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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY FORCES IN AN ERA OF TERRORIST THREATS

BY

MICHAEL D. BEAN

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
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Disclaimer

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force has radically changed how it projects power to support National Security demands. Permanent overseas basing has decreased from fifty bases during the height of the Cold War to sixteen permanent bases in 1998. While the U.S. Air Force must still support national security objectives around the globe, it now must rely more upon temporary basing to augment the decreased permanent presence overseas. Temporary bases provide the commander with the ability to accomplish a given mission but can also increase vulnerability to terrorist attack. On June 25, 1996, one terrorist bomb, which killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, once again leveled the military playing field for our adversaries and the perception of U.S. power. The U.S. Air Force quickly realized that its Security Force was not adequately trained nor equipped to protect deployed assets from such attacks. This study examines the role of USAF Security in the present terrorist threat environment. An historical analysis of air base defense reveals that the Air Force has a short attention span for protection against ground threats. Following World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the Air Force quickly reduced security capabilities when the immediate threat diminished. As new threats materialized, the Air Force had to “reinvent the wheel” to produce a capability to counter that threat. The results of these actions are a lack of continuity and doctrine for security operations.

In an effort to maintain a balance between protection and mission accomplishment, four alternatives are presented in this paper. First, the surface dimension should be
included as the seventh core competency in Air Force doctrine. Next, training of security forces must stress the force protection mission. In an environment with an asymmetric threat, the main defense is the Security Forces on duty. Most ground support personnel have duties that are very technically demanding and should remain committed to their primary duties. The third alternative is to eliminate the Palace Tenure deployments of security personnel and replace them with dedicated units from the 820th Security Forces Group. Maintaining unit integrity will facilitate an effective, coordinated, and controlled security environment throughout the operation.

The final alternative is to exploit advances in technology that reduce the need for additional personnel to monitor activities beyond the perimeter of deployed locations. Security forces need the ability to detect and counter threats before they get to the perimeter fence line.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The terrorist threat to U.S. forces is real. Opponents of U.S. policy cannot engage the United States directly, but can employ terrorism to conduct strategic attacks against U.S. servicemen and women deployed in foreign countries.

GEN (Ret.) Wayne A. Downing

Scope of Research

During the Cold War, the United States Air Force categorized threats in terms of global nuclear attack and Soviet invasions of Western Europe. Forces were structured and money allocated to defend against Soviet Block aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and surface to air missiles. These efforts paid off in 1989 when the Soviet Union disintegrated and the United States became the sole military superpower. In the post-Cold War era, no other nation in the world can match the conventional military force that the U.S. Air Force can bring to bear upon its adversaries.

On June 25, 1996, a single terrorist bomb killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, once again leveling the military playing field for our adversaries and eroding the perception of U.S. power. The U.S. Air Force quickly realized that its Security Forces were not adequately trained nor equipped to protect deployed assets from such attacks. This study examines the role of USAF Security Forces to determine if the
U.S. Air Force has realistically conceptualized the role of its Security Forces in the present terrorist threat environment.

I will examine the current and near-term terrorist threats facing deployed forces, review historical accounts of base defense by U.S. forces, provide an overview of current security forces operations, and conclude with recommendations regarding how the Air Force can correct existing shortfalls in airbase defense. This study will not address the defense of permanent bases nor will it discuss countering threats from large scale conventional forces.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force has radically changed how it projects power to support National Security demands. Permanent overseas basing has decreased from fifty bases during the height of the Cold War to sixteen permanent bases in 1998.\(^1\) While the U.S. Air Force must still support national security objectives around the globe, it now must rely more upon temporary basing to augment the decreased permanent presence overseas. Temporary bases provide the commander with the ability to accomplish a given mission but can also increase vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

The practice of establishing temporary bases to support contingencies creates new vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Terrorists normally search for vulnerabilities and attack the weakest line of defense. The combination of a reduced base infrastructure, poor coordination with host nation intelligence assets, a lack of familiarity with the customs and geography of the surrounding area, and the rotation of Security Forces personnel into the theater creates numerous vulnerabilities that decrease the effectiveness of the Security Forces commander to protect deployed assets from terrorist attack. Air

Force commanders must evaluate how their Security Forces are trained, organized, and equipped to deter terrorist attacks on deployed forces or mitigate the effects of such attacks should they occur. It is their responsibility to use our nation’s resources, skills, and creativity to minimize the dangers of terrorist actions.²

**Methodology**

My analysis of this subject will begin in Chapter 2 with an overview of international terrorism. This chapter will concentrate on U.S. State Department documents that define terrorism and outline current terrorist organizations. This chapter will also analyze existing terrorist threats and discuss the most likely threats to deployed forces in the future.

Chapter 3 is an historical examination of how the United States military and other nations have organized and equipped military forces to protect themselves against terrorist attacks. Chapter 4 will review current Security Force operating procedures and force structure and will focus on how the Air Force currently organizes, trains, and equips its Security Forces to combat terrorism during contingency deployments.

Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the information obtained in previous chapters, identifies shortfalls that exist in the Air Force’s efforts to protect deployed assets, and provides some recommendations to improve the Air Force’s response. It should be noted that I am an U.S. Army Military Police officer who has no parochial service interests in any of the alternatives presented. However, I do have a great deal of interest and

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experience in security doctrine. The validity of the alternatives is based on historical accounts of other forces and their success in countering a comparable threat.

The sources used throughout this research are a combination of government documents, current terrorist studies conducted by civilian organizations, historical references, military briefings, and news/periodical articles.

Conclusion

Terrorist acts will remain a major threat to deployed Air Force assets in the near future. To counter these threats, the Air Force needs to properly identify the most likely threat facing deployed forces and develop a security forces organization capable of countering these threats. This paper will explore the terrorist threat environment and present recommendations on how the Air Force can better protect deployed assets from these threats.
Chapter 2

The Snake in the Grass

Imagine you see the chief of all the enemy in the vast plain about Babylon, seated on a great throne of fire and smoke, his appearance inspiring horror and terror. Consider how he summons innumerable demons, and scatters them, some to one city and some to another, throughout the whole world, so that no province, no place, no state of life, no individual is overlooked.

—Saint Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556)

Terrorism, as an act of influencing a state to change its policies, has been around since the beginning of modern civilization. Dating as far back as the first century, terrorist acts were conducted by a Jewish religious sect, known as the Zealots, who fought against Roman occupation of Palestine. Up through the 18th century, terrorist motivation remained generally religious in nature. Beginning in the 19th century, however, terrorists began acting in behalf of political and revolutionary aims. The 20th century has seen numerous terrorist movements. For example, following the creation of Israel in 1948, conflict between the Arab world and Israel intensified. The United States’ support of Israel led to numerous terrorist acts by Palestinian resistance organizations

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5 Ibid.
against American personnel and interests and has been the motivation for much of the
terrorist threat of the last half-century. Other acts of terrorism against the United States
are fueled by nationalism, religious, and ideological motivations or by groups who
violently oppose the United States in general.6

Before the United States can effectively protect itself from terrorism, it must first
understand what terrorism is. Definitions currently in use are based on several
distinguishing characteristics that set terrorism apart from other violence directed toward
a sovereign state. These definitions are based on the mode of operation of the terrorist
organization, motivations, and specific characteristics of terrorism, or even the modus
operandi of individual terrorists.7 This chapter will address the problem of defining
terrorism and determine what terrorist threats are likely to affect deployed United States
Air Force assets in the near future.

Defining Terrorism

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. Individual societies tend to
define the word in terms relative to their own values and ideas. For example, attacks by
Muslim radicals against American personnel and interests are defined as “terrorist” acts
the United States. However, these same groups claim they are victims of economic or
political terrorism initiated by American “imperialists”.8

6 Ibid
7 Ganor, Boaz, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?”, September
8 Leonard B. Weinberg and Paul B. Davis, Introduction to Political Terrorism. (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1989), 3.
Within the United States, there is no universally accepted and agreed upon definition of what constitutes terrorism. Each agency within the federal government is allowed to define terrorism from its own point of view. This lack of a universally acceptable definition can lead to confusion and ineffective use of resources when determining ways to protect American interests from attack by terrorist organizations. For the purpose of this study, the Department of State and Department of Defense definitions will be reviewed and analyzed.

The State Department, responsible for providing to Congress a complete annual report on terrorism, adopts the definition of terrorism from Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). This statute defines terrorism by breaking it down as to the act, the location, and the type of groups that employ terrorism. The various forms of terrorism are defined as follows:

The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or that has a significant subgroup that practice international terrorism.

At first glance, the State Department definition of “terrorism” appears to clarify what factors are necessary to constitute a terrorist act. But if one breaks down this definition,

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there are several flaws that can confuse policy makers and result in ineffective and even misguided efforts in combating terrorism against the United States.

The State Department definition of “terrorism” does not adequately describe the organizations capable of committing terrorist acts. Subnational groups can be interpreted as guerillas, “freedom fighters”, or national liberation movements. These organizations have historically used politically motivated violence directed at what the State Department calls “noncombatants”. Examples include the Mujahedin rebels in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, and Kurdish rebels fighting against the Iraqi government. Are these groups, who gather together to fight what the United States determines to be an oppressive government, considered terrorists? The Mujahedin were supported by the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Contras throughout the 1980s, and the Kurds are currently supported by the United States in their fight against the Iraqi government. Does this make the United States a sponsor of terrorism? By many definitions of international terrorism, apparently so.

