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READY FOR CHANGE:
ESTABLISH A LOGISTICS OFFICER CORPS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Army Transformation, the Revolution in Military Logistics, and the changes associated with each, mark this as a unique period in the history of our Army. It also offers a timely opportunity to merge Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation officers into a single Logistics Officer Corps. Though not a new idea, it is one that has gained momentum as army force structure changes continue to drive the Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) to provide more multifunctional logistics officers to meet the needs of the Army. The purpose of this paper is to add to the dialogue for those who argue that it's time to establish a Logistics Officer Corps. Specifically, this paper will briefly examine the changes that have occurred in OPMS and the Army's force structure that have blurred the traditional functional lines of responsibility between the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation officers, and now demand multifunctional logisticians. This evolving demand for multifunctional logisticians, coupled with a unique period of change in our Army, make this an ideal time to establish a Logistics Officer Corps.
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READY FOR CHANGE: ESTABLISH A LOGISTICS OFFICER CORPS

Our downsized Army, our increasing emphasis on multifunctional logistics, and our move to a seamless logistics system blend the traditional missions of the logistics branches. I envision the evolutionary progression to an Army Logistics Corps with Quartermaster, Ordnance and Transportation "regiments" oriented on the basic tasks of fueling, arming, fixing, moving and sustaining soldiers.
—Lieutenant General Leon E. Salomon, July 1990

In 1984, then Colonel Huba Wass de Czege wrote that “the U.S. Army was undergoing a more substantive change than at any other time since the period 1938-1941”.1 Most would argue that today’s Army Transformation efforts and the substantial changes that will result in the doctrine, equipment, training and organization of our Army rival the change that took place during the 80’s. Changing how we fight, has, and will continue to have an enormous influence on how logisticians provide support. Army logisticians have grappled with this change process throughout history in order to provide the most effective and efficient support to the Army. Today’s Army Transformation efforts, like the efforts that took place during the 1980’s, once again offer a unique opportunity for the logistics community to step back and look at how we do business. This is a period in our Army’s evolving history when we can reexamine old ideas and explore new ideas as we move to help transform the Army into the Objective Force of the future. The purpose of this paper is to add to the discourse of this change process by examining this vision of an Army Logistics Corps that, then Lieutenant General Leon Salomon spoke of over ten years ago. Specifically, this paper will add to the increasing dialogue that suggest it is now time for the U.S. Army to create a Logistics Officer Corps by consolidating the Ordnance, Transportation and Quartermaster officers into a single branch.

A LIMITED FOCUS

Before beginning this examination, it is important to understand that the logistical support structure of the Army, and the roles of the logisticsian, have continually evolved throughout our Army’s history. Branches have been established, disestablished, combined, then separated, all in an effort to provide the most efficient and effective support to the Army. From this evolution, three primary logistics Corps have emerged; Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation.2 Although the Medical Service Corps and the Aviation Logistics Branch are
today part of the logistics community, the focus of this paper will only be on these three primary logistics corps.

In addition, this paper will only attempt to examine merging the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation officers, excluding any assessment or discussion on a similar merger for the enlisted members of these corps. Many would argue that the merger of the enlisted members into a Logistics Corps would occur simultaneously, while others argue that they would not necessarily merge at all. These questions, however, are not within the scope of this paper.

Finally, while the logistical support structure has constantly changed and evolved to better support the Army, so too have the education, training and expectations of the officers that made up these Corps. Reviewing the changes that occurred in both these areas I believe are central to understanding the evolution of the Ordnance, Quartermaster and Transportation Corps and their officers. By examining these two broad categories, I believe one can see why it’s time to establish a Logistics Officer Corps today. Therefore, let’s begin this review by looking at the change that precipitated the birth of the modern day Ordnance, Quartermaster and Transportation Corps and the quest to train and develop their officers to support the changing needs of the Army.

