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COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE: SHOULD IT BE A JOINT REQUIREMENT?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

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Combatt Search and Rescue: Should It Be A Joint Requirement? (Unclassified)

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- Joint operations
- Command and control

Abstract:
The genesis of this paper is based on the hypothesis that Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is best optimized for the operational commander by being joint. With an increased emphasis on personnel recovery and a reduced force structure, the unique capabilities of the services should be combined to maximize effectiveness. Historical analysis from WWII until present day highlights the benefits and disadvantages of a single-service CSAR focus in comparison to a joint focus. This analysis reveals the joint character of many successful rescue operations. These lessons from the past will shape the manner in which CSAR will be conducted in the future, and also identify needed improvements in procedures, organization, and doctrine to do so. With a top-to-bottom joint focus in organization and doctrine, CSAR can utilize the unique character and tactics that each service brings to the joint force to enhance operational effectiveness.

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ABSTRACT

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE: SHOULD IT BE A JOINT REQUIREMENT?

The genesis of this paper is based on the hypothesis that Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is best optimized for the operational commander by being joint. With an increased emphasis on personnel recovery and a reduced force structure, the unique capabilities of the services should be combined to maximize effectiveness. Through a series of historical perspectives and a current assessment of CSAR capabilities, a joint structure is identified as necessary and desirable.

The historical sections of the paper outline the inception and development of CSAR from WWII to present day. This analysis highlights the benefits and disadvantages of a single-service CSAR focus in comparison to a joint focus. It also identifies that historically CSAR has relied on joint operability to maximize success. Most importantly, the lessons of past have revealed how to shape tactics, techniques, and procedures to be utilized by future rescue forces. The study of current CSAR force structure and organization reveals deficiencies in component CSAR doctrine as well as joint doctrine. While valuable CSAR assets are scarce, a renewed emphasis by senior leadership and associated agencies reveals a joint shift in CSAR organization and employment.

To best augment these changes in CSAR focus, a series of recommendations are offered. The shift to a joint focus at DOD should be emphasized by the services down to the unit level. While this standardization will help a great deal, doctrine should require a primarily joint focus with clear command and control. These organizational changes, along with the integration of tactical level expertise can enhance future CSAR operations.
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Introduction

On 3 June 1995 during Operation Deny Flight one of every tactical aviator's worst nightmares came true. While flying an Air Force F-16, Captain Scott O'Grady was shot down by an SA-6 surface to air missile over Serbian held territory. The next six days involved an extensive effort to locate O'Grady, and once found, extract him. His ordeal and the role of the subsequent combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces propagated the headlines of world media, bringing the saga into the living rooms of America.

With the world watching, the commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe had to make a timely and informed decision on how best to rescue the downed airman. Using the Combined Air Operations Center in Vincenza, Italy as the coordinating agency, he chose his forces. Some 40 aircraft were utilized including USMC CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters as the rescue platforms, and AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters and AV-8B Harriers as the search, suppression, and rescue escort (RESCORT) aircraft. Additionally, Air Force and Army Special Operations Aviation Element helicopters were airborne as back-up if needed. Above the rescue package ensuring route, rescue aircraft, and personnel security were Air Force and Navy assets providing Close Air Support (CAS), Combat Air Patrol (CAP), Airborne Command, Control, and Communications (ABCCC), early warning radar, and air refueling. Approximately six hours after Captain O'Grady made radio contact with Air Force F-16s, he was safely aboard the USS Kearsarge in the Adriatic Sea.

The scope of this CSAR spans the spectrum from tactical level capabilities, to operational level coordination and execution, to possible strategic/political consequences. It also brings into question whether a single service can provide the assets required to conduct a successful CSAR today. or is a joint approach more advantageous? U.S. political leadership's
apparent aversion to casualties, often tagged on to the American public, can bring personnel recovery under intense scrutiny. The “CNN” factor of instantaneous information channeled into American households, the rising costs and value of material and human resources, and the desire to bolster morale of highly tasked forces, places CSAR in the middle of the operational commander’s lap. As actions at the operational level of war are inherently joint, military downsizing continues, and worldwide operations tempo remains high, CSAR becomes more joint in nature through necessity. With these factors in mind, a chronological look at CSAR’s past and a critical analysis of current CSAR organization, force structure, and capabilities will be examined. Based on this assessment, it is the purpose of this paper to validate that CSAR in today’s world climate and force structure requires a joint focus to optimize success.