Another group that fits this category is organized crime families. These groups may also use politically motivated violence against noncombatants but are not labeled by the State Department as terrorists. Examples of such groups are the Colombian drug cartels working with rebel groups in South America. These organizations have assassinated political leaders and journalists in an effort to intimidate governments into changing their policies toward the cartels. Despite their use of violence for political purposes, the United States labels these groups as criminals, not terrorists.

The next source of confusion is what constitutes a noncombatant. The State Department has interpreted a noncombatant as follows:
In addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site…11

The confusion emerges in trying to differentiate between the “terrorist” acts which killed 19 service members in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, or the recent bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, as compared to the United States’ attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan and the air strikes against Iraqi military barracks during operation “Desert Thunder”. It appears that all the acts identified above were premeditated, had some type of political motivation, and were directed against what the State Department defines as “noncombatants”. If a state of military hostilities does exist and a terrorist group operating autonomously from the enemy nation attacks a military site, is that considered a terrorist act or a military act? Again, the answer is unclear and open to several legal interpretations.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for safeguarding all Department of Defense personnel and property against terrorist attacks. Terrorism is defined in DOD Directive Number 2000.12, *DOD Combating Terrorism Program* as:

> The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological. 12

The Department of Defense does not attempt to define the types of organizations that carry out terrorist attacks or differentiate between targets. Instead the DOD focuses on the method and purpose of such attacks. The only flaw in this definition is that the purpose of the attacks might be for other than political, religious, or ideological

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11 Ibid., vi.
purposes. This implies that many criminal acts, and other activities which may not have a political, religious, or ideological aim, could be categorized as “terrorism”.

The purpose in analyzing these definitions is not to identify weaknesses in U.S. actions, nor to attempt to establish a definition that is all encompassing; rather, the purpose is to note the complexity attendant to defining terrorism. The definition of terrorism is codified in the values and beliefs of a society. But for this study, terrorism is defined as:

The systematic use or threat of violence, by sub-national or clandestine groups, to coerce a sovereign government to change local, national, or international political policies.

However, care must be taken when defining what constitutes terrorism because the definition itself can either help or hinder attempts to legitimize actions to counter such threat.

**Terrorist Threats to Deployed Air Force Assets**

Identifying specific terrorist threats to deployed United States Air Force assets requires an analysis of how the United States plans to use military capabilities to shape the global environment and an analysis of the terrorist threats that affect United States policy.

**Use of Military Capabilities**

The United States has embraced many goals throughout its history. Aside from ensuring the sovereignty, prosperity, and well being of its citizens, the United States is dedicated to providing for the safety of all American citizens whether at home or

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13Erickson, 27.
abroad. To accomplish these goals, the United States tries to influence the global environment by using all means of its national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Military power is used to shape the security environment and provide the force projection capabilities required to deter or counter threats to our vital, important, or humanitarian interests abroad.

The National Security Strategy of the United States identifies vital national interests and emphasizes U.S. resolve to use whatever means are available to defend these interests. U.S. vital national interests include:

- Physical security of our territory and that of our allies.
- The safety of United States citizens.
- The economic well being of the United States.

The National Security Strategy also addresses the need to employ military forces when important interests are at stake, or humanitarian situations requiring the commitment of military forces. The commitment of military force in these situations is to be undertaken when the costs and risks are commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake.

The 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review identifies the Defense Department strategy to support the national interests laid out in the national security strategy and expands upon the vital national interests outlined therein. These include:

- Protecting the sovereignty, territory, and population of the United States.
- Preventing the emergence of hostile regional coalitions or hegemons.

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16 Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress., 8.
• Ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources.
• Deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression against U.S. allies and friends.
• Ensuring freedom of the seas, airways, and space, and the security of vital lines of communication.\textsuperscript{17}

The strategy to defend these national interests is summed up in three words: Shape, Respond, and Prepare.\textsuperscript{18} The Air Force plays a key role in all three elements.

Shaping the global environment requires the Air Force to deploy assets on both a semi-permanent rotational and temporary basis. Deployed forces help to build coalitions, promote regional stability, prevent or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression or coercion.\textsuperscript{19} Responding to crises requires the Air Force to quickly deploy assets in order to protect U.S. national interests, demonstrate U.S. government resolve, or to reaffirm the nation’s role as a global leader.\textsuperscript{20} Missions can include everything from fighting a major theater war to conducting peace enforcement or humanitarian operations. Preparing for the uncertain future requires the Air Force to meet current demands while modernizing capabilities in order to maintain superiority over future military threats.\textsuperscript{21}

The fall of the Berlin Wall, break-up of the Soviet Union, and the shift towards a global economy has greatly decreased the threat of global war. In defiance of these positive trends toward peace, however, the world remains a complex and dangerous place.\textsuperscript{22} As outlined in the National Security Strategy and 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States is committed to playing a leadership role in the international

\textsuperscript{17} Senate Committee on Armed Services, \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review}, 150\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} session, May 20-21, 1997, U.S. Government Printing Office. 4.
\textsuperscript{18} Department of Defense, \textit{Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress.}, vii.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 9
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 1.
community and will continue to deploy military power, including U.S. Air Force assets outside national boundaries when vital, important, or humanitarian interests are at stake.

**Terrorist Threats**

According to the U.S. State Department, acts of terrorism around the world have been declining in recent years. Unfortunately, this downward trend in incidents is not reducing fatalities caused by terrorist acts. In 1997 alone, 915 people lost their lives or were injured in terrorist acts compared to 729 casualties in 1992. The number of incidents is decreasing but the lethality of these incidents is increasing.

The Secretary of State has designated seven countries as state sponsors of terrorism and 30 foreign groups as terrorist organizations. Of these 30 organizations, nine have strong anti-U.S. sentiments and can be considered serious threats to U.S. interests. The strong anti-U.S. sentiments of these organizations are deeply embedded in either an ideological or religious belief that is adopted to gain support from sympathizers and legitimize their acts of terrorism in pursuit of an overarching political goal.

Organizations with strong ideological beliefs are often linked to Marxist or Communist ideas. These groups frequently oppose the capitalist societies in which they live and usually advocate the overthrow of their government and an end to capitalist “exploitation”. On the other hand, extremist religious sects often splinter from the primary religious entity in the region. Their goal is to terrorize the “ungodly” leaders and

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23 Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism:1997*, iii.
24 Ibid., Appendix C.
25 Ibid., iv.
population into accepting their viewpoint. Their legitimacy is not based on political doctrine but rather the belief that their actions support the teaching and creed of a Supreme Being. The desired outcome of their terror campaign is usually the overthrow of the government and persecution of religious organizations that oppose their extremist beliefs.

The nine organizations that vehemently oppose U.S. intervention, in their region of operation, and a brief summary of their goals, are listed below.

Ideologically motivated groups:

- **National Liberation Army (ELN)** – Colombian based Maoist-Marxist Leninist guerrilla organization. Attacks the Colombian government’s efforts to eradicate coca and poppy crops. Responsible for bombings of U.S. and foreign businesses, especially the petroleum industry. Anti-U.S.

- **Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)** – Military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. Has strength of approximately 7,000 armed combatants. Goal is to overthrow the Colombian government and ruling class. Anti-U.S. since its inception in 1966.

- **Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)** – Radical leftist Greek organization. Anti-Greek government, anti-U.S., anti-Turkey, anti-NATO. Initial attacks were assassinations of senior U.S. officials. Has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods. Committed to the removal of U.S. bases in Greece.

- **Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)** – Operates primarily in Turkey. Espouses Marxist ideology and is anti-U.S. and anti-NATO. In protest of the Gulf war, this group assassinated two U.S. military contractors and wounded an U.S. Air Force officer.

- **Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA)** – Extreme leftist group based in Greece. This organization is opposed to imperialist domination, exploitation, and oppression. Has previously bombed U.S. military and business facilities. Anti-U.S. and seeks the removal of U.S. military forces from Greece.

- **Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)** – Goal is to destroy Peruvian institutions and replace them with peasant revolutionary regimes. Also wants to rid Peru of foreign influences. Has bombed the U.S. embassy in Peru and conducted attacks

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27 Ibid., 23.
on U.S. businesses. This group is among the world’s most ruthless guerrilla organizations.

Religious motivated groups:

- **Aum Supreme Truth (Aum)** – A Japanese extremist sect based on Buddhist teachings. Aim is to take over Japan and then the rest of the world. Responsible for releasing sarin gas into a Tokyo subway in 1995.

- **Hizballah (Party of God)** – Radical Islamic group located primarily in Lebanon. Goal is to create Iranian-style Islamic Republic in Lebanon and the removal of all non-Islamic influences from the area. Responsible for the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine Corps barracks in 1983. Has established cells in most parts of the world. Strong anti-Western and anti-Israeli sentiments.

