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School of Advanced Airpower Studies
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## Information as a Weapon: Reality Versus Promises

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The concept of information warfare continues to gain visibility within US political and military arenas. Active discourse by individuals within the government and private circles regarding what constitutes the proper emphasis on and employment of information warfare indicates the entire subject is still shrouded in controversy. In the simplest terms, literature on the role of information war exists in two categories: first, as "information in warfare" and second, as "information warfare." The former discusses information in the more traditional notion of a support for decision making and combat operations. The latter, however, uses information as a "weapon" in and of itself in warfare. This thesis addresses the second theme and questions whether information is a weapon. It employs the theories and principles of Carl von Clausewitz as a theoretical underpinning for critical analysis. In this analysis, the paper investigates whether information as a weapon can achieve the purposes of war. Specifically, can the use of the "information weapon" diminish an adversary's will and capacity to fight. The results of the analysis indicate that while information may be considered a weapon, it is one that must be used with caution. The more enthusiastic proponents of the information weapon tend to overestimate its ability to diminish enemy will and capacity to fight. In fact, three characteristics of information warfare, as envisioned by its proponents, are particularly unconvincing. They describe the information weapon as a low cost weapon with high-payoff; a method to eliminate the fog and friction of war for friendly forces, yet enshroud the enemy in the same; and a tool to attain quick and bloodless victories to the point of being able to end wars before the first shot is ever fired. Several implications and cautions resulted from the analysis conducted in this thesis regarding the use of the information weapon. Information is not a weapon that is the technological "silver bullet," able to subdue the enemy without battle. Unlike other, more conventional weapons, the effects of the information weapon is not necessarily predictable because it often targets the human mind and emotions. Thus, in employing the information weapon, the military must not rely solely on its use to obtain political and military objectives. Rather, the strategists must prudently use the information weapon in conjunction with more traditional weapons of war or as a precursor to conventional attacks and operations.
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INFORMATION AS A WEAPON
REALITY VERSUS PROMISES

BY
YULIN G. WHITEHEAD

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
AIR UNIVERSITY
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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.
About The Author

Major YuLin G. Whitehead (BS, International Affairs, United States Air Force Academy; MA, Management, Webster University) is an Intelligence Officer. After graduating from intelligence school at Lowry AFB, Colorado, she was assigned to Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina where she served as an A-10 squadron intelligence section chief and later as wing operations intelligence branch chief for the Tactical Fighter Wing. She graduated in a class of the first four intelligence officers ever to attend the USAF Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada. Her second assignment was as an inspector for intelligence, operations plans, and tactical deception on the Headquarters Tactical Air Command, and later the Air Combat Command Inspector General, Langley AFB, Virginia. Reassigned to the Air Staff, Pentagon, Washington DC, Major Whitehead served as senior plans and policy officer and also as assistant executive to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters USAF. In 1987, she was honored as Intelligence Officer of the Year for the United States Air Force. She was also a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. Upon graduation from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, she was assigned as deputy commander, 607th Air Intelligence Group, Osan AB, Korea. She and her husband, Ray, have been happily married for a decade.
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Abstract

The concept of information warfare continues to gain visibility within US political and military arenas. Active discourse by individuals within the government and private circles regarding what constitutes the proper emphasis on and employment of information warfare indicates the entire subject is still shrouded in controversy. In the simplest terms, literature on the role of information war exists in two categories: first, as “information in warfare” and second, as “information warfare.” The former discusses information in the more traditional notion of a support for decision making and combat operations. The latter, however, uses information as a “weapon” in and of itself in warfare. This thesis addresses the second theme and questions whether information is a weapon. It employs the theories and principles of Carl von Clausewitz as a theoretical underpinning for critical analysis. In this analysis, the paper investigates whether information as a weapon can achieve the purposes of war. Specifically, can the use of the “information weapon” diminish an adversary’s will and capacity to fight. The results of the analysis indicate that while information may be considered a weapon, it is one that must be used with caution. The more enthusiastic proponents of the information weapon tend to overestimate its ability to diminish enemy will and capacity to fight. In fact, three characteristics of information warfare, as envisioned by its proponents, are particularly unconvincing. They describe the information weapon as a low cost weapon with high-payoff; a method to eliminate the fog and friction of war for friendly forces, yet enshroud the enemy in the same; and a tool to attain quick and bloodless victories to the point of being able to end wars before the first shot is ever fired. Several implications and
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Chapter 1

Introduction

*We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological breakthroughs...are changing the face of war and how we prepare for war.*

—William Perry, Secretary of Defense

*Information is not in and of itself a medium of warfare, except in certain narrow aspects (such as electronic jamming).*

—Martin C. Libicki  
*What is Information Warfare?*

The concept of information warfare continues to gain visibility within US political and military arenas. Active discourse by individuals within the government and private circles regarding what constitutes the proper emphasis on and employment of information warfare indicates the entire subject is still shrouded in controversy. Even more fundamentally, the debate often centers on what activities should or should not fit within the realm of information warfare. At the most basic level, there appear to be two divergent opinions as to what information warfare offers US political and military leaders. At one extreme, proponents of information warfare argue that breakthroughs in information technology will fundamentally change the way the US military prepares for warfare and fights. Specifically, they believe information warfare will replace war in the traditional sense. Thus, “warfare” in its “information” variant no longer requires an act of “physical force” to compel the enemy to do one’s will.¹ Those on the other side of the
spectrum see information warfare as merely a new label for operations (such as psychological operations, deception, physical destruction, etc.) military forces have conducted for thousands of years.

Despite the controversy, information warfare seems to have captured the attention of leaders within the US national security community as they struggle to define the concept and its role in US national policy. Ultimately, the emphasis that policy makers place on information warfare may re-direct much of the nation's view of war. This re-direction may, in turn, have significant implications for US military theory, doctrine, training, organization, manning, and equipment procurement.

The dramatic increase in professional and popular literature dealing with every aspect of information warfare testifies to the growing interest in the topic. The writings show extremes in opinions and can become confusing to one who attempts to understand the significance of information to future military operations and warfare. Adding to the confusion are the new jargon and definitions created by those who believe that information warfare will alter the nature of conflict. They see themselves as visionaries, and they make promises regarding the use of information, vowing it will revolutionize warfare. The following excerpt is typical of the outlook of this school of thought:

Industrialization led to attritional warfare by massive armies (e.g., World War I). Mechanization led to maneuver predominated by tanks (e.g., World War II). The information revolution implies the rise of cyberwar, in which neither mass nor mobility will decide outcomes; instead, the side that knows more, that can disperse the fog of war yet enshroud an adversary in it, will enjoy decisive advantages.

Among the many claims made by proponents of information warfare, the most unique and “revolutionary” center on the use of information as a weapon. For example,
John M. Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence, proclaimed in June 1996 that “the ultimate precision guided weapon is the electron.” Supporters of this concept regard information as a weapon in and of itself rather than as a support function for traditional military operations against enemy forces. In another example, the recently published *Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force* explained that the “security environment is changing” and stated that one of those changes includes the way the Air Force views “information.” The document continued by clarifying that “yesterday… information [was] an adjunct to weapons,” whereas “tomorrow… information [will be] a weapon/target.”

The concept of “information as a weapon” is unique and, if valid, may alter basic military theories and doctrines used by warriors throughout history. While this statement may seem alarmist, an examination of the assumptions and outcomes predicted by supporters of the “information weapon” concept makes clear the potential implications for military theory and doctrine. The assumptions describe information warfare as a low cost option with high-payoff potential; a means of eliminating fog and friction of war for friendly forces, while immersing the enemy in fog and friction; and a method for allowing the US military to attain quick and bloodless victories.

These claims are indeed radical and deserve critical investigation. If information really is a weapon that will change the face of war, then the US must immediately alter its view of what constitutes warfare. Further, the US must prepare to fight with modified or radically revised views of warfare, experiences, theories, and doctrine.
Definition of Terms

In addition to creating controversy over what activities fall under the rubric of information warfare, the many interpretations of the various terms cloud the entire concept. Any ten authors of information warfare-related publications will likely produce ten different definitions of what constitutes and does not constitute information warfare. Some will likely substitute “information warfare” for terms such as information operations, information-age warfare, cyberwar, netwar, and knowledge warfare or knowledge-based warfare. In fact, within the Department of Defense (DoD), there are no fewer than 27 different definitions of information warfare or a related term.9

Definitions of information warfare are often so broad that they are of little use in developing common doctrines or applying strategic concepts. Further, Dr. Dan Kuehl, professor at the School of Information Warfare and Strategy at the National Defense University, explained that the school has had a different definition of information warfare in each of the three years of its existence. This constant variation in the definition probably indicates a lack of conceptual certainty regarding its role and impact on national security.10 Current definitions range from the one extreme that essentially makes nearly all human activities subsets of information warfare, to the minimalist reduction of the concept to no more than a series of few nondestructive actions such as collection of information on the enemy.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present an all-encompassing and seemingly endless list of information warfare definitions. Neither is it the author’s goal to develop the ultimate doctrinal definition. However, the author does want to illustrate the diversity of definitions used by theorists (See Tables 1 and 2). Despite these variations, similarities
do exist among the US military services’ definitions of information warfare. They all have a common theme of using information as an offensive and defensive tool. Specifically, they all define the concept as actions taken against an adversary’s information while at the same time protecting friendly information. (See Table 1).

