The requirements for homeland defense have yet to be determined, and when they are phased into existing OCONUS requirements, high-level support for NCW will be even more important.

Therefore, a preferred alternative will embody the expertise of OCONUS and CONUS NCW missions under one authority and will connect NCW, MDZ, and Coast Guard commands.
Recommendation: Build cooperation into structure

- Double-hat commodore NCW Group and deputy MDZ
- Original proposal to create NCW Groups had O-7 commander
- MDZPAC may have to shed CTG 778.4 designation
- First step in repositioning commands for 21st century

This overriding need for cooperation and coordination leads us to a recommendation that builds cooperation into the structure. It represents a first step in meeting the requirements of the CINC's—both at home and overseas—and addressing the needs of the NCW units for resources and a well-informed and responsive chain of command. This alternative double-hats the commodore of the NCW Group and deputy MDZ. Currently, the deputy MDZ commanders are one-star Navy Reserve admirals. Efforts have recently gone toward giving them additional roles, with one result being deputy MDZPAC gaining the designation of CTG 778.4.

The commodores of the NCW Groups are Navy Reserve O-6 billets. However, when the consolidation of NCW forces into the NCW Groups was first proposed, O-7s were envisioned as the commanders. Thus, the elevation of the commodore billets would fulfill the original vision of the prominence of the NCW Groups.

For this alternative to work, however, the CTG 778.4 role may need to be shed by Deputy MDZPAC, both to avoid over-tasking and to eliminate any perception of bias toward the Korean theater of operations. Most importantly, the individuals who fill the double billets must come from the NCW community.

The double-hatting would result in a structure that would fulfill all of the criteria in our matrices. It would ensure that the fleet CINC's NCW advisors—the MDZ commanders—have the information needed to do the job. It would also embody the principle of cooperation, which is crucial to meeting the range of requirements of naval coastal warfare in the 21st century. From this new beginning, the wrangling over roles and responsibilities could be transformed into a productive dialogue in which the concerns of all are represented.
## Combined matrix: Recommendation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>MDZ</th>
<th>NCWGRUs</th>
<th>PHIBGRUs</th>
<th>AREAs</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Billets</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>NCWG1</td>
<td>FSO/FPO</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>HD PS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FSO/FPO</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connected to CG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PSUs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expertise</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LANT</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Connected to CG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PSUs</td>
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<td>Expertise</td>
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<td>CONUS OPCON</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctrine development</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A "Yes" denotes that the criterion is met for the full spectrum of Navy and Coast Guard core NCW forces.
2. MDZ/NCW may have a more narrow perspective since its Deputy was designated CTG 77.4. MDZ/NCW may have a homeland defense focus.
3. Has perceived expeditionary focus.

This matrix shows that MDZ and the NCW Groups, with their connections to the Coast Guard and the PHIBGRUS, meet all the criteria. The double-hatting of the commodore and the deputy links these two commands.

The NCW Groups already report to their PHIBGRU ISICs. The double hat gives the NCW Groups a stake in MDZ as well. And it gives MDZ the closer connection to the NCW groups that they need to function as the fleet CINC's coordinating authority and executive agent for NCW.

Further, this alternative would go a long way towards resolving the need for a broad perspective in exercise scheduling. Also, linking the two commands should unite the strategic and tactical expertise required for the full spectrum of doctrine development.
Remaining Issues

- Requirements of geographic CINCs
- Possible UCP implications

Additional issues remain to be explored. For more understanding and analysis of the role of NCW forces, we need to look at the fleet CINC level and above. In this way, we can gain better awareness of the requirements of the unified CINCs—particularly for homeland defense and for force protection, both of current interest.

Also, as mentioned before, changes from the current round of UCP revisions may affect MDZ responsibilities and organization. These changes will likely occur at both the unified CINC and Navy component levels.
Bottom line

➢ Time of great flux
➢ No clear direction from higher authority
➢ Navy, Coast Guard, and NCW community adjusting to ramifications of MOAs/MOUs
➢ Further study at strategic level is in order
   – Requirements must form basis for reform and refocusing

This is a time of great uncertainty for national security. For the MDZ, administrative and operational authority has been transformed many times in the past few years. More study is needed to understand the bigger picture into which MDZ and NCW fit and to craft a structure and a division of responsibilities that make sense in the 21st century.

For now, Navy and Coast Guard leadership may want to consider our recommendation for institutionalizing cooperation between the MDZ and NCW commands. Once implemented, further reorganization of the MDZ and NCW communities, as suggested in these or other alternatives, can be fully evaluated.
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