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INTERAGENCY STRATEGIC TRAINING

BY

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USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

INTERAGENCY STRATEGIC TRAINING

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this paper is to determine if the strategic education of Foreign Service Officers of the Department of State and Army Competitive Officers of comparable grade assigned to Regional Commanders-in-Chief provides a compatible strategic frame of reference for them to work effectively within the interagency process. For the purpose of this project, “a compatible strategic frame of reference” will be defined as the result of having studied the appropriate strategic documents (National Security Strategy, the Strategic Plan for International Affairs, Department of State Strategic Plan, National Military Strategy, and appropriate Theater Engagement Plans), and having basic knowledge of the structures and missions of the appropriate level of the corresponding agency.

The methodology of this study began with a review of the basic knowledge requirements identified above to determine an inclusive common list of knowledge elements. This was followed by a review of the formal structure of training for the applicable target groups using materiel from the Training and Doctrine Command, and the Foreign Service Institute. The review was supplemented with interviews from both target groups focusing on informal training and specific case studies. Conclusions were drawn based on this combined body of knowledge.
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INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Perhaps most striking, these factors [in managing the war in Vietnam] indicated the absence of an effective politico-military mechanism for thinking strategically. The principal officers... failed to coordinate their efforts in a way which facilitated a balanced assessment of strategic alternatives. The sad consequence was strategic bankruptcy.¹

Bringing together all the elements of our national power will demand a highly integrated and responsive national security community that actively plans for the future - one that molds the international environment rather than merely responds to it. Defense needs to continue building... that sense of jointness beyond the Department to the rest of the national security community.² (National Defense Panel)

INTRODUCTION

We have long since passed the days when the Secretary of State could say to the Secretary of War, “I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of [...] the Army and the Navy.”³ We are now in the midst of an era when the political and military elements of power, as well as the other elements of power, must be fully integrated to ensure the success of our national security strategy.⁴ Clearly, that integration has long been important at the highest levels of government. Increasingly, that integration has also become important at the level of interagency working groups and on the Country Teams working crises abroad. Often this integration of the elements of power must be accomplished on a moments notice during unplanned operations, such as non-combatant evacuations and foreign disaster assistance. Additionally, integration must often by accomplished by junior officers - Foreign Service Officers who have worked only one or two Embassy tours, and Army Competitive Category Officers (herein after refered to as Army Officers) who are on their first tour working with an Embassy.

Both the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have recognized the need to improve integration of the military and diplomatic elements of power. "The Department of State is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agenoy" and must “lead interagency coordination in developing and implement foreign policy... and coordinating and supporting international activities of other U.S. Agencies.”⁵
The DOD has a critical role in interagency integration that supplements the role of the DOS. "The military is a complementary element of national power that stands with the other instruments wielded by our government." Because of its large share of the United States budget (sixteen percent versus the one percent allocated to foreign affairs), the DOD is responsible for the largest financial portion of the National Security Budget.\textsuperscript{7}

To facilitate the success of the National Security Strategy, it is imperative that participants in the interagency process attain some level of a common paradigm for approaching crisis action.\textsuperscript{8} That common paradigm could consist of a mutually understood set of strategic knowledge and discipline for solving problems that is taught at a national strategy college by an interagency team of teachers who teach all of the interagency players a common approach to problem solving. Alternately, that common paradigm could consist of a shared set of strategic knowledge that allows interagency players to achieve a mutual understanding of national goals and objectives that can be applied to the problem-solving techniques that are most appropriate to the individual actors and groups of actors. The second option could be taught by informal or formal techniques at locations chosen by the individual agency.

In the following pages, I examine how effective the DOS Foreign Service Officer (FSO) program and the Army Officer program are in establishing that common set of strategic knowledge for those FSOs and Army Officers who are most likely to be required to respond to a crisis situations at the Country Team level. I examine formal education, a strong point within the DOD, and informal education, a strong point within the DOS, to determine common conclusions. I focus on only the DOD and the DOS because they are generally the lead agencies in the process. Consideration of all of the thirty plus members of the national security interagency process is beyond the scope of this paper.\textsuperscript{9} Likewise, recommendations are outside the scope of this paper, although in the endnotes I do note the recommendations of the personnel interviewed.

