AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY'S OBJECTIVES AND OVERARCHING THEMES TO THE 1997 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD P. MUSTION
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2001
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY'S OBJECTIVES AND OVERARCHING THEMES TO THE 1997
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

by

Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Mustion
Department of the Army

Colonel (Retired) Bill Lord
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of
Defense, or any of its agencies.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Mustion

TITLE: An Assessment of the Army’s Objectives and Overarching Themes to the 1997 Department of Defense (DOD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 12 March 2001 PAGES: 23 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Army's objectives for the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) were to influence the National Military Strategy (NMS), improve the linkage between ends, ways and means, balance force structure, readiness and quality of life, market the relevance of the Army, and change the Cold War funding paradigm within the Department of Defense (DOD). The Army sought to achieve these objectives by articulating a campaign plan, which advanced four themes (What the Army Has Done, The Increased Relevance of the Army, The Army as Part of The Total Force, and The Army as a Joint Warfighting Team).

The Army was unsuccessful in achieving all of its stated objectives because it failed to present a compelling and rational assessment of its existing operational posture and critical resource requirements. As a result, the Army was criticized in numerous areas. However, the Army has taken action to respond to the criticisms and recommendations of the 1997 QDR.

This paper reviews and assesses the Army’s objectives and overarching themes for the 1997 QDR and provides recommendations for improving them for the 2001 QDR.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...........................................................................................................................................III

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY'S OBJECTIVES AND OVERARCHING THEMES TO THE 1997 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR) ...............................................1

THE FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND – THE 1997 QDR .........................................................1

FIVE QDR CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS ............................................................................2

LACK OF FISCAL CEILING ..................................................................................................................2

CHANGING GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................3

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE PATHS .................................................................................................3

THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY ............................................................................................4

TWO MAJOR THEATER OF WAR (MTW) REQUIREMENT ...............................................................4

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE CRITICAL ELEMENTS ........................................................5

THE ARMY OBJECTIVES AND OVERARCHING THEMES FOR THE 1997 QDR .......................5

ARMY OBJECTIVES AND INITIAL THEMES ...............................................................................6

THE STRATEGIC CROSSROADS AND INITIAL OVERARCHING THEMES ................................6

ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY’S INITIAL OVERARCHING THEMES ........................................8

CHANGE IN THE ARMY OBJECTIVE AND THEME .......................................................................9

CONCLUSIONS ...............................................................................................................................10

RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................................11

ENDNOTES .......................................................................................................................................13

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................17
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY’S OBJECTIVES AND OVERARCHING THEMES TO THE 1997 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

The Department of the Army was unsuccessful in achieving its original stated objectives for the 1997 Department of Defense (DOD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Army was unsuccessful because the overarching themes used to achieve the objectives were ineffective and failed to present a compelling and rational assessment of its existing operational posture and critical resource requirements. As a result, the Army was criticized in numerous areas. However, the Army has taken action to respond to the findings and recommendations of the 1997 QDR. This paper reviews and assesses the Army’s objectives and overarching themes for the 1997 QDR. The paper concludes by providing recommendations for improving the Army’s objectives and themes for the 2001 QDR.

In completing this project, the legitimacy of the QDR’s observations and recommendations are not questioned. However, as appropriate, this paper highlights instances where the QDR appears to be inconsistent and recommends the Army address the inconsistencies.

THE FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND – THE 1997 QDR

In December 1991, President-elect Clinton stated, “We need to replace the Cold War military structure with a smaller, more flexible mix of capabilities that retains a survivable nuclear deterrent force, emphasizes rapid deployment of forces, maintains the U.S. technological lead, and is supported by better intelligence.” 1 Seven years later, this statement provided the framework and required military capabilities needed in the 21st Century and indirectly provided the nexus of the 1997 QDR.

