NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

DETERMINING THE CORRECT INSURGENT STRATEGY FOR THE IRAQI OPPOSITION

by

Christopher C. Miller
Major, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Christopher C. Miller

5 February 2001
Determining the Correct Insurgent Strategy for the Iraqi Opposition

9. Personal Authors: Major Christopher C. Miller, USA

10. Type of Report: FINAL

11. Date of Report: 5 February 2001

13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. Ten Key Words that relate to your paper:
Insurgency, Insurgent Strategies, Support to Insurgency, MOOTW, Iraq, USCENTCOM, Operational Art, Operational Elements, Mass-oriented Insurgency, Maoist Model Insurgency

15. Abstract:
USCENTCOM is unprepared to support the U.S. policy toward Iraq of assisting Iraqi opposition groups that are trying to overthrow Saddam Hussein. This is because US-CINCCENT has not correctly identified the nature of the war he is supporting. Currently, USCENTCOM is providing assistance to support a Lenin model insurgency. The alternative proposal is a Cuban model, "foco" insurgent strategy. Both of these strategies are wrong because they don't take into consideration the principal elements that determine the nature of the war. An identification of the principal elements clearly shows that the correct strategy the U.S. should support is a Maoist model, mass-oriented insurgency.

16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution / Availability of Abstract</th>
<th>Unclassified</th>
<th>Same As Rpt</th>
<th>DTIC Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

19. Telephone: 841-6461

20. Office Symbol: C
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test [i.e., the political motives and special circumstances] the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive....
(Carl von Clausewitz, quoted from Michael I. Handel, Masters of War, 3rd edition)

With the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (ILA), the United States pledged overt military support to Iraqi opposition efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is the military command responsible for developing and implementing plans to support U.S. policy toward Iraq. An analysis of USCENTCOM’s strategy to support U.S. policy towards Iraq, and its principal alternatives, shows a misunderstanding of the nature of the war and illustrates the thesis of this paper: U.S. military support of the Iraqi opposition should support an insurgency based on a mass-oriented strategy organized on the Maoist model of protracted war.

During the Clinton Administration, the type and quantity of support to the efforts of anti-Hussein opposition groups pursuant to the ILA was openly debated in the foreign policy community. Bipartisan discontent in Congress with the Clinton Administration’s perceived lack of resolve in supporting the ILA was building in the administration’s final days. Domestic political factors, as well as the likelihood that Saddam Hussein will continue to destabilize the Persian Gulf region and militarily provoke the United States, will probably render much of the Clinton-era debate superfluous in the near future. Domestic political support for more actively aiding the Iraqi opposition is increasing. Additionally, the Bush Administration has already voiced a firm commitment to more actively support the efforts of the Iraqi opposition to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. The most ardent proponents for using overt U.S. military force to assist the Iraqi opposition are either designated to serve in the Bush Administration, or are advisors to the president. Richard Perle and Richard L. Armitage, senior Reagan and George H.W. Bush administration Department of Defense (DOD) officials and likely George W. Bush appointees, have both voiced strong support for providing U.S.
military assistance to the Iraqi opposition. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld signed an open letter in February 1998 calling on President Clinton, "to 'help expand liberated areas' in Iraq 'by assisting the provisional government's offensive against Saddam Hussein's regime logistically and through other means.'" Additionally, Paul Wolfowitz's selection as Deputy Secretary of Defense, the second highest-ranking civilian official in the DOD, makes it likely that serious consideration within the national security community will be given to a more aggressive stance towards Iraq. Wolfowitz has been one of the most vocal proponents for actively supporting the Iraqi opposition with large scale, overt military assistance. Saddam Hussein's continued bellicose behavior and the character of the Bush Administration could force USCENTCOM to provide overt support to the Iraqi opposition regardless of the potential difficulties. A correct understanding of the nature of the war and an identification of the principal elements that have an impact on its nature will allow the Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM (US-CINCCENT) to contribute effectively to the ensuing debate about the type and extent of U.S. assistance to the Iraqi opposition.

This paper will first determine the nature of the war the U.S. is supporting by discussing the policy objectives of the U.S. and the Iraqi opposition groups towards Saddam Hussein's Iraq. It will then analyze the efforts and plans of both groups to determine the strategies they are using. In the next section the suitability of the strategies will be analyzed. The paper will conclude with an identification of the principal elements that must be considered to determine the correct strategy.