Table 1. US Military Services Information Warfare Definitions

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Publication 1-02, <em>DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</em></td>
<td>Information Warfare: “Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while leveraging and defending one’s own information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks.”¹¹</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Army Field Manual 100-6, <em>Information Operations</em></td>
<td>Information Warfare: “Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one’s own information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks.”¹²</td>
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<td>US Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, <em>Information Warfare, Second Draft</em></td>
<td>Information Warfare: “Actions taken within the information environment to deny, exploit, corrupt, destroy or assure information viability. The goal is to achieve an information advantage. IW can make a decisive difference at the strategic level by neutralizing an adversary’s will and capacity to fight. IW can also facilitate military efforts at the operational and tactical levels by enabling freedom of action, security, initiative, and flexibility. Counterinformation and information assurance comprise the majority of IW efforts.”¹³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Navy OPNAVINST 3430.26, <em>Implementing Instruction for Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare</em></td>
<td>Information Warfare: “Use of information in support of national strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage by attacking an adversary’s information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and influence, while protecting friendly information systems.”¹⁴</td>
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On the other hand, the definitions in less formal, and popular literature do vary considerably. These authors tend to develop jargon to substitute for the term “information warfare.” Further, their definitions, at times, show a significant departure
from formal DoD definitions that focus on an offense-defense framework as indicated by Tables 1 and 2.

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<tr>
<td>Dr. George Stein, “Information Warfare,” <em>Airpower Journal</em></td>
<td>“Information warfare, in its largest sense, is simply the use of information to achieve our national objectives…. in its most fundamental sense, is the emerging ‘theater’ in which future nation-against-nation conflict at the strategic level is most likely to occur.”¹⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Richard Szafranski, “Neocortical Warfare: The Acme of Skill,” <em>Military Review</em></td>
<td>“Neocortical warfare strives to influence, even to the point of regulating, the consciousness, perceptions, and will of the adversary’s leadership: the enemy’s neocortical system.”¹⁶</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” <em>Comparative Strategy</em></td>
<td>Netwar and Cyberwar: “While both netwar and cyberwar revolve around information and communications matters, at a deeper level they are forms of war about ‘knowledge,’ about who knows what, when, where, and why, and about how secure a society or a military is regarding its knowledge of itself and its adversaries.”¹⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence E. Casper, “Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Security Strategy for the Next Century,” <em>Joint Forces Quarterly</em></td>
<td>“Knowledge-based warfare is a process that provides superior situation awareness of the battlespace, allowing us to decide at a faster pace than an enemy. It enables us to leverage our battlespace knowledge to achieve discrete effects through precision employment of combat power.”¹⁸</td>
</tr>
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</table>

From the previous two tables of definitions, it is obvious that those interested in the concepts of information warfare cannot come to a consensus on a working definition as they struggle with the complexity of defining the term either too broadly or too narrowly. Nevertheless, their definitional struggle actually has very little impact on this thesis. Since this paper will focus on a recurring theme among information warfare proponents, that of using information as a weapon, the actual definition becomes less crucial to the analysis.
Another term that requires definition is “weapon.” When related to “information” as part of the thesis question, some authors may construe the term “weapon” as a process, while others envision it as a tool to achieve some end. In other words, those who see information as a process would use information to alter enemy perceptions of reality, similar to psychological operations. However, most advocates view information as a tool, equating it as the “ultimate precision guided weapon.” For this thesis both views may be useful. For the purposes of this analysis, “weapon” is defined as a means or device used by the military to “compel the enemy to do our will.”

Methodology and Analytical Criteria

The last several years have seen a virtual explosion in writings on information warfare. Anyone conducting research for this subject area will find no shortage of “experts” and materials discussing the various uses of information. The writers use models ranging from historical case studies to ultra-futuristic scenarios to explain how information warfare has impacted or will impact conflicts.

Faced with the extensive and varied literature, this thesis will examine a large cross-sampling of the writings that discuss information as a weapon. It will present a discussion of what the information warfare community believes is the role of information in war and its impact on warfare. A survey of literature uncovers that the opinions range from those who laud the virtues of using information as the “ultimate precision guided weapon” to those, such as Martin C. Libicki, who caution that “information warfare, as a separate technique of waging war, does not exist.”
This analysis of information as a weapon relies on both official and private sources. They include various Department of Defense policy and doctrinal publications, and academic writings that discuss the impact of the “information weapon” on military planning, employment, and training, as well as the future of warfare. The author also conducted interviews and exchanged electronic mail with various experts on the issue of information warfare.

In assessing whether information is a weapon, this analysis will use the theories and principles of Carl von Clausewitz as its theoretical underpinning. Chapter Two addresses the rationale for relying on the theories of Clausewitz as the basis of analysis for this study. Chapter Three presents the evidence used by proponents to assert that “information is a weapon.” It explains several common themes and assumptions professed by the “information weapon” advocates including the role of information in warfare; the effect of information on fog and friction; and the contribution of information in achieving quick, decisive, and bloodless victories in warfare. Chapter Four couples the principles and theories of Clausewitz with historical case studies to assess the validity and consistency of the arguments regarding the use of information as a weapon. The final chapter draws conclusions from the analysis of evidence and contemplates implications regarding the use and role of information in warfare.

Notes

1Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75. Clausewitz’s definition of war has generally been accepted as the normative definition. He likened war to “a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.” Clausewitz further emphasized the definition of war by stating, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” At one
extreme, the proponents of information warfare appear to challenge Clausewitz’s definition. They believe physical force will no longer be necessary to compel the enemy to do their will and, in fact, information warfare will replace physical force.


3. John M. Deutch had served dual-hatted as both the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The National Security Act of 1947 designates the DCI as the primary adviser on national foreign intelligence to the President and the National Security Council. The DCI is tasked with directing and conducting all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. To discharge these duties, the DCI serves both as head of the CIA and of the US Intelligence Community. It was in his DCI capacity that Deutch testified before the US Senate on the subject of “Foreign Information Warfare Programs and Capabilities.” See also endnote 4, this chapter.


7. This thesis uses Clausewitz’s definition of “fog” and “friction” which encompass both chance and the difference between war on paper and in reality. For more details, see
Notes


9. Maj Rick Sowell, Chairman, Information Warfare Research and Education, College of Aerospace Doctrine and Education (CADRE), Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., interviewed by author, 9 and 10 January 1997. Major Sowell explained that while conducting research to fulfill an internal CADRE tasking in determining how to “operationalize” information warfare, he found no fewer than 27 different definitions within the Department of Defense. Failing to find a satisfactory one, he consolidated 15 definitions into one.


12. Field Manual (FM) 100-6, *Information Operations*, August 1996, 2-2. In this publication, the Army uses the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01 definition of information warfare.


Notes


17. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” previously cited in endnote 2, this chapter.


19. Clausewitz, 75. “War is thus an act to force to compel our enemy to do our will.” A weapon is a means or device to further that objective.

Chapter 2

Carl Von Clausewitz—Timeless and Enduring

*It was my ambition to write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in the subject [of war].*

—Carl von Clausewitz

*On War*

Assessing the validity of whether information is a weapon requires a rigorous and objective examination of the ideas expressed by proponents of the concept. This analysis employs the theories and principles of Carl von Clausewitz as assessment tools. This chapter will show the ubiquitous influence of the theories of Clausewitz in US political thoughts and military writings. Nevertheless, it does not assert that the theories of Clausewitz provided the exclusive and sole influence to the development of US political and military relationship and doctrines.

Clausewitz is relevant to this study on three grounds. First, the sophistication of his thoughts and rational logic of his writings have made his theories eternal. Second, major portions of US military doctrine may be traced to the basic principles explained in Clausewitz’s classic book, *On War*. Third, students attending US military professional military education (PME) schools study the theories and principles of Clausewitz along with other military theorists. Given this role in American theory and doctrine, the
writings of Clausewitz provide a reasonable test of the claim that information is a weapon.

The “Eternal Clausewitz”

Bernard Brodie, an internationally acclaimed RAND political scientist, stated that there are at least two reasons why Clausewitz continues to merit careful study: “first, he was striving always, with a success that derived from his great gifts as well as his intense capacity for work, to get to the fundamentals of each issue he examined, beginning with the fundamental nature of war itself; and second, he is vitally alone in his accomplishment. His is not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war.”

This type of high praise for Clausewitz has a long history. A few decades after Clausewitz’s death, German theorist Wilhelm Rustow compared the work of Clausewitz to that of Thucydides’ as “a work for all times.” Since then, various noted authors have also appreciated the durability of Clausewitz’s work by equating him to Goethe, Shakespeare, and Machiavelli. Further, the introduction to one edition of On War likened Clausewitz to Bacon, Hobbes, Marx, and Adam Smith.