Congress chartered the 1997 QDR as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1997. The 1997 QDR was designed to build upon preceding reviews (the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)) with the objective of providing a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program through 2015. 2 Congress directed that the 1997 QDR be a collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Military Services and Commanders in Chief of Combatant Commands (CINC). In chartering the QDR, Congress also outlined that the review would include a comprehensive review of and recommendations concerning specific defense program areas. 3

Secretary of Defense Cohen reinforced the Congressional objectives by stating, “What I want to do is ensure that this process is undertaken with a notion that we want to look at strategy and that should be the guiding star and not the budget numbers as such.” 4 The
Secretary would further state, “In combat, we do not want a fair fight – we want capabilities that will give us a decisive advantage.”

Indeed, the intent of the QDR was to develop a strategy and military force that provided the U.S. with the decisive advantage to meet the uncertain challenges of the unstable geo-strategic environment. After the QDR, Secretary Cohen stated it was “the most fundamental and comprehensive review ever conducted of defense posture, policy and programs.”

FIVE QDR CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS

There are five critical elements of the 1997 QDR that must be analyzed in order to assess the effectiveness of the Army’s objectives and overarching themes for the 1997 QDR. The five critical factors are the lack of specific fiscal ceilings, the changing geo-strategic environment, the alternative path selected by the QDR, the tenants of the NMS, and the requirement to provide a capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous Major Theaters of War (MTWs). The five critical elements and their impacts are outlined below.

LACK OF FISCAL CEILING

Congress did not provide a specific fiscal resource ceiling for the 1997 QDR. Rather, it appears the congressional intent was to utilize the “independent” National Defense Panel (NDP) as the tool to validate resource requirements, since it was chartered to review the QDR and provide additional recommendations to Congress.

Even though Congress did not establish a fiscal ceiling, the Secretary of Defense did impose a fiscal cap of $250 billion per year as the “topline” for framing the defense force. In defending this self-imposed cap, Secretary Cohen stated the recommendations of the QDR were “fiscally responsible” and built on the premise that national defense spending is likely to remain relatively constant in the future.

The absence of a Congressional fiscal ceiling, combined with Secretary Cohen’s assertion that the QDR would be strategy based and his cap of $250 billion presents the first inconsistency of the QDR and directly impacted on the Army. The result is a “strategy versus capabilities versus resource gap.” The NMS endorsed by the 1997 QDR was not capped, constrained, or limited. The strategy was not adjusted to match the fiscal cap, nor was the fiscal cap lifted to ensure the requirements of the strategy could be achieved. The strategy resulted in “required capabilities” that far exceeded the $250 billion ceiling. Thus, a gap has evolved. For example, today’s defense budget now exceeds $300 billion. Many assert that to fully resource
the strategy would require an increase of up to $100 billion over the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP).  

Given the 1997 fiscal environment and Secretary Cohen's fiscal cap, it would have been irresponsible for the Army to suggest or expect increases in fiscal resourcing. However, the Army did just that and sought additional resourcing without articulating a cogent argument that warranted additional resources. Specifically, the Army did not outline the impact on capabilities that could not be provided within the fiscal limitations or the specific risks or trade-offs in capabilities that were required.

CHANGING GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The 1997 QDR outlined an uncertain, unstable, and changing geo-strategic environment characterized by an increasingly multi-polar, socially, economically, and politically unstable world.  

It outlined an environment consisting of "broad, multiple undefined asymmetric threats" requiring a "capabilities based" military force vice a "threat based" military.  

In asserting that there is no single threat (as existed in the Cold War), the QDR determined that the military requires forces capable of success in multiple environments and across the full spectrum of military operations. Throughout the 1997 QDR and the Army's subsequent response, reference is made to the requirement for a multi-functional or multi-mission capable force -- a force that can be employed against multiple threats is preferred over a specific capability force.

The Army believed it would benefit from the 1997 QDR's geo-strategic assessment. Throughout the QDR process, the Army outlined that its forces were already capabilities based and did not require reconfiguration to multi-mission capable forces. The Army outlined that it was already capable of full-spectrum operations. Therefore, the Army did not advance the need for any new or unique forces that might be required to support the NMS.

