FINANCING PEACE — A MORAL IMPERATIVE AND PRICE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP FOR THE UNITED STATES

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL AARON P. GILLISON
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2001
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
Financing Peace – A Moral Imperative and Price of World Leadership for the United States

by

Lieutenant Colonel Aaron P. Gillison
United States Army

(Dr. Clay Chun)
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Aaron P. Gillison

TITLE: Financing Peace – A Moral Imperative and Price of World Leadership for the United States of America

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 February 2001 PAGES: 59 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The end of the Cold War promised a Peace Dividend. The potential for a major conflict between two great nuclear powers (USSR and the United States) has dissipated, but the number of crisis spots that the United Nations is concerned with has increased. Failing nation states and evolving democracies are on the rise. Financing peace involves much more than just resourcing UN sponsored peace operations. It includes properly resourcing the United Nations with basic funding, provision of military forces for UN sponsored operations, and sufficient funding for humanitarian assistance and other international aid. The U.S. has accrued significant dues in arrears of UN regular budget and peacekeeping assessments resulting in much debate and concern about the stability of the UN. This paper focuses on the special role that the United States has in financing the United Nations and its peace operations. It reviews the origin of the UN, the mandate for Chapter VI and Chapter VII peace operations, and the assessments (ways) required to properly resource (means) requirements (ends).
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

- ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ III
- LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................ VII
- POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT ................................................................. 1
- AMERICA'S CHALLENGE ................................................................................. 2
- PEACE OPERATIONS ....................................................................................... 3
  - UNITED NATIONS PERSPECTIVES .......................................................... 3
  - THE UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE ....................................................... 7
- RESOURCING PEACE ....................................................................................... 10
  - UNITED NATIONS ASSESSMENTS .......................................................... 11
  - UN REGULAR BUDGET ASSESSMENT .................................................... 12
  - UN PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT .......................................................... 14
  - UN VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS .......................................................... 14
  - UNITED STATES PAYMENTS OF UN ASSESSMENTS ......................... 15
  - U.S. PAYMENT OF REGULAR BUDGET UN ASSESSMENT .................. 15
  - U.S. PAYMENTS OF UN PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS ................... 17
  - U.S. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS ................................................................. 17
- IMPASSE OR REFORM ..................................................................................... 18
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. UN ASSESSMENTS (1965-1967) ................................................................. 13
TABLE 2. GDP - PER CAPITA INCOME (Selected Member States) ...................... 24
TABLE 3. UN PEACEKEEPING SCALES LEVELS .................................................. 27
POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

The post-Cold War period has been more unstable than the Cold War. During the Cold War there was a balance of power between the two major powers and their respective supporters that masked a seething hatred and distrust within the respective power blocs. Deposition of Soviet rule released a quest for recognition of ethnicity and religious freedom that was dormant for years, but boiling under the surface. Decline of former colonies re-ignited a classic fight between the haves and the have-nots to global proportions. The proliferation of internal disputes within the borders of sovereign states over the last ten years has resulted in more armed conflicts and resultant peace operations than the previous 40 years of the United Nations (UN). The resulting horror was genocide, ethnic cleansing, failed states, disrespect for the rule of law, and increases in refugees and displaced persons. The sheer volume of conflict during the 1990s provided a great drain on budding economies and the global economy just at the time when major barriers to expanded trade had decreased and free market enterprise expansion was on the horizon.

If left unchecked, the future global environment will reflect even more challenges experiencing increases in intrastate and substate clashes with the least developed states falling further behind.1 The shared goal of most nations is a post-Cold War where peace, stability, respect for human rights, support of freedom of expression, respect for the rule of law, and a free market global economy is the norm, not the exception.

In an increasingly interdependent world, our concern with other nations cannot be limited to securing our borders or even to protecting our trade. Without security and stability on a broader scale, neither our safety or prosperity can be assured.2

"The weakening of states and their failure may have important consequences for U.S. interests. Regardless of a country's strategic affiliation, it will often adversely affect regional stability, and sometimes, it will be the cause of wars. It may also affect U.S. interests when failed states produce an exodus of refugees. Sudden mass migrations will sometimes convert the internal problems of one failed state into a crisis involving several states."3

During the Cold War, the U.S. was distinguished among nations for its emphasis on human rights and is still reason to respect American leadership.4 This post Cold War environment is of great concern to the U.S. because of the emphasis on democratization and concern for the right of free people to live in peace under the rule of law. An often made remark about prosperity is summed up by Linda Kozaryn when she states, "In an increasingly interdependent world, our concern with other nations cannot be limited to securing our borders or even to protecting our trade. Without security and stability on a broader scale, neither our
safety or prosperity can be assured. We are now in a period where the security of one country has a potentially large impact on the region and the world. The U.S. definitely has a place of leadership in the next phase of the Post-Cold War. One area where the U.S. can lead is in resourcing the quest for peace and the one international organization established for this purpose.