The Birth of CSAR

CSAR as a military function grew from the need and ability to rescue downed airman from the English Channel and the Pacific Ocean during WWII. While the ability to field a survivable Search and Rescue Task Force (SARTAF) over land was still impractical, the over water recoveries were possible. The U.S. Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force joined forces to provide recovery for Allied forces from the English Channel. The Germans entered WWII with a robust CSAR force known as the Sceenotdienst, focused around the Heinkel floatplane to execute their channel recovery attempts. In the Pacific, Allied ships, submarines, and seaplanes were used to recover downed pilots and crews from the Army Air Corps, Navy, and Marines. Why did personnel, and especially aircrew recovery, grow in importance so rapidly during WWII? During a 10 day period in 1940 the Royal Air Force lost 154 fighter pilots, either missing or severely wounded, and only produced 63 new fighter pilots during the
same time frame.\textsuperscript{1} Trained pilots became an increasingly valuable commodity as WWII progressed. No one knew this better than Germany and Japan, who were in short supply of aviators in the closing days of the war due to enormous attrition rates.

Also in the closing days of WWII the helicopter was introduced into the China-India-Burma Theater, highlighting new possibilities for over land personnel recovery. The Air Force in 1947 established the Air Force Rescue Service in the Air Transport Command. The service was centered on helicopters, and grew from 11 groups to 50 squadrons to accommodate Korean War requirements. During the Korean conflict the Air Force Rescue Service was able to recover about 10\% of all downed aircrews.\textsuperscript{2} The Navy soon adopted helicopters for carrier service for over water and over land recoveries as well. While some interoperability existed between the Air Force and Navy, rescue operations were normally carried out by the service that lost the asset. As the Korean War came to a close, a great deal of experience was garnered on how to conduct CSAR with helicopters. Unfortunately, the U.S. began a significant draw down of military force structure, and the once robust Air Force Rescue Service dwindled to three squadrons by 1960.\textsuperscript{3}

**Vietnam**

In the early years of Vietnam, the now Air Rescue Service was in a precarious position. Although the U.S. was only engaged initially in a “training” mission, regional commanders identified the need for CSAR assets in theater. Not only were personnel and equipment lacking, but the corporate CSAR knowledge from Korea was apparently lost in the atrophy of post war downsizing.

The Air Force and the Navy recognized they had a daunting task ahead. To simplify
matters the Navy and Air Force divided the responsibility of CSAR within the theater. The Navy would cover the Gulf of Tonkin to five miles inland, and the Air Force would be responsible for the rest of the landmasses. This approach delineated responsibility, but it also lent itself to a single service conducting CSAR for their own assets. This segregation minimized the use of all available airborne assets, and negated opportunities to exchange tactics and procedures.

This approach to the challenge of CSAR was initially very costly, as the Navy lost one rescue aircraft for every 1.4 over land rescues and one crew member for every 1.8 successful rescues. The Air Force was also experiencing the vulnerabilities of their HH-43 and HH-3 helicopters and began searching for a way to protect them. Fixed winged rescue escort (RESCORT) was the key, and the A-1E Skyraider was the answer. In 1965 the Air Force requested the assistance of the Navy in providing additional A-1Es to perform RESCORT duties, and the Navy soon realized the enormous benefit of RESCORT as well. By 1967 the Navy had trained RESCORT assets in theater to take advantage of this teamwork concept of operations. These RESCORT assets also became the search and suppression assets dedicated to locating and protecting the survivor, providing helicopter security, and as the On-Scene Commander (OSC), controlling the rescue. The introduction of the HH-53E and its variants, in addition to HC-130s for command and control and A1-Es, A-4s, and A-7s for RESCORT, saw the birth of the Combat Search and Rescue Task Force (CSARTAF). Now that the services had trained aircrews, additional assets, and interoperability, CSAR became more effective and survivable.

