Clausewitz on Kosovo

A Monograph

by

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If strategists do not follow Clausewitz’s lead as a critical historian, then they risk failure by founding future policy, strategy, and operations on Kosovo myths. One must ask, was Operation Allied Force a rational use of military power to accomplish NATO’s political objectives? This monograph develops and applies Clausewitzian dialectics to test the following hypothesis: If NATO leaders applied their realistic understanding of the war to reconcile their ends, ways, and means and employ effective force to achieve their political objectives, then the use of force would be rational. NATO leaders? synthesis of the forces of reason, violence, and chance enabled them to understand the war, but only after it began. NATO leaders underestimated the will of Milosevic and the Serbs to fight for Kosovo and failed to prepare contingency plans in case their assumptions proved false. NATO leaders? synthesis of the forces of political primacy and military necessity enabled them to reconcile their ends, ways, and means. NATO leaders? synthesis of the principles of overwhelming and proportional force enabled them to employ realistic, effective force to coerce Milosevic. The analysis concludes that Operation Allied Force was a rational use of military power.

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ABSTRACT

CLAUSEWITZ ON KOSOVO, by MAJ Michael W. Johnson, 81 pages.

If strategists do not follow Clausewitz’s lead as a critical historian, then they risk failure by founding future policy, strategy, and operations on Kosovo myths. One must ask, was Operation Allied Force a rational use of military power to accomplish NATO’s political objectives? This monograph develops and applies Clausewitzian dialectics to test the following hypothesis: If NATO leaders applied their realistic understanding of the war to reconcile their ends, ways, and means and employ effective force to achieve their political objectives, then the use of force would be rational. NATO leaders’ synthesis of the forces of reason, violence, and chance enabled them to understand the war, but only after it began. NATO leaders underestimated the will of Milosevic and the Serbs to fight for Kosovo and failed to prepare contingency plans in case their assumptions proved false. NATO leaders’ synthesis of the forces of political primacy and military necessity enabled them to reconcile their ends, ways, and means. NATO leaders’ synthesis of the principles of overwhelming and proportional force enabled them to employ realistic, effective force to coerce Milosevic. The analysis concludes that Operation Allied Force was a rational use of military power.
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INTRODUCTION

To search for truth and to die at the moment of attaining it, to defend passing values, which unfaithful followers corrupted a century later—such was the fate of Carl von Clausewitz.¹

The passion to define the comprehensive nature of a complex subject can torment and inspire Germans. For example, as Ludwig van Beethoven captured the essence of real joy in Simfonie Nr. 9, so Carl von Clausewitz captured the essence of real war in Vom Kriege. Embracing reality but without sacrificing their vision of the ideal, the first Ode to Joy is the definitive expression of harmonious living, while the second Ode to War is the definitive expression of rational fighting.² Combinations of perfect notes and precise words describe the dialectic between happiness and sorrow, escalation and moderation. Opposing forces combine to form complete movements and chapters that lead the audience and the reader to appreciate fully the real, whole, and complex nature of these human conditions. Recognizing their achievements, the United Nations adopted Beethoven’s ninth as the world’s anthem, while three prominent historians generally agreed that, “among all the better-known writers on military theory within Western Civilization,” Clausewitz best “succeeded in transcending the limitations imposed on their insights by the political and technological circumstances of their times,” and wrote “not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war.”³

It is altogether fitting, therefore, that the modern statesman and commander should turn to Clausewitz to address the pressing task at hand: to analyze the recent crisis in Kosovo.⁴ The purpose of this analysis is to derive accurate historical experience, test military theories, and clarify confused concepts to guide leaders in their self-education.⁵ The problem is that many myths surround Kosovo, since politicians, military leaders, and journalists may interpret the war to advance their special interest or singular perspective. For example, Secretary-General Javier Solana hailed the war as a complete success, but senior fellow Michael Mandelbaum concluded
the war was a perfect failure. Similarly, Army General Wesley K. Clark reported to Congress that the combination of air, ground, and political factors was decisive in forcing Slobodan Milošević to agree to terms of peace, but Air Force Lieutenant General Michael C. Short suggested that airpower alone was decisive. If the statesman and commander do not follow Clausewitz’s lead as a critical historian, then they risk failure by founding future policy, strategy, and operations on Kosovo myths.

One must ask, was Operation Allied Force a rational use of military power to accomplish NATO’s political objectives? Webster’s definition of rational—“sane, sensible, or reasonable”—will suffice. Clausewitz would suggest the following hypothesis: if NATO leaders applied their realistic understanding of the war to reconcile their ends, ways, and means and employ effective force to achieve their political objectives, then the use of force would be rational. This contains three key dialectical concepts. First, leaders should understand “the kind of war on which they are embarking” by correctly estimating the relationship between the variable forces of reason, violence, and chance. Second, leaders should subordinate war to the guiding intelligence of policy without demanding the impossible from their chosen instrument. Third, leaders should employ force, sufficient to defeat the enemy means and will, but also proportional to the value of their own ends. These key dialectical concepts lead to the following subordinate research questions: (1) Did NATO’s leaders understand the unique nature of their war? (2) Was NATO’s political-military relationship correct? and (3) Were the aim and employment of military force effective means to achieve political ends? If the answers to these questions are yes, then Operation Allied Force would be a rational use of military power to accomplish political objectives. This hypothesis is represented by the research matrix in figure 1:
This methodology first defines the Clausewitzian dialectic as the evaluation criteria to answer each subordinate question. It then examines how well NATO leaders appreciated the character of each force and synthesized them to understand and fight the war. This approach reveals how myth-makers exploit Clausewitz by citing the single force that supports their special interest. As Raymond Aron observes, “You can find what you want to find in the Treatise: all that you need is a selection of quotations, supported by personal prejudice.” In contrast, examining the complete dialectic penetrates myths by embracing complexity instead of reducing it to simplistic, unrealistic maxims. If NATO leaders failed to consider each force or synthesize them correctly, then the use of military power would not be rational because they either distorted reality, subverted policy as a continuation of war, pursued ends inconsistent with their means, or failed to employ effective force to achieve their objectives.
Clausewitz suffers no lack of criticism, limitations that must be addressed to justify this methodology. Five categories of critics are those who: (1) do not follow his dialectical approach, (2) deliberately misrepresent his views, (3) mistake the nature of the trinity, (4) find the lack of modernity limits the value of the analysis, and (5) believe *On War* in its unfinished form is too contradictory. Michael Walzer represents the first category. Because he does not follow the dialectic past the first page, he concludes that Clausewitz never “surrendered his commitment to the absolute [war].”\(^\text{14}\) Bernard Brodie proves the argument of Carl von Clausewitz was exactly the opposite: “The civil hand must never relax, and it must without one hint of apology hold the control that has always belonged to it by right.”\(^\text{15}\) Basil Liddell Hart and John Keegan represent the second category. They understand Clausewitz, but deliberately misrepresent his views, naming him the Mahdi of mass. Christopher Bassford refutes this unjust criticism.\(^\text{16}\) The third category includes Harry Summers and Martin van Creveld. The former assumes the trinity to be “government, people, army” while the latter portrays the trinity as an arbitrary and inflexible correlation between reason-government, violence-people, and chance-army.\(^\text{17}\) Edward Villacres and Christopher Bassford reclaim the trinity as “reason, violence, and chance” and demonstrate why these forces continue to determine the nature of war.\(^\text{18}\) Michael Handel represents the fourth category. Granting the “richness of wisdom” in *On War*, he believes “Clausewitz’s theories and observations on war require modification” to account for technology, complexity, moral, and economic dimensions.\(^\text{19}\) These modifications indeed augment, but they do not limit or invalidate the final analysis of Clausewitz with respect to the nature of war, the political-military relationship, and the aim of military force.

Calling his work a “formless mass,” Clausewitz himself identified the fifth and most serious category of criticism: because it was not finished, there are no clear, consistent resolutions of the contradictions within *On War.*\(^\text{20}\) Clausewitz wrote his treatise over a period of twenty-five years, during which time he matured from a passionate military reformer to become
an unbiased critical historian. During the first phase of his life, Clausewitz was dedicated to the
defeat of Napoleon; he wrote some sections of *On War* to prepare Prussia to wage national war
that approached in intensity his concept of absolute war. During the second phase, Clausewitz
was dedicated to the pursuit of truth and understanding; he wrote other sections of *On War* to
reconcile theory with the dual nature of war as a historical fact. Clausewitz died, after he
discovered truth, but before he could completely revise *On War* to reflect that truth consistently.

Fortunately, Clausewitz left a warning that overcomes this limitation. Indicating that
only the first chapter of Book I was complete, Clausewitz declared his intention to revise the
entire work along two lines: (1) providing “greater clarity at every point” between wars that
“overthrow the enemy” to dictate peace and wars that “seize bargaining advantages” to negotiate
peace, and (2) emphasizing “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.”

Raymond Aron believes this warning is the key to resolve the contradictions:

> As the book was unfinished, the final synthesis exists only as a draft. But the logic
of the synthesis allows us to resolve all or almost all of its apparent deviations and
incompatibilities, though on one condition: the commentator must base his
remarks on the final note which attests to the vital importance of the first chapter.

Therefore, this analysis relies upon the logic of the first chapter to complete the synthesis and
reconcile contradictory evidence consistent with Clausewitz’s final warning.

Having demonstrated that Clausewitz provides a proper methodology, the reader deserves
an explanation of how the structure of this monograph reaches a conclusion. The second section,
“Background,” provides essential facts: the political motives, strategic setting, campaign plans,
and the conduct of the war. The third section, “Analysis,” develops the dialectics and analyzes
the evidence from the Kosovo war to answer the three subordinate questions. The fourth section,
“Conclusion,” presents the results and determines whether Operation Allied Force was a rational
use of military power to accomplish NATO’s political objectives. It concludes by exposing some
Kosovo myths and considering the implications for future policy, strategy, and operations.
You have asked me, dear friend, to give you my opinion of the strategic problems and the two solutions you have sent me... Forgive me if I start at the very beginning; but nowhere is a basic understanding, the true and unambiguous recognition of inescapable facts, so lacking in the so-called science of strategy. War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means... How then is it possible to plan a campaign without indicating the political condition of the belligerents and the politics of their relationship to each other?²³

Clausewitz thus criticized Major von Roeder for presenting a purely military solution without mention of the essential political facts and relationships that determine the military objective and the amount of effort to be made. Clausewitz demands an answer to the deceptively simple question, “What is it all about?”²⁴ Lest this analysis suffer the same abrupt fate as Roeder’s, it begins with the essential political, strategic, operational, and historical facts necessary to analyze the war in appropriate context.

The Road to War

While the historical causes are centuries old, the most recent crisis began on November 17, 1988, when a relatively unknown Serbian politician, Slobodan Miloševic, “secured the dismissal of Kosovo’s Albanian communist leaders” and replaced them with Serbs.²⁵ To increase his own political power, Miloševic proceeded to exploit Serb nationalism with respect to Kosovo. Miloševic told Serbs at a giant rally in Belgrade, “Every nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia, it is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo will remain in Serbia.”²⁶ A short five months later, the Serbian Parliament rewarded his extreme nationalism by electing Miloševic the President of Serbia. Distinguished Balkan historian Noel Malcolm concludes:

It was indeed the issue of Kosovo that brought about his [Miloševic’s] transformation from little-known Party apparatchik into demagogic political leader... By exploiting the issue of Kosovo, Miloševic quickly turned himself into a national leader, a role which enabled him to quell all opposition to his takeover of the Communist Party machine.²⁷
It is no coincidence that Miloševic celebrated his victory on the Kosovo Polje during the 600th anniversary of the battle, saying “After many decades, Serbia has its state, national, and spiritual integrity back.” Kosovo played the decisive role as the springboard of his rise to power.

The fundamental political disagreements of the war were the two related questions of autonomy and security for the Kosovars. The Serbian Parliament stripped autonomy from Kosovo as a province within Serbia. This act was the proximate cause of the war because it broke the compromise that granted Kosovo autonomy as “a Yugoslav republic in all but name.” Noel Malcolm describes the Albanian reaction to the loss of autonomy as “immediate and intense.” As a measure of popular support, 400,000 Albanians signed a petition demanding the restoration of autonomy. During the next five days, twenty-one Albanians and two Serb policemen were killed in protests. Serbia responded to the violence by holding 200 members of the Albanian elite in solitary confinement without trial, executing fourteen more, and transferring 25,000 Serbian police to Kosovo. The cycle of violence began to escalate, from protest to reprisal to revenge.