The focus of this paper is on resourcing the UN and its peacekeeping operations. The roadmap for determining the United States obligation to the UN and UN Peace Operations is a review of the strategic environment in regards to requirements for the UN and its Peacekeeping operations; UN and U.S. peace operations policies; the resultant resources required to turn the policies into action; and an analysis of UN rate of assessments.

**AMERICA’S CHALLENGE**

If you want to be successful in the 21st Century, you must find your path to democracy, market economics and a system, which frees the talents of men and women to pursue their individual destinies. At the center of this revolution, America stands, inspiration for the world that wants to be free. And we will continue to be that inspiration — not by using our strength and our position of power to get back behind our walls, but by being engaged with the world.

—General Colin Powell

With the post-Cold War and advent of market globalization the most basic challenge facing the United States today is helping to preserve peace. In 1998 alone there were 27 significant conflicts in the world, 25 of which involved violence within nation states.

Based on the U.S. government’s intelligence community recent prediction “the U.S., as a global power, will have little choice but to engage leading actors and confront problems on both sides of the widening economic and digital divides in the world of 2015, when globalization’s benefits will be far from global.” The nation cannot use the military element of national power in every seemingly isolated conflict or be involved in every dispute. Indeed, the country must strike a delicate balance of the level of involvement using all elements of national power to maximize economic opportunities for all countries while minimizing human suffering. Without security against these threats as well as against the classic threat of invasion, the promise of a new century free of the horrors of the last will prove hollow. “Refugee flows destabilize neighboring countries, even draw them into the conflict. Providing a mechanism for humanitarian aid and repatriation saves human lives and mitigates the crises created by sudden
refugee movements. Worldwide, in 1996 over 45 million men, women, and children were refugees and displaced persons.\textsuperscript{10} The most immediate concern with the proliferation of intrastate conflict "is the human suffering along with the denial of human rights."\textsuperscript{11} "Human suffering all too often induces flows of refugees, which create additional concerns for countries. For one thing, these refugees place demands on limited financial resources and can provoke domestic opposition to their assimilation. When refugees flee to countries with few resources, international relief efforts become necessary. Finally refugee flows may upset already fragile ethnic balances and sow the seeds for future conflicts."\textsuperscript{12} With the proliferation of conflict around the globe, the United Nations and the United States must collectively deal with peace operations.

PEACE OPERATIONS

UNITED NATIONS PERSPECTIVES

The UN evolved from the horrible realities of experiencing two world wars in the first 45 years of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. The Charter of the UN was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945 and entered into force on October 24, 1945. This organization of United Nations is to some a natural progression from earlier efforts to organize countries of the world seeking peace into a League of Nations. The United States Senate did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War and created the League of Nations. President Woodrow Wilson supported U.S. participation in the League of Nations, but did not have the support of the Congress. Some historians have suggested that the lack of U.S. support may have contributed to the sparks of conflict and expansionism that led to World War II. While the intent of the UN is similar to the League of Nations, the term United Nations had its genesis from President Roosevelt's coinage early in the 1940s of the allied nations collectively united in its fight against the Axis powers during the Second World War.

The UN is founded on lessons learned not only from the frailty of the League of Nations, but also from the realities of how small sparks in one country can develop into conflict on a global scale. Thus, establishment of the UN met with more coordination between the U.S. executive and legislative branches of government and easy ratification by the Senate. The UN is founded 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.'\textsuperscript{13}

To fulfill this reason for existence there are four principle purposes of the United Nations:

- Maintain international peace and security taking effective collective measures for prevention and removal of threats;
• Develop friendly relations among nations based on equal rights and self-determination;
• Achieve international cooperation in solving international problems; and
• To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.  

