THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS AND THE NEED FOR GRAND STRATEGY

A MONOGRAPH
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14. ABSTRACT
This monograph explores the strategic dilemma facing the Australian Strategic Planning System in the post Cold War environment. Previously the Australian Government and Australian Defense Organization produced Defense White Papers to provide an articulation of government policy regarding Defense. These white papers provided the primary guidance to the military from the government for setting strategic objectives and major defense tasks. Consequently, military strategy sought to attain the objectives set forth in the Defense White Papers. Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment in Australia’s strategic area of interest has changed dramatically. These changes reflect increased regional instability, occasioned by cultural, economic, military and political change. The development of a globalized market economy has further complicated these changes. The result is the need for the Australian Government to articulate Australian national interests as a means to focus the development of economic, diplomatic, informational and military strategy. Presently no national security document exists in which to guide the development of a national approach to strategy development. This monograph proposes the development of a National Security Organization responsible to the National Security Committee of Cabinet for the production of a grand strategy that will coordinate currently separate economic, diplomatic and military strategy.

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Abstract

This monograph explores the strategic dilemma facing the Australian Strategic Planning System in the post Cold War environment. Previously the Australian Government and Australian Defense Organization produced Defense White Papers to provide an articulation of government policy regarding Defense. These white papers provided the primary guidance to the military from the government for setting strategic objectives and major defense tasks. Consequently, military strategy sought to attain the objectives set forth in the Defense White Papers. Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment in Australia’s strategic area of interest has changed dramatically. These changes reflect increased regional instability, occasioned by cultural, economic, military and political change. The development of a globalized market economy has further complicated these changes. The result is the need for the Australian Government to articulate Australian national interests as a means to focus the development of economic, diplomatic, informational and military strategy. Presently no national security document exists in which to guide the development of a national approach to strategy development. This monograph proposes the development of a National Security Organization responsible to the National Security Committee of Cabinet for the production of a grand strategy that will coordinate currently separate economic, diplomatic and military strategy.
Chapter 1

A Continuation of Policy

Australia’s origin and geographical setting has strongly influenced its defense policy since Australian Federation in 1901. From 1901 until 1942 and again from 1945 until 1969, the defense policy was known as the Imperial and later the Commonwealth Defense Strategy. During this period, Australia maintained a small mainly part-time defense force, designed for the land defense of Australia. The Australian Navy in contrast was integrated into the Royal Navy mobilization plans in a global role. Australia relied heavily upon the Royal Navy for both global and regional protection. Australian ground forces were structured to be mobilized in an adhoc fashion, to provide expeditionary forces deployed in support of a larger commonwealth force under British control.

The second major period of strategic change for Australian defense policy was during the period 1955 to 1972. During that period Australian forces participated in several counter-insurgency campaigns in Southeast Asia including the Malaya Emergency, the ‘Confrontation’ with Indonesia and the Vietnam War. The policy of providing forces for these operations was known as ‘Forward Defense’. The Forward Defense policy reflected the changes that had occurred in Asia after World War II. The defense policy recognized the need to have a regional focus based upon alliances primarily between the United States and regional powers. The adoption of Forward Defense and Australia’s increasing regional focus rendered the Imperial Defense Strategy untenable.

The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 and the Australian and US withdrawal from Vietnam during 1970-72, focused Australia on determining a more independent strategic outlook. The resulting
1972 *Australian Defense Review* introduced concepts such as ‘self-reliance’, that later were incorporated as policy in the 1976 White Paper *Defending Australia*. The 1976 White Paper shaped the subsequent 25 years of strategic defense policy. From 1976 until the mid-eighties, there existed an ambiguous strategic void with the emphasis for defense planning somewhere between Forward Defense and the concept of ‘Continental Defense’. The policy of Continental Defense defined the fundamental role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as the defense of Australia against armed attack rather than support for alliance operations and regional deployment of ground forces overseas. In 1986, the *Dibb Review* introduced the concept of ‘defense of Australia’, which was subsequently adopted as policy in the 1987 and 1994 White Papers.

Both the 1976 and the 1987 White Papers were developed during the Cold War, during which the superpower rivalry dominated the strategic environment. United States policy and the Cold War paradigm dictated the development of Australia’s strategic policy. The result was a defense policy with the ADF designed to supplement US military forces in order to pursue Australian national interests. The ADF complied with the military strategy adopted by the US; similar to the way the ADF supplemented Great Britain in the Imperial Defense Strategy. The ADF subsequently adopted a structure based upon tactical units able to provide support to a larger US organization. The development of operational level headquarters was not required because the larger US or coalition nations were expected to provide these structures.

The 1994 White Paper was the first white paper written after the end of the Cold War. It highlighted the obvious challenges the Australian Government faced operating outside the comfort of the bi-polar strategic setting. The paper, however, failed to recognize the fundamental underlying changes that had occurred and did not anticipate the impact these changes would have on the future security situation in the Asian region. These changes were precipitated through the demise of the Soviet Union and were the result of a broader underlying cause of rapid economic growth, social and cultural awareness and political evolution. These changes also provided the
stimulus for groups within societies to challenge the existing government or regimes based upon cultural or religious beliefs, and thus, created increased internal tensions. The Asian Economic Crises and the fall of the Suharto Government in Indonesia were the result of these internal and external regional changes.

The end of the cold war has changed the way the US perceives threats to their stated vital interests. With US forces deployed in Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Kuwait, the US government and public are less willing to become militarily involved in defending interests not deemed vital. The Australian Government has been presented with an increasing dilemma. The government is faced with the likelihood of increased regional diplomatic and military engagement for the protection of Australian interests and for the maintenance of regional stability. The deployment of national resources must now be aligned to the attainment of Australian national interests and not the strategic objectives determined by the Cold War paradigm.

The 1994 White Paper continued to describe the Australian national security environment based upon the concept of defense of Australia. Any strategic deployment was considered unlikely except in the support of coalition operations under US control. The 1994 White Paper maintained a state-based threat as the principle threat to Australia.\(^1\)

The Defence 2000 White Paper recognizes the changes in the regional military, political, economic and diplomatic environment since the end of the Cold War. The Defense 2000 White Paper stated that “in 1997 the government reviewed its strategic policy, and concluded that, with the end of the Cold War and with dynamic growth in Asia, Australia’s strategic circumstances had become more demanding and the potential demands on our armed forces had grown.”\(^2\)

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1. Whilst present and past white papers state there is no military threat to Australia, the adoption of a military strategy based upon the defeat of threats in the Sea and Air Gap to the north of Australia, implies a state-based military threat which the ADF will need to counter.  
The Defense 2000 White Paper recognizes Australia’s most likely deployments in the region will involve an increasing probability of peace support operations, similar to the operations being conducted in East Timor and Bougainville. Those operations call for strategic assets able to sustain forces away from the Australian mainland, with sufficient land forces and naval transportation to provide strategic durability and sustainability. The long-term deployment of forces outside of Australia on peace support operations is a reflection of the changing nature of operations the ADF is likely to conduct in the future. However, the Defense 2000 White Paper still assumes a conventional military state-based threat against Australia, and that threat shapes the strategy and forces structure posture the ADF adopts.