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE PATHS

The 1997 QDR considered multiple strategic paths in assessing the NMS. The various paths outlined potential risks, required capabilities, and priorities. The path selected would then be used to guide the development of force structure, military capabilities, and resource requirements for the DOD.

The 1997 QDR adopted a path that "balanced current demands with an uncertain future" while retaining sufficient capabilities and force structure to sustain our global leadership position and meet the full range of near term challenges. Concurrently, the path outlined the requirement for investment in future capabilities through a focused modernization plan that
leveraged the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and introduced new systems and technologies at the right place and time.\textsuperscript{14} Secretary Cohen described the path selected by the QDR as "a cautious approach that puts more emphasis on continuity than on change. It accepts a reasonable level of risk."\textsuperscript{15}

The balanced path selected by the QDR was the path of least resistance, requiring the least increase in fiscal resources, and smallest changes to force structure. From the Army’s perspective, the path meant only limited changes to force capabilities would be required. As mentioned earlier, the Army asserted its forces were already configured to accomplish multiple missions and as described later, the Army’s force modernization plan was on track to incrementally improve capabilities. Finally, the QDR path meant the Army would not see a shift in the DOD funding paradigm nor would it see a significant increase in the overall DOD budget.

THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The nexus of the 1997 QDR was the endorsement of the NMS. In articulating the NMS for the House National Security Committee, Secretary Cohen stated, “We simply cannot afford to come back to the continental United States, sort of zip ourselves in a continental cocoon, and watch the world unfold on CNN.”\textsuperscript{16} The strategy of shaping, responding, and preparing was adopted as the most viable for the U.S. given the current and projected environment.\textsuperscript{17} The strategy advocates shaping the international environment in ways favorable to the U.S., responding to the full spectrum of threats when required, and preparing now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. The anchors for implementing the NMS were defined by the 1997 QDR as quality people, ready forces, superior organizations, doctrine, and technology.\textsuperscript{18}

From the Army’s view, the NMS did not require a significant change in operations. It was almost business as usual. The Army’s forward deployed forces and sustained warfighting readiness supported the “shaping and responding” pillars, while ongoing modernization programs supported the “preparing” pillar.

TWO MAJOR THEATER OF WAR (MTW) REQUIREMENT

The report of the 1997 QDR stated that a “peer competitor” or another superpower would not emerge before 2015. Accordingly, the 1997 QDR determined that some “near term risk” in required capabilities could be accepted (specifics concerning near term risk were not outlined in the report). However, the 1997 QDR outlined that the DOD must “resource and provide the capability” to be able to respond to two nearly simultaneous MTWs. The QDR stated that the DOD must “for the foreseeable future be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border
aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies. The QDR determined that sustaining a two MTW capability was critical to the U.S. to provide essential flexibility and demonstrate resolve. It is around this threat the QDR endorsed the revised NMS and structured and resourced the force.

It appears the 1997 QDR used the two MTW capability requirement as the force sizing mechanism. The implication is that the forces required for the two MTW requirements could meet all “lesser” included requirements. Using this logic, the QDR neglected to consider requirements for “full-spectrum” operations in determining the force size. For the Army, this meant that forces not required for the “two MTW force” might not be resourced. In the end, the Army was sized by the 1997 QDR to “respond” to two MTWs but is being used more to “shape” the environment.

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE CRITICAL ELEMENTS

The 1997 QDR presents a significant divergence between strategy, requirements, and resources. It endorsed a NMS that could not provide the required capabilities within the assumed fiscal resources. Unfortunately, the services (the Army included) did not refute this shortfall. Rather, time after time, the service chiefs reported to congressional leaders that the NMS could be executed, with some level of risk, within existing resource allocations. What was (and is) lacking was the “adjustment” of strategy or required capabilities to constrained resource levels.

