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NATO'S DUAL CHALLENGE AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY – EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY AND NATO ENLARGEMENT –

BY

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20010622 086
NATO's dual challenge at the start of the 21st century

- European Security and Defense Policy and NATO enlargement -

by

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: NATO's dual challenge at the start of the 21st century
- European Security and Defence Policy and NATO enlargement -

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 3 March 2001 PAGES: 42 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

NATO should be the major pillar and the pre-eminant security organization for a 21st century Europe. But Europe is currently undergoing epochal shifts. The European Security and Defense Policy and the enlargement of NATO and European Union are fundamental changes facing the Alliance. The decision at the European Union (EU) summit in Helsinki in 1999 to expand enlargement negotiations and to develop a military force of up to 50,000 to 60,000 persons opened a public debate, to the praise of some and the criticism of others.

The goals of the EU and NATO are being defined in the context of a changed understanding of security. Today's political security concepts are marked by a comprehensive understanding of security that goes well beyond just a military dimension. The distribution of future tasks between the enlarged EU and the enlarged NATO will characterize the European security system at the beginning of the 21st century.

The paper examines the double challenge that faces NATO – European Security and Defense Policy and NATO enlargement –. It identifies the key questions and the parameters of each challenge, analyze the critical aspects for NATO and proposes options for the way ahead. As the final conclusion the author recommends: As the 21st century progresses, NATO and the EU must establish a balanced relationship in which European capabilities will develop significantly. This will require transatlantic cooperation and a more relaxed American attitude towards sharing leadership in Europe.
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The last ten years have seen complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. These risks include oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. After a long struggle a new European security architecture is taking shape. The struggle resulted from the necessity to define a European military role outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) context. The NATO and European Union (EU) summits in Washington, Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 laid the foundation for dealing more effectively with Europe's current security challenges, in particular by improving its conflict prevention and crisis management capacities.¹

NATO should to be the major pillar and the pre-eminent security organization for a twenty-first-century Europe. After the EU summit at Nice in December 2000, however, discussions about the future of NATO started again and headlines like “Will European Army Destabilize NATO?” could be seen, particularly in American newspapers.² Why is NATO’s future again subject to speculation and debate despite it having fought a recent and apparently successful war in Kosovo?³

If done right, the development of a serious EU defense force could be a good thing for all concerned. It would reduce American burdens in Europe, make Europe a better and more capable partner, and provide a way for Europeans to tackle security problems where and when the United States cannot or will not get involved.⁴

Several earlier efforts to provide a more independent European capability have been found wanting. Questions continue to linger over the ability of the EU to devise workable arrangements to cooperate effectively with non EU NATO members and neutral EU members. NATO issues such as sequencing and burden sharing still remain largely unsettled. In general, in public and in principle the United States remains a firm supporter of a stronger, more independent European security architecture. In practice, however, the United States has continued to have reservations.⁵

Numerous challenges remain for building a common European Security Defense. There are risks, problems and doubts involved in the aim of the new The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Countless political, diplomatic, financial, and organizational hurdles remain to overcome before it can come to fruition. If done badly, ESDP could wind up in one of two ways. It may amount to nothing, like its predecessors or it may create bitterness and dissension among many of the world’s leading democratic powers.⁶ Hence it is legitimate to ask: Will the
European Security and Defense Policy achieve its proclaimed goal of strengthening transatlantic security relations? Where is the European Union heading? Will NATO remain whole and intact? Are NATO and the US doing enough and doing the right thing to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic community and improve European security? How will ESDP influence US domestic and foreign policy discussion opposite Europe and NATO?

ESDP is the fundamental challenge facing the alliance at the beginning of the twenty-first-century. There is a second, and equally important challenge. Both NATO and the European Union in principle are now committed to substantial enlargement. The process of these enlargements will define the future security, political and economic structures of Europe. Two issues are central in this respect: NATO’s relationship with Russia; and a possible further enlargement of the Alliance in close coordination with the expansion of the EU.

According to NATO policy, the 1999 enlargement should avoid drawing new divisions in Europe after the Cold War. Thus, a NATO-Russian relationship was expected to form another cornerstone of a new, inclusive, and comprehensive security structure in Europe. But the recent enlargement of NATO and especially the NATO military operations in the Balkan have been perceived by Russia not only as confrontational but also as relegating it to the sidelines of European developments. The regeneration of the NATO-Russia link does, of course, remain a publicly stated priority of the Alliance.

Consequently, the further enlargement of NATO is creating a dilemma for the Alliance in its relations with non-members: how should it manage relations with Russia, and with the applicants for membership? Less than two years after the Washington Summit, it is already clear that enlargement has been demoted from NATO’s agenda and overwhelmed by other events. It remains doubtful how far member governments are making a success of further enlargement, let alone thinking through its strategic implications. In respect to the NATO and EU dual enlargement two key questions must be answered. Should NATO really enlarge further and how far do the EU and NATO need to adjust to this radical enlargement, in terms of both policies and procedures?

NATO’s long-term purpose still requires attention from its member states. To say that the Alliance’s adaptation is complete would be a mistake. That means, NATO’s further enlargement is linked to a number of other current ongoing and future internal questions. The new strategic
concept, burden-sharing, a division of responsibilities for new missions and, in particular how could the alliance appropriately adapt itself internally -military modernization, command structure and the process of decision-making - after a new enlargement are topics which must be solved.¹¹ The final judgment on these questions will undoubtedly affect future debates on the process of enlargement.

There can be no doubt that NATO needs an appropriate security structure to meet the requirements of the 21ˢᵗ century. Both challenges “ESDP and Enlargement” are profound for NATO and must be solved. They will influence NATO’s future and the perspectives of European Security. Failure in any of the two areas will undermine the Alliance’s political credibility.

This paper examines the double challenges that face NATO. It seeks to identify the key questions and the parameters of each challenge: Further, it will to discuss briefly the critical aspects; the nature of the alliance’s response and possible ways forward.