**STRATEGIC KNOWLEDGE**

For the purpose of this research, strategy is defined as "the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."\textsuperscript{10} Strategic knowledge, as it is used here, is the "resource base that the organization requires to envision
future desired outcomes and negotiat[e] to make them happen [at the national level].

There are numerous sources that can be used to define the minimum amount of strategic knowledge needed to successfully create that resource base within the interagency. For the purposes of this paper, I am only concerned with those documents that, if understood, provide a common frame of reference for the two target groups at the most basic level.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) provides the overarching framework for the strategic interaction of the two target groups. The comparable DOD and DOS documents are the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Strategic Plan for International Affairs and the DOS Strategic Plan. "The [DOS] Strategic Plan outlines the roles and mission of the Department of State in achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States... It is a companion to the International Affairs Strategic Plan which articulates the fundamental national interests of the United States in terms of long-range goals." In addition, the individual Regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs) have Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) that provide guidance to Army Officers operating in individual countries and working with the Country Teams. The TEPs provide guidance that, hypothetically, allows the CINCs representatives to act in a manner that complements the DOS strategy as identified in the corresponding DOS documents. The DOS rough equivalent to the TEP is the Bureau Performance Plan for that region. Although, by common Army definitions, the TEPs and the Bureau Performance Plans could be argued as being operational, rather than strategic, I have included them since they fit the generic definition of strategic knowledge that I use. Notably, I have omitted the individual overseas Mission Performance Plans (MPP) and Security Assistance Organization Plans as not within the scope of this paper.

Together, these six documents should provide sufficient background for a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) or Army Officer to broadly understand the goals of the United States in a region, so that the officer can successfully engage in the expeditious resolution of a crisis that involves the interagency process. To achieve that background, it is not necessary that the officer constantly refer to the document when acting in response to a crisis, but it is necessary that he be sufficiently familiar with the content of the documents to implement the intent of the proponent. For the purposes of this paper, I assume that this level of background can be achieved either by reading the original documents (as is more common in the DOD schools), or by receiving a briefing on their content (as is more common in the DOS system).

THE TARGET AUDIENCE

3
As discussed below, the DOS Foreign Service Officer (FSO) is a member of a relatively small population. There are approximately 5,000 serving FSOS, and 700 serving Senior FSOS. They tend to begin their career in the Foreign Service at approximately thirty-three years of age after some outside experience in the business world or academia, and they leave the service at a later age than Army Officers. The rigorous selection process limits input to 1% to 3% of applicants. FSOS do not have the combat deployability physical requirements demanded of Army Officers, but are required to perform in rigorous foreign settings.

Army Officers makeup a significantly larger audience. The population of Army Officers is over ten times as large as the FSO population. Army Officers tend to join at twenty-two with no significant experience outside of college, and they leave the service after serving approximately twenty-six years, if fully successful. (Fully successful, for the purpose of this paper, is defined as achieving the rank of Colonel. Successful, for the purpose of this paper, is defined as achieving the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and leaving the service after twenty-two years.)

The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) provides one further means of distinguishing differences in the general characteristics between the groups. The theories behind the MBTI posit that individuals differ based on “predisposition’s to cope with the external environment ... which remain relatively constant during the life of the individual.” As a result, the series of tests administered to determine the MBTI provide a series of predispositions that can potentially predict the predisposition of a person towards different stimuli. Both the FSOS and the Army Officers have predominant MBTI types that are significantly different from the proportions of those MBTI types in the population at general and from each other. The most common MBTI type (INTJ) for the FSO is likely to predispose him to prefer to achieve knowledge by experience. The most common MBTI type (ISTJ) for the Army Competitive Category Officer is likely to predispose him to prefer to achieve knowledge by formal education.