- **The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)** – Considered a group of loosely affiliated factions of militant Palestinians. Committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestine state and the destruction of Israel through a holy war. U.S. is considered an enemy because of its support for Israel. Also opposes Arab governments that it believes have succumbed to Western influences.28

One threat not addressed in the State Department’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, is the new phenomenon of privately sponsored terrorism. This threat came to light when an exiled Saudi businessmen named Osama Bin Laden declared a “holy war” against the United States. He has been linked to almost every Muslim extremist organization within the past five years and is considered a role model for many Islamic terrorists. Osama Bin Laden has vowed to rid the holy lands of all Americans and Jews as well as overthrow the Saudi Royal family. He is suspected of supporting numerous terrorist acts against U.S. assets worldwide.29

As the United States responds with military power to crises around the globe, it must plan for and commit resources required to counter the threats from these known terrorist

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28 Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism:1997*, Appendix B.
organizations. The predominant method of attack in 1997 was bombings.\textsuperscript{30} However, as the U.S. builds defenses for such attacks, terrorists often resort to alternative tactics to continue their cause. The final section will discuss how terrorist organizations are adapting their tactics for future operations against deployed U.S. Air Force assets.

\textbf{Future Terrorist Threats to Air Force Assets}

The requirement for the Air Force to forward-deploy assets on operations short of a major theater war is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years.\textsuperscript{31} These forward deployments demonstrate the United States’ commitment as a world leader, lend credibility and enhance regional stability for our allies, provide a crisis response capability, and promote U.S. influence and access to all corners of the globe.\textsuperscript{32} Unfortunately, these deployments will also antagonize state and non-state adversaries in these regions.

The current supremacy of the United States in conventional military power will likely force our adversaries to pursue an asymmetric response to U.S. provocation. These adversaries may use unconventional means such as terrorism to avoid a direct confrontation with deployed forces and thus challenge U.S. resolve in the region. Adversaries may also employ terrorist tactics to disrupt or destroy key centers of gravity required by deployed forces to sustain regional military operations or inflict casualties on U.S. Air Force personnel in an effort to weaken American public support for continued presence in the region.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{30} Department of State, \textit{Patterns of Global Terrorism:1997}, 1.
\textsuperscript{31} Department of Defense, \textit{Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress.}, 8.
\textsuperscript{33} Department of Defense, \textit{Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress.}, 2-3.
There are two recent trends that indicate a shift from traditional terrorist bombing attacks to the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological agents in attacking targets. First, terrorists are not claiming responsibility for recent attacks. Second, the advancement and proliferation of technology has enabled these groups to acquire such weapons.

The 1998 attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa started the age of the “Anonymous Terrorist”. This relatively new phenomenon is probably linked to the severe retaliation expected by the United States when a group’s involvement is discovered. Terrorists have discovered that they no longer require open declarations of their vicious acts in order to create the confusion and fear necessary to affect U.S. will. Even Osama Bin Laden, who is suspected of supporting recent attacks on U.S. military service members abroad, will not directly claim responsibility. In a 1998 interview with ABC News, Osama Bin Laden was asked about the 1996 bombing of the U.S. Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia and other attacks. He did not claim responsibility but instead praised the individuals who carried out the attacks by stating, “We look at these young men as great heroes and martyrs who followed the steps of the prophet, peace be upon him. We called and they answered.” Even though the United States retaliated against Osama Bin Laden for his suspected involvement in the 1998 embassy bombings, this trend of anonymity may force the U.S. to reconsider striking suspected terrorist locations in the future. Without fear of retaliation, terrorists will be free to pursue more lethal means with which to attack deployed U.S. military forces.


35 Ibid.

As stated earlier, the second trend involves the advancement and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological technology. Until recently, experts in terrorism believed that the use of nuclear materials in terrorist attacks was beyond the financial and technical capabilities of such organizations. However, the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and the increased involvement of organized crime in trafficking of nuclear materials may require a new look at this possibility. In 1994, the head of the German Federal Criminal Police reported that the number of incidents in Germany involving nuclear material increased from 41 in 1991 to 267 in 1994.\(^{37}\) No one can say with certainty the successful number of attempts to traffic in nuclear materials that occurred during this timeframe. As technology progresses, the capability to attack targets with nuclear weapons will also become available to terrorist organizations.

The use of chemical and biological agents is believed to be increasingly favored by terrorist organizations because of their relative ease and cheapness in comparison to nuclear weapons.\(^ {38}\) Chemical and biological agents can be manufactured, purchased from legitimate suppliers, stolen from research or military facilities, or provided by state sponsors. These agents can also be converted to weapons with ease and anonymity. Use as weapons include the contamination of food supplies or water sources, aerosol attacks, or the release of vapors into enclosed areas or air conditioning and heating systems.\(^ {39}\) The ease with which these weapons can be acquired will undoubtedly increase their attractiveness to many terrorist organizations in the future.

\(^{37}\)“High Tech Terror: The New Threat From Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons”,

\(^{38}\) Ron Purver, “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature”,
Thus, deterring future terrorist attacks will become increasingly more difficult in the future. Many terrorists have come to realize that they can produce the fear and confusion necessary to achieve their goals by anonymously attacking U.S. forces in their respective regions. Furthermore, anonymity, or at the most a subtle claim of responsibility, will greatly diminish the ability of the United States to secure worldwide support in order to militarily retaliate against such attacks.

Bombing will most likely continue as the attack of choice by most terrorist organizations. But the advancement in technology and proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents, coupled with a reduced threat of retaliation, has greatly increased the value nuclear, chemical and biological agents as asymmetric weapons against the overwhelming power of U.S. military forces.

Ibid.
Chapter 3

Ground Attacks in History

Air Force bases and ancillary units are static or semi-static, and the initiative for attack is invariably with the enemy who can choose his time and method of attack. In many instances, the first intimation of action is the explosion which destroys aircraft, vital facilities, or the opening of fire on personnel.  

—Colonel A.C. Carlson, USAF  
April, 1952

Security of air bases against attack is not a new concept for the Air Force. In 1921, airpower theorist Giulio Douhet theorized that the best defense against enemy airpower is through indirect attacks on airfields: “The surest and most effective way of achieving this end is to destroy the enemy air force at its bases, which are found on the surface. …it is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.” Although Douhet was talking primarily of air attacks against enemy airfields, ground attacks throughout the years have proven to be an effective alternative.

This chapter will begin with an historical perspective of air base defense beginning in World War II and continuing through the Korean War. Following this, a more detailed

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The discussion will look at how the military responded to ground attacks on airbases in Vietnam and the terrorist attack on the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon in 1983.

**The Advent of Air Base Ground Defense**

Prior to the Second World War, the military saw no need for air base defense against ground attacks. During World War I, air bases were located well behind the trench lines, making them relatively immune to attack by conventional ground forces while the threat of attack by unconventional forces was virtually nonexistent.\(^{42}\) This false sense of security, coupled with the lack of appreciation for increased mobility and organized airborne operations, led the United States military into World War II ill-prepared for air base ground defense.\(^{43}\)

**World War II**

The Germans began World War II using a mobile form of warfare to smash through their European enemies. Using airpower and airborne forces, Germany captured or destroyed a number of allied air bases in support of major ground offensives in 1939 and 1940.\(^{44}\) But it was not until May of 1941, when the Germans captured airfields on Crete, did the allied forces change their concept of base defense.\(^{45}\) The capture of the British airfield at Maleme by air-dropped troops caused great concern in Britain. As a result of this defeat, a sub-committee of the British War Cabinet was established in July 1941 to “examine the existing system of aerodrome defense and to make recommendations for

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\(^{43}\) A.C. Carlson, Col., USAF. *Air Base Defense*, 2.

improvement”. The committee concluded that control was “divided” and made the following recommendations:

1) A RAF Aerodrome Defense Corps be formed under the control of the Air Ministry.

2) During land operations, the garrison on an aerodrome should be place under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces. Subordinate commanders should exercise this control directly through Station Commanders.

3) The Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, should be the advisor to the Air Ministry on aerodrome defense policy.

