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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE IN A NEW MILLENNIUM

BY

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United States Army

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Partnership for Peace
In A New Millennium

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
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This study analyzes the NATO Partnership for Peace (PiP) and provides recommendations for future direction and changes to the program. It reviews the European security environment, the evolution of NATO and its post-Cold War transition, the development of PiP and its relationship to NATO expansion and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

PiP is exceeding the objectives set for the program: transparency in defense planning and budgeting, civil control of military forces, non-combat operations, cooperative military relations between NATO and partners, and force interoperability. PiP continues to evolve. It draws NATO and partners closer thus creating a more secure and stable Europe. Changes and improvement in PiP will continue to occur as the Alliance’s roles and missions adapt to the dynamic environment in Europe. After extensive review of available literature, I propose the following recommendations: (1) the EAPC expand its political dialogue and allow partners a greater voice in the planning and execution of security actions, (2) EAPC and PiP focus greater emphasis on crisis prevention, (3) NATO and EAPC increase emphasis on arms control and disarmament, (4) NATO assign partner nation personnel to NATO subordinate commands and CJTFs, (5) NATO assist in moving ESDF from conceptual to operational status, and (6) NATO develop a sponsorship program for partner military units.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, capitalizing on the success of PiP, is immersing as a potentially important cooperative security structure for Europe. The establishment of diplomatic missions to NATO, by partner nations under EAPC, has added the political voice of partners to the NATO decision-making process. With the addition of three new NATO members and development of the Membership Action Plan (MAP), partners seeking future NATO membership no longer view the EAPC and PiP as a consolation prize but as a true partnership enhancing European security and the only road to membership. The EAPC will also continue to evolve as partners draw closer to the Alliance. EAPC and PiP have already promoted significant improvements in partner country policies and behavior in the areas of democratization, open economies, civil control of the military and interoperability. Thus, they have contributed to European security and they will continue to be part of the solution for the new millennium.
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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE IN A NEW MILLENNIUM

“We seek to build constructive partnerships with them in order further to promote security and stability in a free and undivided Europe which will recognize the political, economic, social and ecological elements of security, along with the indispensable defense dimension.... Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.”

— North Atlantic Council
June 7, 1991

European stability is a vital interest to the national security of the United States (US). Section III of the US National Security Strategy (NSS), dated December 1999, identifies two strategic goals the US has toward Europe. “The first is build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace.”¹ The second is to “… meet global challenges no nation can meet alone.”² The NSS specifically identifies NATO enlargement and Partnership for Peace ( PfP) as two of the major programs that will help attain these goals.

NATO’s PfP is a military outreach program designed to engage and develop constructive relationships with Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations as well as neutral Western European nations. The program currently includes all 19 NATO members and 27 partner countries. “It is designed to serve as a permanent and dynamic feature of the European security architecture”³ The objectives of the initial PfP program were defined in the invitation letter published at the NATO summit in January 1994: “… we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.”⁴ Two additional objectives that have been agreed to include: (1) non-combat operations under United Nations (UN) or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and (2) force interoperability over the longer term with NATO members, including participation in Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).

During the dynamic and turbulent 1990s, many CEE nations sought NATO membership primarily as a counterbalance to Russia’s military might. Fears of a resurgent nationalist or hard line Russia drove many countries quickly to the West. These nations were offered membership in the more limited North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) established in 1991 and the PfP program in lieu of full NATO membership. The relationships between NATO and partner nations have developed and changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Programs
and organizations have changed to keep pace with the changing dynamics in European Security. However, there are still many issues to be addressed and resolved.

Numerous partner nations have participated in thousands of PfP activities as well as major contingency operations and military deployments such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Several nations seeking closer relations with NATO and NATO countries expanded beyond PfP and deployed outside of Europe on multi-national or United Nations operations such as Operation Desert Thunder and Desert Fox in Kuwait. Because of the increased commitment and participation of partner nations, there is a desire for greater influence in the development, planning and execution of PfP activities and operational deployments. Most partner nations have made dramatic changes to their internal national organization and ways of doing business with respect to politics, economics, military, diplomatic, education, and human rights. They are pressing for greater recognition of their commitments and sacrifices. Some are hopeful that these actions will accelerate their full membership in NATO.