**Political Objectives and the Nature of the War**

Since war is generally regarded as a political act, an examination of the objectives of the United States and the Iraqi opposition groups towards Saddam Hussein's Iraq is necessary to understand the general nature of the war. In February 1999 United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright enunciated U.S. policy toward Iraq:

...we have consistently—ever since the Gulf War—been pursuing a policy of containing Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. The administration—
starting last year—added something to that element, which is containment plus, the
'plus' being regime change in order for the people of Iraq to be able to have a leader
that is representative of them or allows them to choose a leader.\(^6\)

The two elements of containment and regime change have been the twin pillars of U.S. policy towards
Iraq since the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. Public statements indicate that the Bush
Administration will continue pursuing the same policy, although with more emphasis placed on regime
change.\(^7\)

U.S. policy toward Iraq is bifurcated with Congress playing a significant role in the
development and implementation of policy. Overwhelming bipartisan congressional dissatisfaction
with the Clinton Administration’s policy toward Iraq resulted in the passage of the ILA. The purpose
of the ILA was to force the Clinton Administration to take a more aggressive approach toward Saddam
Hussein. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott described the ILA as, “a strong demonstration of
Congressional support for a new policy toward Iraq—a policy that overtly seeks the replacement of
Saddam Hussein’s regime through military and political support for the Iraq opposition.”\(^8\) The ILA
authorizes the President to provide Iraqi democratic opposition organizations humanitarian assistance,
up to $2 million dollars in radio and television broadcasting assistance, and up to $97 million of
military assistance, which is defined as a “drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the
Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and
training for such organizations.”\(^9\)

Only opposition groups that are committed to democratic principles, respecting human rights
and maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq are eligible to receive ILA assistance.\(^10\) In deference to
Turkish concerns, this requirement precludes the establishment of a separate and autonomous Kurdish
state in northern Iraq. A unified post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would also reduce the influence of Iranian
fundamentalism in the Persian Gulf.\(^11\) There are two additional requirements publicly stated by
Clinton Administration officials—and relevant to the Bush Administration—but not mandated by the
ILA. The first is that U.S. support of Iraqi opposition groups must be acceptable to the Arab allies in the region who will be needed to provide basing, logistics, and political support. The second is that the U.S. must play a low visibility, supporting role to prevent Saddam Hussein and the Arab world from characterizing the Iraqi opposition groups and their supporters as U.S. puppets. As with most U.S. foreign policy decisions there are practical reasons for supporting the Iraqi opposition groups as well as idealistic reasons. Although not officially stated, the principal purpose for U.S. support for selected opposition groups is to guarantee considerable influence in post-Hussein Iraq with the minimum expenditure of resources.

Seven groups have been designated to receive ILA assistance. The principal recipient has been the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella organization of the major anti-Hussein groups. Although the Clinton Administration never formally designated any of the groups as the leader of the Iraqi opposition, the INC, having received the majority of ILA assistance and the vocal political support of Congress, is the defacto leader of the Iraqi opposition.\textsuperscript{12} The objective of the INC is to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power and it "...is dedicated to the institution of constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic government in Iraq, guaranteeing essential human rights to all Iraqi citizens."\textsuperscript{13} The INC's charter also calls for the establishment of a centralized government that maintains the territorial integrity of Iraq and the restoration of Iraq's international legitimacy by implementing all required United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).

The U.S. policy objectives and support of the INC's efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein clearly show that with U.S. support the INC is conducting an insurgency, "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."\textsuperscript{14} Further analysis of the nature of the insurgency is necessary to determine which of the four general categories of insurgency the U.S. is supporting and the INC is conducting.
Current U.S. Strategy

As far as strategies are concerned, four general approaches have been popular in recent and present times—the conspiratorial [Lenin model], protracted popular war [Maoist model], military focus [Cuban foco model], and urban warfare. Each places a different combination of requirements on insurgents. The conspiratorial approach emphasizes an elite small-scale organization and low-level violence; protracted popular warfare stresses political primacy, mass organization, and gradually escalating violence; the military-focus approach emphasizes military primacy and concentrates on either guerrilla or conventional warfare; urban warfare involves small-scale organization and low to moderate terrorist attacks in urban centers..."\textsuperscript{15}

The strategy the U.S. is implementing to support the Iraqi insurgency has not been publicly stated. To deduce the U.S. strategy it is necessary to analyze the type and quantity of assistance the U.S. has provided, as well as the statements by the current US-CINCCENT and his immediate predecessor.

