

Korean Unification and the U.S. Army

A Monograph

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14. ABSTRACT

The U.S. National Security Strategy states that peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a non-nuclear, reunified peninsula will enhance stability in the East Asian region and is clearly in the strategic interest of the United States. The U.S. Army performs a pivotal role in pursuing national objectives, policies, and commitments. Strategy includes organizing and connecting the ends, ways, and means for all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). This monograph addresses a strategy for Korean unification through non-conflict scenarios. The issue of Korean unification is viewed in the context of the Northeast Asia region and a proposed U.S. strategy for Korean unification and a potential role for the U.S. Army is presented in the context of regional interests and international implications. Given the historical and regional situation in 2001 this monograph addresses the principle question: If the desirable conditions attain and unification proceeds, does the U.S. Army have a role in Korean unification? Regional history makes Korean unification an issue beyond the confines of the peninsula. Historical interactions among the great powers make Korean unification a regional problem with international ramifications. The monograph explores the sources of power (geography, population, economy, national will, and national direction) which inform the strategy. The long range missile threat posed by North Korea's weapons program also threatens stability in the region. This threat has provided an impetus for President George W. Bush's pursuit of national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD)--particularly regarding South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Though ROK President Kim Dae Jung's stated policy includes no intention to harm or absorb North Korea, a collapse would certainly cause this policy to be overcome by events. North Korea can no longer present itself as an alternative model for unification, and the monograph considers three possible reunification scenarios (gradual integration, hard landing and soft landing). The policy perspectives of the two Koreas and the major powers are considered. The monograph explores a role for U.S. Army forces in peaceful Korean unification through peacetime military engagement, stability operations, and conflict termination. The sources of power as well as the geopolitics, ideologies, economics, and militaries of the states helped inform the strategy. The objectives of the strategy are maintaining peace, security, and stability. The Northeast Asia policy (including both Koreas and Korean unification) is a policy of engagement. The commitments (or intention to use the instruments of power) include track one and track two diplomacy, national economic assistance as well as private investment, an information campaign that views Korean unification in the historical context of Northeast Asia, and a commitment to keep U.S. military forces forward deployed in the region to foster security and stability.

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Abstract

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The U.S. National Security Strategy states that peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a non-nuclear, reunified peninsula will enhance stability in the East Asian region and is clearly in the strategic interest of the United States. The U.S. Army performs a pivotal role in pursuing national objectives, policies, and commitments. Strategy includes organizing and connecting the ends, ways, and means for all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). This monograph addresses a strategy for Korean unification through non-conflict scenarios. The issue of Korean unification is viewed in the context of the Northeast Asia region and a proposed U.S. strategy for Korean unification and a potential role for the U.S. Army is presented in the context of regional interests and international implications.

Given the historical and regional situation in 2001 this monograph addresses the principle question: If the desirable conditions attain and unification proceeds, does the U.S. Army have a role in Korean unification? Regional history makes Korean unification an issue beyond the confines of the peninsula. Historical interactions among the great powers make Korean unification a regional problem with international ramifications.

The monograph explores the sources of power (geography, population, economy, national will, and national direction) which inform the strategy. The long range missile threat posed by North Korea's weapons program also threatens stability in the region. This threat has provided an impetus for President George W. Bush's pursuit of national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD)--particularly regarding South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.

Though ROK President Kim Dae Jung's stated policy includes no intention to harm or absorb North Korea, a collapse would certainly cause this policy to be overcome by events. North Korea can no longer present itself as an alternative model for unification, and the monograph considers three possible reunification scenarios (gradual integration, hard landing and soft landing). The policy perspectives of the two Koreas and the major powers are considered.

The monograph explores a role for U.S. Army forces in peaceful Korean unification through peacetime military engagement, stability operations, and conflict termination. The sources of power as well as the geopolitics, ideologies, economics, and militaries of the states helped inform the strategy. The objectives of the strategy are maintaining peace, security, and stability. The Northeast Asia policy (including both Koreas and Korean unification) is a policy of engagement. The commitments (or intention to use the instruments of power) include track one and track two diplomacy, national economic assistance as well as private investment, an information campaign that views Korean unification in the historical context of Northeast Asia, and a commitment to keep U.S. military forces forward deployed in the region to foster security and stability.

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INTRODUCTION

In the year 2001, the Korean peninsula abides as perhaps the final frontier of the Cold War. It has become cliché to discuss the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting paradigm shift to a “new world order” with a single superpower.¹ For the purpose of this monograph, it has only narrow relevance, but the Cold War origin of the partition on the Korean peninsula is certainly significant. The 37,000 U.S. military personnel who are continually deployed in Korea for deterrence and defense serve alongside 680,000 South Korean troops and opposite over one million North Korean armed service members.² The technical state of war (the political condition of “not war, but not peace”) characterizes a fifty year long military confrontation which remains the most heavily armed face-off on Earth--a dozen years since the Berlin Wall came down.

Though the *Eagle and the Bear* series might have one believe that nearly every conflict since World War II had its roots in the Cold War face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union, the partitioning of Korea actually did originate in this way.³ The intended temporary demarcation line in Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel--“drawn for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces by the United States and the Soviet Union, has developed into an immovable barrier.”⁴ American and Soviet occupation forces had divergent ideas about what to do with Korea, which had been a Japanese Protectorate since 1905. The result

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March/April 1999). President George H.W. Bush used the term “new world order” in a speech shortly after his inauguration in 1989.

² Jonathan D. Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*, ed. Chung Min Lee (Washington DC: Rand Corp, 1999). xi. If the reserves from North and South Korea are included, the total forces exceed ten million.

³ The *Eagle and the Bear* series is a collection of ABC news reports on conflicts throughout the world and the implications for the Cold War superpower spheres of influence.

⁴ The division of Korea along the 38th parallel at the end of World War II was essentially for military expediency by the United States and the Soviet Union. See Tae-Hwan Kwak, Kim Chong-Han, and Hong-Nack Kim, eds. *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches* (Seoul, Korea: Kyungnam University Press, 1984). 2.

was the emergence of two separate regimes which have dashed the hope of national reunification.⁵

The U.S. National Security Strategy states that “peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a non-nuclear, reunified peninsula will enhance stability in the East Asian region and is clearly in the strategic interest of the United States.”⁶ It is in the U.S. strategic interest because “globalization--the process of accelerating economic, cultural and political integration--means . . . we are affected by events beyond our borders.”⁷ To influence those events, “we must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power.”⁸ The instruments of national power are diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. To create a national strategy requires a decision making process which organizes and connects the ends, ways, and means for all the instruments of power. The U.S. National Military Strategy establishes two national military objectives: (1) promote peace and stability, and (2) defeat adversaries. The elements of the military strategy are to shape the security environment, respond to threats to national interests, and prepare now for an uncertain future.⁹

The U.S. Army performs a pivotal role in pursuing national objectives, policies, and commitments. One of the challenges for the U.S. Army in Korea in 2001 lies in preparation for the strategic and operational consequences of potential changes on the peninsula that could lead to Korean unification--without a major conventional conflict. The Combined Forces Command (CFC) has spent several decades preparing for the current defense mission to deter a North Korean attack and if deterrence fails, to fight and win. This monograph addresses Korean

⁵ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1963). 32.

⁶ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington DC: The White House, 1999). 43.

⁷ *Ibid.* iv.

⁸ *Ibid.* 1.

⁹ Joint Chief of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1998). 2.

unification through non-conflict scenarios, assuming that preparation for the conflict scenario is already fully developed. This is not to suggest that conflict is impossible. In fact, North Korea has exploited its growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities for political and economic leverage as well as for a force multiplier.¹⁰ Additionally, growing instability and potential loss of central control in North Korea may lead to small-scale outbreaks of violence--short of the potential full-scale attack into South Korea.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Korean peninsula has figured prominently in the United States policy on East Asia and the Pacific.¹¹ During the Administration of President William J. Clinton, the policy of engagement dominated U.S. foreign commitments.¹² It would be impractical to write about Korea and neglect the profound influences of the region. Korea has always been a buffer state in the region--from Chinese Manchuria, to the maritime eastern province of Russia, and one hundred twenty miles from the islands of Japan.¹³ None of the regional powers dares ignore Korea--historically a bridge to the Asian continent or a mere stepping stone to the islands. This monograph views the issue of Korean unification in the context of the Northeast Asia region.¹⁴ A proposed United States strategy for Korean unification and a potential role for the U.S. Army is presented in the context of regional interests and international implications.

¹⁰ See B.C. Koh, "North Korean Policy toward the United States," in *North Korea after Kim Il Sung*, ed. Dae-Sook Suh (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 88.

¹¹ A succession of U.S. administrations had foreign policies, from containment of Communism, massive retaliation, graduated pressure, and mutually assured destruction, which represented the Cold War mentality of the U.S. toward the USSR--the superpowers that divided Korea.

¹² See "The Imperative of Engagement" which states that today's complex security environment demands that all our instruments of national power be effectively integrated to achieve our security objectives. In House, *National Security Strategy*. 1.

¹³ Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*. 10-11.

¹⁴ See Kent E. Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 1 (January/February 2001). 106. Calder states that only in Northeast Asia are the world's three principal nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, and China) and the two largest economic powers (the United States and Japan) still politically and geographically engaged.

The U.S. military has an obvious role (along with its allies) in deterrence, and if deterrence fails to achieve victory through combat. If Korean unification results through peaceful means (starting with the existing armistice) military potential facilitates negotiations that lead to a permanent peace settlement. Given the historical and regional situation in 2001 this monograph addresses the principle question: If the desirable conditions attain and unification proceeds, does the U.S. Army have a role in Korean unification? Secondary questions to be explored include (1) what kind of peacetime military engagement might the U.S. Army be involved in? (2) Should the U.S. Army conduct stability operations as a part of Korean unification? (3) Does planning for conflict termination apply when the start point is “not peace, but not war,” which may be the antecedent for Korean unification?

Strategy--a decision making process which organizes and connects the ends, ways, and means for all the instruments of power--is the focus of this paper. This monograph also addresses the sources of power which the United States and the nations in the Northeast Asia region have at their disposal. The potential role of the U.S. Army is considered in the context of national decision making, based on several potential scenarios for peaceful unification. The linkage of national interests and objectives (as ends) to policies and commitments (as ways) to programs (as means) which allocate resources in support of objectives, policies, and commitments describe the strategy.¹⁵ Finally, the strategy, which may include the U.S. Army in Korean unification, is evaluated for feasibility, acceptability and suitability.