In addition, there are still lingering issues in the NATO-Russia relationship and many Partner-Russia issues. Many key personnel in Russia perceive that PfP, NATO expansion, the NACC and its successor the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) are creating a new division of Europe. The Russians were a strong proponent of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They believed the OSCE should be the stable and leading force in European security; therefore, NATO expansion and PfP are unnecessary.

The North Atlantic Alliance and current NATO programs cannot remain static in light of the dynamic and sweeping changing taking place across Europe. Nor can they ignore these calls for action and change from partner nations. NATO must closely examine its current structure and the PfP program. This self-examination must address several critical questions: Can PfP, in its current form, meet its objectives? What changes can be made to improve the program? Is membership in the EAPC and participation in PfP being used as a consolation prize in lieu of full NATO membership?

This research reviews the European security environment, the evolution of NATO and its post-Cold War transitions. It examines the development of PfP, its enhancements, its relationship to NATO expansion and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. This study will help NATO define itself in a dynamic and changing environment. This paper analyzes the Partnership for Peace Program and provides the following recommendations for future direction and changes to the program: (1) the EAPC expand its political dialogue and allow partners a greater voice in the planning and execution of security actions, (2) EAPC and PfP focus greater emphasis on crisis prevention but remain ready to implement required action in crisis
management, (3) NATO and EAPC increase emphasis on arms control and disarmament, (4) NATO assign partner nation personnel to NATO subordinate commands and CJTFs, (5) NATO assist in moving ESDI from conceptual to operational status, and (6) NATO develop a sponsorship program similar to the United States National Guard State Sponsorship Program for partner country military units. Implementation of these recommendations will help shape Partnership for Peace in a new millennium.

EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – EVOLUTION OF NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in the aftermath of World War II. It was established under the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. There were 12 original founding members. Seven other nations joined the organization between 1952 and 1999. A list of current NATO members and the year they joined the alliance is in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year Joined</th>
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<th>Year Joined</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>West Germany (now Germany)</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

TABLE 1. NATO MEMBERS

The treaty was one of the primary Western countermeasures against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. The goal of the organization was to deter an attack by the Soviet Bloc armies and safeguard the freedom of Western Europe and North America. It is a collective defense organization, meaning an armed attack against any one member is considered an attack against all members. Article 5 of the treaty states if one or more nations are attacked in Europe or North Africa, all others nations will assist the party or parties so attacked. Article 4 provides for consultations among allies whenever any member perceives that its territory, political independence or security is threatened. "The treaty was also designed to encourage political, economic, and social cooperation." 5 As stated in the preamble to the treaty, "Alliance
members are committed to safeguarding the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{6}

NATO's principal decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It is the only body formally established by the treaty and was given the authority to establish subordinate committees necessary for implementing the treaty. The NAC develops policy and supervises all subordinate agencies and activities, both military and civilian. The council is chaired by the secretary-general and meets on several levels including: Summits (i.e. Heads of State), Ministerial (i.e. Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers) and Permanent (National Ambassadors assigned to NATO).\textsuperscript{7} NATO decisions are made by consensus after discussion and input from all member nations. Decisions made by NATO are therefore decisions made by all member countries. Accordingly, NATO can only implement a course of action agreed to by all members.\textsuperscript{8}

The Alliance is a transoceanic partnership between countries in North America and Western Europe. “The objectives of the partnership between European and North American members of the Alliance are primarily political, underpinned by shared defense planning and military cooperation, but also by cooperation and consultation in economic, scientific, environmental and other relevant fields.”\textsuperscript{9} However, from its inception in 1949 until the end of the Cold War in 1989, NATO was faced with a significant military threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, the vast majority of NATO's efforts and resources were focused toward military planning and the collective defense of the Western Europe.