The British War Cabinet acted upon these recommendations and on February 1, 1942, the first formidable force committed to the protection of air bases was established as “The Royal Air Force Regiment”. The regiment’s first mission was to provide relief for army units defending air bases in Britain. The primary mission of the regiment was as a mobile striking force, capable of immediate defensive response by trained station personnel (i.e. all personnel assigned to the Royal Air Force with the exception of medical, dental, chaplains, and women’s services). As the war progressed, the threat of home invasion decreased and the regiment prepared to deploy overseas with the RAF forward-based forces. The regiment became a mobile force responsible for clearing captured airfields of enemy resistance, minefields, obstructions, and protecting the Royal Air Force squadrons that operated from them. From their initial formation and deployment in 1942 until the end of World War II, the Royal Air Force Regiment

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46 A.C. Carlson, Col., USAF. Air Base Defense, 9.
48 Ibid, 10.
50 Ibid, 12.
successfully defended against all but two attempts by axis powers to capture British airfields.\textsuperscript{51} As the war ended, the Royal Air Force realized the necessity for base defense and retained the regiment on active duty.\textsuperscript{52}

The United States Army Air Forces followed the British example and formed the first air base defense battalions in June of 1942.\textsuperscript{53} Organizational planning called for each battalion to be equipped with M-2 half-tracks, self-propelled 75mm guns, heavy machine guns, 60mm mortars, M1 rocket launchers, and a tank platoon.\textsuperscript{54} Their mission was the “security of air bases and other vital installations of the Air Corps such as tanks, and tank farms, bomb dumps and radar stations” against enemy attack.\textsuperscript{55} The battalions were organized to provide both fixed and mobile defense forces. Mobile forces were organized to “hunt out the enemy immediately on receiving information on him” and to “flank him or attack him in the rear as he engages fixed defenses”.\textsuperscript{56} Fortunately the unit personnel were not assigned the missions they were equipped to perform. Instead, under the Services Command, personnel were assigned such duties as “guarding of gasoline, ammunition and ration dumps, entrances to the Officers clubs, Officers Clubs and Hotels, empty warehouses, dry cleaning establishments”.\textsuperscript{57} Following the surrender

\textsuperscript{52} Wayne Purser, LTC., \textit{Air Base Ground Defense: An Historical Perspective and Vision for the 1990s}, 10.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, 9.
\textsuperscript{54} A.C. Carlson, Col., USAF. \textit{Air Base Defense}, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, 7.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 7.
of the Japanese in 1945, it was no surprise that all air base security battalions were inactivated.58

**Korean War**

In 1947, the United States Air Force gained its independence from the Army and became a separate service. Under a 1947 joint service agreement between the Army and Air Force, the Air Force became “responsible for the security of it’s own installations…including protection against air, mechanized, and chemical threats”.59 Unprepared to meet this mission, the Air Force entered the Korean War with little to no air base ground defense capabilities.

Upon the outbreak of war in June 1950, the Air Force quickly built up ground forces for base defense. Air Police strength increased from 10,000 personnel in July 1950 to 39,000 in December 1951 and infantry weapons and equipment were quickly procured.60 With the personnel in place to defend air bases, the Air Force slowly turned to the development of base defense doctrine. On March 3, 1953, Air Force Regulation 355-4, *Defense – Local Ground Defense of Air Force Installations*, was published. This regulation defined the responsibility of the installation commander to provide protection of air bases from local attacks such as:

1) Infiltration
2) Guerrilla warfare
3) Civil disturbance

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59 Ibid, 10.
4) Local airborne, seaborne, or ground attack\textsuperscript{61}

This concept of ground defense relied heavily on the use of non-Air Police personnel trained and equipped to man perimeter defensive positions. Air Police tasks and functions included:

1) Providing a reconnaissance or observation screen to permit other personnel to continue normal duties until the last possible moment.

2) Combat patrolling against guerrilla, partisan, or irregular forces.

3) Performing as a mobile ground fighting unit.

4) Assisting in organizing the defenses of installation and the training of personnel.\textsuperscript{62}

Although thorough in detail, the doctrine did not address the need for continuous defense. The Air Force did not embrace air base defense and perceived active ground defense as an “emergency function”, not requiring continuous operations:

Active local ground defense of Air Force installations by Air Force personnel (except normal internal security measures) is an emergency function, normally of short duration, and the capability which the Air Force must achieve is an emergency capability. This emergency capability does not include provision for sustained ground defense operations.\textsuperscript{63}

Despite the build-up of police personnel and issuance of written regulations outlining ground defense, securing airbases from organized guerrillas, thieves, enemy saboteurs, and South Korean scavengers remained a serious problem.\textsuperscript{64} In order to maintain minimum-security requirements, Fifth Air Force was forced to augment organic security


\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, 2.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, 1.

forces with Republic of Korea Army, National Police, and local guards.\textsuperscript{65} To further exacerbate the problem, Air Police officers had little experience in developing air base defense plans. Most of these base defense officers averaged less than one year of total active military service prior to their assignment in Korea.\textsuperscript{66}

As the Korean War came to a close, the Air Force once again reduced its capability to defend air bases. The difference this time was that the Air Force realized a need for such a capability but the “experience of the Korean War, reduced resources, a new national strategy, and revised intelligence estimate” did not support costs associated with the retention of such capabilities.\textsuperscript{67} With limited security capabilities at hand, the Air Force adopted a new concept of air base defense outlined in Air Force Regulation 205-5, \textit{Internal Installation Security}. This defense concept emphasized the need for fixed security positions to secure those assets deemed “essential to the combat mission” by the local commander.\textsuperscript{68} Point defense capabilities gave the commander the ability to safeguard specific assets against “sabotage, espionage, subversion, and attacks by hostile persons, mobs or forces”, but relinquished organic offensive and area protection capabilities to available U.S. and friendly ground forces.\textsuperscript{69} This point defense of critical assets and reliance on security from external sources would follow the Air Force into the war in Vietnam in 1961.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, 132.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, 132.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid, 1.
Vietnam War

On November 15, 1961, Detachment 2, 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron became the first U.S. Air Force unit to enter the war in Vietnam. This unit, along with other Air Force units that followed, relied heavily on U.S. and Vietnamese ground forces when countering the 475 attacks against the ten critical bases occupied by the Air Force during the war. The Air Force’s base defense policy throughout the war remained much as it did prior to 1961: “USAF security responsibility ended at the perimeter, and within that perimeter it was restricted to USAF resources”.

From 1961 through 1964, the Air Force relied solely on Vietnamese military forces for protection. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam was responsible for external and perimeter defense while the Vietnamese Air Force provided internal security. This security relationship was described as “unplanned, uncoordinated, and uncontrolled” but the inadequacy of the arrangement was not acted upon and corrected because the threat of attack by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army never did materialize.

Following the November 1, 1964, mortar attack on Bien Hoa air base, which destroyed five B-57 aircraft and damaged an additional fifteen, General Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, directed improvements to air base security. General Hunter Harris Jr., Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command Air Forces, also informed the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, that security

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71 Ibid, iii.
72 Ibid, 19.
73 Ibid, 12.
74 Ibid, 12.
arrangements of air bases in Vietnam were unacceptable and stressed that protection from future mortar attacks was unlikely without the protection of U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Army security units. However, political considerations delayed the deployment of U.S. ground forces until March 1965.

Hopes that U.S. ground forces would take responsibility for the protection of air bases quickly faded when the U.S. military in Vietnam decided to take a calculated risk on air base security and shift the priorities of ground forces to offensive operations. General Westmoreland, in a December 1965 letter to commanders, rejected the use of ground forces for static security. Use of ground forces for this task would “cripple decisive offensive operations and delay enemy defeat”. He ordered all commanders to initiate defensive efforts and instructed that “all service units and all forces of whatever service finds themselves without infantry protection… will be organized, trained and exercised to perform the defensive and security functions which I have just discussed… I reiterate that their participation in self-defense is not an optional matter, but an urgent necessity”. The U.S. Air Force interpretation of the letter and subsequent direction to air base commanders was consistent with previous air base defense policy. Air base commanders were told that General Westmoreland’s directives applied “specifically to US ground forces” and they were directed to support the offensive spirit of the letter with “all feasible internal security for self-defense actions”. The Air Force continued

77 Ibid, 27.
78 Ibid, 27.
79 Ibid, 28.
80 Ibid, 28.
throughout the remainder of the war with the stated policy that U.S. Air Force responsibility for defense did not extend beyond the legal perimeter of the air base.\textsuperscript{81}

Under the “Safe Side Program”, the Air Force continued to refine its internal security response by organizing and deploying combat security police squadrons to assist in the protection of air bases during high-threat periods.\textsuperscript{82} In March 1968, the 821\textsuperscript{st} Security Police Squadron, with a strength of over 500 personnel, became the first such unit organized. Squadron personnel underwent a thirty-day training program stressing marksmanship and ground base defense skills.\textsuperscript{83} Following this training, the 821\textsuperscript{st} deployed to the Republic of Vietnam as quick reaction force, capable of providing “high firepower, mobility, surveillance of base perimeters, and defense and security of internal base areas”.\textsuperscript{84} In July of 1967, the Air Force Chief of Staff approved the organization of a total of ten Security Police squadrons, one Wing Headquarters, and a Security training school.\textsuperscript{85} In early 1969, the Department of Defense reduced this force to the training school, Wing headquarters, and only three squadrons.\textsuperscript{86}

Generally, the internal security efforts of the Air Force were effective in detecting and stopping penetrating attacks.\textsuperscript{87} This may be accounted for by the fact that 96\% of the 475 attacks on air bases used standoff weapons rather than attempting to penetrate

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 28.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, 110.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, 110.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, 110.
\textsuperscript{85} Briefing, subject: Personnel aspects of Combat Security Police Program, 13 March 1969, Given to BG Vance Hey, TAC, DP.
However, the uncoordinated and sporadic effort by U.S. forces to provide a viable defense within the range area of the enemy’s standoff weapons provided the Viet Cong with the sanctuary needed to conduct such attacks.