Beyond the praise, the primary reason that the basic theories and concepts in On War remain timeless and enduring is the book’s view of war. Clausewitz recognized that warfare is a human event encompassing many aspects of human affairs rather than a mere science or art.

Too often, novice, and sometimes serious, military strategists use On War as a book of quotations to support a military concept du jour and to lend credibility to their writings. Consequently, the allegation that Clausewitz is an oft-quoted but seldom-read
theorist\textsuperscript{25} carries more truth than most students of strategy are willing to admit. This is understandable, since \textit{On War} is a complex book that requires deliberate and repeated study for full appreciation.

Clausewitz recognized warfare as a complex human event and did not write \textit{On War} as a how-to book with checklists that would enable the military strategist to achieve victory on the battlefield. Because Clausewitz sought to examine the many facets of war, he dealt with topics of philosophy, epistemology, history, political science, psychology, and military strategy and tactics. In fact, Clausewitz would dissect a single concept, such as the definition of war,\textsuperscript{26} from many different angles, taking the reader down many roads, yet often returning to the same fundamental points.\textsuperscript{27}

Clausewitz is frustrating to many readers for the same reason that he is enduring and timeless. The following syllogism may demonstrate this point. Consider that:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{If } A &\neq B \\
\text{And } C &= A \\
\text{Therefore } C &\neq B
\end{align*}
\]

If humans do not behave according to laws
And warfare is a human event
Therefore, warfare will not follow laws

The syllogism represents the approach Clausewitz used in developing the theories and concepts for \textit{On War} and demonstrates the remarkable level of sophistication in his thinking. Through the use of this approach, he formulated theories and concepts that challenge strategists to consider characteristics and factors within the complex realm of warfare. He best summarized this philosophy in Book II,

In the conduct of war, perception cannot be governed by laws: the complex phenomena of war are not so uniform, nor the uniform phenomena so complex, as to make laws more useful than the simple truth. Where a simple point of view and plain language are sufficient, it would be pedantic and affected to make them \textit{complex} and \textit{involved}. Nor can the theory of war apply the concept of law to action, since no
prescriptive formulation universal enough to deserve the name of law can be applied to the constant change and diversity of the phenomena of war.\textsuperscript{28}

In another classic dictum, Clausewitz developed a dual concept of the “trinity.” In the metaphysical realm, the trinity consisted of violence, chance, reason. In the physical realm, the trinity consisted of the people, army, and the government. Specifically, he associated the people with violence, the army with chance, and the government with reason. In his own words, Clausewitz explained that war necessarily involves an interaction of the “paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”\textsuperscript{29}

**US Military Doctrine**

Many of the fundamental concepts of *On War* permeate US military writings. The relationship between the US political goals and military objectives embodies the concepts in *On War*’s most well known dictum, “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”\textsuperscript{30} In his classic use of duality, Clausewitz explained that theorists could not develop a practical theory for the conduct of war unless they also understood the direct relationship between the ends and means. In this case, he saw the end as the political objective of war and combat as the primary military means to achieve it.\textsuperscript{31}

Many current US military doctrinal publications reflect the fundamental theories developed in *On War*. Two examples include the Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, *Basic
AFM 1-1 is the current capstone doctrine document for the US Air Force and serves as the foundation of all other Air Force doctrine. Even a cursory review of this manual reveals the influence of Clausewitz’s theories and concepts. Remarkable similarities exist between the two publications, and both On War and AFM 1-1 warn their readers not to allow doctrine to become dogma. Other resemblances are equally striking and directly reflect the concepts described in On War. Yet the most telling evidence of the influence of Clausewitz on AFM 1-1 is the use of his words as the epigraph for Chapter 1 of the document, “It is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy.”34 Some of the other examples of the impact of On War on AFM 1-1 are (See Table 3):

**Table 3. On War’s Influence on AFM 1-1**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Subject</th>
<th>On War</th>
<th>AFM 1-1</th>
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<td>Doctrine and Dogma</td>
<td>“[Theory] is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.” (page 141)</td>
<td>“Thus doctrine is a guide for the exercise of professional judgment rather than a set of rules to be followed blindly. It is the starting point for solving contemporary problems.” (page vii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War and Politics</td>
<td>“We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” (page 87)</td>
<td>“War is an instrument of political policy.” (page 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definition of “War is thus an act of force to...”

“The military objective in war is to...”
The impact of Clausewitz on the US Army’s FM 100-5 appears equally compelling. A few comparisons of On War and FM 100-5 will again demonstrate the tremendous influence of Clausewitz’ writings on the US Army’s approach to warfare (See Table 4).

**Table 4. On War’s Influence on FM 100-5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>On War</th>
<th>FM 100-5</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doctrine and Dogma</strong></td>
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<td>“As an authoritative statement, doctrine must be definitive enough to guide specific operations, yet remain adaptable enough to address diverse and varied situations worldwide.” (page 1-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Paradoxical trinity.”</strong></td>
<td>Regarding the “paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity….” Clausewitz equates them to the people, the commander and his army, and the government. (page 89)</td>
<td>“A special relationship exists within any nation among the government, the people, and the military; national values address this relationship.” (page 1-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Offense and Defense</strong></td>
<td>“As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” Also, “If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object.” (pages 84 &amp; 358)</td>
<td>“The defense is the less decisive form of war. The defense may nonetheless be stronger than the offense, thus METT-T³⁵ may necessitate defense in a campaign for a force-projection army prior to conducting offensive operations.” (page 6-19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken as a whole, the fundamental concepts explained in On War appear to have directly shaped a significant portion of US military doctrine.
US Professional Military Education Schools

US professional military education (PME) schools have at least one common theme in their curricula. These service PME schools\(^36\) as well as the National Defense University’s School of Information Warfare and Strategy all instruct their students on classical military theories, including and especially Clausewitz’s *On War*. Clearly, each school subscribes to the belief that the concepts of these military theorists still hold relevance to contemporary and future planning efforts, and the education of military officers.

Most interesting and directly apropos to this analysis is the School of Information Warfare and Strategy’s course titled “Classical Strategists Through an Information Lens.”\(^37\) The school’s course syllabus explains that “the course seeks to determine how the ideas of these noted individuals [classical and post-classical theorists] have influenced war in the past and how they can further our understanding of information war.” The course description cites two specific theorists: Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.

Not only does current military doctrine and thinking reflect the influence of Clausewitz, but the US military encourages this influence to continue in the future. If PME school curricula are an indication, then it seems reasonable to assume that the US military must view at least portions of Clausewitz’s theories as enduring and timeless.

Conclusion

As previously stated, despite the ubiquity of the theories of Clausewitz in basic military doctrine, this chapter does not assert that the theories of Clausewitz were the sole influence on the development of US political and military relationship and doctrines. The
author does, however, contend that much of US military doctrines mirror the ideas expressed by Clausewitz in his writings. Whether On War directly influenced developers of doctrine and strategy cannot be stated with absolute certainty; however, the parallels between the two are unmistakable. It is reasonable to assume that modern US military doctrines and strategies emerged from the thoughts of many theorists, tempered by national experience. Nevertheless, US military thoughts will likely continue to reflect the basic theories and thoughts found in the writings of Clausewitz.

The next chapter will present the case study for the use and classification of information as a weapon. It will explain how advocates of the information weapon view its employment strategies and the resulting effects. The author will refrain from critical analysis of the evidence presented in Chapter Three so as to not bias the evidence promoted by its proponents. Of course, the author will critical analyze the case study in Chapter Four to answer the thesis question of whether information is a weapon.

Notes

21. For a systematic and analytical study at how Bernard Brodie arrived at the conclusion that On War “is not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war,” reference Brodie’s War and Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973).
Notes

26. Clausewitz, 75-89. For example, Clausewitz, in defining “What Is War?” first explained war as a duel, then as a wrestling match, and then as a card game. Initially, the reader may become frustrated in attempting to find a definition of war but this is one example of the sophistication of his thought process. It is likely that Clausewitz did not intend for the reader to lift the definition of war from strictly one analogy. Rather, with each analogy, he sought to explain another aspect of war that must be considered in the study of warfare. By the end of the first chapter, through the use of analogies and the building block approach, he made one of his fundamental points, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.” (87) Further, a reader may expect a culminating definition of war at the end of chapter one but may be disappointed with “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” (89) In essence, it depends.

27. van Creveld, 36.
28. Clausewitz, 152.
29. Ibid, 89.
30. Ibid, 69, 87, and 605.
31. Ibid, 605.
34. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, 1.
35. FM 100-5, Glossary-6. METT-T is the acronym used by US Army planners to ensure they consider appropriate factors for an operation. METT-T is the acronym for mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available.
36. Additionally, each service’s advanced military studies courses all devote time to examine the relevance of classical theorists. These advanced studies include the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, and the US Marine Corps’ School of Advanced Warfighting Studies. Within the US Air Force, all levels of PMEs (Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College) study Clausewitz and other classical military theorists.
37. Course information provided by Dr Daniel Kuehl and taken from the Academic Year 1996-97 School of Information Warfare and Strategy Syllabus.
Chapter 3

Information—The Ultimate Precision Guided Weapon

“The electron is the ultimate precision guided weapon.”

