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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE SUPPORT TO PEACE OPERATIONS

BY

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
United States Army Reserve Support to Peace Operations

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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The United States must be prepared to respond to smaller-scale contingency operations as the Army continues to integrate the Active and Reserve components into a Total Force. Currently, the Army has too much to do and given the necessity for USAR involvement in smaller-scale contingencies, the time has come to determine how the USAR can best support such operations, especially when the President declares a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC). Should the USAR provide Troop Program Units (TPU), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), or some mix of these? Using peace operations as an example of one of the many smaller-scale contingencies that the USAR will be called on to support, this study examines the use of reserve forces in response to a PRC. It reviews the requirements for PRCs and describes the types of USAR forces available. Following the analysis of USAR support to peace operations, the study recommends: The USAR should support PRCs with enhanced TPU force structure, stabilized IMA positions, increased Drilling IMA authorizations, retention of the IRR Activation Authority as a placeholder for authorized positions, and standard sets of USAR personnel to serve on CINC’s staffs.
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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE SUPPORT TO PEACE OPERATIONS

The world is currently beset with ethnic and border conflicts, rogue states' development of strategic missiles, and even the potential use of weapons of mass destruction from small autonomous terrorist groups. That is, the world is not yet a peaceful place. Accordingly, U.S. National Security Strategy states,

... the United States must be prepared to respond to the full range of threats to our interests abroad. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, and reinforcing key allies.¹

Our capability to respond to smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) will require the continued integration of the Active and Reserve components into a Total Force. Since 1973, when the Department of Defense adopted the Total Force Policy, America's military—active and reserve—has been ready and available to provide for the common defense. According to MG Plewis, Chief, Army Reserve, the Army no longer can "afford holding the Army Reserve in reserve just for major emergencies. The Army has too much to do and too few active soldiers to do everything that must be done."² Greater reliance on reserve forces, with their lower peacetime sustaining costs compared to similar active forces, could help provide a more capable force structure for a smaller Defense budget."³ As stated by Hon. William Cohen when he was Secretary of Defense, "Accessibility is one of the keys to successful Total Force integration."⁴

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) has much to offer. Its vision statement proclaims the USAR is "the essential provider for training and support operations, engaged worldwide with ready units and soldiers."⁵ Given the necessity for USAR involvement in smaller-scale contingencies, we must determine how the USAR can best support such operations, especially when the President declares a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC). Should the USAR provide Troop Program Units (TPU), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), or some mix of these? Using peace operations as an example of one of the many smaller-scale contingencies that the USAR will be called on to support, this study examines the use of reserve forces for PRC support, the requirements for PRCs, and the types of USAR forces available. Following an analysis of USAR support to peace operations, the study concludes with the recommended USAR option for supporting a peace operation in a PRC.
USE OF RESERVE FORCES FOR PRCs

Since 1989, the average frequency of Army contingency deployments has increased from one every four years to one every fourteen weeks. In the past 11 years the Army has participated in domestic relief/support, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, migrant operations, regional cooperative security, peacekeeping operations, sanction enforcement, show of force, force protection, and limited/regional conflicts. "Peace operations and peacekeeping operations, in particular, are not new to the U.S. military; what is new about them is the number, pace, scope, and complexity of recent operations."

Historically, the President could call up reservists only with a declaration of National Emergency. However, President Kennedy did not declare a National Emergency for the Berlin Crisis or the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Johnson never declared the Vietnam War a National Emergency. Many people believed his reluctance to call up reserves contributed to the lack of popular support for the Vietnam War. In 1976, therefore, Congress gave the President authorization to call up members of the Selected Reserve for operations other than National Emergencies. (See Appendix 1 for chronology of documents affecting PRCs.) In 1990, President Bush declared the first Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. (Since 1998, the word "select" has been removed and the term PSRC changed to PRC.) (Following the declaration of a National Emergency the PSRC changed to the first partial mobilization.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Non-Vol</th>
<th>Volunteer*</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Allied Force) Apr 99-Present</td>
<td>7,118</td>
<td>4,304</td>
<td>11,422</td>
<td>Designated a Contg. Ops 24 Apr 99; PSRC 27 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Crisis (Desert Thunder)</td>
<td>2,610</td>
<td>13,183</td>
<td>15,993</td>
<td>Designated a Contg. Ops 24 Feb 98; PSRC 24 Feb 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (Joint Endeavor/Guard/Forge)</td>
<td>21,035</td>
<td>15,972</td>
<td>37,007</td>
<td>JE: Dec 95-Dec 96; JG: Dec 96-Jun 98; JF: Jun 98-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (Support / Uphold Democracy)</td>
<td>6,250</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>8,338</td>
<td>Designated a Contg. Ops 15 Sep 94; PSRC 15 Sep 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PRC since Desert Storm</td>
<td>37,213</td>
<td>35,547</td>
<td>72,760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Obs 22 Aug 90; PSRC 2 Aug 90; Partial MOB 18 Jan 91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait/Iraq (Desert Shield / Storm)</td>
<td>239,187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Number of volunteers is estimated

Updated 31 Oct 00
Components - ARNG, USAR, USNR, USMCR, ANG, USAFR, USCGR

FIG 1 – PRESIDENTIAL RESERVE CALL-UPS 2
During Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990 to 1991, the U.S. Army Reserve supported the first PSRC and its follow-on partial mobilization with 650 units/cells (some 65,000 TPU members) and approximately 20,000 IRR members. (Members of the IRR were not eligible for involuntary activation during the PSRC; it took partial mobilization to "reach out and touch" the IRR.)

Since Desert Shield/Storm, the U.S. presidents have declared four PRCs (PSRCs). The Army Reserve has mobilized civil affairs, postal, medical, engineer, transportation, psychological operations, and other units.

Throughout Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Joint Guard and now Operation Joint Forge, the U.S. Army Reserve has provided well over 70% of the total Reserve Component support. ... By August, 1998, more than 11,150 Army Reserve soldiers had been mobilized under PSRC. This includes 332 troop program units, consisting of some 775 detachments/elements.9

From April 1999 to present, the USAR has supported Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo. "The Army Reserve has mobilized civil affairs, medical, military police, psychological operations, and other units. By September, a total of 443 personnel were supporting this operation from locations in Kosovo, Germany and Italy."10 The USAR continues to activate personnel in support of this and the other active PRCs.