Historical Background and Context

Regional history makes Korean unification an issue beyond the confines of the peninsula. Historical interactions among the great powers make Korean unification a regional problem with

¹⁵ From class notes taken during CGSOC curriculum from C-500, Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting.

international ramifications. In developing a realistic strategic aim (the broad purpose or overall goal to be achieved by the strategy), it is important to understand the history of the Korean people and the nations which immediately surround the peninsula. Korean unification is perhaps the most pressing issue in Northeast Asia today. The states with an interest in the issue are: (1) Republic of Korea (ROK) (South Korea); (2) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) (North Korea) (3) People's Republic of China; (4) Japan; (5) Russia; and (6) United States of America. Each of these states have domestic and foreign policy postures which can effect unification--and in particular the potential role of the U.S. Army in Korean unification.¹⁶

From the time of the Qing Dynasty (the Manchu Empire), China controlled Korea with a loose and distant grasp. Three wars have been fought on Korean soil since that time--by outsiders with Korean "victims" as the real losers each time. The Japanese met the Chinese hordes near Pyongyang in the Sino-Japanese war (1894-5). They fought in Korea to secure access to vast and wealthy Manchuria with iron ores, coal, water, power, food, and timber. With the Treaty of Shimonoseki (17 April 1895) Qing China renounced all influence in Chosun (Korea) and ceded Formosa (Taiwan) to Japan. The weakness of China allowed Russia to secure forts and bases in Manchuria and move across the Yalu, seeking to control Northern Korea, but in 1895 "all powers agreed to the continuing freedom of Chosun."¹⁷

Japan defeated Czarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5) with Japanese troops debarking at Inchon and marching north to attack across the Yalu. Russian influence in Manchuria was checked and Japan emerged as the predominant East Asian power. The Japanese signed a treaty with Chosun, "guaranteeing the Hermit Kingdom's independence, in return for the use of its territory as a base of operations."¹⁸ However, by November 1905, the Marquis Ito had

¹⁶ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. v.

¹⁷ Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*. 10-11.

¹⁸ Ibid. 15. See also Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953*, 1st Anchor Books ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 1989).

forcibly negotiated a treaty of protection between Chosun and the Empire of the Rising Sun. Korea had become a Protectorate of the Japanese Empire and Japan promptly colonized Korea in 1910.¹⁹

Following the Japanese surrender on the Korean peninsula in 1945 to the U.S. in the South and the USSR in the North, the stage was set for the third war on Korean soil.²⁰ Though a unified Korea was the original intention, the realities on the ground resulted in the rise of separate governments. On 17 September 1947, the United States informed Moscow of its intention to place the Korean problem before the United Nations while the emerging governments were consolidating power. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was established on 15 August 1948 (under President Syngman Rhee) and the USSR established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 9 September 1948 (under Kim Il Sung who had been a Soviet Army officer and had fought in the guerilla actions against Nationalist China).²¹

The U.S. recognized the new Republic of Korea on 1 January 1949 and withdrew the last American occupation forces. South Korea sought a solution to the reunification problem within the framework of the United Nations, but North Korea disagreed and wanted no interference from external forces (including the UN). On 12 January 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson "drew his famous line which did not include Korea or Taiwan within the United States security cordon in the Far East."²² In Peking, Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong, Russian President Joseph Stalin, and North Korean President Kim Il Sung conferred and agreed that the United States would stand aside (as it had during the fall of Nationalist China) if Koreans attacked Koreans.²³

¹⁹ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 20.

²⁰ See Bruce Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947*, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

²¹ Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*. 30-32.

²² *Ibid.* 32.

²³ *Ibid.* 32-33. See also Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997).

On 25 June 1950, Pyongyang, counting on its strength *vis-a-vis* Seoul, pursued its policy of “liberation of South Korea” by attacking south. The departure of U.S. occupation forces six months earlier had included a treaty to help train ROK security forces. However, the North Korean People’s Army (nKPA) achieved near total surprise and by 28 June “the ROK Army Command could only account for 22,000 men of the 98,000 its rolls had carried out on the 25th.”²⁴ The United Nations Security Council (in the absence of the Soviet delegate who was boycotting the seating of Red China) passed a strong resolution which called for: (1) the cessation of hostilities, (2) a North Korean withdrawal back to the 38th parallel, and (3) all members to render assistance to the UN and refrain from assisting North Korean authorities.²⁵

The military role in international power is essential in building coalitions and shaping the international environment to protect and promote U.S. interests. With the establishment of separate governments on the peninsula (modeled on their occupying “guests”), the DPRK and the ROK fought their civil war supported by their respective Cold War allies and ideological comrades. The ROK forces fought as a part of the United Nations Command led by the United States, and the DPRK fought with Russian equipment support and later alongside Chinese Communist Forces when UN forces threatened the Manchurian border. The final outcome of the war has yet to be ratified by a Peace Treaty. The fifty-year stalemate is upheld by an official cease-fire signed in 1953 by the DPRK, China, and the U.S. as the leader of the UN forces.²⁶ President Syngman Rhee never signed the armistice in 1953, but Rhee finally supported the

²⁴ Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*. 49. The NKPA captured Seoul and continued their attack to the Naktong River (the Pusan perimeter). With the Inchon landing and the breakout, United Nations forces drove the NKPA back into North Korea (all the way to the Yalu River and neighboring Manchuria). The Chinese Communist Forces entered the war and pushed back to the 38th parallel where the front stabilized along the current demilitarized zone (DMZ).

²⁵ Ibid. 51.

²⁶ Ibid. 448. The armistice was signed by Kim Il Sung, China’s Peng Teh-huai, and American General Mark W. Clark.

cease-fire. "There was no more war--but there was no peace. There was no victory."²⁷ The history on the peninsula and the region introduces the discussion of power in the region.

Sources of Power

The relevance of history in the region is manifest in defining sources of power for the Koreans and each of the major powers. The sources of power are geography, population, economy, national will, and national direction. The geography is self-evident but the availability of natural resources makes the juxtaposition of the states more critical. For example, plentiful natural gas fields in Siberia and mineral rich Manchuria represent significant historical and future interests for survival and territory.²⁸ On the Korean peninsula, natural resource availability differs from North to South as well as the capability to utilize (or exploit) those resources.²⁹

Demographics are an important source of national power. The population distribution in the region shows the relative small size of Korea compared to its neighbors. South Korea has forty-one million people, North Korea twenty-one million for a peninsula total of only sixty-two million, compared to China's 1.1 billion, Russia's 148 million, and Japan's 125 million.³⁰ Ethnicity and nationalism also figure prominently in the region. The Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans are not the same. Each has distinctive cultural history. Koreans have some Chinese roots in language (though Han Gul is uniquely Korean) and there are some adopted Japanese

²⁷ Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*. 448.

²⁸ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia." 107.

²⁹ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. xiv.

³⁰ Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kigler, eds. *Strategic Assessment 1999* (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999).

influences from long, harsh colonization.³¹ Nevertheless, Koreans treasure their homogeneous *Han* Korean background.³²

A national economy is a source of power and it translates into the economic instrument of power through trade, economic policy, and allocating (or withholding) economic resources in support of national objectives, policies and commitments. Japan's economy is the second largest in the world (behind the U.S. only). As the economic powerhouse, Japan wields substantial influence and it is an invaluable source of capital to help resource potential reunification challenges. China has enjoyed double-digit economic growth for over ten years. The size of her economy is as significant as the recent changes of opening markets and ending businesses operated by the People's Liberation Army. South Korea (before the Asian financial crisis in 1997) was the marvel of growing economies.³³ Russia has been dealing with internal recuperation and has little to offer the region in 2001, but the potential for Russian throughput via rail and shipping has promise for development. Finally, North Korea maintains one of the most secretive existences in the world, but her economic problems are not easily hidden. They have had negative growth from 1990 to 2000 (a net decrease in GNP and significant loss in trade between Russia and China which were so vital to economic health before) as well as disastrous drought, floods, and famine in several regions.³⁴

The final sources of national power are national will and national direction. The national will for each of the regional actors must be ascertained in order to judge the acceptability and

³¹ Roy Richard Grinkler, *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). 9 and 22.

³² For a complete discussion see Andrew C. Nahm, *Korea: Tradition & Transformation a History of the Korean People* (Seoul, Korea: Hollym Corporation Publishers, 1989).

³³ Binnendijk and Kigler, eds. *Strategic Assessment 1999*. 130.

³⁴ Andrew Natisios, *The Politics of Famine in North Korea* [Internet] (1999, accessed 30 Dec 2000); available from <http://usip.org/oc/sr/sr990802/sr990802.html>. See also Darrell H. Zemitis, *The Future of North Korea: Scenarios and Implications for the United States Army* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Berkeley Press, 2000).

suitability of a U.S. strategy for Korean unification. This is particularly the case on the peninsula. The Korean people have desired unification for decades but this desire may wane “as the passage of time has created conditions on all sides which tend to perpetuate division.”³⁵ China may desire to resume peaceful hegemony--particularly if that means a decreased role for Japan and the U.S. in the region.³⁶

National direction differs from collective will in that leadership roles and direction may change with elections, new policies, and individual personalities. Just as circumstances may evolve dynamically, particular regimes and administrations (and associated term limits for elected leaders) influence progress, stagnation, or reversal in international relations. In the region in 2001, ROK President Kim Dae Jung is three years into his five-year term and his “sunshine policy” may die with the end of his administration. Chinese President Jiang Zemin faces the run up to the 2002 Communist Party Congress and is close to the end of his term. President George W. Bush was inaugurated in February 2001 and has not completed his thorough regional policy review.³⁷ “If reunification comes any time soon, it more likely will come on the crest of emerging current events, rather than rising up from the underlying conditions. . .”³⁸

³⁵ Ben Kremenak, *Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours, and Dead Ends* (College Park, Maryland: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 1997). 76. Separated family members are dying off or growing very old and because Japanese colonization (1910-1945) preceded the North-South separation, no Korean now living remembers a unified, independent Korea.

³⁶ See Larry M. Wortzel, "U.S. Chinese Military Relations in the Twenty-First Century," in *Conference on the People's Liberation Army* (Wye Plantation: September 11-12, 1998).

³⁷ See Barbara Slavin, "Mixed Signals on N. Korea May Indicate Cabinet Rift," *USA Today*, March 8 2001.

³⁸ Kremenak, *Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours, and Dead Ends*. 76.