The emergence of the US as the only super-power has redefined the role the Australian military plays in the unilateral attainment of Australian National Interests. The geo-political framework within the areas designated as Australia’s area of direct military interests has changed. The result is that national security decision making has become more complex because there is no assurance of US Intervention. The recognition by the US that Australia has a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region indicates a US to expectation of unilateral Australian military involvement in the region. Whether Australia wants this role or not, the international media, international diplomacy and public opinion may drive government policy into action. The challenge facing the government concerns the way national security decisions are made. The challenge for the military is to develop a national military strategy that helps to attain Australian national interest, and not the interests determined by the Cold War paradigm.

The Australian military has been busier in the last five years than it has in the last fifty\(^3\). Tension in areas including the Mulukas, Irian Jaya, and Aceh, and deployments to Fiji, Solomon Islands, Bougainville and East Timor have increased the frequency of Australian military

involvement within the region. The political and economic stability of these countries contributes to the wider security and economic prosperity of the Asia Pacific region and Australia. Hence, instability in these countries contributes to wider regional instability. These political difficulties have the potential to affect Australia’s economic stability and physical security.

Other areas of potential concern include Burma, the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the South China Sea, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. The frequent crises in these regions highlight the nature of contemporary military operations and the Australian government's requirement for a readily available response.

Most of the conflict in Kashmir, South China Sea, Sri Lanka and the Philippines existed during the Cold War and therefore, did not directly contribute to any notion of post Cold War change. It is when these existing regional concerns are added to the more recent regional issues such as: instability in Indonesia, the increased military spending in China, India and Japan, the potential for reunification in Korea, the nuclear arms debate in India and Pakistan and the uncertainly about long term US basing rights in the region, where they add to the level of complexity that was absent ten years ago.

The increased international and domestic awareness of human rights and the global economy also contribute to the internationalization and increased awareness of problems in the region. Public awareness places increased pressure upon Australia for action. How the Australian Government articulates its National Security Policy or Grand Strategy will shape the actions it takes in response to the increased level of regional complexity. Presently Australia has no national security policy. That fact raises the question of how do the separate governmental departments like DFAT and the ADO prepare for the uncertainly in the region and what national objectives are their strategies aimed to achieve.

During the Cold War, Australia strategically prepared for the conventional military defense of Australia. Australia was prepared to provide forces in support of either a United Nation or US
lead coalition. The nature of military operations now includes the entire spectrum of operations from peace support operations to major regional conventional conflict. The broad range of contemporary deployments requires close coordination of national assets, such as Diplomacy, Informational resources, Military capability and economic policies, to ensure policy success.

Military operations are a continuation of policy. Defining the correct policy is now becoming more difficult in the changing strategic climate. The changed strategic climate in a post Cold War environment has created a puzzle for the Australian Government in two critical areas. Firstly, the current Strategic Planning System (SPS) must produce overarching policy across departmental boundaries, policy that guides the employment of national resources to attain Australian National Interests. Secondly, the military needs to ensure military strategy is synchronized to attain Australian national interests as well as UN or US coalition objectives.

In the past, the government avoided unilateral engagement in the region due to the implications of the Cold War. The attainment of Australian objectives is still inhibited by the lack of a coordinated and published national security policy and the current SPS structure. The existing SPS structure is designed for policy development during the Cold War based principally upon the diarchy of DFAT and the ADO. Subsequently, policy preparation within the SPS has difficulty considering emerging threats that lie outside the purview of either DFAT or ADO.

The potential for the ADF to deploy in the region has increased because many governments in the Asia-Pacific region face political and economic instability, especially Indonesia. This increased level of deployments highlights the need for Australia’s military strategy to be aligned with national objectives. The changing strategic environment and the increased operational tempo of the ADF requires the military to deploy on operations uncommon ten years ago. It also demands the ADF operate without the safety net of the US or Coalition headquarters. Operating without allies increases the importance of defining Australian national security objectives in such a way that those objectives can be adequately pursued in the current threat environment.
Ensuring the coherence between policy objectives and programmed capabilities is the function of the SPS. The existing SPS includes a series of governmental committees involved in the national security decision making and is the main process used to develop the Defense White Paper. The process has changed very little in the past fifty years. It represents a system well suited to operate within the cold war environment; an environment in which separate departments had limited international influence. With the international and regional environment becoming more uncertain, it is important now more than ever before, that the Australian government synchronize the National Security Policy across departmental boundaries. The committee structures within the existing SPS are not well suited for this purpose and must be modified to accommodate the new environment.

**Why Change?**

In the past, the Australian government has mainly defined national security in military terms. Desmond Ball in *Australian Defense Policy for the 1980*, wrote in 1982 that the perspective of national security was narrowly focused upon the military. He argued that:

> “to maintain this view through the 1980’s would be to forgo the possibility of influencing the numerous non-military or quasi-military development which are far more likely to impinge on Australia’s national well-being, sovereignty and security…security concerns such as communications, energy, natural resources, refugees and human rights, could not have been foreseen twenty or even ten years ago.”

The irony of Mr. Ball's statement is that the same could be said today. During the Cold War, Australian defense policy was completely dependent on powerful friends (initially the United Kingdom and then the United States). The Australian contribution to the security relationship consisted of essentially expeditionary forces that served under the command of the allies. The Australian defense policy was devised to ensure that the Australian military deployed in support

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of its allies in a mutually beneficial relationship. This was evident in ADF deployments to Korea, Malaya and Vietnam. By providing support to its allies Australia sought to ensure that the allies would feel compelled to deploy in support of Australia when the need arose. The Australian military had no need to develop a thorough understanding of the relationship between Australia’s grand strategic objectives and its military objectives. The ADF would deploy as tactical units in support of a US or UK coalition objectives. The size of the ADF dictated that Australian national interests were often subordinate to the broader Cold War strategies determined by the Allies. The result was a lack of doctrine and education about the operational level of warfare and the role the military played in support of the attainment of Australian national objectives. The force structure that subsequently developed to accommodate this military strategy was aligned along service lines.

The development of military strategy along service lines resulted in tactical level units commanded by service headquarters in peacetime, and strategic level headquarters during operations. The establishment of an operational level of command was left to the larger UK or US Armies. Australia did not establish an operational level headquarters until 1997. The absence of an operational level headquarters reinforced the emphasis towards tactical operations and prevented the military from understanding the requirements for linking tactical battles and engagements to operational objectives and grand strategy. The result is a complete lack of what Shimon Naveh In Pursuit of Military Excellence, The Evolution of Operational Theory, describes as ‘cognitive tension’. Cognitive tension transpires from the general orientation to the attainment of the strategic aim, while being limited through the means available at the tactical level to achieve the higher aim. Cognitive tension is a vital component to understand and implement operations successfully at the operational level of conflict and is the fundamental underpinning of the operational art.\footnote{Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence - The Evolution of Military Excellence (Portland Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 13.} The result is the Australian military lacks an intellectual understanding of the
operational level of warfare and the role of grand strategy in the establishment of a coherent military strategy. This lack of understanding has prevented the military from demanding a grand strategy from the government and subsequent reform of the SPS.

The Australian government concept of defense self-reliance requires that Australia maintain the military capabilities to defend itself without depending on help from other countries' combat forces.