SPECIALIZATION TO GENERALIZATION

The Army reorganization in 1962 abolished the Technical Services chiefs and led to the demise of the Technical Services, the predecessor of today’s primary logistics corps. The absence of the Technical Services chiefs removed the senior spokesmen for army support forces from the decision-makers at the Department of the Army. Without a voice at the decision making table, a void was created regarding the training and professional development of logistics officers. In addition, it became difficult to identify, train and assign those logistics officers who were multi-skilled in managing support requirements. This was important because units that previously performed branch specific technical missions, under the Technical Services, were now merged into new units without branch names - the birth of the “support” unit. As one can imagine, the personnel management functions and training for the logistics officers of these new merged units would become an issue of concern and debate for the next several years. Much of this debate would focus on the skills required of logistics officers. Did the army need logistics officers who specialized in a particular skill, such as petroleum management, or those who were generalists, capable of managing several logistics functions, such as supply
and maintenance. Not until 1970, in the Report of the Department of Army Board for Review of Responsibilities for Logistics Doctrine, Personnel, and Training Functions, did the Army first attempt to end this debate. In this report, later known as the Lockhart Report, the Army recognized that there was a requirement within the logistics officer career fields for both logistics generalists and specialists. The ability to train a logistics generalist, the predecessor of today's multifunctional logistician, who is capable of managing logistics functions of multiple functional branches, would become a recurring theme in logistic officer training throughout the next three decades. However, the need for an officer to specialize would dominate officer training for the next several years.\(^6\)

In 1971, this was evident, when the Army instituted an officer personnel management system (OPMS) that was designed, for the most part, to improve officer professionalism. Officers were expected to be both leaders and managers. In order to accomplish this, OPMS changed how officers were managed. They would now be managed by a control specialty rather than by career branch. So not only was the officer expected to be a leader and a manger, he was also expected to be technically proficient in his specialty. For instance, prior to OPMS, an Ordnance officer was assigned jobs because he was Ordnance. Now he became an Ordnance officer with a missile materiel specialty, and was assigned jobs based upon that specialty. This specialty would later become the officer's Area of Concentration. This change institutionalized officer specialization, and would require the officer to receive specific training in his particular control specialty.\(^7\) This would severely limit the officer's ability to receive institutional training in other skills, particularly in those specialties outside his career branch. Finally, it would significantly hinder the Army's ability to identify and assign multi-skilled logistics officers whom they decided, in the Lockhart report the previous year, were truly needed.

So, in March 1974, the Army issued Department of Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization, in part, to help fix the lack of visibility and training of multi-skilled logistics officers. Though its purpose was to provide professional development direction for all commissioned officers, it also included guidance to identify, train and assign multi-skilled logisticians. To do this, DA Pam 600-3 created specialty code 70, Logistics Management Officer, as a capstone position that contained responsibilities for two or more logistics functions or commodities. However, it was soon realized that this was not satisfying the army's logistics requirements because, among other reasons, specialty code 70 pertained only to officer's in the rank of Colonel, but there were requirements for Logistics Management Officers at lower ranks. There was also confusion in the definition of "logistics manager" in that it did not clearly differentiate between positions that were commodity oriented
(i.e. subsistence, petroleum, or, ammunition) and those that were functional positions (i.e. ordnance, quartermaster, or transportation). Clearly, the Army was struggling with how and when to create this multi-skilled logistics generalist, and now the idea of "logistics management" was part of the debate. At the same time however, DA Pam 600-3, continued to stress the need for officers who were skilled specialists in their own Area of Concentration.

This dual "generalist-specialist" requirement continued to be reinforced, and was highlighted in the 1977 Review of Education and Training for Officer (RETO) study directed by the Army Chief of Staff. This study concluded that the Army continued to have requirements for both types of logisticians, but to clear up previous confusion, went on to spell out definitions for the generalist and the specialists, and gave examples of each. The most significant area of the RETO study, however, was the focus it placed on the Officer Advanced Courses. The study found that, although intended, the advanced courses did not prepare officers for their next duty assignment, and that there was little standardization from one branch course to the next. Each branch school trained according to its perceived needs, thus creating officers with radically differing educations. It suggested that the Army do away with the advanced course, arguing that the Army and the officers would be better served through; an expanded Officer Basic Course, the creation of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, on-the-job experience, and specific temporary duty courses that would train a person for a particular job. These recommendations will be worthy of further discussion later in this paper, but at this point it is important to note that RETO recognized the haphazard methods in which officers were being trained, and sought to standardize it and emphasize teaching common military skills to all officers, across all branches.