THE TARGET LEVEL

The interagency is a process, rather than a place. The process spans five levels of the national security process. At the highest level is the National Security Council. At the second level is the Principal Committee of the NSC. At this level, the interagency process involves the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Director of
Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Advisor. The third level is at the Deputies Committee. This level of the interagency process includes the deputies to the NSC principals along with the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. The fourth level is the Interagency Working Groups, which includes the individuals, groups, or forums that exist below the Deputy level. The fifth level is the Country Team. The Country Team consists of representatives of each of the U.S. Government agencies that operate within a foreign country. The Country Team is headed by the U.S. Ambassador to that country. This study focuses on the interagency process as it applies to members of the targeted audience operating with the Country Team. The study focuses on this level of the process because it is the level at which the least experienced members of the target audience are likely to operate, and is the level at which a time-sensitive, national security crisis is most likely to happen. As a result, improper preparation of the target audience to work at this level is most likely to result in failure.

Army Officers working on the Country Team are generally considered to be joint officers. Joint officers are officers who are assigned to selected jobs that require interaction with other uniformed services. The educational and assignment requirements for joint officers are governed by the Goldwaters-Nichols Act of 1987, which significantly routinized joint officer qualifications by mandating required joint education and required minimums for assignment durations.

EDUCATION

FORMAL

Both the Foreign Service Officer and the Army Officer have access to formal systems of education. The formal education system for the Foreign Service is operated at one primary location, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) located at the National Foreign Affairs Training
Center (NAFTC) in Arlington, Virginia. Centralized rather than distributed, this is notably different from the Army formal education system, and provides a number of potential advantages in terms of standardizing educational content. Operating from one primary location with one set of teachers could provide an advantage, as it minimizes possible inconsistencies in curriculum. Conversely, the Army formal education system for teaching the targeted group at multiple locations creates an increased potential of inconsistencies and redundancies in curriculum. The Basic and Advanced Courses are located at Branch (specialty) centers. The Combined Arms and Service Staff School (CAS3) and Command and General Staff College (CGSC) are located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The primary Senior Service College (SSC) is located at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, but there are several other sites. The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) is located in Norfolk, Virginia. The Army teaches at least in four schools with four sets of teachers, while FSI teaches the same information at one school with one set of teachers.

FSI and the SSC exchange officers through a fellowship program. The fellowship program allows officers to gain an understanding of the program that they are sent to, and provides an opportunity for the officers to offer suggestions to make the programs more compatible. For example, in 2000, the Army fellow to FSI completed his fellowship by providing an analysis of training opportunities that would be mutually beneficial to the Army and the DOS.
The mandatory entry course required of all FSOs is the A-100 course.\textsuperscript{22} The A-100 course is a seven week Department of State orientation program.\textsuperscript{23} The target audience for this course is entry-level career candidates who have passed the rigorous exam system. Typically, they are about thirty-three years of age and have a Masters Degree, usually in international relations (approximately 38\%) or political science (approximately 32\%).\textsuperscript{24} Significantly, they predominately come from the MBTI category of Introverted, Intuiting, Thinking, Judging (INTJ) (47\%, as compared to the general population level of 12\%).\textsuperscript{25} Given the INTJ preference to experience, rather than instruction, the predominance of INTJs may be a significant factor in the preference of the DOS to teach its personnel by informal/experienced based education rather than formal education.\textsuperscript{26}