Defence self-reliance also reflects strategic realities. Australia's security is not so vital to other nations that we can assume others would commit substantial forces to our defence. This will become increasingly so as our strategic environment becomes more complex. Our alliance with the United States does not mean we can expect it to provide for our defence. Indeed, that alliance obliges us to provide effectively for our own defense… Nor could we expect the United Nations to defend Australia. So defence self-reliance remains essential for us.  

The Australian government retained this concept of self-reliance in the Strategic Policy Review 1997, wherein “self-reliance is a concept which focuses on our ability to defend Australia without assistance from the combat forces of other countries.” The Defense 2000 White Paper continues the discussion of self-reliance stating, “First, we must be able to defend Australia without relying on the combat forces of other countries …in the long run, dependency [upon external allies] would weaken the alliance, both in the eyes of Australians and in the eyes of Americans. For that reason, self-reliance will remain an inherent part of our alliance policy.” 

Australia must be able to act independently of the US in Australia’s near region and immediate neighborhood. The puzzle for the Australian Government and the Australian Military is to extend self-reliance to include Australia’s national interests. Focusing primarily on the physical protection of the Australian mainland only continues the misalignment of military resources to only one part of Australia’s national security policy and maintains a limited Cold

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War regional military engagement policy. Self-reliance must also be extended politically through policy, as well as through military strategy, to those interests deemed vital by DFAT and other government agencies.

Australia cannot rely upon the US or other major allies to commit resources in regional ‘non-conventional’ operations not perceived vital to their national interest. The latest Australian involvement in peacekeeping operation in East Timor is evidence of this fact. The US Government was prepared to commit support personnel, but did not want to deploy combat forces. The US recognized the importance of a stable Asia, but could not justify the actions as vital to US interests, in light of its existing commitments to Bosnia and Kosovo. This new environment, however, demands that the Australian Government produce a grand strategy to coordinate previous separate and disparate departmental policy documents, to achieve a ‘whole of government’ approach enabling it to take a leadership role in the region.

The relative strategic stability for Australia during the Cold War and Australia’s reliance upon US or Coalition forces to provide operational and strategic headquarters on operations has delayed any significant reform of the strategic planning structures. The policy of defense self-reliance has focused the Australian military upon limited regional engagement policies. The changing regional complexity and the resulting political, economic and social changes, now draw attention to the viability of previous strategic structures and processes. The Strategic Planning System and the way the Australian military links military means to national ends through grand strategy needs to be reviewed.

This paper assesses the adequacy of the existing Strategic Planning Systems structure and its ability to develop a coherent military strategy in the current strategic climate. To understand the issues raised by the assessment it is necessary to understand the Strategic Planning System and the processes it uses to produce policy documents such as the Defence White Paper. The Defence White Paper produced in 2000 and the DFAT White Paper *In the National Interest* produced in 1997 are both products of the SPS and were used to describe the present limitations in the SPS.
The analysis of these two documents indicates that the present SPS structure is limited in its ability to synchronize government policy across departments, and relies heavily upon a committee process designed for a previous era. A possible remedy for the current system is the establishment of a National Security Organization responsible for the production and coordination of grand strategy.
Chapter 2

Strategic Planning System

Under section 51 of the Australian constitution, the Commonwealth Government has responsibility for ‘peace, order and good government’ and Defence and external affairs. Section 119 assigns to the federal government the responsibility for ‘protecting every state against invasion and, on application of the executive government of the state, against domestic violence’.9 To meet these tasks the Australian Government has developed a Strategic Planning System (SPS) to determine appropriate National Security Policy. A diagram showing the layout of the present SPS is at Figure 1. The committees within the SPS act as advisory agencies to an executive level, embodied in the cabinet, empowered to employ the nations resources.

National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) 10

The function of the NSCC is to deal with national security issues, including strategy and issues of long term relevance to Australia’s economic, political, trade and defense interests. The NSCC also oversees Australia’s intelligence and security agencies.11 The principle members of this committee are the Prime Minister who serves as the chairperson, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Treasurer and the Attorney General. This committee is supported by the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS), which is supported in turn

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10 Some articles refer to the National Security Committee of Cabinet as the NSC and not the NSCC. The abbreviation NSCC is in sympathy with Australian Doctrine ADFP 9 and is used throughout.
by other inter-departmental committees such as the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG). The NSCC considers submissions from the cabinet related to the charter of the NSCC. These cabinet submissions plan on how the country should attain national security objectives, but the cabinet relies upon advice from ministers and departments to do so. The NSCC is not a full time committee and meets irregularly to address issues raised. It is supported by regular SCNS and SPCG meetings but there is no dedicated standing organization that deals with the National Security Environment.\footnote{Carl Oatley, working Paper No 61, \textit{Australia's National Security Framework: A Look to the Future} (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, October 2000), 11.}

**Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS)**

The SCNS is the main interface between the government departments and the NSCC. The SCNS is chaired by the Secretary Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and is the senior interdepartmental committee on national security matters. It provides advice to the NSCC on options and strategies. Core membership for the committee includes Secretaries of PM&C,
Defense, DFAT, Attorney General, Treasurer and the Chief of Defense Force and Director-General Office of National Assessments. This is the highest level in the strategy formation process at which defense attends, unless invited to attend the NSCC.

The SCNS meets on a regular basis but much of the work for the committee is conducted out of session with critical crises management issues being pushed up to the NSCC for action or endorsement. The composition of this committee and its current framework has led to a tendency to over-manage defense and foreign policy crises and operational matters and to slight broader security issues. The composition of this committee also limits discussion to conventional state based military concerns or trade issues. Emerging threats such as cyber-attack, organized crime, terrorism, illegal immigration, illegal fishing, and piracy cannot be addressed adequately unless the committee broadens its membership.

**Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG)**

The SPCG oversees the day-to-day coordination of responses to international crises. It does not consider formal strategy papers and has no executive powers. This group is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of PM&C and consists of deputy secretaries representing DFAT and Defense. Normally the Deputy Secretary Strategy and Intelligence and the Vice-Chief of Defense Force attend its meetings. To facilitate crisis management Interdepartmental Committees (IDC) may be formed. The IDC’s are likely to be subordinate to the SPCG and structured to ensure that the relevant departments interact. IDC’s are not permanent committees and are formed as needed.

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15. Ibid.
Defense input into Strategic Planning System

The Chief of Defense Force (CDF), through the Minster of Defense, is the government's principle military advisor and is “responsible for developing military strategies to support ongoing national interests and objectives, responding to crises.” 18 The CDF is a member of the SCNS and is able to attend the NSCC upon invitation. The presence of representatives from defense does not guarantee a synchronized approach to policy development. Input from CDF does not guarantee that either the SCNS or the NSCC will accept proposals from defense. Due to the composition of the committee structure and absent of any incentive to provide an integrated approach to policy development, the SPS remains inter-departmental within the committee process and part of a non-systems approach to planning.19 The present SPS is designed principally to provide advice to an executive. Submissions are often formulated independently and do not reflect the priorities and funding needs of other departments. The lack of a full-time coordinating organization responsible for synchronizing national security policy inhibits the production of a coordinated policy.