Recent Developments

The United States involvement in the “tragic fratricidal war of 1950-53”³⁹ has shaped much of the United States’ Northeast Asia handling. More than fifty years since the start of the war, much has changed in the international environment. Russia has reemerged in the region (following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation’s economic collapse and slow recovery), and President Vladimir Putin has begun a dialog with both North and South Korea.⁴⁰ The death of Kim Il Sung (in 1994) and the consolidation of power by his son, Kim Jong Il, was followed by several years of floods, famine, and political uncertainty in North Korea.⁴¹ The opposition party election of Kim Dae Jung in South Korea (in 1997) and the peaceful transition to his Millennium Democratic Party brought Kim’s “sunshine policy” and new attempts at North-South rapprochement.⁴² The opposition party election of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan refocused international attention on China, its double-digit economic growth, and U.S. relations with Taiwan (despite a One China policy).⁴³ Finally, Japan--the economic giant of Asia--has begun working with the U.S. on a Theater Missile Defense system that has most of the great powers in a quandary.⁴⁴

³⁹ Kwak, Chong-Han, and Kim, eds. *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*. 1.

⁴⁰ Global Intelligence Update, *Putin and the North Korean Missile Offer* [Internet] (Global Intelligence Update, 2000, accessed 30 December 2000); available from <http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu/072400.ASP>.

⁴¹ Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo, eds. *North Korea after Kim Il Sung: Continuity or Change?* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).

⁴² See C. Kenneth Quinones, “North Korea: From Containment to Engagement,” in *North Korea after Kim Il Sung*, ed. Dae-Sook Suh (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). and Dae Jung Kim, *Inaugural Address by Kim Dae-Jung, the 15th-Term President of the Republic of Korea* (Seoul, 1998).

⁴³ Frank Ching, “Korea Fallout: U.S.-China Tensions,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 163, no. 37 (2000).

⁴⁴ Michael Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for US Policy Coordination* [Internet] (1999, accessed 21 November 2000); available from <http://www.nbr.org>.

ROK President Kim Dae-Jung and DPRK Leader Kim Jong-Il met in Pyongyang in June 2000, the first such meeting in the history of the two Koreas.⁴⁵ This historic summit as well as the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 to Kim Dae Jung, and the symbolic marching under the Korean Unification flag at the Sydney 2000 Olympics show how acute the issue of Korean Unification is for 2001.⁴⁶ Though this monograph is not intended to be exhaustive and prescriptive, a more comprehensive understanding of current issues and individual roles will help inform a strategy for U.S. military planners for a potential role in peaceful unification. Several potential scenarios end with ultimate unification of Korea. “There are certain conditions which make unification more desirable: (1) The people of both Koreas want it; (2) It results in a democratic and market-oriented state that helps stabilize the region and provides an economic partner for regional and global states; and (3) The united Korea is not a nuclear weapon state. The final desirable condition is that unification be achieved by peaceful means.”⁴⁷

Reunification Scenarios

The U.S. and Republic of Korea have shared two overriding strategic objectives since the end of the war in 1953: (1) deterrence of another major conflict and (2) should deterrence fail, defense of the territorial and political integrity of the ROK. At the same time, the two allies have emphasized the central importance of peaceful change on the peninsula eventually leading to the creation of a democratic, unified Korean state.⁴⁸ However, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 made the strategic and operational

⁴⁵ Won Ki Choi, *The Inter-Korea Summit: What Lies Beneath?* (20 Jun 2000, accessed 30 December 2000); available from <http://www.kimsoft.com/wonki.htm>.

⁴⁶ See William J. Taylor, *North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads* [Internet] (Policy Forum Online, 20 March 2001, accessed 20 March 2001); available from <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/index.html>.

⁴⁷ Amos A. Jordan, ed. *Korean Unification: Implications for Northeast Asia*, Significant Issues Series, vol. XV (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993). 2.

⁴⁸ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 2.

implications of unification much clearer.⁴⁹ “History and culture can provide the context and the parameters for events, but it is only in combination with other factors, such as chance and the abilities and characters of the human actors on the scene, that the final outcome takes shape.”⁵⁰ So far, this monograph has addressed regional history, sources of power and recent developments. The parameters for peaceful unification are addressed in three possible reunification scenarios.

“The central challenge in conceptualizing future scenarios on the Korean peninsula is the disparity between the ultimate objective and the means to achieve it.”⁵¹ This is exactly the purview of strategy--linking the ends, ways, and means. There are no obvious solutions and attempts at strategy by analogy (the German unification model from 1990 or a reconstruction model which immediately follows combat and a military victory) neglect the all important context of each particular situation. This monograph addresses the context of three possible scenarios for peaceful unification which inform the strategy.

Peaceful Unification

The reunification scenario that received the most attention from the military planners of the Combined Forces Command (ROK-U.S.) (prior to German unification) was the major theater war (MTW) scenario in which the victor dictates terms to the defeated.⁵² However, this scenario certainly represents a Pyrrhic victory offset by the staggering losses on both sides. This paper focuses on peaceful scenarios and the decision making challenges which require flexible and adaptive strategy. The first scenario is the ideal situation which ultimately produces national integration without a resort to force.

⁴⁹ See Helmut Schmidt, *The Lessons of the German Unification Process for Korea* (Paris: Inter Action Council, 1993).

⁵⁰ Kremenak, *Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours, and Dead Ends*. 55.

⁵¹ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 84.

⁵² Schmidt, *The Lessons of the German Unification Process for Korea*.

This scenario most closely resembles the Republic of Korea strategy of gradual integration, implementation of confidence building measures, major threat reduction activities, and comprehensive political and social reconciliation between the two Koreas.⁵³ The basic principles of attaining national unification were codified almost thirty years ago in what is known as the July 4 Joint Communiqué of North-South Dialog in 1972. The principles are (1) unification should be achieved through independent Korea efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference, (2) peaceful means without the use of force against each other, and (3) a greater national unity transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.⁵⁴

Hard Landing

The other scenarios have in common the eventualities of a DPRK collapse. Though President Kim Dae Jung's stated policy includes "no intention to harm or absorb North Korea,"⁵⁵ a collapse would certainly cause this policy to be overcome by events. The huge costs associated with absorbing North Korea (mass unemployment, rapidly failing industries requiring massive infusion of relief and investment, large scale migration to escape further economic devastation, and potential chaos in command and control systems for the military and government infrastructure) make this scenario daunting even without the horrors of combat.⁵⁶ The definition of hard landing is "the inability of the regime in power to maintain effective political, economic, social, and military control, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the regime and, in the extreme case, the state."⁵⁷

⁵³ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 49.

⁵⁴ Young Whan Kihl, "South Korea's Unification Policy in the 1980s," in *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*, ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1984). 24.

⁵⁵ Kim, *Inaugural Address by Kim Dae-Jung, the 15th-Term President of the Republic of Korea*.

⁵⁶ Binnendijk and Kigler, eds. *Strategic Assessment 1999*. 132-5.

⁵⁷ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 40.

Soft Landing

The soft landing represents “a process whereby gradual and controlled implementation of selective economic reforms enables a command economy to assume some characteristics of a market economy, although no regime change occurs.”⁵⁸ This scenario is similar to the above in that there is a DPRK “landing” though some stability remains without the chaos, the regime is able to cope with the pressures of partial reforms, and the weakened system may slowly fragment or regionalize easing the absorption by South Korea.⁵⁹

According to author William J. Taylor, engagement is desirable as long as it does not threaten the North Korean regime (nor is it perceived as a threat), but helps North Korea get educated how the world runs. “You can’t hasten the advent of the spring by melting the snow, even if you use artificial sunshine. At the same time any attempts to pressure, to dictate and get tough would only lead to contrary results-- militarization, rather than demilitarization, more threat to neighbors rather than less. This is not a dove approach--rather, it is the only pragmatic, non-ideologized one.”⁶⁰ Having addressed regional history, sources of power, and three possible reunification scenarios, the policy perspectives of the states follow.

Policy Perspectives

Military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz wrote “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”⁶¹ Policy--a pattern of actions to obtain objectives, and commitments--the intention to use the instruments of power, represent the ways of strategy. The ends are national interests and objectives--the outcomes to promote interests. The means are the programs which allocate

⁵⁸ Ibid. 40.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 40.

⁶⁰ Taylor, *North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads*.

⁶¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 87.

resources in support of objectives, policies and commitments. Clausewitz suitably describes the phenomenon of war with three tendencies that make war a paradoxical trinity--the theory of war as an object suspended between three magnets: (1) the people (composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity), (2) the commander and his army (the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam), and (3) the government (the dominant role of rational policy, subject to reason alone).⁶² The monograph now addresses the policy perspectives of the major powers and the two Koreas.

The United States

The regional strategy of the United States is based on the premise that a stable and prosperous East Asia and Pacific is vital to U.S. national security interests. Leadership and security commitments are central to stability and foster an environment within which nations can prosper. Three pillars provide the framework of the national security strategy: (1) enhancing security; (2) advancing economic integration and rules-based trade; and (3) promoting democracy and human rights.⁶³

President George W. Bush said in his inaugural address that he wanted a “more humble foreign policy” in which the United States respects other nations’ policies, cultural differences and regional leadership. Although he pledged continuing support to allies (and leadership in existing alliances and coalitions), he stated that “the U.S. will not demand that other nations see thing our way or that they be forced to do things our way.”⁶⁴ This was to many a reference to three principle regions--the Middle East, the Balkans, and Northeast Asia. Israel and the PLO must negotiate on their timetable (not the U.S. timetable). The Balkans must come to a regional,

⁶² *Ibid.* 89.

⁶³ House, *National Security Strategy*.

⁶⁴ George W. Bush, *Inaugural Address* [Internet] (2001, accessed 3 March 2001); available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html>.

lasting solution--not one imposed by American idealism and frustration with ethnic hatred. The Korean peninsula (and the entire Northeast Asia region) must be addressed with this same responsible, humble policy.⁶⁵ Recent dealings with the DPRK have been largely one-sided giving far more than receiving.⁶⁶ This has served to foster North Korean Kim Jung Il's style of international diplomacy--when you want something, simply cause a ruckus and diplomats come running with food and checkbooks.⁶⁷

In 1994, the U.S. got the DPRK to agree to end its plutonium production in return for two new light water nuclear reactors and interim supplies of heavy fuel oil. The 1994 "Agreed Framework" established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)-- a consortium led by America but including South Korea, Japan, and the European Union, who are buying the oil and building the reactors.⁶⁸ The project is behind schedule, largely the result of North Korea's obstructive behavior. The two new reactors were meant to start producing electricity by 2003, but the first concrete will not be poured before the end of 2002, and it gets harder each year for KEDO to find the money for the interim fuel deliveries.⁶⁹ Some of President Bush's advisers want to explore substituting conventional power plants for the nuclear ones promised, but South Korea opposes the idea of changing the agreement.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ See Stephen Mufson, "Bush Casts a Shadow on Korean Missile Talks," *Washington Post*, 8 March 2001.