II. Transformation of NATO and the European Union

(1) Current situation

In the past decade the world has witnessed the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself, unification of the two Germanys, and the subsequent issues of enlarging both the European Union and NATO. The current security structure that has emerged is based around these two organizations. The European Union is committed to a process of eastern and southern enlargement, which will double its present membership over the next ten to fifteen years.¹² The further enlargement of NATO is also on the European and transatlantic agenda. NATO’s great challenge at the opening of the twenty-first century is to expand through enlargement that zone of confidence, security, and stability to Europe’s eastern half. The extension of these multilateral institutions will define the political, security and economic framework of Europe for the next generation and more.

The European Union itself has never attempted to define the limits of membership, at least not on geographical or historical-cultural grounds. However, the EU sets high standards for
candidate countries. The political conditions for membership were most clearly set out in the Copenhagen criteria:

“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for a protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.”\(^{13}\)

The Helsinki European Council, in December 1999, committed the EU to active negotiations with all ten central and east European applicants as well as with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.\(^{14}\) Beyond these thirteen there is an additional list of potential candidates, which would take the EU’s membership well beyond thirty. \(^{15}\) Though the Nice summit of December 2000 is being derided as a failed opportunity within the EU, the eastern and central European nations eager to join were encouraged by the stated intention to accept qualified applicants by 2004.\(^{16}\)

Alongside the EU, NATO is committed in principle to further enlargement, while postponing until its next heads of government meeting in 2002 any reopening of discussions with the current nine declared applicants.\(^{17}\) There was no official geographic or time limit set for NATO’s further expansion in Europe. But both communiqués of the 1997 Madrid NATO Council and the 1999 Washington NATO Council declared “the Alliance expects further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibility of membership” and reaffirmed “the commitment to the enlargement process of the Alliance”.

(2) NATO enlargement and how far do the EU and NATO need to adapt?

A further enlargement of NATO by integration of the nine Central-East European countries which are still waiting hopefully on NATO’s doorstep would be a significant change in the European security environment.\(^{18}\) The “Alliance’s Strategic Concept” and the “Study on NATO Enlargement” define the purpose and the principles of enlargement and, the Membership Action Plan entails the annual reviews of a aspiring members’ progress toward meeting NATO’s membership criteria.\(^{19}\) But all documents fail to answer the question: What is the ultimate end state of enlargement, and how will the members know when that goal has been achieved? How fast should NATO enlargement take place, and how far should it go?\(^{20}\)
Nevertheless, beside those open questions three key questions are central for NATO’s enlargement:

- Should NATO enlarge further?
- How should NATO manage relations with Russia, and with membership applicants?
- How far do the EU and NATO need to adjust to enlargement, in terms of both policies and procedures?

The Alliance leaders have said that the door to further NATO accession remains open. In 1999, this policy has also found endorsement in official, high-level NATO documentation. Yet for all the logic of expansion and public professions of its support, NATO has, in fact, pursued a much more cautious and discreet policy. There have always been persuasive reasons in favor of a limited enlargement; reasons linked to calculations of cost, political expediency and the danger of diluting NATO’s military effectiveness and credibility. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that enthusiasm for further enlargement has waned significantly within NATO. Clear support for enlargement as a continuing process is now very limited. It is possible that the next NATO summit in 2002 could postpone the decision and only review the enlargement process. However, the “open door” commitment has raised expectations among a large number of aspirants. So it’s seems to be too late to ask whether such an extensive enlargement of NATO is really desirable. Promises have been made, expectations raised, prestige committed, in all of the accepted applicants.

At the same time, NATO’s further enlargement has been the source of prolonged controversy with Russia. Russian leaders across the political spectrum have made clear their opposition to any further enlargement. Their most active hostility has focused on the suggestion that the three Baltic States might be incorporated into the Western alliance, thus encircling the Russian area of Kaliningrad within NATO territory. The inclusion of the Baltic States into NATO however, has strong bipartisan support. Baltic American lobbies have already encouraged a number of members of Congress to suggest that their home countries must be included in any further round of enlargement. Administration support for Baltic membership in NATO was confirmed during the Baltic Charter signing ceremony when former President Clinton declared: “America is determined to create the conditions under which Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia can one day walk through NATO’s door.” Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security Adviser, said in April 2000: “I don’t believe in any red lines, especially in the Baltics. After fifty years of occupying the neighbors, the Russians should not be surprised if they are not trusted.”
On the other hand, the management of relations with Russia is among the most difficult of NATO's current political tasks. Relations have, in fact, been troubled for some time. Russia's nervous reaction to the prospect of NATO's enlargement eastwards has clearly revealed that the Alliance is still perceived as a challenge to Russia's security interests. The key question remains: How should NATO manage relations with Russia, and with the applicants for membership? Or in other words: Are Russian concerns still so important to NATO that the Alliance has to take her opposition for enlargement in consideration?

Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interests, reciprocity and transparency. The aim is to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. As EU and NATO expand their activities and membership; their roles on the continent are increasing. Russia finds itself in the painful position of having lost its old allies in Europe and being unable to attract any new ones. The former Warsaw Pact partners have all adopted a strong anti-Russian stand; the Baltic States are openly unfriendly and, even the reliability of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries is doubtful. NATO’s military operation against Yugoslavia was assessed by Russia as a flagrant violation of international law. Russia was deeply concerned that the decision to use force was taken in spite of its objections. Russia's withdrawal from partnership activities in March 1999 propelled NATO-Russian relations back to a point before signing of the 1997 NATO – Russia Founding Act.