The Australian government has no position comparable to the US Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs nor any organization comparable to the US National Security Council. The NSC was formed in 1947 to coordinate the action of separate departments toward attaining common national objectives. The US National Security Agency performs policy coordination, supervision and adjudication as well as crises management. It also becomes involved in policy formation by developing options for the US National Command Authority based upon an independent and bi-partisan approach.20

18 Ibid para 3-5.
19 Oatley, Australia's National Security Framework, 11.
Limitations of the Current Strategic Planning System

The NSCC does not generate and initiate policy but makes decisions in consultation with the government departments and it usually reacts to national security crises. The NSCC does not oversee the disbursement of all resources related to national security. The SCNS and SPCG committee do not have the authority to develop a whole of government approach to policymaking and does not have direct input into the budgetary process.\footnote{Oatley, Australia’s National Security Framework: 11.} The result is a structure that is dependent upon bureaucratic committee structures. It is well suited for crises management and decision making against traditional threats. The system is not well suited for either coordinating policies for presentation to the NSCC or developing long-range policies. Additionally the present system contains no organization responsible for the oversight and coordination of objectives and long term strategies.

National policy produced from the SPS is the result of a centralized, departmental specific policy development process. The military is not provided with the full membership status in the NSCC. If the government indeed desires to achieve a whole of government approach to policy formation then defense cannot be left with its present status as the uninvited guest. This is not to say that military officers determine policy. Military representation provides advice to the Defense Minister on what the military is capable of performing and adding to the policy development process. It also fulfills the notion of a whole of government approach and is consistent with those aspects concerned with the development of a national strategy.\footnote{See Department of Defence Australia, Australian Doctrine Electronic Library CDROM, ADFP 101 Glossary (Sydney: Headquarters Training Command, 2000), National Strategy definition.}

The principle aspects of national power consists of diplomacy, an informational aspect, economic policy and the military (DIME).\footnote{Department of Defence Australia, ADFP 101 Glossary. These aspect are taken from the definition of National Strategy which states that “National Strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, [Diplomacy] economic, [Economic] and psychological powers of a nation [Informational], together with its armed forces [Military], during peace and war, to secure national objectives”.

\[\text{[21] Oatley, Australia’s National Security Framework: 11.} \]
\[\text{[22] See Department of Defence Australia, Australian Doctrine Electronic Library CDROM, ADFP 101 Glossary (Sydney: Headquarters Training Command, 2000), National Strategy definition.} \]
\[\text{[23] Department of Defence Australia, ADFP 101 Glossary. These aspect are taken from the definition of National Strategy which states that “National Strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, [Diplomacy] economic, [Economic] and psychological powers of a nation [Informational], together with its armed forces [Military], during peace and war, to secure national objectives”.} \]
achieve a truly synchronized and coordinated approach to a national security policy. Carl Oatley states that:

While the government continues to rely on cabinet and the committee process for decision making, the government no longer has the mortgage on all the information the new century is offering. For much of this century, the government had exclusive control over most security-related information in the areas of defense, foreign affairs and, to some extent, the economy. As globalization trends overwhelm economic activity, an increasingly educated public is recognizing the importance of other security issues such as the economy, social justice and the environment. In this context, the relevance of a total and continually closed decision making structure needs to be reviewed. 

This statement highlights the increased levels of complexity that the NSCC needs to be aware of. The limited involvement of external agencies and the rigid institutional framework make the present SPS inflexible and make difficult the formulation of policy responsive to the changing situations requiring all the government's resources. The present SPS structure and its basis towards crisis management prevent it from dealing efficiently with the increased potential of Australian involvement in the region. A compartmentalized policy development process institutionally works to reinforce the importance of each department and restricts the formulation of policy alternatives. Long term planning is departmental specific and in the short term is reactive and overly influenced by current issues.

There is a need for a structure that is able to transcend parochial issues and to provide advice to the NSCC on a coordinated approach to policy development. The organization must be separate of other departments to ensure it has an unbiased and independent viewpoint. It might also provide the ability to look at longer-term issues across a more diverse spectrum. Such an organization would be able to work with existing departments and ensure that policy is coordinated and funded against national goals not departmental objectives. An organization subordinate to the Prime Minister, yet independent of the political process in government would

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be able to produce and coordinate grand strategy across all governmental departments concerning national security.

The failure to adopt such a structure will serve to maintain the present situation and leave Australia with no overarching national security policy document that sets forth broad government objectives. The government will be left with a separate DFAT and a Defense White Paper each discussing national interests in departmental terms.
Chapter 3

Strategy

To understand the requirements for strategy formulation it is necessary to explore the governmental structure needed to produce it. Strategies consist of a series of subordinate plans and objectives all working towards the attainment of the higher objectives. Grand strategy is the product needed for the articulation of national interests and objectives that guide the military to develop a coherent military strategy. Without an overarching policy document, departments will continue to develop strategy in isolation of other departments and continue to resist change.

The term strategy comes from the Greek word ‘strategos’ meaning the commander or the art of generalship. In modern times the role of strategy has become broader. Strategy is no longer the exclusive purview of the military nor does it deal exclusively with the use of armed forces. The difficulty in separating the military focus from the popular understanding of strategy is due mainly to the perceived narrow difference between military and grand strategy. The difference between military and grand strategy is a function of the historical development of the term. Discussions about strategy rarely include a discussion about the synchronization of national assets. Because of the evolution of strategy from the military domain, the discussion is often only associated with military operations.

The need to synchronize military objectives to a strategic end-state is a fundamental component of the operational art and reinforces the concept that war is politics by other means. There appears therefore the need to identify grand strategic or national objectives before the

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25 James J. Schneider, "The Theory of Operational Art," (Leavenworth, Kansas, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988), Theoretical Paper Number 3: 8, See also Collins, John M. Grand Strategy:
planning occurs on the implementation of departmental strategies. Henry Mintzberg refers to a conventional strategic planning process, where a strategy is subordinate to objectives. The articulation of national objectives in the form of a grand strategy shapes the development of subordinate strategies within the military and other government departments.

Grand Strategy

Grand strategy is the process “by which the nation’s basic goals are realized in a world of conflicting goals and values. The ends of grand strategy are usually expressed in terms of national interests. The role of the strategy process is to translate those national interests into means for achieving those ends.” The ADF defines national or grand strategy as “the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.” The means of achieving national interests are those elements of national power commonly referred to as Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) capabilities. Collins in *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practice* defines grand strategy as something which:

“fuses all the powers of the nation, during peace as well as war, to attain national interests and objectives. Within that context, there is an over-all political strategy, which addresses both international and internal issues; an economic strategy, both foreign and domestic; a national military strategy, and so on. Each component influences national security immediately or tangentially.”

Collins refers to grand strategy as the means to fuse policies together during both war and peace and the subordination of other policies under grand strategy. This grand strategy permits policy

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28 Department of Defence Australia, Australian Doctrine Electronic Library CDROM, *ADFP 101 Glossary* (Sydney: Headquarters Training Command, 2000), ‘National Strategy’. This definition contains the necessary elements of national power. The definition in LWD1, 1998, p 3-2 is in conflict with this definition. Environment and social elements are not considered components of national power, but are important in shaping national values and the geo-political environment which help to determine national interests.

development with national objectives not departmental objectives in mind. Sir Basil Liddell Hart defines the purpose of grand strategy as the means “to coordinate and direct all of the resources of the nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.”

Additionally “while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the operation, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.” The essential quality of grand strategy is its position above other strategies and therefore guides the whole of government.