In the 27 months since the passage of the ILA, the executive branch has spent $2 million of the $97 million budgeted. The $2 million was expended on non-lethal aid, primarily for administrative items and for training four INC members in civil-military affairs.\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, in January 2001, the Clinton Administration, under pressure from Congress, announced that it was providing $12 million in humanitarian aid to the INC to be distributed covertly in Iraq.

General Tommy R. Franks, the current US-CINCCENT, has not changed USCENTCOM’s strategy for supporting the Iraqi insurgency that was developed by his immediate predecessor General Anthony C. Zinni, US-CINCCENT from 1997-2000. General Frank’s response to congressional questioning during his nomination hearing on 27 June 2000 about his plans for dealing with Iraq was, “I expect to ‘stay the course’ in containing Saddam Hussein until provisions of the applicable UNSCRs are met.”\textsuperscript{17} Due to his position and his obligation to serve as a subordinate of the executive branch, it is unlikely that General Franks would have presented a countervailing opinion to the administration’s policy and objectives. However, General Zinni, who retired from active duty in June 2000, and politically split with the Clinton Administration when he declared his support for George W. Bush
during the 2000 presidential campaign, has continued maintaining his support of the same strategy he
enunciated while on active duty assisting in the development of U.S. policy and strategy in the Middle
East. In March 2000 Zinni said:

I think in those two areas they [the Iraqi opposition groups] should concentrate: internal coherence and cooperation and regional credibility. I've been opposed to lethal aid because I do not believe that is a viable option or will work...I am in favor of working with the opposition groups. I am in favor in [sic] helping them develop a political base, a cooperative approach, and credibility in the region. But they need to take those first steps before they start thinking about armed resistance to Saddam at this point.18

Although not explicitly stated, General Zinni's19 statements and actions as US-CINCCENT show that the United States is providing support for a politically organized insurgency of the Lenin model.20 This type of insurgency is based on a small, highly disciplined cadre that conducts a campaign of subversion to gain power primarily through political means. A clandestine armed element supports the political efforts through selective acts of terrorism, but does not rely on conventional military operations. The characterization of the nature of the war the U.S. is supporting as a politically organized insurgency precludes the use of the military element of U.S. power. The only military aspect that may have an unplanned benefit for the policy of regime change is those actions by USCENTCOM to enforce the no fly zones in northern and southern Iraq and to conduct maritime interdiction operations to enforce UNSCRs in support of the U.S. policy of containment.

**Alternative U.S. Strategy and INC Strategy**

It does not appear that USCENTCOM has conducted any meaningful, deliberate planning for supporting alternative options to support the U.S. policy of regime change. This planning lapse was publicized in several recent congressional hearings.21 During the 28 September 2000 Senate Armed Forces Committee hearing on United States policy toward Iraq, Richard Perle accused one of the other witnesses, recently retired General Zinni, of not conducting, “careful, serious study—getting a group of the appropriate planners together,” to develop a military strategy to support the United States policy.
of overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. General Zinni, whose outspoken opposition to providing U.S. military support to the Clinton Administration's policy of regime change is well documented, did not refute Perle's assertion. Additionally, General Franks made no reference to current or potential military plans to support anti-Saddam opposition efforts at his confirmation hearing or during his 19 September 2000 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. policy towards Iraq. The validity of Perle's accusation is not known; however, this writer, who worked closely with the USCENTCOM Special Operations Command from December 1995 to July 2000, is not aware of any deliberate military planning to support the Iraqi opposition.