—John M. Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence
Testimony to the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs;
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, June 25, 1996

There are many views of what constitutes information warfare. The differences in interpretation are understandable given the subtle (and sometimes not-so-subtle) variations in the definitions of information warfare. Also, the various terms used as substitutions for “information warfare” also add to the differing views of the topic. The differences in interpretation have translated into a virtual explosion of literature written by authors with their own definitions of information warfare.

The literature may be grouped into two broad categories based on the authors’ thematic approach to information warfare. The first category involves a concept that discusses information warfare in terms of the more traditional notion of the use of “information in warfare” to support decision making and combat operations. This first theme does not address the thesis question of whether information is a weapon and therefore, is inappropriate for this paper. On the other hand, the second category is a wholly different approach and one that directly provides evidence to support or refute the thesis question. Authors in this category regard “information as a weapon” in warfare.
Dr. George J. Stein, a professor at the US Air Force Air War College, also saw a clear separation between using “information in warfare” and using “information as a weapon” or what he termed “information warfare” or “information attack.” He believes that there is significant difference between the two categories. Specifically, he explained “information in warfare” as

All those papers and briefings that begin “Information has always been central to warfare…” and then go on to explain that “our new computer system will get information to the warfighter” so he can “achieve information dominance on the battlefield” and thus demonstrate our service’s mastery of IW, confuse information-in-war with information warfare. Whether we are digitizing the cockpit or digitizing the battlefield, this is not IW.40

The US Air Force document, Cornerstones of Information Warfare, made a similar distinction by distinguishing the difference between “information age warfare” and “information warfare.” It explained the former as “using information technology as a tool to impart our combat operations with unprecedented economies of time and force” such as cruise missiles exploiting information age technologies to put a bomb on target. Information warfare, however, “views information itself as a separate realm, potent weapon, and lucrative target” and fits in the category of using information as a weapon.

Using this typology, it appears many of those who claimed Operation Desert Storm was an information war are actually describing the use of information in warfare or information age warfare. For example, Alan D. Campen, a former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated that “this war differed fundamentally from any previous conflict [and] the outcome turned as much on superior management of knowledge as it did upon performances of people or weapons.” Further, using this definition, his and others’ argument that Operation Desert Storm was not only an information war, but the
first one in history, holds little credibility because it is not the first time an armed force failed to attain victory for lack of knowledge. Historical examples abound and one of the most celebrated is the 1944 Allied Operation Fortitude during World War II. In this instance, Adolf Hitler and the German high command’s lack of knowledge and miscalculations regarding the actual Allied invasion site, aided by their preconceptions and the Allied “Bodyguard” deception plan, contributed in large part to the Allied defeat of Germany. Even after the May 1944 Allied invasion of the Normandy coast, Hitler continued to believe that the impending “real” invasion would occur on the northern coast of France. Therefore, Alan Campen’s and others’ assertion that Operation Desert Storm differed fundamentally from previous conflicts because of the superior management of knowledge ignores historical precedents.

The USAF and Dr. Stein’s categorizations of the use of “information as a weapon” and “information in warfare” provide a logical method to separate the two main themes of information warfare literature. However, it is not the intent of this thesis to argue the merits or faults of their delineations. Rather, this thesis will use those writings that profess the use of information as a weapon rather than those that boast the effective use of information in warfare in supporting combat operations since the latter is not relevant to the thesis question of whether information is a weapon.

The “Information Weapon”

Identifying literature that advocates information as a weapon is fairly elementary. The authors usually declare their beliefs with such definitive statements as “the electron is the ultimate precision guided weapon”; “information is both the target and the
weapon” 48; “the day may well come when more soldiers carry computers than carry guns” 49; “the US may soon wage war by mouse, keyboard and computer virus” 50; “information may be the most fearsome weapon on the emerging techno-battlefield” 51; “the most potent new US weapon, however, is not a bomb, but a ganglion of electronic ones and zeroes” 52; and “in Information Warfare, Information Age weaponry will replace bombs and bullets.” 53 Certainly, this is not a comprehensive list of information warfare-related writings that proclaim information as a weapon, but it does represent a cross section of ideas that appear in a range of publications, from official government documents to more popular books and magazines meant to attract the average reader.

After one gets past the attention-getting steps of pithy statements proclaiming information as a weapon and a target, one significant theme emerges. Specifically, the “information weapon” advocates believe “information warfare can enhance power projection by diminishing an adversary’s will and capacity to make war.” 54 Linking the information weapon to the enemy’s warfighting capabilities and will to fight is significant because US military thinking has evolved to accept that diminishing these two aspects of an opponent will lead to victory for our own forces. 55 The US Army Field Manual on Information Warfare explains the significance of this linkage by equating the information weapon to the purpose of firepower in combat—“the generation of destructive force against an enemy’s capabilities and will to fight.” 56

Similarly, literature not under the purview of DoD also expounds on the ability of the information weapon to affect the enemy’s ability and will to fight. The most apparent difference between official DoD publications and popular literature is that the latter may not use the exact phrase of using information to affect “the adversary’s will and capacity
to make war.” Nevertheless, this is a firmly established concept that appears frequently in writings about information warfare. For example, retired Col Richard Szafranski, a former US Air Force Air War College professor who has written extensively on various military-related topics, equated subduing the enemy’s will to “neocortical warfare,” which “strives to influence, even to the point of regulating the consciousness, perceptions and will of the adversary’s leadership: the enemy’s neocortical system.”

In another example, Dr Dan Kuehl, a professor with the School of Information Warfare and Strategy at National Defense University, in an attempt to answer “what’s new with information warfare?” explained that information warfare will “influence the enemy’s will and ability to fight so that they stop fighting and you ‘win.’”

Information warfare is aimed at affecting the enemy’s cognitive and technical abilities to use information while protecting our own—to control and exploit the information environment. In some ways it is technologically independent in that operations can be conducted via any of the media of war, not just cyberspace, to attain that key objective of weakening the enemy will, but in other ways the new medium of cyberspace offers a particularly rich environment through which we can reach those elusive targets, the enemy’s will and capability, via the various entry ways and connecting points in the information environment, whether they be hardware, software, or wetware.

If information is the weapon, and the aim of the use of the information weapon is to diminishing an adversary’s will and capacity to make war, then what is the target of the information weapon? For this question, the answer varies. The Air Force views information itself as a separate realm, potent weapon, and lucrative target.

Other advocates of the information weapon either do not specifically address what constitutes a “target” or tend to agree in principle with the Air Force definition. While the latter group of advocates agree that the target is information, their description of the
“information target” may be more esoteric. As a case in point, Stein explained that “information attack, while ‘platform-based’ in the physical universe of matter and energy, is not the only counter-platform,” and believed that doctrinal thinking must move away from the “idea that information attack involves only the use of computers and communications.”

He incorporated John Boyd’s “Observation-Orientation-Decide-Act” (OODA) Loop in defining the targets of the information weapon. Stein saw indirect information warfare attacks as affecting the “observation” level of the OODA Loop at which information must be perceived to be acted on. On the other hand, direct information warfare corrupts the “orientation” level of the OODA loop to affect adversary analysis that ultimately results in decision and action. Thus, to him, the information weapon may or may not be used against a counterplatform. Stein’s bottom line is that “information is both the target and the weapon: the weapon effect is predictable error.”

The weapons effect of “predictable error” resulting from the use of the information weapon is an incredible notion because it assumes that one can predictably induce errors an adversary will make in “observing” and “orienting” information that ultimately results in decision and action.

In another example, Szafranski, in the most general terms, appears to agree that the information weapon affects the information target but wants his readers to focus on the “enemy mind” as a whole. He stated,

The target system of information warfare can include every element in the epistemology of an adversary. Epistemology means the entire “organization, structure methods, and validity of knowledge.” In layperson’s terms, it means everything a human organism—an individual or a group—holds to be true or real, no matter whether that which is held as true or real was acquired as knowledge or as a belief.
In Szafranski’s construct, the “acme of skill” is to employ the information weapon to “cause the enemy to choose not to fight by exercising reflexive influence, almost parasympathetic control, over products of the adversary’s neocortex.”

Thus, the prototypical advocate of using information as weapons espouses the aim of such weapons as to influence an adversary’s will and capacity to make war. Further, with information as the weapon, its target, in the simplest sense, is also information. A more esoteric definition of the target is the enemy mind or his cognitive and technical abilities to use information. Finally, the explicitly stated and sometimes implicitly assumed weapons effect is predictable error. Specifically, the use of the information weapon will allow one to predict how an enemy will err in judgment, decisions, and actions.

**Characteristics of Information Warfare**

Interestingly, these same information warfare writings also envision some common characteristics regarding warfare when employing the information weapon in future wars. They usually describe an information weapon as a low cost weapon with high-payoff; a method to eliminate fog and friction of war for friendly forces, yet enshrouding the enemy in the same; and a tool to attain quick and bloodless victories.