The five factors noted above are not extraordinary. Rather, they appear to reflect that the world we have lived in since the end of the Cold War (1989) is the same world we expect to exist through the year 2015. Contrary to Secretary Cohen’s statements, a review of the five factors and their impacts, indicates that the “cautious approach” adopted by the 1997 QDR was determined more by fiscal constraints than by the geo-strategic realities. However, the strategy and required military capabilities endorsed by the 1997 QDR exceeded the fiscal reality as evidenced by the almost immediate growth in the DOD budget to over $300 billion.

THE ARMY OBJECTIVES AND OVERARCHING THEMES FOR THE 1997 QDR

The 1997 QDR was a collaborative and interactive process. As deliberations were conducted and initial decisions rendered, the services’ were “in the loop” and were not surprised. As the process evolved the services had the “opportunity” to adjust their objectives and themes to react to the decisions. Accordingly, as will be outlined below, the Army’s objectives and themes changed in response to tentative recommendations by the QDR.
The Army had multiple opportunities to present briefings, information papers, and recommendations to the various 1997 QDR panels. The Army used these opportunities to outline its objectives and overarching themes. In some instances, the Army went outside the QDR to “present its case” to leaders in Congress and the civilian sectors of the U.S. Finally, the Army employed internal key leader forums as opportunities to reinforce the objectives and themes and to garner consensus and support from within the Army.

**ARMY OBJECTIVES AND INITIAL THEMES**

“The Army QDR question is: What is the minimum cost to DOD to have the maximum Army capabilities necessary to meet the National Security Strategy?”\textsuperscript{21} Despite Congressional and Secretary of Defense guidance, General Reimer’s comment clearly indicates the Army assessed the QDR to be a resource drill.\textsuperscript{22} The Army quietly entered the QDR expecting to face a force and resource reduction and as a result, developed multiple resource options.\textsuperscript{23}

With this as the untold reality, the Army’s initial stated objectives for the 1997 QDR were to influence the NMS, improve the linkage between ends, ways and means, balance force structure, readiness and quality of life, and market the relevance of the Army. Additionally, the Army saw the 1997 QDR as an opportunity to change the Cold War funding paradigm within the DOD by increasing its share of the DOD budget allocation.\textsuperscript{24} In its simplest form, the Army’s initial objectives were focused on obtaining increased force structure, end strength, and fiscal resources. The Army sought to outline that its operational tempo had significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, while it had concurrently reduced force structure and end strength. From the Army’s perspective, it was enduring significant fiscal constraints that were impeding its ability to modernize and recapitalize the force and provide for acceptable quality of life for soldiers and family members. Regrettably, the objectives, while well aimed, lacked essential, compelling rationale and supporting evidence.

To accomplish the objectives and educate key decision-makers that the Army was America’s only “full-spectrum, multi-capable force” a campaign plan was developed to market the Army. The plan consisted of the Army’s assessment of the current environment (The Strategic Crossroads) and four major themes. As outlined below, the Army’s overarching themes, while useful and informative, failed to accomplish the objectives.

**THE STRATEGIC CROSSROADS AND INITIAL OVERARCHING THEMES**

The DA asserted that the DOD was at a strategic crossroads and presented two paths to the QDR for moving the DOD into the 21st Century.\textsuperscript{25} The first path was marked by
evolutionary, “creep ahead” change that preserved a cold war force with cold war capabilities. On this path, modernization consisted of incrementally improving and enhancing existing current systems and warfighting doctrine which would rest on extrapolations of past conflicts. The alternative path reflected revolutionary, “leap ahead” change. This path would reshape the Armed Forces for the 21st Century consistent with NSS and NMS, and the strategic environment. The path would mortgage Cold War capabilities for new, innovative and revolutionary weapons platforms, doctrine, and organizations.26 While not articulated in the Army’s briefing materials, it appears the Army really sought a third path – the sustainment of current capabilities while concurrently seeking revolutionary, leap ahead changes in select systems, organizations and capabilities. In the end, this “blended path” – later formally recommended by the DA to the OSD – is consistent with the path adopted by the 1997 QDR.