In contrast, the EU is regarded by Russia as being the most powerful economic partner and important political actor in Europe. Russia does not see the EU’s present policies as a threat. Russia-EU relations are considered to be developing successfully and to have good prospects. Russia's official policy recognizes the essential role of the United States in European developments. Europe is traditionally one of the central bilateral issues discussed between Russians and Americans. Yet, there is an amount of negativity in Russia's perceptions of, and reactions to, the US presence in Europe. And, Russia's indignation with respect to NATO military operations in Yugoslavia was directed predominantly, indeed almost exclusively against the United States- as if the Europeans did not participate in them at all.
Russia is no longer a military threat, but it is still the only serious nuclear rival to the US. There are no political forces in Russia today that believe that a re-establishing the status quo ante is an achievable goal. However, Russian transformation is far from complete. No one can predict Russia's future with certainty. Its disintegration is as possible as its resurrection as a global player during the first half of the 21st century. The anti-NATO mood in official circles has, in turn, fed into isolationist and particularist currents in Russia strategic thinking. This and the "no allies" situation in Europe could have major policy consequences. One possible approach for Russian policy makers would consist of promoting an "Asia first" policy and developing preferential partnership with Russia's potential challenger in this area. Most significant examples are Russian-Chinese rapprochement and Russian-Indian military cooperation. Although Russia's connection with states of concern should not be exaggerated, some of them may be regarded as potential candidates for partnership by default, simply because alternative options, particularly in Europe, do not look available. This could create major problems for the security of the NATO member states, and endanger America's foreign policy in Asia and its position as a superpower in the world. This, the relationship with Russia remains one of the most important tasks. Building a "strategic partnership" with Russia is one key to security and stability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area. Without the involvement of Russia it will be more difficult or downright impossible to achieve progress in international crisis management, arms control, and non-proliferation. If NATO's aim of "promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area through partnership, cooperation and dialogue" is to have credibility, then some modus operandi, in particular for the further NATO enlargement needs to be worked out with Russia. The enlargement of NATO will be a key element for a future relationship with Russia.

This task is simply too big for NATO alone. NATO and the EU must work closely together to resolve these issues. This leads to the question: How far do the EU and NATO need to adjust to this enlargement, in terms of both policies and procedures?

Strategic redefinition of European international politics and institutions has come during the past decade far more often from American leaders than from Europeans themselves. The politics surrounding NATO's 1999 enlargement were complex and resulted in new and profound commitments for NATO. Three factors were key to the enlargement; the United States leadership in the Alliance, the American domestic political environment and the skilful diplomacy of the Visegrad States. At the NATO summit in Madrid 1997, no state made a sustained effort to challenge US leadership on the choice of only three invitations for new members. The NATO
superpower got what it wanted despite the protests of its weaker allies. However, some allies felt that the Clinton administration was acting for purely domestic political reasons. This is not to say that the United States based its decision to enlarge NATO purely on domestic political factors, but these dynamics cannot be dismissed as unimportant. 38

The larger NATO becomes, the greater the area it covers. Soon NATO could be closer to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), both in terms of missions and memberships. 39 The OSCE itself has a key role to play in enhancing Europe's stability. It provides the US with a venue for developing Europe's security architecture in a manner that complements the NATO strategy.40 But, a nearly identical OSCE and NATO in terms of mission and membership would raise questions about the necessity of NATO and the US role in NATO. A grave weakness arising from the merger of OSCE and NATO missions and membership is the dilution of the power of the United States which could inhibit it from leading a cohesive Alliance. A relegation of American influence in European security by making the Alliance answerable to OSCE has been a long-term objective of some Russian foreign policy makers.41

The last European Union summit, in December 2000, reinforced the feeling that political leadership and strategic thinking are in short supply. The risk of drift — of decisions delayed until past the next domestic elections in successive member states, of deadlines postponed by governments distracted by more immediate concerns- is evident. In the face of this predicament — "open door policy"— "relations with Russia", "dual enlargement", and "OSCE-consequences" — and the lack of Strategic thinkers and the tendency to postpone key policy decisions a limited NATO expansion carefully coordinated with a EU expansion, could be the way ahead.

The question which NATO governments face in the 2002 summit meeting will be whether a "southern enlargement" is possible without a simultaneous "northern enlargement" to incorporate the Baltic States. 42 Such a "southern enlargement", to take in Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and perhaps Bulgaria, would allow NATO to save face in light of its public commitments and would provide a reward to Romania and Bulgaria for their practical support of Operation Allied Force. A modest enlargement of this type would effectively spell the end of the "open door" approach and thus would require, in parallel, an explicit, high-level and coherent policy of reassurance for those excluded from membership. A further development of interoperability and other forms of direct military cooperation under the enhanced Partnership for Peace could lead to a "razor thin" distinction between formal NATO
members and non-members. Such a level of incorporation does not equate a formal Article V collective defense provision, but it does constitute strategic assurance and, crucially, approximates a deterrent.  

President Putin has clearly positioned himself as an Europeanist. In the new version of the National Security Concept, the first comprehensive foreign and security policy document of the new administration signed by Putin it is clearly stated: Russia wants to be with the "leading states of the world" and among them. Moscow's policy seems to be open to rapprochement with NATO. But like any other political leadership, Putin and his administration will be subject to various pressures. Therefore, he must have a clear indicator for his Europe policy. It must be clear to the people of Russia that NATO believes that only with Russia, and not without it, can all the key dimensions of politics, economics, and military affairs in Europe be achieved. This approach would send a clear message and most likely avoid an irreparable break in relations of NATO with Russia and, could provide a starting line for the European Union's further expansion. It also might be the right signal for the future US – Russian discussions and the needed indicator that Russia and NATO have a special strategic relationship and a common responsibility for the security in Europe.

In the years to come the issue of NATO and EU enlargement as a long-term process will thus in all probability remain a controversial topic with the international security environment and a challenge to the Alliance. Consequently, a "US-EU-NATO grand strategy" is required to make sure that the selective enlargement of EU and NATO will not reopen a damaging divide in Europe. NATO enlargement and EU expansion are separate but parallel processes in support of the same overall cause.

The future stability, security and prosperity of the European region, over the next generation and beyond, depends on the successful management of the enlargement process. A coordinated Western response must have a greater degree of clarity between NATO and EU governments about the complementary purposes of the two institutions. It is a task which requires strategic leadership, from all of the member governments of the European Union— and a greater degree of sensitivity and sympathy, on both sides of the Atlantic, to each other's different priorities, and to the distractions of each other's domestic lobbies. The end state of the dual enlargement and this process must be a part of a new European security structure and a deeper transatlantic community.
III. European Security and Defense Policy

(1) Current situation

While a massive conventional attack on NATO as a whole is unlikely in the foreseeable future, the security situation is characterized by a large range of military and nonmilitary risks that are hard to estimate in terms of how they will develop. NATO still needs capabilities to carry out missions for collective defense (Article 5), but at the same time it needs capabilities to conduct non-Article 5 missions.