The UN Charter has nineteen chapters, which define the roles of member states; establishes the Security Council; authorizes settlement of economic and social issues; encourages regional organizations; envisions peaceful settlement of disputes; and authorizes action with respect to threats to or breaches of the peace. Chapter V of the UN Charter describes the composition of the Security Council. The United States is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (i.e., Permanent Five (P-5)). Beyond the five permanent members of the Security Council, there are non-permanent members who are elected for two-year terms. Article 23 states, “The General Assembly shall elect other members of the UN to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, with due regard, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security.” The verbiage used for consideration of non-permanent members of the Security Council is a clear indicator of the overarching intent of the United Nations in regards to the obligations involving contributions. Thus a case could be made that member states have by their very membership concurred with the obligation to support maintaining international peace and security, which is a fundamental precept for the organization’s very existence.

The UN Charter empowers the Security Council to settle disputes and take action with respect to breaches of peace. The UN Security Council first tries to get parties to settle their grievances without warfare and bloodshed. “The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter provide the standards applicable to two different situations affecting the peace. The Charter incorporates, with a few small changes, the text of the League of Nations Treaty in regards to “Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.” Chapter VI covers Pacific Settlement of Disputes and authorizes the UN Security Council to investigate any international situation that may give rise to a dispute, to make recommendations to all parties involved for resolution, and/or take action. The UN Security Council places peacekeeping forces, with no intent to engage in hostile actions, between disputing parties. “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Chapter VI actions are affectionately termed "traditional peacekeeping." Traditional peacekeeping operations occur only after all of these critical conditions are met:

- Conflict is of sufficient concern to justify intervention;
- International community agrees that the UN should become involved;
- Disputing parties agree to stop fighting and seek peace;
- A plausible political settlement exist and is defined; and
- The UN has the capability to help.

Traditionally, UN missions have been known as Chapter VI actions, because that section of the Charter deals with the peaceful settlement of international disputes. However, Chapter VII contains the term "peace enforcement," referring to military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council. Article 42, Chapter VII, of the UN Charter provides that if "interruptions of economic relations, means of communication, and severance of diplomatic relations would be or have proven to be inadequate, the Security Council may take military action as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Chapter VII does not require the consent of the warring parties; authorizes military action by air, sea, or land forces as required to restore order; and is commonly referred to as peace enforcement. Peace enforcement includes blockades, enforcement of sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, forceful disarmament, and direct military action.

"In the Dayton peace plan, the UN Security Council has played an important legal role, authorizing the use of force to carry out the cease-fire and peace agreement. At Dayton, the parties accepted the peace plan and agreed to the deployment of a multinational Implementation Force, including NATO forces and troops from other countries. But the belligerents' consent is backstopped by a Security Council Chapter VII resolution authorizing the use of force if the parties stray from the cease-fire or agreement."  

Some peace operations fall between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. As a result, an informal term, "Chapter VI 1/2," has emerged to describe such activities as conflict prevention, demobilization, cantonment of weapons, and actions taken to guarantee freedom of movement within a country. While there is no formal UN acknowledgement of
peace operations between Chapter VI and Chapter VII consider Chapter VI ½ activities as shaping actions preventing proliferation of disputes between warring factions outside the current area of contention. An example of a chapter VI ½ mission is UN operations in Macedonia with the intent of keeping the internal dispute in Yugoslavia from spilling over into Macedonia. This delineation between Chapter VI; VI ½; and VII mandates is unresolved, but it has significance in many ways to member nations. For example, one effect is reimbursement from the UN to member states for expenditures. The U.S. government "seeks UN reimbursement for blue-helmet operations (i.e., the few hundred U.S. troops that wore UN blue berets and UN shoulder patches in Macedonia prior to the Kosovo Air Campaign) while it asks that the Congress pay for all non-blue helmeted operations."²²

The UN has seen an unprecedented increase in peacekeeping with 38 operations between 1988 and 1999 — nearly three times as many in the previous 40 years.²³ The UN has experienced both success and failure in these missions, it is under resourced, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is not sized correctly to plan and control operations. Somehow the UN must come to grips with the gray area between Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions. It must organize and deploy peace operations forces that have planned for worse case scenarios and are capable of imposing peace. "In Rwanda in 1994, hundreds of people were slaughtered when unmanned UN forces failed to stand between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups."²⁴ The UN is unlikely to change its charter to reflect an expansion of the chapters regarding peace operations. However, all member states must recognize Secretary General Kofi Annan's new policy that "calls on the states of the world to step in wherever and whenever human lives are being consumed in conflagrations of hate, disease, or poverty."²⁵

The UN sponsored Brahimi Report reviewed peacekeeping operations over the last decade and recommended 20 changes. The major point that world leaders addressed at the now famous Millennium Conference in September 2000 was strengthening the UN to accomplish its reason for existence. The report also identified the need for preventive deployments and peacebuilding missions and therefore infers that there is a requirement for other than Chapter VI and VII operations.