Ibrahim Rugova sought to avoid the ethnic violence that destroyed Bosnia. He urged the people to conduct passive resistance to restore autonomy. Rugova led the majority of Albanians until the Dayton Accords failed to resolve the question of autonomy. Then the power of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to rise until it became the true representative organization of the Albanian majority. Chris Hedges records that a KLA fighter told him:

We all feel a deep, deep sense of betrayal [after the Dayton Accords]. We mounted a peaceful, civilized protest to fight the totalitarian rule of Miloševic. We did not go down the road of nationalist hatred. . . . the result is that we were ignored. [Dayton] taught us a painful truth, those that want freedom must fight for it. This is our sad duty.

The successful Croatian attack to regain the Krajina region with the de facto blessing of Western democracies, and the complete inability of Rugova to gain international support to resolve the Kosovo problem, led the majority of the Albanian people to support the violent KLA approach. Leaders on both sides charted a course towards crisis diplomacy and war.
It has been the American policy to protect Kosovo from Serbian attack since 1992 when President George Bush issued his “Christmas warning” to Milošević. When the violence escalated, Washington dispatched Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to negotiate a settlement backed by the threat of NATO airstrikes. Holbrooke gained consent for the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to deploy to Kosovo and monitor the situation. However, three problems doomed the October agreement: (1) without a military technical agreement, the details were left too vague, (2) the system could monitor but not enforce Serb compliance, and (3) ignoring the Albanian demands for autonomy, it provided no incentive for the KLA to refrain from attacks. The weakness of the agreement became obvious after the Racak massacre in January 1999. There “at least forty-five people had been slaughtered, including three women, a twelve-year-old boy, and several elderly men.” Still, the Racak massacre mobilized the West. NATO resolved to address the problems with the KVM during the international conference at Rambouillet.

To understand the Kosovo war, one must understand the intense diplomacy that occurred when national interests clashed at Rambouillet. The essence of the compromise solution was, and remained throughout the war, “Serb acceptance of NATO deployment in exchange for the Albanians giving up their demands for a referendum [on independence].” NATO believed that the threat of a bombing, or minimal airstrikes if the threat failed, would force Milošević to agree to the compromise framework. Yet Milošević believed that if he refused to concede a referendum, then the Albanians would not sign the agreement, rendering the Albanians equally responsible for the failure of talks. Milošević was correct to believe that the KLA had to sign the peace agreement before NATO could use force. NATO leaders had to blame the failure to negotiate on Milošević to meet the political and moral requirement of last resort.

At first, Milošević’s assessment proved correct, since the Russians refused to allow the word referendum and the KLA field commanders issued death threats against members of the Albanian delegation who signed a deal without explicit calls for a referendum on independence.
Secretary of State Albright personally assured the Albanians, saying, “You’ll get NATO to protect your people. Don’t mind the small print because you will be running the show and many of the problems in the text will be irrelevant.” In spite of her appeal, the Albanian delegation first voted 9-7 against signing the Rambouillet agreement. Albright was incredulous, in the words of an American diplomat, “when she realized that those little assholes were going to stick it to the Secretary of State.” Rather than end the talks in failure, the Albanians requested time to communicate with their people in Kosovo. Former Senator Robert Dole went to Skopje to pressure the Albanians commanders with this stark warning: “If you don’t sign the agreement, then we’ll abandon you.” When the Albanians returned to Rambouillet, they promptly signed the accords without an explicit call for a referendum.

The decision now lay squarely with Slobodan Miloševic. As Geoffrey Blainey clarifies, the choice for war or peace depends on the relative expected outcomes of each course.

While the breakdown of diplomacy reflects the belief of each nation that it will gain more by fighting than by negotiating, the breakdown of war reflects the belief of each nation that it will gain more by negotiating than by fighting.

Many believe that Miloševic made an irrational decision, but it is worth considering his perspective. Tim Judah believes that, “it is vital to understand that the man [Miloševic] has no long-term vision. His main interest is power and keeping it, and what he is best at is manoeuvring from day to day.” Miloševic believed that allowing NATO troops “free and unrestricted passage throughout” the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] was a direct threat to the survival of his regime.

Ceding the sacred historical Serb homeland to the Albanians without firing a shot would sacrifice the foundation of his power to his political opposition. He believed the NATO threat of a “swift, severe, and sustained” air campaign was not credible, given the political divisions within the alliance and the past poor performance of Operation Desert Fox. The Yugoslav military chiefs led Miloševic to believe that: (1) they could shoot down 10-20 NATO planes per week, (2) they could destroy the KLA within one week, (3) they could
widen the war in Bosnia and Macedonia to increase the pressure on NATO, and (4) the Russians would offer diplomatic support and military equipment, including sophisticated air defense missiles.\textsuperscript{46} From this perspective, resistance offered benefits. Optimistic that Serbia would lose less by fighting than by negotiating, Milošević directed the Serb delegation not to sign the accords. The war the KLA wanted was now inevitable.

The Strategic Setting

The ultimate political objective of the KLA was independence for Kosovo; its immediate objective was to force the withdrawal of Serbian military and police forces. The strategy was to start a war the West could not ignore, provoke intervention, and allow NATO to affect the Serb withdrawal. The KLA predicted the Serbs would escalate violent reprisals and commit a massacre made for television, like the mortar attack in the Sarajevo market. They believed the political repercussions from the early failures in Bosnia would lead the West to intervene. After NATO forced the Serb military and police to depart, Kosovo would gain autonomy at worst and independence at best. Thus, the KLA planned to use guerilla type military power to contest Serbian rule, information power to exploit Serb reprisals in the media, and diplomatic power to gain the support of the West. The KLA was the actor unsatisfied with the \textit{status quo} that sought a positive aim: to gain independence for Kosovo via a people’s war.\textsuperscript{47}

The personal objective of Milošević was to retain political power. To co-opt the people and the state, he declared the political objectives of the Yugoslavia to be the retention of Kosovo, the suppression of terrorism, and the freedom of Serbia. His strategy was to refuse at the negotiating table what could not be won on the battlefield. He planned to use military power to conduct ethnic cleansing and crush the KLA, information power to split the NATO alliance to halt the bombing, and diplomatic power to enlist the support of Russia and China to elevate global tensions. Milošević was the actor satisfied with the \textit{status quo} who sought a negative aim: to preserve Serbian rule in Kosovo by destroying the KLA and dividing the NATO alliance.
President Clinton said that NATO’s political motive in Kosovo was “to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace that restores Kosovars to self-governance.” It is important to remember that self-governance did not mean independence. To the contrary, NATO intended to restore the autonomous status of Kosovo within the FRY. The humanitarian motive of the war was “to force Miloševic back to the negotiating table so that NATO could find a way short of independence to protect Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population from Serb violence and political domination.” The stated political objectives that defined the goal were that Miloševic must:

1. Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and para-military forces.
3. Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence.
4. Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations.
5. Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords.

To compel Miloševic to agree to terms, NATO planned to use military power to destroy infrastructure and military units as punishment, information power to demonize Miloševic and hold the alliance together, and diplomatic power to isolate Serbia and gain Russian leverage. To be clear, diplomacy was the “decisive operation,” military force the “shaping operation.” NATO was an unusual actor in favor of the status quo plus that sought both positive and negative aims: to compel Serb agreement but prevent Kosovo independence.

The Campaign Plans

To achieve these political objectives, General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported to Congress that the military operational objectives of NATO were:

1. To demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans.

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(2) To deter Milošević from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and create the conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing.

(3) To damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage war. The concept was to persuade Milošević that he would lose more by fighting than by negotiating. NATO had to make his personal costs of resistance (the political effects of the air campaign) higher than his costs of accepting the terms (NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo). Not without controversy, General Clark identified two enemy centers of gravity: critical infrastructure in Belgrade and the Yugoslav military forces in Kosovo. The decisive points to attack these centers of gravity were key system nodes and the units moving or in contact with the KLA.

The NATO campaign plan is best described as gradual escalation because it slowly and systematically increased the effects on key systems to pressure on Milošević to agree to the Rambouillet terms. NATO rejected overwhelming force from the start. Phase 0 sent NATO aircraft to regional airfields as a signal of its resolve. Phase 1 conducted limited air operations to achieve air superiority, degrade air defense and command and control, and strike troops in Kosovo. Aircraft were deliberately kept above 15,000 feet to avoid casualties. Phase 2 focused more intensively on the forces in the field. This included military infrastructure in Kosovo, reinforcements, headquarters, telecommunications, material depots, and the production and storage of fuel. Phase 3 would intensify the air campaign to strike high-value targets throughout Yugoslavia. Phase 4 would redeploy forces. There was no planned use of ground troops in combat operations; they would be the implementation force after Milošević conceded.

The Serbian campaign plan countered NATO’s military superiority with asymmetric methods. Serbia identified NATO’s unity as the center of gravity. The decisive point to attack NATO’s unity was in the media: by causing casualties, by creating the impression of a quagmire, by exploiting sympathies for Serbia, by securing overt Russian support, and by showing excessive collateral damage. The concept was to split the alliance by causing its democracies
with relatively weak ruling parties to halt the bombing and forgo the requirement for a NATO implementation force in the peace terms. Serbia also identified the KLA as a center of gravity. The decisive point to attack the KLA was in their sanctuary. Since the guerilla fighter swims as a fish in the sea of the populace, Milošević planned to empty the sea by forcing the mass exodus of Albanians to expose the KLA and to solve his long-term Albanian problem by ethnic cleansing.55

The Conduct of the War

The Serb delegation suspended negotiations at Rambouillet on March 18, 1999. The next day, over 300 tanks and 40,000 Yugoslav soldiers and special police troops launched Operation Horseshoe to drive thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Serbian atrocities included detention, executions, systematic rape, burning of homes and mosques, and looting property. The State Department estimated 10,000 ethnic Albanians were killed and “almost one million Kosovar Albanians left the province and another 500,000 have been internally displaced.”56 The humanitarian crisis pressured NATO, which fought somewhat hypocritically to protect the Kosovars but without risking casualties. However, NATO decreased the pressure to commit ground troops to combat by establishing refugee camps for the Albanians in Macedonia. The exodus also enabled NATO to demonize Milošević in the media and consolidate the alliance’s will to use decisive military force. On balance, some strategists believe the half-hearted campaign of ethnic cleansing was a significant mistake by Milošević.57 A more brutal campaign that provoked ground intervention would have increased Western casualties. Benevolence toward Albanian civilians would have denied NATO the moral high ground in the media.

The NATO air campaign in Kosovo began on March 24 and lasted for 78 days. NATO claims to have destroyed 80 percent of Yugoslavia’s air force, 66 percent of its ammunition production capability, 40 percent of its fuel supplies, and 50 percent of the artillery, and 33 percent of the armored vehicles in Kosovo. NATO flew 37,465 combat sorties, including 14,006 for suppression of enemy air defense and 10,808 strike-attack sorties. 35 percent of the munitions
were precision-guided. The targeting procedure was complex, due to the intense political considerations and the nature of coalition warfare. General Clark and Secretary-General Solana held daily video-teleconferences with military lawyers and political heads of state to gain approval to strike sensitive targets. NATO lost only two planes and suffered no casualties.\textsuperscript{58}

When Phase 2 did not achieve the political objective, “NATO widened the air campaign to produce strategic effects in Serbia proper.”\textsuperscript{59} To further increase the pressure on Milošević, Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin apparently told Milošević that NATO would use ground forces if the air campaign failed and that Russia would not stand in NATO’s way. Milošević’s one way out, the Russian suggested, was to settle now before a ground war raised the stakes…Milošević did just that.\textsuperscript{60}

NATO leaders were quick to proclaim that NATO accomplished its mission and achieved all of its strategic, operational, and tactical goals. Secretary of Defense Cohen credited “the solidarity of the NATO alliance, the continuous efforts to engage Russia in diplomacy, the buildup of NATO ground combat power, and the persistent military efforts of the Kosovar Albanians.”\textsuperscript{61}

The claims of success have not gone unchallenged. From the military perspective, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon concluded that NATO leaders misunderstood the war, allowed politicians to stifle operations, and erred by using gradual escalation to achieve their objectives.\textsuperscript{62} From the ethical perspective, Michael Walzer asked whether “countries with armies whose soldiers cannot be put at risk are morally or politically qualified to intervene?” His answer was, “You can’t kill unless you are prepared to die.”\textsuperscript{63} Yet both challenges are not conclusive because they argue from singular perspectives, military idealism and moral absolutism.