The breakup of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars have posed severe challenges for the region as well as for NATO and the EU. On the other hand, the Balkan wars have highlighted problems within the NATO alliance, most notably over European contribution of less than 20 percent of the total air sorties in the bombardment of Serbia in the spring of 1999. In an embarrassing way the air campaign against Serbia had illuminated the degree to which the European NATO allies had fallen a technological generation behind the United States. Shortcomings in command and control, strategic intelligence, strategic airlift, precision-guided munitions and in other fields demonstrated the gap between the European allies and the United States. In terms of military capabilities, the Alliance had become grotesquely imbalanced. 46 General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in his “Kosovo After-Action Review” in October 1999: “Such disparities in capabilities will seriously affect our ability to operate as an effective Alliance over the long-term.”47

Europe has neither the political nor the military instruments to master the challenges on its continent. In Kosovo, the Europeans learned the hard way that they not only want to have a stronger European role in keeping peace, but that they urgently need to have one. It has become clear that a common European Security and Defense Policy is urgently required. 48

(2) From European Security and Defense Identity to European Security and Defense Policy

The story of the “European pillar” goes back beyond the beginning of NATO itself: its challenges and conundrums are now 53 years old 49. On 17 March 1948 five West European countries, facing the emergent Soviet bloc and determined to put their own history of strife behind them,
signed the Brussels Treaty on "Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence." During the acute phase of the Cold War and the first stages of détente several attempts were made to create or strengthen a European pillar. The story of European defense can safely be fast-forwarded up to 1991, when NATO accepted that a separate, but not separable "European Security and Defense Identity" could grow, provided that it did so within NATO. At the January 1994 meeting of the North Atlantic Council green light was given to the emergence of some form of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Since that meeting ESDI and enlargement have alternated at the top of the Alliance's strategic agenda. The final breakthrough for ESDI happened at the Berlin ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1996.

The Berlin decisions led to the establishment of arrangements between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) to allow the WEU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities in possible operations under its political control and strategic direction. Most of the organizational arrangements between NATO and the WEU were in place by 1999 and were put to the test during a joint crisis management exercise in February 2000. At the December 1998 Anglo-French summit in St.Malo, U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair lifted the fifty-year-old UK veto on the Europeanization of defense policy. Britain and France agreed on a new call for the EU to develop credible, autonomous military forces.

At the December 1999 Helsinki European Council the "European Headline Goal with the following key decisions were taken:

- "To develop an autonomous capacity to take considerations and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army."
- "Member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year, military forces of up to 50,000 to 60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks."
- "New political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework."
- Modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO.
- "Appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis management."

The EU - member states also committed themselves to medium and long-term efforts to improve still further both their operational and their strategic capabilities. Additionally, they
decided to continue taking steps to strengthen their capabilities, carrying out existing or planned projects implementing multinational solutions, including in the field of pooling resources. At the June 2000 Feira European Council, the EU assisted by NATO’s military experts, defined the variety of measures needed successfully to carry out the full range of the tasks. At a Capabilities Commitment Conference on 20-21 November 2000 in Brussels the EU, drew together the specific national commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki European Council. At this meeting 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft and 100 ships were pledged for the future EU rapid reaction force. A new chapter in relations between the EU and NATO was opened with the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the EU interim Political and Security Committee in Brussels in September and November 1999. In the space of two years, from St.Malo over Helsinki to Nice, the European Union has made more progress on common defense than during the previous forty years of European development. The pace of these developments is as striking as their seriousness and scope.

(3) European Union – NATO partnership

The establishment of relations between the European Union and NATO will without doubt be one of the most delicate issues to be settled for the maintenance of transatlantic harmony. The important decisions taken by the EU will have implications for the entire Alliance. For the understanding of the EU – NATO relationship it is important to answer this question: Why is there a European Security and Defense Policy- and what is its difference as compared to European Security and Defence Identity ? There is a clear differentiation between ESDI and ESDP. ESDI was always a NATO military project, essentially designed to solve a number of structural and political problems within the Euro-Atlantic community. ESDP, on the other hand, is a part of Europe’s idea of a common defense. One of the European Union’s goals is to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP). This aim includes the progressive framing of a common defense policy. ESDP is therefore a EU political project and goes much further than ESDI in positioning not only the necessity but also the legitimacy of some relatively autonomous measure of European security policy.

The new European defense initiative was started for a mix of reasons. The reasons ranged from domestic British reasons and the desire for more European influence in NATO, to the concern that Europe might have to fend for itself if the U.S. Congress took an isolationist turn. Many EU members also supported the project simply to promote further integration. The impact of the Kosovo war became a major driving factor for all European countries. Europe’s dramatic military
deficiencies and the realization of just how close the Americans were this time to staying out of this conflict resulted in the agreement at Helsinki to create a rapid-reaction capability and build the institutions to manage it. \(^60\) The advantages of a EU better able to act forcefully and independently must therefore be weighed against the danger that the new initiative could duplicate costly NATO structures and assets, and alienate NATO’s non EU members.

The yardstick to measure the European Security and Defense Policy was clearly set by Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State. Her “three Ds”: no decoupling of Europe’s security from that of America’s; no duplication of effort and capabilities; and no discrimination against those allies who are not within the EU illustrate the conceptual way ahead. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s “three Is”: the indivisibility of the transatlantic link; the improvement of European capabilities; and the inclusiveness of all allies in Europe’s defense policy confirm the parallel thinking for the establishment of ESDP on both sides of the Atlantic. \(^61\)

At the June 1999 EU’s Cologne Summit, European governments for the first time committed themselves to a common European defense policy. They declared their aim that “the Union must have the capability for action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO.” \(^62\) This is not a call for a European army. European Union governments are not questioning the agreed “NATO first.” \(^63\) But they are calling for a clear European vocation to establish a partnership with the USA based on more balanced military capabilities and shared political leadership. Cooperation for the decision-making process between NATO and the EU requires formal links.

