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MAINTAINING A CONSTABULARY CAPABILITY WITHIN THE US MILITARY

BY

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Maintaining a Constabulary Capability within the US Military

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this paper is to address the requirement that the US military maintain a constabulary capability to support United Nations peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the paper will show what is unique about establishing a constabulary capability, within the US military, focusing on international peace operations. It will also make recommendations for future enhancement of these required capabilities. Based on the need to have a constabulary capability, the paper will present alternatives to satisfy this requirement by establishing a separate force. Finally, the paper recommends the creation of a separate constabulary, from within DoD, to be the mainstay of the US contribution to peace operations.
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MAINTAINING A CONSTABULARY CAPABILITY WITHIN THE US MILITARY

"And therefore let none hesitate to accept war in exchange for peace. Wise men refuse to move until wronged, but brave men as soon as they are wronged go to war, and when there is a good opportunity make peace again. They are not intoxicated by military success; but neither will they tolerate injustice from a love of peace and ease."

The country that is not prepared to support a neighbor in the prevention of conflict or in the restoration of peace is destined to know that conflict. Countries should strive to seek to solve those contentious issues that may someday cause them to send their brave warriors to a distant conflict. Remember, no one loves peace more than the warrior, but in order to keep the peace, the warrior must be prepared to serve as the peacekeeper.

The purpose of this paper is to address the requirement that the US military maintain a constabulary capability (as a primary resource in peace operations) to support United Nations (UN) activities to restore normalcy to a country or countries in conflict. It will also make recommendations for future enhancement of these required capabilities after analyzing various courses of action. Based on the demonstrated need to have a constabulary capability, the paper will present the best alternatives to satisfy this requirement.

As envisioned, this constabulary force would form the core of US forces required in a UN authorized peace operation. This force would provide part of the initial international capability that sets the conditions for the re-creation of a non-functioning criminal justice system and provides support for UN Civil Police (CIVPOL) until the indigenous law enforcement force is self-sustaining. Most commonly in UN peace operations, the process of bridging the "security gap" between instability and order by a military force (with constabulary capability) is required for the peace process to be truly possible. Then working with CIVPOL, the constabulary force helps to maintain order and to build up an indigenous police force, and then withdraws as this indigenous police force (and the total criminal justice system) becomes self-sustaining. A self-sustaining indigenous police force is, of course, necessary for the peace building process to be successful. This paper will also discuss the key relationship of a constabulary force to CIVPOL and will depict some of the detrimental effects deployment of military forces to perform a constabulary role have on the combat readiness (the loss of warfighting skills).
NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

US military units are assigned the mission to support peace operations based on the direction of the National Command Authority (NCA) as part of the national security strategy (NSS). Specific units are assigned to participate based on their state of training and operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The unit that is “next in line” is normally alerted to prepare for the mission. Preparation for a peace operation can be all-encompassing based on the type of unit. Infantry units are perhaps the better suited for peace operations because of their focus on small unit actions and leadership at a small unit level. Units are assigned the tasks that deal with threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

Normally, an international mandate directs a peace mission to establish a secure and stable internal environment. The United Nations provides guidance for executing peace operations in the mandate and through the approved rules of engagement (ROE) for the force. Usually, peace operations under Chapter 6 (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or 7 (Enforcement) of the UN charter interjected into an intrastate conflict requires the indigenous civilian police to be developed to respectability. Ultimately, a functional indigenous criminal justice system is required before the military force can be withdrawn.