⁶⁶ See Quinones, "North Korea: From Containment to Engagement," and Koh, "North Korean Policy toward the United States."

⁶⁷ Scott Snyder, "Negotiating on the Edge: Patterns in North Korea's Diplomatic Style," *World Affairs* 163, no. 1 (2000).

⁶⁸ Selig S. Harrison, "U.S. Policy toward North Korea," in *North Korea after Kim Il Sung*, ed. Dae-Sook Suh (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). Also see Thomas L. Wilborn, *Strategic Implications of the US-DPRK Framework Agreement* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1995).

⁶⁹ Georgi Toloraya, *Korean Peninsula: Are There Things More Important, Than Peace?* [Internet] (Policy Forum Online, 2001, accessed 28 March 2001); available from http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0102I_Toloraya.html.

⁷⁰ Taylor, *North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads* (accessed 2001).

The participation in the Four Party talks (U.S., China, ROK and DPRK) has at least kept the dialog going until the more promising developments of 2000. However, the increasing bilateral discussions between the U.S. and North Korea during President Clinton's administration allowed North Korea to detract attention from inter-Korean discussions.⁷¹ This is a difficulty for the Bush administration. To continue with previous policy gives in to the brinkmanship of Kim Jong Il; however, to completely disengage may destabilize apparent progress. President Kim Dae Jung said during his March 2001 visit to Washington, "South Korea-North Korea relations can advance only so far without progress in U.S.-North Korea relations. The two must move in parallel."⁷² Regionally, no single power is clearly in charge. "This was frustrating to the U.S., and despite efforts by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the two Koreas were driving the pace of regional change."⁷³ The diplomatic policy of the U.S. regarding the region is developing and the military policy for the region should follow a similar path.⁷⁴

The Gulf War established U.S. (and coalition) military supremacy. The United Nations Command, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and CFC (ROK-U.S.) exemplify a powerful alliance-- with even more access to sophisticated technology than was used in Iraq (witness the extensive use of precision munitions in Kosovo in 1999). U.S. forces in Japan and ROK are prepared to execute their deterrence and defend mission. As the U.S. pursues the objectives of security and stability, these forces must be prepared to execute additional missions if military means are committed to support Korean unification.⁷⁵

⁷¹ See Stephen Mufson, "Seoul's Kim Presses for U.S. Role," *Washington Post*, 9 March 2001.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia."

⁷⁴ Ben Barber, "Powell Wants North Korea to Reduce Million-Man Army," *Washington Times*, 9 March 2001.

⁷⁵ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 93.

Northeast Asia

The most significant dilemma in Northeast Asia is the absence of a formal regional association of states to deal with international issues.⁷⁶ Other regional relationships (such as NATO, the Partnership for Peace, the Arab League, the African Crisis Response Initiative, and the hemispheric security initiatives adopted at the Summit of the Americas) serve to shape a favorable international environment within formal structures.⁷⁷ The closest to Northeast Asia is the regional security dialog in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, the “principle members” of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) do not include Northeast Asia.⁷⁸ Working to establish a Northeast Asia Forum (including both Koreas for the time being) could yield positive results for all the players. Korean unification could even be a byproduct of such a forum instead of simultaneous bilateral and multilateral attempts at influencing the outcome.⁷⁹ It is clear that common objectives of security and stability (with varying weight of ways and means) apply to all countries in the region.

Peoples Republic of China

The regional influence of China affects U.S. strategy formulation for Korean unification.⁸⁰ Based on the history of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the Chinese do not want Japan on the Asian continent (or with a strong military).⁸¹ The involvement of the Chinese Communist Forces in the Korean War indicates the Chinese view on foreign militaries in the

⁷⁶ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia," 106.

⁷⁷ House, *National Security Strategy*. 2.

⁷⁸ ASEAN, *Participants in the ASEAN Regional Forum* [Internet] (2001, accessed 1 March 2001); available from <http://www.asean.or.id/amm/partcp.htm>.

⁷⁹ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia." 117-9.

⁸⁰ See Ching, "Korea Fallout: U.S.-China Tensions."

⁸¹ For a discussion of the fear of Japanese militarism, see William J. Taylor and Abraham Kim, "Korean Security in an Insecure Post-Cold War Era," in *Change and Challenge on the Korean Peninsula: Developments, Trends, and Issues*, ed. Jae H. Ku and Tae Hwan Ok (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996). 28.

region--they do not want United Nations (read U.S.) troops along the Manchurian border. "When it looked like North Korea might collapse in 1997, the most senior leaders and military strategists of the PLA privately warned that if the United States thinks it can approach the Yalu River, even in support of humanitarian operations in North Korea, it could look like 1950 all over again."⁸²

China sees itself as the regional power. "It is one thing to tolerate America's accession to the East Asia hegemonic role as long as it serves to put a lid on Japan's military. But Asian hegemony is a role which was invented by and historically belonged to the Middle Kingdom."⁸³ However, China's desires for the region are not particularly belligerent (with the possible exception of Taiwan) and their interests in security and stability for economic growth are consistent with each of the other powers.⁸⁴

China is not an aggressive power. The U.S. military force structure can be downsized and reconfigured. Five factors have propelled major powers towards imperialism: a large, unified state; a rising economy; an ideology of dominance; a superior military capability; and popular support for an aggressive foreign policy. Today's China largely lacks these prerequisites. Its 15th century venture into imperialism ended in retreat, mainly for cultural reasons. The same cultural baggage still inhibits expansion, as does a rising economy dependent upon international integration. China lacks an ideology of dominance and superior military capabilities. Popular support for aggression is also missing.⁸⁵

The U.S. support of Taiwan and the continuing arms sales (including the upcoming sales in May 2001) effect the U.S.-Chinese relationships more than the Korean unification issue.⁸⁶ Theater Missile Defense is another contentious issue with China (and others in the region) as will be discussed below. Any disruption of U.S. efforts to control events in Northeast Asia benefits China in a zero sum game of regional political clout. "China is benefiting from intensified local

⁸² Wortzel, "U.S. Chinese Military Relations in the Twenty-First Century," 3.

⁸³ Kremenak, *Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours, and Dead Ends*. 58.

⁸⁴ Nicholas Berry, "China Is Not an Imperialist Power," *Strategic Review*, (Winter 2001).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 4.

⁸⁶ On April 1, 2001 a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter and the American plane had to do an emergency landing on Hainan Island. The Chinese officials detained the U.S. servicemen for eleven days and the damaged plane remains on the Chinese airfield.

pressure against U.S. bases in the region, especially in Korea.”⁸⁷ The dissatisfaction of the Japanese in Okinawa, with 47,000 troops in the area, have a similar effect.

Japan

“The most unfortunate victim of the new geopolitics is undoubtedly Japan--which is ironic, given that it is the economic giant of Asia.”⁸⁸ They share the security and stability objectives of the other powers; however, they are in an awkward position given Korea’s colonial past.⁸⁹ Japan has the economic resources to assist unification, but along with resources may come influence. Both Koreans and Chinese do not want significant Japanese influence to return to the peninsula or the Asian mainland. Japan has a strong defense alliance with the U.S., and the Japanese Defense Forces enjoy considerable defense expenditures.⁹⁰ The biggest security issue for Japan is the WMD threat to her major cities. Stability concerns include the prospect of more open trading partners, economic growth and stability throughout the region, and natural resource trade which is so vital for the island nation’s survival and prosperity.⁹¹

Russia

The end of the former Soviet Union (and its Warsaw Pact) brought the end of the Cold War. The economic collapse of the Russian federation and its slow recovery make Russia’s immediate future uncertain. Russia’s regional influence has been marginalized in that they were not invited to the Four Party talks (consisting of China, the U.S., ROK and DPRK). They also are

⁸⁷ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia." 108.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 109.

⁸⁹ Korea became a Protectorate of the Japanese Empire in 1905 and was colonized by Japan in 1910. See Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas : A Contemporary History*.

⁹⁰ Binnendijk and Kigler, eds. *Strategic Assessment 1999*. 131.

⁹¹ See Armacost and Pyle, *Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for US Policy Coordination* (accessed 2001).

not part of the KEDO and therefore receive no benefit of Russian reactors being constructed in North Korea or credit for having contributed to ameliorating North Korea's energy emergency.⁹²

Russia can benefit from a relationship with a unified Korea based on access to warm water ports, the potential economic development from trans-Siberian resource extraction, and a Korean peninsula rail system linking all of Northeast Asia. "As North Korea's economy strengthens, its demand for Russian energy could also rise sharply."⁹³ Russian President Vladimir Putin's first state visit after taking office was to Pyongyang, and he has also made trips to Seoul and Beijing.⁹⁴

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

Following the Korean War, North Korea progressed more quickly than South Korea in political consolidation and economic reconstruction. Taking advantage of this semblance of self-sufficiency, "Kim Il Sung expounded the ideology of *Juche* (self reliance), which as applied to national unification, meant emphasizing efforts by Koreans themselves and removing foreign influences, including the United Nations and in particular the forces of the United States."⁹⁵ The *Juche* ideology includes national self-reliance in the international political scene, a self-defense capacity (clearly an issue of national security), and the independence of the national economy.⁹⁶

Inherent in the *Juche* ideology is faithlessness in and distrust of outside influences. President Kim Il Sung "had long repeated Pyongyang's demands for the withdrawal of U.S. troops [from South Korea] and an end to the anti-Communist confrontation policy of Seoul."⁹⁷

⁹² See Toloraya, *Korean Peninsula: Are There Things More Important, Than Peace?* (accessed 2001).

⁹³ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia," 107.

⁹⁴ Choi, *The Inter-Korea Summit: What Lies Beneath?* (accessed 2001).

⁹⁵ Kwak, Chong-Han, and Kim, eds. *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*. 3.

⁹⁶ Kremenak, *Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours, and Dead Ends*. 49

⁹⁷ Kwak, Chong-Han, and Kim, eds. *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*. 9.