US-CINCCENT's decision not to publicly provide other military options for supporting the Iraqi insurgency has resulted in non-DOD entities developing and actively advancing alternatives in the foreign policy and national security establishment. The plans propagated by the most influential advocates of providing significant support to the Iraqi insurgency have several common elements. The fundamental goal of these plans is to support the INC's efforts to establish a provisional government in an enclave in Iraq that would be protected from attack by Saddam Hussein's forces by U.S. air power. The U.S. military would provide anti-armor weapons and communications equipment, as well as logistical support to maintain the "safe havens" which would draw deserters from the Iraqi army. The international community would recognize the INC-led provisional government as the Iraqi government-in-exile and indict Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity. Economic sanctions would be lifted in the areas controlled by the INC and the production of oil would finance the provisional government as well as attracting the dispossessed and disgruntled from other areas. Offensive military operations would expand the liberated areas until conventional combat, a coup, or a popular uprising overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime. U.S. military involvement would be limited to providing equipment, logistical support, air support, training and advice. None of the plans propose
the direct involvement of conventional U.S. ground combat forces and do not provide any detail on the type and quantity of U.S. military forces that would support the Iraqi insurgents.

The INCs strategy for overthrowing Saddam was developed by a group of U.S. consultants consisting of General Wayne Downing, former CINC-United States Special Operations Command, and two former CIA officials. The INC's plan is generally the same as the plan described above although it provides more detail on the military aspect. The principal element of the strategy is military. A cadre of 200 to 300 Iraqi exiles would receive training from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Army Special Forces or from a third country. This core group would then train an army of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers to conduct attacks, seize defensible territory, and draw defectors from the military and government, and then progressively expand across Iraq in a "rolling coup". Deserting Iraqi soldiers would augment these forces. In 1998, Ahmad Chalabi, head of the INC and principal spokesman, described the INC as providing the Iraqi political movement while the U.S. provided, "...the political, logistical, and military help the INC needs to confront and replace Saddam." In September 2000 Chalabi further enunciated the INC's requirements for U.S. support by adding, "...I would say that we need to work with the United States on a plan of action which would have a military component to get rid of Saddam quickly."

The INC strategy is essentially a formal codification of the experiences of Iraqi opposition efforts between the end of the Persian Gulf War in April 1991 and August 1996. Immediately following the cease fire ending the Persian Gulf War, the Shiite population in southern Iraq responded to President Bush's call to rise in revolt against the Sunni-dominated regime of Saddam Hussein. The U.S. did not militarily support the Shiite efforts and forces loyal to Saddam Hussein crushed their rebellion. During this time the INC also established a provisional government in northern Iraq under the protection of U.S. air power. In this area, the INC developed the necessary infrastructure to provide governmental and civil services to the population. The INC's plan to overthrow Saddam
Hussein was developed by the CIA that supported their efforts initially with a significant covert action program. The plan called for a coordinated attack by a force of 20,000 Kurdish separatists, 1,000 INC soldiers, and 1,000 Iraqi communists against major Iraqi army garrisons in northern Iraq. By displaying the impotence of the Iraqi army, it was expected that units loyal to Saddam Hussein would desert and either trigger a coup or Hussein’s assassination by disaffected members of the military. If this didn’t occur, the growing anti-Hussein forces would attack from their enclaves and begin a “rolling coup” that would travel across Iraq and end with Hussein’s removal. The U.S. withdrew support for the plan in 1995 and began supporting the efforts of a small group of Iraqi generals that were planning a palace coup. Although the “rolling coup” was attempted, it was ineffective without U.S. support and ended in August 1996 with Saddam Hussein’s forces wiping out the enclave in northern Iraq and forcing the devastated and factionalized INC into exile. Until the passage of the ILA in 1998, it appears the U.S. continued to provide limited covert aid to the assassination or coup plotting of Iraqis in Saddam Hussein’s inner circle.  

The alternative strategy to USCENTCOM that many in the U.S. advocate and the INC has followed in their post-Persian Gulf War attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussein is generally the same type of insurgent strategy used by Fidel Castro to overthrow the Batista regime in Cuba in 1958. The strategy is known as “focoism” or the Cuban model:

“Foco” refers to the “mobile point of insurrection”; the concept, generalizing the peculiar Cuban experience, is that lengthy political preparation at the village level, as prescribed by Mao and Giap, is not essential. A small revolutionary force, by using violence, can mobilize popular support much more quickly; instead of political mobilization leading eventually to violence, violence transforms the political situation. Awakened by foco attacks, angered and encouraged by the brutality and ineptitude of governmental response, alienated if the government seeks help from a foreign power, people will be mobilized for revolution in a process in which violence itself is the catalyst.
Analysis

USCENTCOM's resistance to providing support to a Cuban model insurgency is understandable. It failed the two times it was used in Iraq in the 1990's. Additionally, although focoism was successful in Cuba, it has been unsuccessful in over 200 other cases. Although every situation is different, the general characteristics that make the Cuban model effective are considerable preparation of the populace with propaganda, a charismatic leader, and a government that is near collapse.