The problems associated with air base defense in Vietnam were a result of the U.S. military’s failure to properly identify and adapt to the type of war being waged. The Air Force maintained a Cold War “internal” security posture designed to foil Soviet agents breaking in and conducting sabotage and failed to adapt this policy in a guerrilla warfare environment. The purpose of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army ground attacks on air bases was not only to destroy critical assets or deny the use of airfields, but also to harass U.S. forces. In more than one-third of the attacks, no damage to aircraft was reported and less than five rounds were fired by the enemy. The objective of attacking airfields was not the total destruction of U.S. Air Force assets, but to wage an attrition war that would steadily kill Americans and destroy aircraft in an effort to undermine U.S. popular support for the war.

As noted, Air Force security personnel did an excellent job of internal defense. The problem was that the Air Force senior leadership refused to acknowledge ultimate responsibility for security of its bases and develop the organic capability required to expand that security outside the base perimeter. As early as 1952, the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command warned Air Force leadership that U.S. Army ground forces could

88 Ibid, 68.
90 Ibid, 28.
91 Ibid, 28.
not be expected to defend air bases and that “ground defense must inescapably remain an organic USAF function”.

However, providing internal security for critical assets at air bases is a complex task. In situations where asymmetric threats dominate the environment, internal security by itself may not be enough to deter aggression. Commanders should understand the motives and means of the aggressor and develop whatever capability is necessary to defend against those means.

**Beirut**

The U.S. Marine Corps experience in Beirut highlights two considerations that Air Force leaders should be attuned to when defending fixed locations against asymmetric threats: 1) reliance on host nation forces for external support; and 2) political constraints which may affect base defense planning in military operations other than war.

The U.S. Marine Corps first entered Beirut in 1958. Their deployment was in response to a request by the Lebanese president for U.S. assistance in countering both a civil war and threats of invasion from Syria. Tensions in the country quickly settled down and the Marines were withdrawn with few incidents. They were called upon to enter Beirut again in 1976 when internal fighting threatened the safety of U.S. civilians in that country. This time they quickly evacuated over 300 noncombatants and departed the area without incident. The Marines were required to conduct yet another noncombatant evacuation in July of 1982 in response to deteriorating security conditions

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94 Ibid, 6.
caused by an Israeli invasion in June and subsequent fighting throughout the country.\textsuperscript{95} As before, their training and professionalism carried them successfully through the mission. Unfortunately, the evacuation was just the beginning of a much larger mission that the Marines were not trained for.

Lebanon was in a state of turmoil caused by a raging civil war and the invasion by Israel. On September 29, 1982, 1,200 marines from the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit were inserted into Beirut as part of a multinational force intended “to establish an environment that would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in establishing sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area”.\textsuperscript{96} The 32\textsuperscript{nd} Marine Amphibious Unit’s area of responsibility consisted of the Beirut International Airport and surrounding area.

The task at hand was enormous. Over 100,000 people had been killed in fighting over the previous eight years.\textsuperscript{97} Lebanon was then home to seventeen officially recognized religious sects, two foreign armies of occupation, four national contingents of a multinational force, seven national contributors to a United Nations peace-keeping force, and some two dozen extralegal militias.\textsuperscript{98}

On September 23, 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning order alerting the Marines of their upcoming mission. In that alert order the mission statement directed the

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid, 8.


\textsuperscript{98} Ibid, 24.
Marines to be “part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area”. The Marines on the ground were left to interpret what was required of them during a “presence” mission. The Marine commanders interpreted the mission to mean being visible without appearing threatening to the civilian population. Based on this interpretation, the Marines developed a mission statement, concept of operations, rules of engagement, and force structure that took into account both political and military considerations and requirements. It was evident from the outset that commanders at all levels were confused about the exact nature of the mission.

The security of the Marines ashore was not a serious issue at the beginning. As a precondition to their landing, a cease-fire was negotiated between hostile forces. Furthermore, the Lebanese population did not oppose their presence and for the most part applauded their arrival. Because the marines were landing in a permissive environment, peacetime rules of engagement, which authorized deadly force only in self-defense, were enforced throughout the Marines’ area of responsibility. Based on the perceived low threat and anticipated short duration of the operation, it was determined that the Lebanese Armed Forces could provide the necessary security needed. That determination would quickly change as the Lebanese Armed Forces began losing control in the months ahead.

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99 Ibid, 35.
100 Ibid, 38.
103 Ibid, 44.
The Marines soon discovered that political constraints were the driving consideration in establishing a defensive perimeter around their base at the Beirut International Airport. Internal security consisted of access control, surveillance posts, emplacement of barbed wire obstacles, hardening of fixed positions, and patrolling of the perimeter. Efforts to increase security by securing the surrounding key terrain and extending the perimeter met with political resistance. Furthermore, the rules of engagement that the Marines were operating under hindered their ability to quickly respond to threats.

In November 1982, the Marines expanded their “presence” mission and began actively training the Lebanese Armed Forces in basic tactics. Throughout the next year, the resistance by the anti-government factions increased and the Marines lost their status as neutral peacekeepers as they began supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces with supplies and equipment. All recognition of neutrality was lost when, in September 1983, U.S. naval gunfire was employed in direct support of Lebanese forces in contact with Palestinian units. The “presence” mission had been expanded to include direct combat support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. This combat support forever ended the perception of neutrality, making the Marines legitimate targets for the anti-government parties involved in the civil war.

In the month leading up to the terrorist truck bomb that killed 241 U.S. service members, the Marines became the targets of numerous terrorist type attacks. Colonel Geraghty, 22d Marine Amphibious Unit Commander, summed up the situation: “The direct threat against the Marines has increased significantly as several of the more radical

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106 Ibid, 40.
107 Ibid, 88.
groups view the MNF as an alternative and readily visible source against which to
demonstrate their [hostilities]".109 Sniper fire from outside the perimeter was a daily
occurrence and small arms attacks on rotary wing aircraft grounded most air
operations.110 In response to this threat, Marine commanders increased internal security
measures and coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces responsible for outer
security.

Intelligence during this time focused on terrorist type car bomb attacks. Approximately one hundred car bomb threats had been directed at the Marines since June. Most focused on threats directed against convoys supporting the U.S. diplomatic
mission. There were no intelligence reports indicating that terrorists in the region had the
capability to deliver such a massive truck bomb as the one that destroyed the Marine
barracks on October 23, 1983.111 Nevertheless,

On 23 October 1983, a truck laden with the equivalent of over 12,000
pounds of TNT crashed through the perimeter of the compound of the U.S.
contingent of the Multinational Force at Beirut International Airport,
Beirut, Lebanon, penetrated the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters
building and detonated. The force of the explosion destroyed the building
resulting in the death of 241 U.S. military personnel.112

The facts and circumstances surrounding the attack were investigated by the
Department of Defense.113 The investigation concluded, among other things, that the
security surrounding the compound was inadequate for the increased terrorist threat.

109 Ibid, 92.
110 Ibid, 92-93.
111 Ibid, Appendix D, Remarks by the Commandant of the Marine Corps Senate Armed Services
Committee, 31 October 1983, 167-169.
112 Long Commission, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act,
October 23, 1983, 1.
113 Ibid.
Absent from the report were judgements concerning the political decision to initially deploy the Marines into Lebanon and subsequent decisions to change the mission from one of presence to one of supporting a combatant in a civil war. These decisions, coupled with the ensuing change in the threat environment, imposed security constraints on commanders that could not be overcome.

The problems associated with security of the Marine’s Beirut International Airport compound were threefold. First, the Marines were given a mission they were untrained to perform. They did not understand the role required of them in a “presence” mission nor did they foresee any specific adversary among the various groups operating throughout the country. Commanders interpreted their role to mean limiting actions that would appear confrontational and reduce all perceptions that the Marines were an armed threat to any group within Lebanon.

Secondly, the Marines were forced to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces for security outside the perimeter fence. At the beginning this arrangement was sufficient, but as the civil war heated up and the asymmetric threat increased, the Lebanese were incapable of adequately protecting the compound. The Marines did conduct local patrols in their area of operations, but these patrols were organized to support the “presence” mission, not to identify and eliminate specific threats directed against them.

The final and most profound problem was political. One Marine Corps officer, on his third tour in Lebanon, described the mission as being “eighty percent political and 20 percent military”.114 This point was evident early on. From the initial mission statement, which emphasized a non-combatant role, to the development of the compound security

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plan, to the increased support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, political considerations far outweighed any sound military rationale. It was these political decisions that ultimately motivated the anti-government factions to direct their attacks against the Marines.

For the reasons mentioned above, the Marines were unable to properly identify and adapt their security to the increasing asymmetric threat facing them. The anti-government factions that opposed U.S. policy in Lebanon knew they could not militarily overpower the Marines. Instead, they turned to terrorism in an effort to undermine U.S. popular support for that policy. As the U.S. Air Force continues to support national security objectives by deploying forces to temporary bases, commanders must be cognizant of the political factors which may hinder base security efforts.

Summary

The five case studies presented in this chapter highlight three factors that adversely affected base defense planning and employment. In the first three accounts, the Air Force did not maintain the organic capability required to protect assets against asymmetric ground attack. As Vietnam unfolded, the Air Force was ill prepared to counter the surface dimension threat with the existing force structure. Friendly ground and Host Nation forces were relied upon for external defenses.