**REQUIREMENTS FOR PRC SUPPORT**

Guidance for supporting contingencies comes from Presidential Decision Directives (See Appendix 1 for chronology of documents affecting PRCs.). This guidance directs the use of a disciplined and coherent decision-making process for supporting UN or U.S. contingencies, such as peace operations. Decisions for supporting contingencies must acknowledge constraints within force structure. The PRCs enhance Total Force Integration by enabling the military to involuntarily activate reserve forces from all components, while continuing to access volunteers. In recent years, we have seen an increasing reliance on reserve forces.
FIG 2 – OUTPUT DELIVERED: TOTAL FORCE CONTRIBUTION

As noted in a recent reserve force employment study, "demand for U.S. participation in Smaller-scale contingency operations remains high, the Department of Defense is looking for new ways to conduct these operations as efficiently as possible and manage operational tempo effectively." All Service Components continually review procedures for improving accessibility to reserve assets. For a PRC, the supported and supporting Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) normally submit their force structure requirements. The CINCs may request units, detachments/elements, specific Military Occupation Specialties (MOS)/Area of Concentration (AOC), or individuals. Historically, the CINCs request specific MOSs or AOCs rather than complete units or detachments. This pattern will probably continue for the near term. The anticipated types of units for current PRC deployments in the next 12 months include: Postal, Finance, Combat Camera, Criminal Investigative, Military Intelligence, Facility Engineer, Military Policy, Press Camp, Public Affairs, Combat Stress Control, Veterinary Medicine, Combat Support Hospital, Ground Ambulance, Rear Area Operation Center, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation units, detachments, or elements. With an eye toward meeting these diverse requirements, the USAR is reviewing its structure and procedures for supporting peace operations during a PRC.
TYPES OF USAR FORCES AVAILABLE

The USAR is one of the seven reserve components (the others are the Army National Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve). The USAR has three manpower management categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, or Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve has four components: Troop Program Units, Active Guard Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentee, and Individual Ready Reserve.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total U.S. Army Reserve</th>
<th>1,055,192</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ready Reserve</strong></td>
<td>369,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standby Reserve</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retired Reserve</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Reserve</strong></td>
<td>207,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRR</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PAID DRILL STRENGTH</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TPU STR</strong></td>
<td><strong>AGR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188,099</td>
<td>12,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Program Unit</td>
<td>Active/ Guard Reserve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 31 Jul 00 RCCPDS Strength Summary Report

FIG 3 – USAR STRENGTH FIGURES

Management of the USAR begins with the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), which “provides direction for USAR planning to accomplish the mission of providing trained OCAR structure units and individuals to support Army mobilization plans.” At this time, the U.S. Army Reserve is the Army’s primary source of Echelons Above Corps (EAC) combat support (CS) and Echelons Above Division (EAD) combat service support (CSS) forces. In fact, more than 40% of the CS and CSS forces are in the Army Reserve, including medical, engineer, transportation, civil affairs, military police, and psychological operations units.

In coordination with OCAR the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) command most TPU members. A field-operating agency of OCAR, the Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM), manages the IMA and IRR members of the USAR.

The USAR began its recent force structure planning with a review of SSC requirements during the Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) study, with the announcement of
the Army Transformation, and in preparation for the FY01 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2009, and the changing presidential administration.

In coordination with the Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau, CINCs, and other government agencies, OCAR has coordinated force structure allocation rules; review and approval of Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs), Modified TOEs (MTOEs), Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDAs); and establishment of required and authorized USAR force structure. This coordination developed the USAR's CS/CSS capabilities, which the USAR calls its "Core Competencies." Listed below are types of CS/CSS units and the percentage of the Total Army's CS and CSS units in the USAR force structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training &amp; Exercise divisions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Theater Area Army Commands</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway units</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPW brigades</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Terminal battalions</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate General units</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Medical groups</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs units</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Theater signal commands</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations units</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Transportation commands</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical brigades</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Transportation groups</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical battalions</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Water supply battalions</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum groups</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Petroleum supply battalions</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical brigades</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Motor battalions</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIG 4 – PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL ARMY'S CS AND CSS UNITS IN THE USAR**

As noted in a key Department of Defense (DoD) report, "The Army Reserve provides the CS/CSS command and control units for U.S. Army Central Command, the Corps support command for I Corps, the engineer brigade for III Corps and the majority of priority Force Support Package units." CS/CSS structure is expensive for the AC, but reserve units benefit from civilian acquired skills and the capability of developing expertise on specific CS/CSS tasks. The OCAR continues to enhance the USAR CS/CSS deployability by coordinating development of modular units (such as Quartermaster Supply companies, Ammunition Supply companies, Postal units) through the Force Design Update process. Designed modular units limit the requirement for ad hoc Derivative Unit Identification Codes (DUIC) during a PRC.

The USAR manages over 1300 UICs and 1500 DUICs. Many of the DUICs were developed to satisfy peacetime stationing requirements, but DUICs also identify modular Platoons, detachments, or teams that may mobilize as single elements. (for example, a Maintenance Company mobilizes a DUIC of one platoon of 37 soldiers, rather than a full company of 215 soldiers). The USAR may further subdivide the UICs into DUICs to meet CINC
force structure requirements. The establishment of a DUIC of a MTOE unit enables the force programmer to identify specific paragraph and line numbers on the MTOE to mobilize. Specific paragraph and line numbers enable the mobilization planner to request specific MOSs, AOCs, or rank structures. The establishment of a TDA DUIC may be used to subdivide TDA units, but it may also be used to develop generic units in cases where no specific paragraph or line numbers are identified. This is advantageous for mobilizing MOSs or AOCs not available within established UICs.