The A-100 course is designed to develop group and institutional spirit within the Service, service skills, such as writing and public speaking, and administrative skills. Strategic knowledge, as defined for this paper, is briefly covered during the A-100 course. Coverage includes exposing the entry level FSO to the National Security Strategy and foreign policy. As part of this coverage, the Dean of the Defense Intelligence Agency Attache School provides an overview briefing on the membership and the functions of the Country Team.\textsuperscript{27}
The cone specific courses follow the A-100 course. Cone courses are seven to nine months in duration. Cones are technical specialties in which FSOs serve. They are comparable to the twenty-four Army branches. The cones include: Administrative, Consular, Economic, Political, and Public Diplomacy.\textsuperscript{28} The political cone is the career field most likely to require an FSO to work within the interagency process with Army Officers. Additional education is available for FSOs in the political cone to prepare them to work with the Army Officers.\textsuperscript{29} The primary course in this field is course 505 - Political-Military Affairs. The course is taught once a year and lasts only three days. The course, "examines the broad scope of political-military work and how it relates to broader national security policy."\textsuperscript{30} In particular, the course provides a one hour forty-five minute discussion of the National Military Strategy, and a two hour discussion of Presidential Decision Memoranda.\textsuperscript{31} This course provides some exposure to strategic knowledge, but does not offer comprehensive exposure.

FSI also has a number of other courses that potentially teach strategic skills that are offered at various times in an FSO career. These courses are not mandatory, except as noted below.\textsuperscript{32}

The next formal education for the FSO is after approximately four years/two overseas tours, when the officer is reassigned to Washington and is being considered for tenure. The FSO receives a one week Washington Trade Craft course. This course does not teach strategic skills.

Mandatory training is next provided for the FSO who becomes a Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). (There formerly was a mid-career course that was offered prior to the DCM, but that course has been discontinued.\textsuperscript{33}) Attendees at the DCM course typically have served sixteen years and have achieved the grade of FS-O1, equivalent to an Army Colonel\textsuperscript{34}. The course is only offered to those that have been selected for a DCM appointment, with approximately ten to fifteen percent of the target audience achieving this level. The course is two weeks in duration, and focuses on "skills and knowledge DCMs and Principal Officers need to manage their missions effectively... [including] build[ing] teams across divisions and agencies at post... utiliz[ing] critical leadership skills... oversee[ing] mission personnel systems..."\textsuperscript{35} The course does not address the strategic knowledge identified in this study, but does discuss the roles and responsibilities of participants in the Country Team.\textsuperscript{36}

A variety of optional courses are available between the fourteenth and seventeenth year of service. These courses include the impressive array of language courses which is offered at
all levels. Other courses include long-term training programs with the General Staff Colleges, the DOD Senior Service Colleges, and civilian schools and institutions.\textsuperscript{37} The primary potential targeted strategic education opportunity for FSOs would be the Senior Seminar, but the course curriculum does not take advantage of that opportunity.\textsuperscript{38} The Senior Seminar is a one year course that includes approximately 20 participants from the Department of State and 12 participants from other organizations, including the military services. It is offered to recent selectees to the Senior Foreign Service as an optional course.\textsuperscript{39} Attendees have typically served in the DOS for seventeen to twenty-five years.\textsuperscript{40} It provides an extensive hands-on training course on “how to sell what’s in the U.S. and what agencies do.”\textsuperscript{41} The course provides minimal formal training in strategic skills, but does offer extensive opportunities for informal exchanges between members of the target audiences.\textsuperscript{42}

Attendees at the Ambassador course typically have served approximately twenty to twenty-five years. The Ambassador course is ten days in duration, and focuses on, “the leadership role of the Ambassador... apply[ing] knowledge gained from running an overseas post... and manag[ing] and building[ing] teams...”.\textsuperscript{43} The Ambassador course only provides minimal exposure to strategic education.

In the Department of State, general training education, unless focused on the duties required for a specific job, has historically been considered non-productive time\textsuperscript{44} Reference to “academic degrees, titles, or specific institutions of higher learning” are “inadmissible comments” in employee evaluations.\textsuperscript{45} As a result, there is little incentive in the DOS to attend training because it provides little or no advantage in a very competitive environment. This may be because the prevalent MBTI of DOS FSOs predisposes them to not value formal education, or because the Foreign Service does not have adequate personnel to resource regular mandatory training.\textsuperscript{46} Often, there is an underlap in replacing personnel that exasperates personnel shortfalls. Additionally, there is no DOS FSO overstrength account that is comparable to the thirteen percent Army Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Student (TTHS) account.\textsuperscript{47} (The comparable segment of the current TTHS for education is five-and-one-half percent.) Personnel most likely to attend later mandatory education programs are those that are targeted for specific career advancement.