Grand strategy orchestrates national goals, objectives, and interests through the appropriate elements of national power to accomplish national objectives. National interests are served by all components of the DIME to achieve the national strategic ends. Presently the Defense 2000 White Paper does not synchronize the adoption of a Maritime Strategy or the Defense Tasks with the other national interests defined by the DFAT White Paper in 1997.

**Strategy Formation and Defense 2000**

Henry Mintzberg in *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, provides his understanding of the term strategy. According to Mintzberg strategy is a plan that provides a direction, guide or course of action into the future, a path to get from here to there. Unfortunately strategy does not always come to fruition and, therefore, is not that simple. Mintzberg goes on to state that strategy is also a pattern, representing a consistency in behavior over time. The Defense 2000 White Paper provides an example of both the plan and the process needed for strategy formation.

The Defence 2000 White Paper calls its intended plan or strategy for the ADF a Maritime Strategy providing for a stable region. The ADF’s core function is to defend Australia from

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31 Hart, *Strategy*, 322
33 Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, 23
armed attack.\textsuperscript{34} Since the end of the Cold War, the behavior of the ADF has supported regional and international engagement conducting non-conventional military operations mainly involving the land forces.

The Defence 2000 White Paper outlines a plan for the ADF to use air and naval assets as the principal means to thwart an attack on Australia. As part of the Defence 2000 White Paper plan, the Army deploys to Northern Australia to deal with any residual enemy land forces unfortunate enough to be successful in their attack. If the air and naval forces need to deploy away from the Australian mainland, the land forces are deployed in support of the air and naval forces. The ADF's actions over the past ten or so years have been different. The ADF has deployed primarily land forces to support regional stability. Contrary to the intended strategy in the Defense 2000 White Paper air and naval assets have played a secondary role to land force deployments over the past decade. A difference between the SPS planned employment of the ADF and the behavior of the ADF has become evident. Figure 2 indicates how the behavior of an organization can result in emergent strategies that influence the intended or planned strategies. The trends in the region will continue to shape emergent strategies and influence ADF deployments, while the intended deployment or plan continues to determine budgetary and force structure requirements. The ongoing deployment of the ADF to counter non-conventional regional threats has the potential to place increasing budgetary and structural pressures upon the deliberate strategies described in the Defense 2000 White Paper. The present SPS is not well structured to include emergent strategies due to the composition of the committee process, and the irregularity of the white paper development.

\textsuperscript{34} Department of Defence, \textit{Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force}, viii.
The White Paper presents a deliberate strategy. A deliberate strategy can only be achieved when the intentions of the plan are fully realized. The problem with producing white papers on an adhoc basis and setting the deliberate strategy for 10-15 years, is that many problems will arise in that time frame that were not anticipated. The need for such a long time frame is determined mainly by the force development and acquisition process and not specifically the need for long term strategy. This style of planning was possible during the relative strategic stability of the Cold War, but is unsuitable for the contemporary environment.

The changing strategic environment in Australia’s near and immediate neighborhood, as well as those areas where Australia’s economic interests lie continues to evolve. Any strategic plan must therefore be flexible and accept change. Presently, strategies are developed only by
concerned departments involved in the committee process. The SPS needs to be able to accommodate the development of emergent strategies. Presently there is no mechanism to allow the SPS to develop these policies outside of crises management.

The disproportionate use of land forces in the past ten years in contrast to the planned or intended use of air and naval forces provides an example of an emergent strategy or adjustments in the planned actions that were needed if the policy outcomes were to be achieved. The assumption of the deliberate planning process is that the plan has considered the relevant assets required to produce the intended outcome. The outcomes desired by the Defense 2000 White Paper, are both the protection of the Australian mainland and offshore territories but also the promotion of regional stability. The SPS needs to develop a process of strategy formation that accommodates both deliberate and emergent strategies. A strategy for the protection of Australia is well developed in the defense of Australian concept. What remains ambiguous is how this strategy provides for the stability of the region or even how the NSCC intends to shape the region to attain regional stability outside of reactionary military and diplomatic deployments.

Mintzberg states that “few, if any, strategies can be purely deliberate, and few can be purely emergent. One suggests no learning the other suggests no control. All real world strategies need to mix these in some way to attempt to control, without stopping the learning process.” 35 Effective strategies need to mix both the intended and emergent strategies to have any real expectation of having them realized. The present SPS structure and the lack of a strategic coordination body may be inhibiting the incorporation of emergent strategies into the strategy development process and the ability to provide feedback from non-DFAT or defense agencies. The tendency to produce white papers at irregular intervals and not through a regular review process maintains a structure and a process that inhibits the inclusion of emergent strategies. 36

35 Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, 25.
36 In 1996 the then Defense Minister Mr. Ian McLachlan, MP stated that I “had not yet made my mind up about this proposal [defense review], or whether we should opt for a full-scale White Paper.” This reliance upon the minister and department of defense to instigate a major defense review reinforces the mental
A difficulty with the present Maritime Strategy adopted in the Defense 2000 White Paper is that the only way to validate the strategy is to defend against an actual armed attack on Australia. Yet, the strategy recognizes that these attacks are only a ‘remote possibility’ and ‘most unlikely’. This fact does not mean that the ADF should not possess conventional warfighting capability and structure itself for non-conventional operations. Rather, it highlights that the approach taken to develop the military strategy detailed in Defence 2000 White Paper was fixed on conventional military defense concerns. The white paper has potentially ignored the most likely emergent strategies that will continue to occur in the region during the life of the document.

The SPS has maintained a heavy reliance upon an intended strategy that may never eventuate. In addition, the ability for large conventional air and naval assets to contribute to regional stability is further reduced when the main actors in regional stability are not organized governments. The current catalysts for regional instability in Australia’s immediate neighborhood are economic, social, territorial and cultural problems not military or national expansionism. Hence, there is a need for a strategy that considers a wider spectrum of response and uses all of the nation's resources, not just the military. Strategy needs to define the outcome desired and model the resources needed to meet that outcome. The meager attention paid to emerging threats in the latest Defense 2000 White Paper is potential evidence of an inflexible strategy and rigidity in the SPS. Additionally, recognizing that emergent strategies exist means that strategies are not always the product of a stratified formulation process. Hence, the term strategy formation is used and not formulation.

Mintzberg also describes a strategy as providing an organization a position and perspective. A strategy can provide the organization with a position relative to other departments or organizations. The ADO has a strategy based upon the physical protection of Australia which models that exist regarding security threats and potentially fails to incorporate the ability for regular review and external academic advice on emerging threats. See MacLachlan, Ian, *Australian Defense Policy After Year 2000* in Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense No 120, Australian National University, 1997; 7. 37 Department of Defence, *Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force*, p23 and 24.
provides the department relative standing to the other governmental departments. It establishes the boundaries of its actions and most importantly establishes the basis for funding relative to other departments. Without a strategy to establish the position relative to other departments, the ADO would be continually justifying its expenditures and actions. Strategy seen as a position is significant because it defines the level of importance of the ADO in grand strategy. Defense is only one of many departments responsible for National Security. Organizations like the Federal Police are becoming increasingly important as non-military threats continue to emerge. Non-governmental organizations can also be used to maintain relative stability in a country. For example, CARE Australia or Doctors without Borders can provide Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid. The ADO strategy for the fulfillment of the objectives defined in a grand strategy will help to maintain the position of the ADO relative to other departments and assist in securing resources.