Additionally, some units identified as High Demand Low Density (HLDL), Multi-component Units (MCUs), and Army Reserve Elements (AREs) provide specialized capabilities. Depending on operational requirements, the USAR may designate such units as Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Postal, or Firefighter as HDLD. The OCAR continually evaluates changing operational HDLD requirements and coordinates the force structure required for USAR support. A busy operational tempo and limited force structure of units with specialized unit or individual Military Occupation Specialty capabilities create high demand for these low-density units. The Army and OCAR may resolve some issues for supporting HDLD requirements by contracting.

The OCAR’s coordination in the development of MCUs for enhancing CS/CSS command and control structure (such as 304th COSCOM and 377th TSC) has resulted in a mix of MCUs commanded by Active or Reserve Commanders. The USAR will participate in the start-ups of Multi-Compo units through FY 07. This coordination enables the unit members to enhance their training through AC and RC integration. The Title 11 Active Component positions were changed to Title 10 positions, thus expediting the units’ ability to mobilize “Fly Away Cells” or elements.

The AREs provide CINC headquarters with highly qualified TPU soldiers. The TPU soldiers perform up to 48 Individual Duty Training (IDT) periods and train approximately 12 Annual Training (AT) days a year with their units. The ARE members work as individuals within the CINC Mobilization TDA, but are assigned to the ARE, a TPU managed by the USARC. However, in another program, IMAs rather than TPU members man the AREs.

Individuals in the IMA portion of the Selected Reserve are assigned to either IMA or Drilling IMA (DIMa) positions on the Mobilization (MOB) TDA or MOB MTOE of Active Component units. Normally authorized to support surge requirements for mobilization, changes to DoD Directive 1235.11 expand the definition “to include other positions that have specialized or technical requirements.” The IMAs train approximately 12 AT days a year with their
assigned units. The DIMAs perform up to 48 IDT periods, in addition to their regular AT training days. The AR-PERSCOM manages DIMAs in the AREs.

The IRR, part of the Ready Reserve, but not the Selected Reserve, includes reserve members assigned to the IRR Augmentee Program (IRR-AUG) and the Individual Ready Reserve Activation Authority (IRRAA). Personnel in the IRR-AUG program are attached rather than assigned to MOB TDAs or MOB MTOES and are not eligible for involuntary call-up. With the scheduled increase of IMA positions in Fiscal Year 2001 (FY01), the USAR will close the IRR-AUG program by the end of FY01 and offer the reservists the opportunity of transferring into the IMA or DIMA programs.

A subcategory of the IRR, the IRRAA, contains reservists, of whom a maximum of 30,000 may be involuntarily called up during a PRC. However, a lack of personnel in the category has raised questions about the utility of the IRRAA. Currently no reservists have been called to active duty from the IRRAA in response to a PRC. Personnel must volunteer for the IRRAA category before they are eligible for involuntary call-up during a PRC. The IRRAA has a unique advantage in that if the category is not filled, the program provides positions for volunteers to move into during PRCs.

Members of the USAR may volunteer for service in a peace operation at any time according to Section 12301(d) of Title 10, which permits the service Secretaries to order reservists to active duty with their consent. However, no PRCs were declared for such operations as Restore Hope in Somalia and Operation Stabilize in East Timor, and the RC provided volunteers. The Sinai Multinational Force and Observer Mission is another example of peace operations supported by the USAR without a PRC. Reserve personnel deploy to the Sinai on individual orders. During a PRC, volunteers may receive individual mobilization orders as an IMA or IRRAA. Or they may be assigned to a TPU and receive unit orders. Only members in the Selected Reserve and the IRRAA are available for an involuntary call-up during a PRC. Historically, PRCs have required USAR support.

ANALYSIS OF USAR SUPPORT TO PEACE OPERATIONS

Declaring PRCs to activate reserves is an innovative way to access the RC. In the past, the USAR has participated in five PRCs and remains committed to providing “trained and resourced combat support and combat service support units to support National Military Strategy ...” The Defense Department’s concept for implementing the 1997 National Military Strategy includes: ... Relying upon reserve forces to provide expanded support to non-traditional missions (e.g., individual volunteer specialists and units to provide a rotational
base for active forces deployed abroad). Many of the specialties for peace operations require training and experience found predominately within the Reserve components. 22

Through the QDR and TAA process, the USAR acquires force structure requirements for supporting SSCs. However, with the increasing number of SSCs and with current recruiting challenges 23 confronting the USAR, the USAR's SSCs support capabilities have become limited.

The USAR has been forced to deploy a combination of TPU units and IMA and IRR soldiers for PRCs. Current methods of deploying units and personnel must improve. A limited force structure of TPUs, IMAs, and IRRAs and the diversity of CINC requirements have forced the USAR to mobilize over 450 DUICs since December 1995. 24 The DUICs enable the USAR to provide specialized support for CINC requirements. However, the number and frequency of PRCs resulting in involuntary call-ups can impact on readiness and the on-going availability of USAR units and personnel. Dividing units into specific mobilizing DUICs may decrease unit readiness by degrading unit training and mission capability. In addition, requirements for multiple mobilizations (personnel may mobilize once per PRC) may increase attrition. Therefore, the USAR needs to enhance its capability by selecting one of the following five options:

- Enhance TPU force structure capabilities
- Enhance the IMA program
- Change the availability of the IRR
- Enhance the IRRAA program
- Enhance force mix (TPU, IMA, IRR).

Selecting the proper enhancement option is important because of end strength limitations. USAR end strength reductions since 1989 have affected the Ready Reserve. The Ready Reserve's end strength consists of both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. Changes in strength in the TPUs or IMA categories affect the Selected Reserve, while changes in the IRRAA affect only the IRR.

OPTION ONE, ENHANCE TPU FORCE STRUCTURE CAPABILITIES.

The USAR could enhance force structure capabilities for supporting SSCs through the TAA and QDR process to achieve increased modularity of structure in accordance with required demands by streamlining the mobilization process to fill CINC PRC requirements with established UICs or DUICS and by limiting IMA strength increases.
Advantage

The Biennial TAA and quadrennial QDR reviews enable the Army to evaluate and update force structure requirements to meet National Military Strategy. Improvements in the TAA and QDR process for evaluating contingency force requirements has enhanced the Army’s ability to coordinate the requirements and authorizations among the three components (Active, USAR, and Army National Guard). Identification of required force structure enables the USAR to improve its capability to support peace operations by exchanging outdated structure for additional HDLD, MCUs, modular, or other Core Competency units. Resourcing the types and size of modular sub-units and units required for SSC support will allow the USAR to limit its requirements for ad hoc DUICs.