NATO has evolved as an organization and has developed its political and military structures to take account of the transformation of the European security environment since the end of the Cold War. Changes in NATO's structures and policies reflect the common agreement between NATO member countries to maintain the political and military cooperation essential for joint security. At the same time, they have extended their cooperation to new partners in Central and Eastern Europe, in order to promote stability and security in Europe as a whole.\textsuperscript{10}

**NATO'S POST COLD WAR TRANSITION-TOWARD AN INTEGRATED EUROPE**

Beginning in 1989, a dynamic and fundamental change swept across Europe. It was a revolutionary change that altered the political and military landscape of the continent. The Berlin Wall came down and formerly communist countries began a rapid evolution toward democratic rule. Communism was in retreat and the communist domino effect the west had feared for 40 years were beginning to fall in the opposite direction. Democratic dominos fell from Western Europe eastward. The ideological and military division of Europe, represented by the Iron Curtain, came down. The crest of this reform peaked in 1991 with the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact followed closely by the break-up of the Soviet Union. "The international repercussions of these events and their implications for the security arrangements in Europe had a profound impact on the Alliance, enabling it to adjust its structures and policies to the new circumstances of the 1990s, while maintaining its core function of ensuring the security of its members."  

NATO reform began in 1989 when the Alliance offered Democratic Institution Fellowships to former adversaries and for the first time in 40 years permitted official visitors from the Warsaw Pact nations into NATO Headquarters in Brussels. At the June 1990 Ministerial meeting in the United Kingdom, "the Alliance extended a hand of friendship to build confidence and closer relations between all European countries, including members of the two Alliances beginning with diplomatic liaison and military-to-military (Mil-to-Mil) contacts." The Military Cooperative Program (MCP) was one of the first mil-to-mil programs initiated. MCP allocated non-NATO officers to NATO Major Subordinate Command Headquarters with the intent of developing dialogue and co-operation between militaries.

The strategic transformation of the Alliance began in July of 1990 with structure and policy changes initiated at the Summit conference in London. NATO policy with respect to the Warsaw Pact nations shifted from primarily military and adversarial to predominately political and building constructive partnerships with individual states. The goal of this policy shift was to promote security and stability in a free and undivided Europe. The Alliance published an updated Strategic Concept in 1991 outlining its new perspectives, detailing its approach to security, and providing guidelines for Alliance forces in implementing its new initiatives. The new Strategic Concept called for cooperation with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe as key to the Alliance's strategy. "The concept also provided for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and introduced major changes in NATO's integrated military forces, including substantial reductions in their size and readiness...increased use of multinational formations; the creation of a multinational Rapid Reaction Corps."  

The threat of a large scale Soviet attack that had preoccupied NATO for forty years had disappeared. The Alliance acknowledged that risks to its security had shifted from armed assault to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and sabotage, and instability in some CEE nations. The new strategy adopted a broader view to security focusing on crisis management and conflict prevention. It assumed completion of agreed upon and planned withdrawals of conventional and nuclear forces from Central Europe by both Western and CEE nations. The Alliance maintained conventional and nuclear forces in Europe but at significantly lower levels. To ensure effectiveness, remaining forces became increasingly more
mobile, multi-national and integrated. The Alliance's Strategic Concept was updated again in 1994 and 1999 with each new version adapting to the momentous changes going on in the European security environment.

Another notable policy shift was the idea of building comprehensive security through mutually reinforcing institutions such as the OSCE and the WEU. In that line, NATO developed the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in December 1991 with nations from the former Warsaw Pact and Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). The NACC conducted regular meetings at various military and political levels. It provided a forum for discussion and deliberation on European security issues. "The NACC was developed to broaden NATO's relationship and cooperation with CEE nations and the Soviet Union. This council, however, excluded European neutral states like Sweden, Austria, and Finland but included states devolved from the former Soviet Union, like Tajikistan, that could by no stretch of the imagination be considered part of Europe."

The NACC was a coordination and liaison cell limited to consultations and seminars only. It had no operational connections to the Alliance or subordinate organizations or units. "The NACC was intended to further overcome Cold War insecurity residuals and reinforce a new era of European relations where the confrontation and division of past decades would be replaced by dialogue, partnership and co-operation."