First steps have been taken. The first EU High Representative for Common and Security Policy, former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, took office in October 1999, filling the post for the first time. Shortly after, he was also appointed to Secretary General of WEU. This was an another clear signal of the intention of the EU governments: NATO remains the core institution of Western collective defense and the EU security and defense project will be in harmony with the Alliance framework. The establishment of permanent political and military bodies within the EU Council – Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and a Military Staff- provides the EU with structures for an independent decision-making process and for cooperation with similar NATO decision-making bodies.
This part seems to be no problem for all partners involved. The question of where the operational planning should be conducted, however created some trouble between the United States and the EU member states. The EU proposal to create an independent planning capacity in their Military Staff and not to use NATO-HQ SHAPE for this purpose was for the US “a duplication of effort” and in contrast to the already achieved ESDI procedures.

This leads to a central question: Which of the achieved agreements between NATO and the WEU can be transferred to a NATO-EU relationship? NATO allies agreed in July 2000 to a EU proposal to set up EU-NATO ad hoc working groups. The aim was to move work forward in four specific areas: security arrangements; developing permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the two organizations; defining modalities for EU access to NATO assets; and EU capability goals. The starting point for the discussions on the practical military aspects of developing the NATO-EU relationship were the following subjects:

- assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
- the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
- Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
- The further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

The achieved arrangements between NATO and WEU should help to develop reasonable political and military NATO-EU procedures. But in contrast to the former possible WEU-led operations, possible scenarios for EU differ from EU-led operations using NATO assets to autonomous EU operations without the capabilities of the Alliance. Therefore, it will not be the case that NATO can simply strike the “W” from WEU. Rather, NATO will have to work out new military cooperation and sharing agreements with the EU.

The EU is seeking to set up appropriate structures to ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the non- EU European NATO and non- European members. For the EU-led operations using NATO assets it is important to ensure the fullest possible involvement of the non- EU European allies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey. Some of the countries don’t want to join the Union, others are candidates for EU membership. For the EU, Turkey’s national interest and positions are different from the other NATO states. Turkey is a member of NATO and the council of Europe, and its leaders
want to join the EU. But its refusal to relinquish the death penalty is, alongside its fragile democracy, weak economy and poor treatment of the Kurds provides more than adequate ammunition for those Europeans who are reluctant to envisage a EU including Turkey.\textsuperscript{69} Therefore it is understandable that a lone stand by Turkey prevented the 19-country Alliance from concluding a basic agreement on its future cooperation with a EU rapid reaction force in crisis management on 15 December 2000.\textsuperscript{70} Turkey, which has offered a large continent to the EU, insists that it must be included in the “decision-making” that could affect its security interests. Therefore NATO should give the EU access to its planners and assets only on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{71}

This is a serious interruption of the ongoing negotiations between NATO and EU. But, the non-EU European allies must understand that they cannot have a permanent seat at the EU’s decision-making table. On the other hand, there is much the EU can do to include them in its plans\textsuperscript{72}. So it should be possible to solve the question of how Turkey and the non-European allies should be able to participate in consultation, deliberations and in the decision process.

The EU should have the autonomous capacity to make decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to conduct autonomous EU military operations. How can the EU conduct these operations without duplication of existing NATO bodies and assets? It is difficult to see how the EU, without considerable duplication of NATO bodies and US assets, would ever be in a position to conduct a mission with which the United States disagreed. Does that mean the EU should not develop its own decision-making bodies and operational planning capabilities or that it should skip the autonomous military operations?

EU military operations require a political and military decision-making process, operational planning capabilities, command and control structure and military assets. For autonomous military operations, the EU needs an independent decision-making process. The operational planning for EU operations, for the time being, could be done in existing NATO-HQ’s. However, this might create a dilemma in the future. The EU will be dependent on NATO, and the goodwill of the non-European EU members of the Alliance, and on the United States and Canada. Such a position is not necessarily problematic. EU and NATO should be able to develop reasonable procedures for the conduct of operational planning. But it does mean at least a compromising of the EU’s aspiration for autonomy. The development of a command structure for EU-led
operations as well as for EU autonomous operations should be achievable without major problems.

The key question is, where will the necessary military assets for the EU going to come from? When adopting the new Strategic Concept in 1999, all NATO countries agreed to Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). That means they will improve their capabilities in the key areas of deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, operational effectiveness, survivability and command and control. Although highly experienced and adept at peacekeeping, most European forces lack the means to conduct truly demanding, modern military operations: airlift, sealift, satellite intelligence, precision-guides munitions, and all-weather and night-strike capabilities.\textsuperscript{73}

The EU members decided at Helsinki in 1999 to rapidly develop Collective Capability Goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. Several steps were taken to overcome the deficiencies: A Franco-German initiative for a European Air Transport Command was launched. At the end of this decade a European strategic lift capacity and a strategic airlift command with permanently pooled and subordinated European strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling assets will be available; and, the decision has been taken to jointly develop and procure a Future Transport Aircraft.\textsuperscript{74}

The EU members would like to close the technological gap between the United States and European allies with the Franco-German initiative for a European satellite-based reconnaissance capacity and the foundation of the European Armaments Agency in 2001. Unless and until this capabilities gap with the United States can be closed, ESDP will remain a largely paper exercise, and the prospect of significant autonomous EU actions will be a mirage.\textsuperscript{75} If the EU is ever going to acquire the military capacity implicit in its current ambitions, it is probably going to have to persuade the European voter to increase defense spending.\textsuperscript{76} The new security environment requires that the Europeans must assume a bigger responsibility in crisis prevention and crisis management, when and wherever European security interests are involved. ESDP is a EU political project and an instrument for autonomous measures of European security policy. It would be a mistake to build the assessment of its way ahead only on the current situation.
Another problem that the non-EU member states face is that the EU states, in pursuing autonomy, will increasingly invest in capabilities that duplicate unnecessarily those already available. There might be the possibility that the EU may over time develop a permanent military structure that duplicates NATO’s integrated military structure.\textsuperscript{77}

Given all of the above, the future of EU – NATO relations depends on consultation procedures, the notion of autonomy and above all, the institutional relationship between both. The most important question, however, has still to be answered: How will ESDP influence the transatlantic link?