Intensive propaganda efforts were directed at the people of Iraq in 1991 and in support of the 1995 uprising. In 1991, sixteen of the eighteen provinces in Iraq rebelled against Saddam Hussein, indicating the effectiveness of the propaganda effort and the widespread dissatisfaction with his regime. In preparation for the 1995 uprising, most of the Kurdish area of northern Iraq was under INC political and military control and accessible to both print and broadcast mass media outside of the totalitarian control of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The characteristics of the leadership of the 1991 revolt in southern Iraq is not known, but Ahmad Calabi, the leader of the INC during the 1995 rebellion, and its current leader, can not be characterized as charismatic. Chalabi is a western-educated banker who has been an effective spokesman, but has been unable to dominate the disparate organizations that make up the INC. His hold on the INC is tenuous at best, based on the diverse and conspiratorial nature of the Iraqi opposition. The INC consists of competing Kurdish factions, Shiite fundamentalist factions, groups representing disaffected Sunnis, as well as monarchists, to name a few. All are publicly committed to a democratic form of government in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, but their unifying principle seems to be a desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

It appears that the most important factor that determines the success of the Cuban model is that the timing of the armed uprising coincides with a critical weakening of the government that is unable
to counter the outpouring of popular resentment. In both 1991 and 1995, it seemed that Saddam Hussein's regime was near collapse. In fact, this assessment was inaccurate. In both instances the opposition forces were easily defeated by loyalist forces clearly showing that Saddam Hussein's power and legitimacy were sufficient to defeat such an insurgency. There are no indications that Saddam Hussein's control over Iraq is weaker today than it was after the Persian Gulf War and is therefore susceptible to the Cuban model insurgency.

The proponents of conducting a Cuban model insurgency argue that the strategy will work if supported and protected by air power and anti-armor weapons provided by the United States. The argument is fundamentally flawed due to a complete misunderstanding of the enemy and its interaction with the strategy. There is danger in citing historical analysis as noted by the cautionary advice of an American soldier-scholar that, “...each insurgency is unique and defies accepting those solutions that worked elsewhere. Blindly trying to apply 'lessons learned' has resulted in failures on both sides.” Nonetheless, the historical examples of 1991 and 1995 provide relevant insight into Saddam Hussein's counterinsurgency techniques and are instructive. In both cases he effectively counteracted the effects of U.S. and allied support to the opposition. In 1991, he was able to suppress the widespread rebellion with helicopters and conventional forces before effective allied support could be provided to the insurgents. In 1995, Saddam Hussein's forces countered U.S. air supremacy over northern Iraq by infiltrating small armor elements to launch a coordinated surprise attack on the key INC-held town of Erbil and defeating the INC and forcing its leadership into exile before allied air power could assist them. Saddam Hussein also divided the opposition by establishing a temporary alliance with a rival Kurdish faction. These two examples, as well as his refusal to meet the Persian Gulf War cease fire requirements he agreed to, indicate that he and his security forces are adept at undermining U.S. influence.
Since the defeat of the INC in 1995-96, the U.S. has strengthened the no-fly zones by declaring them “no enhancement” zones in northern and southern Iraq where Saddam Hussein can not move large-scale forces. The advocates of the Cuban model insurgent strategy believe that the U.S. air power enforcing the no enhancement zones, along with the provisioning of the insurgency forces with anti-armor weapons, will be sufficient to protect INC enclaves. These factors, they assert, negate the threat of Iraqi armor and will allow the successful prosecution of the strategy. This assessment ignores Saddam Hussein’s political acumen and counter insurgency skills. He will likely be able to counter these limitations with other military and political means. It takes little imagination to envision the use of small, mobile counter insurgency forces that operate under the cover of darkness or bad weather and can quickly mass and disperse to avoid U.S. air attack and to counteract the effects of insurgent anti-armor weapons. The willingness of Iraqi opposition groups to form alliances of conveniences with Saddam Hussein’s regime to gain advantage over rivals is likely to continue. This will allow Saddam Hussein to continue playing opposition groups against each other to limit their effectiveness and maintain his influence.