Individual NATO countries also began to develop new programs in line with the new NATO strategy of partnership and dialogue. The United States established the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) spearheaded by General Colin Powel in 1992. JCTP established US Military Liaison Teams (MLTs) in Ministries of Defense in CEE countries. These teams presented host countries with the US example of how a civilian controlled military works in a democratic society. The MLTs communicate host nation requirements and provide support for Traveling Contact Teams (TCT). The TCTs are experts in specific functional areas and provide instruction, training or coordination. They share their specialized competence with host nation military personnel and can also conduct assistance visits or on-scene evaluations of needs and conditions of the host nation. Examples of TCTs include special operations, logistics, communications, and Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) development. In addition to coordinating for TCTs, the MLT coordinates visits for host nation experts to visit US facilities or organizations in Europe and the United States.

Another national outreach program supporting the new NATO strategy is the US National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). The SPP "began in December 1992 after the Chief of the National Guard Bureau led an interagency team to Lithuania. It was the first visit by an American official of that level in 50 years."

The SPP links the National Guard from US states
with Ministries of Defense in CEE nations. The goal of the program is to “demonstrate, through the example of the citizen-soldier, the role of the military in a democratic society. The dual state and federal role of the Guard also serves as a valuable model of capability and cost-effectiveness.” SPP improves bilateral relations between the US and partner country, promotes regional stability and improves civil-military relationships. Participating states build long-term relationships with the partner countries. Examples of SPP activities include disaster preparedness exercises, environmental operations, search and rescue exercises and civil-military programs. Currently 31 states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are partnered with 30 countries. A list of participating partners by region is listed below.

**EUCOM AOR**

Alabama – Romania  
Georgia – Georgia  
Maryland – Estonia  
North Carolina – Moldova  
South Carolina – Albania  
Vermont – Macedonia

California & Kansas – Ukraine  
Illinois – Poland  
Michigan – Latvia  
Ohio – Hungary  
Tennessee – Bulgaria  
Texas & Nebraska – Czech

Colorado-Slovenia  
Indiana – Slovakia  
Minnesota – Croatia  
Pennsylvania – Lithuania  
Utah – Belarus

**CENTCOM AOR**

Arizona – Kazakhstan  
Montana – Kyrgyzstan

Louisiana – Uzbekistan  
Nevada – Turkmenistan

**SOUTHCOM AOR**

Florida – Venezuela  
Missouri – Panama  
Louisiana & New Hampshire – Belize

Kentucky – Ecuador  
Puerto Rico – Honduras  
Mississippi – Bolivia  
Washington DC – Jamaica

West Virginia – Peru

The one state partnership within the PACOM AOR is Hawaii – Philippines. These programs, initiated under the new strategy, reaffirm the principle of commitment and mutual cooperation as a key component to security.

It has been stated that the development of the NACC and all of the programs initiated under the new strategy were a deliberate attempt to delay the admittance of CEE nations into NATO. However, these programs were developed to draw together neutral nations from Western Europe as well as CEE nations, the majority of whom were not seeking NATO membership. The goal was improve relationships and increased security throughout Europe.
As these new organizations and programs advanced, CEE nations seeking NATO membership continued to press for greater ties and interoperability with the Alliance. Partnership for Peace became the next step in the evolutionary process.

DEVELOPMENT OF PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The PfP program was a bold new initiative designed to expand and improve political, military, and civil-military cooperation throughout Europe. It was a program designed to tie together all of the separate initiatives created under the new Strategic Concept and to expand from dialogue and cooperation into exercises and operations. It was initiated, in January 1994, with a desired end result of increased stability, decreased threats, and strengthened relationships of NATO and non-NATO countries. The genesis of the program originated with key NATO staff members and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), GEN Shalikasvili. Many of the early outreach programs called for liaison visits, familiarization briefings and occasional small unit demonstrations.