The USAR must retain the capability to develop DUICs for specific unplanned mobilization requirements. (Mobilization of complete units activates soldiers not required for the PRC, creating MOS or AOC mismatches, and degrades experience and expertise required for missions.) The development of elements or modules smaller than UIC level provides the TPUs with a predictable organization for training.

The TPU’s collective training develops unit cohesion. Units supporting PRCs provide or coordinate the care, feeding, and other administrative requirements of the troops. The units address the problems and concerns of individuals. The individuals have a built-in advocacy with the units. Members of units share personal familiarity. Performance of duty is not only documented in the unit records, but in the minds of the soldiers. Positive peer pressure enhances the performance of the individuals and consequently enhances the readiness of the units. However, sometimes the cohesion of the unit and the ability to mobilize the unit becomes a “two-edged sword.”

The USAR faces the challenge of maintaining unit cohesion or the possibility of increased personnel attrition from multiple PRC mobilizations. The OCAR has supported the soldiers with an unwritten policy of not involuntarily activating individuals for a second PRC, within four years of their previous call-up, even though the law authorizes involuntary activation for each new PRC. Units mobilized the second time have acquired new people; therefore, new people are going on the PRC instead of the same person having to go twice. The policy of filling DUICs mobilizing for PRCs with volunteers has reduced the attrition rate of most demobilizing units (Only 20 units out of 203 reviewed by USARC had more than 10% of the personnel mobilized leave the USAR within one year after returning from the PRC). Moreover, increased force structure would reduce the requirements of mobilizing units a second time.
The Selected Reserve consists of both the TPU and IMA, so any change in the IMA numbers will affect TPU End Strength. Transferring the scheduled FY02 increase of 3000 authorized positions in the IMA for FY02 to the TPUs would enable the USAR to develop additional HDLD units.

Disadvantages

The TAA process is slow, designed to structure the Army for Major Theater Warfare, but it has not fully met SSC requirements. The USAR has a mission of supporting the Army in a major conflict. If the USAR changes force structure to support SSC requirements too fast, and the models used in TAA and QDR change, the USAR may become a bill payer.\textsuperscript{27} Pressure from the CINCs to fill only those positions required for the operation, due to SSCs end strength limitations, push the USAR to develop modular units faster. However, even modular elements contain too many positions and have required further reduction into DUICs. The USAR has thus divided over 50 modules into smaller DUICs for PRCs.\textsuperscript{28}

A unit subdivided into DUICs for a specific SSC may lower its reported readiness and ability to deploy as a unit for a second contingency or conflict. Under the current AR 220-10, a unit with deployed DUICs cannot include the deployed element in its readiness count, unless the element has deployed into the unit’s primary mobilization theater.\textsuperscript{29} Fortunately USAR members are volunteering to fill PRC requirements, so the readiness impact resulting from the turnover of personnel following a PRC deployment has been minimal.\textsuperscript{30} This doesn't mean that some units haven’t had problems and that the USAR will not experience increased attrition if the number of contingencies are not carefully managed. Some units have suffered significant attrition: For example, a postal unit had 100% turnover after returning from their PRC deployment\textsuperscript{31} and some HDLD units have experienced attrition problems as illustrated below.
FIG 5 – USAR HDLD UNITS' ATTRITION FY97 – FY99

Even medical units may experience readiness challenges. Medical personnel deploy on a 90-day rotation schedule\textsuperscript{32}, which may mean pulling personnel from four or five units to accomplish a 6-month mission of a single unit. The units receiving or rotating additional personnel, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, may lose or lack unit cohesion (for example, units mobilizing for a second time with new personnel have the advantage of not forcing personnel to a second call-up, but at the same time they may lose unit cohesion from having too many new members). The USAR must continually monitor effects of continued PRCs on unit readiness, especially with the reductions of the past years.

The Selected Reserve end strength has dropped from 319,244 in FY89 to 206,892 in FY00. Projected end strength for out years range from 205,300 in FY01 to 205,000 in FY07.\textsuperscript{33}

OPTION TWO, ENHANCE THE IMA PROGRAM.

Through this option, the USAR would enhance the IMA program, with increased structuring of DIMA positions, and reduces TPU structure.

Advantages.

Individuals are assigned to specific mobilization positions and train with the assigned units. The IMA program has shown to be one of the best force multipliers that the Army has. Having trained soldiers used to working in the active units allows you to ramp up fast for a contingency.\textsuperscript{34} When individuals mobilize with the unit, they are known and have had the
opportunity for developing cohesion with the unit. The USAR IMA program supplies the personnel for surge requirements, enhances training of the individual, and helps the units in their daily or crisis requirements. In FY00 there were 6235/1402 authorized positions and 4557/984 assigned IMAs/DIMAS. The FY01 authorizations increased to 8000/1402, with 5461/984 assigned as of 1 Oct 00. Authorizations for IMA positions increase to 11,000 for FY02 and FY03, with funding remaining at the required level of 8000.

A USAR reduction of TPUs end strength would allow for full funding of the IMA positions. The reduction would even fund a full conversion of the increased IMA positions to DIMA positions, because the cost of TPU and DIMA members is offsetting. However, increasing authorization of only 400 DIMA positions would stabilize the DIMA to IMA ratio from FY00 to FY01 at 22.5% and limit the increased costs of DIMAs over IMAs. With the new DoD authorization for IMAs, an increased authorization of DIMAs would enable the USAR to increase training opportunities for USAR reserve members. The DIMAs are authorized up to 48 additional training periods per year above the authorized IMA training days. The DIMAs can use their additional training dates to provide additional support for crisis actions, thereby allowing active units to improve their surge capability with greater flexibility and availability.

Personnel from the IRR or the TPU program can transfer to the IMA for call-up during a PRC. The USAR has mobilized 659 individuals in support of Balkans operations. This process works well as individual orders are published by AR-PERSCOM.