The Department of State conducts a number of exercises to complement other education. One type of these exercises is conducted in about 100 embassies each year (from a total of 163 embassies).\textsuperscript{48} They are one day interagency exercises that normally focus on Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). In addition, four times a year, DOS provides
players to Regional CINC NEO exercises.\textsuperscript{49} The DOS also conducts several simulation exercises at the national level to consider potential strategies for global areas of concern, such as the newly independent Republics. They do provide an opportunity for the application of the targeted strategic knowledge, but the exercises are not intended to provide education.

The formal education system for Army Officers includes a number of schools spread across the Continental United States that are generally under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Army conducts basic courses that are conceptually comparable to the A-100 course. But, the target audience is considerably younger (twenty-two years old), less educated (bachelors degree), and less experienced than comparable FSOs. Since these officers have a lower professional maturity level than FSOs and are required to lead groups of subordinates, the Army has a more pronounced need to focus on formal education to grow its own leaders than does the Foreign Service. Therefore, the Army must spend a considerable amount of time at these schools providing leadership and technical training. The purpose of the basic course is, “to prepare commissioned ( ) Lieutenants to function as platoon leaders capable of performing common soldier skills and entry level technical tasks...”\textsuperscript{50} The duration of the basic course is normally considerably longer than the A-100... fourteen weeks.

The targeted Army Officers MBTI type tends to be Introverted, Sensing, Thinking, Judging (ISTJ). (30\% of military officers are ISTJ, compared to 6\% of the general population).\textsuperscript{51} As with FSOs, this may have a subtle impact on how the officers relate to education: the ISTJ MBTI type may predispose Army Officers to favor formal education.

The formal basic course is complemented with a mandatory advanced course that is five and one-half months in duration, and a Combined Arms Service and Staff School (CAS3) six week course that is given at the same career point as the Washington Trade Craft course given by FSI. The Advanced Course is focused on technical skills, while the CAS3 course is focused on staff skills.\textsuperscript{52} Neither of these courses provides exposure to the targeted strategic skills.

The first real exposure of an Army Officer to the targeted strategic knowledge is at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The CGSC is attended during the eleventh to fourteenth year of service. (As a personal note, the CGSC has significantly increased its exposure of students to the targeted strategic knowledge since I attended the CGSC in 1992-1993.) CGSC is conducted at approximately the same career point that an FSO receives DCM training, but the Army Officers who attend CGSC are of a relatively lower grade than attendees at the DCM course. The CGSC has five principle sections in the ten month course. The fifth section of courses covers Operational Warfighting and Strategy. The course devotes four class
days to cover the NSS, NMS, and the TEP in detail as part of the twenty-nine lessons of the fifth section. The DOS documents (the IASP and Strategic Plan) are not specifically covered in detail during the course. \(^5^3\)

Primary Army Officer formal education on strategy is conducted at one of the Senior Service Colleges (SSC). This education is conducted at approximately the twenty-second year of service, at approximately the same career point as the Ambassadorial course. Attendees typically are forty-four years of age, and have a Masters Degree. The duration of this training is ten months and includes a two hour block of instruction given by an Ambassador. The course includes members of all of the Services (15 percent of the 325 students) and Department of the Army civilians and members of other government agencies (approximately 15 percent of the student body). In addition to mandatory education, the course is supplemented by a series of electives, including a course on interagency operations that provides some of the targeted strategic knowledge requirements of this study.\(^5^4\) This course will be supplemented during Academic Year 2002 by an elective on grand strategy.\(^5^5\)