Member states must expend human and fiscal resources to enforce UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) mandates and support normal operations of the UN. "The general who commanded UN forces in Rwanda says that with 5,000 well-armed soldiers, he could have saved thousands of lives."²⁶ One proviso in Article 43 of the UN Charter provides that member states to "make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The U.S. and its European allies are not overly enthralled with the idea of providing an open ended commitment for troops to UN missions, so many UN peacekeepers come from developing nations. “Developing nations now contribute more than 75 percent of the nearly 30,000 UN troops taking part in peacekeeping around the world.” However there is another proviso of Article 43 that recognizes the need “for member states and the Security Council to first conclude agreements which are then subject to ratification by signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”

Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years.

—Brahami Report

THE UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE

The U.S. accepts the UN Chapter VI and VII definitions, but has attempted to delineate the full spectrum of peace operations. Even though the UN has recognized preventive deployment and peace building in the Brahimi Report, there is no expectation that the UN will expand its definition of Peace Operations with additional chapters to the UN Charter. Regardless, the U.S. must recognize the essential mission mandate requirements to facilitate proper force structuring to ensure mission accomplishment. Further, the U.S. realizes the possibility of peace operations not sponsored by the UN. Therefore the U.S. defense establishment further delineates Peace Operations into five types of operations:

- Peacekeeping operations - military operations, with the consent of all major parties to the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (e.g., cease fire, truce, or other agreement) where fighting has ceased.
- Peace Enforcement operations - use of military force, or the threat of military force, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Consent of disputing parties is not required.
- Preventive Diplomacy – actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Military support may take the form of a preventive deployment.
• Peacemaking – is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arrange an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.

• Peacebuilding – post conflict actions that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid relapse into conflict.\textsuperscript{31}

The difference in peace operations definitions between the UN and the U.S. is not of great importance. The U.S. can and does accomplish several of the further defined missions in the context of a Chapter VI or VII mission. However, how the UN mission mandate classifies a peace operation is critical to the constitutional process that approves payment of U.S. government funds to support the mission. The U.S. Congress has six fundamental powers that affect participation in international organizations (e.g., the UN); deployment and sustainment of military forces; and financing UN peace operations. "These powers that affect American Foreign Policy are:

• lawmaking power,
• owner of the purse,
• confirmation power,
• oversight power,
• war power, and
• treaty power."\textsuperscript{32}

"The UN Participation Act, passed in 1945 for the purpose of regulating U.S. involvement with the UN, was designed to make it very difficult for the president to assign troops to serve the UN without prior congressional approval. It gives the president the limited authority to assign up to 1,000 U.S. military personnel to a Chapter VI UN mission. Even that limited authority applies only if the U.S. government can show that the mission in question is not a Chapter VII operation, which requires congressional approval."\textsuperscript{33}

The U.S. strategy is to promote democracy and human rights abroad, to bolster economic prosperity, and enhance American security. U.S. Peace Operations policy is conceptualized in Presidential Decision Directive–25 (PDD-25); refined in PDD-56 with interagency cooperation guidance; and tailored even further in PDD-71 with improvement of capabilities to rebuild effective foreign criminal justice systems. These three PDDs represent an evolution reflective of the numerous peacekeeping contingency missions from 1993 to today. Many U.S. legislators, view Clinton era U.S. Peace Operations Policy as placing the proverbial finger in the dike to
hold a flood of pain, and death that although unfortunate most often occurs in areas of the world that are not in America's vital interests. The Clinton administration, although bloodied in Somalia, propelled the strategic objective of engagement and "creating a stable, peaceful international security environment where democratic values and respect for human rights and the rule of law"34 exist. The strategy is based on the notion that "the U.S. must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home."36

"The Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25) articulated that the U.S. should participate in a peace operation if that operation advances U.S. interests, its conclusion is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria, and the consequences of inaction are unacceptable."37

PDD-25 addressed six major points:
- Determining which peace operations to support,
- reduction in U.S. costs for UN peace operations,
- providing a clear definition of command and control of U.S. personnel,
- reforming the UN's capability to manage peace operations,
- improving the U.S. Government's management of and funding for peace operations, and
- creating better cooperation between the executive, legislative branch, and the American public concerning peace operations.