In an era of decreasing resources appropriated to the defense budget, information warfare advocates see the use of the information weapon as a low cost alternative to conventional military forces. Commander Lawrence Downs, winner of the Distinguished Essay in the 1995 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy Essay Competition, explained that “a tiny piece of code can have the same effect on a city’s power grid as a Tomahawk missile. There are no large armies to field, no expensive fleets of ships, aircraft, or
armor. Others agree that while the “[US] military’s microsensors and omniscient rows of video monitors may be expensive” the technology and cost needed to operate in the information warfare battlefield, “the cyberspace,” is very low.69

Another common alleged information warfare characteristic concerns the ability of the information weapon to immerse the enemy in “fog” and “friction”70 while minimizing the same for friendly forces. This idea is generally inherent in most of the official DoD definitions of information warfare—to control and exploit the enemy information environment while at the same time protecting our own. In fact, RAND analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt warned that “the information revolution implies the rise of cyberwar, in which neither mass nor mobility will decide outcomes; instead, the side that knows more, that can disperse the fog of war yet enshroud an adversary in it, will enjoy decisive advantages.”71

Finally, and perhaps the most extraordinary of the claims, is the opportunity for the US to attain quick and bloodless victories resulting from the use of information warfare. Even more incredible are the assertions, made in the following paragraphs, that the proper use of the information weapon may result in terminating wars before they start.

Regarding the possibility of quick and bloodless victories, many authors believe it is possible to compel an enemy to do one’s will without resorting to traditional battles between military forces. One proponent, Col Mike Tanksley, chief of the US Army’s information warfare center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, painted an ideal bloodless retribution against a tyrant that threatens an American ally. In his scenario, the US does not immediately send legions of soldiers or fleets of warships.
First, a computer virus is inserted into the aggressor’s telephone-switching stations, causing widespread failure of the phone system. Next, computer logic bombs, set to activate at predetermined times, destroy the electronic routers that control rail lines and military convoys, thus misrouting boxcars and causing traffic jams. Meanwhile, enemy field officers obey the orders they receive over their radios, unaware the commands are phony. Their troops are rendered ineffective as they scatter through the desert. US planes, specially outfitted for psychological operations, then jam the enemy’s TV broadcasts with propaganda messages that turn the populace against its ruler. When the despot boots up his PC, he finds that the millions of dollars he has hoarded in his Swiss bank account have been zeroed out. Zapped. All without firing a shot.72

Others seem to agree with variations of Colonel Tanksley’s information warfare Armageddon scenarios.73 For example, Col Owen Jensen, with a background in space operations, believed “information warfare promotes precision strikes. It strikes to eliminate collateral damage and to minimize casualties. It does not aim for brutal annihilation of the enemy army but rather to paralyze his nervous system and cause him to change his behavior.”74 Following the bloodless theme, RAND analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt explained that “an information offensive aimed at an enemy might seek to deter and dissuade a belligerent society without having to destroy its armed forces.”75

If the nature of the “bloodless” victory concept is extraordinary, others have taken it to its ultimate extreme. They believe that not only will the information weapon give the US the ability to attain bloodless victories, but it may also prevent a war from starting at all. For example, Col Mike Tanksley asserted that with information, “You can stop a war before it starts…. We think we have a paradigm shift here.”76 Others77 echo similar thoughts with such statements as the “most effective use of information warfare is to terminate conflict before conventional forces are ever employed”78 and that “successful
employment of IW assets could theoretically end a war before the first shot is fired.” 79
Commander Downs stated that this is possible by “destroy[ing] the entire digital
infrastructure of a nation, bringing commerce to a halt while instilling fear and
uncertainty in the populace. This could force a nation to make concessions without a
conventional armed attack.” 80

Indeed, the claims of the more enthusiastic information warfare advocates are
extraordinary. The notion of the information weapon as being capable of obtaining
predictable errors to the point of subduing enemy will without firing a shot subscribes to
the belief that human behavior and reactions are not only predictable but may be precisely
manipulated. Analysis in the next chapter will consider these characteristics in answering
the thesis question of whether information is a weapon.

Summary

The huge, and at times, confusing volume of literature written on the topic of
information warfare can generally be categorized as one of two types. First, in the more
traditional notion of the use of “information in warfare” to support decisions and combat
operations. The second type of literature is a wholly different way at viewing information
and is the basis of evidence for this thesis. It is the use of “information as a weapon” in
and of itself in combat operation.

In the simplest terms, the information weapon advocates posit that in information
warfare, the weapon is information, the target is information or the human mind that
observes and orients the information, and the aim is to diminish the adversary’s will and
capacity to make war. Interestingly, the advocates also assert that several attributes will
characterize information warfare. In their descriptions, they describe the information
weapon as a low cost weapon with high-payoff; a method to void fog and friction for
friendly forces, yet enshroud the enemy in the same; and a tool to attain quick and
bloodless victories.

The next chapter, an analysis of the arguments of the information weapon advocates,
will ask if the world is so predictable and so simple.

**Notes**


42. Ibid.


44. Campen, vii. Other examples include: (1) Toffler, 69. The Tofflers stated the Gulf War represented a completely “new form of warfare.” They asserted that “a revolution is occurring that places knowledge, in various forms, at the core of military power.”; (2) James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, *A League of Airmen: US Airpower in the Gulf War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994), 182 and 219. These RAND Corporation defense analysts asserted that “Desert Storm represented the first modern ‘information war,’ in that every aspect of military operations depended to some degree on information provided by many systems operating in various media and at all echelons.”
Notes

45. Col Edward C. Mann III, *Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, April 1995), 146. Colonel Mann directly challenged Alan Campen’s claim that Operation Desert Storm was the “first information war” by pointing out that “Campen tacitly avers the truth—suggested by Sun Tzu 2,500 years ago—that the ultimate goal of the struggle is to dominate the enemy in knowledge—not information. Collection and analysis of information is, of course, a part—but not the whole—of the issue.”

46. Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 140, and 150-152. Chapter 5 provides an insightful account of the Allied Operation Fortitude during World War II. The success of Operation Fortitude with its corresponding deception plan, code-named “Bodyguard,” was aided by Adolf Hitler’s preconceptions that the Allies would land somewhere on the northern coast of France. This belief seemed reasonable to Hitler and his generals because they believed the Allies would use the shortest route, making use of better air cover, to invade Pas de Calais which would quickly place the Allies within striking distance of the Ruhr and the heart of the German resistance. Even after the actual May 1944 Allied invasion of Normandy, Hitler continued to believe that this operation was merely a diversionary landing prior to the actual impending invasion of northern France. Thus, Hitler’s lack of knowledge, reinforced by his preconceptions and Allied misinformation, contributed in large part to the Allied defeat of Germany. Therefore, Alan Campen’s and others’ assertion that Operation Desert Storm differed fundamentally from previous conflicts because of the superior management of knowledge seems to ignore historical evidence.

47. Correll, 3. See note 1 of this chapter.


49. Toffler, 71.


Notes


59. Ibid, 10-11. Also, Dr. Dan Kuehl, Professor of Military Strategy, School of Information Warfare & Strategy, National Defense University, interviewed by author, 1 April 1997. Dr. Kuehl explained that “the computer, telecomms systems, etc are hardware; the instructions that guide the computer, i.e., WINDOWS95, is the software; the human brain is the wetware, and it’s the most important element in IW. Until and unless we get truly intelligence agents and AI, all the hard/software won’t matter, because the final decision point is the brain, i.e., wetware.”

60. USAF, Cornerstones, 2.


62. John R. Boyd, “A Discourse On Winning and Losing,” briefing slides, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., August 1987. Boyd’s “Observation-Orientation-Decision-Act” (OODA) Loop is based on the concept that “every individual operates an OODA Loop that is unique in speed and accuracy. Speed is based on the individual’s mental capacity and capability to deal with information and changing environments. John Boyd asserts that one can paralyze an enemy by operating inside the opponent’s OODA Loop, meaning that the individual is operating a faster cycle speed than the enemy’s. Accuracy is determined during the orient part of the cycle by what information is filtered and how it is organized. Boyd considers the orientation as the most important part of the cycle because ‘it shapes the way we interact with the environment—hence orientation shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act.’” Description of Boyd’s OODA taken from: 2025 Support Office, ed, “Information Operations: A New Warfighting Capability,” in 2025 White Papers, vol. 3, Book 1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, November 1996), 49.

63. Stein, “Information Attack,” 114. Stein explained that “in many cases, indirect IW will be platform-to-platform as, for example, offensive and defensive electronic warfare, jamming or other interference systems, and psychological operations via the successor systems to Commando Solo. It may, however, rely on nonelectronic old fashioned military deception and psychological operations.”

64. Ibid. Stein described corruption of the “orientation” portion of the OODA Loop through affecting the analysis, “whether artificial-intelligence or information-technology based or, most importantly, based in the mind of the human decision maker, decides and acts with full confidence in either the information observed or the integrity of his (machine or human) analytic processes.”