This brief review of the literature indicates that the primary research question has not been satisfactorily addressed by scholars and strategists. Armed with this understanding of the essential facts and political motives of the war, one may now apply Clausewitz’s dialectic to resolve the debate. The question remains: was Operation Allied Force a rational use of military power to achieve NATO’s political objectives?
The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled. . . . Anyone for whom all this is meaningless either will admit no theoretical analysis at all, or his intelligence has never been insulted by the confused and confusing welter of ideas that one so often hears and reads on the subject of the conduct of war. These have no fixed point of view; they lead to no satisfactory conclusion; they appear sometimes banal, sometimes absurd, sometimes simply adrift in a sea of vague generalization; and all because this subject has seldom been examined in the spirit of scientific investigation.64

One should begin this investigation by understanding Clausewitz’s instrument. His dialectic is often called Hegelian, but Raymond Aron shows how Clausewitz developed a unique philosophical approach.65 Like Hegel, Clausewitz embraced complexity by describing the effects of different forces, commonly known as thesis and antithesis. Unlike Hegel, Clausewitz does not construct a synthesis that “rises above temporal contradictions.”66 Hegel’s synthesis “cancels, preserves, or raises up” the opposing forces to become a universal concept like “absolute freedom.”67 Writing “Pity the theory that conflicts with reason,” Clausewitz rejects universal concepts like absolute war because they contradict historical fact.68 Instead, his synthesis often defines the whole as a spectrum of possibilities based on the relative strength of the thesis and antithesis that continue to exert their unique influences in each case. Clausewitz’s dialectic supports his aim for theory, that is, a realistic understanding of war.

A relevant example is Clausewitz’s dialectic about the variable intensity of war. From the analogy of two wrestlers using physical force to throw their opponent and render him incapable of resistance, Clausewitz begins with the general definition or universal concept, “war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”69 Yet Clausewitz realized that war’s ends, ways, and means vary widely in history. Some wars use significant force to overthrow the enemy to dictate peace; most wars use limited force to seize bargaining advantages to negotiate peace. The general definition or universal concept fails to explain the two types of war in history.
Clausewitz constructs a dialectic to explain this historical variance. He defines the thesis as the extreme forces that increase the intensity toward absolute war: reciprocal action, the clash of two independent wills, and the competition to win that escalates violence to the maximum exertion of strength. Next, he defines the antithesis as the moderating forces that reduce the intensity toward limited war: means are usually proportional to the ends, war is not an isolated act or a single blow or a final event, the effects of nonlinear feedback in successive acts of war, and the influence of the political object itself. Rejecting the universal concept in Hegel’s traditional style, Clausewitz completes the synthesis by developing a realistic spectrum of possible wars based on the relative strength of the extreme and moderating forces:

Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation.

The complete dialectic explains why real war varies from peacetime military engagement to thermonuclear war. As figure 2 reveals, Clausewitz’s synthesis is consistent with the Army’s concept of “full spectrum operations” in Field Manual 3-0, Operations.

**Antithesis = “Moderating” Forces**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Intensity</th>
<th>High Intensity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peacetime Military Engagement</td>
<td>Theronuclear War</td>
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<td>Small-Scale Contingency</td>
<td>General War</td>
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<td>Major Theater War</td>
<td>War of Extermination</td>
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<td>Armed Observation</td>
<td>Absolute War Dictate Peace</td>
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**Thesis = “Extreme” Forces**

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<tr>
<th>Proportionality</th>
<th>Reciprocal Action</th>
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<td>Not 1 Act, Blow, Result</td>
<td>Clash of 2 Wills</td>
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**Synthesis = Spectrum of Intensity**

Figure 2. Example: Clausewitz’s Dialectic and Full Spectrum Operations.
Clausewitz was not content to cease analysis with this first dialectic because it left the forces defined in theoretical, not realistic, terms. Bernard Brodie remarks, “Fortunately, Clausewitz was of much too pragmatic a fiber to lose himself either deeply or for long in this brand of idealism.”\(^7^4\) His quest to define the forces more clearly to enable better estimates about the nature of war leads to another dialectic and the first subordinate research question.

**Question 1: The Nature of the War**

Did NATO leaders understand the unique nature of their war? Clausewitz was quite explicit that understanding the nature of the war was the first and most important task:

> The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.\(^7^5\)

Understanding the war is the essential task of strategy because it leads to the appropriate political-military relationship, military aim, and amount of effort. Wars are only limited to the extent that both sides support limited war. Wars are won when the victory of men in tactical combat leads to operational success and strategic peace. Wars are lost when strategists fail to establish cause and effect relationships between the levels of war because they do not understand themselves, their enemy, or their unique war. To understand the war, one must understand the paradoxical trinity.

Clausewitz recognized the moderating forces were primarily a function of reason. He described the political objective as the “essential factor in the equation” that determines the intensity of the war because: “The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need make yourself.”\(^7^6\) If reason ruled war, then “the political objective—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”\(^7^7\) War dominated by the rational force of political reason resembles a racecar during a turn: the driver can control the amount of speed required to negotiate the curve in minimum time.
Clausewitz also recognized the extreme forces were a function of violence. This irrational force makes determining the nature of war more complicated, but also more realistic, than a simple calculation of competing national interests. Clausewitz explains why:

The political object cannot, however, *in itself* provide the standard of measurement. Since we are dealing with realities, not with abstractions, it can do so only in the context of the two states at war. The same political object can elicit *differing* reactions from different peoples, and even from the same people at different times. We can therefore take the political object as a standard only if we think of *the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move.*

The Vietnam war illustrates this point. Americans failed to appreciate that the war, limited from their perspective, was total to the Vietnamese. The political objective (a noncommunist South Vietnam) elicited a different reaction from the American people at different times as their support declined. Misunderstanding its nature, the United States fought an ignorant war to negotiate peace when the extreme value of the political objective to the Vietnamese demanded an intense war to overthrow the enemy and dictate peace. Recognizing its true nature, American leaders should have refused to fight an intense war that was not worth winning. War dominated by the irrational force of passion resembles a rocket during lift-off: the astronaut cannot control the speed but is simply blasted into orbit, or into the sea, depending on the amount of available thrust.

Because cultural, moral, and psychological factors determine the complex relationship between reason and passion, Clausewitz introduced a third force that defines the nature of war: the exercise of creative art within the realm of chance and probability. Leaders must estimate the intensity of the war based on the degree of expected enemy resistance. They must also select the military aim and design the war plan that uses tactical victories to achieve peace. Both tasks lack certainty. They are essentially assumptions and theories ruled by chance and probability because:

In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.
Leaders on both sides attempt to establish the nature of the war by their decisions. War dominated by the nonrational force of chance and creativity resembles a game of poker: the skilled gambler plays each new hand based on the value of the pot, the personality of his opponent, the cards showing on the table, the probability of the winning hand, and his instinct for Lady Luck.

Clausewitz has thus developed three realistic, dynamic, and variable forces to define war—reason, violence, and chance. To understand the unique nature of each war, leaders must complete the synthesis of the paradoxical trinity:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone... Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

Reason guides war by determining the ends. Violence sustains war by motivating the means. Chance and creativity plan war by designing the ways. Each force in each war is different; each force in the same war may change. To understand the war and how it evolves, one must continually assess their distinct but complementary influences shown in figure 3.

Figure 3. The Trinity.
How does one complete the synthesis of the magnetic forces that pull war toward their respective poles? Instead of a spectrum of intensity, Clausewitz described a logical and dynamic process to determine the specific nature of the war by examining the relative strength and interrelationship of reason (R), violence (V), and creativity. This process is shown in figure 4:

Leaders begin the synthesis process by defining their own political objectives. Then they can estimate the force of reason based on the value of the enemy’s sacrifice demanded by those political objectives. The scale is shown in terms of the enemy’s national interests at stake—survival, vital, important, and tertiary. The synthesis is dynamic primarily because the state can and often does change its political objectives based on success or failure in war. As the sacrifice value of the enemy’s interest is higher, then reason dictates greater force will be required to achieve the political objective and consequently the war will be more intense.

Figure 4. The Synthesis of the Trinity.
Next leaders estimate the force of violence based on the enemy’s national will to fight to deny the political objective. The cultural, moral, and psychological factors that determine the people’s reaction “call for study.” If violence is proportional to what political reason would dictate \( (V \leq R) \), then there will be a predictable relationship between interests and resistance: survival interests generate extreme resistance, vital interests generate significant resistance, and so on. If violence is greater than or less than reason would dictate, then the people will fight stronger or weaker than expected. The people’s passion may change during the war, which can lead to a delayed change in the political objective. As the degree of popular resistance is higher, then violence dictates greater force will be required and the war will be more intense.

Complicating the analysis, political leaders use rhetoric and the media to manipulate the popular support before, during, and after war. In the Gulf War, Americans were reluctant to fight for an abstraction, their vital interest in the stability of the world’s oil supply. Therefore, the administration stressed the impact in jobs and compared Hussein to Hitler to increase the popular will to fight. Yet when questioned why the Coalition did not conquer Iraq to depose “Hitler,” President Bush emphasized the limited U.N mandate was to liberate Kuwait to decrease the popular demand for war. Television reveals, not always the true political motive or military aim, but rather how political reason attempts to manipulate passion to reach the desired level.

Based on their estimates of reason and passion, leaders determine the aim and employment of military force, all of which are dynamic and subject to chance and probability. As a generalization, if the enemy is fighting to defend interests that the people believe are truly vital, then the required force would lead to the first type of war: overthrow the enemy to dictate peace. Less than vital interests or significant resistance would lead to the second type of war: seize a bargaining advantage to negotiate peace. Once leaders complete this synthesis process from the enemy perspective to know the nature of the war, they must conduct another synthesis from their own perspective to determine if they have sufficient reason and will to achieve their ends.
Martin van Creveld calls the Clausewitzian trinity the “Prussian Marseilles,” undoubtedly because the logical synthesis resembles an elegant waltz where the people dance (passion), the orchestra plays (creative spirit), and the conductor leads (reason). Next, one must analyze the evidence from the Kosovo war to see if NATO leaders passed their supreme test of judgment.

**Force 1: Political Reason**

Did NATO leaders correctly estimate the NATO and Serbian interests at stake in the political objectives of the war? Yes, although the evidence suggests NATO leaders knew themselves better than they knew their enemy. They understood their objective to prevent another tragedy like Srebenica was a humanitarian interest. They knew their objective to prevent refugee flows and an expanding crisis in the Balkans from damaging the economic stability of Europe was an important interest. These interests were sufficient political reason to support diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis with the threat or use of airpower, a cost-effective war.

Before the war, NATO leaders apparently mistook the interests at stake for Miloševic. They believed that his interests in Kosovo were comparable in value to his interests in Bosnia, where the use of limited airstrikes appeared to cause him to yield. This was reasoning by bad analogy. At the end of the Bosnian war, Serbia had passed the culminating point of the offensive. At the beginning of the Kosovo war, Serbia still dominated the KLA. Furthermore, losing Kosovo would complete the “historical Serb catastrophe” under his rule. This was the fundamental miscalculation: Kosovo was vital to Miloševic’s political survival.

Faced with opposition, NATO leaders realized their own vital interests were now at risk. If NATO did not succeed in Kosovo, then its credibility and power would be “devastated.” In effect, Kosovo was to NATO what Masada was to Rome. As Edward Luttwak argues, “for the Romans as for ourselves, the elusive goal of strategic statecraft was to provide security for the civilization without prejudicing the vitality of its economic base and without compromising the stability of an evolving political order.” Defeating the two rebellions on Masada and in Kosovo
were deliberate acts to enhance the psychological power of coercive diplomacy, the cost-effective means to achieve this strategic goal. Luttwak concludes, “The lesson of Masada was that the Romans would pursue rebellion, even to the mountain tops in remote deserts, to destroy its last vestiges, regardless of cost.”

Likewise, the lesson of Kosovo was that NATO would follow through, even to the mountaintops in remote Balkan regions, to enforce stability and safeguard human rights in Europe, but—even better for credibility’s sake—at minimal cost. Milošević challenged NATO’s credibility in Kosovo just as the rebel Jews challenged Caesar’s credibility at Masada. Political reason demanded that both Rome and NATO act to preserve the credibility of its coercive diplomacy. Moralpolitik may have started the Kosovo war, but realpolitik ended it.