This maturation of the CSAR mission, along with the dedication and courage of the rescue forces, saved 3,883 lives in Vietnam, of which 2,780 were under combat conditions. In
the process. 45 rescue aircraft and 71 rescue personnel were lost.\textsuperscript{7} The growing success of CSAR during the Vietnam War can be attributed to the dedication of assets, mission specialization, and standardization of tactics. These factors were realized through often times costly on-the-job training and the persistence of field commanders focused on their mission and personnel.\textsuperscript{8} While senior planner's consideration for CSAR was still limited, a growing understanding of its capabilities showed in the attempted POW rescue at Son Tay.

**Son Tay Rescue Attempt**

Through a series of intelligence gathering means, a number of POWs at Son Tay Camp were identified as being close to death. Military leadership requested and received approval from the NCA to mount a rescue effort to free these POWs. Army, Air Force, and Navy commanders formulated the idea, plan, and execution. The CSARTAF encompassed Air Force helicopter, RESCORT, refueling, CAP, and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) aircraft. Army Green Berets were on the helicopters to effect the ground rescue and the Navy launched a diversionary raid with 69 aircraft over Hanoi to occupy the North Vietnamese. In 29 minutes on the ground, rescue forces killed over 200 North Vietnamese troops and completely overwhelmed the camp, sustaining no casualties.\textsuperscript{9} Unfortunately, no prisoners were recovered as they had been moved prior to the rescue attempt. While this endeavor illustrated the increasing awareness of CSAR, it also highlights learning points from our Vietnam experience. Most important of these was the success of joint CSAR, where the unique contributions of the services were combined to enhance mission effectiveness. While the rescue attempt was proficiently executed, the months of preparation and weather delays proved to make the effort unsuccessful because of the movement of the prisoners. The
lessons learned on daily alert CSAR missions proved to be valid in this joint effort as well. To successfully execute a CSAR, you must incorporate speed, preparation, and flexibility. The "ad hoc" or service approach to CSAR up until this point, unfortunately meant that speed and flexibility were severely degraded by having to reactively prepare for Son Tay. Despite these lessons JP O-2. *Unified Actions of Armed Forces*, developed after Vietnam, still delineated the responsibility to individual services to provide CSAR for their own operations.\(^{10}\)

Additionally, service doctrine post Vietnam had a predominately helicopter-centric focus, discounting search, suppression, and RESCORT duties. This is evident in current Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-50.22. *Combat Search and Rescue Manual*, which devotes ten pages to rotary winged operations, and only two pages to fixed winged assets. This is unfortunate, given the fact that the fixed winged pilot/crew is the OSC/mission commander in charge of controlling the rescue forces and SARTAF assets, communicating the plan of action to all players, and executing the rescue once the operational commander’s approval is given (see figure 1).

**Vietnam to Desert Storm**

While many of the tactical lessons learned in Vietnam were not lost in the significant post war downsizing, the small service rescue contingents found it difficult to build a credible force. For example, the small budget going into Air Force CSAR platforms was diminished with the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, Desert One. Much of the money and effort designated for CSAR helicopter upgrades was diverted to the special operations mission after the failed rescue attempt.\(^{11}\) During the seventies, eighties, and nineties, the apparent indecision on how to manage CSAR assets was evident in the Air Force and the Navy. As the
Air Force Rescue Service found itself in the Military Airlift Command, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and finally in the Air Combat Command (ACC); Navy assets fluctuated between active and reserve units.

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act called for all services to incorporate joint capabilities into all warfighting plans and missions. By the late 1980s, Air Force rescue helicopters were in short supply and often A-10 units, now the Air Force’s search, suppression, and ESCORT asset, would train with the Coast Guard and other services. While this joint operability was within the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, it was not by design.

The USAF was not maintaining an adequate rescue platform service capability, as per JP O-2, so A-10 units searched elsewhere for training opportunities. Finally in 1991, the USAF began to build its rescue platform fleet again with the establishment of HH-60 Blackhawk squadrons. Although this was a positive step in building the service capabilities again, it was too late to affect operations in Desert Storm. With an insufficient number of HH-60s and crews, the AFSOC HH-53s and Army UH-60s were called upon to act as rescue platforms. Both the crews and platforms were highly capable, but their training and equipment was only minimally focused on theater level CSAR. Consequently, due in part to these factors and their limited availability while accomplishing their primary missions, CSAR assets rescued only 3 of 64 crewmembers downed in Desert Storm. 