65. Ibid.


67. Ibid, 44.

69. Douglas Waller Washington, “Onward Cyber Soldiers,” *Time*, 21 August 1995, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 26 January 1997, available from http://www.pathfinder.com/@@LL1c6QYAspdOHaCM/time/magazine/domestic/1995/950821.cover.html. Others who have also cited the low cost of operating in the cyberspace environment are: (1) Kuehl, “What’s New About Information Warfare?” 9.; (2) Schwartau, 22. Schwartau stated that “information warfare is a low-budget, high-tech vehicle for mass destruction.”; (3) Campen, vii. Campen contended that “if soundly grasped and properly assimilated, the principles of information warfare will lead to US military forces that are not only much leaner and cheaper to field, but still capable of effective support to the nation’s goals and objectives.”

70. This thesis uses the terms, “fog” and “friction,” as defined by Carl von Clausewitz which encompass both chance and the difference between war on paper and in reality. For more details, see Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119-120.


74. Others who have stated that information warfare may terminate wars before they start include: (1) Szafranski, “Neocortical Warfare?” 43-44. Szafranski explained, “The aim [of neocortical warfare] is not merely to avoid battles. The aim is to cause the enemy
Notes
to choose not to fight by exercising reflexive influence, almost parasympathetic control, over products of the adversary’s neocortex.”; (2) Donald E. Ryan, Jr., “Implications of Information-Based Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-1995): 114. Lieutenant Colonel Ryan posited that “depending upon an enemy’s level of information dependence, moreover, it may be possible to prevail without a resort to combat.”

78. Downs, 58.
Chapter 4

Analysis—Is Information a Weapon?

*We cannot expect the enemy to oblige by planning his wars to suit our weapons; we must plan our weapons to fight war where, when, and how the enemy chooses.*

—Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy
US Navy, 1895-1956

*The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them.*

—Ardant du Picq
d. 1870, Battle Studies

This chapter analyzes the major arguments proposed by those who advocate the use of information as a weapon. In answering whether information is a weapon, the analysis will examine the stated aim of the proposed weapon. Specifically, can the use of the information weapon diminish the adversary’s will and capacity to fight? This chapter will also examine the assumed characteristics of information warfare. In the end, whether the information weapon can actually affect the enemy’s will and capacity to fight will provide the answer to the thesis question—is information a weapon?

**Enemy Will and Capacity to Fight**

When advocates of using information as a weapon state the aim of the “weapon” is to diminish the adversary’s will and capacity to fight, they may or may not have realized that they established a direct link to one of the important concepts of Carl von Clausewitz.
Essentially, after Clausewitz explained the concepts and characteristics of war,\textsuperscript{81} he stated the aims of war as encompassing

\ldots three broad objectives, which between them cover everything: the \textit{armed forces}, the \textit{country}, and the \textit{enemy’s will}. The fighting forces must be \textit{destroyed}: that is, they must be \textit{put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight}. Whenever we use the phrase “destruction of the enemy’s forces” this alone is what we mean.

The country must be occupied; otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces.

Yet both these things may be done and the war, that is the animosity and the reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy’s \textit{will} has not been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit.\textsuperscript{82}

Just as the purpose of war is to destroy the enemy’s will and capacity to fight, so is a weapon a tool that allows one to achieve those purposes. The US military has embraced this relationship as the concept has permeated its thinking in various official military doctrinal publications.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the “information weapon” proponents realized their weapon must be able to diminish adversary will and capacity to fight so that information may be considered a legitimate weapon of war. Of course, the obvious question now is to determine whether the use of the information can contribute to the purposes of war. An affirmative answer would lead to the conclusion that information is a weapon. Conversely, a negative answer would indicate that information is not a weapon.

In addressing the information weapon’s effect on the “adversary’s will and capacity to fight,” there is a paucity of evidence available for analysis. Most of the literature tends to identify either “information” or the “enemy mind’s ability to observe and orient” as the
targets of the information weapon. Unfortunately, these two concepts can either encompass every target or are so esoteric that it is difficult to identify specific targets. The remainder of this portion of the analysis will first address the “information” target and then tackle the target of the “enemy mind’s ability to observe and orient.”

It appears that the US Air Force has recognized the difficulty of identifying specific information targets and has attempted to address the issue through its *Cornerstones of Information Warfare* pamphlet and draft doctrinal documents. For example, the Air Force has stated “information warfare is any attack against an information function, regardless of the means.” 84 Therefore, “bombing a telephone switching facility is information warfare. So is destroying the switching facility’s software.” 85 Similar types of targets may then include elements of the enemy integrated air defense system (IADS). In defining the information target, the US Air Force is attempting to focus information warfare as “a means, not an end, in precisely the same manner that air warfare is a means, not an end.” 86 However, an unintended consequence may result from this overarching target definition: if information warfare encompasses nearly every target, then the concept merely becomes a new label for traditional military operations (such as psychological operations, deception, physical destruction, etc.) that military forces have conducted for thousands of years.

Others cite the effects of an information attack against the information target as capable of “wield[ing] the power to blind, deafen, muzzle and mislead their enemy by poisoning or crippling their computer systems.” 87 This is reminiscent of the type targets that Col Mike Tanksley relayed in his information warfare Armageddon scenarios.
whereby computer viruses and logic bombs brings down an entire nation—“Zapped. All without firing a shot.”

Do the information weapon attacks against communications and control facilities, the enemy’s IADS, and their computers diminish adversary will and capacity to fight? Well, yes and no. Certainly, “hard killing” elements of the enemy information functions or “soft killing” through introduction of viruses and logic bombs into the enemy’s computer systems would affect his capacity to fight. Hard kills result in the physical destruction of information systems and interconnectivities, while soft kills render computer screens “blank” or cause the systems to present faulty displays.

Given that the information weapon could affect an enemy’s capability to fight, will it also be able to affect his will to fight? While the enemy computer terminal operator may feel frustrations and even decreased morale resulting from leaders’ demands for unavailable information, the latter’s will to fight may or may not be affected. In other words, how would “blinding” enemy leaders affect their will to fight? Would they actually surrender or would US “blinding” operations actually backfire and force adversary leaders to panic and resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction? For example, Russia adopted a military doctrine in November 1993 that indicated a belief that during a East-West conflict, an attack on Russia’s early-warning system for strategic nuclear forces is possible. In such a situation, the Russians may assume the worst—the invasion of Russian territory by foreign military forces. With their sensors blinded and command and control systems destroyed by information weapons, Russian leaders may not be able to obtain information and may resort to whatever means necessary to protect their homeland. In essence, they will be “blind” but their strategic nuclear weapons will
still be intact and operable. How can the information weapon advocate be certain that Russia will not employ the nuclear weapons?

Instead of just contemplating whether the information weapon will affect an enemy’s will to fight, one should ask how US military leaders would react if an adversary blinded friendly command and control systems? Would US military leaders lose the will to fight if their computers went blank? The will to fight is an elusive target and it is difficult to assess whether the information weapon is capable of affecting it. Certainly, other factors such as political objectives and whether the enemy is fighting for its own survival or for more limited goals would surely figure into the “will to fight” equation.

Despite the value of “will,” some information weapon advocates, drawing from Col John Warden’s view of the enemy as a system, argue that the relationship of will (morale) and the capacity to fight (physical) can be expressed in the following equation:

\[(\text{Physical}) \times (\text{Morale}) = \text{Outcome}^{90}\]

Specifically, they believe a weapon need not affect both will and capacity to fight to put the enemy in such a condition that he can no longer carry on the fight. In fact, Colonel Warden stated that the physical part of the equation is easier to target than morale, so US forces should focus on the physical. He asserted, “If the physical side of the equation can be driven close to zero, the best morale in the world is not going to produce a high number on the outcome side of the equation.”\(^91\) Clausewitz cautioned against this type of reductionism and wrote, “If the theory of war did no more than remind us of these elements, demonstrating the need to reckon with and give full value to moral qualities, it would expand its horizon, and simply by establishing this point of view
would condemn in advance anyone who sought to base an analysis on material factors alone.”  

Indeed, numerous historical cases support Clausewitz’s warning of not underestimating the importance of morale or the will to fight. One of the most distinct examples for the US remains the Vietnam War during the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Despite the US military’s efforts in destroying the Vietnamese communists’ material resources and significantly reducing the movement of their lines of communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the communists retained their will to fight.  

In the end, it was their tremendous will to fight and, arguably, the US lack of will to fight that allowed North Vietnam to defeat the US and the Saigon regime.

Nevertheless, advocates of information weapon’s effectiveness use the “information warfare” actions in Operation Desert Storm to show that destruction of the capacity to fight (physical) affected the will the fight (morale).

Coalition forces spent the early days of Desert Storm gouging out the eyes of Iraq, knocking out telephone exchanges, microwave relay towers, fiber optic nodes and bridges carrying coaxial communications cables. By striking Hussein’s military command centers, the coalition severed communications between Iraqi military leaders and their troops. With their picture of the battlefield—their battlefield awareness—shrouded in a fog, the Iraqis were paralyzed.

Noticeably lacking from this illustration is the explanation that after the supposed “paralysis” of the Iraqis, deployed Coalition military forces fought an air and ground war in Iraq. The combination of Coalition air forces that bombed Iraqi targets from 17 January to 2 March 1991 coupled with the Coalition ground attack that began on 24 February 1991 ultimately led to Iraq’s agreement to accept all terms of the United Nations cease-fire resolution. In other words, the efforts to “blind” and “paralyze” the
Iraqis, while impressive and important, did not by themselves diminish their capability or will to fight. Rather, the “blinding” efforts made the Iraqis more vulnerable to conventional Coalition military attacks and operations.