North Korea has also had decades of official strategies for dealing with the ROK: use of force (1945-1953); peace offensive (1954-1961); revolutionary strategy (1962-1969); negotiation (1970-1979); confederation (1980-1989); and coexistence (1988 to present).⁹⁸ In addition to dealing with the ROK, the DPRK has also aroused the world community with its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.⁹⁹

After accession to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 and finally agreeing to safeguard inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992, the DPRK declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT effective June 12, 1993 (only to suspend withdrawal on June 10, 1993).¹⁰⁰ The discovery of a major underground facility at Kumchang-ri caused havoc in the region when a nuclear production and reprocessing capability was suspected. An on-site inspection of the facility in May 1999 revealed nothing.¹⁰¹

The DPRK's "Great Leader," Kim Il Sung died of a heart attack in July 1994 (though he still maintains his titular status as "Head of State"). His son, "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il assumed power as Chairman of the North Korean Defense Committee--the *de facto* top position in the country.¹⁰² The 1997 defection of North Korea's Hwang Jong Yop, who was the principle author of Kim Il Sung's *Juche* ideology, appeared to indicate that the Kim Jong Il regime was in

⁹⁸ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 32.

⁹⁹ Hideshi Takesada, "The North Korean Military Threat under Kim Jong Il," in *North Korea after Kim Il Sung: Continuity or Change?*, ed. Thomas H. Henriksen (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).

¹⁰⁰ Doug Bandow, "Nuclear Issues between the United States and North Korea," in *North Korea after Kim Il Sung*, ed. Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 124-5.

¹⁰¹ Doug Struck, *North Korea's Kim Sheds Madman Image* [Internet] (Washington Post, 26 Oct 2000, accessed 1/6/2001); available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/oct2000/e20001026sheds.htm>.

¹⁰² B.C. Koh, "Recent Political Developments in North Korea," in *North Korea after Kim Il Sung: Continuity or Change?*, ed. Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo (Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1997). 3.

jeopardy.¹⁰³ Four years later (in 2001) Kim Jong Il remains firmly in control without an apparent challenger.¹⁰⁴

Kim Jong Il has stated that his power comes from the military, though his consolidation of power seems complete in the Communist Party, the state, and the military.¹⁰⁵ The North Korean military is formidable and its principle military objectives are five:

- (1) Maintain the military capabilities needed to achieve strategic and operational surprise in wartime and to sustain strategic momentum so that breakthrough operations can be successfully concluded before the arrival of major U.S. reinforcements.
- (2) Utilize massive firepower against CFC forces through its artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles.
- (3) Isolate Seoul and capture all air and naval facilities capable of supporting U.S. reinforcements and resupply efforts.
- (4) Neutralize ROK and U.S. air power.
- (5) Foster widespread internal confusion and panic in the South, thereby creating domestic pressures in the ROK for a settlement on terms advantageous to the DPRK.¹⁰⁶

North Korea can no longer present itself as an alternative model for unification. Simple national survival is a goal--politically, economically, and ideologically.¹⁰⁷ Since the June 2000 summit between the Presidents, the defense secretaries also met and the DPRK is seeking more normal diplomatic relations with several European Union countries. "North Korea accepted Belgium's proposal that it appoint its ambassador to South Korea to concurrently serve as top envoy to the North. The Netherlands and the North, which normalized relations earlier agreed that

¹⁰³ Kremenak, *Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours, and Dead Ends*. 1.

¹⁰⁴ See Barber, "Powell Wants North Korea to Reduce Million-Man Army."

¹⁰⁵ Dae-Sook Suh, "Kim John Il and New Leadership in North Korea," in *North Korea after Kim Il Sung*, ed. Chae-Jin Lee (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 13 and Yong-bae Shin, "North Korea Sending Messages of Opening, Reform to U.S.," *Korea Herald*, 23 January 2001.

¹⁰⁶ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 67-68.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* xii.

the Dutch ambassador to South Korea will be accredited to both Koreas.”¹⁰⁸ North Korea has also established normal relations with Italy and Australia.¹⁰⁹ Whether this signals an extensive deception campaign or a legitimate effort to opening and reform is yet to be seen. Kim Jong-II could claim to be continuing the vision of his father or confronting the practical reality that continued isolation will not remedy the country’s current plight--no matter how noble the *Juche* ideology.¹¹⁰

Republic of Korea

South Korea was slow to recover internally from the devastation of the war, and military governments controlled the country until the late 1980s. Following a coup, President Park Chung Hee ruled from 1961 until his assassination in 1979. General Chun Doo Hwan (1981-1988) seized power and filled his government with political cronies, including his hand-picked successor, Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992) who served until the popular election in 1993 of President Kim Young Sam. (1993-1997).¹¹¹

The ROK elections of December 1997 brought Kim Dae Jung to the presidency in the first *peaceful* transition of power from the ruling party to an opposition party. Ironically, in 1973, North Korea used the arrest of Kim Dae Jung, then a South Korean opposition leader, as an excuse for breaking off unification talks.¹¹² President Chun Doo Hwan put Kim Dae Jung on trial for treason in connection with a bloody revolt in Kwangju in May 1980. After having been

¹⁰⁸ Unattributed, "Pyongyang Accepts Belgium's Offer for Twin Mission to South, N. Korea," *Korea Herald*, 18 January 2001.

¹⁰⁹ Taylor, *North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads* (accessed 2001).

¹¹⁰ Toloraya, *Korean Peninsula: Are There Things More Important, Than Peace?* (accessed 2001).

¹¹¹ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas : A Contemporary History*. and Kwak, Chong-Han, and Kim, eds. *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*.

¹¹² *Ibid.* 6-8.

sentenced to death, Kim Dae Jung was permitted in 1982 to leave for asylum in the United States, from which he returned with guarantees for his safety in 1985.¹¹³

It was in the turbulent 1980s, as South Korea yielded to an uneasy democracy movement, that the fortunes of Kim Dae Jung and another man, Lim Dong Won, began to improve and intertwine. "Lim Dong Won, director-general of the National Intelligence Service, secretly engineered the June 2000 meeting with Kim Jong Il and continues to manage the tortuous process of rapprochement with the North. He is indisputably the point man for President Kim Dae Jung's 'sunshine policy' of reconciliation."¹¹⁴ Lim Dong Won emerged in 1988 as deputy chief of the unification board under Roh Tae Woo and he espoused the soft line that drew him to Kim Dae Jung. Lim Dong Won visited Pyongyang in 1991 and 1992 for negotiations on the "Basic Agreement" achieved between the North and the South.¹¹⁵ At the same time, he inspired the enmity of the South Korean intelligence service when the North Koreans set up a meeting between Mr. Lim and his long-lost sister who had remained in the North.¹¹⁶

Since his inauguration in 1998, President Kim Dae Jung has worked three areas with regard to unification. (1) No toleration of armed provocation of any kind. (2) No intention to harm or absorb North Korea. (3) Actively pushing reconciliation and cooperation between the South and North beginning with those areas which can be most easily agreed upon.¹¹⁷ The principle objectives of security and stability were to separate politics from economics (emphasizing private enterprise), and increase contacts and visits. Kim Dae Jung also articulated

¹¹³ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas : A Contemporary History*.

¹¹⁴ Don Kirk, "The South Korean Spy Chief Who Paved the Way for Thaw with North," *International Herald Tribune*, 31 January 2001. 1.

¹¹⁵ This dialog and negotiations led to the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North--the Basic Agreement. See Young Kyu Park, "Post-Unification Challenges," in *Korea Unification: Implications for Northeast Asia*, ed. Amos A. Jordan (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993). 35.

¹¹⁶ Kirk, "The South Korean Spy Chief Who Paved the Way for Thaw with North." 2.

¹¹⁷ Kim, *Inaugural Address by Kim Dae-Jung, the 15th-Term President of the Republic of Korea*.

four principles of cooperation: (1) work toward providing economic assistance to DPRK; (2) End the Cold War confrontation on the peninsula and create a lasting peace; (3) reunite separated families, and (4) exchange special envoys with Pyongyang and prepare for a summit with Kim Jong Il.¹¹⁸ Kim Dae Jung was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 for his efforts as he “simultaneously enticed the North out of isolation, reassured Japan, and stimulated Russian interest in mutually beneficial contracts in trade, transportation, and energy.”¹¹⁹

The South Koreans have shown great courage and patience in dealing with Chairman Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang and by reducing some posturing and hard-line stands, they are merely allowing what they see as inevitable--the eventual collapse of the DPRK.¹²⁰ The last thing that South Korea wants is to have to replay the German model of absorption of East Germany by West Germany. South Korea has made substantial progress in democracy and economic growth, but they are no where near as large an economic force as West Germany was in 1990. East Germany also had a population about one quarter that of West Germany whereas North Korea is fully half the population of South Korea.¹²¹ A similar, rapid decline in North Korea would absolutely cripple South Korea without substantial economic aid from abroad (especially from those countries who can afford it most--the U.S. and Japan).¹²²

Long Range Missile Threat

With security and stability being the objectives of the strategy, two interrelated issues effect security more than any other. The first issue is production and reprocessing of fissile material (for possible use in nuclear weapons), and the other is missile delivery systems capable

¹¹⁸ Albert J. Jr. McCarn, *Why Is the Korean Summit Such a Big Deal?* [Internet] (CALL, 2000, accessed 17 March 2001); available from <http://call.army.mil/call/trngqtr/tq4-00/mccarn.htm>. 3.

¹¹⁹ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia." 107.

¹²⁰ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*.

¹²¹ Schmidt, *The Lessons of the German Unification Process for Korea*.

¹²² Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 23-4.

of destabilizing the region (beyond the artillery and rocket systems on the peninsula). Both of these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issues are serious because they have been North Korea's bargaining chips in their brinkmanship diplomacy, and they have been a source of hard currency through sales to Iran and Pakistan.¹²³

The North Korean Nodong mobile missile has a 1300-kilometer range and "is viewed as a credible terror weapon against large cities in Japan . . . the principal North Korean missile threat to Japan despite possible problems with its accuracy."¹²⁴ This is not DPRK's most advanced system. In August 1998, North Korea tested the Taepodong I missile, which has a range of [2000]-kilometers, over Japanese airspace.¹²⁵ During the March 2001 visit to Washington, Kim Dae Jung said, "The United States should demand that Pyongyang strictly adhere to the 1994 agreement ending the north's nuclear program, a 'complete resolution' of the missile development and export problem, and a guarantee that it will not engage in aggression."¹²⁶

China has been producing the Dong Feng 11 and deploying them in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions, which face the Taiwan Strait.¹²⁷ The Dong Feng 31 is a solid fuel, road mobile 8000-kilometer range missile capable of hitting multiple locations in Asia including U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea, and China is also importing the SSN-22 supersonic cruise missile, called the Russian *Sunburn*, for its 24 new Sovremenny-class destroyers.¹²⁸ For China, once again, the issue of Taiwan comes to the fore based on the U.S. response to the missile issue.