The first theme sought recognition for “What the Army Has Done” since the end of the Cold War. This theme highlighted that the Army had executed a 36% downsizing of the force, closed numerous installations and facilities, incurred a 39% reduction in buying power, and sustained critical forward presence, while maintaining peak operational readiness.27 The message was the Army had transformed and had reduced to the lowest possible level in structure, facilities, and buying power. Further reductions would put the Army and the Nation at risk.

The second theme outlined the “Increased Relevance of the Army” in the geo-strategic environment of the 21st Century. The message of this theme was the Army, “on-point, shaping the global environment with overseas presence, responding to full spectrum threats, and concurrently preparing for the future.”28 The theme summarized the Army’s involvement in providing over 71% of the forces for 31 full-spectrum operations since the end of the Cold War.29 The Army’s position was it executed the operational missions, maintained critical forward presence, and sustained operational readiness with only 24% of the National Defense Budget (FY97).30 The Army’s relevance was outlined as “fighting and winning the Nation’s Wars by employing land forces to exercise direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, its resources and its people.”31

The third theme outlined the Army as “The Total Force” that was continuously changing and modernizing and founded on doctrinally sound principles.32 The Army’s modernization programs were on track to provide incremental improvements in most major combat systems, while at the same time fielding the Army with enhanced capabilities of selected new weapon platforms (Comanche, Crusader, and Longbow Apache). The Army was on the path to “methodical and evolutionary change” – moving from Force XXI to Army XXI to Army After Next.
The theme emphasized that the Army had “transformed” to a power projection, capabilities-based force with integrated active and reserve forces.³³

The final theme outlined the Army as a member of the “Joint Warfighting Team.” General Reimer characterized this as, “the Army’s unique and indispensable contribution to the landpower of our Nation’s joint forces.”³⁴ The message reflected that only land forces could make permanent changes compared to the transitory effects achieved by air and naval forces.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY’S INITIAL OVERARCHING THEMES

Three critical shortfalls in the Army’s overarching themes prevented the accomplishment of the objectives.

First, the Army’s message failed to articulate the service’s core competencies. As a result, the Army was unsuccessful in linking its capabilities and competencies to the strategic ends, ways, and means. The Army did not outline its core competencies as strategic ends, its required capabilities as ways, or required programs and resources as means. Outlining the ends, ways and means would have enabled the Army to clearly present how it supports the NMS and the resulting true cost in terms of dollars, personnel, equipment, and infrastructure.

The second shortfall was the Army’s failure to provide a compelling argument that would warrant changing the DOD Cold War funding paradigm. The Army’s initial overarching themes highlighted what it had accomplished with 24% of the Defense budget. In doing so, the Army failed to present a detailed bill or resource requirement to the 1997 QDR and link the resource requirement to a specific capability needed to execute the NMS. Rather, the message presented was the Army could and would willingly accomplish whatever requirements were put before it. Thus, a cogent argument warranting an increase in the budget was not provided. The Army did not outline the actual costs (direct and indirect) associated with sustaining a trained and ready force that had been used in an increased manner. The Army outlined that it had used the resources provided in an efficient and cost effective manner; and not that it required more resources.

The funding argument employed by the Army (but not clearly articulated) was that during the Cold War, the Army portion of the budget averaged 24 to 27%.³⁵ The Cold War defense program placed greater emphasis on a nuclear and strategic deterrent, i.e. Air Force and Navy. Therefore, the Army portion of the budget during the Cold War was adequate. However, the post-Cold War strategy and threat required increased land power.³⁶ As a result, the Army’s rationale was it warranted an increased share of the budget. However, as presented this

8
argument lacked merit. The Army’s failure to outline its core competencies in relation to the NMS and the corresponding fiscal requirements negated this argument.