The Operation Desert Storm illustration, besides being a reductionist argument that distorted the nature and causes of US and Coalition military successes against the Iraqi forces, also ignored other realities. First, several Desert Storm analysts suspected that after coalition forces destroyed Saddam Hussein’s more advanced telecommunications systems (satellite, microwave, and cable systems), he continued to relay launch orders to his SCUD missile batteries via courier. Second, the often simplistic method depicted regarding the ease with which the US took down the Iraqi command network may have been overstated. Specifically, while Coalition air power greatly reduced the capacity of the communication links between Baghdad and its field army in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, sufficient “connectivity” remained for Baghdad to order a withdrawal from Kuwait that included some redeployments to screen the retreat. Therefore, the ambitious hope that bombing the leadership and command, control, and communications targets would lead to the overthrow of the Iraqi regime and completely sever communications between the Baghdad leadership and their military forces “clearly fell short.” Third, the Iraqi forces, the Revolutionary Guards notwithstanding, were poorly trained and motivated, and lacked high morale prior to any coalition information attack. Thus, it was not the effect of the information weapon alone that weakened the enemy’s will to fight.

There are other examples of military forces that continued to fight after being isolated from higher headquarters when their communications became inoperable. During the Normandy campaign in 1944, German forces often fought under emissions
control or radio silence. Yet, their effective training, sound tactical leadership and doctrine, and adherence to Auftragstaktik, or mission-type orders, enabled them, for almost two months, to fight the numerically superior Allies to a stalemate before attrition finally wore down their effectiveness.101

Perhaps those who advocate using the information weapon against the second type of information target, the “enemy mind’s ability to observe and orient” place more importance on the morale factor than the physical. Champions of attacking this type of information target have coined this form of information warfare as “perception management,”102 “orientation management,”103 or “neocortical warfare.”104 While these terms may imply some “new” types of warfare, in actuality, they are merely amorphous terms for what had been traditionally called psychological operations, propaganda, and military deception. For the purpose of discussion, this thesis will address this form of information weapon as perception management.

The same question posed about information as a target also applies to the second information target, the enemy mind. The key question is whether information warfare will necessarily reduce the mental ability and will to resist. While it is true that perception management can deceive, surprise, add to the enemy’s fog and friction, and even affect the morale or the will to fight, it will not likely produce a “predictable error” as Dr. George Stein assumed.105 The concept of producing a “predictable error” implies that one can predictably induce advantageous errors in an adversary’s actions and decision making. In essence, it assumes that human behavior and reactions are totally predictable and may be precisely manipulated. This concept ignores Clausewitz’s
philosophy of the unpredictability of humans and warfare as illustrated through the following syllogism.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{If } A & \neq B & \text{If humans do not behave according to laws} \\
\text{And } C & = A & \text{And warfare is a human event} \\
\text{Therefore } C & \neq B & \text{Therefore, warfare will not follow laws}
\end{align*}
\]

Not only does the concept of “predictable error” ignore Clausewitz’s theory regarding human nature and warfare, it also seems to challenge common sense. For example, is it really possible to predict the actions, intent, and decision making rationale of such disparate minds as those of Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, Ho Chi Minh, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Muammar al-Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Mohammed Aideed, and Kim Chong-il? Hitler thought he could achieve a predictable outcome when he drew up the “Barbarossa” plan and “believed nothing less than the Soviet Union could be defeated in four months.” Yet, in April 1945, Soviet tanks entered Berlin, almost four years after German forces invaded the Soviet Union in May 1941. A “predictable error” may be extremely difficult to predict, much less to induce.

In the same vein, perception management will likely have minimal impact on the enemy’s capacity to fight, unless, of course the “information attack” deceives the enemy regarding the disposition and location of friendly forces. As an illustration, the World War II Allied deception plan, “Operation Fortitude,” contributed to Adolf Hitler’s preconceptions of the location of the impending invasion of France. Consequently, invading Allied forces at Normandy did not face the bulk of the German troops in France and Belgium guarding the Pas de Calais and the Belgian and Dutch coastline.

Somewhat more troublesome is the view of many of these advocates who believe it is possible to use the perception management weapon to target the enemy mind with “the
aim of subduing hostile will without fighting.” They balk at the view that this type of attack should supplement and enhance more conventional forms of warfare. Again, the literature is sparse in terms of specifics on how perception management will “subdue hostile will.” But it does not lack in promises to stop a war before it starts. One example of how this type of attack might target hostile will was posed by Thomas Czerwinski, a professor in the School of Information Warfare and Strategy at the National Defense University. “What would happen if you took Saddam Hussein’s image, altered it, and projected it back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party?” While it is not possible to state with absolute certainty the reactions of the Baath Party, Saddam Hussein, or the world community, it is unlikely that such perception management attacks will completely subdue hostile enemy will. Those who predict it is possible to subdue enemy will with perception management seem to assume, as in this example, that enemy leaders will have no interactions with their followers.

Civilian and military leaders have used perception management, or propaganda, throughout the history of warfare. The difference today is brought about by the advent of the microprocessor, which allows another medium, cyberspace, for friendly forces to propagate the perception management message to the enemy. Unfortunately, propaganda has, at best, had limited utility. To elevate its stature above that of a supplemental role in war is unrealistic.

It is inconceivable to expect perception management alone to subdue hostile will to fight, especially when history has shown otherwise. The idea that perception management will enshroud the enemy in “fog” and “friction” and subsequently subdue his morale assumes the enemy will react exactly as the propaganda plan expects. This
assumption discounts historical cases. For example, during World War II, the US military had nearly destroyed the Japan’s capacity to fight and targeted the will of the people through leaflet drops and fire bombings of cities with populations over 100,000, along with the release of two atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite the horrific death and destruction, Japanese military commanders refused to surrender, and the Japanese people were in despair after hearing of their Emperor’s decree to surrender. How realistic, then, is the information weapon advocates’ vision that enemies will surrender through information attacks targeted at the enemy mind or “neocortical” system? Will the enemy stop fighting because the US, through perception management attacks, tells him to stop? Unfortunately, the enemy may not always be so cooperative.

The Information Weapon—Use with Caution

In analyzing whether information is a weapon, this thesis tested the ability of information itself to target “information” and the “enemy mind’s ability to observe and orient” for the aim of destroying the enemy’s will and capacity to fight. The results indicated that while information may be considered a weapon, it is one that must be used with caution. The more enthusiastic proponents of the information weapon tend to overestimate its ability to diminish enemy capacity and will to fight.

Information is not a technological “silver bullet,” able to subdue the enemy without battle. Unlike other, more conventional weapons, the effects of the information weapon are not necessarily predictable because it often targets the human mind and emotions. Thus, in employing the information weapon, one must not rely solely on its use for
success in achieving political objectives. Rather, the strategist must prudently use the information weapon to supplement more traditional weapons of war or as a precursor to conventional attacks and operations.

While this thesis has answered the question it set out to investigate, other factors have emerged in the course of this analysis. The extreme claims for information warfare, even when employing the information weapon as envisioned by its advocates, are particularly unconvincing and even irresponsible. The most zealous advocates of information warfare describe information as a low cost weapon with high-payoff; a method to eliminate the fog and friction of war for friendly forces, yet enshroud the enemy in the same; and a tool to allow attainment of quick and bloodless victories.

Regarding the first characteristic, low cost weapon with high-payoff, the cost will depend on the specific information weapon itself. Certainly, introducing a virus or logic bomb into a computer system may be a relatively low cost option, whereas physical destruction of the enemy integrated air defense system (IADS) will likely accrue significant costs. The claim of high-payoff is also debatable. As previously discussed, “predictable errors” may be extremely difficult to predict and induce as the information weapon often targets human reactions and emotions.

In an ideal world, fog and friction would be eliminated for friendly forces and yet maximized against the enemy. However, the exact information weapons intended to increase the enemy’s “fog of uncertainty” may lead to totally unintended consequences that are inconsistent with the original intent of the weapon. Worse, the nth order effect may actually prove counterproductive to the original intent and objective. In a complex, hierarchical command and control system, destruction of selected communications
connectivity may actually result in a more streamlined and efficient command and control system. At least three unintended consequences may result. First, the enemy leader, without the intermediate command and control steps, is now able to send his orders directly to the lower echelons. For example, during Operation Desert Storm, after Coalition forces destroyed Saddam Hussein’s more advanced telecommunications capabilities, he continued to relay launch orders to his SCUD missile batteries via courier. Second, if communications connectivity is severed, lower echelons will likely operate in autonomous modes. While they may lack the complete situational battlefield picture that upper echelons would normally provide, the lower echelons benefit by not having to wait for launch orders to flow from the top. Third, destroying or degrading enemy command and control systems may deny friendly forces the ability to collect vital enemy communications and signals. Thus, employment of the information weapon may actually simplify enemy operations and increase friendly fog and friction since friendly collection assets will not be able to collect against emitting enemy electronic systems.