Disadvantages

Past volatility in the IMA program has limited the availability of IMA positions. Drops in IMA positions through FY00 limited the ability of active units to fill requirements with IMA positions. From 1991 to 2000, the IMA program faced continued turbulence. Dropping from a force requirement of 13,000 to 3000 space requirements, units lost many authorizations and therefore the personnel they had identified for working in their IMA positions. With ongoing reductions in IMA allocations, the AC and the RC had no incentive for requesting IMA positions. The recent change in policy and the increase in requirements and authorizations will strengthen the IMA program. Lag time in personnel systems and personnel attitudes may challenge the USAR for the next year or two. Currently the authorization schedule for DIMA is expected to remain constant at 1402 spaces.
OPTION THREE, CHANGE THE AVAILABILITY OF THE IRR.

The USAR could coordinate a change the law to authorize involuntary call-up of the IRR during a PRC and discontinue the IRRAA program.

Advantage.

Authorizing this large pool of previously trained individuals, currently not available for a PRC, to be involuntarily called up for a PRC would increase the availability of USAR personnel. With IRR personnel available for call-up, there is no requirement to have a special mobilization category, such as the IRRAA. The AR-PERSCOM has mobilized ”775 soldiers to date in support of [PRC] operations in the Balkans. All are volunteers who were subsequently reassigned to TPUs, or IMA billets.”

Disadvantage.

The law would have to be changed to authorize a call-up of the IRR during a non-National Emergency. Current members of the IRR were enlisted or commissioned with the understanding that after their initial obligation they were only eligible for military duty during a National Emergency. So the enlistment and commissioning contracts would have to be changed. Their availability may then depend on the number of years they served on active duty, or in the Selected Reserves.

The IRR end strength has dropped from 274,588 in FY89 to 161,622 in FY00. Projected end strength for out-years range from 156,580 in FY01 to 149,460 in FY07.

OPTION FOUR, ENHANCE THE IRRAA PROGRAM.

Another option would have the USAR coordinate retention of the IRRAA for PRC requirements and change to the law to authorize involuntary assignment to the IRRAA category.

Advantage.

The new category of involuntary IRRAA creates a pool of IRR personnel previously not available during a PRC. Volunteers in the IRR mobilization category—IRRAA—are available for involuntary call-up during a PRC. Soldiers are called up on individual orders published by AR-PERSCOM. The soldiers are then trained, having left active duty or the Selected Reserve less than 24 months previously. Specific IRRAA MOSs, AOCs, or ranks are available to meet unique CINC requirements.

The IRRAA also provides AR-PERSCOM positions for volunteering soldiers during a PRC. Prior to the change in law authorizing 30,000 IRR soldiers to mobilize during a PRC,
soldiers wanting to volunteer had to transfer to a TPU or IMA position. Now personnel may remain in the Ready Reserve, without transferring to a Selected Reserve position. The USAR normally receives enough volunteers for PRCs, but the process of activating volunteers is difficult. If TPU or IMA positions are not available, the USARC or USACAPOC must develop DUICs. Retaining the IRRAA category enhances the USAR's call-up capability.

Congress could increase this pool of personnel by removing the voluntary requirement to belong to the IRRAA. Through a change in the enlistment or commissioning contracts, the soldier could plan for a specific time in the IRRAA category. Of course, this would depend on the number of years they sign up for active duty, or for Selected Reserves.

Disadvantage.

No IRRAA member has mobilized for a PRC.\textsuperscript{42} The requirement for individuals to be off active duty or out of a TPU for less than 24 months and to volunteer for placement in the IRRA has proven to be less than satisfactory in meeting the goals of this program. The USAR tried providing benefits for going into the IRRAA, but this didn't help. People are tired of the operation tempo and deployments.\textsuperscript{43} Currently there is only slightly more than 300 members in the IRRAA,\textsuperscript{44} with no projected improvement in fill rates. The potential exists that Congress won't allow the Army to hold the IRRAA positions vacant for possible use during a PRC and will kill the program.

The provision requiring voluntary entry into the IRRAA category has limited the numbers. However, if we change the law to remove the word voluntary, we may decrease the caliber of personnel supporting the PRC. Also the enlistment and commissioning contracts must change to require individuals to spend two years in the IRRAA. This change in contracts may impact recruiting, or the amount of time the soldiers agree to serve on active duty or in the Selected Reserve. Why change the law to force personnel into the IRRAA? If they wanted to serve, they would join a TPU or the IMA. When a contingency operation expands and becomes very hot, the USAR may have shortages, but by then we should be declaring a partial mobilization.\textsuperscript{45}

OPTION FIVE, ENHANCE FORCE MIX (TPU, IMA, IRR).

In this option, the USAR would support PRCs with enhanced TPU force structure, stabilized IMA positions, increased DIMA authorizations, retention of the IRRAA as a placeholder for authorized positions, and standard sets of USAR personnel to serve on CINC's staffs.
Advantage.

In FY01, OCAR will review all USAR TPU requirements for FY01 QDR and TAA 2009 and coordinate HDLD, MCUs, and all other reserve structures required to ensure Total Force Integration. Enhanced CINC’s planning with the Theater Engagement Planning process will improve their capability to identify force structure requirements. Until the addition of new modular structure and the identification of all IMA positions in the “out-years,” the USAR will continue activating DUICs to fill many PRC requirements.

Stabilizing the IMA structure at 8,000 would enable the USAR to coordinate standards for supporting reserve requirements. With a stabilized IMA structure, the USAR can establish priorities for supporting reserve requirements. Also, CINC’s enhanced planning with the Theater Engagement Planning process will improve their capability to identify IMA requirements. In addition, an increase of 400 DIMA positions for the UASR would enhance training opportunities and flexibility for an additional $2.4 million.\(^{46}\) Retaining the IRRAA as a placeholder of positions increases the USAR’s capability to call up individuals. Retaining the voluntary status of the IRRAA provides a source of highly trained, motivated personnel, at the same time as it provides a capability for mobilizing personnel without moving them into the Selected Reserve. No changes are required in the law concerning IRRAA or IRR volunteer status.

Disadvantage.