The U.S. response, a presidential campaign issue for George W. Bush, is the continued development and eventual deployment of missile defense systems--both National Missile Defense

¹²³ Bandow, "Nuclear Issues between the United States and North Korea," and Natisios, *The Politics of Famine in North Korea* (accessed 2001).

¹²⁴ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia." 115.

¹²⁵ Ibid. Calder erroneously lists the Taepodong Missile's range as 8000 kilometers.

¹²⁶ Mufson, "Bush Casts a Shadow on Korean Missile Talks." The 1994 agreement is the "Agreed Framework on the Nuclear Issue" between the DPRK and U.S.

¹²⁷ Wortzel, "U.S. Chinese Military Relations in the Twenty-First Century." 3.

¹²⁸ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia." 114.

(NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD).¹²⁹ This has significant impact on every country in the region except South Korea--they are already severely threatened by North Korea's shorter-range delivery systems (artillery, rockets, and missiles capable of delivering chemicals *and potentially low yield nuclear devices*).¹³⁰ Presidents Kim and Bush settled a controversy over Seoul's support for the ABM Treaty (expressed in a joint letter with Russia's President Putin), but observers said that "the NMD issue may come up again as a thorny problem between the two sides because of the South Korean government's ambiguous stance."¹³¹

Russia has concerns about the 30 year old Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (signed while the USSR) which prohibits NMD. "Russia reaffirmed its strong opposition to the United States' plan to create a National Defense Missile (NMD) system, saying it poses a threat to global security."¹³² Japan is obviously an advocate for TMD because of their vulnerability (witness the 1998 DPRK missile test), and China is against TMD because of its implications for Taiwan. According to a South Korean official, "The NMD basically targets China. There is a high possibility that the Bush administration will adjust its North Korea policy in the context of its policy on China, leaving little say for Korea."¹³³

America's Founding Fathers were brilliant, foresighted men. It rings true today when Alexander Hamilton wrote, "Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and

¹²⁹ Yong-bae Shin, *Korea Plans to Set out NMD Stance before Kim Embarks on U.S. Visit* [Internet] (Korea Herald, 2001, accessed 1 March 2001); available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Mar2001/e20010301korea.htm>.

¹³⁰ Patrick E. Tyler, *South Korea Takes Russia's Side in Dispute over U.S. Missile Defense Plan* [Internet] (New York Times, 2001, accessed 28 February 2001); available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2001/e20010228south.htm>.

¹³¹ Key-young Son, "Seoul Offers Conditional Nod on NMD," *Korea Times*, 9 March 2001. 2.

¹³² Yong-bae Shin, "Russian Envoy Reaffirms Opposition to NMD," *Korea Herald*, 18 January 2001.

¹³³ Unattributed, "Seoul Remains Concerned About NMD," *Korea Times*, 29 January 2001. 1.

perfect virtue?"¹³⁴ Though common objectives of security and stability seem to apply throughout Northeast Asia, peaceful Korean unification may yet remain elusive.

ANALYSIS

Instruments of National Power

Diplomatic

The Korean unification issue has resembled a diplomatic whirlwind from middle of 1999 to the beginnings of 2001. President Clinton sent former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, as a special envoy to North Korea in 1999 to conduct an assessment.¹³⁵ President Putin went to Pyongyang as his first official visit abroad in 2000.¹³⁶ Chairman Kim Jung Il (secretly) visited Beijing weeks before his June 2000 summit with President Kim Dae Jung in Pyongyang.¹³⁷ Kim Jung Il then went to Shanghai and promised a visit to Seoul (eventually).¹³⁸ North Korea's first Vice Chairman came to Washington and Secretary of State Madeline Albright traveled to Pyongyang.¹³⁹ Finally, ROK President Kim Dae Jung met with President Bush in Washington in March 2001.¹⁴⁰

An important consideration in the area of diplomacy is the level at which the diplomacy is carried out. The official structured diplomacy--track one--"is traditionally employed in dealing with an aggressive adversary. Government leaders feel compelled to adopt firm stands to protect

¹³⁴ Alexander Hamilton and others, *The Federalist Papers: A Collection of Essays Written in Support of the Constitution of the United States: From the Original Text of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). No. 6. 26.

¹³⁵ Congressional Record, *2000 Report to Congress Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula* [Internet] (12 September 2000, accessed 3 March 2001); available from <http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/us/korea09122000.html>.

¹³⁶ Don Kirk, *Putin in Korea: A Mix of Trade and Politics* [Internet] (New York Times, 2001, accessed 1 March 2001); available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2001/e20010226politics.htm>.

¹³⁷ McCarn, *Why Is the Korean Summit Such a Big Deal?* (accessed 2001).

¹³⁸ Young-jin Oh, "Kim Notes NK Aspiring to Be '2nd China'," *Korea Times*, 18 January 2001.

¹³⁹ Taylor, *North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads* (accessed 2001).

¹⁴⁰ Mufson, "Seoul's Kim Presses for U.S. Role."

the country's interests."¹⁴¹ Track two consists in the preparatory discussions, "unstructured and unofficial, based on best case analysis" which is necessary to build confidence when "distrust, fear, hatred, suspicion and misunderstanding . . . is too deeply ingrained to warrant any meaningful confrontation at the official track one level."¹⁴²

According to Stephen Mufson, one of the reasons the Bush administration has stated "there is no hurry" in opening relations with the DPRK leadership (or even continuing the pace of the Clinton diplomatic efforts) is the malleable foundation upon which the high level talks were continuing.¹⁴³ The reciprocity and transparency of the DPRK commitments are dubious; however, as Russian foreign policy expert Georgi Toloraya expressed, "Reciprocity yes, but softly and carefully in conversations among diplomats-not tough posturing with headlines in the news."¹⁴⁴

Some of the reasons for a "less hurried" approach include the fact that verification mechanisms, confidence building measures, and follow through (on the 1991 Basic Agreement, the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 1997 IAEA inspection, and even the Four Party Talks) have been left wanting.¹⁴⁵ The change of U.S. administrations (and policy) can have significant impact. "The apparent confusion over [U.S.] message [during Kim Dae Jung's visit] could have real consequences in places like the Korean Peninsula, especially with regional powers like China, Japan and South Korea all seeking clues to the new president's thinking."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Manwoo Lee, "Korean Unification: Combining Two Track Diplomacy," in *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*, ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1984). 345-348.

¹⁴² Ibid. 348-350.

¹⁴³ Mufson, "Bush Casts a Shadow on Korean Missile Talks."

¹⁴⁴ Toloraya, *Korean Peninsula: Are There Things More Important, Than Peace?* (accessed 2001).

¹⁴⁵ Slavin, "Mixed Signals on N. Korea May Indicate Cabinet Rift."

¹⁴⁶ David R. Sands, "Mixed Signals Sent on Evolving Bush Foreign Policy," *Washington Times*, 9 March 2001.

Even with the long-standing alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea, it is necessary to conduct alliance management at both the political and military levels. Alliance management is even more important now that a way has opened for a peaceful conclusion.¹⁴⁷ According to William Taylor, North Korea passed the main crossroads (perhaps out of necessity) and they chose the right direction when they warmed up to Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine policy, held the North-South Summit in Pyongyang in June 2000, and entered the ongoing process of North-South dialogue and rapid normalization of relations with nations around the world.¹⁴⁸ "The correct U.S. foreign policy construct now is not another crossroads where Pyongyang just might take the wrong direction by miscalculation or by accident. Rather, the approach should be to remove obstacles from the road already chosen."¹⁴⁹

Economic

The objectives of security and stability are certainly outcomes to promote interests in economic prosperity. The havoc caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed the fragility of Asian markets. The South Korean economy, after so much success and growth since the late 1980s, was in crisis based on the structure of the economy. The *chaebols*, highly leveraged and diversified industrial groups which sought more market share than profit, grew too big and suffered from poor corporate management. The *chaebols* accounted for ninety percent of the ROK GDP and between November 1997 and May 1998, seven of the top thirty failed along with 3000 company bankruptcies per month. Once the world's eleventh-largest economy, the ROK accepted a \$57 billion assistance package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1998,

¹⁴⁷ Trudy Rubin, "George W. Should Expedite Korean Talks," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 9 March 2001.

¹⁴⁸ Taylor, *North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads* (accessed 2001).

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

combined foreign and domestic currency debt was \$730 billion (twice the size of the 1997 GDP) and unemployment quintupled to nearly eight percent.¹⁵⁰

The financial crisis also affected military modernization and operations. The ROK and Japan both cancelled or delayed planned procurements and reduced exercises which were critical for maintaining operational readiness. In fact the ROK defense budget which had increased every year of its existence (over five percent per year for the past decade) was decreased 0.4% in 2000 for the first time ever.¹⁵¹ Japan's economic worries complicated the legislation of the Revised Defense Cooperation Guidelines--except for a commitment to TMD based on DPRK nuclear and missile programs. The result of the delayed modernization in regional militaries (except China which continues increased defense spending) is that the ROK and Japan will not be able to make up the difference in capability without continued bilateral alliances with the U.S.¹⁵²

The real economic issue effecting unification is the decline of North Korea's economy. With a contracting economy (due in large part to the significant decline in trade with China and Russia, or the new demand for hard currency to continue trade) and North Korea's inability to realistically practice their *Juche* ideology only and reverse the downward trend, reform and opening appear imperative.¹⁵³ Kim Jong Il told Chinese leaders he wanted to build a city in North Korea modeled on booming Shanghai.¹⁵⁴ Kim Jong Il toured the Shanghai stock exchange, General Motors' \$1.5 billion Buick factory and the NEC Corps \$1.2 billion semiconductor factory--then praised China's system of freeing markets while maintaining political control through the Communist Party.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Binnendijk and Kigler, eds. *Strategic Assessment 1999*. 124-125.

¹⁵¹ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 22.