(4) European Security and Defense Policy and the transatlantic relationship

All major documents of NATO, all papers published by the Clinton Administration, several studies of US commissions about Americas strategy in the 21st century confirm the importance of the transatlantic relationship and the dominant role of NATO for a new European security structure.\textsuperscript{78} The Alliance’s Strategic Concept states: “NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible”.\textsuperscript{79} And further on: “The achievement of the Alliance’s aims depends critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defense.”\textsuperscript{80}

The US in NATO was always more than “primus inter pares,” and reserved the right to independent strategic action. The idea that Europe should play a role in the security more commensurate with its size and resources has been promoted in different forms on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, the main focus was always on “burden-sharing,” while in Europe much of the driving force has been generated by France long-term ambition of creating a more balanced Alliance, structured by two more or less equal pillars.\textsuperscript{81} US public support for greater European defense efforts, however, has always masked certain ambivalence.\textsuperscript{82} It was always easier for the United States to support defense initiatives when they were unlikely to add up too much. Therefore, ESDP has created some major discussions in the United States. There is a tendency in Europe to seek greater autonomy from the US. ESDI within NATO was the preferred form of burden sharing; leaving US political and strategic leadership unchallenged. Where the US in 1996 thought to give the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance a more autonomous military role in the NATO framework, the Europeans are now building this
autonomous role in the EU framework. There is the concern about a strategic decoupling, due to the technological obsolescence and the inadequate defense spending in Europe. And, there is the concern about a political decoupling, due to the European Union’s wish and effort to become more capable of taking action on security matters.

French criticism of American dominance in NATO and their public statements that the EU must be able to conduct autonomous operations without an explicit US veto over EU decision-making created some problems in the relationship with the USA. A statement testifying on ESDP to the House on International Relations in November 1999 clearly demonstrates how people would assess the European Union’s way to strengthen NATO. “We should openly acknowledge that the aim to align the foreign and defense policies of the EU’s members into one shared and uniform policy is at times motivated either by a desire to distance themselves from US influence, or in some cases by openly anti American intentions.” 83 Some observers, however, insist that this is a false analysis.

There are many convincing statements by European politicians, to include these: “Strengthening the transatlantic link will remain the central part of a policy aimed at achieving peace, security and democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. No one should believe that the importance of the new NATO and our American allies for European security would be reduced if Europe had a greater capacity for action.” 84 And, it’s inconceivable that the EU would consider embarking on military actions without intensive consultations with the US government.

On the other hand, there are statements which show that a US strategy for the 21st century and the establishment of a stronger European pillar are in line. “Today, we don’t really see ourselves as being in Europe to fix Europe. The US sees itself as being in Europe as part of a partnership and the question is, what can we do with Europe?...though the US is the sole remaining superpower in the world, we don’t want to go it alone.” 85

A RAND study suggests an imaginative tradeoff which would allow the EU to move towards considerable autonomy while retaining US commitment. This would involve EU recognition that Western security interests are in fact global and therefore require European acceptance of the universalization of NATO’s remit, under US leadership and with active EU solidarity. In exchange, the US would guarantee support for ESDP under increasingly autonomous EU responsibility. 86 This would be an interesting and promising approach for the coming decades.
It could help to solve the problem of political decoupling. Therefore, it is to be hoped that the next five to ten years will witness a sensible trade-off between a EU and the United States. The EU tightly linked to NATO, but enjoying greater and greater confidence and capacity, and a United States more relaxed about European capacity and more prepared to share leadership, particularly in the European theatre.

The establishment of new strategic objectives for the United States and of Europe must be seen in the light of strategic decoupling and US domestic affairs. There is still the US fear that the Europeans will not be able to close the technological gap and that they are not willing to spend the required money for adequate defense matters. The European members of NATO have made and broken so many promises of taking greater initiative, of assuming greater responsibility, of making a greater investment in defense, that it is hard to convince an American policymaker to give the current promises any degree of respect. The speed of the Helsinki initiative, in particular the development of an effective EU political and military structure and the availability of forces, was an impressive start. But it’s not enough. Now, the EU members need to give far greater priority to modernizing and streamlining their military capabilities.

To achieve this goal, a reinforced transatlantic defense-industry cooperation is required. In the past, US industry profited from selling sophisticated equipment to NATO countries without sharing much work or technology. The US defense market system was largely closed to Europeans and increasingly the European NATO countries have produced their own hardware—even when it is was more costly and less advanced.\(^6\)

A continuation of this trend in the long run will create major problems for both industries. Viable defense industries on both sides of the Atlantic are required. New ways to promote technology sharing, streamline licensing procedures and encourage appropriate joint ventures have to be developed to serve companies on both sides of the Atlantic. Traditionally, Atlanticists believe that strong European common defense capabilities would simply push Congress (and the American public) back towards isolationism.\(^5\) In the mid-term ESDP as the basis of a new European security structure and the process of transforming the US Army could enhance this trend.

A strong European Union force and an American Army that could deploy five divisions anywhere in the world in 30 days might lead to the point that the Congress and the American
people will become skeptical about the commitment in NATO and deployment of US forces in Europe. Therefore, it is important that the American people and the US Congress understand: NATO remains the anchor of US engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. The Europeans are the US most important partners, because they are politically able to employ military power abroad. The US is unable to achieve many of its global objectives without help from Europe: prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; dealing with Russia, protecting the international economic and financial system from the turbulence of globalization, ensuring access to energy at affordable prices.

Cooperation between US government and Congress in each phase of the development of ESDP is necessary. Leading European politicians should be included in this information process. The aim of ESDP should be clear to everybody: ESDP will strengthen the transatlantic link and benefit Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

IV. Conclusions

NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. As the Western nations transition into the 21st century, NATO needs an integrating strategy that establishes political and military cohesion between nineteen member states, twenty-four partners, and Russia and Ukraine, all of which at times have divergent interests and goals. In making this transition, NATO faces two central challenges which are deeply interrelated. These are the European Security and Defense Policy and a further enlargement of NATO and EU. These challenges will dominate the political-military agenda of Europe in the near future and for some time to come.