The OCAR must ensure that USAR force structure doesn’t change too fast in TAA, thereby making the USAR a bill payer. Force structure changes take time. Most changes identified during TAA 2009 will occur between 2005 and 2009.

Readiness reporting requirements on the Unit Status Report may continue to impact on the readiness of units with DUICs deployed, especially if the units cannot count their deployed DUIC as a deployable element. (Units with DUICs not deployed to a unit’s primary theater cannot count the DUIC.) The Army should consider changing this reporting procedure.

Currently the USAR participates very little in the IRRAA. The lack of involuntary assignment to the IRRAA will present no incentive for change. Expect no involuntary call-up of IRRAA members during FY01. Additionally, the USAR has received no funding for an additional 400 DIMAs. Additional funding from the Department of the Army is currently not expected.

RECOMMENDATION

The USAR should support peace operations in accord with option five above. This option enables USAR to assimilate several procedures that will enhance support to smaller-
scale contingencies. The USAR would support PRCs with enhanced TPU force structure, stabilized IMA positions, increased DIMA authorizations, retention of the IRRAA as a placeholder for authorized positions, and standard sets of USAR personnel to serve on CINCs' staffs.

OCAR would direct the USAR structure changes, with input from USARC, USACAPOC, and AR-PERSCOM. The QDR identifies requirements to support the National Military Strategy, then through the TAA process OCAR identifies the requirements and resourcing for USAR force structure. The structure is resourced through the force management process. The OCAR then apportions the authorized spaces within the Selected Reserve. Currently FY02 and FY03 provide an unresourced authorization for 3000 additional IMAs. Recommend IMA resourcing remain at 8000, and OCAR attempt to gain authorization and resourcing for an additional 3000 TPU units (an increase to 187,000) spaces, for a total Selected Reserve End Strength of 208,000. Also, recommend OCAR coordinate the additional $2.4 million per year, required for resourcing 400 DIMAs as part of the 8000 IMA program.

The AR-PERSCOM manages the IMA program, while management or command and control of TPU units is done through the USARC and USACAPOC. The USARC and USACAPOC conduct the force management process to ensure USAR TPU units are capable and operational units. OCAR in coordination with the USARC, USACAPOC, CINCs, Army, and other staffs and agencies, coordinate during each QDRs and TAAs to ensure that the USAR is adequately resourced with the proper Core Competency units, HDLD units, MCUs, or modular units for supporting SSCs. The OCAR should coordinate the continued emphasis on MCUs, HDLD, and modular updates. The OCAR should continue efforts to stabilize USAR force structure and set a standard for reserve structure in CINC's staff.

Theater engagement plans increase CINCs capability for developing requirements for force structure. Crisis planning, operational requirements, and end strength limits impact on the amount and type of force structure CINCs request during a PRC. Requests for specific positions or individuals result in the development of DUICs. Improved planning and coordination of reserve forces' support for CINCs would enhance the USAR's ability to support the requirements with validated, stabilized TPU, IMA, or IRRAA structure. This coordination would reduce the requirement to develop DUICs to support the mission. However, the USAR must retain the capability for developing DUICs for unplanned SSCs requirements.

The USAR has the capability of individually supporting CINC requirements through the IMA and IRRAA programs. Since individuals can be called up as an IMA or an IRRAA, the USAR has some flexibility. This option requires the AR-PERSCOM to retain the IRRAA
program as a placeholder for positions to place volunteers during a PRC and continue placing available personnel into the IRRAA for involuntary call-ups during a PRC. OCAR should not request change to the law to place personnel into the IRRAA involuntarily. The AR-PERSCOM should continue efforts to place qualified personnel into the IRRAA. The AR-PERSCOM should identify a “standing” vacancy list for placement of volunteers during a PRC. IRR personnel can volunteer for call-ups in the IRRAA without transferring to a Selected Reserve position.

OCAR should not request a change in the law that involuntarily activates the IRR during a PRC. Contracts would have to be changed and this could affect recruiting or limit the amount of time the soldier stays in the Selected Reserve or on active duty.

Bottom line: The USAR should support PRCs with enhanced TPU force structure, stabilized IMA positions, increased DIMA authorizations, retention of the IRRAA as a placeholder for authorized positions, and standard sets of USAR personnel to serve on CINCs’ staffs.
APPENDIX 1 - CHRONOLOGY OF DOCUMENTS OR DECISIONS AFFECTING PRCs

1945 - Charter of the United Nations - Ratified Treaty - Chapter VI and VII provide rules and guidance for peace operations.

1956 - Title 10, Section 673, (now Section 12302) - Authorizes, upon the declaration of a National Emergency, the mobilizing of 1,000,000 reservists for 24 consecutive months.

1976 - Title 10, Section 673(b) - Authorized the President to mobilized up to 50,000 (this changed to 200,000 by 1990) reservists for 90 days with a 90 day extension for other than National Emergency.

1995 - Congress extends the 90 days to 270 days.

1998 - Title 10, Section 673 - Changed to Title 10, Section 12302

1994 - Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" - Prescribes specific steps to improve U.S. and UN management of UN peace operations to ensure proper selection and enhance effectiveness - "[T]he first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral peace operations suited to the post Cold War era"148

1997 - PDD 56, "Managing, Complex Contingency Operations" - Requires U.S. Government agencies to institutionalize past experience, lessons learned, and planning processes and develop implementation mechanisms.

1999 - Title 10, Section 12304 - Grants the President authority to authorize the Secretary of Defense, without the consent of the members concerned, to order any reserve unit (TPU), any Selected Reserve member not assigned to a unit (IMA), or any member in the Individual Ready Reserve mobilization category (IRRAA) to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 270 days. Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the IRR may be on active duty under this section at any one time, of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the IRR.

1999 - Title 10, Section 101 - Any operation supported by a PRC becomes a contingency by law.


2001 - Presidential Decision Directive changing to National Security Presidential Directives
ENDNOTES


10 Ibid.


14 “Military Contingencies and the USAR.”

15 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 35.

16 The Army End Strength is fixed with a mixture of “Operating”—combat forces establish by the Defense Planning Guidance—and “Generating”—CS/CSS forces established by the TAA process. Every position (space) assigned to the Generating force limits Operation Force numbers.