Although CENTCOM’s informal determination that the Cuban model insurgent strategy is not appropriate for the INC is accurate, the alternative strategy based on the Lenin model that is supported by General Zinni, and apparently by General Franks, is also flawed and based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the war. The Lenin model’s principle requirement is that the insurgents have access to the political system to exercise political action to undermine and subvert the government. Typically such access is provided by rival political parties, labor unions, religious or social organizations, and student groups. Such opposition organizations do not exist in Saddam Hussein’s totalitarian Iraq. The U.S. has been unable to provide effective support to clandestine anti-Hussein organizations because they are infiltrated by the Iraqi security services. Even if the U.S. is supporting clandestine efforts to undermine Saddam Hussein’s regime that haven’t been compromised by Iraqi security services,
Hussein’s tight control over the instruments of power make it extremely difficult to subvert his regime. The necessarily small size of a Lenin model insurgent organization would make it unlikely that a rapid takeover of the government by the elite core could establish control over the country in a democratic manner even if they were successful. A successful Lenin model insurgency would probably be forced to resort to oppressive tactics to establish and maintain control and to keep Iraq from breaking apart along factional lines. Efforts to seize power by a coup or assassination are also unlikely.  

Saddam Hussein’s elaborate personal security measures have allowed him to survive the plots of numerous organizations committed to his overthrow or assassination.

The Lenin and Cuban model strategies are clearly based on an inaccurate assessment of the distinctive military and political characteristics of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the nature of the INC. General Zinni cautioned in 28 September 2000 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

You know, this [proposal to provide U.S. military support to Iraqi opposition group’s efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime] is going to fall to the United States military to handle, with a half-baked scheme. When this law [the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998] was being considered around here [Washington, DC] and these military schemes were being designed, they were being done in the back rooms. No one ever called the commander-in-chief of U.S. Central Command or any uniformed military officer that I know of to ask about the feasibility of these plans.

Although these plans are feasible, they aren’t likely to accomplish their objectives. The planners have failed to correctly identify the principal elements that will determine the outcome and how those factors interact. Only when this is done, can the correct strategy be identified.

**Principal Elements and Identification of the Correct Insurgent Strategy**

The INC leadership has requested U.S. assistance in developing their plans and strategy. This request has presented the United States a unique opportunity to develop the means to coerce Saddam Hussein in the near term and to influence post-Hussein Iraq. To avoid a “half-baked” scheme that will result in defeat and the loss of U.S. credibility and influence with the INC and other allies, the
principal elements that most influence the conduct of the insurgency must be identified. When the principal elements are identified the correct strategy can be ascertained.

Ten years and over eight billion dollars have failed to drive Saddam Hussein from power.\textsuperscript{36} All of the plans implemented to quickly overthrow him have been defeated. Saddam Hussein's control of Iraq is secure and is unlikely to diminish in the near term. Even if Saddam Hussein was killed tomorrow, or he was overthrown by a coup, it is unlikely that the new regime would be a representative government that would renounce its ambitions to be a regional hegemon. More likely, it would be another authoritarian regime hostile to the U.S. and a threat to the pro-Western states in the region. The protracted struggle between Saddam Hussein and the U.S. will likely continue. Additionally, other than Saddam Hussein's Baathist Party and army there is no element that could maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq following Hussein's death or overthrow. The INC must develop broad-based support and sufficient organization to replace Hussein's governmental apparatus and to maintain control of the country after Hussein's overthrow.