However, GEN Shalikasvili “realized there was a lot more to cooperation than having vodka and caviar with the occasional picture of 300 US [soldiers] and 300 Russians jumping out of the same plane.” NATO thus began the process of developing a program to establish permanent links with non-NATO European countries. There was also a parallel planning process being conducted in the United States by the Department of State, Department of Defense and the National Security Council. Each offered strategic alternatives on how the program should be structured and defined. Consensus emerged that the new program had to be individualized to each interested country. Interested partners were in different stages of transformation and each had differing views with respect to NATO membership and NATO expansion. Each country had different abilities to contribute militarily to the partnership and differing financial situations. It was also decided that the program should include not only CEE nations but also neutral countries throughout Europe as well.

The goals of the initial PfP program were defined in the invitation letter published at the NATO summit in January 1994: “… we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, an others as may be agreed.” All partners were invited to send a permanent liaison to NATO Headquarters in Brussels and a staff to the Partnership Coordination Cell established in Mons Belgium.
Currently, the PfP program includes all 19 NATO members and 27 partner countries.\textsuperscript{22} The following is a list of partner countries currently participating in PfP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Tadjikistan</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2. PF P PARTNER NATIONS**

The program clearly met a need for security and cooperation in Europe. PfP was attractive to former Warsaw Pact nations, newly independent nations and traditionally neutral nations throughout Europe because the program allows each partner to define its own relationship with NATO. Each nation develops an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) jointly with NATO. The IPP lists “specific cooperation activities agreed between NATO and that Partner.”\textsuperscript{23} It details the range, depth, breadth, and pace of participation of individual partners.

The objectives of PfP are clearly articulated in the Partnership For Peace Invitation that was issued in January 1994. PfP will forge new security relationships between the Alliance and its partners. “The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance.”\textsuperscript{24} NATO also committed to consulting with any partner who perceived a threat to its territory, political independence, or security. But it deliberately omitted the commitment to military action in defense of partners.

In joining the partnership, states must subscribe to and abide by the PfP Framework Document. Key commitments contained in the framework document include: “…the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force, … to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means.”\textsuperscript{25}

PfP was a giant leap forward in the integration of a free and democratic Europe. The program was open to all NACC and OSCE nations. It included those who wanted to join NATO,
and those who did not, including neutral countries. It went far beyond the dialog of the NACC to operations in the field involving non-article 5 exercises such as peace keeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations, peace support operations, developing interoperable forces, and command and control structures. It was a political success in that it brought together members of the Alliance and the former Warsaw Pact in a non-threatening manner without alienating any of them, especially Russia. It did this while reaffirming that the Alliance remains open to all European states. Additionally, PfP offered permanent facilities at NATO and SHAPE Headquarters for partner nations in order to improve relations and facilitate closer cooperation.

Upon launching PfP at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, NATO leaders simultaneously “reaffirmed that the Alliance was open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to security in the North Atlantic Area.” Over the door to NATO membership widened so did the expectations of nations seeking membership. The Alliance made it clear that joining PfP and participation in the NACC were important first steps toward membership. NATO wanted to ensure that prospective members would be contributors to European security and not just consumers.

**ENHANCED PfP AND THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL**

NATO expanded PfP in 1997 by “giving it a more operational role, providing for greater involvement of partners in decision-making and planning, and strengthening its dimension of political consultation.” This expansion occurred “partly on the basis of experience gained through the multi-national cooperation that has taken place through IFOR (Implementation Force) and subsequently SFOR (Stabilization Force) peace-keeping missions in Bosnia.”

Over 4,600 military personnel from 15 partner nations are currently participating in SFOR. In addition, military personnel from partner nations are participating in KFOR (Kosovo Force).