OPMS continued to evolve over the next few years as the Army tried to develop a flexible officer management system to accommodate changes that were occurring in the Army structure. Three branch immaterial positions were created to place officers in positions that did not require any specific branch experience. Branch immaterial was created to identify positions any officer could fill, combat arms immaterial identified positions that could be filled by any combat arms officer, and logistics immaterial identified positions that could be filled by any Ordnance, Quartermaster, or Transportation officer. At the same time, DA Pam 600-3 was updated in an effort to refine officer training requirements and develop "recommended" officer career paths, a practice that continues today. This updated version of DA Pam 600 eliminated specialty code 70, Logistics Management Officer, and replaced it with the skill identifier 7Z, Logician. This skill identifier was then used in authorization documents to identify positions that required officers who were qualified in multiple logistical functions and were in the rank of
Major through Colonel. Specific criteria and training outlined the requirements to receive and maintain the skill identifier and positions were identified across the Army.\textsuperscript{12} The significance of this period was that the Army was searching for ways to produce and train the right officers for the right jobs. It is apparent through the research that as early as the mid 1980s, the Army was finding that they needed officers who were capable of doing many more things than their Area of Concentration of their branch specific job. In the logistics community, specialization was losing out to an increasing demand for officers who were capable of working in multiple logistical functions.\textsuperscript{13}

**INCREASING THE DEMAND FOR MULTIFUNCTIONAL LOGISTCIANS**

The significant event that brought about the increased demand and documented need for the multifunctional logistician can be traced to the reorganization of army units that occurred under the “Army of Excellence” banner beginning in 1982. During this period, the support structure made significant changes to support the force and the emerging Airland Battle doctrine. Functional support battalions within divisions, such as maintenance, supply and medical, were changed to multifunctional battalions. These new multifunctional battalions would incorporate supply, maintenance, transportation and medical functions into one organization.

The birth of the Forward and Main Support battalions provided divisional units with a single focal point for all their combat service support needs. By the late 1980's, this concept would spread to the Corps Support Commands and similar structural changes took place that led to the creation of the Corps Support Battalion and the Corps Support Group that would provide multifunctional support to divisional and nondonvionional units throughout the combat zone. The command and staff positions that were built into these new organizations would require officers that were knowledgeable in the tactical aspects of logistics; fueling, fixing, arming, moving and sustaining the warfighter.\textsuperscript{14} The positions called for multifunctional logisticians. The need for, and the demand on, these multifunctional officers would grow significantly during this reorganization. As we have seen, however, the Army still really hadn't resolved how to identify and train these multifunctional logisticians. At best, our personnel management system was only identifying senior officers and labeling them as logisticians. The dramatic structural changes the Army of Excellence underwent, however, would create a much greater demand and a need to train more than just the senior officers as multifunctional logisticians.
INTEGRATING CENTERS AND MULTIFUNCTIONAL TRAINING

During this period of significant force structure change, the TRADOC Commander recognized a growing problem with integrating training and doctrine development. In 1986 the TRADOC IG described a system, whereby separate branch interests and a lack of coordination between organizations created serious disconnects in combat, training and doctrine development. This finding led to the development of the Integrating Centers where a collection of the responsible staffs of related Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) would work to fix these shortcomings. The Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) at Fort Lee, Virginia, became the integrating Center for the logistics BOS, and focal point for the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps' synthesis of combat, training and doctrine development. The creation of CASCOM would play a primary role in the direction these three branches would take during this period of change, as the Commanders of these three branch schools would now work for, and take direction from the CASCOM Commander. More importantly though, the training and development functions at each of these branch schools would now, for the most part, take place at CASCOM, where branch programs now took on a more common logistics flavor rather than an independent parochial branch perspective.