Desert Storm to Present Day

As the U.S. entered the 1990s, USAF rotary winged and fixed winged rescue assets were deployed around the world in contingency operations such as Operation Northern Watch (ONW) and Operation Southern Watch (OSW). However, when operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo began, the USAF once again had to rely on USMC and USSOCOM rescue aircraft to execute CSAR extraction duties. While CSAR efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo were successful due to competent sister service platforms and crews, their success can also be contributed in part to operating in a mature theater. In other words, had this been an operation where units were quickly deployed to a locale, a lack of an established command and control structure and little time to coordinate CSAR operations would have made this task much more difficult.

Current Challenges

While today's joint doctrine outlines the structure of joint CSAR, it still requires each service and USSOCOM to perform CSAR in support of their own operations. JP 3-50.2. *Doctrine for Combat Search and Rescue*, states that CSAR operations will become joint when the capability of a component commander to conduct their own CSAR is exceeded and two or more components of the JTF are required.\(^{13}\) This "service first" approach has led to individual service doctrine to develop differently, causing confusion during joint operations. An example would be NWP 3-50.22, which addresses CSAR in the same general way that JCS and USAF doctrine does, but includes additional roles and responsibilities not addressed in the others.

First, the NWP emphasizes the use of "minimal" assets to accomplish CSAR. This emphasis misses the mark as JP 3-50.2 defines the goals of CSAR as: to return valuable resources, to deny the enemy opportunity to exploit for intelligence and propaganda, and to maintain force morale. In the modern context of CSAR and the complex CSARTAF required for success, the word minimal hardly seems appropriate to effectively achieve those objectives for the JTF and distressed personnel. In addition, Navy doctrine employs a Rescue Mission Commander, whose duties are redundant to the RESCORT/OSC duties found in Air Force and joint
doctrine. Navy doctrine also dictates that the OSC be the senior individual of any unit in the CSARTAF. This is considerably misguided as the OSC is a duty performed by the pilot/crew that has the highest situational awareness, is best trained for the mission, or is designated by the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC), and has nothing to do with seniority.

Looking specifically at joint doctrine, the means for standardization of CSAR forces is available. However, the graduated approach from service to joint responsibilities inhibits the speed and preparedness required to simplify a complex CSAR mission. As an example, a service component requiring assistance will first notify the JSRC. At this point the JSRC may pick-up the mission commander duties, leave them at the requesting component Rescue Coordination Center (RCC), or give them to the component RCC designated to provide support. This means that the mission commander duties may be changing hands when timely and informed decisions are needed. This change of tactical control will make early execution of the plan confusing and inefficient in a system where communications are already challenging.

The way joint doctrine is structured, as seen in JP 3-50.2 (see figure 2), service CSAR units report to their own component RCCs that in turn report to the component commander. Doctrine also states that the JFC should establish a JSRC to coordinate and execute joint CSAR requirements. The JSRC can be kept on the JFC staff, or designated to a component commander who will have their RCC perform their service requirements as well as act as the JSRC. Depending on where the JSRC resides, either the JFC or component commander will designate a director of the JSRC. JP 3-50.2 implies that the RCC is responsible to the component commander, but how does the JSRC director fit in? Joint doctrine states that the
director is the JFC’s representative for CSAR and can task components to support CSAR missions. If the JSRC is being performed by a component RCC, the director works for a component commander and is responsible to the JFC. However, if the JSRC is kept at the JFC level, an RCC director could be receiving guidance from his component commander and a JSRC director. This guidance could be conflicting, and the resulting confusion and required coordination to solve conflicting direction will cause delays in time critical situations.