Second, the reliance on friendly forces, especially those of third world nations, for security outside the perimeter fence can invite disaster. The priority of the base defense mission given to these forces can quickly change, as was the case in Vietnam, leaving an area directly adjacent to the airfield as an unopposed staging ground for both direct and indirect attacks by hostile forces.
Lastly, political constraints, especially evident in the Marine operation in Beirut, are likely to affect base defense planning and should be taken into consideration when Air Force commanders evaluate the threat and security requirements of their units.
Chapter 4

Current Operations

The commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education and training necessary to defend against and counter terrorism.115

Long Commission Report
December 20, 1983

Introduction

The 25 June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex reinvigorated the security mindset of the U.S. military. The U.S. Air Force was once again reminded that it is vulnerable to terrorist attack and quickly adopted measures to reduce these vulnerabilities. More importantly, the Air Force changed its mindset regarding how it views the role of every airman: “The Air Force must understand that every airman is a force protector.”116 Even with this new mindset, Security Forces remain the focal point for force protection.

This chapter begins with a discussion of current U.S. Air Force initiatives that address force protection and security force requirements for the 21st century. Following


this discussion, I will identify how the Air Force currently trains and organizes Security Forces in an attempt to counter terrorist threats to deployed assets around the world. An analysis as to the merit of these initiatives and current operations will be discussed in Chapter Five.

**Security Force Concept for the 21st Century**

It is important to look at what the Security Force vision of the future entails because many of the proposed concepts in that vision have already been acted upon and affect how Security Forces currently deploy around the world in support of Air Force contingency operations. The basic concept of the 21st century vision requires four critical changes: doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. The following outlines security forces initiatives in regards to these four areas.

**Doctrine**

The first proposed change involves Air Force doctrine. It requires that force protection become the Air Force’s seventh core competency. The premise driving this concept is that force protection is the responsibility of all Air Force personnel. Including the ground dimension of warfare in formal Air Force doctrine will set the foundation for future planning and execution of force protection efforts.

*Joint Vision 2010* lays out four overarching concepts that guide the services into the next century of warfighting. The concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection are combined to achieve the full

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118 Ibid, 7.
spectrum dominance needed to successfully execute military operations in the future.\textsuperscript{119} The Air Force’s contribution to the achievement of these joint concepts is addressed in its six core competencies of air and space superiority, precision engagement, information superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support.\textsuperscript{120} These core competencies are vital for successful accomplishment of the joint mission, but they fail to address the surface threat faced by deployed Air Force personnel. Protection from ground threats is considered a sub-set of full-dimensional protection but is not adequately addressed in current Air Force doctrine.\textsuperscript{121} The emphasis of the current doctrine is protection of assets from air attack. Protection of U.S. airbases from ground threat is not addressed. “Air and space power provides a responsive and flexible force capable of attaining air and space superiority, the basis for full-dimensional protection.”\textsuperscript{122} Yet, the notion that air and space superiority “provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack”, is mistaken when facing asymmetric terrorist ground attacks.\textsuperscript{123}

**Organization**

The second change involves restructuring Security Force organizations. The force structure of the Air Force must address deficiencies in security forces manning.\textsuperscript{124} Security Forces manning is currently based on peacetime commitments.\textsuperscript{125} This level of manning does not provide sufficient security forces for protection of deployed assets.

\textsuperscript{119} Air Force Basic Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD 1), September 1997, 36.  
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, 36.  
\textsuperscript{122} AFDD 1, 39.  
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, 29.  
\textsuperscript{124} USAF White Paper, 5.  
\textsuperscript{125} Major Jay Chambers, USAF Security Forces Officer, interviewed by author, 24 February 1999.
Since 1990, deployment of security forces has increased by 31%, while the manning level of security forces has decreased by 36.5%.\textsuperscript{126} The increase in deployments, coupled with a decrease of personnel, has degraded security efforts worldwide.

Another change in organization involves the creation of a unit whose sole mission is to provide force protection in all operating environments.\textsuperscript{127} On March 17, 1997, the Air Force addressed this deficiency by activating the 820\textsuperscript{th} Security Forces Group.\textsuperscript{128} This headquarters unit, consisting of 80 personnel, is programmed to expand to include at least three dedicated deployable squadrons. Organic capabilities will include not only security forces assets, but intelligence, counterintelligence, transportation, communication, medical, explosive ordnance, and disaster preparedness personnel.\textsuperscript{129} The sole mission of this unit will be the dedicated protection of deployed Air Force assets.

The final consideration proposed by the Security Forces staff for reorganization is command and control. Force protection is the responsibility of the wing commander. Therefore, the Security Forces staff proposes that all resources dedicated to this mission must be under the direct control of the wing commander, with the security forces commander as the single point of contact for all protection matters.\textsuperscript{130} Every deployable wing in the Air Force should have a force protection asset of at least a flight size strength.\textsuperscript{131} These organic forces would then deploy with each wing on contingency

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{126} USAF White Paper, 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 4
  \item \textsuperscript{129} USAF White Paper, 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{130} Ibid, 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid, 7.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
operations. The staff further proposes that the manning of these units be high enough to ensure protection at home base is not neglected during wing deployments.132

Training

The third change proposed by the Security Forces staff is designed to instill a warrior spirit in all Air Force personnel.133 Basic trainees must understand that the Air Force is a branch of the armed forces.134 Winston Churchill expressed this point best in 1941 when he said, “Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air groundmen, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers”.135 Current basic training programs emphasize dress and appearance, marching, and administrative details with a minimum of time spent on physical fitness or combat weapons skills. This proposal includes the incorporation of military skills such as marksmanship, basic soldiering, first aid, and NBC defense into all basic training.

In order to sustain these critical skills and solidify the warrior spirit, the Security Forces staff recommends the exploitation of existing force protection training opportunities. Each base level organization should develop a training program, similar to the current base level safety training programs, that teaches personnel their role in force protection operations and base defense plans should be exercised on a regular basis.136 The Security Forces staff further recommends that participation in structured training environments, such as the Joint Regional Training Center, be utilized to train personnel in

132 Ibid, 7.
135 Ibid, 4.
136 Ibid, 9-10.
Finally, increased attendance by all personnel at formal schools as well as training in joint-service and coalition operations must be planned for and conducted.\textsuperscript{138}

In order to gain long term success and instill a force protection mindset in every airman, the Air Force Security Forces staff insists that it needs sweeping changes in how it trains personnel. “The goal is not to make every airman a defender, but to provide the required survival and defense skills.”\textsuperscript{139}

### Equipment

The fourth change addressed by the Security Forces staff is to change how the Air Force plans to fund and procure equipment that enhances the force protection capabilities of commanders. Historically, the Department of Defense increased funding for force protection only after threats were identified and a terrorist incident took place.\textsuperscript{140} The Security Forces staff proposes changing the procurement process from this “cyclical” pattern to a process of identifying investments based on needs associated with the threat and sustaining these investments with upgrades that will increase capability and reduce risk.\textsuperscript{141} For new systems, the procurement strategy would be to identify a force protection infrastructure during the development of new Air Force systems. Once identified, the protection requirement would then be programmed into the system cost and funded as part of the acquisition program baseline.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid, 10.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid, 10.
\textsuperscript{139} Force Protection for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century (FP21): Meeting the Challenge of Tomorrow’s Aerospace Force, 17.
\textsuperscript{140} USAF White Paper, 11.
\textsuperscript{141} Integrating the Surface Dimension Into Air Force Doctrine, 39.
\textsuperscript{142} USAF White Paper, 11.
The modernization of current force protection equipment will be based on identified vulnerabilities. Efforts to explore and integrate technology, tactics, and training, designed to increase force protection readiness, are the responsibility of the Air Force’s Force Protection Battlelab. The lab is charged with developing a concept of operations on the employment of current force protection equipment and identifying additional equipment requirements based on reduction in risk versus lifecycle costs.

Interoperability of future equipment is a great concern for force protection planners. In order to maintain proficiency and ensure continuity, personnel should train and work with their equipment on a daily basis. An example of a failure of interoperability is the security force’s current utilization of two separate radio systems. A non-tactical, commercial system is used by base security forces personnel in their day-to-day police operations and a tactical system is deployed during contingency operations. Furthermore, the tactical system currently employed is not compatible with that of other U.S. and allied forces. To correct deficiencies of this nature, the Security Forces staff recommends the exploitation of technology to ensure future equipment is versatile enough to be utilized in both base police operations and contingency deployments.

The force protection vision for the 21st Century requires an Air Force-wide cultural shift. Proposed changes to current Air Force doctrine address the surface dimension as well as the corresponding asymmetric threats associated with that dimension. This

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143 Ibid, 12.