This common logistics approach became evident when the CASCOM Commander recognized the need for increased multifunctional logistics training as a result of the support battalion structure design. In 1988, he directed a 2-week multifunctional module be added to the functional officer advanced courses of the Ordnance, Quartermaster and Transportation schools. Although this approach filled a gap in multifunctional training that was previously non-existent, it was not standardized, and the module tended to take on the flavor of the instructor and school that was teaching it. Additionally, the module was taught at the branch school and attended by only officers of that branch. Therefore, in 1991 the CASCOM Commander directed the development of the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC), to be taught at Ft. Lee, Virginia, that would combine the officers of the functional branches in a branch neutral setting. In June 1992, the first multifunctional CLOAC was taught, and the full-scale implementation followed in Fiscal Year 1994. At this point in time, separate advanced courses for the Ordnance, Quartermaster and Transportation officers would no longer exist. This event would initiate institutional multifunctional training at the company grade level, and validate a need dictated by the support battalion structure. CLOAC would also serve as the genesis of any future Logistics Officer Corps.
In 1993, in a nearly simultaneous effort, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved a new career field, Functional Area (FA) 90, logistics. This career field supported the doctrine and related organizational changes that grew out of the “Army of Excellence”, by creating a population of officers with the requisite skills who could be tracked and managed just like the other career fields. In the past, the logistics immaterial designation 03A was used to assign officers to logistics jobs just because they were from a combat service support branch. With the creation of FA 90, the Army changed force structure documents and coded over 1700 positions that were required to be filled by logisticians. So now with FA 90, one could not only identify a certain population of officers, but also know how many positions the Army needed to be filled by multifunctional logisticians.17

The FA 90 designation created in 1993 is the current system, with minor modifications, that we live with today. The “Multifunctional Logistician Program”, as Functional Area 90 is referred to today, is designed to ensure the “development of officers to the grade of colonel who are competent in planning and directing multifunctional logistics operations from the factory to the foxhole, across the entire spectrum of logistical functions of arm, fix, fuel, move and sustain.” In addition, the position code FA 90 used in personnel authorization documents will identify positions in the rank of captain through colonel that require experience in integrating the functions of supply, transportation, maintenance, aviation logistics, medical services administration and field services.18

It is important to note here that the development process of the Multifunctional Logistician Program takes place in 2 “phases”. Phase 1, the apprentice phase, focuses on educating the officer, while phase 2, the application phase, allows the officer to use the previously acquired skills and knowledge in assignments of greater multifunctional logistics complexity. The education portion of the apprentice phase consists of today’s version of the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course (CLOAC), now called the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (CLC3). This is the only institutional training requirement for the FA 90 logistician. The remainder of FA 90 training comes during the application phase, as officers learn, on-the-job, those skills required of the other logistics functions. There are opportunity courses, such as the 6-month Logistics Executive Development Course or the 2 week Support Operations Officer Course, that provide additional institutional training opportunities in multifunctional logistics. These courses, however, are not required training courses in order for an officer, currently in a logistics branch, to be awarded FA 90 (officers who branch transfer from a non-logistics branch must take one of these courses to become a FA 90).19 Right or wrong, it is clear that the institutional training required to create the multifunctional logistician
has served merely to introduce those attending CLC3 to the other functions of the logistics community. The expectation has been, and will most likely continue to be, that a FA 90 multifunctional logistician will learn what the Army expects him to know about the other logistics functions through successive assignments to positions that require knowledge in more than one logistics function. Although the research has shown the Army has sought to provide institutional multifunctional logistics training for decades, today’s application phase of FA 90 training is how the Army has always created multifunctional logisticians.