The enhanced PfP program “contains more than 2,000 activities, ranging from large military exercises down to small workshops grouping a handful of people, PfP touches virtually all areas of NATO’s activity.” Numerous political and civil-military activities provide additional means of influence and participation. This large and diverse range of PfP activities was developed to meet the 3 objectives of the enhanced program: develop a more operational role for PfP, allow greater involvement of partners in the planning and decision making process, and strengthen the political consultation element in PfP. Key enhancements made to PfP in order to accomplish these objectives include: (1) expansion of PfP exercises to include the full range of new NATO missions including Peace Support Operations, (2) creating PfP Staff Elements (PSEs) from partner countries, (3) participation of PSE and/or personnel from partner countries
in Combined Joint Task Forces, (4) establishment of full Diplomatic Missions of partner countries with NATO and (5) an expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process.31

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), established concurrently with the Enhanced PfP, "acts a political roof for PfP and offers Allies and Partners a forum in which to exchange views on common issues."32 The EAPC was set up to succeed the NACC. The new body provides an expanded forum for dialogue, consultation and coordination. The new council brings together the 19 NATO members and 27 partners in a single collective forum for regular consultation. Where as PfP is a bi-lateral program between NATO and each partner, the EAPC is a collective organization of all members and partners. The EAPC meets at the ambassador, foreign minister, defense minister, and head-of-state level. All meetings are open discussions on security related matters.

The EAPC has developed a two-year action plan which has 4 sections: (1) short term work schedule, (2) long term programs, (3) Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness, and (4) PfP programs. Subject areas covered by the EAPC include: political and security related matters; crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; NBC proliferation; international terrorism; defense planning, budgets and strategy; security and economic developments; civil emergencies and disaster preparedness; nuclear issues; defense related environmental issues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control; scientific cooperation, peace support operations; and others.33

"The EAPC has played a valuable role as a forum for consultation on the crisis in Kosovo. A series of extraordinary meetings was held to keep Partners informed of the status of NATO planning and preparations for possible military options in Kosovo and to exchange views with Partners on developments."34 In recognition of the importance of the EAPC, almost all partner nations have established permanent diplomatic missions with NATO. A significant achievement of the EAPC was the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) in June 1998. The EADRCC is till establishing it’s role and procedures, but has already provided support in a variety of situations such as refugee support in Albania and flood relief in the Ukraine. The EAPC has become a permanent element of the European Security environment. Membership in the EAPC is also one step in a series actions required for nations seeking NATO membership.

THE MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN

In the introduction of its new Strategic Concept published in April 1999, the Alliance states "it must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for accession of new members."35
Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance remains open to any European nation willing and able to fulfil the responsibilities inherent in the treaty and who can demonstrate they will contribute to the security of the Europe and the North Atlantic area. The Alliance extended the first round of invitations to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 1997. All three nations became full NATO members in 1999.

Selection of new members is based upon the applicant nation's ability to "increase the political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance the overall European security and stability." The Alliance has clearly signaled that it intends to extend additional membership invitations. However, it must do so in a slow and methodical process. Quick expansion could be detrimental to the Alliance and the overall security of Europe. The Alliance must allow applicant nations time to adopt its military and political processes to conform to acceptable Western and Alliance standards. In addition, it must ensure that no nation, especially Russia, feels it is being left out or isolated. To that extent, NATO and Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 and established a Permanent Joint Council with the goal of strengthening relations and ensuring the mutual trust essential for peace and stability.

NATO developed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as a program of activities to assist interested nations with their preparations for possible future membership. MAP helps aspiring applicants focus their preparations and priorities on meeting the requirements for admission. The plan was developed based on experience and lessons learned during the integration process of the three newest members from 1997 to 1999. Membership in NATO is a national commitment. It must involve the entire nation not just the Defense or Foreign Ministries. The Plan establishes national level interdepartmental meetings ensuring all government departments are included in a coordinated and systematic effort.