Both NATO leaders and Milošević realized that they must increase the intensity to win the war and protect their vital interests. Herein lies the problem: leaders may only raise the intensity of war by persuading their people that the cause it is worth fighting for and worth the collateral damage done to innocent civilians. As Clausewitz argued, political reason is not sufficient to raise the war’s intensity by itself.

### Force 2: Violence and Hatred

Did NATO leaders correctly estimate the passion and will of the Serbian and Western people to fight for those national interests? Yes, but both NATO leaders and Milošević miscalculated the will of the Serbs to fight for Kosovo before the war. Because they believed the Serb will to be minimal, Ambassador Holbrooke thought that coercive diplomacy would succeed while Secretary Albright said that only four days of bombing would be required. At the other extreme, Milošević believed he could raise the will of his people to offer significant resistance to defend the sacred Serb homeland. Exploiting nationalism, one of his generals argued, “If we lose Kosovo, we will lose Serbia, the FRY, and our freedom which is sacred to all citizens.” The Serbs were in the middle. They initially rallied to support Milošević, but they did not offer sustained, significant resistance to defend Kosovo, especially when they could not strike back.
NATO’s politicians appreciated their own people’s lack of will to fight more clearly. Their people and legislatures would not support a ground war to protect the Kosovars or to preserve an abstraction, NATO’s credibility. One should not assume that the American people are universally “casualty averse,” but rather consider five factors that determine public support: (1) perceived benefits, (2) prospects for success, (3) prospective and actual costs, (4) changing expectations, and (5) political leadership. If NATO fought a ground war against stiff Serb conventional and unconventional resistance, a real possibility, then these factors suggest that no amount of presidential leadership would persuade the American people to fight and die to protect the Kosovars or preserve NATO’s credibility without the prospect of immediate success.

Increasing the force of violence to begin the war was arguably NATO’s easier task. To build popular support for the war, leaders demonized Milošević for the Racak massacre and ethnic cleansing. To allay fears about casualties fighting for humanitarian interests, President Clinton publicly ruled out the use of ground troops. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger contends the president’s statement, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,” was essential to win the war because it secured popular support, maintained alliance cohesion, and neutralized opposition in Congress. In effect, President Clinton called Milošević’s bluff by selling risk-free morality, satisfying the public pressure to “do something” without paying the price. As a result, Michael Ignatieff called Operation Allied Force a “virtual war” because:

For the civilians and soldiers killed in air strikes and the Kosovar Albanians murdered by Serbian police and paramilitaries the war was real—and fraught with horror—as war can be. For the citizens of the NATO countries, on the other hand, the war was virtual. They were mobilized, not as combatants, but as spectators. The war was a spectacle: it aroused emotions in the intense but shallow way that sports do.…Technological mastery removed death from our experience of war.

Although Ignatieff thought NATO should protect the Kosovars, he recognized that the people demanded “death be removed” from their experience of peacekeeping. Strategists who criticize the decision to rule out ground troops by insisting on a “muscular threat” before the war
do not question the credibility of that threat. They do not suggest realistic media strategies that would have persuaded people to die for humanitarian interests or abstractions. In effect, they ignore the force of passion in war, basing their criticism solely on reason and chance.

Increasing the force of violence to win the war was NATO’s harder task. After the light airstrikes failed, the improvised media strategy might be a case of Br’er Rabbit asking Br’er Fox, “please don’t throw me in the briar patch!” In what can be construed either as weak leadership or a political masterstroke, President Clinton allowed his opposition make the case for him. Ethicists like Michael Walzer and realists like Senator John McCain called for using troops. Eventually, administration officials joined Prime Minister Tony Blair by publicly considering ground options. The skeptic would ask, which threat would be more credible: (1) the president initiating the call for a ground invasion against stiff public and political opposition, or (2) the president reluctantly calling for a ground invasion after his people and opposition encouraged him to do so? Regardless, it is clear that NATO’s politicians understood the force of passion represented in their poll numbers and focus groups far better than NATO’s commanders.

**Force 3: Chance and Creative Spirit**

Did NATO leaders weigh the chance and probability of NATO and Serbian interactions to determine the aim and employment of military force? Barely. NATO leaders made poor estimates before the war, but they were able to improvise and recover during operations. Leader must use their intuition “to perceive truth” and judge the probabilities of countless variables. Leaders must also react to defeat the uncooperative enemy when they misjudge probabilities. The point is not to criticize NATO leaders for getting it wrong before the war, but to criticize them for not even planning for the possibility that they might be wrong. History and the American people “hold the political leader accountable for a blunder, which almost by definition reflects a gross lack of foresight.” NATO’s single-minded faith in limited airstrikes and lack of contingency planning almost founndered the alliance on the rock of Serb nationalism.
Respecting the force of chance and creativity did not require NATO leaders to predict the war with certainty or design the perfect campaign. Statesmen and generals concede this is impossible. Richard Holbrooke said, “diplomacy, like jazz, is the constant improvisation on a theme.” Helmuth von Moltke wrote, “Strategy is a system of expedients.” Both men evidently agree with Clausewitz that general friction, complexity, and nonlinear phenomena defy certainty. The intended strategy and the emerging strategy combine to wage real war.

However, respecting the force of chance and creativity did require NATO to prepare and evaluate contingency plans in case Miloševic proved their assumptions wrong. The most shocking aspect of the war was that NATO apparently had no “Plan B” in case Miloševic refused to yield. Admiral James Ellis admits “NATO lacked not only a coherent campaign plan and target set but also the staff to generate a detailed plan when it was clear one was needed.” Other evidence includes: (1) no aircraft carrier was in range, (2) the amount of airpower was comparable to the four-day Operation Desert Fox, (3) no ground troops were available to protect the Kosovars. Daalder and O’Hanlon conclude, “The initial bombing strategy of gradualism can be defended as a reasonable gamble… But it was wrong to hinge everything on it.” Indeed, Barbara Tuchman might diagnose the NATO leaders with a severe case of “wooden-headedness” for discounting the key fact of Kosovo’s special relationship to Miloševic and Serbia:

Wooden-headedness, the source of self-deception, is a factor that plays a remarkably large role in government. It consists in assessing a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions while ignoring or rejecting any contrary signs. It is acting according to wish while not allowing oneself to be deflected by the facts.

Leaders cure “wooden-headedness” by ruthlessly vetting assumptions, testing analogies, and evaluating contingency plans. The goal is to avoid the “prestige-credibility” trap that appears to preclude withdrawal when flexible response fails. By respecting chance and exercising creativity before the war, strategists avoid the difficult choice between withdrawal from Vietnam or continuing down “the March of Folly, the pursuit of policy contrary to self-interests.”
Synthesis: Unique Combination of Forces

Did NATO leaders reach an accurate synthesis of the trinity forces to understand the unique nature of their war? Yes, but NATO recovered during execution what they almost lost from poor strategic planning. The ultimate question for NATO leaders was whether the war would be one to negotiate peace or one to dictate peace. Clausewitz wrestled with the exact same question of the dual nature of war of war:

In its effect it [limited war] was a somewhat stronger form of diplomacy, a more forceful method of negotiation, in which battles and sieges were the principal notes exchanged. Even the most ambitious ruler had no greater aims than to gain a number of advantages that could be exploited at the peace conference.

… but in 1793, a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly war again became the business of the people… War, untrammeled by any conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury. This was due to the peoples’ new share in these great affairs of state …

Will this always be the case in the future? From now on will every war in Europe be waged with the full resources of the state and therefore have to be fought only over major issues that affect the people? Or shall we again see a gradual separation taking place between the government and the people?

NATO leaders reached an accurate synthesis of the trinity forces to answer Clausewitz’s question and pass their supreme act of judgment. They wanted to keep the war limited because their people initially supported minimal efforts to pursue humanitarian interests. (See figure 5.) This was not sufficient to defeat the Serb people, who supported moderate efforts to defend important interests. Confronted with failure, NATO successfully raised their peoples’ will to support moderate (stronger airstrikes) and possibly significant (ground invasion) means to protect vital interests. Milošević tried but failed to generate significant resistance by exploiting Serb nationalism to defend his vital interests. The conduct of the war proved NATO’s synthesis was correct: it was a limited war to seize bargaining advantages (by destroying targets with airpower) to support the decisive diplomatic operations to implement Rambouillet accords. But NATO leaders should be thankful, for they “took the first step without considering the last,” the “elemental fury” was nearly unleashed, and they were almost “drawn into its vortex.”
Some object to the conclusion that NATO leaders understood the war because they did not wage real war.\textsuperscript{114} They can cite American military doctrine that asserts war is “large scale combat operations” where the goal is to “fight and win as quickly as possible”; anything less is not real war but something else, “operations other than war.”\textsuperscript{115} That may explain why General Clark said of Kosovo, “This was not, technically speaking, a war.”\textsuperscript{116} In a sentence sure to be edited in his intended revision, Clausewitz himself wrote, “The art of war will shrivel into prudence, and its main concern will be to make sure the delicate balance is not suddenly upset in the enemy’s favor and the half-hearted war does not become real war after all. [italics added]”\textsuperscript{117} If NATO’s naïve politicians really understood war, the counter-argument goes, they would have waged real war, in which doctrine asserts the one true objective is “rapid, decisive victory.”\textsuperscript{118}
This faulty argument defies the logic of the trinity and the history of war by excluding limited wars of the second type that negotiate peace. Operation Allied Force was a real war by Clausewitz’s own definitions. It was an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will. It was the continuation of policy with other means. That policy limits unnecessary violence and guides the creative spirit makes the war rational, not unreal or something else. As Raymond Aron argues, Clausewitz has no right to use the expression Halbding or Halbheit [half-hearted war] to characterize wars of little energy, or wars of the second type, unless he ignores the threefold definition. To the extent that all wars contain the three elements—original violence, free activity of the spirit, and political understanding—cabinet wars do not deserve the name of half-war, they are only wars in which the third element dominates and the first tends to fade out because of the social organization (i.e., participation of the army rather than the people). Clausewitz corrects his error in the first chapter and explains why the false distinction between real war and half-hearted war may have dangerous effects on the political-military relationship. It can either subordinate policy to serve the perceived needs of absolute war or demand the impossible from the instrument in limited war. The next question further explores this dialectic.

**Question 2: The Political-Military Relationship**

Was NATO’s political-military relationship correct? This question addresses the second intended revision of *On War*. As Clausewitz warned, “This distinction between the two kinds of war is a matter of actual fact. But no less practical is the importance of another point that must be made absolutely clear, namely that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.” The casual reader will miss the point by assuming Clausewitz meant, “If a state cannot get what it wants by diplomacy, then it goes to war.” This assumption is not only false, but it suggests a clear division between policy and war, the very division that Clausewitz intended to tear down. “To make history intelligible and action rational,” his theory subordinated war as the means to serve political ends, meaning policy must guide its chosen instrument. Yet the political-military relationship is far more complex in reality than it appears in theory. It is a fierce struggle for control to reconcile the ends, ways, and means of war.
The devil is truly in the details of this dialectic. What is the proper role and responsibility of the statesman and the commander? How do they compromise to modify ends, ways, and means when they disagree about military objectives or political constraints? How does the military use physical and finite resources to achieve ambiguous political concepts like “pacification?” To explain this complex struggle for control, Clausewitz describes the dialectic twice:

If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. [thesis] That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chose means, a process which can radically change it [antithesis]; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. [synthesis]

We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. [thesis] What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with those means. [antithesis] That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. [synthesis]

The thesis is political primacy. Clausewitz fully accepts the implications of his dictum, arguing that policy governs war before, during, and after hostilities. “Politics is the womb in which war develops—where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form.”

He admits that policy may be flawed, but nevertheless insists that, in planning, “Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice-versa.” Clausewitz recommends making the “commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.” The point is not to grant the commander veto power, but to enable the cabinet to participate in his military decisions, approve his plan, and supervise his actions. In sum, Clausewitz argues “forcefully and unequivocally that the influence of the [political] purposes upon the [military] means must be continuing and pervasive.”
Two historical examples, one negative and one positive, illustrate and support political primacy. The Kaiser asked Moltke for a partial mobilization against Russia, which had mobilized to protect Serbia in 1914. When Moltke replied “it cannot be done,” the Kaiser responded, “Your uncle would have given me a different answer.”

The general staff had subordinated policy to war by demanding full mobilization and execution of Schlieffen’s plan. Because World War I was so “divorced from political life,” it became “something pointless and devoid of sense.”