146 Ibid, 18-19.
proposal also requires the restructuring of basic training to emphasize individual combat skills and instill a warrior spirit in each and every airman. At the base level, the Security Forces staff proposes that commanders set aside valuable time for additional training in force protection tasks and procedures. Finally, the identification and funding of force protection infrastructures should become a prerequisite to the development and deployment of future Air Force systems. These proposed changes are designed to instill the force protection mission in every Air Force member. According to the post-Khobar towers Downing Investigation Report, “Terrorists have the luxury of searching for a single vulnerability. Only a coordinated, dedicated effort will deter them.”147

U.S. Air Force Security Forces

The U.S. Air Force Security Forces have changed their focus in recent years. No longer are the men and women in the career field known strictly as “security police”. They are now postured to tackle the role of force protection and, as of July 1997, are referred to as “security forces”.148 The following sections will identify how the Security Forces train and organize to conduct force protection missions during contingency operations. Many of the concepts discussed are still in their infancy. If approved, many will evolve into robust initiatives within the coming years. Once full operational capability is achieved, these concepts will be evaluated to determine their effectiveness.


Training

As part of the overall Air Force effort to improve force protection, the training emphasis for security forces recently changed from law enforcement to force protection. To facilitate this change, all personnel within the existing security, law enforcement, and combat arms career fields were merged into one security forces core career field.  

Separate “shreds” remain in the combat arms and military working dog arena, but airmen selecting these shreds must convert back to the core field at the seven-skill level. In layman’s terms, all new security forces personnel will receive training in basic ground combat skills during their initial training. Following this training, some personnel will branch off or “shred” from the core security forces career field and specialize as combat arms personnel or military working dog handlers. As these personnel progress to the senior noncommissioned officer ranks, they will revert back to core security forces duties as their primary responsibility.

The merger into one security forces core career field led to the restructuring of initial entry security forces training. The 343rd Training Squadron, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, is charged with the responsibility of providing “law enforcement, security, ground combat skills, and weapons training to accomplish the force protection mission of the United States Air Force”. In June 1998, the 343rd conducted the first combined security apprentice course. The 343rd is currently funded for 51 of the 92 days required to train

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149 Ibid, slides 2-3.
150 Ibid, slide 5.
airmen to the security forces apprentice level standards. In order to emphasize ground combat skills, most law enforcement training was eliminated from the course and is now taught through distant learning programs and on-the-job training at an airman’s first duty station.

**Organization for Deployment**

There are three distinct ways in which security forces are organized for deployment: The Phoenix Raven program, the 820th Security Forces Group, and Palace Tenure commitments. The specified mission varies by organization, but the overarching task for each deployment is force protection of Air Force assets.

The Phoenix Raven program was implemented in early 1997 to protect Air Mobility Command assets while transiting “high threat areas”. Security forces personnel who volunteer for the program must complete a specialized eight-day training course emphasizing skills needed to protect assets with both lethal and non-lethal force. After finishing the initial training, security forces personnel are required to complete monthly training requirements in order to maintain proficiency.

Security Forces personnel designated as Phoenix Ravens deploy in teams of two to four persons with Air Mobility Command aircraft. Manning for each deployment is based on the threat, location, known host nation/theater security measures, and mission

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153 Interview, Major Chambers.
154 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
The Air Mobility Command Threat Working Group conducts an operational risk assessment of en-route airfields to determine if security measures are adequate. If the Threat Working Group identifies security shortfalls at these locations then Phoenix Raven personnel are tasked for deployment. Colonel Rocky Lane, Director of Force Protection for U.S. Transportation Command and Air Mobility Command (AMC), explains the process and importance of having Ravens on aircraft this way: “Every AMC mission we schedule is evaluated by a threat working group for level of threat. If any part of the mission indicates a possible threat to our aircraft and crews, that threat will be greatly reduced by assigning a Raven team to the crew for that mission.”

Phoenix Raven teams are designed to deter, detect, and counter threats at the deployed location. They accomplish these mission by conducting four primary functions: 1) Advise the aircraft commander and crew on force protection measures; 2) perform close-in aircraft security; 3) accomplish airfield assessments, highlighting existing security measures and vulnerabilities; and 4) assist with aircrew duties. As of December 1, 1998, thirty-five airfields worldwide require Raven security when used by Air Mobility Command assets.

The mission of the 820th Security Forces Group is to “provide a fully-integrated, highly-trained, rapidly-deployable, ‘first-in’ force protection capability to any operating

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160 “Ravens to provide aircraft security”, Air Force News.
161 “Phoenix Raven Program”.
location in support of the USAF Global Engagement mission!”. The 820th is the first unit of its kind in the Air Force. “It is the first time a composition unit has been built that solely focuses on security and force protection.”

The 820th Security Forces Group was activated on March 17, 1997, and became fully operational on September 2, 1997. The unit is structured to provide the organic capabilities necessary to “assess each threat and act accordingly.” Current force structure includes the group headquarters, six Security Forces flights consisting of forty-eight personnel, and an Air National Guard heavy weapons flight organized into six MK 19 Grenade Launcher, eight M2 .50 caliber machinegun, four 81mm mortar, and two weapons maintenance teams, as well as two fire control center elements. Inherent in the command structure of the headquarters element is sixteen different Air Force Specialty Codes. Figure 3-1 identifies these unique capabilities organic to the headquarters element. This robust command element gives the Group Commander direct control over the critical staff expertise needed to counter terrorist threats and allows the commander to coordinate the efforts of key components such as explosive ordnance disposal, communications, intelligence, civil engineering, and logistics. Figure 3-2 depicts the 820th Security Forces Group organizational structure.

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The deployment of the 820th is tied to the Air Force’s newly developed Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) concept. When an AEF is alerted for deployment, the 820th headquarters element receives the initial tasking to provide force protection assets. A mission analysis is then conducted to determine the necessary security force structure. This analysis identifies the region in which the AEF will operate and any potential threats in that region. Using the METT-T model, (mission, enemy, terrain, time, troops) the headquarters identifies a force protection package capable of countering those threats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Field</th>
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<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3-1. 820th Security Forces Group Staff Personnel Breakout.**


169 Ibid, slide 8.
The bulk of deployable force protection assets are assigned to one Air Force Reserve and five active duty Security Forces flights located throughout the United States. Subordinate to the 820th, these flights are specifically trained and organized to support the AEF concept.  

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172 Ibid, slide 9.
173 Ibid, slide 29.
Upon deployment, these flights are augmented with personnel from the 820th Group headquarters, specific heavy weapons capabilities from the Air National Guard heavy weapons flight and military working dog teams from various locations. Rounding out the deployed force protection package is an Air Force Office of Special Investigations Antiterrorism Specialty Team. This team provides specialized counterintelligence, antiterrorism, and force protection capabilities designed to complement the intelligence assets inherent to the 820th Security Forces Group.

United States Marine Corps Brigadier General James T. Conway recently explained that, “The terrorist tries to look for the weak target. We can do [our] absolute best…as commanders at given installations, but one of us is weaker than the others. …That’s were the terrorist will go”. The 820th Security Forces Group headquarters and subordinate deployable flights provide the AEF commander with force protection capabilities to strengthen deployed base defenses and deter against terrorist attacks. In short, make the terrorist look elsewhere.

The final way in which security forces currently organize for deployment is in support of Air Force “Palace Tenure” requirements. Palace Tenure is an Air Force personnel program designed to meet personnel needs for on-going, worldwide deployment operations. These requirements are identified by the geographic commander and passed down through the Air Force to the Major Commands.

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174 Ibid, slide 27.
The Air Force currently has 1305 security forces personnel deployed in support of Palace Tenure requirements.\textsuperscript{178} The most common size security forces unit deployed in support of Palace Tenure requirements is a squad-size, 13-person element.\textsuperscript{179} Individual airmen with specialized training, such as military working dog handlers and heavy weapons elements, are also deployed when the geographic commander identifies the requirement for specific capabilities.\textsuperscript{180}

Deployment timeframes vary depending on the mission, but the normal rotation cycle is approximately 120 days.\textsuperscript{181} Every security forces member undergoes weapons training prior to deployment and deploys with an M-16 rifle.\textsuperscript{182} Security forces may deploy with additional weapons if required. In addition to weapons training, all security forces members receive specific training in antiterrorism, first aid, and chemical warfare prior to deployment.\textsuperscript{183}

**Summary**

In an effort to build stronger defenses to protect deployed personnel and equipment from terrorist threats, the U.S. Air Force Security Forces staff is proposing changes to current Air Force doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. Organizations such as the Phoenix Raven program and the 820\textsuperscript{th} Security Forces Group have already been created; force protection training is being conducted throughout the Air Force, and money is being committed to new technology designed to enhance protection. Will this

\textsuperscript{178} Notes, Email response from HQ ACC/SFOC, 12 March 1999.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
be enough to deter future terrorism? Probably not without a institutional change in how the Air Force views the threat of ground attacks.

The two hardest changes to incorporate into the Air Force will be to change doctrine and to increase the personnel of the security forces career field. To achieve air and space superiority, the Security Forces staff recommends that the Air Force addresses the threat of terrorism and incorporates this threat into existing doctrine. This will require a new mindset for the Air Force, one that may take years to instill. In light of the recent personnel drawdowns and budget reductions, an increase in security forces personnel is unlikely to occur. The activation of units and increase in security forces personnel will undoubtedly divert funds away from technology requirements and precious pilots from the cockpit. With that said, Chapter Five addresses alternatives that will help the approximately 21,000 active duty and less than 10,000 reserve component security forces members protect deployed forces against future terrorist attacks.184

183 Ibid.
Chapter 5

What Next?

_Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you._

Paul Wilkinson
British Scholar, Author on Terrorism
_Daily Telegraph, (London, 1 September 1992)\textsuperscript{185}

Summary

The United States will continue to use its military power to shape the strategic environment of the future. The United States Air Force will remain at the forefront of this power, forward deployed, to assist in projecting military power in regions opposed to U.S. policy. Most adversaries in these regions do not have the conventional capability to defeat the Air Force in the air and are likely to use asymmetric means to oppose U.S. policies and undermine support of U.S. actions. As the U.S. armed forces develop methods to counter known threats, terrorists and other irregular forces will adapt their means and methods of attack to exploit weaknesses in our defenses. The lethality of future attacks is likely to increase as the advancement in technology and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues.

\textsuperscript{185} Taken from _The Columbia Dictionary of Quotations_. Licensed from Columbia University Press. Copyright 1993, 1995 by Columbia University Press. All rights reserved.
Following the June 1996 attack on Khobar Towers, the U.S. Air Force, as it had done in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, quickly trained, organized, and equipped a robust organization capable of providing internal security of forward deployed assets. The Phoenix Raven Program provides point defense for aircraft in high threat areas while the 820th Security Forces Group and Palace Tenure deployments provide air base security during contingency operations. Additionally, initiatives are being discussed that would instill a surface threat mindset in all Air Force personnel. These initiatives require a fundamental change in Air Force doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. If history is any indication of future actions, the Air Force will quickly lose interest in security operations and dismiss these initiatives as too costly or unnecessary.

Historical analysis of air base defense reveals that the Air Force has a short attention span for protection against ground threats. Following World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the Air Force quickly reduced security capabilities when the immediate threat diminished. As new threats materialized, the Air Force had to “reinvent the wheel” to produce a capability to counter that threat. The results of these actions were a lack of continuity and doctrine for security operations.

An analysis of the Vietnam War revealed that in order to provide an effective, coordinated, and controlled security environment one must have organic capabilities to protect against known threats. In Vietnam, the Air Force maintained a Cold War mentality of internal security and concentrated organic capabilities inside the “legal perimeter” while relying on friendly ground forces for protection outside the perimeter. Ground force priorities quickly changed from supporting air base defense to offensive operations, leaving a sanctuary from which the enemy launched effective standoff
attacks. As the standoff threat intensified, the Air Force failed to adjust its security policy or develop the capabilities required to counter this threat.

In Beirut, the Marines had the organic capability to defend themselves but commanders were forced by political constraints to alter their perimeter defense and rely on Lebanese forces for external security. These constraints resulted in heavy sniper fire and a terrorist bomb attack that left 241 service members dead. The lesson for the Air Force is that political considerations will be a factor when defending temporary bases. Commanders must anticipate these factors and adjust base defense plans as required to meet the threat.

Where to Go From Here

There is no perfect formula for complete immunity from terrorist attack. The key is to invest enough resources to deter attack without divesting yourself of the resources necessary to accomplish the mission. “Force protection can not be the mission. If it is, we don’t get the job done.”186 The following recommended alternatives are present to assist Air Force leaders in developing a Security Forces organization capable of deterring future terrorist acts while maintaining a delicate balance between protection and mission accomplishment. These alternatives will be discussed in terms of doctrine, training, organization, and equipment.

Doctrine

The Security Forces staff proposal for changing current Air Force doctrine by including the surface dimension threat as a seventh core competency should be
implemented by the Air Force. AFDD1 states, “A particular core competency is not necessarily unique to the Air Force, but for our Air Force they are not optional”. The continued use of forward deployed Air Force assets to shape the strategic environment, coupled with the inability of most adversaries to defeat the U.S. Air Force in the air, substantially increases the surface dimension threat to such a point that security of forward deployed air bases is no longer optional.

History has shown that the U.S. Air Force lacks the patience to maintain a constant alert. As the threat decreases, capabilities are also decreased. As a seventh core competency, force protection will have an enduring place in future Air Force planning, programming and execution. No longer will Security Forces be thought of as a necessary burden, but will be looked upon as a combat multiplier required to accomplish the mission. This change in focus will undoubtedly take years but appears to be essential for the Air Force if it is to maintain a viable defense force.

Training

The primary mission of all Security Forces must be to provide force protection. Security Forces training, from initial basic training up through the senior officer level must stress the combat skills required to accomplish this mission. The law enforcement mission remains an important function, but training in combat skills can not suffer because of it. Security forces can be organized at installations in such a way that meets the law enforcement requirements but does not detract from the training of combat skills. An example of this is to schedule Security Forces squads or flights, depending on the size

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186 Quote from Colonel Rocky Lane, chief of Security Forces, Air Mobility Command. Taken for Air Force Magazine. To Protect the Force. Published by The Air Force Association, November 1998, p.34
of the law enforcement requirement, so that they work one month in law enforcement duties, one month in small unit tactics/weapons training, and one month in squad/flight level collective tasks. This type rotation is used by U.S. Army military police units and has been effective in maintaining proficiency in both law enforcement and combat support missions. The benefits of adopting this concept are that security forces will be able to meet the installation requirements and maintain proficiency in the combat skills required to protect deployed assets. The drawback of this alternative is that in order for it to be implemented, base commanders must accept additional risks or inconveniences by eliminating some security forces manning requirements. The elimination of such tasks as funds escorts or the reduced hours of operation for gates and offices are two generic examples of ways in which security forces can be reduced. This reduction will free up the man-hours required for training in combat skills.

Terrorists are likely to continue to enjoy the element of surprise by determining the time, place, and method of attack. Training non-Security Forces personnel in combat skills such as the construction of fighting positions and range cards will not reduce this threat. These personnel should continue to be trained in technical tasks related to their primary duties. Additional training should include threat awareness, basic lifesaving skills, disaster preparedness/response, and NBC protection. In an environment with an asymmetric threat, the main defense is the Security Forces on duty. Most ground support personnel have duties that are very technically demanding and they should remain committed to their primary duties.

Organization

The current policy of manning the Security Forces career field for peacetime operations is not the most effective method of maintaining a high quality of life standard for security forces personnel while meeting the requirements for security of deployed forces. But with the recent personnel drawdowns and defense budget cuts, security forces can not realistically expect further increases beyond the activation of the 820th Security Forces Group Headquarters and its subordinate squadrons.

The 820th Security Forces Group Headquarters is sufficiently staffed to provide command and control for the six assigned security forces flights. The composition of the unit adequately represents the critical career fields necessary for the planning and execution of base defense operations. When called upon to protect deployed assets, units of the 820th SF Group should deploy in mass. If the security requirement for a deployed location is a squadron size unit, then a designated squadron deploys as a unit. If the deployment continues for an extended time then another squadron should replace it. The benefit of maintaining the concept of unit integrity is that it will facilitate an effective, coordinated and controlled security environment throughout the operation. The shortcoming of mass deployments is that the current size of the 820th and subordinate units only allows them to provide security for two extended deployment operations. Any deployments beyond this capability would require the continued practice of Palace Tenure piecemeal deployments. If this is the case, the training concept previously outlined will be critical for security forces if they are to maintain the required combat skills necessary for base defense.
Equipment

The Air Force should continue to invest in resources that will reduce the need for additional personnel to monitor activities beyond the perimeter of deployed locations. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles, remote surveillance systems, automated closed circuit television cameras, and thermal imaging devices provide security forces with the ability to detect threats before they get to the fence line. The exact surveillance distance will vary with each deployment but as a minimum, the capability must exist to monitor the footprint area of known enemy weapons systems. Once detected, elimination of the threat will require the capability of security forces to employ firepower quickly on target. This will require either an organic standoff weapons capability like the MK-19, organic mobile assets in which to deploy personnel and equipment, or good communication and coordination with friendly/host nation ground forces. If security forces are not authorized, based on the tactical or political situation, to employ firepower outside the perimeter fence, then passive measures must be employed to mitigate the effects of the threat. Deployable blast mitigation devices, Mylar glass covering and individual clothing that protects against chemical and biological agents can all be used to reduce damage to equipment and personnel casualties.

The initial cost of procuring such equipment will be high. Fortunately, most of the equipment needed to support security requirements is recoverable upon completion of the mission and can be used on subsequent deployments.

Conclusion

This study does not imply that these actions alone will insulate the Air Force from future terrorist attack. As defenses are established to deter one method of attack,
terrorists will develop another, often times more lethal, method in which to strike. But without incorporating into doctrine the threat of asymmetric terrorist attacks, the resolve necessary to expend the resources to protect against those threats will quickly dissipate. Security Forces will be viewed as they have in the past, like an umbrella. When the sun is shining, one throws their umbrella in the closet and forgets about it. As the rain starts, the umbrella is pulled out, opened and found to contain many holes caused by neglect. Those holes are just the target that terrorists are looking for.
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Notes. Email response from HQ ACC/SFOC, 12 March 1999.