To accomplish this, the UN uses CIVPOL specifically to train, monitor, and assist local police and corrections specialists.\(^2\) However, CIVPOL often requires, at least initially, the support of a military force (that may have to operate even before CIVPOL is operational). Essentially, CIVPOL contingents have been authorized when there is recognized need is to establish an indigenous criminal justice system (police, courts, and corrections) that conforms to generally recognized democratic practices – equality before the law, fair and unbiased treatment of all citizens, etc. These CIVPOL forces may or may not have “executive authority” (and thus be armed and enforcing local law). They are always very dependent on the military force in the operation to provide additional support. This support is normally coercive presence and, when required, technical assistance focused on civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, and military police functions. Additionally, support provided may include US military equipment and/or combat service support items.\(^3\)

During peace operations, employment of a security force is paramount to successful mission accomplishment. When the UN authorizes the establishment of a peace operation, the parties in conflict may still be hostile. CIVPOL are not trained or equipped to establish a secure environment. A military or constabulary force is needed to ensure CIVPOL can successfully operate with the local indigenous police force. A constabulary force (with attributes of both military and police forces) is particularly valuable for this function.
The primary UN international policing efforts are performed by a combination of participants. The participants are policemen (who meet minimum experience and physical criteria) who come from nations located throughout the world. "When acting under a UN mandate, such civilian police are referred to as CIVPOL, and they are administered by the Civilian Police Unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in UN Headquarters in New York." The DPKO has established minimum requirements for CIVPOL service. These include being sworn members of the police force in their home country, having at least five years of community level policing experience, and unquestionable personal and professional integrity. Additionally, prospective members should be able to drive a 4X4 vehicle and have the ability to speak the official language of the mission. For example, during the early 1990's, while executing operations in Namibia (the former country of South West Africa) and in Cambodia, CIVPOL were used as monitors to bridge the gap between no police force and a marginally capable criminal justice system in order to return to civil police authority.

CIVPOL are normally present to train and monitor local police – not to enforce the law themselves (since all law for domestic crimes is national, not international law). CIVPOL members have been called upon to perform a wide variety of tasks to include screening (vetting) new police cadets, operating police academies, observing local police forces, developing and mentoring local police trainees, and actually conducting police operations themselves (this in very limited in places like Cambodia where there was a UN Interim Administration). More recently, international law enforcement units, such as the International Police Task Force (IPTF) have been employed in Bosnia.

THE CONSTABULARY FUNCTION

In order to gain experienced personnel and responsive units, the UN may request constabulary forces to augment and compliment, but not to serve in the role of CIVPOL. As part of the international intervention, they serve as a security force to support and add credibility to the CIVPOL and the peace operation. The US deploys military combat units to serve in a constabulary role to accomplish this important security mission. These combat units maybe the first and most capable forces on the ground. They must be prepared to separate belligerents and to restore law and order. These forces should have specialized skills, such as crowd control capabilities and investigative expertise, which are not common to traditional military or civilian police organizations. However, military combat units serving as constabulary forces generally are not trained in police operations and they thus require focused training to do this function acceptably. They lack some of the peacekeeping skills found in military police units.
As an example, in a recent Washington Post article, writer Thomas Ricks wrote that military police units are very comfortable with their current role in Kosovo. Unlike combat units, military police “are old hands at using the least amount of force necessary to get the job done.” His article indicates, “combat units aren’t trained to shout and shove at their adversaries. They are trained to kill them.”\(^6\) In fact, combat forces want to secure victory, not stability. As a consequence, military combat units have to be trained before deploying on peace operations. The mentality of the combat soldier must be changed to allow him to able accept the long boring duty, which may involve watching traffic pass, to accomplish a mission of preventing a church from being attacked.\(^7\) Then they need to be retrained to be fully effective as warriors.

Deployment of forces with a constabulary capability is also critical to the establishment of a military exit strategy. A functional indigenous criminal justice system is necessary to allow institutions of good governance to develop to cement the process of peace — and as such is a precursor to the final withdrawal of the force. Constabulary forces are designed to bridge the security gap before CIVPOL and local police are fully functional (which may take years). Once local authorities are prepared to control their destiny with the help of the constabulary force and CIVPOL and that peace is self-sustaining, the UN can withdraw.

The term constabulary refers to a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment.\(^8\) Some of the tasks required of a constabulary force include: conduct law enforcement functions, crowd control, and guarantee human rights.\(^9\) Countries such as France and Italy have national constabulary forces that are capable of performing constabulary operations as a normal course of duty (e.g., Gendarmes, Carbinerari, etc). These units are national police serving under the Ministry of Defense and have both a military and civilian enforcement role. As important as this capability is for peace operations, the US does not have discrete forces with constabulary capability. See table #1 for countries with national constabulary forces.