A strategy also provides the organization a perspective. Organizational perspective is mainly an internal aspect of effective leadership and communication. The strategy articulates where the organization is going and how it intends to get there. Articulating the organization's chosen path is important for the growth and development of the organization and helps to build and maintain morale. It provides the members of the organization with a sense of ownership and pride in the organization when the establishment performs well. This aspect of strategy formation reinforces the need for a regular production of defense strategy, far more frequently than is presently the case with the defense white paper. Frequent strategy production can improve strategic communication within the government and the ADO. It provides a vehicle by which the ADO informs other levels of the bureaucracy about how it contributes to the higher grand strategy. It provides advice on the capabilities offered by the military and provides guidance to agencies and individuals. A more frequent production of the defense white paper will also
increase the international transparency of developments in the ADF and will encourage other countries to do the same, further adding to regional stability.

Strategy is like the backbone of the human body. It supports the structure and provides form and function but is also flexible enough to accommodate or adapt to changes in the environment. The strategy adopted is a reflection of the organizational structure and provides direction for force development, doctrine and future force employment. It should reflect the behavior of the organization; otherwise, the forces developed will not meet the organizational requirements. Fundamentally, military strategy provides direction in accordance with higher national objectives. The articulation of higher national objectives shapes the development of grand strategy.
Chapter 4

Present Strategic Puzzle

The future requires change and the strategic puzzle that faces Australia today cannot be solved effectively by the mechanisms that help to create them. The international security environment is being shaped by two contradictory trends: a tide of economic, technological, and intellectual forces that are integrating a global community, and powerful social and political forces that fragment nation's along ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions. Governments are pressed from below by the force of ethnic separatism and violence, and from above, by economic, technological, and cultural forces beyond the government’s full control. Human society is being transformed on a magnitude equal to that of the transformation between the agricultural and industrial epochs, but far more rapidly.\(^{38}\) The impact of globalization is generally positive. However, in some ways globalization exacerbates local and regional tension and increases the prospects for conflict.

The region in Australia’s immediate neighborhood is a microcosm of the ongoing global transformation. The strategic problem for Australia is to overcome the fractious aspects of the transformation. Australia needs to benefit from the integrated and globalized economy, whilst reducing the regional instability so that the benefits of globalization can be obtained. This can only be achieved through a synchronized grand strategy that ties both DFAT and Defense objectives together, along with other departments, to achieve national goals.

Keeping the eye on the ball

Grand strategy helps to keep the national government focused upon national objectives. The Sandline affair represents an Australian policy error that could have been avoided. The Sandline affair involved the Papua New Guinea (PNG) government's attempt to use mercenaries to settle the Bougainville conflict.

The origins of the Bougainville conflict between the PNG government and the Bougainville people dates back to when the region was a German colony. The native population of Bougainville claims to have been exploited by one foreign power after another. In recent times, this exploitation has manifested itself in the development of the Panguna copper mine by mineral company CRA in conjunction with the PNG Government. The PNG government owned a 20% share of the mining operation on Bougainville. The mine operated by CRA at Panguna contributed a large amount to the PNG Government Gross Domestic Product. The local Bougainville population resented the environmental damage caused by the mine. That resentment in turn fueled existing sentiment for potential self-determination among the Bougainville people. The Bougainville people take exception to the control exercised over them by the PNG government, claiming to be natives of the Solomon Islands and not Papua New Guinea. The result was the formation of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the commencement of terrorist activities in order to close down operations at Panguna mine.

The Panguna mine eventually closed in March 1989. In response, the PNG government deployed the PNG Defense Force (PNGDF) to remove the influence of the BRA over the mining operations. Years of unsuccessful attempts by the PNGDF to destroy the BRA led to the PNG Government's decision to hire the Sandline International company to complete the task. Sandline International provides mercenary services to recognized governments for the resolution of internal conflict. Sandline International was to provide approximately 70 personnel to train
PNGDF personnel and “conduct offensive operations with the PNGDF to render the BRA ineffective and repossess the Panguna mine,” at a cost of 36 million US Dollars.\(^3\)

The resolution of the Bougainville situation and the reopening of the Panguna mine was a great PNG Government concern. The political situation between Australia and Papua New Guinea government prior to the Sandline incident had become strained. During that period, communication between PNG and Australia was largely ineffective and was characterized by distrust and cynicism. This was due to the perception held by Australian officials that the PNG government was corrupt. The PNG government’s decision to hire Sandline International to solve the Bougainville situation highlighted the PNG government's growing frustration with the problem. Fortunately, local PNG opposition to the use of mercenaries and their anger over the alleged corruption of some of the PNG leaders gave rise to a groundswell of domestic opinion that led to the replacement of the government.

The existing Australian SPS and the lack of a coordinated Australian grand strategy contributed to the Sandline incident. The incident highlights the failure of individual government departments to appreciate the importance of the dispute between the PNG and Bougainville. The incident highlights the fact that no overarching strategic organization was available to coordinate a coherent strategy for resolving the Bougainville crisis. There was clearly no overall Australian position on how the situation should have been resolved. Individual departments were unable to coordinate policy between departments even if they desired to do so.

The consequence of the Sandline Affair is the current deployment of over 200 Australian military personnel to Bougainville as part of a Peace Monitoring Group. The Peace Monitoring Group is tasked to monitor the cease-fire between the PNGDF and the BRA and the implementation of the Lincoln agreement. Prior to and during the Bougainville crises there

appears to have been little coordination between DFAT and Defense in an attempt to solve this issue. The current Defense 2000 White Paper states that “if Papua New Guinea’s problems continue its ability to handle future challenges will be hampered, and its viability as an effective state could come into question.”

Analysis such as this indicates that the situation in the ‘near neighborhood’ could become worse.

A grand strategy that synchronizes the objectives of DFAT with economic policy and information programs, combined with military activities with the PNG Defense Force might have prevented the deterioration in the relationship between the PNG and the people of Bougainville. Just as important, a government organization responsible for the development and long term monitoring of grand strategy might have forestalled the use of military forces entirely. If the Australian government does not wish to revert to its pre 1975 role of caretaker of the PNG government, a more coherent approach to the employment of national resources is needed.

In the National Interest

In August of 1997 the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, the Honorable Tim Fisher MP, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Alexander Downer MP, co-signed the first DFAT White Paper In the National Interest. That white paper highlights two core interests for Australia and recognizes the strategic puzzle facing the region. These core interests are the security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of living of the Australian people. The paper recognized that the Australian defense capability is significant in regional terms and that Australia’s future relies largely upon its capacity to sustain a foreign and trade policy of broad scope. For a trading nation such as Australia, the alternative to active participation in the global economy and the affairs of its region will be irrelevance and a decline

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41 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government White Paper, In the National Interest (Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997), ii.
in Australia’s international status, increasing the probability of regional instability.\textsuperscript{42} The DFAT White Paper calls for integrating domestic and international strategies to produce a whole of government approach emphasizing the linkages between the domestic and foreign trade policies. The White Paper calls for an integrated policy framework that is:

\begin{quote}
Crucial to enhancing Australia’s international competitiveness. In a global economy the competitiveness of the Australian economy will be the single most important determinant of Australia’s future. It is the benchmark against which both domestic and international policy must be measured.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

Australia’s national security and its economic interests are linked to the broader security and stability of the Asia Pacific region. Australia’s biggest export markets are in North East Asia, which includes China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan. From a security perspective, the DFAT White Paper recognizes that the security and stability of South East Asia is dependent upon stability in North East Asia. Any threat to East Asia, (determined to be the Republic of Korea) would have immediate and adverse effects on Australia’s trade with its major export markets and, consequently, on the jobs and standard of living on individual Australians.\textsuperscript{44}

Any major threat to East Asia would, therefore, have a major impact upon the Australian economy and one of the core interests detailed by DFAT. The threat to East Asia could have subsequent effects upon other major trading partners in the region such as Japan and China. A threat to East Asia could threaten the vital sea lines of communication through the Malacca straits upon which approximately 98\% of Australia’s trade passes.