At the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO leaders stated the enlargement process would be reviewed in 2002. Nine countries have professed interest in joining the Alliance and are participating in MAP. A list of interested nations is included in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3. MAP COUNTRIES**

"The MAP gives substance to NATO's commitment to keep its doors open. However, participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership, nor does the Plan consist
simply of a checklist for aspiring countries to fulfil. Decisions to invite aspirants to start accession talks will be taken within NATO by consensus and on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{37}

MAP does not replace PfP. It is a complementary program in addition to it. MAP candidates must participate in PfP because it allows them to develop interoperability with NATO forces. PfP also helps aspirants prepare their force structure and capabilities for future NATO membership. MAP offers a list of activities to help strengthen a country's candidacy. It provides advice and recommendations on preparations for membership. Aspirants choose the activities and the pace of work on them. NATO follows the progress each nation is making and provides political and technical advice. "All aspirants have submitted an Annual National Program on preparations for possible membership, covering political and economic, defense/military, resource, security and legal issues. These programs are expected to be updated each year by aspirant countries but can be amended at any time."\textsuperscript{38}

The MAP covers a broad spectrum of issues and aspiring nations are expected to meet certain goals in each field. Applicant nations must settle all international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means. They must demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law and human rights. Armed forces must be subordinate to civilian control. They must promote stability through economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.\textsuperscript{39} Recent developments from the NATO Political Committee annual session in Berlin on November 21, 2000 call for a further strengthening of the Alliance's outreach program by the MAP. It urges member governments of the Alliance "to keep further NATO enlargement as one of the top priorities for the Alliance, and to consider seriously the possibility of inviting new members at the next NATO summit." In addition it "calls upon the NAC to issue no later than during the summit meeting in 2002 invitations to NATO accession negotiations to any European democracy that seeks membership in the Alliance and that has met the criteria for NATO membership..."\textsuperscript{40}

Statements such those quoted above provide focus for the future direction of NATO. As NATO continues to adapt to the dynamic security environment in Europe, programs will to change to meet new requirements. The next section will look at the future strategic direction of NATO and PfP.

**BUILDING ON SUCCESS--THE FUTURE OF NATO AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE**

The Alliance's new Strategic Concept published in April 1999 provides a roadmap for NATO's future direction. In general, the concept calls for maintaining the collective defense, reinforcing the Transatlantic link, allowing European Allies to assume greater responsibility,
deepening relations with partners, working more closely with complementary organizations, and preparing for accession of new members. It is a proactive and ambitious agenda.

The EAPC will remain the overarching framework for all actions and activities dealing with partner nations. The first recommendation of this paper is for the EAPC is to expand the political dialogue and allow partners a greater voice in planning and execution of security actions that directly or indirectly affect partner nations. Partners should not only sit in on meetings but they should help set the agenda and contribute to decisions. Narrowing the difference between Ally and Partner will help keep NATO at the center of European security. However, this must be balanced with the right of the Alliance to make decisions affecting its members and collective security. The NATO-led Bosnia and Kosovo operations have shown that partner nations are willing and able to contribute to wider European security issues and should be given greater responsibility and more say in these type of operations. However, many allies including the U.S. are reluctant to give partners greater say in the selection and execution of military operations.

The second recommendation of this paper is for the EAPC and PfP to focus greater emphasis on crisis prevention in an effort to shape the European security environment and reduce the number and intensity of potential conflicts. For example, the EAPC and PfP could be used as a forum for former Yugoslav republics and former CIS nations to solve lingering disputes about borders, humanitarian issues, ethnicity, political and economic relationships, demilitarization, etc. However, when crisis prevention or deterrence fails, NATO and partner countries must remain ready and willing to implement required actions in crisis management.

Since the threat of armed assault against the Alliance has been significantly reduced, NATO must turn its attention toward more likely threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and regional instability. Diplomatic relations must be enhanced. These activities must be linked together and be mutually supporting. For example, if counter-proliferation fails and WMD technologies are proliferated, then it must be reversed, if possible, through diplomatic means. The third recommendation of this paper is that additional issues such as arms control and disarmament must continue to be addressed by NATO, the EAPC and bilateral negotiations.

PfP will remain the primary tool for enhancing operational links and increasing interoperability between NATO and partners. The Alliance must be committed to increased participation of partners. The fourth recommendation of this paper is that the assignment of partner nation personnel to NATO subordinate commands and CJTFs must be made a reality. Operational forces of partner nations should be attached to or participate with NATO forces.
similar to what they are doing in Bosnia and Kosovo. European forces must become more integrated and versatile. CJTFs must acquire the force projection resources necessary to deploy rapidly over great distances and develop the logistics to support and sustain the force. To make this occur, my fifth recommendation is that NATO and EAPC assist in moving ESDI from a conceptual idea to operational reality.