**PRECEDEnT FOR CHANGE**

Creating a new branch or functional area without a substantial amount of training is not without recent precedent. The Army has been consolidating military occupational specialties (MOSs) for some time. Downsizing and shrinking budgets of the 1990s accelerated the pace and need for consolidation of functions to eliminate excessive redundancies and achieve some economies of effort. Take for instance the consolidation of the Quartermaster 76 series MOS in the early 1990’s. The Army took 4 separate supply support specialties: the motor pool repair parts specialist (76C), the subsistence support specialist (76X), the authorized stockage list (ASL) automation management specialist (76P) and the ASL warehousing specialist (76V), and consolidated them into one MOS, the Automated Logistical Specialist (92A). Many can argue the success of, or shortcomings associated with this merger. However, it has been a process that has constantly been reviewed, and will continue to evolve in order to meet the changing needs of the Army. Changes in training, assignment policies and new technologies have taken place to accommodate deficiencies identified with this merger. Modifications in MOS consolidations like this one should be expected as we change Army force structure and requirements. This does not mean they are bad or wrong decisions. They must, however, continue to be reviewed to ensure the merger continues to meet the needs of our ever-changing Army. This merger, like countless other MOS consolidations we have seen during the recent past, are particularly relevant in that similar force structure changes and consolidations are necessary today as we transform our Army. The process of assessing the needs of the Army, and that changes in doctrine and structure are driving factors in how we change, are just as pertinent in consolidating officers into a logistics corps as they were in consolidating these supply specialists into a single function.  

Officer branches have also seen a need to consolidate and merge their specialties. Up until last year, officers entering the Ordnance branch received Officer Basic Course training as
either Maintenance Materiel managers, taught at the Ordnance Center and School in Aberdeen, Maryland, or as Munitions Materiel managers, who were taught at the Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School in Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. These two specialties were combined, and are now taught to all newly accessed Ordnance officers during their basic course at Aberdeen. A similar project is underway for the Advance Course attendees that will combine the same two specialties into a common module for Ordnance officers attending the Ordnance branch phase of the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. This change reflects a trend that has grown from the birth of multifunctional logistics officer training. Institutional training is used to provide officers with more of a general background, in this specific case, an Ordnance officer who is equally versed in maintenance and ammunition management prior to assuming assignments in either of these areas. This trend is currently gathering a great deal of momentum as TRADOC moves to develop a one-site Officer Basic Course. Though in the initial stages of development, the intent will be to have all newly commissioned officers attend an initial common core of training at the same installation (perhaps Fort Benning) regardless of their branch affiliation. After this common core training is completed, officers would then proceed to their specific branch school for branch specific training. This new concept offers a great deal of opportunity and possibilities for changing how we currently train Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation lieutenants.

For instance, new lieutenants interested in logistics could be accessed into a Logistics Corps with a regimental affiliation in one of the current functional Corps (Ordnance, Transportation or Quartermaster), and proceed to the initial one site Officer Basic Course for common military training. After this common core, the Logistics Corps officers could go to a common location (like Fort Lee) and receive a version of the multifunctional logistics subjects currently being taught to the logistics captains at CLC3. Upon completion of this instruction, the officers would then receive specific training on functional subjects in their regimental affiliation to prepare them for their initial assignment. This concept does not drastically change how we train new logistics lieutenants today, but would acquaint them up front, rather than waiting until they’ve completed their first assignment, to the multifunctional logistics role they will be required to perform during their careers. TRADOC’s desire to create a common Officer Basic Course provides a logical, and very timely, window of opportunity to merge the officers of the three functional corps into a Logistics Officer Corps.
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY LOGISTICS

Another key ingredient that makes this window of opportunity so logical and timely is the ongoing Revolution in Military Logistics. Former Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer, stated there could not be a revolution in military affairs without first a revolution in military logistics. This prompted the Army's senior logisticians to define the Revolution in Military Logistics and create a vision to guide the Army through it. At the focal point of the revolution in logistics is a shift from the supply-based system of mass logistics to a distribution-based system. In this distribution-based system, speed offsets the need for huge stockpiles, as inventories are replaced by a managed flow of materials through a distribution pipeline. Distribution-based logistics relies on new automation and communication technologies that effectively track materiel to ensure not only what is on hand, but where it is located. The use and understanding of these new technologies, such as Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and In-transit Visibility (ITV), and the most efficient way to capitalize on the information they provide, is vital to the Quartermaster, Ordnance and Transportation officer alike. These technologies have blurred the traditional lines of responsibility between these officers, since they each have a need for some or all of the information that they provide. All three branches now have a requirement to ensure their officers have a common understanding of the function and applicability of each new system. This requirement alone has, and will continue to demand a logistician who is, and must be, more multifunctional so that he can maximize the decisions he must now make as a result of the speed at which the information has become available.