18 Dan Kohner Dkohner@osd.pentagon.mil, “RE: Strategic Research Project (SRP),” electronic mail message to Clair.Anderson@carlisle.army.mil, 16 January 2001. Reference the IRRAA and IMA for PRCs.

19 Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ryan, USAR, AR-PERSCOM. Telephone interview by author, 20 February 2001. Information gathering interview concerning the IRRAA and IRR-AUG programs.

20 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 71.

21 Ibid., 32.

22 Ibid., 78.

23 “FY 1999 was one of the most challenging years for recruiting since the beginning of the all-volunteer force; ... The ARNG exceeded its recruiting quota, accessing 132 soldiers above its target of 56,958, but the active component fell about 6,300 soldiers short of its goal of 74,500, and the number of USAR recruits was 10,300 below the goal of 52,084. A booming economy, low unemployment, and increased opportunities for college undoubtedly contributed to the difficult recruiting environment. However, new initiatives sparked a year-end upturn in the number of accessions and provided a good head start for the challenge of meeting FY 2000 recruiting targets.” (Note: A distinguished speaker at the U.S. Army War College verified the Army met its FY 2000
recruiting goal, but acknowledged expected challenges for the coming years—
demographics, economics, education) Cohen 184.

24 MAJ Stephen Colonna Stephen.Colonna@usarc-emh2.army.mil, “RE: Strategic
Research Project: with attachment: “MOB_DEMOB LIST,” electronic mail message to author
Clair.Anderson@carlisle.army.mil, 20 Nov 00. Reference PRC mobilizations.

25 Major Sey Nam, USAR, USARC DCSOPS MOB Branch, telephone interview by author,

26 MAJ Harvey Denison DenisonH@usarc-emh2.army.mil, “OJF Unit Attrition,” to author

27 The TAA process takes two years, in cycle with POM development. Structure
requirements may change between cycles and units activated early may “fall-off” the
requirements list (e.g.: additional transportation units for fuel tankers are no longer required due
to Army Transformation).

28 Colonna.

29 MAJ Harvey Denison, USAR, USARC DCSOPS Analysis and Evaluation Branch,

30 Denison, “OJF Unit Attrition.”

31 LTC Ronald Nelson, USAR, USARC DCSOPS MOB Branch Chief, telephone interview

32 Special USAR provision grants medical personnel 90-day rotation limits. Ibid.

33 Dan Kohner Dkohner@osd.pentagon.mil, “RE: Strategic Research Project (SRP)” with
attachment: “Reserve Component Strength,” electronic mail message to
Clair.Anderson@carlisle.army.mil, 16 January 2001. Reference the IRRAA and IMA for PRCs.

34 Colonel Hans W. Mijocevic, USAR, ARPERCENT (AR-PERSCOM), interviewed by SSG
Michael A. Warren, 13 March 1996, Operation Joint Endeavor oral history project - Draft notes,
edited by Colonel Mijocevic.

35 Colonel Hans W. Mijocevic, USAR, USAWC Senior USAR Advisor, interviewed by

36 Note: DIMA numbers part of IMA numbers (e.g.; 8000/1402 equals 8000 total IMA
position, including DIMA positions. 8000 – 1402 = 6598 equals IMA positions minus DIMA
positions).
Planning figures for 34 officer and 66 enlisted per 100 DIMAs. Both IMAs and DIMAs authorized 13 days Annual training ($388/day/officer and $245/day/enlisted). The difference is the 48 training periods authorized for DIMAs ($188/period/officer and $90/period/enlisted). Officers: 34 x $188 x 48 = $306,816 + Enlisted: 66 x $90 x 48 = $285,120 = $591,936 ($600,000 rounded). Additional funding for 400 DIMAs (rounded) is: 4 x $600,000 = $2,400,000 or $2.4 M.

"to include other positions that have specialized or technical requirements," Kohner, "RE: Strategic Research Project (SRP)."

MAJ Aaron Williams AARON.WILLIAMS@arpstl.army.mil, "FW: Strategic Research Project," electronic mail message to Clair Anderson TaCalone@aol.com, 15 November 2000. Reference IMA and IRRAA.

Ibid.

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Sam Small, contractor, SyTech, OCAR, telephone interview by author, 31 October 2000. Reference PRCs and call-up capabilities.

Ryan.

Mijocevic, USAWC interview.

Planning figures for 34 officer and 66 enlisted per 100 DIMAs. Both IMAs and DIMAs authorized 13 days Annual training ($388/day/officer and $245/day/enlisted). The difference is the 48 training periods authorized for DIMAs ($188/period/officer and $90/period/enlisted). Officers: 34 x $188 x 48 = $306,816 + Enlisted: 66 x $90 x 48 = $285,120 = $591,936 ($600,000 rounded). Additional funding for 400 DIMAs (rounded) is: 4 x $600,000 = $2,400,000 or $2.4 M.

Fiscal Year 2001 Selected Reserve authorization is TPU 184,194; IMA 8,000; and AGR 13,106 for a total of 205,300. Rounded the FY02 total of 205,000 breaks down in the same format.

GLOSSARY

Accessibility - Term describing the degree reservists are available to deploy when called up voluntarily or involuntarily - to fill the manpower needs of the military services.

Active Guard Reserve (AGR) - Members on Active Duty for administration, recruiting, instruction, training, or in support of missions assigned to the Reserve components.

Army Reserve Element (ARE) Program (formerly Joint Reserve Unit Program) - Designed to provide TPU augmentation elements for integration into the Commander's in Chief (CINC) staff to meet peacetime, crisis and wartime requirements in a timely manner. The USARC manages the AREs with TPU members and AR-PERSCOM manages the AREs with DIMAs.

Drilling IMA (DIMAs) positions - Select number of IMA positions identified as critical elements for mobilization during Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) requiring an incumbent to maintain an even higher level of proficiency than a regular IMA soldier. DIMAs authorized to participate in Individual Duty Training (IDT). DIMAs are IMAs serving in a DIMA position.

Force Design Update (FDU) - A semi-annual process to obtain HQDA approval for new force designs or changes to existing designs.