The mission of the Australian Defense Force is to prevent or defeat the use of armed aggression against Australia and its interests. With the growing impact of globalization on the Australian economy, the ability to define clearly interests outside physical security will become increasingly important, but also increasingly difficult. Interests will become broader and result in the military becoming more involved in non-conventional military tasks. When considering the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, \textit{In the National Interest}, vi.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid, vii
\item \textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 2.
\end{itemize}
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issue of grand strategy and national security, more than DFAT and Defense issues need to be addressed. When the ADO considers the fulfillment of its mission, it needs to consider how it adds to the wider security of national interests outside the context of physical protection and the traditional aid to the civil power in domestic assistance.

The Defense 2000 White Paper and the DFAT White Paper are products of the SPS. Each document went through the same interdepartmental processes and scrutiny prior to its presentation to the NSCC for approval. Yet, the Defense 2000 has not articulated in the military strategy how it intends to address one of the most compelling changes to the security environment in the past ten years. The Defense White Paper does not align the national security objectives of the defense force with the need to protect the national economy as a vital component of national security. It has maintained a military focus upon state based threats. The omission of the reference to the role of the military in economic protection appears to maintain Australia's reliance upon the US for intervention. If 'jobs and the standard of living of the Australian people’ are truly a core interest and the White paper excludes it from honest consideration then the white paper may violate the concept of defense self-reliance.

The Defense 2000 White Paper maintains a conventional military threat towards Australia and emphasizes the physical protection of the country. This emphasis is at the expense of a force structured for the most likely operations and those determined by the government endorsed DFAT core national interests. Defense 2000 White Paper details that in the highly unlikely event of unprovoked armed aggression against any of Australia's immediate neighbors the capability to provide a military force would be drawn from the forces we have developed for the defense of Australia.\(^{45}\) Also the ADF is expected to make “greater contributions to coalition operations closer to home where Australia's interests and responsibilities are greater”.\(^{46}\) Clearly, here the Defense White Paper shows its bias towards countering military threats at the expense of


\(^{46}\) Ibid, 51.
emerging threats. Additionally the concept of describing security in relation to the ‘immediate neighborhood’ and then ‘wider interest’ maintains this fixation on the physical dimension of security and defense in depth.

**Defense Tasks**

The main tasks for the ADF is the defense of Australia against a physical attack. The force built to defend Australia is designed to be also ready to undertake operations to promote Australian wider interests. Other tasks include contributing to security in the region either by resisting aggression or by conducting lower level operations such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. The primary tasks of the land force in supporting Australia’s wider strategic interests would be to secure the operating bases from which Air and Naval forces would operate to attack military forces away from Australia. Additionally, supporting wider interests would involve Air and Naval forces providing capabilities in support of coalitions in higher intensity operations. Peacetime National Tasks include support to coastal surveillance, emergency management and counter-terrorist operations. The Defense 2000 White Paper pays little attention to how the military forces contribute to the security of the interests defined in the DFAT White paper, except for the conventional defense tasks.

If no national security policy exists, what organization or policy is driving the development of a coordinated approach to national security? The existing departmental committee process has no requirement to achieve national objectives other than those objectives determined by the individual departments. The defense policy has maintained the defense of Australia focus with little attention to other core national interests.47 This gap between the objectives and the departmental resources results from a genuine lack of awareness throughout the ADF of the

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47 It is recognized that the latest Defense 2000 White Paper does differ from previous government’s concept of how the defense of Australia would be conducted. In previous years, the emphasis was placed on the domination of the sea-air gap with a peripheral role of the Army. The latest Defense 2000 White Paper emphasis the concept of land-sea-air gap. The Defense 2000 White Paper offers a more balanced approach to force employment, but maintains the emphasis towards the attainment of military objectives without the
requirement to link the National Military Strategy, which the White Paper informs, to a higher form of grand strategy. The current SPS reinforces this situation. Without any grand strategy and without any true desire to coordinate across departmental boundaries in the SCNS no national security policy is likely to immerge. The lack of operational awareness is partly due to the historical development of the SPS and the reliance upon the committee process. The second contributing factor is the lack of the cognitive tension which must exist at the operational level of warfare. “Cognitive tension is produced by the polarization between the general orientation towards the strategic aim and the adherence to the tactical mission.”

This means tactical actions cannot be determined without a clear understanding of the strategic goal. However, strategic goals may not be directly obtainable by tactical means. Hence, operational headquarters work to design operations that move towards the strategic goal. The failure to recognize the link between the two levels results in the failure to link the numerous governmental departments’ actions to the desired strategic outcome. If there is no grand strategy, what have previous military strategies sought to achieve? From the analysis between the Defense 2000 White Paper and the DFAT White Paper, it is clear that military objectives are departmentally specific and only accommodate half of the national security strategic requirements.

A National Security Organization

Australia will need to cope with state disintegration and integration, new forms of conflict that are not yet understood, and non-traditional threats arising from environmental or economic concerns. The issues will tend to be regional and global rather than national. The present Defense 2000 White Paper maintains the structure of the ADF for the defense of Australia, but recognizes the changed nature of operations since the end of the Cold War and the importance of considering DFAT’s core economic interests.

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the region. The present SPS structure retains an outdated approach to security thinking by focusing upon physical presence and fails to include broader security concepts. The current SPS provides a process for reacting to situations through adhoc meetings to consider recommendations from specific departments or cabinet.

There is no one person or organization that is responsible to oversee the daily interaction of the departments, and to ensure the synchronization of policy and objectives. If the government is truly interested in a whole of government approach not only for policy development, but also for policy implementation, then a coordinating body is needed. A National Security Organization (NSO) is needed to overcome these deficiencies.

The establishment of an NSO, backed by legislative and statutory authority would allow permanent representation at the NSCC, with direct access to the Prime Minister and other Ministers. The NSO would be able to draft a grand strategy for the NSCC. A grand strategy to synchronize broad policy and define a common set of national interests is essential to the achievement of the whole of government approach. The grand strategy would provide both DFAT and ADO with a common set of national objectives so that their departments could work together. Such a strategy would ensure a more efficient use of both the DFAT and ADO budgets. It would also allow the integration of other federal government departments such as Federal Police into security plans, and consider academic assessments of emerging trends and threats. The production of grand strategy and the development of a NSO would provide greater transparency to the budgeting outcome of ADO and DFAT. Increased transparency of national security issues would add legitimacy and endorsement from a national perspective and assist in departmental justification of additional projects. A NSO would reduce the internal tension that presently exists in the SPS through the provision of long-term strategy guidance developed for the NSCC. The ability to coordinate national intelligence collection efforts towards a common national interest would further be enhanced by a common focus on collection requirements. The NSCC would be better able to anticipate strategic dilemmas through the constant focus of the
NSO organization in the security dimension, incorporating emergent strategies into existing strategy, plans and concepts.