Even before PDD-25 was published, there were efforts to reduce the U.S.' cost for UN peacekeeping, but the pressure intensified subsequent to the publication of the PDD. In May 1997, President Clinton signed PDD-56 Managing Complex Contingency Operations with the intent of improving interagency coordination, planning, and execution on the next complex contingency mission. The intent of PDD-56 "to establish management practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations"38 has not been realized. The lack of executive agency tasking in PDD-56 left the directive without the necessary impetus to ensure implementation. In 1999 A.B Technologies Consulting firm found that little of PDD-56 guidance had been accomplished.39

PDD-71 was issued on February 24, 2000 and "dealt with strengthening criminal justice systems in support of U.S. peace operations and other complex contingencies."40

The Clinton era U.S. Peace Operations Policy was functional, but disjointed and not cohesive. Conceptualization and articulation of the policy via PDDs was good first start but
more is required to ensure that a sound peace operations policy is fully enacted. "PDD-25 is surprisingly unrestrictive" and seems to leave major gaps in determining which peace operations U.S. forces will participate in. There is disparity between executive and legislative branches' views on selecting which missions to participate in, funding U.S. operations, and UN assessments.

Force structure, training, and funding are the means that strongly influence U.S. capability to execute Peace Operations Policy. Since 1990 missions have increased while resources have decreased. The increased frequency of U.S. military participation in peace operations, albeit not under UN auspices, as now structured raises concerns on meeting the challenges involved in carrying out such operations on a routine basis. The U.S. must determine when it will support a mission directly with military combat type forces and when it will support with logistic forces and or other elements of national power.

"Besides deploying more and more soldiers for peace operations, the U.S. has spent an increasingly large amount of money on such operations. Between 1988 and 1998, appropriations for those operations soared from less than $100 million to almost $4 billion." Much of this funding is directly to support deployments of our military forces and our nation's efforts in direct diplomacy, but a portion of this funding is paid to the UN. The regular UN budget assessment and the ad hoc peacekeeping assessment is a highly contested point of contention with the U.S. legislature.

RESOURCING PEACE

"If we don't deal with the causes of the conflict, the United Nations is reduced to dealing with the consequences of the conflict. And that means the United Nations specialized agencies, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, end up spending much more money in dealing with the consequences than we will in dealing with the causes."

Supporting peace operations is an expensive proposition in financial terms as well as in terms of human treasure. The regular biennium "2000-2001 budget, exclusive of peace operations, is $2.536 billion" with a regular assessment of $1.268 billion in 2000. According to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Management, the overall level of peacekeeping assessment for 2000 would be the highest in five years — $3.3 billion. As of 30 September 2000, total unpaid assessments totaled $3.094 billion for member states. The unpaid and delinquent payment of assessments has developed into a major problem that restricts the UN
from performing at its optimum level of efficiency. Each member of the United Nations must deal with its system of government and balance desired end-state in peace operations with means to do so. Peace operations are similar to other endeavors in that it is an attempt to "achieve great results with limited means."\textsuperscript{47}

The UN provides three methods of raising resources to support collective security and peace. The UN is funded by a normal assessment that provides for general operations of the organization; a peacekeeping assessment to resource specific mission requirements approved by the Security Council; and voluntary contributions to support UN sponsored organizations that receive little or no direct funding from the regular budget. Discussions on the UN's regular budget scale of assessment take place in the UN's Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee with technical details reviewed by the Committee on Contributions.\textsuperscript{48}

**UNITED NATIONS ASSESSMENTS**

The UN Charter does not explicitly require mandatory payments from any nation. However Article 17 of the Charter says, "the General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization. The expenses of the organization shall be borne by members as apportioned by the General Assembly."\textsuperscript{49} Most of the 189 UN member states see payment of UN assessments as a treaty obligation and therefore feel compelled to pay. Other member states challenge the authority and size of their UN assessments based on performance of the UN and respective national constitutional control of budgetary matters. The question that lingers is what happens if a member state does not pay its assessment. "The charter speaks of a nation's being in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions, but provides no mechanism for collecting the money. The charter merely specifies that a nation shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of contributions due from it for the preceding two years."\textsuperscript{50}

The central argument of the Report of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing completed in 1993 is "that the UN must be assured of the timely availability of funds to meet obligations placed on it by member states. Governments should insist that the organization is effectively managed, but they must provide it with the financial capacity to do what they ask it to do."\textsuperscript{51} Today 98 percent of the costs are borne by just 30 members, with the other 159 collectively paying just 2 percent. The top five contributors pay more than 75 percent of expenses.\textsuperscript{52}
UN REGULAR BUDGET ASSESSMENT

"The UN's regular budget includes the expenses of its main decision making bodies: the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. Its largest portions are dedicated to administrative expenses." The General Assembly approves its budget for a two-year period.