Although Iraq's neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, and Iran, could provide considerable INC sanctuaries for training and base areas, no strategy could rely on them. For political reasons the leadership of the Arab nations and Iran can not be seen as supporting the efforts of the non-Moslem United States to overthrow an Arab ruler. In the case of Turkey, the possibility of the establishment of an independent Kurdish state will limit their involvement. The bordering states will probably initially provide limited covert assistance, but no active sanctuary, to the INC due to U.S. pressure and a desire to influence events in neighboring Iraq, and increased assistance would probably be provided with significant INC battlefield success. INC sanctuaries can be created by exploiting the geography of Iraq which includes large expanses of desert in the south and west and rugged mountains in the north. Because the INC can only expect limited external support initially, it must support itself within Iraq.
INC success can not be predicated on consistent U.S. and UN support. Although Congress is currently committed to supporting the INC, congressional support is fickle. Recent history is replete with examples of inconsistent congressional support to U.S. allies in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Angola, and Vietnam, to name a few cases. Additionally, U.S. air support, contingent on UN authorization to enforce the no fly zones which can be withdrawn at any time, can not be relied on. A related concern is that, barring an extremely hostile act by Saddam Hussein, there is insufficient U.S. public support for large-scale military intervention. It seems likely that the American public will only support limited, low risk, low visibility assistance to the Iraqi opposition like that provided to the Mujahideen in their resistance to Soviet control of Afghanistan. INC strategy must be effective regardless of the type and quantity of U.S. assistance.

Saddam Hussein has sufficient security forces to control the major cities in Iraq, but not enough to maintain continuous control over the rural areas. Hussein does, however, have the ability to establish localized control over the population in any rural area he determines can threaten his power. The impact of the limited size of Hussein’s security force is that when he launches a major counter insurgency effort in one area, other areas are left less well defended. Consequently, the INC can’t be tied to territory, but must be mobile and flexible enough to avoid Saddam Hussein’s massed counter insurgency efforts.

The INC will require wide spread popular support to provide material assistance, and to protect them from Saddam Hussein’s counter insurgency efforts. The INC will also need significant popular support when they take power to keep Iraq from disintegrating into fractious groups and regions. Despite the instances of wide spread rebellion during Saddam Hussein’s rule indicating significant discontent with his regime, he has maintained control of Iraq since 1968 by rewarding his supporters and brutally supressing his opponents. The maintenance of his rule through periods of significant hazard attests to the effectiveness of his techniques. Discontent with the oppressive and often brutal
techniques Hussein has used to maintain power provide significant opportunities for the INC to exploit by presenting an appealing alternative vision of the future. Therefore, the INC must present a vision of a better quality of life and future than that provided by Hussein.

Equally important, the INC and their supporters must be able to withstand the inevitable paroxysm of violence that Saddam Hussein will direct at a rebelling region or group.\textsuperscript{38} To maintain their influence the INC must also present a clear explanation of their strategy to their supporters that will explain and withstand the inevitable setbacks. A unifying ideology and strategy is also necessary to establish the INC as an effective insurgent force. Commitment to the goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein may be sufficient to unify competing factions within the INC but will probably not guarantee a stable, unified post-Hussein Iraq.

Therefore, the strategy for the U.S. to recommend to the INC and support with training, advice, and material and political assistance, is one of protracted struggle that can be successful with limited external support. The insurgency must be rural based and mobile to avoid the strength of Saddam Hussein’s forces in the urban areas, and the ability of his counter insurgency forces to establish local control of selected rural areas. As a rural based insurgency, the INC will require popular support for material assistance and security. To gain popular support, the INC must create a vision of a better future than Hussein has provided. To maintain the loyalty of its supporters and the unity of its leadership, the INC must use an easy to understand strategy that can justify setbacks and military defeat. Finally, the INC’s organizational structure must be sufficient to effectively govern in the post-Hussein period and keep Iraq unified. The only insurgent strategy that incorporates the principal elements is the mass-oriented insurgency of the Maoist model.

The mass-oriented insurgency accounts for the protracted nature of the struggle and turns protraction into a weapon of the insurgent.\textsuperscript{39} "The statement ‘Time is on the side of the insurgent’ often appears in the literature on insurgency. This implies that an initially insignificant effort,
maintained long enough, will succeed.”

The emphasis of this type of insurgency on political and military organization and the establishment of a rival government allow for the insurgents to quickly supplant the defeated regime and maintain internal control. The mass-oriented insurgency recognizes the importance of building popular support through disciplined behavior and the propagation of an ideology that attracts adherents. The Maoist model establishing three stages of guerrilla warfare maintains popular support by presenting an easy to understand framework that is flexible. The three staged theory, “presents a simplistic view of insurgency—a view well adapted to the indoctrination and psychological organization of cadres, troops, and populace whose average level of formal education is quite low.”