It was fortunate that President John F. Kennedy read the Kaiser’s response in *The Guns of August* before the Cuban Missile Crisis. When the military recommended “real war” by invading Cuba, Kennedy rightly refused because it was not rational to risk a nuclear exchange. The statesman, Clausewitz would urge, must insist on receiving a full set of military options, select the one most consistent with political reason, and supervise the commander as required to support his policy. Kennedy succeeded where the Kaiser failed.

Clausewitz’s metaphor, that war is an instrument, is instructive. The carpenter (president) wants to build a cabinet (political objective). He selects the right tool (instrument) for the task: a hammer to drive nails through the wood (a war to dictate peace) or a knife to carve the finer details (a war to negotiate peace). The tool does not presume to tell the carpenter what to build or which tool to select. It simply drives or cuts what it is told.

The problem is, the instrument metaphor does not account for the complex reality of war. The cabinet is rarely a physical object but usually an ambiguous concept like pacification. The carpenter may not be able to define the cabinet, but he will recognize it when he sees it and when he does not. He may not know how to use tools, as modern technology has made woodworking complex. The hammer knows how to drive a nail better than any other hammer on the planet, but it does not know how to build “pacification.” The carpenter may not know if he has the right tools, enough wood, sufficient desire, or the justifiable need to build the cabinet, but he begins anyway because his wife demands that he “build something now!” If he finds resources lacking,
he can change his mind and build a bookcase instead. He may cease work altogether, even though the nails already spent would be driven in vain. The wood is alive, it strikes back, and it resists the carpenter’s best efforts to impose his will. There is always a chance of encountering an unforeseen knot in the wood that ruins the entire project. Forced to be realistic, the carpenter has several options. He can: (1) boldly attack the wood and rely upon his “distinguished intellect and strength of character” to learn on the job, (2) study woodworking to gain experience before he begins the project, or (3) hire a genius as a project manager to help him build the cabinet.\textsuperscript{131}

The antithesis is military necessity—as in necessary to achieve the political objective, not the military’s preferences. Because the president’s intelligence and prior experience varies, Congress made the chairman and the regional commander-in-chief his project managers. Their essential task is to ensure that policy “shall not be inconsistent with the chosen means” because:

War in its relation to policy has above all the obligation and the right to prevent policy from making demands that are contrary to the nature of war, to save it from misusing the military instrument from a failure to understand what it can and cannot do.\textsuperscript{132}

Bernard Brodie, “the dean of America’s civilian strategists,” admits that policy may render force ineffective.\textsuperscript{133} The chairman has no right to make demands, but he does not subvert civilian control of the military when he explains why the politically expedient ways and means may not achieve the political ends in the real world.\textsuperscript{134} He must help the president reconcile the ends, ways, and means by connecting presidential vision with real resources and a campaign plan that is feasible, acceptable, and suitable. To do this, he must translate meaning between two foreign languages, political desires and military terms.\textsuperscript{135} He should clarify the unintended consequences, the unanticipated problems, and the unforeseen possibilities of war to inform policy and prevent strategic miscalculation. What is the true opportunity cost of choosing war? Military feedback allows policy to revaluate the costs and benefits of force and revise itself as necessary. In effect, Moltke was wrong to advise, “Policy must not be allowed to interfere in operations,” but Moltke was right to observe, “The demands of strategy grow silent in the face of a tactical victory.”\textsuperscript{136}
Two examples illustrate and support military necessity. Blaming Prussia’s defeat on the failure of unrealistic policy, Clausewitz wrote, “Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power!” H. R. McMaster argues the secretary of defense and the joint chiefs were guilty of the same “dereliction of duty” for failing to advise the president during the Vietnam war. Waging twenty-five years of politically constrained but futile war in Vietnam was just as irrational as waging four years of total war because Schlieffen said so.

The synthesis is to reconcile ends, ways, and means through rational compromise and appropriate political supervision. (Figure 6.) War adapts to policy as reason requires but policy adapts to war only when necessary to achieve its purpose. When the true nature of the war is to negotiate peace, the political objective is different from the military aim, and the primary considerations are preserving friendly means and will, then war must adapt to policy. When the true nature of the war is to dictate peace, the political and military objectives are the same, and the primary considerations are defeating the enemy’s means and will, then policy may have to adapt to the reality of war—or reduce its political demands. The goal is rational, effective force.

**Thesis = Political Primacy**

Policy ENDs

Control

War MEANS

**Antithesis = Military Necessity**

Policy adapts to War

Less Supervision

Policy = Military OBJ

Enemy Means & Will

War of Extermination

Approve Strategy

Approve Operations

Approve Tactics

Approve Targets

ROE

War adapts to Policy

More Supervision

Armed Observation

Friendly Means & Will

Political ≠ Military OBJ

Dictate Peace

Thesis = Reconcile Ends, Ways, and Means

Synthesis = Reconcile Ends, Ways, and Means

Fig. 6. The Political-Military Relationship.
In the first instance, the war will appear more political in character, requiring greater supervision of the ways and means to ensure consistency with ends. (i.e., the Bosnia Implementation Force) In the second, the war will appear less political in character, requiring less supervision of military activity. (i.e., World War II) In reality, both kinds of wars are “equally political.”

Like the legal system, the truth should emerge from the adversarial process between policy and war. The difficult case is a dilemma of two worthy ideas, like political realism and the warrior spirit. The commander is the counsel who bears the burden of proof to overrule the presumption in favor of policy. The statesman is the activist judge who rules when and how policy or war should yield to resolve conflicts between ends, ways, and means. The Constitution and Clausewitz grant this right to decide and direct operations to the president and his policy:

> Once again: war is an instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.

Policy may err by imposing unnecessary constraints that risk tactical and operational success out of a “kind-hearted” desire to limit bloodshed. Yet policy may also err by shirking its duty to guide war by placing blind faith in the maxim, “the military knows best.” The commander knows tactics best, but rarely does he know policy or grand strategy best. Indeed, “the difference between an excellent president [Truman] and a dismal failure [Johnson] may lie in knowing when not to believe a general.” With the unquestionable right to rule war comes the tremendous responsibility to understand the political-military dialectic and reach the correct synthesis.

**Thesis: Political Primacy**

Did NATO leaders ensure military operations were consistent with their political purpose? Yes, absolutely, and much to the military’s distaste. Military lawyers verified that each target satisfied the tests of necessity and proportionality. President Clinton met with the General Shelton daily to approve individual targets. The heads of state of all NATO countries reserved
the right to approve sensitive targets before they were struck. The restraints on war and the degree of supervision were consistent with the true political purpose of the war, to preserve NATO’s credibility. Should the alliance split because the United States overruled targeting objections, then the war would have been a tactical success but a strategic failure because NATO’s cohesion, and hence credibility, would have been significantly damaged.

Antithesis: Military Necessity

Did NATO leaders ensure the trends and designs of their policy were consistent with the means of war? Here the difference between the stated and unstated political objectives, between the media spin and the truth, is decisive. If the political objective was truly to end the violence immediately, then policy was not consistent with the means. The operational objective admits the point by changing words from the duly impressive, “ensure the immediate ending of violence,” to the modestly hopeful, “deter continuing attacks.” Even airpower enthusiasts will admit that airpower by itself could not immediately protect the Kosovars from ethnic cleansing. NATO leaders, realistic about the lack of popular support and satisfied with a post-war improvement in security for the Kosovars, would not risk failure by accepting western casualties to save the eastern people. NATO’s policy was consistent with the means of war because the primary political motive was to preserve its credibility. Operation Allied Force achieved that purpose.

Synthesis: Reconcile Ends, Ways, & Means

Did NATO leaders reconcile their ends, ways, and means through rational compromise and an appropriate degree of supervision? Yes, the political-military relationship was correct. The degree of supervision was not optimum for warfighting, but it was necessary and effective to shape decisive diplomacy. Clausewitz describes of how policy modified war in Kosovo:

Thus policy converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a mere instrument. The terrible two-handed sword that should be used with total strength to strike once and no more, becomes the lightest rapier—sometimes even a harmless foil fit only for thrusts and feints and parries.
Some recommended the “two-handed sword” (ground troops) to strike Milošević down. General Short recommended the “rapier” (intensive air campaign) aimed “for the head of the snake” to strike Milošević down but with less physical effort. Policy refused, demanding the “harmless foil” (select strategic attack and counterland) to wound the unarmed Milošević with impunity until he conceded. The foil proved appropriate to the task of shaping diplomacy.

Nevertheless, the political-military relationship in Kosovo is the source of confusion, frustration, and opposition. Commanders are trained to seek certain victory by overwhelming force; they typically detest ambiguous victory by negotiation in which policy “introduces a high degree of uncertainty into the whole business, turning it into a kind of game.” The dedication to decisive victory stems from the fact that limited war is not a game to those who fight and die. General Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to race the Russians to Prague because he was “loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes.” General Douglas MacArthur believed there was no substitute for victory because, “If we are not in Korea to win, then this administration should be indicted for the murder of thousands of American boys.” General Short, whose son flew forty missions over Kosovo and was struck by an anti-aircraft missile, testified:

The litmus test I felt I had to pass every night was if my son were killed in Kosovo, I needed to be able to tell his mother and his wife that he was killed doing something that I thought generally would help bring the war to a close and bring Milošević to the table.

This litmus test is natural since “military officers have usually spent their entire careers perfecting their skills with respect to some means of war… and they become deeply attached emotionally to those means.” Indeed, General Short has admirably defined the essence of military leadership: protecting each warrior as if he were your own son and ensuring victory redeems his sacrifice.

But protecting warriors and decisive victory are not the essence of political realism, which disregards emotional sentiment and military maxims. The lives of warriors are relevant only to the extent that casualties decrease the power (means and will) to protect national interests.
The will to win at all costs, so essential to survive Valley Forge, charge Cemetery Hill, and bomb Schweinfurt, is conditional on a cost-benefit analysis under political realism. Therefore, doctrine errs and exceeds its authority to state, “The military objective in war is rapid, decisive victory.”\textsuperscript{156} As a rule, it limits operational art to Napoleonic strategy when real war demands flexibility and versatility. Decisive victory was desired and consistent with policy in 1991, but the “cult of the offensive” and the “mantra of decisive victory” led to disaster in 1914. The maxim may not be consistent with policy in wars to negotiate peace and it ignores Pericles’ strategy of exhaustion.\textsuperscript{157} The proper military objective in war is whatever reason and passion demand to achieve peace, which varies according to the trinity. These realizations fall as heavy blows to the military leader.

General Short may not have realized that his “quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence.”\textsuperscript{158} He testified that the policy of preserving NATO unity by combined target approval decreased the immediate effectiveness of the air campaign and increased the risk to pilots. He specifically urged the United States to overrule French objections to sensitive targets:

If you can’t run with the big dogs, stay on the porch. The United States Air Force is the big dog. The United States of America is the big dog when it comes to applying airpower. I believe that our position as the big dog could have been leveraged to a greater degree with regard to the playing of the red card, to withhold a target set, consistently as one nation [France] did.\textsuperscript{159}

General Short admits “speaking without full understanding of the political ramifications of my concerns.”\textsuperscript{160} One ramifications would be the likely French reply to the big dog theory of coalition warfare: if you want allies, compromise; if you do not want allies, go your own way. General Clark did exert leverage to gain French approval to bomb the Danube bridges, but they refused because they believed the effects would cause the Serbs to increase their support of Miloševic.\textsuperscript{161} Military idealism demands the French submit to the American way of war. Political realism refrains from wishful thinking, accepts that the French will be… French, and searches for the pragmatic solutions that maximize benefits and minimize costs.\textsuperscript{162} To persuade policy to yield, General Short must think and argue as an economist about the political effects of military action.
Simply put, the benefits of NATO cohesion, the long-term power to protect vital interests, justified the costs of delay and the risk to warriors. Like Moltke, General Short was wrong to insist that policy not interfere in military operations, but he was right to remind political leaders that strategic peace depends on operational success and tactical victory. The joint chiefs anticipated that limited airstrikes might fail to produce the desired political effects. The immediate question was how to increase the intensity of the air campaign. The problem was that policy demanded the allies concur and their own domestic politics demanded limited airstrikes be attempted first. Policy did not demand overwhelming force or decisive victory from the start, since protecting the Kosovars was not the primary political motive. Therefore, there was no urgent military necessity to overrule the policy of preserving NATO unity. The pragmatic solution was to let the French approach fail, and then exert leverage to lead the united alliance to peace. The economic “maxi-min” solution was to win the war without rupturing the alliance. To clarify this point in greater detail, the next question compares the military-preferred doctrine of overwhelming force and the political-preferred approach of graduated response.