The development of a NSO and the requirement for a coordination body is not new. Mr. Ross Babbage in *A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the 1990’s* stated in 1989 that a high-level policy development and coordination staff is needed to coordinate National Security Issues.\(^{50}\) The development of a NSO was supported by the Mr. Alan Wrigley’s report to the Minister for Defence in 1990 called *The Defense Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia’s Defense*.\(^{51}\) Gary Brown in *Australia’s Security: Issues for the New Century*, suggested in 1994 that an independent Australian National Security Staff be formed as an element of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.\(^{52}\) In October 2000 Carl Oatley’s in *Australia’s Security Framework - A Look to the Future* called for the establishment of a new National Security Body and the opening up of the national security process to a much wider audience.\(^{53}\) Ian Wing in *Refocusing Concepts of Security – The convergence of military and non-military tasks*, stated in November 2000, that the creation of the NSCC and the SCNS in 1996 does not fulfill the requirements of a supra-department. Wing calls for the establishment of a National Security Council to ensure of whole of nation governmental process.\(^{54}\)

The NSO would have the following five main functions: coordination and integration, policy supervision, policy adjudication, policy formulation and crises management. Coordination and integration is one of the two most important areas for the NSO. This function ensures the various government departments’ objectives articulated in the grand strategy, are synchronized in the attainment of national security objectives. The integration aspect ensures that all government

departments have equal opportunity to comment on proposals and are encouraged to effect resolution in areas of disagreement before submission to the NSCC. This function is designed to supplement the existing coordination and integration conducted as part of the SCNS, but ensures a much wider audience participation.

Once a decision has been reached by the NSCC, an effective system of government must have a mechanism responsible for ensuring that decisions are carried out and for supervising their implementation.\textsuperscript{55} This is the role of policy supervision. Departments cannot be expected to inform upon themselves of non-compliance of government policy and generally lack the credibility to intervene in other departments internal operations. This function ensures that the national resources available in the DIME are coordinated. This coordination will help the government to shape the region and move towards the attainment of regional stability in a whole of government approach.

Policy adjudication is closely related to policy supervision except it involves the resolution of issues from other departments concerning national security, providing the NSCC with the NSO preferred position on issues. These positions are based upon the government endorsed national security objectives as articulated in the grand strategy. This function provides the ability for a much broader base for consideration of national security issues outside the traditional ADO and DFAT. This function provides for the consideration of emerging strategy, resulting from government action and policy changes.

Policy formulation is the main function of the NSO. The NSO develops grand strategy for the NSCC approval. Implicit in this function is the assumption that policy formulation is the proper purview of DFAT and that any effort to dilute DFAT leadership in this area must be resisted. This relationship between the primacy of DFAT for policy development and the


function of the NSO in developing a grand strategy will no doubt cause some concern. From the analysis of previous defense white papers and the most recent Defense 2000 White Paper, the primacy of DFAT over ADO in the coordination of policy and development of common objective is difficult to determine. The lack of common objectives between the DFAT White Paper and the Defense 2000 White Paper is one of the primary reasons for the need for grand strategy. The perceived inability for coordination between DFAT and ADO throughout the SPS has resulted in the current military strategy focused towards departmental objectives. The formulation of grand strategy by the NSO must be taken in concert with the other functions of the organization. The development of grand strategy is an inclusive, not exclusive action, ensuring the functions of coordination, integration, supervision and adjudication, regarding national security issues are maintained.

The NSO should develop a grand strategy every four years to incorporate national security interests, goals and objectives. The grand strategy should be reviewed every two years to incorporate changes to the national security environment. The military should be directed to develop military strategy based upon the objectives and outcomes desired in the grand strategy and not the defense white paper maintaining the focus upon national and not departmental objectives.

Crises management is less concerned with the immediate employment of national resources than with the provision of advice to the NSCC during crises. The NSO provides advice on the long-term impact of actions taken by the government. The NSO provides the expertise to look across the DIME and all departmental objectives to determine what impact actions will have on national objectives. The NSO, through the grand strategy, is not distracted by the employment of departmental resources and can focus on the long-term impact on national security objectives. The NSO is able to provide advice on how to shape the region for the attainment of regional stability in the long-term without departmental bias.
Previously the SPS had been insensitive to change due to the reliability of US military response to Cold War issues. Now the strategic environment in the region has changed. The incentive now is to coordinate departments and align Australian national interests with the means available. The incentive for change is to establish a structure that can guide national policy for the future and not maintain a rearward looking dysfunctional approach to military strategy or national security policy.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

A coherent military strategy is one that links military objectives to the attainment of national interests. The mission of the Australian Defense Forces is to prevent or defeat the use of armed aggression against Australia and its interests. Presently the DFAT core interest of protecting the jobs and standards of living of the Australian people, interpreted as the Australian economy, does not have high visibility in the four key defense task detailed in Defense 2000 White Paper. This latest white paper maintains the focus upon the attainment of departmental objectives, focusing upon the physical protection of Australia, at the exclusion of all other interests.

The current national military strategy produced by the ADO is not guided by any national security document. The failure of the SPS to produce such a document is a function of its structure, reflecting the strategic climate of the Cold War. It also reflects the lack of cognitive tension on behalf of the military. The ADF only developed in 1997 an operational level headquarters. For the first time, the ADF has now been required to intellectually consider how it intends to attain the strategic objectives outside of the Cold War paradigm. The ADF must now link the military objectives and strategy detailed in the White Paper to national objectives.

The SPS has undergone little structural development in the past fifty years. The existing SPS structure is unsuited to develop coherent military strategy. The current system does not address emerging strategies. The SPS structure inhibits the development of a synchronized and whole of government approach by limiting participation in policy development to the diarchy of DFAT and ADO. The limited ability for the SPS to adopt emerging strategies maintains a
military strategy shaped towards the style of threat the ADF would like to engage, but not what is likely to be encountered.

The Defense 2000 White Paper, and previous white papers, maintain a deliberate strategy based upon conventional military application of force in the sea-air gap to the north of Australia. This deliberate strategy has the potential to result in an unbalanced military force, further reducing the ability of the ADO to perform emerging strategies, such as peacekeeping missions. The maintenance of a strong military based upon land, air and naval strength is essential for physical protection but has been unable to provide stability in the region. Stability operations will involve predominately land forces with air and naval forces operating in support. The current military strategy based upon physical protection only is believed to be inadequate for the new strategic environment which Australia has entered along with the rest of the world.

To adequately address changes in the strategic climate the current SPS needs to be modified through the provision of an agency responsible for the coordination of policy between departments. A National Security Organization responsible for the production of a grand strategy and the coordination of national security policies across departments would provide the NSCC the ability to articulate core interests with a synchronized and holistic approach. The NSO and the development of grand strategy provides the mechanism for the ADO to align their military strategy to the attainment of strategic objectives, synchronized with other departments in the federal government. The publication of grand strategy and subsequent alignment of military strategy to all relevant national interests will result in a coherent military strategy.


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