The Maoist model also allows for reverting back to earlier stages of insurgency to account for setbacks and changes due to enemy or external interaction. The Maoist model also recognizes the importance of controlling the population as opposed to holding territory and is designed for situations where the enemy controls the urban populations.

Clausewitz cautions that the process of determining the nature of the war, although sounding easy, is in fact extremely difficult due to the tremendous number of variables, as well as the adversary’s interaction, that must be considered. A Clausewitz scholar interprets why this analysis is necessary, “Clausewitz would answer that although no political or military leader can accurately predict the nature of war, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to try. This maximizes his chance of establishing a sound basis for his strategic and operational planning as well as for his war preparations.”

An analysis of the strategies of the U.S. and the INC to overthrow Saddam Hussein clearly shows that those developing them did not correctly determine the nature of the war because they improperly identified the principal elements. By recognizing that a mass-oriented insurgency of the Maoist model of protracted war is the correct strategy for the Iraqi opposition to use to overthrow Saddam Hussein, US-CINCCENT can articulate his operational requirements to his staff and subordinate commanders so they can develop effective plans to implement U.S. policy.
NOTES


7 Reference footnotes 1-4.

8 Trent Lott, Congressional Record, Senate, “Establishing a Program to Support a Transition to Democracy in Iraq,” 105th Cong., 2d Session, 7 October 1998.


10 Ibid.


19 (Question by Senator John McCain) “Now when the Iraq Liberation Act was passed General, you said, ‘I do not think these questions have been thought through or answered. If they have, no one asked me about it. I will be honest with you. I do not see the parts of this act that make it sensible.’ (John McCain, “Statement,” U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Policy on Iraq, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 28 January 1999, 14); “I certainly favor a different regime, but I favor it in a way that these considerations of territorial integrity, that it is representative government afterwards, and it is done in a way that does not destabilize the region, those considerations are in place and we find the correct way to do it within those considerations. Then I am fully supportive of it.” (Anthony C. Zinni, “Statement,” U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Policy on Iraq, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 28 January 1999, 28); “In my view, there aren’t any that we could arm today that would march on Baghdad and successfully achieve regime change. I have been accused of being opposed to the I.A. I have never said that. I am all for getting these groups together. I am all for encouraging them to work out their differences. I do not feel it’s wise at this point to speak of providing weapons that are not viable to them. Whatever we do should be done with the stability of the entire region in mind, and we should be careful not to act in a way which could promote the division of Iraq.” (Anthony C. Zinni, “Statement,” U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Policy on Iraq, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 28 January 1999, 32); “There are
those that look for short term, quick answers. Perhaps we could arm opposition groups, perhaps we could stir up some sort of covert action. Our track record has not been great and that’s a kind of roll of the dice in my view in many cases if not done correctly. It’s not impossible but also very difficult and very iffy. So you often at times end up with containment as the best option.” (Anthony C. Zinni, “United States Policy in the Gulf,” RUSI Journal, 144 (August 1999): 47); “I wacked my brain for over four years thinking about a policy, other than containment, that would work, a short, quick answer to resolving the problem of Saddam Hussein. And I have to be honest with you; I didn’t come up with a better one…..Containment seems to be what you end up doing when it’s difficult to generate the political will, the popular support to take military action.” (Anthony Zinni, “Statement,” U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Policy Toward Iraq, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 28 September 2000, 5 (CIS Congressional Universe transcript)).


22 Perle further stated, “I don’t believe that General Zinni convened his planners and said, ‘All right, gentlemen, let’s talk about how we might build on the potential strengths of the opposition in, not a quick and easy solution, but a longer-term alternative to the current situation.’ Somebody ought to do that, whether it’s General Zinni’s successor or the next administration.”


29 Gunther, 150-161.

21


37 An NBC/Wall Street Journal poll in March 1999 poll of 2,012 Americans showed that 49% of those surveyed believed that the U.S. should use American troops to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Based on the considerable debate over the use of U.S. forces to reestablish the territorial integrity of Kuwait in 1991, this level of support is probably insufficient.


39 Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this section are: *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, various pages; Shy and Collier, various pages; *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, various pages; Franz and Jensen, various pages.

40 *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, 2-5.


42 Handel, 92.