In addition to the SSC, the DOD offers courses at the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS) of the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). The JCSOS course is required education for joint staff officers with joint assignments, and meets some of the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that are identified above. As a result, the career point at which the course is taken varies widely. (The course is typically taken after completion of 12 years of service, but may be taken at other times.) The course is seven weeks in duration, and is generally focused on the skills required for a joint duty assignment. Instruction includes four core subjects including strategy. One block of the course “sets the foundation by examining national-level strategy documents and tracing how they impact military policy at and below the theater level.”\(^5^6\) In addition, the JCSOS has thirty elective focused studies that include an interagency focused study that discusses some of the targeted documents.\(^5^7\)

Like the DOS, the Army conducts a number of exercises to supplement formal education. The scope and focus of the exercises varies depending on the school conducting the exercise. In particular, the SSC conducts a two week Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE). The SCE applies knowledge of some of the targeted strategic skills, and has limited DOS interaction.

Clearly, the Army places more value than the DOS does on formal education. In part, this difference appears to be driven by the relative demographical immaturity of entry level Army Officers, and the need to grow officers to lead soldiers. Both formal education systems
teach some of the targeted body of strategic skills, but neither system teaches all of the targeted documents. Both systems have shortfalls in teaching the documents that are developed by the other agency.

INFORMAL

The Department of State (DOS) tends to place more value on informal education than on formal education. This may be the result of the more “mature” entry level of its personnel, or the personality type of its personnel, as discussed above. Again, INTJs, the predominant MBTI type among FSOs, are more likely to perceive things through experiencing them...they “can be perpetual students...[a]lways exploring and envisioning ‘what might be’...”

There are a number of informal educational techniques used by the Foreign Service. The first is the vetting of candidates by the application process. In 1999, of 9,380 applicants, less than 5% were selected. By comparison, in 1995 the selection rate was less than 1%. The application process is a highly selective process. It offers the potential to select only applicants that have educational backgrounds that provide the targeted strategic knowledge prior to joining the DOS. A review of the candidates’ degrees does not bear this potential out. For example, approximately 2% of the applicants had degrees in Security Policy Studies, the educational background most likely to have resulted in achieving the targeted strategic knowledge. Vetting of candidates does not appear to result in selection of applicants who are already educated in the targeted strategic knowledge.

The second informal technique used by the Foreign Service is the individual development plan (IDP). The IDP identifies job descriptions, development objectives, knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA), and appropriate education to support identified development. It is followed up with counseling, and is integrated into the promotion process. It does not specifically require competence in the targeted strategic knowledge, but does provide a tool to ensure that the appropriate education and mentoring is conducted to achieve the level of proficiency identified in the IDP. The IDP was established in the early 1990s, has not achieved full implementation.

The third informal technique used by the Foreign Service is mentoring by senior officers. For the purposes of this paper, mentoring is the process of senior officers assisting junior officers in achieving informal education through counseling and career development. The first two assignments of a FSO are always to overseas embassies. At the end of these tours the
FSO will generally be tenured, and receive a follow-on assignment to Washington with the associated discussed above. While in Washington, the tours generally thought to be most career enhancing are with the Regional Bureaus. Followon assignments may include Washington or overseas tours. FSOs are exposed to the interagency process from the earliest levels, but strategic skills begin to become critical at the DCM level, when the FSO runs the Country Team interagency process on behalf of the Ambassador. After twenty seven years of service, the FSO may enter the Senior Foreign Service track, similar to Army General Officers. As a senior officer, the focused assignments may include Ambassadorships with progressively greater responsibility, and assistant secretary positions. A successful FSO career is completed after thirty-three years of service. In each of these assignments, the FSO works with senior FSOs who should have experience in the targeted strategic knowledge as well as experience in working in the interagency process. Despite antecdotal evidence that I received from interviews that mentoring is not used effectively, there are mentoring opportunities at each assignment that can prepare the FSO to work with Army Officers in the Country Team interagency process.