Unfortunately, this chain fails to illustrate how the JSRC fits into the picture, or how RCCs integrate with the JSRC. If the JSRC is supposed to be the single point for CSAR matters, then the JSRC should be depicted as the lead CSAR entity. The JSRC is shown to be in coordination with all the RCCs, but it needs to be displayed as the lead agency for command and control to provide guidance and structure, not just coordination. Without a well defined chain of command, the possibility of duplication of effort and redundancy at the unit and RCC level causes inefficient use of valuable resources and assets.

JP 3-50.2 (see figure 3) depicts an example of the USSOCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC is SOC’s equivalent of an RCC) acting as the JSRC. This chart again only has the RCCs coordinating with the JSRC. It also fails to clearly depict how component commanders interact here. If the component commander owns the rescue assets in his command, how does the JSRC task them? In this example, does the commander of USSOCOM have to go through the component commanders, or is coordination through the RCCs appropriate to chop forces to the JSRC? Not providing a clear chain of command on how the component commanders and their RCCs augment the JSRC causes confusion, to say the least.

As CINC's around the globe are directed to be cognizant of casualty aversion, collateral damage, and force protection, the success or failure of these efforts are played out
on the world stage. This stage encompasses multiple contingency taskings requiring numerous commitments by all services after years of significant downsizing. No service in these contingencies has the current capability to provide comprehensive CSAR for themselves. The increased focus on personnel recovery and CSAR has alerted many CINC/JFCs to enhance their CSAR capacity. While search, suppression, RESCORT platforms such as the A-10 are deployed around the world, they are often dedicated to CAS and anti-armor missions. This focus has begun to change, and their missions are becoming increasingly CSAR oriented while deployed. In the past year, ONW staff requested and received A-10 support dedicated to the CSAR role. The active duty A-10 units, which in the past 10 years have dwindled by 50%, are supporting CSAR operations in Korea, Europe, ONW, and OSW. The inability of active units to meet the demand for these aircraft has resulted in augmentation by Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units.

Reorganization and Awareness

In the FY 96 Defense Authorization Act, which contained the Missing Persons Act, a means by which to focus senior level attention on personnel recovery issues was born. The Office of the Secretary of Defense established the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), responsible for DOD policy, control, and oversight of personnel recovery issues. According to Mr. Bob Jones, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DPMO is dedicated to “preserving the lives and well being of warfighters in danger of isolation or capture while fulfilling U.S. commitments” as one of its duties. Secretary Jones goes on to say “our goal is to ensure that both the isolated person and recovery force are highly trained and equipped to survive isolation and recovery. Simply put, the recovery of the live American is our top
Along with DPMO, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) was established in USJFCOM. While DPMO is the coordinator and enforcer, DOD’s executive agent for personnel recovery is now USJFCOM instead of the USAF’s ACC. In today’s doctrine, organization, and execution, CSAR is becoming decidedly joint.

In recent years a greater emphasis has been placed on operational and tactical joint training in exercises such as Desert Rescue which integrates Navy and joint assets together, and JCSAREX Woodland Cougar which integrates Army and Air Force assets. In addition to these exercises, the Air Force is broadening its focus on CSAR beyond a helicopter-centric approach. In the winter of 2000, at a conference usually held to discuss the requirements for designated rescue platforms, pilots who perform RESCORT/OSC duties were invited to expand the scope of Air Force thought on CSAR. In January of 2001, the USJFCOM symposium on joint personnel recovery helped pave the way for better joint interoperability, technology, and training opportunities for the services and their CSAR tasked units. These exercises and conferences also help highlight the leaps in capability that the integration of airborne and space ISR assets, and other technologies into aircraft, radios, and survival equipment provide. Unfortunately in the past, piecemeal integration by service agencies only meant various levels of modernization throughout the platforms assigned CSAR duties. As joint exercise opportunities increase, and CSAR forces continue to work together in mature theaters, their interoperability and effectiveness will continue to increase.