¹⁵² Binnendijk and Kigler, eds. *Strategic Assessment 1999*. 130.

¹⁵³ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 9.

¹⁵⁴ Associated Press, "North Korea Leader Vows to Visit South," *Chicago Tribune*, 27 January 2001. 2.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 2.

President Kim Dae Jung said that “North Korea is trying to be the ‘second China’ emulating the giant neighbor’s reform and openness policy that has helped it become the world’s economic success story.”¹⁵⁶ He went on to say that “If North Korea agrees, then the United States and South Korea should guarantee its security, provide economic assistance and help North Korea secure loans from international lending institutions.”¹⁵⁷ The contributions of private corporations and institutions should continue in parallel with the track two diplomatic efforts.

Informational and Political

For a strategy that may involve the U.S. Army in peaceful unification, the information campaign is a critical component. The most important information means in the strategy is viewing and portraying the security and stability ends in the context of the region (all of Northeast Asia).¹⁵⁸ This monograph has exposed the fact that viewing Korean unification from the myopic perspective of the peninsula alone is to neglect the larger issues of history and context among the major powers. “After unification, consideration will have to be given to the interwoven nature of the U.S.-Korean alliance with those of a host of other bilateral relations (a unified Korea-China; U.S.-China; U.S.-Japan; unified Korea-Japan).”¹⁵⁹

Based on the model of Switzerland and Austria, In K. Hwang proposed the idea of Korean unification via permanent neutrality. He argued that once Pyongyang realizes that it cannot dictate terms of unification to Seoul because of the shifting balance of power in Seoul’s

¹⁵⁶ Oh, "Kim Notes NK Aspiring to Be '2nd China'."

¹⁵⁷ Struck, *North Korea's Kim Sheds Madman Image* (accessed 2001).

¹⁵⁸ See Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia." 106.

¹⁵⁹ Thomas H. Buchanan, "The Coming Decade of Change on the Korean Peninsula: Implications for Northeast Asia and the United States," *East Asia International Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (1999). 9.

favor economically and politically, North Korea may consider a negotiated settlement.¹⁶⁰ The problem with such a proposal is that the Westphalian balance of power notion (as understood in the west since 1648) applies differently in Asia due to cultural differences. The Confucian notion of power is not about balance, but senior to subordinate, father to son, and elder to younger. In the realm of nation-states, there are similar relationships in spite of ideology.¹⁶¹

The strategy this paper has proposed includes security and stability (which are common objectives for all the states). However, the one core objective of the U.S. National Security Strategy intentionally missing is the need to introduce democracy in a missionary style to change North Korea from within.¹⁶² “Such an attempt would really be based on a dreaming inability to grasp the nature of North Korea as a sort of cult-state, governed by ideology where the concepts that are acquired by a Western man are completely alien.”¹⁶³ Georgi Toloraya claims that many myths prevail in the Western (and South Korean) perception of North Korea. “The gap is actually much wider than most Western analysts think, and the testament to it is the fact that North Korea is regarded as an ‘unpredictable’ country, which equals being dangerous.”¹⁶⁴

Rhetoric and propaganda remain important in international relations.

North Korea is not happy with Secretary of State Colin Powell for calling Kim Jong-Il a dictator. We cannot but interpret this as reflecting the sinister intention of big-war industrial monopolies and other conservative hard-liners in the U.S. to keep U.S.-DPRK relations hostile and belligerent forever. If the U.S. brandishes a sword at us, we will counter with a sword and if it shows good faith, we will reciprocate.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ In Kwan Hwang, “A Quest for Korean Unification Via Permanent Neutrality,” in *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*, ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1984). 393.

¹⁶¹ Grinkler, *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War*. 102.

¹⁶² The U.S. National Security Strategy lists enhancing security, promoting prosperity (stability), and promoting democracy as core objectives. House, *National Security Strategy*.

¹⁶³ Toloraya, *Korean Peninsula: Are There Things More Important, Than Peace?* (accessed 2001).

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Holger Jensen, "North Korea Angry at Powell for Calling Leader 'Dictator'," *Denver Rocky Mountain News*, 28 January 2001. 1.

Particularly as new relationships develop, old animosities die hard. “North Korea's latest diplomatic offensive is part of its circumventing strategy designed to weaken the new U.S. administration's hard-line stance toward Pyongyang. The North seems to be in a hurry to establish diplomatic ties with more Western nations at an early date because of uncertainty over its future relations with Washington.”¹⁶⁶ The North is sending a message to the United States that it would push for openness and reform by showing its eagerness to improve relations with foreign nations. As Kim Jong Il negotiates from a point of weakness (without his nuclear program or missiles) he will continue to look for opportunities to portray North Korea as the victim of the major powers.¹⁶⁷

Finally, information operations should address the particular audiences with the appropriate message. On the peninsula, the ROK-U.S. alliance should stand during transition to a unified Korea.¹⁶⁸ North Koreans and South Koreans should be reminded that as unified Koreans they have regional vulnerabilities.¹⁶⁹ During the North-South summit in Pyongyang, Kim Dae Jung remarked that a U.S. withdrawal “would create a huge vacuum that would draw these big countries into a fight over hegemony,” Kim Jong Il reportedly replied, “Yes, we are surrounded by big powers-Russia, China, and Japan--and so therefore it is desirable that the American troops continue to stay.”¹⁷⁰

Military

In addressing possible commitments (or intentions to use the instruments of power), this

¹⁶⁶ Shin, "North Korea Sending Messages of Opening, Reform to U.S."

¹⁶⁷ Koh, "North Korean Policy toward the United States."

¹⁶⁸ McCarn, *Why Is the Korean Summit Such a Big Deal?* (accessed 2001).

¹⁶⁹ Park, "Post-Unification Challenges," and Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*.

¹⁷⁰ Nayan Chanda, "G.I. Joe, Meet Kim Jong Il," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 163, no. 40 (2000). See also Barber, "Powell Wants North Korea to Reduce Million-Man Army."

monograph has addressed the question: If the desirable conditions attain and unification proceeds, does the U.S. Army have a role in Korean unification? The U.S. Army in peaceful unification is the employment of the military instrument of power. However, what could the Army do if it was not engaged in (or preparing for) combat? The challenge for defense planning and strategy formulation is the shift from “deter and defend” to more unconventional scenarios with major deviations from the familiar outlines. To answer the secondary questions, peacetime military engagement, stability operations, and conflict termination are discussed. The definition of these terms are followed by an analysis of the U.S. Army as a means to execute the strategy. The military means includes the size, composition and location of the U.S. forces, the command arrangements (assuming that alliance management may include modification of the CFC), demobilization of North Korea, and dismantling WMD facilities and stores.

Peacetime Military Engagement

Peacetime military engagement (PME) “elevates to mission status the role that U.S. armed forces play in shaping an international environment that promotes and protects U.S. national security interests.”¹⁷¹ The Army in particular contributes to promoting regional stability, reducing potential conflicts and threats, and deterring aggression and coercion through overseas presence and engagement with foreign militaries, governments and people. It includes programs and exercises conducted with other nations in order to shape the international environment, open communication, improve mutual understanding and interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners, and demonstrate by example the role of the military in a democracy.

¹⁷¹ Department of the Army Headquarters, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0. Operations (DRAG Edition)* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000). 1-4.

These activities are proactive and take advantage of opportunities to shape the security environment in favor of U.S. national interests.¹⁷²

In the peaceful unification scenarios, PME should be the dominant role for the Army if military means are employed. The military means are only part of the policy (which includes the pattern of actions to employ all the instruments of power) to achieve the ends of the strategy-- security and stability *in the Northeast Asia region*. The strategy must be holistic for the region, since a strategy focused only on the peninsula is problematic because of the larger regional, historical issues. The size of force is less significant than the fact that presence and engagement continues. The force with a role in unification need be no larger than the force currently in South Korea for the deterrence and defense mission.¹⁷³

The composition of the force for PME activities needs to have capabilities that allow it accomplish its potential missions--in proportion to the types of military actions (offense, defense, stability, and support).¹⁷⁴ The alliance management activities discussed as a part of the diplomatic instrument of power also apply to the military. The continued existence of the United Nations Command will be an issue for that body. Both North and South Korea were admitted to the UN in 1991 and a unified Korea would also benefit from UN membership.¹⁷⁵ The U.S. forces of the Combined Forces Command should remain on the peninsula with a relationship (military alliance) with the unified Korean armed forces. The location of those forces should be consolidated into a smaller number of installations and not relocated into what is now North Korea (based upon the force reductions model in Europe--forward presence maintained on fewer

¹⁷² Ibid. 9-1.

¹⁷³ Jim Garamone, *No US Troop Reduction Planned in Korea* [Internet] (American Forces Press Service, 2000, accessed 17 November 2000); available from http://www.af.mil/news/Jun2000/n20000619_000925.html.

¹⁷⁴ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 1-15.

¹⁷⁵ Ki Jung Kim, "Possibility of Multi-National Forces Dispatched and Foreign Policy Implication for South Korea in Times of North Korea Collapse," *Strategic Studies*, (1999). The author argues against multinational peacekeeping forces, but support multinational affiliation.

kasernes only in the former Federal Republic of Germany).¹⁷⁶ Reciprocal military-to-military contact is the primary method of executing PME. PME activities are stability operations, but they use only cooperative actions to accomplish objectives.¹⁷⁷

Stability Operations

According to Army doctrine, full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. “Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the diplomatic, civil, and military environments. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable environment.”¹⁷⁸ The use of military means to conduct stability operations would mean employment of Army forces in unified action (integrated joint, single-service, special and support operations with interagency, non governmental, and international operations).¹⁷⁹ The consequence of unified action in stability operations for a peaceful unification scenario is that the U.S. Army will likely have a small role in the overall effort--compared to the role of ROK Army forces and non-military organizations (government and private).¹⁸⁰

The size, composition, and location of the U.S. Army forces would be the same as those advocated for Peacetime Military Engagement. The potential types of stability operations could include: peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, combating terrorism, and arms control.¹⁸¹ However, the demobilization of North Korea, peace operations, and humanitarian and civic assistance operations are potentially much

¹⁷⁶ Schmidt, *The Lessons of the German Unification Process for Korea*.

¹⁷⁷ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 9-3

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 1-15.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 2-1.

¹⁸⁰ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*.