A significant opportunity to use the mentoring technique as part of its informal education is created by the Foreign Service reliance on bidding for assignments. This is in marked contrast to the Army system. An Army assignment officer using an officer's file and an individual preference statement determines which officer will fill an assignment. The gaining organization has little direct input on which candidate fills its position. In contrast, the process for filing key Foreign Service assignments typically involves direct interaction between the candidate and the potential mentor/supervisor, including a job interview. As a result, there is a great potential to achieve the targeted set of strategic skills by mentoring. Antecdotal evidence that I gained from interviews indicates that this potential is not routinely used to build the strategic knowledge targeted in this study.

The Army also uses a number of informal education techniques. There is no comparable vetment process of entry level candidates. Virtually all of the officers who apply for commission (over 90%) are accepted.
Initially entry Army Officers are given a development program (Department of the Army form 67-9-1 series) called the Officer Support Form. The Officer Support Form is similar to the IDP. Using the Officer Support Form, the Officer and his supervisor develop goals and performance measures. Those goals and performance measures are followed-up with counseling and used in composing the officer's annual evaluation. After the officer has passed the entry level, the system becomes less rigorous in content, but still provides the potential for use as a mentoring tool to develop the targeted strategic competencies. But, there is no requirement at any level that the Officer Support Form be used to plan or execute education in the targeted strategic knowledge.

Although extensive opportunities for mentoring exist in the Army, they do not provide the same potential for mentoring that the FSOs have. Assignment/Informal Training during the first twelve years of service is generally focused upon technical/leadership skills of a specific military branch. (Military branches are conceptually similar to FSO cones, but they generally require more specific skills. In addition, the Army has significantly more branches (24) than DOS has cones(5).) The first realistic opportunity that an officer has for mentoring in the targeted strategic knowledge is assignment to a Joint Combatant Commands, which generally happens
in the tenth to twelfth year of service. Because joint assignments are not a requirement for a successful career, it is unlikely that the Army Officer will have been exposed to a mentor who could successfully guide his achievement of the targeted strategic knowledge prior to this assignment. Since this is the type of assignment in which he will need to apply the targeted strategic skills, any mentoring that he receives at this point is probably too late to have full value. If the officer has not gained the knowledge by this point, he will probably need to learn on the job. In addition, many of the potential mentors on the Joint Combatant Command staff will not have had experience that they can use to mentor the officer, because they have never been assigned to a Joint Combatant Command before. This is in marked contrast to the DOS system that places a premium on FSOs experiencing the interagency process nearly constantly over their career, while working for other FSOs who are qualified to mentor those officers.

The Army has taken actions as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to address this problem. Increasingly, officers are being assigned to Joint Combatant Command for extended tours (three years), then reassigned to another tour at a Joint Combatant Command at around twenty years of service, approximately five years later. As a result, the Army is developing officers who are qualified to perform the duties of mentors for junior officers.

CONCLUSIONS

Neither the DOS nor the Army provides comprehensive coverage of basic strategic knowledge as defined in this study. Each approaches education through its own unique methodology. Each recognizes the need for interagency education and has increased efforts to provide that education.

The Department of State provides some mandatory education on National Security Strategy documents, but it is not adequate to meet the targeted strategic knowledge levels. The Foreign Services Institute provides a comprehensive program of formal education, but much of that education is not mandatory. The DOS formal education system is augmented by a more robust informal education program that relies on experience and progressive assignments, but it does not provide a consistent product that ensures that FSOs are educated to the targeted strategic knowledge.

The Army also provides some mandatory education, but falls short of providing adequate, mandatory education in all of the targeted strategic skills. The Army education system provides a robust mandatory formal education program that occurs throughout the
career of the Army Officer. That system provides significant education on Department of Defense-specific documents, but does not provide adequate coverage of interagency documents. The Army's informal education system is less robust than the Department of State's, and does not provide sufficient mentoring to compensate for the educational shortfalls of its formal education system.

Incremental changes to correct these shortfalls may appear self-evident, but are beyond the scope of this document.