Question 3: The Aim and Employment of Military Force

The disagreement between NATO’s political and military leaders came from the last question: was the aim and employment of military force appropriate means to achieve NATO’s political objectives? (In modern terms, the “aim” is the operational objective and “employment” is operational design.) Again, the different cultures between the politician and the commander lead to vastly different perspectives. For example, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger favored overwhelming force, because “if we decide to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly with the clear intention of winning.” Secretary of State George Schultz favored flexible response, because “there had to be some way to deal with violent threats that lay between doing nothing or launching all-out conventional war. Diplomacy could
work [to address] problems most effectively when force—or the threat of force—was a credible part of the equation." To resolve the debate, Clausewitz constructs a dialectic between overwhelming and proportional force, the two poles represented by the secretaries.

The context of this dialectic is the modern operational level of war, which Clausewitz referred to as strategy. Clausewitz’s definition of strategy, “the use of engagement for the purpose of war,” is a subset of the joint definition of operational art, “the employment of military forces to attain strategic and operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.” Clausewitz emphasized the essential task of war planning is to determine the “operational objective,” the specific military conditions that achieve the political purpose of the war. Clausewitz did not develop a complete operational theory to achieve these objectives. Instead he suggested using overwhelming or proportional force as a general operational approach, depending on the nature of the war.

Unlike Jomini (the principles of war), J.F.C Fuller (paralysis), Guderian (blitzkrieg), Svechin (Soviet operational art), Warden (five rings), the Marine Corps (maneuver-warfare), and the Army (air-land battle), Clausewitz did not endorse one specific operational theory as the method to win wars. Each theory may offer insight to the new and unique war, but no one theory is sufficient for all wars, no one theory will escape modification in practice, and perhaps no one theory is even appropriate. The last case would demand the artistic imagination to create a new operational theory. Clausewitz argues, “Any method by which strategic plans [operational plans] are turned out ready-made, as if from some machine, must be totally rejected,” because:

War is not like a field of wheat, which, without regard to the individual stalk, may be mown more or less efficiently depending on the quality of the scythe; it is like a strand of mature trees in which the axe has to be used judiciously according to the characteristics and development of each individual trunk. Clausewitz believed the operational ways (use of the axe) and means (size of the axe) must vary according to the ends (where the tree should fall) and the nature of war (the nature of the tree).
Clausewitz “eschewed generalization” but simultaneously “rejected the anarchy of pure pragmatism.” He stressed situational problem-solving, using military history and theories as aids to judgment. He developed some theoretical principles for wars that overthrow the enemy to dictate peace, but he died before he could distinguish with greater clarity theoretical principles for limited wars that negotiate peace. Nevertheless, from the logic of the first chapter, it is possible to complete his revision and construct a dialectic between the two general operational approaches.

The thesis is overwhelming force. If strong reason and passion demand an offensive war to dictate peace and available means permit, then use overwhelming force to render the enemy defenseless and force him to submit. Because absolute war trumps limited war, “Everything is governed by a supreme law, the decision by force of arms.” Russell Weigley explains why this fact led the United States Army to adopt overwhelming force and “the strategic tradition of U.S. Grant” as the American way of war:

An army strong enough to choose the strategy of annihilation should always choose it, because the most certain and probably the most rapid route to victory lay through the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces.

The operational approach using overwhelming force to annihilate or exhaust the enemy is straightforward: destroy the enemy’s means and will to resist. First, destroy the enemy’s primary fighting forces, his operational “centers of gravity,” so “they can no longer carry on the fight.” Second, occupy the country, “otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces.” Third, the war is not over “so long as the government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit.” In modern terms, Clausewitz would support maneuver-warfare, but only as an intelligent way to defeat the enemy through positional advantage. The large national armies and the nature of the empty battlefield after the Industrial Revolution demanded successive battles and campaigns before armies are destroyed, which leads to exhaustion and the modern Soviet and American theories operational art. Still, the approach is straightforward because the political and military tasks are the same: defeat, destroy, and seize.
The antithesis is proportional force. If limited reason, passion, or available means demand the war be ended by negotiation, then apply proportional force to gain advantages that persuade the enemy to yield. The reality is, although the United States are usually strong enough to choose overwhelming force, political or popular constraints may prevent its selection.

Clausewitz argues that war is ultimately the continuation of domestic politics with other means:

in that case [overwhelming force for limited objectives] all proportion between action and political demands would be lost: means would cease to be commensurate with ends, and in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would raise.¹⁷⁷

The citizen objects to overwhelming force when he does not value the political objective because “the subtleties of logic do not motivate the human will.”¹⁷⁸ The statesman objects to overwhelming force because he desires to “economize his strength”¹⁷⁹ If proportional force is not sufficient to choose annihilation, then a different operational approach is required.

The operational approach using proportional force to persuade the enemy to yield is not straightforward at all. The greatest difficulty is establishing the cause and effect relationship between political and operational objectives that are different. When the people reject the means of overwhelming force, the statesman must usually “renounce the end of absolute success” and select “no greater military aim than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose.”¹⁸⁰ Now that the aim is no longer to destroy the enemy’s forces or conquer his country, something must take its place. What will the military do and how will that achieve peace? The effect of persuasion is similar to annihilation: yielding to terms. The cause is radically different: no longer a matter of physical fact, it is a state of conceptual belief. Therefore, Clausewitz identifies the mind of the enemy leader as the decisive point to win the war of persuasion:

When we attack the enemy, it is one thing if we mean our first operation to be followed by others until all resistance has been broken; it is quite another if our aim is only to obtain a single victory, in order to make him feel insecure, to impress our greater strength upon him, and to give him doubts about his future. If that is the extent of our aim, we will employ no more strength than is absolutely necessary. [italics added]¹⁸¹
This leads Clausewitz to rely on the logic of basic economics as the operational approach in wars of persuasion: make the costs of fighting higher than the costs of yielding the political objective. If the political demands are limited, then there are two reasons why the enemy would choose to negotiate peace instead of continued fighting: “the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost.” Proportional force must be sufficient to persuade the enemy that he cannot win or that he will lose more by fighting. As Clausewitz argues,

If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must not of course be merely transient—at least not in appearance. Otherwise the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve. Any change that might be brought about by continuing hostilities must then, at least in theory, be of a kind to bring the enemy still greater disadvantages.

The theory of coercion connects the concepts of sacrifice and hardship with military force. (See figure 7.) From the estimates of the forces of reason (R) and violence (V), leaders

![Combined Theory of Coercion](image-url)
should make a pessimistic, rational, and optimistic estimate of the enemy’s cost of yielding the sacrifice demanded by the political objective. Next they consider chance and exercise creativity to identify the degree of hardship necessary to force the enemy to yield the political objective. Finally they translate the effects of hardship into operational objectives: seize, degrade, or destroy something. The first decision is to determine the point in the spectrum of applied force that one should begin the war of persuasion. Clausewitz would probably recommend starting at the rational yielding point with the maximum available force for the greatest psychological effect on the enemy leader—if that is consistent with policy and passion. The modern political theory of gradual escalation recommends starting at the opposite end of the spectrum with minimal force. The war may begin with a minor operation, such as a show of force or a raid to destroy a specific target. If the threat of escalation to the enemy’s yielding point is credible, then the politically appealing benefit is winning the war at minimum cost. Clausewitz admits this estimate process is dominated by intuition, chance, and probability. The statesman and the commander

must guess, so to speak: guess whether the first shock of battle will steel the enemy’s resolve and stiffen his resistance, or whether, like a Bologna flask, it will shatter soon as its surface is scratched; guess the extent of debilitation and paralysis that the drying up of particular sources of supply and the severing of certain lines of communication will cause the enemy; guess whether the burning pain of the injury he has been dealt will make the enemy collapse with exhaustion or, like a frightened bull, arouse his rage; guess whether other powers will be frightened or indignant, and whether and which political alliances will be dissolved or formed.184

If the statesman and the commander guess wrong, then the theory of gradual escalation fails when they enemy refuses to yield prematurely. If leaders miscalculate the value of the enemy sacrifice demanded by the political objective, then they will reach a point that requires a second political decision. Then leaders must: (1) reduce the terms of peace to a level that the enemy accepts, (2) increase the force to inflict greater hardship, (3) adopt the strategy of annihilation, or (4) quit the war.185 The gamble of gradual escalation may yield potential savings from credible coercion. However, the failure options are not appealing because of the superpower’s “prestige-credibility” trap.
Clausewitz believed the path through the weltering maze of subjective variables is to conduct “operations that have direct political repercussions.” General knowledge about the enemy’s cultural and moral values is essential to determine the people’s reactions and their ability to influence the government’s decision. Precise intelligence about the enemy leader’s personality and the systems he values is essential to determine his yielding point. Because they are valuable, centers of gravity are still useful concepts and may be operational objectives, but they are not the exclusive target set to increase hardship. The necessary effects against those centers of gravity may vary from threaten to destroy. Even under the antithesis of proportional force, the amount of effort is determined by the enemy’s resistance to the political objectives.

The synthesis is successful coercion by effective force. Political ends vary from unconditional surrender to a mutual cease-fire. Military ends vary from decisive victory or exhaustion to the destruction of a single target. Operational approaches vary from annihilation to persuasion. A full spectrum of ends demands a full spectrum of ways and means because:

We can see now that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent’s outright defeat. They range from the destruction of the enemy’s forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attacks. Any one of these may be used to overcome the enemy's will: the choice depends on circumstances.

The standard, however, remains the same for both types of wars: achieving the political objective by effective force that overcomes the enemy’s will. There is no separate logic of limited war. Instead, the logic is the same in both types of war: (1) reason limits the ends in accordance with the people’s passion, (2) the enemy resistance determines the possible ways and means to accomplish the ends, (3) if reason and passion cannot accept the necessary ways and means, then leaders should reduce their overly ambitious ends. If reason and passion limit the ways and means directly, then force may not be effective. It is not rational to wage a futile limited war because policy lacks the courage or wisdom to reconcile its ends, ways, and means.
The choice and the circumstances Clausewitz describes are shown in the dialectic below:

**Antithesis = Proportional Force**

- Persuasion: Make Costs > Benefits
- Economy of Force
- Domestic Politics
- Reason & Will

**Thesis = Overwhelming Force**

- Operational Objective
- “Supreme Law”
- Enemy Resistance
- Reason & Will

**Synthesis = Successful Coercion by Effective Force**

Fig. 8. The Military Aim and Amount of Effort.

Leaders must create an operational theory of cause and effect that uses tactical victory to achieve strategic peace. They must translate that theory into a campaign plan that is feasible, acceptable, and suitable. The military prefers overwhelming force because of the certainty it appears to offer. The politician prefers proportional force because of voters and economy of force. These values first clashed over the theory of gradual escalation in Vietnam. They clashed again in Kosovo.

**Thesis = Overwhelming Force**

Did NATO leaders appreciate the need for overwhelming force to destroy the enemy’s means and will to resist? Yes, but the alliance rejected the principle of annihilation until the day before the end of the war. Initially, leaders did not perceive the need to exploit the threat of overwhelming force as coercive leverage against Milošević because they misunderstood the nature of the war. Subsequently, the alliance was divided between those states that believed the threat was necessary and those that refused to endorse the threat because of domestic politics.
As a result, no NATO leader said, “We will do whatever it takes to win,” until the day before the end of the war. NATO reached the second decision point of gradual escalation on June 2, when the national security advisor publicly informed critics of NATO’s strategy that:

   First, we will win.  Period.  Full stop.  There is no alternative.
   Second, winning means what we’ve said it means.
   Third, the air campaign is having a serious impact.
   Fourth, the president has said that he has not ruled out any options.  Go back to #1:  We will win.189

In a television interview on that same day, Berger suggested that “NATO consensus is valuable but not a *sine qua non.*” He emphasized the main point again: “[President Clinton] had made a decision that he was not going to lose and that he was prepared to go for a ground invasion.”190

Also, Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin informed Miloševic of NATO’s intentions, which Russia would not prevent. Miloševic agreed to terms the very next day.

   Although the timing is debatable, this proves the value of overwhelming force as the high end threat of gradual escalation.  General Clark surely had this in mind when he remarked that he wished ground troops had not been ruled out as an option.  Gradual escalation failed in Vietnam in part because the North Vietnamese were certain the United States would never invade.  Gradual escalation succeeded in Kosovo in part because Miloševic believed NATO might invade.  Annihilation, the decision by force of arms, remains the supreme law of war.