**Recommendations**

Based on the analysis of past and present CSAR organization, force structure, and capabilities, the following recommendations are offered to optimize CSAR capabilities.
1) **Joint Organization.** While an increased focus in DOD has been prevalent in the recent past, agencies from the top down need to continue to structure a joint force. Starting at the strategic level with the DPMO, through the JPRA, the combatant commands, and down to the service units, a focused push to standardize operations should be emphasized. This will serve to establish a peacetime organization and chain of command for CSAR operations, training, and issues. Service doctrines should augment joint doctrine to highlight unique service capabilities, procedures, and techniques, but not at the expense of common joint operating procedures. Additionally, the diverse histories and experiences of the different services, or their lessons learned, can be pooled to facilitate the exchange of ideas and tactics.

Through this joint organizational chain, technology and integrated aircraft systems should be determined. This identification of common joint required systems would enhance training opportunities, and pay huge dividends for the operational commander when these units deploy to their AOR. Most importantly, the establishment of this organizational structure would ensure there is an advocate for the importance of CSAR to fight the debilitating downsizing of force structure between major conflicts. If speed, preparation, and flexibility are key to a CSAR's success, then a force who trains together, from a common set of procedures, and with common operating systems can exploit these variables.

2) **Primary Joint Focus in Doctrine.** Existing CSAR doctrine should be revised to reflect a joint responsibility first to maximize interoperability, yet still require the services to maintain a CSAR structure able to support service requirements. While recent history has shown us that few conflicts in the world today are not joint, a robust service capability is still necessary to provide support in instances where a service may be acting alone. An example
would be an extraction of a downed naval aviator after the inception of hostilities, and prior to augmenting forces arriving. While contingency operations often enable services to work together, having trained to do so prior to their arrival is paramount. Now preparatory training exercises, focused on joint operations, will enable the JSRC to concentrate on combat employment and not on rewriting special instructions, standards, and CONOPs each time new units arrive with different service operating methods. This approach will provide the operational commander with the most flexible and mission ready CSAR force available. History has proven that joint capabilities greatly enhance a CSARTAF well beyond what an individual service’s capabilities can provide. The writing is on the wall; operational employment of CSAR for a JTF and above should have a joint focus first.

3) **Clear Command and Control Structure.** To augment this “joint first” focus a clearly defined command and control structure during CSAR operations should be delineated in joint publications. The establishment of the JSRC should be the focal point of all CSAR assets, the coordination agency, and the approval authority for all operations for the JFC (see figure 4). As Air Force doctrine states, the component commander who possesses the preponderance of CSAR assets in theater should be tasked to use his RCC structure as the JSRC, or provide the director if a JSRC is established at the JTF staff (see figure 5). The other component RCCs would not only coordinate with the JSRC, but also receive direction on the utilization of assets. Component commanders would still be able influence the use of their assets in conjunction with the JSRC director, and if conflict arises it can be addressed directly by the JFC/JFACC. This would preclude RCCs from getting conflicting direction from the JSRC and component commanders. To lend credibility to this structure a director of
the JSRC must be a qualified CSAR warrior. This position requires current in depth knowledge to correctly advise the JFC and make time critical decisions on the force requirements and courses of action to facilitate a rescue situation.

Now, when a CSAR crisis is presented the JSRC will immediately begin to analyze the situation with the assistance of the RCCs. If a full blown integrated CSARTAF is required, then the JSRC will perform mission commander duties. If it is determined that the situation is one that an individual component can handle, then the mission commander duties can be immediately given to the component RCC. This will allow for maximum visibility by the JFC, centralized control; and assignment of duties to the appropriate level, decentralized execution.

4) Mission Enhancement through Comprehensive Experience Base. Finally, service doctrines should be expanded to recognize search, suppression, and RESCORT/OSC platforms as dedicated CSAR resources, not just players in a CSARTAF. A definite omission of the personnel who perform these duties has been prevalent among the different services, because they were not considered dedicated rescue assets by the rescue community or doctrine. This philosophical shift has already happened in joint doctrine. However in Air Force and Navy doctrine, RESCORT/OSC platforms are dedicated CSARTAF assets but not dedicated rescue resources. While missions such as SEAD, CAP, and CAS are prevalent in various other mission packages, RESCORT/OSC is a dedicated rescue mission. These pilots/crews are deployed, dedicated to the mission, performing the majority of roles and responsibilities during a CSAR. This is not to say that the rescue vehicle’s roles are not important by any means. However, if comprehensive doctrine and tactics are to be built upon,
these other dedicated rescue resources with the preponderance of responsibilities must be better incorporated.