Since its founding, the UN's basic concept for determining a scale of apportionment of UN expenses was "the member states capacity to pay." The regular budget assessment formula itself is extremely complicated. It is based on an average of member states’ gross domestic product (GDP), and is adjusted with discounts for countries with low per capita income and high levels of external debt. GDP is the total value of goods and services produced in a nation during a year. A 'scheme of limits' is also in place to prevent any member state's rate of assessment from rising or falling too fast from one biennium to the next. The UN formerly used a 10-year average of GDP and as of 1996 used a 7.5-year average. This reduces the number of years over which a country's GDP is averaged in setting assessment shares, so newly prosperous countries pay a larger share. The regular budget scale also includes a floor rate (0.001 percent of the budget). Currently, 34 members are assessed at this floor. In dollar terms, these countries were assessed approximately $10,000 each in 1999. Assessments are due in full within 30 days of the billing date; usually in January of the year the assessment applies. Assessments are considered to be in arrears if they are not paid in full by December 31 of the calendar year in which they are due. Under Article 19 of the Charter any member state that has arrears equal to two years worth of dues payments can lose its vote in the General Assembly. The UN has no way to deter member states from paying their dues a few months or even a year past the deadline.

The formula yields, for each country, a rate of assessment that equals some percentage of the regular UN budget. By 1965, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council bore the brunt of the fiscal burden of UN operations with 64.38 percent combined. The table below provides percentages of UN expenses that each country's respective assessment covered.
MEMBER STATES | % OF UN BUDGET
---|---
UNITED STATES | 31.91
USSR | 14.92
UNITED KINGDOM | 7.21
FRANCE | 6.09
CHINA | 4.25
**TOTAL** | **64.38**

**TABLE 1. UN ASSESSMENTS (1965-1967)**

During 1965 to 1967 with 121 member nations, the five permanent Security Council member states provided for 64.38% of the fiscal funding required for normal operations for the United Nations. The Federal Republic of Germany was not a member state of the UN in 1965, but provided 7.41 percent of the UN budget. From 1965 to 1967, the U.S. contributed half of the P-5 assessment and 31.91 percent of the overall budget.

"In 1946, when the U.S. accounted for roughly 50 percent of world gross national product (GNP) and the UN had only 55 members, the scale ceiling was set at 39 percent out of recognition that it would be unhealthy for the UN to over-rely on one member state. The ceiling was last reduced in 1973 to 25 percent. Since then 56 new member states have joined the UN and the world economy has been transformed. Only the U.S. is subject to the current and outdated ceiling of 25 percent. The U.S. 1999 regular budget contributions amounted to approximately $304 million."

The failure to get adequate UN funding was illustrated in the late 1980s. "In 1987, the UN experienced serious shortfalls and cash flow problems because of the combined effect of U.S. withheld and deferred payments, exchange rate losses, and other member's arrears. Of these three factors, UN officials said that not knowing how much or when the United States would pay was the most serious financial management problem they faced. At the end of 1987, the UN reported U.S. arrears of $426 million, estimated exchange rate losses of about $292 million, and other members' arrears of $194 million."

The U.S. is by far the largest contributor to the UN system, contributing nearly $3 billion in 2000. The U.S. continues to be the largest financial contributor for the regular budget and peacekeeping operations. In fact, by 2001, just three of the P5 will be among the UN's top five regular budget and peacekeeping contributors. Nineteen member states will pay more than the P5 member with the lowest budget contribution, and fourteen nations will pay at a higher rate for
peacekeeping. At the same time the U.S.'s peacekeeping assessment has continued to grow.\textsuperscript{65}