**NOT A NEW MISSION**

Historically, the US Army has performed constabulary functions. During the late 1800’s, the US Cavalry served as a constabulary force in its role to secure “the plains” for westward movement of a population intent on expansion. The US used constabulary forces in the early 1900’s in China during and after the Boxer Rebellion. Additionally, constabulary forces were used in the Philippines, Latin America, and the Caribbean Islands in the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) century. Finally, after both World Wars, constabulary forces were used to control citizens in countries ravaged by conflict (such as Germany and Japan). As indicated by the preceding
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries w/Constabulary Forces</th>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>Size of unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Gendarmes</td>
<td>Nation-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounties</td>
<td>Nation-Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Guardia</td>
<td>Nation-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Carabineri</td>
<td>Nation-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1. COUNTRIES W/CONSTABULARY FORCES**

chronology, service as a constabulary force is not a new mission for the military. The difficult task appears to be combining the constabulary mission with the requirement to a fight up to two Major Theater Wars nearly simultaneously as called for in our NSS.\(^\text{10}\) Unfortunately, military units are sometimes faced with difficulty in peace operations due to a lack of discipline or a lack of training for the constabulary function. For an example of difficulties in peace operations, refer to the operations of the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of 82nd Airborne Division.\(^\text{11}\) A soldier from this unit was convicted and sentenced to life without parole for the sodomy, rape, and murder of an 11-year old Kosovo Albanian girl. Problems encountered by this unit were attributed to a lack of unit level training and individual indiscipline. These difficulties can also be attributed to the combat unit not having the proper mentality to perform in a peacekeeping role with the correspondingly restrictive ROE.

Recognizing the special skills required, US Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 71, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on the Strengthening of Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations" - February 2000, directs the military to maintain a constabulary capability.\(^\text{12}\) To that end, all units deploying to peace operations usually conduct a Mission Readiness Exercise to validate their ability to execute their peacekeeping/constabulary mission. Additionally, leaders must focus on the need to train a unit capable of operating across a “full spectrum.” These units should be able to execute low intensity as well as high intensity operations. They must be able to serve in a wide array of situations. The object is to provide a force that does not have a diluted ability to conduct peace operations while also maintaining warfighting tasks. A situation in which peacekeeping/constabulary operations undermine the military's warfighting readiness must be avoided.\(^\text{13}\)
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON THE STRENGTHENING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE OPERATIONS - PDD-71

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 71 has not been rescinded by the current administration. It is the current policy on strengthening indigenous criminal justice systems as a key element of support to international peace operations. History has shown that often times "as the military conflict ends a security vacuum develops." 14 This vacuum develops because local law enforcement authorities have been destroyed, implicated in atrocities, and/or become a part of the problem by being biased toward a faction. The intent of the PDD is "that the Executive Branch of the US Government improve its capacities to participate in rebuilding effective foreign criminal justice systems...." 15

PDD 71 requires DOD to maintain a constabulary capability within our military. Constabulary forces maybe paramilitary units that train for and conduct law enforcement functions in their home countries, or military forces with this enhanced capability. These forces are best employed as units rather than as individual replacements. If a separate unit, the constabulary force normally works for the military force commander, much like the Multinational Special Units (MSU), currently in use in Bosnia and Kosovo. The military force commander has a capable staff section to facilitate command, control, and coordination between different organizations. Additionally, when under the control of the military force commander, and when feasible and allowed under terms of existing statues, constabulary forces receive logistical support, updates on intelligence, and other types of support in the same manner as regular military units.16