To improve interoperability and promote closer contacts with between NATO and partners, programs such as the United States National Guard’s State Sponsorship Program should be expanded and enhanced. My last recommendation is to develop sponsorship programs for all partner nations’ active duty military units. This expanded program would assign a NATO unit at the battalion, brigade and division level as a sponsor to a like unit in a partner country. This program would personalize PfP. It would put a face, a name and a unit to the program. Most current PIP exercises are one-time events and then the relationship between units is lost. Sponsors would develop long-term relationships at the tactical level. Just as programs such as Epals link schools, organizations, and people around the world via the internet, sponsors could maintain continuous contact with their partner unit thus enhancing their developmental progress.

The readiness impact of this program would be marginal since the program would assign units from all 19 NATO countries with units from partner countries. The sponsor and partner unit would develop a bilateral agreement on how they would implement the program. Each unit would be free to develop the relationship as they see fit and as funding, optempo, and training requirements allow. If the units are great distances apart, information, ideas, and contacts can be maintained over the internet as well as through personnel visits or exchanges, etc. For units that are closer together such as those in Europe, the sponsorship can be done through joint training exercises, officer/non-commissioned officer professional development exchanges, military competitions, social functions, etc.

CONCLUSION

As NATO enters the new millennium, it must be prepared to meet the challenges and opportunities presented. The changes and adaptations made in the past ten years, since the end of the Cold War, have given us insight to the type and pace of changes that will occur in the future. Change is critical if NATO is to continue to contribute to European security and stability. This study has shown that the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept is focusing on the right issues. NATO shifted from a reactive, armed military assault focus to a conflict prevention, crisis management, and partnership focus. Support for and cooperation with mutually reinforcing
organizations has become a central feature of the new NATO. Internal reforms and reorganizations such as ESDI, EADRCC, and the creation of CJTFs have improved NATO's ability to fulfill its obligations and enhance security and stability in the North Atlantic area.

"The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social, and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension." PfP and the EAPC have transformed and expanded to include all of these critical areas. The more than 2,000 PfP activities listed in the 2000-2001 Partnership Work Program cover all of these areas. PfP continues to support the transformation of the Alliance, improve relationships with partners, and enhance the interoperability of forces.

This study has shown that PfP is exceeding the objectives set for the program: (1) transparency in defense planning and budgeting, (2) democratic control of armed forces, (3) non-combat operations, (4) cooperative military relations between NATO and partners, and (5) force interoperability. PfP continues to evolve and draw NATO and partners closer thus creating a more secure and stable Europe, a vital U.S. security interest. Changes and improvement will continue to occur in PfP as the Alliance's roles and missions adapt to the dynamic strategic environment in Europe. The recommendations espoused in this study will serve to further develop long-term relationships and enhance cooperation and security. The recommendations include: expanding political dialogue in EAPC and allowing partners a greater voice in the planning and execution of security actions, focusing greater emphasis on crisis prevention but remaining ready to implement crisis management, increasing emphasis on arms control and disarmament, assigning partner nation personnel to NATO subordinate commands and CJTFs, moving ESDI from conceptual to operational status, and developing a sponsorship program for partner military units.

The EAPC, like PfP, has become a permanent collective and cooperative security structure for Europe. The establishment of diplomatic missions to NATO, under EAPC, has added a political voice for partners in the NATO decision-making process. With the addition of three new NATO members and development of the MAP, partners seeking future NATO membership no longer view the EAPC and PfP as a consolation prize but as a true partnership enhancing European security. The EAPC must also continue to evolve as partners draw closer to the Alliance. EAPC and PfP have proven they can influence, assist, shape, and train newly independent and developing nations in their journey toward democratization. They have contributed significantly to European security and stability and they will continue to be part of the solution for the new millennium.

Word Count = 6,563
ENDNOTES


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