The change to a distribution-based system has also led to a dramatic change in force structure, similar in magnitude to the change that took place when the Army embraced the Army of Excellence (AOE) force structure in the 1980's. The basic building block of the Force XXI combat service support concept is multifunctional modular units in direct support of combat units. At the division level, the current AOE forward support battalion (FSB) combines functional companies under the command of a multifunctional logistician (FA90). The Force XXI FSB now merges those functional companies into multifunctional companies (less the medical company). In addition, combat service support elements that were once organic to the combat units are now merged with the direct support elements of these multifunctional companies. The result, is an organization that centralizes organic and direct support combat service support of the supported battalion, called a Forward Support Company (FSC). This new FSC provides all classes of supply, food service, medical support, and maintenance (both unit and direct support) to the maneuver battalion it supports. The Force XXI FSB will also have a Base Support
Company (BSC) to provide logistics support to the brigade rear area (less medical and medical supply) and limited back up support to the FSCs. The BSC will also support the brigade with ammunition and general supplies to include packaged petroleum and lubricants as well as barrier materiel. It will also maintain the brigade’s spare parts authorized stockage list (ASL), and provide supply and service support to the engineer battalion supporting the brigade. Unlike the old AOE FSB, where a single Support Operations section coordinated the logistical requirements of the brigade, both the FSC and the BSC will maintain Support Operations sections to coordinate the logistical requirements of their supported units. This divisional logistics system significantly changes the scope and responsibilities of the logistics officers assigned to these new units. With the AOE structure, Lieutenant Colonels and Majors were performing the multifunctional tasks associated with coordinating logistics for their supported units. Now, this new structure pushes those coordination requirements, as well as the understanding of multifunctional logistics, down to the Captains and Lieutenants in these new organizations. These changes require officers who are trained in multiple logistics disciplines, true multifunctional logisticians, at a point in their careers much sooner than the logisticians in the current force structure. Rather than wait until an officer has completed his first assignment and returns to the Combined Logistics Officer Captain’s Career Course to be introduced to multifunctional logistics, Force XXI logisticians will need to receive this basic instruction prior to their initial assignment. Force structure will dictate the need for multifunctional logisticians, once again blurring the traditional functional lines of responsibility.

CONCLUSION

The Army has tried for years, with varying degrees of success, to train officers with the right skills, for the right jobs, to match the needs of its force structure. This was, and continues to be, the underlying goal of the Officer Professional Management System. I have attempted to review this system to highlight the evolution of this process with the logistics officers of the three primary logistics Corps, as well as its direct link to changes in force structure. We saw in the early years, following the abolition of the Technical Services, a system that struggled with the concept of logistic officer specialists and generalists. The Army agreed it needed both, and the force structure was such that it could accommodate both types of officers. But, subsequent changes in force structure would greatly expand the need for the logistics generalist, the multifunctional logistician. However, we learned there wasn't a sufficient system in place to produce these multifunctional officers, so the system worked on several "logistician" programs
to accommodate this shortfall. This system of providing officers with the right skills to match the Army's force structure continues today as we try to determine the best ways to produce the logisticians needed in Force XXI.

Army Transformation, the Revolution in Military Logistics, and the changes associated with each, mark this as a unique period in the history of our Army. I believe it also offers a timely opportunity to merge Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation officers into a single Logistics Officer Corps. Logistics officer training and force structure changes have, and will continue to blur the responsibilities of each Corps, as the system works to create more multifunctional logisticians.

General Salomon probably had the right approach when he spoke of creating a Logistics Corps that maintained regimental affiliation. The move to the one-site Officer Basic Course easily lends itself to this concept by simply adding follow-on common logistics training for logisticians. Other methods have been written about, while still others remain to be explored. I believe, like many, a Logistics Corps is inevitable. Obviously this type of change is difficult but, returning to Colonel Wass de Cege, "knowing why, when, and how to change is key to maintaining an Army's effectiveness."25 The "why" we've examined, the "how" has been, and will be debated, the "when" is now. Establish a Logistics Officer Corps.

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ENDNOTES


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