The PDD stresses the need to also improve the speed of CIVPOL deployment to more quickly augment the military force performing a constabulary function and the US requirement to participate. Rapid deployment of CIVPOL closes the "security gap" and leads to the early return of military units to their warfighting missions. Furthermore, the functional presence of CIVPOL reduces operational tempo levels in our active duty military units (rate at which a unit or individual is assigned a mission and/or is engaged in operations). A more rapid CIVPOL deployment supports the effort in restoring normalcy and return of the "Rule of Law" in a nation in conflict. To further improve the level of law enforcement expertise in support of CIVPOL, PDD-71 calls for the participation of the US Secret Service and the US Park Police and other federal agencies as well as local police departments. Under PDD-71, the Department of State is the lead agency to implement the support required to field and sustain the US contribution to UN CIVPOL.17
US CIVPOL ORGANIZATION

In the US, CIVPOL participants are selected from municipal, state, and federal levels of law enforcement agencies. As indicated above, CIVPOL operations are designed to help restore the criminal justice system to legitimacy as focused on all aspects of the “rule of law.” CIVPOL members attempt to restore the justice system from the ground level up. Hopefully, the local population will come to understand that CIVPOL is there to help them reestablish a “rule of law” for the benefit of all. PDD-71 looks for ways to enhance US capacity to support UN CIVPOL operations by providing personnel to UN declared operations. The Department of State (DOS) is designated as the lead agency and is responsible for policy development and all aspects of US CIVPOL support to UN operations. Additionally, DOS is responsible for development and implementation of training and technical assistance plans and programs for foreign police forces and all necessary procedures for coordinating with US agencies relating to the criminal justices system. The increasing requirement for US CIVPOL members is reflected in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Personnel Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. US CIVPOL PARTICIPATION

CIVPOL IN BOSNIA

In Bosnia, CIVPOL activities were performed by an organization designated as the International Police Task Force (IPTF). “Annex 11 of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords provided for the training of civilian police forces in accordance with international human rights standards and deployment of a 1,721-member, UN-run IPTF.” 18 The IPTF has a mandate to train local civilian police forces. Additionally, the IPTF was later mandated to investigate abuses of civilian police. This authority has added legitimacy and respectability to the operation. The IPTF personnel are also unarmed (except for side arms). Their primary purpose is to serve as trainers and monitors of the local police factions. They are tasked to select, certify, train, and mentor local police on proper law enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) appropriate to a democracy. 19 A primary issue facing the IPTF in Bosnia, as well as in other
peace operations, is that of being viewed as biased to a particular faction. Therefore the IPTF has to provide facilities to train all parties to a conflict. They must also co-locate IPTF elements with all local police forces. By doing this, the implication of being bias is removed and the parties can focus on rebuilding their country.

Another very important mission for the IPTF in Bosnia is to restructure the police force. This new force is designed to be free of human rights abusers and it acts as a force that serves to protect, impartially, all persons in Bosnia from crime. The IPTF mandate identifies this process as one of its priorities. This is a radical departure for police forces of the various entities in Bosnia with their legacy of communism and support for authoritarian regimes and the abuses of their wartime past. Previously, their primary function was to operate as a source of population control. A former IPTF Commissioner, Peter Fitzgerald wrote:

“Every police officer has the opportunity to facilitate or impede democracy. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, the police must realign their missions from protection of the state to the protection of citizen’s rights.”

CIVPOL RELATIONSHIP TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

In his book, Police in Peace Operations, Erwin Schmidl provides an outstanding review of the genesis of civilian police in international peace operations. From the creation of the civilian police by the UN in 1964 to present day operations in the Balkans, the concept of CIVPOL has evolved into a viable option in peace operations. Schmidl’s book provides focus on the gap caused by the transition of operations between the military and police units. However he notes that, “military police has a primary focus on the military force and does not have a civilian police mandate.” In their operations, CIVPOL wear the uniform of their own departments with UN accoutrements. Schmidl indicates that peace operations “were not invented by the UN in the Cold War, but gradually evolved in the 19th century out five types of military operations:

- Colonial interventions and counter-insurgencies
- Use of military forces in occupation duties
- Use of military forces in aid to the civil power
- Frontier operations (e.g., the US Cavalry, etc.)
- Multinational operations (e.g., against North African Pirates)