Conclusion

Major General Lance Smith, Commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center, outlines the focus of CSAR today and its consequences in the “Foreword” to Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, *Combat Search and Rescue*. He states that, “combat search and rescue (CSAR) preserves critical combat resources while denying the enemy a potential intelligence source. It is a key element in sustaining the morale, cohesion, and ultimately, the operational performance of friendly forces.”

Through the maturation of CSAR, a service-oriented focus has governed the development of the mission in the past. However, as shown through countless examples, CSAR’s success or failure has hinged on joint integration of forces. In a world where the loss of a single life abroad or in conflict is a major headline, additional focus on personnel recovery is a must. This focus also must take into account the CSAR team and its vulnerabilities. The value of a highly trained aviator and the loss of a single aircraft are increasingly significant in this resource constrained force structure. Now, DOD has chosen to lead by reorganizing its agencies to deal with these issues, and delineating roles and responsibilities to the military command structure. Those responsibilities now lie in USJFCOM. This reorganization will help to standardize training, technology requirements, and procedures for the services. Now doctrine and personnel need to adapt to this guidance, and provide the CINC/JFCs a joint focused and prepared CSAR team made up of capable service components.
The lessons learned from the past should serve as the catalyst for future development of CSAR. The guidance from senior leadership and operational commanders is clear; a joint capable CSAR team is needed. As operations tempo continues to be high and resources continue to dwindle, a joint focus once again becomes more inevitable to achieve a commander’s desired goals. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry sums it up well. “Preserving the life and well-being of our service members and civilians who are placed in harm’s way while defending our nation’s interests is, and must remain one of our highest priorities.” Refocusing sound existing doctrine, continuing to foster a joint organizational structure, and consolidating the nation’s rescue experience base, will give CSAR increased capability for the diverse environment in which it will be asked to operate.
NOTES


12 Ibid., 10.


18 Ibid., 49.
18 David S. URE. Weapons Officer 358th Fighter Squadron, Telephone conversation. 5 Jan 2001.


22 Ibid., i.

23 Ibid., 1.
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Ure, David S. Weapons Officer 358th Fighter Squadron, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ. Telephone conversation, 5 Jan 2001.


TYPICAL VOICE CIRCUITS IN A JOINT COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE TASK FORCE

AIRBORNE MISSION COMMANDER

JOINT SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER

RESCUE VEHICLE

REScue ESCORT (ON-SCENE COMMANDER)

COMPONENT RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER

ISOLATED PERSON

RESCUE COMBAT AIR PATROL

UNIT

Figure III-4. Typical Voice Circuits in a Joint Combat Search and Rescue Task Force

Figure III-1. Joint Combat Search and Rescue Command Relationships
(Service Components)

TYPICAL JOINT COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE (CSAR) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (SERVICE COMPONENTS): (COMMANDER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES HAS BEEN ASSIGNED JOINT FORCE CSAR RESPONSIBILITIES)

Figure III-3. Typical Joint Combat Search and Rescue Command Relationships (Service Components): (Commander Special Operations Forces Has Been Assigned Joint Force CSAR Responsibilities)

NOTES
(1) Includes United States Coast Guard forces assigned to the joint force
(2) Has been designated as JFACC
(3) Has been assigned joint force combat search and rescue responsibilities
(4) Has been designated as joint search and rescue commander
(5) Also performs component RCC duties as required
(6) CSAR TF performing a joint combat search and rescue mission (tactical control)

PROPOSED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DURING EXECUTION OF JOINT CSAR
(COMMANDER AIR FORCES HAS BEEN DESIGNATED JFACC AND GIVEN JOINT COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE RESPONSIBILITIES)

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

COM ARFOR
COM NAVFOR
COM MARFOR
COM SOC

COM AFFOR (JFACC)

RCC
RCC
RCC
JOC

RCC (DESIGNATED JSRC)

UNITs
UNITs
UNITs
UNITs

COORDINATION

OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL CONTROL

Figure 4.

A-5
Figure 5.