¹⁸¹ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 9-1.

larger than the small U.S. Army force could handle. U.S. headquarters could assist in planning and resourcing such operations, but they would be best executed by the much larger and fully capable ROK Army and other government agencies. The U.S. experience in unified action (particularly in interagency and non-governmental organization (NGO) coordination) could assist the Koreans but should not supplant them. The most crucial issue for security and stability would be the dismantling of WMD facilities and stores, and the arms control regimes for counterproliferation.¹⁸² U.S. Special Operations forces traditionally have that mission and the U.S. Army may have a supporting function for this acute challenge.

Conflict Termination

Conflict termination (or perhaps “not-peace, not-conflict” termination) will have some unique challenges as unification brings full peace. Two concepts (war termination and exit strategy) have some relevance, but neither adequately addresses the potential issues on the Korean peninsula. If the conflict scenario were to occur and major hostilities were to resume, war termination would literally mean the “end of the fighting,” and the victor could dictate the terms of the peace to the vanquished. Once the fighting stopped, there would likely be peace operations and humanitarian assistance activities which immediately followed. The exit strategy would be the criteria (a time limit or set of circumstances) that would allow forces to disengage and redeploy.¹⁸³

However, in the peaceful unification scenarios, the (major) fighting ended in 1953 and there will be no “dictating of terms” for the peace. Likewise, this monograph proposes a continued U.S. military presence in the region (for security and stability in Northeast Asia as well

¹⁸² Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 95.

¹⁸³ Kevin Benson and Christopher Trash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," *Parameters* XXVI, no. 3 (1996).

as the Korean peninsula), so an exit strategy has little meaning since forces will continue with Peacetime Military Engagement activities--even as Korean forces unify their nation and country. This is not to suggest that the planning that has taken place for “post-hostilities” in the conflict scenario was wasted effort. Some of the tasks, issues and concerns will be the same, but the conditions will be different. These differences could be positive (dramatically better relations, infrastructure still intact, little (or no) loss of life and property, and cooperative former belligerents). There could also be latent animosity among those (North Koreans) who feel that they “lost” without having had the opportunity to fulfill their ideological destiny. Many of the disaffected could be current and former soldiers with lots of ammunition, a loss of respect for their “defeated” leaders, and little hope of supporting a future alongside a million other “out of work” nKPA soldiers. “From the beginning, the two Koreas have pursued mutually exclusive unification policies . . . the aim of North Korea has been to bring about a united Korea under its control, South Korea has pursued a policy of unification that would deny the possibility of a united Korea under Communism.”¹⁸⁴ It seems clear that the united Korea will not be a Communist state, how quickly this happens could determine the size of the “conflict termination” challenge.

CONCLUSIONS

When Secretary of State, Madeline K. Albright returned from her trip to North Korea, President Clinton’s advisors narrowly dissuaded him from travelling to Pyongyang himself.¹⁸⁵ With the swearing in of the George W. Bush administration, there was some confusion as to whether the “gains” produced in the U.S.-DPRK relationship would continue where they left off, or take a new (more cautious, even distrustful) course. The Bush administration stated it was

¹⁸⁴ Kwak, Chong-Han, and Kim, eds. *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*. 3.

¹⁸⁵ Larry M. Wortzel, "North Korea: Too Much, Too Soon," *Miami Herald*, 27 October 2000.

“conducting a full review of the issues and the area,”¹⁸⁶ before establishing a policy, but was tentatively supportive of Kim Dae Jung’s sunshine policy. However, “there is no hurry” in opening relations with the DPRK leadership.¹⁸⁷

The speculation that the more tentative approach by the Bush team stems from two principle sources. First, the DPRK regime of Kim Jong Il has a history of negotiating through uncertainty and tacit threats. An example would be the launch (test firing) of the Taepodong I missile over Japanese airspace to broker food aid and energy needs (in spite of the 1994 Framework Agreement).¹⁸⁸ Second, the Bush administration and the Defense Department under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, have announced their commitment to National Missile Defense.¹⁸⁹ The threat posed by a potentially nuclear capable North Korea, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons from North Korea (to places like Iran and Pakistan) have provided urgency to the NMD program. Eliminating that “threat” could undermine the immediacy of the NMD and TMD programs.¹⁹⁰

The historical background of the Northeast Asia region, with particular regard to the Korean peninsula, and the complexity of the issues surrounding peaceful unification after half a century of partition inform the strategy. The developments of 1999 through 2001 made the issue of Korean unification more promising than ever.

The Pyongyang Summit with a reciprocal visit on the horizon; exchange visits of separated families; acceleration of South Korean and other foreign investments in the North; a U.S. Secretary of State in Pyongyang and a North Korean vice-marshal in Washington; an agreement to re-connect a North-South railroad and main highway; a moratorium on North Korean long-range missile testing while U.S.-DPRK missile talks continue; acceleration of North-South cultural exchanges; proposals for American educators to teach in North Korea; rapid North Korean normalization of relations with

¹⁸⁶ Slavin, "Mixed Signals on N. Korea May Indicate Cabinet Rift."

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Snyder, "Negotiating on the Edge: Patterns in North Korea's Diplomatic Style."

¹⁸⁹ Sung-min Chang, "Seoul's Resounding 'No' to NMD," *Korea Times*, 5 February 2001, and Son, "Seoul Offers Conditional Nod on NMD."

¹⁹⁰ Mufson, "Bush Casts a Shadow on Korean Missile Talks."

nations all over the world: all these changes, considered cumulatively, constitute positive change in North Korea's behavior.¹⁹¹

Developing a strategy to organize and connect the ends, ways, and means of all the instruments of power was the focus of this monograph. The sources of power as well as the geopolitics, ideologies, economics, and militaries of the states helped inform the strategy. Purpose, objectives, and interests represent the ends. The purpose is to promote national values of life, liberty, domestic order, welfare, and *security*. The interests are survival, territory, sovereignty, people, and *stability*. The objectives of the strategy are maintaining peace, security, and stability.

The policies and commitments represent the ways. The policy is the pattern of action to obtain the objectives. The Northeast Asia policy (including both Koreas and Korean unification) is a policy of engagement. The commitments (or intention to use the instruments of power) includes track one and track two diplomacy,¹⁹² national economic assistance as well as private investment,¹⁹³ an information campaign that views Korean unification in the historical context of Northeast Asia,¹⁹⁴ and a commitment to keep U.S. military forces forward deployed in the region to foster security and stability.¹⁹⁵

The programs which allocate resources represent the means--such as U.S. Army troops employed in Peacetime Military Engagement activities,¹⁹⁶ the U.S. contribution to KEDO,¹⁹⁷ and

¹⁹¹ Taylor, *North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads* (accessed 2001).

¹⁹² Lee, "Korean Unification: Combining Two Track Diplomacy."

¹⁹³ Binnendijk and Kigler, eds. *Strategic Assessment 1999*.

¹⁹⁴ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia."

¹⁹⁵ Andrea Stone, *US Troops Will Remain in South Korea* [Internet] (USA Today, 25 Oct 2000, accessed 30 December 2000); available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/oct2000/e20001025ustroops.htm>.

¹⁹⁶ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*.

¹⁹⁷ Don Kirk, *U.S. Doubts Rise on North Korean Deal to Build Nuclear Reactors* [Internet] (International Herald Tribune, 2001, accessed 1 March 2001); available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2001/e20010226doubts.htm>.

support of a Northeast Asia regional forum.¹⁹⁸ Particular attention was paid to the issue of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and emerging policy with the advent of a new U.S. Administration in 2001.¹⁹⁹

The Council on Foreign Relations submitted a report in 1998 advocating engagement with the DPRK. “Engagement to be useful and productive must be non-antagonistic, carried out with an open attitude, and generate and reflect reform policies.”²⁰⁰ The engagement and recent events discussed are not the first efforts towards unification, though they appear the most promising to date. In October 1980, Pyongyang made a proposal for establishing a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK).²⁰¹ ROK President Chun Doo Hwan proposed an exchange of visits between the top leaders of Seoul and Pyongyang in 1981. President Chun also proposed, in 1982, to adopt a constitution for a unified Korea by organizing a Consultative Conference for National Reunification (CCNR).²⁰² The difficulty in decision making for an engagement policy lies in the difference between linear projections (including post unification defense issues) versus the discontinuous path which requires flexibility and adaptability.²⁰³

United States regional arguments with China and Russia look comparable but hide a big dissimilarity. “To put it crudely, the Bush administration may be prepared to disagree with Russia because it thinks it hardly matters. It wants to confront China because it thinks it matters a lot. This difference could lead to a profound shift in the focus of American policy away from Russia, and by extension Europe, towards China, and by extension Asia.”²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁸ Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia."

¹⁹⁹ Son, "Seoul Offers Conditional Nod on NMD," and Rubin, "George W. Should Expedite Korean Talks."

²⁰⁰ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*. 6.

²⁰¹ Kwak, Chong-Han, and Kim, eds. *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches*. 9

²⁰² Kihl, "South Korea's Unification Policy in the 1980s." 28-33.

²⁰³ Pollack, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication*.

²⁰⁴ Taylor, *North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads* (accessed 2001).

North Korea's political system is based fundamentally on the *Juche* philosophy, a home-grown version of Marxism-Leninism which, buttressed by decades of anti-imperialist government disinformation focused primarily on Japan, the United States and South Korea, makes most leaders in Pyongyang very suspicious of U.S. diplomatic motives. Fundamental ideas die hard and slowly.

Even if North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and his senior confidants with access to the Western media and the internet are changing their minds, the military and civilian people who have to negotiate and implement policy remain locked in the mental concrete of *Juche*. All the North Korean agreements and negotiations referred to above have put an enormous strain on the North Korean government bureaucracy. Unlike their counterparts in Tokyo and Seoul, they simply do not have many thousands of people educated at western universities in such areas as free-market business and economics, in western contract law, or in the technicalities of arms control negotiations. The DPRK bureaucracy just can't 'handle the load' and it shows in terms of negotiating psychology as well as speed.²⁰⁵

Context is all important for any strategy to be valuable and potentially successful. However, there are no guarantees, and non-rational chance plays an equal role with rational policy and irrational violence and emotions. "History and culture are collective experiences which exist over decades and centuries, but historic decisions are made by individuals acting in the here and now."²⁰⁶ Historic decisions are not generally those which perpetuate the *status quo*. Memorable moments are made at the extremes--brilliant thrusts towards a brighter future and a better peace, or horrible abominations which are anathema to peace and stability. Both courses are possible in Northeast Asia, and Korean unification could be the issue for the next historic decision.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Kremenak, *Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours, and Dead Ends*. 75.

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