In current peace operations, CIVPOL work primarily with the indigenous police force and depends on a military force serving in a constabulary role for backup with armed authority as required. The constabulary force provides a presence that lends credibility to CIVPOL and, if
necessary, military firepower to convince a faction to abide by local law. Simply stated, CIVPOL supports the local police in the enforcement of local statues. The constabulary force supports CIVPOL by providing backup force when required and is especially valued for crowd control, etc. The constabulary force must develop a mindset that allows its members to perform tasks such as security patrols and be able to use minimum force necessary for a given situation. (The military force has been trained to execute a mission with overwhelming force. This is perhaps the primary point of departure between a military unit and a constabulary force). A challenge exists because US military units: serve as both a constabulary and a combat force.

DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTABULARY CAPABILITY

CONSTABULARY FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR US COMBAT MILITARY UNITS

Presently, the military has had difficulty executing sustained constabulary type operations that appear to be endemic in current peace operations. The military is focused on fighting and winning, nearly simultaneously, two major theater wars (MTW), for example in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula. The military force is structured and equipped to fight a force-on-force operation. The US Army is 40% smaller than it was in 1989, prior to the Gulf War. Because of its force structure (size) and the changes resulting from the end of the bipolar days of the Cold War, the Army is deploying 300% more today than in 1989. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Henry Shelton, spoke during a National Strategy Forum in Chicago in March 2001 where he indicated that the military has a shorter amount of time to react to a variety of threats to include ethnic conflicts and a proliferation of weapons technology than ever before. He also said, "the US needs to be on the guard against partnerships or coalitions that run counter to its interests. I for one believe that we need to maintain our armed forces' strength to make sure we guard against strategic surprise and that we always deal from a position of strength."24

By establishing a unit with the mission of executing constabulary operations, the military could accomplish its mission of peacekeeping without causing an impact on the remainder of its warfighting capability. Additionally, this organization will preclude the military from over-committing forces traditionally allocated to warfighting to long-term peacekeeping operations. This would also address problems with operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). Finally, the military would be able to focus on supporting the nation's "Two nearly simultaneously MTW" strategy without the risks inherent in using the same force for both missions.
NEED FOR SEPARATE CONSTABULARY FORCES

Constabulary forces compliment CIVPOL in critical areas better than could military forces not trained for these operations. Military forces require additional training to increase their ability to perform constabulary tasks (the more required the further the constabulary function is from the wartime mission). Such tasks include: actions to regulate movement; intervention to stop civil violence; stopping or deterring widespread looting, vandalism, riots, or mob-type action; and, dispersing unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances. These tasks are not, normally, included in a combat unit’s mission essential task list (METL). The US does not maintain full-time constabulary type forces (excluding Military Police) qualified for duty in war-torn countries. As indicated above, PDD-71 has directed that the US military maintain a constabulary capability for contingency deployments (however, this policy does not direct the creation of constabulary units). 25

The constabulary mission is assigned to units based on their availability to perform the mission. Oftentimes units with a warfighting mission are assigned tasks to serve in peace operations and as a result, receive degraded ratings on readiness for warfighting. A recent article in The Sentinel, a Carlisle, PA newspaper, reported that, the US Army’s 3rd Infantry Division was downgraded to the second-lowest level of battle readiness due to a lack of training and personnel. The article quoted the commanding general, MG Walter Sharp, as saying, “the division was downgraded to a C-3 rating. This means the division would need to prepare for weeks, if not months, if it were called up for wartime duty.” 26 The article indicates the 3rd Infantry Division has had over 4,000 soldiers deployed in the Balkans since October 2000. The C-3 rating is a result of missed warfighting training while deployed as peacekeepers in Bosnia. This example and others as when the 1st Armored Division and 10th Mountain Division reported decreased readiness due to peacekeeping commitments, depicts the need for establishing a separate constabulary force to execute peacekeeping duties. A separate peacekeeping force alleviates the need to assign warfighting military units to peacekeeping missions. With the establishment of a separate constabulary force, if a situation develops that requires both a peace operations and a conventional force, the risk for mission accomplishment isn’t jeopardized.