High Demand Low Density (HDLD) Units - Units designated as such due to the low number of units available in the force structure, while operations requirements for specific unit, element, MOS, or AOC capabilities requires high (multiple) usage rate.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) - Pre-trained individuals assigned to Active Component wartime-required (mobilization TDA [Table of Distribution and Allowances] or MTOE [Modified Table of Organization and Equipment]) positions that are not authorized in peacetime. IMAs serving in DIMA positions are classified as Drilling IMAs (DIMAs).

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) - Pretrained individuals who have already served in Active Duty units or in the Selected Reserve, and have either re-enlisted or have some portion of their military service obligation remaining. They are subject to involuntary recall to Active Duty to fulfill mobilization requirements (not PRC, except IRRAA). Personnel in the Control Group (Annual Training) have training obligation and the personnel in the Control Group (Reinforcement) have no mandatory training requirements.

Individual Ready Reserve Activation Authority (IRRAA) (Also called the Ready Patriot Program) - Provides qualified filler personnel for deploying units or positions. Individuals in the IRRAA are available for involuntarily activation from the IRR during a PRC, under the following requirements: The member volunteered for the IRRAA, maintains a service
obligation, achieved an honorable separation from active service or a TPU within the last 24-months, and is physically fit and Military Occupational Specialty qualified.

Individual Ready Reserve Augmentees (IRR-AUG) - Similar to the IMA program the IRR soldiers in the IRR-AUG can be attached to mobilization tables of distribution and allowances positions. The USAR cannot involuntarily activate an IRR-AUG soldier for a PRC.

Involuntary - Annual Training (AT) - routinely 14 days a year - Involuntary AT limited to 15 days. Soldiers should not be in a Contingency Operation in this status.

Involuntary - Inactive duty training (IDT) - Better known as “drill weekend” - 48 per year - Reservist may conduct operational missions in this status. Unit may combine drills.

Involuntary - Selected Reserve Call-up - Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) - President augments or provides assistance to the active forces for an operational mission. This is limited to a total of 270 days per soldier. This is routinely used to support contingency operations (smaller-scale contingency). Any operation, which utilizes PRC, becomes a Contingency by law.

Multiple-Component Units (MCU) - A Multi-Compo unit combines personnel from more than one component (Active Component, USAR, or National Guard) on a single authorization document. The intent is to develop and incorporate into Army regulations, an optimal set of policies and procedures that will leverage the unique strengths of each component in a single unit.

National Military Strategy (NMS) - Provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The current 1997 strategy is “Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A military Strategy for a New Era.”

National Security Strategy (NSS) - Designed to meet the fundamental purposes set out in the Constitution. The President’s 1999 strategy identifies National Interests and the requirements of shaping, responding, and preparing.

Peace building - Supporting measures that promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies.

Peace enforcement - The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally under international authorization, to cause acceptance of resolutions or sanctions leading to peace and support U.S. diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peace enforcement is to restore peace under conditions favored by the international community.

Peace Operations - Umbrella term encompassing three types of activities with a predominantly diplomatic lead - preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building (Military can support
with advisers, observers, or limited military operations.) - and two complementary activities with predominately a military lead - peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Military forces used).

Peacekeeping - Neutral military or paramilitary operations undertaken with the consent of major belligerents that monitor and help implement an existing truce and diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.

Peacemaking - Diplomatic action to help negotiate agreement between hostile parties, as foreseen under Chapter VI, United Nations Charter.

Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC)/Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) - Common term for ordering Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members to active duty for other than war or national emergency, under provisions of Title 10, Section 12304. Term not used in Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces and was formally called a PSRC before the passing of the 1997 Armed Forces Reserve Act. Except for a Weapons of Mass Destruction incident the President cannot declare a PRC to provide assistance to either the Federal Government or a State in time of a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe. Only members of the Selected Reserve and the IRRAA are eligible for involuntary call-up during PRCs.

Preventive diplomacy - Actions to prevent disputes arising between parties, to prevent disputes escalating into conflict, or to limit expanding conflict.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) - Provides a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program. A quadrennial fundamental and comprehensive examination of America’s defense needs.

Ready Reserve - Consists of units or Reserves, or both, liable for active duty as provided in [Title 10].

Retired Reserve - All Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who receive retired pay as a result of their Active Duty and/or Reserve service, or who have qualified for retired pay, but have not yet reached age 60.

Selected Reserve - Individuals and units that are essential to wartime missions. Selected Reservists have priority for training and equipment over Reservists in other categories.

Smaller-scale contingencies (SSC) - Operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, and reinforcing key allies.

Standby Reserve - Individuals who are designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary disability or hardship.
Total Army Analysis (TAA) - Biennial program for identifying and resourcing force structure requirements within NMS and QDR guidelines. Computer modeling of support requirements for the Operational forces determines the requirements for Generating.

Troop Program Units (TPU) - Authorized units for manning, funding, training, and mobilizing. Identified by Unit Identification Codes (UIC) and subdivided by the use of derivative UICs (DUIC). Personnel assigned to TPUs are designated TPU members in strength accounting.

Unit Identification Codes (UIC) - Individualized six-digit identification code assigned to every unit in the Army. UICs ending in "AA" identify the units available for mobilization planning. Sub elements of a unit are identified or mobilized under a derivative UIC (DUIC) not ending in "AA."

Voluntary - Additional duty special work (ADSW) (paid by the reserve components) - temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) (paid by the active component) - Limits this type of duty to 139 days (at 140 days a soldier is authorized a PCS move) and 179 days (at 180 days an RC soldier could count in the AC end strength on 30 Sep), see AR 135-200/210.

Voluntary and Involuntary - Additional duty training (ADT) - Individuals with prior approval may perform duty up to a maximum of 29 days of ADT. It is often referred to, as AT, but in fact AT is a subset of ADT (maximum 29 days includes AT). Volunteers may perform their 48 drill periods, but soldiers involuntarily ordered to duty cannot be required to perform the 48 drills for that year. This capability allows access to the USAR prior to a PRC. Soldiers should not be directly in a Contingency Operation in this status.
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