For the first time in history there seems to be a chance to implement President Kennedy's two-pillar concept for Euro-Atlantic security. Collective defense will remain NATO's business, effective crisis management will leave NATO and the EU with the same military requirements. But Europe's role in peacekeeping is bound to grow. It is important to recognize and reinforce EU's defense equation. The EU cannot see its status reduced to that of NATO subcontractor and the Alliance shouldn't be treated as a secondary organization in matters of European security. Still, as the leading guarantor of European security and a force for European stability, NATO must play a leading role in promoting a more integrated and secure Europe, prepared to respond to new challenges.
As the 21st century progresses, NATO and the EU must establish a balanced relationship. This will be a difficult task in the short term. But both challenges – ESDP and NATO enlargement – are difficult issues and must be solved to build a new European security structure.

NATO’s and the EU’s relationship to the two former superpowers Russia and United States are the key to further development. The double enlargement and, in particular the extension of NATO, should not be conducted without an involvement of Russia. Careful and limited relations with Russia will be the cornerstone for this process and for all important future negotiations. NATO’s aim of "promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area through partnership, cooperation and dialogue" is only possible in a special strategic relationship with Russia. At the same time, it is necessary that the selective enlargement of EU and NATO will not reopen a new damaging divide in Europe. NATO enlargement and EU expansion are separate but parallel processes in support of the same overall cause.

In the 21st century, only the United States remains a truly global power - in political, military, economic, and cultural terms. It feels a responsibility to provide global leadership; it has global interests. Europe, by contrast, is still a political power which is re-emerging. Yet, no single country, not even a superpower, can solve the problems of tomorrow’s world on its own. Therefore, in the long term NATO and EU have to establish a relationship in which European capabilities will develop significantly. This will require transatlantic cooperation and a more relaxed American attitude towards sharing leadership in Europe. Today the good ship NATO is still navigating among the rocks; but there is a good chance that in the future this same ship will be able to steer into deeper, calmer and hopefully safer waters.
ENDNOTES

1 NATO summit in Washington, April 1999, EU summits in Cologne, June 1999 and Helsinki, December 1999


3 See Department of Defense, "Strengthening Transatlantic Security- A U.S. Strategy for the 21st century, Washington, December 2000, page 15. NATO accomplished its mission through the most precise and lowest collateral damage air campaign in history, with no American or Allied combat casualties in 78 days of operations and over 38,000 combat-related aircraft sorties.

4 See Gordon, Philip H., "Their Own Army" in Foreign Affairs, page 12

5 See Department of Defense, page 2 and 18-24

6 See Gordon, Philip H., page 12


8 George Robertson, "NATO in the new millennium", NATO Review 47,4,1999, page 6


10 See General Secretary George Robertson, Speech on Permanent representatives Council at 17 March 2000: The 1999 Alliance's Strategic Concept confirms that the essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means. It affirms the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law which the Allies share, and their determination not only to defend one another but to contribute to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area.

11 Decision-making was never easy in a NATO of 16 or now of 19 members; and in a non-Cold War environment consensus will be even more difficult to achieve.

12 The process of enlargement of the European Union was launched on 30 March 1998. Negotiations are currently being held with the following twelve applicants: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The basic principle of the negotiations is that all the applicant countries must accept existing EU law.

13 The statement was made in the Conclusion of the Presidency of the Copenhagen European Council, in June 1993.
Central and eastern applicants are: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Turkey is in principle a candidate for membership, though not yet ready to open full negotiations.

See Wallace, William, page 477; additional candidates could be: Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbian Yugoslavia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Montenegro, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and, the King of Morocco has re-opened the question of a application to EU.

See Norman Gelb, "Germany takes the lead in Europe" in The New Leader, January/February 2000. The EU summit demonstrated that the new structure will be difficult to negotiate. Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair declared: “We cannot do business like this in the future,” and several other heads of government expressed their disgust as well. French President Jacques Chirac, who as the present holder of the EU's rotating presidency organized and chaired the conclave, was accused of being overbearing, obstructionist and muddled.

See Ryan C. Hendrickson, page 53 Applicants are: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; this are the current applicants; however there are more countries interested to join NATO; prior to NATO's 1999 enlargement there were statements like “In time, Russia could be considered for NATO membership” see Robert Hunter, “Solving Russia: Final Piece in NATO's Puzzle”, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000, page 120;

See Anton Bebler, NATO’s Enlargement and Slovenia, Oesterreichische Militaerzeitschrift 6/99, page 711 - 716

At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept; Membership Action Plan (MAP): NATO has established a program of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership. There is a continuing requirement to assist them in reorganizing their military structures and forces to make their future contribution and enable aspirants within the framework of MAP to familiarize themselves with and adhere to NATO military procedures and standards.


In Madrid 1997, French President Chirac and others called vigorously for an “open door” policy for future members. This “open door policy” was also expressly supported by the Clinton administration and the campaign of the new President George W. Bush has stressed that NATO enlargement is important and is going to happen. See Department of Defense, page 22

See Washington summit communiqué, 24 April 1999, pare. 7; Membership Action Plan, 23-24 April 1999, para. 1; see NATO Press Communiqué ,24 April 1999 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” says in pare. 39: No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

See Stuart Croft, / Howorth, Jolyon / Terriff, Terry / Webber, Mark "NATO' triple challenge", in International Affairs Vol. 76, Number 3, 2000, pages 495 – 518;
24 See Wallace, William, *From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The transformation of the EU and NATO*, in *International Affairs*, Volume 76, Number 3, July 2000, page 482; and during his visit to Romania the Deputy General Secretary of NATO, Sergio Balanzino, made the statement "I hope that Romania still wants to join NATO and EU," in *Bundeswehr Aktuell*, 4 December 2000.