The US military has had difficulty in achieving combat readiness rates commensurate with their ability to execute designated missions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Henry Shelton said in a December 14, 2000 speech at the National Press Club, “... we must be mindful that long-term commitments to achieve nation building, and the like, place our readiness at risk.” 27 Even though, combat units are currently performing peacekeeping missions in the
Balkans, the Military has concerns with the addition of a constabulary capability requirement. According to James Kitfield, author of the article "The Peacekeepers," included in the March 2001 edition of the Government Executive, military leaders have indicated: "the military is ill-suited to peacekeeping or peace-making operations – and that such missions dilute the military's warfighting ethos and squander military resources." Military forces are now tasked to fight forest fires, support Hurricane/Tornado Disaster Relief, operations in support of Olympic security efforts, and support operations in the Balkans, Turkey, Kuwait, and the Sinai. Additionally, units must be able to train for and execute missions to the Joint Readiness Training Center, National Training Center, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center. Adding another mission on top of the tasks indicated above would put combat units at risk of not being able to execute warfighting missions.

Kitfield also wrote that, "experts believe the peacekeeping and warfighting missions assigned to the military have become "entangled." That argues, they say, for creation of a specialized peacekeeping force within the military force structure." He quotes Don Snider, a professor at West Point, as saying that because of this entanglement, there is an argument "for the creation of a constabulary force to allow the rest of the US military to focus on experimenting with fighting big wars." Additionally, Kitfield makes note of the results released in April 2000 from the independent panel, The US Commission on National Security for the 21st Century, which says, "stability operations are likely to increase in the future, therefore, the military needs rapidly deployable units capable of assuming humanitarian relief and constabulary duties." 

COURSES OF ACTION TO DEVELOP A SPECIALIZED CONSTABULARY FORCE

As the primary organization to ensure world peace and stability, the UN will need to retain its current capabilities to respond to international crises. Listed below are three courses of action (COA) to address the US military requirement to maintain a constabulary capability in support of our NSS that may include involvement in UN operations. Each COA includes a series of advantages and disadvantages that affect the viability of the COA. The constabulary force in each COA would be trained specifically for the mission of closing the security gap and would work with CIVPOL to perform security functions even better than our general military forces can do now.

COA #1

**DOD should develop, from current structure, a unit capable of independent constabulary operations.** This unit should be based on the structure of an army division with
three subordinate brigade combat teams (BCT). The primary mission of this unit would be to perform peacekeeping operations in a constabulary role. Each constabulary BCT would be organized into four battalion-sized units with three subordinate companies each. Each battalion would have a Headquarters and Service Support Company (HSS) to which specialized units (Psychological, civil affairs, engineers, signal, and military intelligence) could be attached. The battalions would be equipped with light military type transport vehicles and have a heavy platoon size unit in the HSS for reaction operations. In this option, the division-sized unit would be created from current army structure. A light division could form the core of this provisional constabulary force. A division could oversee education, training, and readiness, as well as provide command and control upon deployment. Two simultaneous peacekeeping operations could be supported with a rotational capability to sustain support. If additional assets were required, the constabulary force could be the “core” to which they are attached.

**Advantages**

- This unit would be familiar with DoD institutions and could be rapidly incorporated into transportation systems and service support lines.
- The unit would have DoD-like support systems and that would save money by avoiding research, development, and other costs (many of which would be redundant to investment already made in the US Army).
- This type unit would have similar communications, command and control, and computer interface.
- Transition from active military to a constabulary unit would be easier because these members remain in the DoD.
- This size force would be capable of sustaining US presence in peace operations provided the numbers of supported operations are reasonable.

**Disadvantages**

- This large force is removed from the force structure available to fight major theater wars.
- DOD maintains responsibility for manning, preparation, and training of the constabulary unit. Being in the national constabulary may create an “us versus them” mentality within the military itself.
- DOD maintains responsibility for transportation and service support requirements.
- Budget requirements for this force remain a responsibility of the DOD.
COA #2

The government should create a constabulary force outside of DOD and assign it to the Department of Justice (DOJ). This unit should also be based on the structure of an army division with three subordinate brigade combat teams (BCT). Its subordinate organizations would be similar to the force in COA #1, except this unit would have a chain of command that starts in the Department of Justice. This constabulary unit would operate on a daily basis under the guidance of the DOJ. The primary mission of this unit would to perform peacekeeping operations in a constabulary role. During times of national crisis, this unit could fall under the to provide additional manpower for a particular mission.