WORD COUNT = 5643
4 George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, 1982 to 1989, Interview taken from Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus, (Stanford, CA: May 1998), 1.
5 Ibid
11 Dr. Roderick R. Magee II, Strategic Leadership Primer (Carlisle, Barracks, PA: United States Army War College), 47.
16 Barry M. Blechman, Kevin P. O’Rey, and Renee Lajoie, "Grading Theater Engagement Planning," Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 2000/Number 24).
17 The Foreign Service Officer, (unknown source, dated 1996), 1.
23 Teddy Taylor, Director for A-100 course, Telephone interview by author, 16 November 00.
24 Bernadette Cole, Office of Recruiting, Directorate of Human Resources, Department of State, Subject: “FYI - Selling points,” electronic mail message to Ambassador McCallie, 1 June 2000. Also, “98 FSO Orientation Class” demographics are now on-line at the Department of State website.
26 Otto Kroeger and Janet M. Thuesen, Type Talk: Or How to Determine Your Personality Type and Change Your Life (New York: Delacourte Press, 1988), 228.
27 Dr. Ruth Weisenberg, Deputy Director Foreign Service Institute, telephone interview by the author, 21 November 2000.
-50 attendees at midlevel (LTC) courses such as the General Staff Colleges

-43 attendees at Colonel level courses typically including:
  3 at the AWC
  18 at the National Defense University
  8-11 at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces
  3 at the Air War College
  3 at the Naval War College
  1 at the Marine War College
  1 at Fletcher
  1 at the Hoover Institute at Stanford
  1 at the Council for Foreign Relations
  1 at the East/West Center
  1 at the Atlantic Council

-30 attendees at senior level courses such as the senior seminar

-In addition, the Foreign Service provides a number of detailees to institutes, including:
  1 at the United States Military Academy
  1 at the Air Force Academy
  1 at the Command and General Staff College
  1 at the Air Force Staff College
  1 at the School of the Americas
  4 at the AWC

38 Dr. Ruth Weisenberg, Deputy Director Foreign Service Institute, telephone interview by the author, 21 November 2000.
39 Ibid
41 Colonel Dennis Murphy, Former Marshall Fellow to the Foreign Service Institute, interview by the author, 8 December 2000.
42 Ibid
44 Ibid
46 Ambassador Marshall McCallie, Deputy Commandant for International Affairs of the United States Army War College, interview by the author, 19 December 2000. Ambassador McCallie had a number of specific recommendations for addressing the formal training shortfall. They generally seemed to track with the recommendations of others. Some of his specific recommendations were:
1. A mid-career course that is six weeks to two months in duration.
2. The purpose of the course is to "create a cadre of young Americans from these agencies, so that later, when they are faced with a crisis they say...how can we work together to serve our Nation."
3. Cover the following topics:
   a. Strategic and operational planning (presented by DOD)
   b. Political reporting and analysis (presented by DOS)
   c. Economic financing and forecasting (presented by the Department of Treasury)
   d. Use of Intelligence (presented by the CIA)
   e. Role of International Markets (presented by Customs and the Department of Agriculture)
   f. U.S. Trade (presented by the U.S. Trade Representative)
4. Two to three exercises including a strategic planning exercise.

48 Dr. Ruth Weisenberg, Deputy Director Foreign Service Institute, telephone interview by the author, 21 November 2000.
49 Ibid
55 Professor David Bennett, State Department Fellow at the Army War College, interview by the author, 19 December 2000.
57 Ibid
58 Otto Kroeger and Janet M. Thuesen, Type Talk: Or How to Determine Your Personality Type and Change Your Life (New York: Delacourte Press, 1988), 228.
59 Ibid
60 Karen Krebsbach, What is the Foreign Service? American Foreign Service Association online, 1.
61 Bernadette Cole, Office of Recruiting, Directorate of Human Resources, Department of State, Subject: \"FYI - Selling points," electronic mail message to Ambassador McCallie, 1 June 2000.
63 William Harris, Foreign Service Detaile to the Army War College, interview by the author, 11 December 2000.
64 Ibid
65 Colonel Dennis Murphy, Former Marshall Fellow to the Foreign Service Institute, interview by the author, 8 December 2000.
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