The third shortfall was the Army’s failure to accurately portray its fragile and very precarious condition as a result of prolonged fiscal resource shortfalls and the over commitment of forces for the size of the force – the mission creep effect. Throughout the 1997 QDR, the Army took great effort to ensure it was given credit for all it had done (31 operational missions, 71% of the deployed forces, and execution of force and buying power reductions, etc.) The Army could honestly state it had not said no to any mission or requirement from the National Command Authority (NCA). By failing to present the true impacts, alternatives, assessments, or recommendations, the Army did not provide a viable argument for increased resourcing (either personnel or fiscal). Regrettably, the Army ethic prevented the leadership from saying no to the mission creep.

CHANGE IN THE ARMY OBJECTIVE AND THEME

As initial feedback of QDR findings and recommendations, including proposals for significant reductions in force structure were released, the Army objective and theme changed to an aggressive series of counter proposals and revised alternatives. Rather than being proactive and attempting to shape the 1997 QDR’s decision, the Army’s efforts became reactive in nature. The Army’s objective shifted to “force preservation” with the theme of aggressively questioning the decisions of the 1997 QDR.

In memoranda to General Shalikashvili and Secretary of Defense Cohen, General Reimer asserted that the 1997 QDR was skipping the defense strategy as the driver and pursuing a modernization bogey that was not linked to strategic requirements. Thus, the QDR had become the “feared” resource drill that was using “salami slice” reductions that were inconsistent with the revised NMS. General Reimer’s memoranda accomplished two actions outlined below.

First, he “generically” outlined at least $16 billion in potential fiscal savings in other DOD agencies and infrastructure. While this drew attention to needed infrastructure reduction and the “growth” of Defense agencies at the expense of the Services, his recommendations in this area lacked specific detail. General Reimer did not show how the Army had “cleaned house internally” in the area of infrastructure and came across as robbing another service to pay for the Army. Additionally, while outlining the fiscal cuts that could be made in other agencies, he failed to present a compelling argument for why additional resources should be provided to the Army.
Second, he clearly outlined the “blended path” of sustaining current capabilities while “leaping ahead” to a revolutionary force. General Reimer called this “The Path to 2020”.\textsuperscript{40} The force requirements outlined by General Reimer are extremely similar to the required capabilities outlined in the final 1997 QDR report and appear to be the framework and nexus for Army Transformation. He emphasized a need for “strategic preemptions”; to preventing or terminating a conflict on favorable terms before it becomes a debilitating, protracted war of attrition.\textsuperscript{41} To accomplish this, General Reimer outlined the need for forces that are “more agile, more tactically and strategically mobile, less logistically encumbered, and much more joint” force.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, General Reimer recommended a revised DOD modernization strategy that recapitalized select joint platforms, inserted new technologies into existing platforms (C4ISR product improvements) and refocused RDA on high-payoff and leap-ahead capabilities.\textsuperscript{43}

CONCLUSIONS

While the Defense Secretary Cohen stated that the 1997 QDR was a strategy driven event, in the end fiscal realities, not the strategy, drove the recommendations. The result is an unexecutable NMS where the requirements of the strategy exceed current capabilities due to fiscal constraints. The failure of the services to present core competencies as ends, ways, and means linked to the NMS and the failure of DOD to conduct iterative assessments of strategy versus resources, have put the services in a fragile and precarious position.

The Army’s initial objectives for the 1997 QDR were correct. However, the overarching themes employed lacked cogent definition and were inadequate and failed to provide a direct link to the stated objectives. As a result, the Army was not fully successful in achieving its objectives and was left with a mixed bag of results and criticisms from the 1997 QDR. The Army retained its combat force structure, was directed to reduce end strength of active and reserve forces, was criticized for failure to completely integrate the RC, and did not realize a net increase in fiscal resourcing. At this point, it is difficult to assess whether the Army was effective at influencing the NMS. It is clear that the Army failed to improve the linkage of ends, ways, and means to the Army core competencies and the NMS.