Perhaps the most disturbing claim is that of the information weapon’s capability to attain quick and bloodless victories and its extreme view of preventing a war before it starts. While the information weapon may be able to prevent bloodshed in a limited number of scenarios, expecting it to end a war before the first shot is fired is pure speculation. A more realistic consequence resulting from the employment of the information weapon would be a degraded enemy that lacks complete battlefield situational awareness because leaders are “blinded” and cannot communicate with troops in the field. There is a lack of historical evidence that supports the concept that a “blinded” enemy would simply surrender without fighting. On the contrary, history
shows military forces, isolated from higher headquarters, do continue to fight. The German military, during World War II, emphasized *Auftragstaktik*, or mission-type orders, that relied on general guidance from above combined with lower echelon initiative. This philosophy resulted in German forces fighting under radio silence, without upper echelon guidance, as during the Allied Normandy campaign.

Maj Gen Michael V. Hayden, commander of the Air Intelligence Agency, summed it best when he called the “notion of a bloodless war played out on computers as fanciful” and does not foresee the US mothballing its stockpile of conventional and nuclear weapons in the near future. Further, he stated, “Can I imagine a time in which we won’t have destructive war? No. But I think it’s easy to imagine a time when we can use information as an alternative to traditional warfare.” General Hayden explained that “in Bosnia, I think it’s fair to say, information is the weapon of first resort. To back that up is the potential for heat, blast, and fragmentation.” He relayed the following incident to describe the use of the information weapon to help create the zone of separation between warring factions in Bosnia.

Some of the factions didn’t comply completely. But the Implementation Force goaded, forced, cajoled and pressured them to do it. One of the things they did was take clear evidence [and] information that they had not complied with the treaty. The IFOR commander turned to the Serb, the Croat and the Muslim and said, “Move those tanks.” Their response was “What tanks?” The commander says, “These tanks,” pointing to the concrete evidence. “Oh, those tanks,” they said. And then the tanks were moved. In Bosnia, I think it’s fair to say, information is the weapon of first resort. To back that up is the potential for heat, blast and fragmentation. But in this case, information was used as an alternative. We achieved an objective without going immediately to some sort of destructive approach.
It is clear that while information may be used a weapon, strategists must use it with caution and common sense. It is not a “silver bullet” weapon. Rather the strategist should plan the use of the information weapon in conjunction with more traditional weapons and employ it as a precursor weapon to “blind” the enemy prior to conventional attacks and operations.

The US military arsenal includes a variety of weapons, and strategists must ensure their most effective use in future wars. The strategy of the future will likely include the use of the information weapon in conjunction with more conventional weapons. In developing the plan, the strategist must realize the use of the information weapon will demand prudence and carry implications that may impact the employment of the weapon. The last chapter warns of the additional cautions that a strategist planning to employ the information weapon must consider.

Notes

82. Ibid, 90.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
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91 Ibid.
92 Clausewitz, 184.
93 Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 363. Mark explained that “the greatest single advantage of the Communists in resisting interdiction, other than their low logistical requirements, was that they were usually free to give battle or to decline it at will.”
94 Earl H. Tilford, Jr., “The Prolongation of the United States in Vietnam,” in Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge, eds. Dr. Karl P. Magyar and Dr. Constantine P. Danopoulos (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 371 and 389. Tilford proclaimed that “Hanoi won the Vietnam War.” He explained that North Vietnam and the Viet Cong forces sustained their will to fight. “For the communists, their fight with the United States and the Saigon regime was purposeful. Their objectives were constant, achievable, and better define. Their political and military leaders, in working to achieve those objectives, devised superior strategies which, eventually, produced victory. The communists wanted to make the Americans suffer—over an extended period of time—until they gave up.”
95 McKenna, previously cited in endnote 7, this chapter.
97 James P. Coyne, Airpower In the Gulf (Arlington, Va.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 1992), 190.
99 John R. Levine and Carol Baroudi, The Internet for Dummies, 2nd ed. (San Mateo, Calif.: IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1994), 12. The authors asked, “Can the Internet really resist enemy attack?” and answered, “It looks that way. During the Gulf War in 1991, the US military had considerable trouble knocking out the Iraqi command network. It turned out that the Iraqis were using commercially available network routers with standard Internet routing and recovery technology. In other words, dynamic rerouting really worked. It’s nice to know that dynamic rerouting works, although perhaps this was not the most opportune way to find out.”
100 Keaney and Cohen, 60.
102 Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), 22-23. Perception management is “manipulating information that is key to perceptions.”
Notes

103. George J. Stein, “Information Attack: Information Warfare in 2025,” in 2025 White Papers, vol. 3, Book 1, ed. 2025 Support Office (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, November 1996), 91, 114. Dr. Stein stated, “Information attack is not so much perception management as orientation management. Information is both the target and the weapon; the weapon effect is predictable error.”


107. Ibid, 151.


110. Gordon and Trainor, 246-248. Also, Black, 16.

111. Depuy, 4. Also, DiNardo and Hughes, 76.

112. McKenna, previously cited in endnote 7, this chapter.
Chapter 5

Conclusion and Implications

There is still one absolute weapon...That weapon is man himself.

--General Matthew B. Ridgway, US Army
Speech in Cleveland, Ohio, 10 November 1953

One characteristic of the US military and its way of war is its fascination with technology and the associated search for the high-tech “silver bullet” that will allow quick victories with minimal collateral damage.\textsuperscript{113} Hence, it is not surprising that extremists have embraced information warfare as the magic weapon that would allow the US military to win bloodless victories and end wars before the first bullet is ever fired. The use of the information weapon demands caution and its employment carries with it implications that the strategists must consider.

First, perhaps one reason for the vast interest in the application of information warfare is because the US may be the most vulnerable to its effects. As Lt Gen Kenneth A. Minihan, director of the National Security Agency, explained, “Information is both the greatest advantage and, given American dependency on information, the greatest weakness of the US.”\textsuperscript{114} Consider the following assertion, “Under IW, the enemy soldier no longer constitutes a major target. IW will focus on preventing the enemy soldier from talking to his commander. Without coordinated action, an enemy force becomes an unwieldy mob, and a battle devolves to a crowd-control issue.”\textsuperscript{115} Is this actually a
vulnerability analysis of our own US military to information warfare? Given the US system of assigning specific targets to individual aircraft via the air tasking order (ATO), the descriptions of enemy vulnerability to the information weapon may actually be a reflection on American air campaign process. Could an information weapon bring the air operations center (AOC) to a standstill if it destroyed computers within the AOC, leaving it with no capability to develop and transmit the ATO to flying wings?

A second implication concerns the importance of maintaining US combat readiness with conventional military forces. Eliot Cohen, noted author and professor at Johns Hopkins University, warned, “Transformation in one area of military affairs does not, however, mean the irrelevance of all others. Just as nuclear weapons did not render conventional power obsolete, this revolution will not render guerrilla tactics, terrorism, or WMD obsolete.”\textsuperscript{116} The US military must, therefore, remain capable of fighting less technologically advanced enemies as well as peer competitors. History is full of examples of less technically developed militaries overcoming and defeating more “capable” foes. The most vivid example for the US remains the Viet Cong, who were able to defeat technology with rudimentary tactics and a willingness to sacrifice their soldiers. In facing a “Viet Cong” type adversary, can the US realistically expect to defeat an enemy without resort to heavy destruction, or at least having in place the potential to do such destruction?\textsuperscript{117}

A third implication that civilian and military leaders must seriously consider is the legality of information warfare. This question is especially important when one considers “preemptive” information attacks. Chapters three and four noted that one envisioned characteristic of information warfare regards the use of the information weapon to end a
war before the first shot is fired. How will the international community react to this type of preemptive attack by the US, a superpower, especially if it is against a third world rogue power? Is the US willing to chance an information attack that would blind a peer competitor and risk escalating the conflict with the use of weapons of mass destruction? Is an information attack an act of war? Further, the use of perception management, especially one that alters an enemy leader’s image to tell his people to surrender, is comparable to faking surrender with the use of the traditional “white” flag. This and other actions may violate the “principle of chivalry which addresses the use of trickery—both permissible ruses and impermissible perfidy and treachery.”

Obviously, the potential consequences of the employment of the information weapon are new and evolving, and the implications of information warfare raise many issues that have no clear legal precedent.

**Conclusion**

The information weapon may be an effective tool to supplement the military’s arsenal of more traditional weapons. Further, its use as a precursor may enhance conventional attacks and operations against a “blinded” and degraded enemy, thus decreasing effective enemy defense and counterattacks. However, the US should not consider the information weapon a “silver bullet” that will completely subdue adversary will and capacity to fight. Further, strategists must refrain from uncritically assuming the information weapon is capable of terminating wars before the first bullet is even shot.

The US civilian and military leaders should strive to understand why information warfare appears so attractive, in order that realistic and useful doctrinal guidance may be
developed for its employment and incorporation into the overall warfighting strategy. The consequences of not accomplishing this self examination could result in the military promising too much, too fast.

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