Advantages

- Law enforcement requirements inherent in constabulary functions would be reinforced if integrated into the DOJ.
- The unit could still be familiar with DoD institutions and when required, could be rapidly incorporated into transportation and service support systems, yet it would be more able to work with other US Government (USG) agencies.
- This type unit would have similar communications, command and control, and computer interface as the military. This would ease requirements for requisitioning of equipment for use during peace support operations. This would also facilitate integration with military service support units.
- Assigning the unit to the DOJ would facilitate international coordination with constabulary forces of other countries. Coordination of this type is difficult at present primarily because the military provides the constabulary capability from within the DoD.

Disadvantages

- Assigning the constabulary force to the Department of Justice (DOJ) would create a lack of commonality in military organizations and a lack of familiarity with other necessary military support systems.
- DOJ would have the responsibility for manning, preparation, and training of the constabulary unit. There could have to be a duplication of resources with DOD because it has many of these requirements in preparing the military for operation.
- DOJ will be required to coordinate with DOD for transportation and service support requirements. This creates an added complexity that may slow response time for the constabulary unit.
- DOJ assumes the requirement to budget for this force. This could cause over commitment of resources in both the DOD and DOJ for common items.

COA #3

DOD retains the PDD-71 requirement to maintain a constabulary capability and is prepared to execute peace operations when ordered. This COA maintains the status quo and continues to assign the mission to military units based on availability. This implies there is not a need to make adjustment to military organizations in order to execute a constabulary mission.

Advantages

- No additional adjustments required to military organizations. DoD provides this force when UN operations are implemented.
- Military units have come to expect to serve in peace operations and have developed procedures for preparing and certifying units prior to deployment.
- Allows the military to retain current structure to meet present day requirements.

Disadvantages

- Potential exists for downgrading readiness rating of combat units that participate in peace operations.
- DoD must balance assigning combat units to peacekeeping mission and returning those units to an appropriate level of readiness for warfighting to execute combat tasks.
- Military is still at risk for performing warfighting missions based on allocating units to both peacekeeping and warfighting missions.
- Combat units are not optimized to perform a difficult constabulary mission.

RECOMMENDATION

This writer recommends that COA #1 be selected to improve US support to UN authorized peace operations. This COA provides the nation with a constabulary capability in accordance with guidelines found in PDD-71. However, as a result of establishing a separate constabulary force, the military does not receive a degradation of combat capability by serving in peace operations. This unit should have a force structure that is separate and distinct from current assets within the military. Further, I recommend the development an office within DoD that has the responsibility for coordinating command, control, and logistical support for US constabulary units assigned a role in UN peace operations and to ensure this organization receives appropriate visibility and support when deployed.
CONCLUSION

The constabulary unit's primary duty is to train for and execute peacekeeping operations. It focuses on the security gap that is caused by the transition from hostility to stability. The force is redeployed subsequent to the establishment of a fully functioning indigenous criminal justice system. Therefore, establishing a separate constabulary force allows the military to both support UN peace operations, especially the CIVPOL component, and to maintain a higher state of warfighting readiness. Establishing this separate constabulary force is the best way to fulfill PDD-71 requirements and to provide the military with combat units unfettered to execute wartime missions.

Word Count = 5,650
ENDNOTES


5 PDD-71, 110.


7 Ibid.

8 Oakley, et.al., 22.

9 PDD-71,110-111.


12 PDD-71,113.

13 Ricks.

14 PDD-71,105.

15 Ibid., 105.

16 Ibid.,111.

17 Ibid., 113.

18 Oakley, et.al., 350.


22 Ibid., 6.


25 PDD-71, 113.


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 52.

30 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