The Army used the “Just Because” rationale in advocating a requirement for more personnel end strength and dollars. The lack of compelling rationale that outlined the impacts of the NMS on the force, and the second and third order effects of the NMS doomed the Army’s efforts. The Army’s most critical error was advocating, “look what we have done for 24% of the DOD budget” versus outlining here is the impact of executing the NMS with 24% of the DOD budget.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army faces a significant challenge as it prepares for the 2001 QDR. Accordingly, the Army must develop and stay the course with consistent, well rounded and justified objectives and themes for the 2001 QDR.

The Army must present how it currently supports the NMS as a compelling argument for sustained land power. Further, the Army should outline its mission, core competencies, and functions as they relate to the NSS, NMS, and Joint Vision in the form of ends, ways, and means. By doing so, the Army can present what it is required to do, what it currently can do, and what programs and resources are required to execute the mission.

The Army must be cautious in presenting a message that it lacks the capabilities of a full spectrum force. In 1997, the Army announced that it was America's only full spectrum force, dominant at all levels of conflict. If the Army enters the 2001 QDR indicating it lacks this capability, then it must outline what has changed in the geo-strategic environment since 1997.

The Army must recognize the fiscal realities and articulate a message that quantifiably supports increased resourcing other than, "just because". It would be unrealistic for the Army to present a fiscally unconstrained program to the 2001 QDR. Rather, the Army would be better served to outline the "ends, ways, and means" necessary to execute the NMS. Imbedded in the ends, ways, and means should be the clearly defined cost. Accordingly, the 2001 QDR would be able to review the Army's plan and determine the cost (with reasonable fidelity), the potential trade-offs, and finally the critical risks. Finally, in this line, the Army must not go to the 2001 QDR with a message of look what we have done with 24% of the DOD budget. To do so would be devastating to the Army.

In line with the fiscal realities noted above, the Army must complete a detailed review and assessment of all existing science and technology, research and development, and procurement programs. The review must center on the following questions: What is the value added of the program? Will the Army be able to sustain overmatch capability without the program? Does the program directly support the Army Objective Force? Does the failure to resource this program jeopardize the Army Objective Force? After review the Army must be prepared to divest itself of programs that do not link to Army Transformation.

WORD COUNT 5,901
ENDNOTES


3 United States Statutes At Large Containing the Laws and Concurrent Resolutions Enacted During the Second Session of the One Hundred Fourth Congress of the United States of America, PL104-201, sec. 923 (1996). Among the specific areas the QDR was directed to cover included: defense strategy, relevant defense assumptions, force structure, readiness requirements and priorities, modernization requirements, infrastructure requirements, roles and missions of reserve component forces, combat and combat support force ratios, requirements for strategic mobility, requirements for forward presence and pre-positioning, recommendations for resource shifting as required during conflict and finally, other matters considered appropriate.


5 Cohen, v.


7 United States Statutes At Large Containing the Laws and Concurrent Resolutions Enacted During the Second Session of the One Hundred Fourth Congress of the United States of America, PL104-201, sec. 924 (1996), 2626.


11 Ibid.


13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.


16 Ibid.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid, 12.

20 Goure’, 25.


22 Ibid. General Reimer’s briefing to Army Senior Leaders characterizes the QDR as a DoD Resource Drill to answer the question: “What is the minimum cost for the DoD to have the maximum joint capabilities necessary to meet the NMS?”

23 Ibid.


26 Shinseki, “QDR.”


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Garner.

32 Garner.


36 Ibid. Additionally, the Report of the QDR, supplemented by briefings outlined in the bibliography makes repeated reference to the increased requirement for land power.

37 Ronald H. Griffith, Vice Chief of Staff. “Army Force Reduction Options,” memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 9 April 1997. General Griffith signed the forwarding memorandum to the Secretary on behalf of General Reimer who was unavailable. The cover memorandum indicates General Reimer personally crafted the reduction options. This memorandum is supplemented by General Reimer’s memorandum to the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff (“QDR Review Options” dated 31 March 1997).

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


United States Congress. United States Statutes At Large Containing the Laws and Concurrent Resolutions Enacted During the Second Session of the One Hundred Fourth Congress Of the United States of America. 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1997.