25 See Wallace, William, page 481; the Baltic States were for half a century part of the Soviet Union; and President Putin has expressed his strong opposition to NATO expansion, nothing that such a move "would destabilize the situation in Europe and the world", quoted in *Baltic News Service*, 15 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, world news file;


27 Ms Rice spoke at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, 27 April 2000

28 See Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia: a part of Europe or apart from Europe?", in *International Affairs* Vol.76,Number 3, July 2000, pages 443 - 458

29 See NATO Press Communiqué ,2 4 April 1999, page 9. NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed at the May 1997 summit meeting between President Yeltsin and the sixteen NATO heads of state and governments at the Elysee Palace, Paris, 27 May 1997. In this context it's important to recall that Ukraine has a special role too. On the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values.

30 See Sigmar Stadlmeier, "Voelkerrechtliche Aspekte des Kosovo-Konflikts," *Oesterreichische Militaerzeitschrift* 5/99, page 567 – 574; and Vladimir Baranovsky, page 454: he explains the Russian point of view and their interpretation of international law

31 See Vladimir Baranovsky, page 454

32 Ibid., page 449. "Status quo ante" means to get back the former status of a superpower.

33 See Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, Mark Webber, "NATO' triple challenge", in *International Affairs* Vol. 76, Number 3, 2000, pages 495 – 518

34 See Vladimir Baranovsky, page 450

35 See Wallace, William, page 492

36 NATO-Meeting in Madrid in July 1997, the NATO heads of state invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to negotiate joining the Alliance with the goal of formal membership by April 1999
37 See Department of Defense, page 23 “Under the Constitution, a two thirds affirmative vote of the Senate is required to give its advice and consent to ratification of a treaty or treaty amendment. And, Visegrad States: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, treaty signed in 1991.


39 See “Woerterbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik,” Hamburg, page 263: 55 member states of Europe, North America, the Caucasus and Central Asia form the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Charter commits members to, among other things, the establishment of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams to assist in conflict prevention and crisis management. The Charter also recognizes that European security in the twenty-first century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states.


41 See James Wyllie, page 116 and Vladimir Baranovsky, page 453

42 See Bilinsky, Y, "Will there be a second, third wave in NATO enlargement" paper presented to the 31st National Convention of the American Association of Slavic Studies, St. Louis, Missouri, November 1999, page 22

43. See Stuart Croft, page 499

44 See Vladimir Baranovsky, page 450, The National Security Concept was signed by Putin on 10 January 2000.

45 See Wallace, William, page 493

46 Department of Defense, page 15

47 "Kosovo After Action Review," presented to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 October 1999


49 See Public Papers of the Presidents, J.F. Kennedy, Vol. IV, p. 517ff, 25 Jun 1963, Paulskirche, Frankfurt .The idea of an "European pillar" was first proposed by US President John F. Kennedy. The creation of a "European Pillar" within NATO should help to come to a better burden-sharing between the US and the European NATO countries and to enhance the responsibility of the European allies.

51 See Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, Mark Webber, page 503; interrupted only from Kosovo war.


54 Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, pares. 25-8 forces must be capable of ensuring humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace making (the so called Petersberg tasks), in accordance with article 17 of the treaty on E.U.

56 New permanent political and military bodies will be established within the Council: a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (MC), the Military Staff (MS)


58 The "second pillar" of the EU, created under the Maastricht Treaty to replace European political Cooperation. It establishes the broad foreign policy objectives of the EU institutions to cooperate in promoting these objectives.

59 See Feira European Council, Presidency Conclusions, pages 503-504.

60 See Philipp H. Gordon, page 14.


62 see German EU Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Annex III “Strengthening the Defence Dimension of the EU”.

63 See Bundeswehr Aktuell in 12/1999; In addressing German military commanders on 1 December 1999, US Defense Secretary Cohen said: “I prefer to say that NATO should have what I call first option on any action that would be taken in the way of a military operation.” This is the notion, which is written into the Helsinki declaration: “where NATO as a whole is not engaged.”

64 See Michael Evans, “EU Force puts NATO at risk of becoming relic,” in London Times; 6 December 2000, reports that US Secretary of Defense kept the pressure on EU.

65 SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.


67 Canada has also expressed an interest in participating in such operations.
63 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Turkey are candidates; Norway and Iceland do not want to join EU.

63 See William Wallace, page 489; and Martin Walker, page 473

70 See Douglas Hamilton, “Turkey blocks deal to share NATO forces, in Reuter, 16 December 2000

71 see Anton La Guardia, “America tries to stop EU going it alone on defence,” in London Daily Telegraph, 16 December 2000

72 Participation for non-EU allies could be: involved in regular discussions of matters affecting common security, the opportunity to be involved militarily if EU decides to undertake an operation, involvement in the creation of structures and in the decision-making process for any mission in which they are taking part.

73 Philipp H. Gordon, page 15

74 see Rudolf Scharping, “NATO and Perspectives of European Security”, Speech at the Columbia University in New York, 3 November 2000

75 Philipp H. Gordon, page 16

76 See Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, Mark Webber, page 508; and IISS, “The Military Balance 1999-2000, Oxford University Press, 1999, page 300 provides the figures in 1998, the US spent $266 billion (3.2 per cent of GDP) on defense. The eleven EU members of NATO together spent $160 billion (2 per cent of GDP)- or 60 per cent of the US total

77 Strobe Talbott, “Americas Stake in a Strong Europe,” Remarks at a conference on the future of NATO, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 7 October 1999


79 The Alliance Strategic Concept, page 7

80 Ibid., page 11

81 See Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, Mark Webber, page 504. The United States as one pillar of NATO and the European pillar as the second.

82 See Martin Walker, page 471: under the Bush administration, the initial plans for a European Security and Defense Identity laid out in the Maastricht Treaty provoked ion February 1991 a sharp diplomatic note, the Bartholomew Memorandum, which warned that the pursuit of a separate European defense system would undermine the integrity of NATO and could jeopardize US commitment to the Alliance;
83 See J. Bolton, Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute, testimony to House Committee on International Relations, 10 November 1999.


85 See Ron Assmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, address to Baltic Sea Conference, Stockholm, 4 November 1999.


88 See Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, Mark Webber, page 507.

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