   **Antithesis:  Proportional Force**

   Did NATO leaders appreciate the need for proportional force to make the cost of continued fighting greater than the costs of yielding the political objective?  Yes, leaders considered, endorsed, and applied the principle of persuasion.  However, political leaders were focused on force proportional to their limited popular support instead of force proportional to the enemy’s resistance.  Because military leaders were focused on force proportional to the enemy’s resistance, they clashed over the theory of gradual escalation.
Air Force basic doctrine actually encourages proportional force, gradual escalation, and persuasion, much to the dismay of both army and air force officers. For example, the doctrine asserts “mass is an effect, not just overwhelming quantity.” Political effects without overwhelming quantity were exactly what the political leaders wanted. Strategic attack supports proportionality and coercion by designing operations “to achieve their objectives without first having to necessarily engage the adversary’s fielded military forces in extended operations at the operational and tactical levels of war.” Colonel John Warden based his theory of the air campaign on the assertion that, “Victory is and always has been achieved in the mind of the enemy commander.” Precision engagement supports gradual escalation and coercion by providing “the scalpel of joint service operations—the ability to forgo brute force-on-force tactics and apply discriminate force precisely where required.” Having replaced the rusty saw with the sterile scalpel as the instrument of policy, why should the air commander disagree when the statesman decides he should conduct micro-surgery instead of amputation?

The disagreement was about the targeting effects on centers of gravity. General Short focused on attacking the enemy strategic center of gravity, the target set around Belgrade. Political leaders focused on protecting the friendly center of gravity, NATO’s unity. The two concepts were, to some extent, mutually exclusive: the more airpower attacked the enemy’s systems, the more the people in sympathetic democracies might question excessive force. Airpower is not non-lethal; people die when smart bombs explode. General Clark and Secretary Solana tried to reconcile the two imperatives by pressuring heads of state for approval to strike additional targets. In another example, General Short disagreed with the apportionment of significant airpower to counterland operations against the Serbian forces in Kosovo because they were not as valuable to Milošević as the target set around Belgrade. While this is true, attacking the Serbian operational centers of gravity in Kosovo protected the friendly center of gravity. Political leaders needed the media effects of action to protect the Kosovars to sustain support.
The second area of disagreement concerns the amount and tempo of inflicting hardship. From personal experience negotiating with Miloševic, General Short believed that, “if you hit this man hard, slapped him upside the head, he’d pay attention.” General Short concluded, the stronger the military effects of targeting, the stronger the political effects of persuasion, and the faster Miloševic will yield. By attacking the enemy strategic center of gravity with effective force early, one may avoid the protracted war that can be a more significant threat to the friendly center of gravity as the war drags on. General Short advised:

I’d have gone for the head of the snake on the first night. I’d have turned the lights out the first night. I’d have dropped the bridges across the Danube. I’d hit five or six political and military headquarters in downtown Belgrade. Miloševic and his cronies would have waked up in the morning asking what the hell was going on.

Yet obstinate human nature suggests that coercion may still take time before reason conquers the forces of violence, hatred, and enmity. The gradual escalation in Kosovo is shown in figure 9:

![Gradual Escalation in Kosovo](image_url)

**Figure 9. Gradual Escalation in Kosovo.**
Synthesis: Successful Coercion by Effective Force

Did NATO employ effective military force to accomplish the political objectives? Yes, the ways and means accomplished the ends, but as Daalder and O’Hanlon suggest, it was more a case of good luck than intelligent design. NATO’s political leaders failed to follow the logic of war when they allowed popular passion to limit the ways and means of war directly, without considering the enemy’s resistance. To force Miloševic to agree to peacekeepers in Kosovo, NATO needed the threat of overwhelming force. In a perfect world, NATO leaders should have agreed to how far they were prepared to go up the scale of escalation before starting the war. They should have prepared Plan B. In the real world, perhaps the United States and Britain wagged the dog, first to persuade allied leaders to begin the war by emphasizing proportional force, and second to win the war by threatening overwhelming force. The hawks may have gambled the doves would follow when the only alternative meant significant damage to the alliance. If the gamble failed, then NATO would have faced a severe prestige-credibility trap.

So, why did Miloševic concede? Recall that General Clark reported that the combination of air, ground, and political factors was decisive, but General Short suggested that airpower alone was decisive. General Clark is right to emphasize the synergy between the decisive diplomatic operations and shaping military operations, but General Short is right to observe how precision engagement with impunity increased the psychological pressure on Miloševic. The limited peace terms that kept Kosovo as a province of Serbia allowed the Serbs to rationalize defeat. NATO actually reduced its terms by dropping the demand for right of passage throughout Serbia and accepted Russian presence on the International Implementation Force under NATO’s leadership. The factor not addressed by the raging army-air force debate is cultural: Kosovo was over 90 percent Albanian. After the bombing began, the Serbs decided they would rather have electricity than suffer in vain for the memory of Lazaar. Complexity theory suggests that the combination of many factors persuaded Miloševic to concede.
Some object to the conclusion that NATO applied effective force because Operation Allied Force violated the principles of war. Addressing this concern in the following interview, General Clark reveals that he is quite familiar with the interrelationship between the Clausewitzian dialectics about the political-military relationship and effective force:

Public Policy: You believe in the massive use of force…

Clark: I believe in the effective use of force. I think it’s necessary when you cross a threshold to use force as decisively as possible…

Public Policy: So I just wondered how you felt about the Kosovo conflict. It seemed that you were restrained many times by the administration, by the joint chiefs and by our European allies. How can we get by that?

Clark: Well, I hope we'll never have a conflict in which military leaders are unconstrained by political leaders…. War is an extension of the policy spectrum. It's a political act carried on by other means. It has to be directed toward a politically determined goal. It has to be carried on within politically acceptable constraints. That being said, war has its own dynamic…. In the case of Kosovo, there was no surprise; that was given away for diplomatic reasons. There was no mass; that was given away in order to meet the political concerns of the allies who wanted to use a minimalist approach in the use of force. So those two principles of war were violated at the outset. The bottom line on the Kosovo operation was that it was successful. But I think that we have to understand that we came very close.198

The operational challenge was to determine which principles derived from the 19th century Napoleonic wars were necessary to accomplish the political objective in the 21st century media war that NATO had to fight against Serbia. Jomini makes valid points about surprise and mass, but to apply them methodically in operational warfighting reflects what Clausewitz called “a poverty of imagination.”199 If policy objects to surprise and mass, then creative operational art must search for another way. NATO could have applied the principle of hostage-execution. On the first day, inform Miloševic that NATO will “execute” his air defense. On the second day, NATO will “execute” his radio and television. On the third day, his electricity, and follow through until he concedes. Full spectrum operations demand full spectrum thinking. There is no principle of war or operational theory that is universally applicable to all wars past, present, and future. The mind—guiding effective force—was, is, and will remain the key to victory.
CONCLUSION

Nothing is more important in life than finding the right standpoint for seeing and judging events, and then adhering to it. One point and one only yields an integrated view of all phenomena; and only by holding to that point of view can one avoid inconsistency.  

Clausewitz’s dialectic enables us to find the right standpoint for seeing and judging war by providing a comprehensive view of all its phenomena. Examining the complete dialectic penetrates the myths of war by embracing complexity instead of reducing it to unrealistic maxims. This analysis applied the Clausewitzian dialectics to test the following hypothesis: If NATO leaders applied their realistic understanding of the war to reconcile their ends, ways, and means and employ effective force to achieve their political objectives, then Operation Allied Force was a rational use of military power. The results of this scientific analysis are below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate Questions</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Did NATO leaders understand the unique nature of their war?</td>
<td>F₁ Political Reason</td>
<td>Yes *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F₂ Violence &amp; Passion</td>
<td>Yes *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F₃ Chance &amp; Creative Spirit</td>
<td>Yes *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Σ F₁ – F₃ Unique Balance of Forces</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Was NATO’s political-military relationship correct?</td>
<td>Thesis Political Primacy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antithesis Military Necessity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Synthesis Reconcile Ends, Ways, &amp; Means</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Was the aim and employment of military force appropriate means?</td>
<td>Thesis Overwhelming Force</td>
<td>Yes *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antithesis Proportional Force</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Synthesis Effective Force</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Research Question</td>
<td>Was Operation Allied Force as a rational use of military power to accomplish NATO’s political objectives?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The pre-war estimates were poor, especially the lack of contingency plans.

* NATO had to rediscover the principle of annihilation.

Fig. 10. Research Results.
On balance, Operation Allied Force was a rational use of military power to accomplish NATO’s political objectives. The initial evidence from the Kosovo war suggests that NATO leaders synthesized the variable forces of reason, violence, and chance to understand the war—at least after it had begun. The war surprised NATO leaders because they underestimated the value of Kosovo to Milošević and the Serbs. The failure to prepare contingency plans in case their assumptions were wrong was especially egregious. NATO leaders retained the correct political-military relationship by subordinating war to the guiding intelligence of policy without demanding the impossible from their chosen instrument. NATO employed effective force, sufficient to preserve NATO’s credibility by forcing Milošević to agree to terms, but also proportional to the value of their own ends. However, Milošević forced NATO’s political leaders to recall the unappealing fact that the decision by force of arms remains the supreme law of war.

The task of critical analysis is to understand why Operation Allied Force was successful. The reason, “it worked,” is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the war was rational. After all, Clausewitz wrote “Anyone who asserts that the campaign of 1812 was an absurdity because of its enormous failure, but who would have called it a superb idea if it had worked shows complete lack of judgment.”\(^{201}\) Clausewitz judges success or failure by the quality of the assumptions that leaders make about themselves, the enemy, and the war. Certainty is impossible, but leaders must strive to make assumptions that are valid and necessary because:

If the political aims are small, the motives slight, and the tensions low, a prudent general may look for any way to avoid major crises and decisive actions, exploit any weakness in the opponent’s military and political strategy, and finally reach a peace settlement. *If his assumptions are sound and promise success we are not entitled to criticize him.* [italics added] But he must never forget that he is moving on devious paths where the god of war may catch him unawares. He must always keep an eye on his opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him armed only with an ornamental rapier.\(^ {202}\)

In Kosovo, the aims were indeed small, the motives slight, and policy demanded prudence. NATO exploited the weakness in Serbian air defense systems by using airpower to attack the
enemy centers of gravity with near invulnerability. By avoiding a ground war to protect the friendly center of gravity, NATO exploited the weakness in the Serbian strategy to win the media war by inflicting casualties. NATO’s assumption that three day’s bombing would succeed was naïve, but the key assumption was correct: the psychological effects of sustaining damage without being able to defend or strike back would coerce Milošević to yield to the Rambouillet terms. By Clausewitz’s standard, the war was rational and successful.

Captain Wesley K. Clark raised the first implication of Operation Allied Force on future policy and strategy while attending the Command and General Staff College in 1975. He wrote a master’s thesis that warned, “operations designed for overt coercion have been less successful than interventions to defend territory or support friendly governments.” Rather than optimistically apply the theory of gradual escalation as the coercive method in future warfare, citing Operation Allied Force as an analogy, political and military leaders would do well to stop and think. They should remember, in Kosovo, they were “moving on devious paths,” they “took the first step without considering the last,” the “elemental fury” was nearly unleashed, and they were almost “drawn into its vortex.”

Know yourself, know your enemy, and know your war.

Rebecca West raised the second implication of Operation Allied Force on future policy and strategy while traveling through Kosovo in the 1930’s. David Fromkin notes how West observed, “If you were ruthless enough to gain the power to change the world, you probably would lack the idealism to change it for the better. But if you were sensitive and gentle and good, you were unlikely to command enough force to translate your programs into reality.” Thinking about Clausewitz’s dialectic, Raymond Aron observed the same dilemma of politics: “We have finally come to the decisive question: is there not a fundamental divergence and perhaps incompatibility between the principle of annihilation and the supremacy of policy?” When kinder-hearted Western leaders decide to improve the world by force, then idealism may need to adapt to the reality of war in which the decision by force of arms remains the supreme law.

Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*, 231. Clausewitz supported the ideal of rational fighting: “Clausewitz’s aim, like Montesquieu’s or all sociologists’, was to make history intelligible and action rational, by adapting means to ends.” Beethoven supported the ideal of harmonious living in *Simfonie Nr. 9* by immortalizing the following words from Schiller’s poem: “Deine Zauber binden wieder, was die Mode streng geteilt. Alle Menschen werden Brüder, wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.” My translation: “Thy magic binds back together, what cruel Fate has torn apart. All people will become like brothers, under Thy gentle wing.”


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 132. Clausewitz on theory: “Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls… It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield.” (141)


Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo*, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 21 October 1999 in [database on-line]; available from *FDCH Political Transcripts*, Military Library FullTEXT database. General Wesley K. Clark’s testimony: “I think the end result occurred from a variety of factors… [but] the indispensable condition for all the other factors was the success of the air campaign itself… After the Washington Summit, NATO’s resolve was visibly increased. The isolation of Milošević in the theater intensified after the summit… Milošević’s military men had to look at the corps headquarters [in Albania] with the 5,000 U.S. troops there, the Apaches, the brigade, the radars, the MLRS, the two artillery batteries that were down there as a potent force… And when the KLA launched its offensive, Milošević began to see that he was really in danger of losing his armed forces… So it was the combination of factors, along with finally closing off his last avenue of hope, Russia.” Lieutenant General Michael Short’s testimony: “Make no mistake. This was an airpower success. Airpower brought Milošević to the table, and it was made possible by the men and women at the tactical level.”


34 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo*, 9. American policy with respect to Kosovo: “In a letter to Milošević, President Bush warned that ‘in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia proper.’” This so-called ‘Christmas warning’ was reiterated by the Clinton administration within a month of taking office in 1993, when the new secretary of state, Warren Christopher, stated, ‘We remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event the conflict in Kosovo is caused by Serb action.’”


37 Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 211.

38 Robert Audi, ed. *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 397. The principle of last resort requires that there be no reasonable belief that a peaceful alternative to defend the just cause exists. See also: Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 212.

40 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 214.

41 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 220.


43 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 230.

44 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 210.

45 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 227-228.

46 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 232.

47 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 130-141.


49 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 2.


51 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 2000): 4-22. “Decisive operations at any echelon directly achieve the mission of the higher headquarters.” The NATO and Russian diplomatic effort directly achieved the mission: to gain Milosevic’s consent to Rambouillet terms. “Sustaining operations at any echelon create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation.” The air campaign supported coercive diplomacy by increasing the costs of resistance.


53 Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 21 October 1999 in [database on-line]; available from FDCH Political Transcripts, Military Library FullTEXT database.


60 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo,” Foreign Policy (fall 1999), 132.


64 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 132.


66 Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, 226.


68 Clausewitz, On War, 136. Clausewitz describes his dialectic: “Once again, we must remind the reader that, in order to lend clarity, distinction, and emphasis to our ideas, only perfect contrasts, the extremes of the spectrum, have been included in our observations. As an actual occurrence, war generally falls somewhere in between, and is influenced by these extremes only to the extent to which it approaches them.”

69 Clausewitz, On War, 75.

70 Clausewitz, On War, 76-77.

71 Clausewitz, On War, 78-81.

72 Clausewitz, On War, 81.

73 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, 1-14.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 88.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 81.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 81.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 81.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 86.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 89.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 81.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 88. Reason manipulates passion: “At times, it is true, these [emotions] might be so aroused that the political factor would be hard put to control them… On the other hand, if policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back.”

Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 63.

Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 198.


Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 235. On NATO’s credibility: “Miloševic had, as we have seen, already decided to gamble. The problem was, as the report indicated, that NATO could not afford to lose. If it did, its credibility would be devastated.”


Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 237.


Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 269.

Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War, 2-4.


Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 130-133.

Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 160. On polls: “As Clinton undoubtedly realized, although public support for the war initially stood as high as 60 percent in most polls, with more than 50 percent also supporting the use of ground forces in a combat mode if necessary, the latter number declined somewhat over the course of the conflict and would have declined much more had an invasion gone badly.”

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 112. Why use intuition? “Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated—mostly in the light of probabilities alone. The man responsible for evaluating the whole must bring to his task the quality of intuition that perceives the truth at every point.”

Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, 36. Reasonable foresight: “One must not demand too much in the way of foresight; it is too easy to be unreasonable in this respect.”


Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 86. Clausewitz suggests the need for contingency plans before the war when he argues: “The art of war deals with living and with moral forces. Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things as much as the smallest.”


Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 104.


Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, 354. The superpower prestige-credibility trap: “Moreover, ‘prestige’ and ‘credibility’ were bound to be among the items of cost rather than of gain… As we pointed out in the case of Vietnam, prestige ought itself to be considered a variable in terms of commitment and of sanctions; but too often it is looked upon as absolute: ‘The United States has committed its prestige, and therefore must prevail!’ The whole conception of ‘flexible response’ thus threatens to founder on the dogma of prestige.”


Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 *Operations*, 4-22, and Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0 *Operations*, 1-2.

Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, 3.


Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*, 68.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 607. “We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging.”


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 605. Clausewitz explicitly writes, “We deliberately use the phrase, ‘with the addition of other means’ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.”


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 149.
Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 607. On flawed policy: “That it [policy] can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there. In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy, and here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community.”

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 608. Peter Paret notes that subsequent translations of *On War* changed the language to subvert this intention. “In his 1943 translation based on the second edition, Jolles rendered this alteration correctly as: ‘that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions.’ That, of course, is a reversal of Clausewitz’s original sense… Clausewitz emphasizes the cabinet’s participation in military decisions, not the soldier’s participation in political decisions.”


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 608. Clausewitz on statesmen: “We are far from believing … an experienced soldier, simply on the basis of their particular experience, would make the best director of policy… Far from it. What is needed in the post is distinguished intellect and strength of character. He can always get the necessary military information somehow or other.”


Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, 358. How policy may render force ineffective: “Among the military lessons we have learned [from Vietnam] is that restraint in the application of force—in order to keep that application consistent with its purpose—may make the force applied ineffective for its purpose.” I would counter that the restraint of force did not keep its application consistent with its purpose (a noncommunist South Vietnam) but rather consistent with the limited American will and geostrategic constraints imposed by China. The political purpose demanded a more intense war to dictate peace.


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 608. Translating policy into operational terms: “In the same way as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language fails to express himself correctly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve.”


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 88. Why both wars are political: “While policy is apparently effaced in the one kind of war and yet is strongly evident in the other, both kinds are equally political.”


Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, 69. Brodie argues: “Restraint as a demonstration of ‘goodwill’ to the opponent is preposterous when we are at war with him and killing his people.” Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 75. “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed.”

Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, 75.

Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, 74.


Testimony by Michael Short, Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo*.

Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 20. “Making war by accepting political constraints that impede sound military preparations can be a prescription for defeat—and nearly was in this case [of Kosovo].”


Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, 44.

Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, 83.
Testimony by Michael Short, Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo*.

Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, 471.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 *Operations*, 1-9. Note, the Army may make a stronger claim that the “tactical military objective in battle is rapid, decisive victory.”

Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War, Volume I: Warfare in Antiquity* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990): 136, 230. Pericles’ strategy of exhaustion: “But here we have a war—and from now on we shall encounter this type time and again—that, for the most varied reasons, eliminates the possibility of such a decision. Nevertheless, means are to be found to bend the will of the enemy and to attain the political goal of the war… What could result from such a conduct of war, which might almost be called the ‘nonconduct of war?’ An overwhelming decision, never. Everything depended on who first reached the point of no longer being able to bear the pain, who first became exhausted… Over and over again we admire the wisdom of Pericles, who did not allow himself to be misled by all the abundant strength of his Athens into a strategy of unconditional victory and conquest and refused to seek useless victories.”


Testimony by Michael Short, Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo*.

Testimony by Michael Short, Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo*.

Testimony by Wesley Clark, Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo*.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 79. Clausewitz understood coalition warfare: “Furthermore, allies do not cooperate at the mere desire of those who are actively engaged in fighting; international relations, being what they are, such cooperation is often furnished only at some later stage or increased only when a balance has been disturbed and needs correction.”

Testimony by Wesley Clark, Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo*.


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 582. Whether Clausewitz introduced the operational level of war is subject to debate. In support of the proposition, from his personal experience in the 1812 Russian, the 1813 Leipzig, the 1814 Paris, and the 1815 Waterloo campaigns,
Clausewitz understood that several armies could fight indecisive battles, that wars consist of several campaigns, and that there is “only one results that counts—final victory.” He also warned: “If we do not learn to regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefended provinces are of value in themselves, we are liable to regard them as windfall profits… A businessman must work on the basis of his total assets, and in war the advantages and disadvantages of a single action could only be determined by the final balance.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 182.

167 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 177; Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0 Operations, GL-10.

168 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 579. Emphasizing the operational objective: “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter is its operational objective.”

169 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 155. Clausewitz describes the consequences of methodism: “When in 1806 the Prussian generals plunged into the open jaws of disaster by using Frederick the Great’s oblique order of battle, it was not just a case of a style that had outlived its usefulness but the most extreme poverty of the imagination to which routine has ever led. The result was that the Prussian army under Hohenlohe was ruined more completely than any army has ever been ruined on the battlefield.”


171 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 75.

172 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 99.


174 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 595. Center of gravity: “One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.”

175 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 90. Note, the three steps all refer to this citation.

176 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 541. Clausewitz supports maneuver with a purpose: “[Maneuver] is, in fact, a play of balanced forces whose aim is to bring about favorable conditions for success and then to use them to gain an advantage over the enemy.”

177 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 585.

178 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 585, 78.
Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 615.


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 92. Clausewitz explains why this is a necessary option in limited war: “Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political objective, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.” Conclusion: if a superpower cannot reduce its ends or quit the war, then it should not fight a war unless the people are prepared to use overwhelming force to dictate peace.


Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 94. Why personality matters: “One further kind of action, of shortcuts to the goal, needs mention: one could call them arguments *ad hominem*. Is there a field of human affairs where personal relations do not count, where the sparks they strike do not leap across all practical considerations? The personalities of statesmen and soldiers are such important factors that in war above all it is vital not to underrate them… It can be said that these questions of personality and personal relations raise the number of possible ways of achieving the goal of policy to infinity.”


Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo*. General Short describes his negotiations with Milosevic: “The three of us sat down around a small coffee table, and Mr. Milosevic said, ‘General, you cannot make me move my SA-6’s. They have been in place for many years. A logistical nightmare. It would be very difficult for me. I cannot—do not ask me to do that. I will just turn them off, and it will be all right.’ At this point I’d been up for about 32 hours, a very tired, old fighter pilot. Pardon the expression, I leaned forward and said, ‘Mr. President, you’re pounding sand up my ass.’ And he leaned forward and said, ‘What means pound sand up my ass?’ I explained to him that I thought he was pulling my chain. I had been watching his SA-6’s for the last six weeks. He was moving them every day. I knew very well that he can move them. He said, ‘You’re right. I will move the missiles.’”


This suggests a relevant analogy. The new tank platoon leader describes a goal that requires a new approach to maintenance. The experienced tank platoon sergeant says, “Sir, that ain’t the way we do things around here!” Who is right? The platoon sergeant may speak prematurely, without considering the value of the goal or the new approach. He may also speak from experience, knowing the new approach had been tried in a previous battalion and it failed. The point is, the commander in chief cannot tell the president “That ain’t the way we do things” without considering his goal and the new approach. He may be right to recommend against ineffective force, but not because of personal preference or close-mindedness.


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Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Lessons Learned from the Air Campaign in Kosovo, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 21 October 1999 in [database on-line]; available from FDCH Political Transcripts, Military Library FullTEXT database.


If strategists do not follow Clausewitz’s lead as a critical historian, then they risk failure by founding future policy, strategy, and operations on Kosovo myths. One must ask, was Operation Allied Force a rational use of military power to accomplish NATO’s political objectives? This monograph develops and applies Clausewitzian dialectics to test the following hypothesis: If NATO leaders applied their realistic understanding of the war to reconcile their ends, ways, and means and employ effective force to achieve their
political objectives, then the use of force would be rational. NATO leaders’ synthesis of the forces of reason, violence, and chance enabled them to understand the war, but only after it began. NATO leaders underestimated the will of Milosevic and the Serbs to fight for Kosovo and failed to prepare contingency plans in case their assumptions proved false. NATO leaders’ synthesis of the forces of political primacy and military necessity enabled them to reconcile their ends, ways, and means. NATO leaders’ synthesis of the principles of overwhelming and proportional force enabled them to employ realistic, effective force to coerce Milosevic. The analysis concludes that Operation Allied Force was a rational use of military power.

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