UN PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT

Prior to 1973 there was no formal UN peacekeeping assessment methodology or formula and funding for peacekeeping operations occurred through voluntary contributions or the regular budget. After 27 years of existence and several peacekeeping operations it became necessary to establish some sort of mechanism for assessing member states for the expenses of peacekeeping operations. "During the Arab Israeli War in 1973 the UN Security Council established the UN Emergency Force to conduct peacekeeping operations. This ad hoc arrangement is derived from a formula based on the regular UN scale of assessments and provides the majority of UN members discounts of 80% or 90%, with the P5 assigned to pay a premium to offset discounts given to other members."\textsuperscript{66}

"The peacekeeping scale divides member states into four categories, Group A comprises the five permanent Security Council members. Group B is made up of developed nations. Group C consists of economically less developed states, and Group D consists of least developed states. Member states in Group B contribute to peacekeeping at the same rate that they contribute to the regular budget. Members of Group C contribute to peacekeeping at a rate of 20 percent of their regular rate. Members of Group D contribute to peacekeeping at a rate of 10 percent of their regular rate. Security Council members make up the difference, paying somewhat more than their regular rate: The U.S. for example, is assessed for 25 percent of the regular budget and for 30 percent of peacekeeping."\textsuperscript{67}

In 1996, the UN peace operations assessment to the U.S. was 30.7 percent, but the U.S. capped its payment at 25 percent.\textsuperscript{68} Approximately 20 countries enjoy above average per capita incomes while still receiving 80 percent discounts for UN peacekeeping. Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, and the Philippines have agreed to give up their peacekeeping discount, setting an impressive example for other UN member states.\textsuperscript{69}

UN VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Voluntary contributions fund the operational budgets of a number of development and humanitarian relief agencies including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Environmental Program (UNEP), and the UN International Children's Fund (UNICEF). In 1992 the UN received $2.758 billion in voluntary contributions for programs. The regular budget assessment was $1.181 billion or 43 percent of the voluntary contributions. Peace operations assessment was $1.333 billion or 48 percent of the voluntary contributions. Voluntary
contributions accounted for 52 percent of overall UN funding in 1992.\textsuperscript{70} The UN continues to receive the majority of its funding from member states voluntary contributions. Even after several perceived mishaps, member states appear eager to voluntarily support UN operations. There are countries that don’t have the fiscal resources to provide the UN, but can and do provide troops. Member states that provide forces to support a UN Charter mission expect reimbursement for the use of these soldiers. As an example, “the five largest troop contributors – India, Nigeria, Jordan, Bangladesh, and Ghana – supply about 13,700 soldiers, well over a third of all UN “blue helmets.”\textsuperscript{71}

**UNITED STATES PAYMENTS OF UN ASSESSMENTS**

"Historically, U.S. dues have been smaller than the proportionate size of the American economy. In 1945, the U.S. dues assessment was 42 percent, against a U.S. share of 50 percent of the world’s GDP; in 1972, with the admission of Germany to the United Nations, U.S. dues were reduced from approximately 31.5 percent to 25 percent, against a U.S. share of 31.7 percent of the world’s GDP."\textsuperscript{72} Even though “the U.S. economy produces approximately one-quarter of the world’s wealth, American dues have been 25 percent in recent years. Much criticism about UN financial activities include a lot of concern about an assessment schedule that is unchanged since 1972. "Under this archaic assessment schedule, the U.S. pays 25 percent of the UN’s administrative budget, currently about $300 million a year, and 31.7 percent of the peacekeeping budget, more than $1 billion annually in recent years."\textsuperscript{73}

“Since 1992, the country has been assessed between 30 percent and 32 percent of the total costs of UN peace missions. U.S. payments to the UN for peace operations increased from less than $40 million in 1988 to a peak of more than $1 billion in 1994.”\textsuperscript{74}

Of the nearly $3 billion the U.S. contributed to the UN in calendar year 2000, just $830 million was for assessed contributions for the regular budget and peacekeeping. More than $2 billion went toward voluntary contributions for UN development, health, disarmament, humanitarian aid, human rights, and environmental activity.\textsuperscript{75} The $2 billion voluntary contributions is 63 percent of total calendar year 2000 U.S. contributions to the UN, not including DOD activities that are indirectly supportive of UN operations.

**U.S. PAYMENT OF REGULAR BUDGET UN ASSESSMENT**

The U.S. has sought and continues to seek a reduction in the UN assessment it pays. At least since 1985, “U.S. officials have been concerned about budget growth in the UN system organizations and have worked to gain more influence over budget levels and program
priorities." In 1985, the U.S. began withholding payments of assessments. Withholdings from the organizations increased from about $9 million through fiscal year 1985 to $440 million through fiscal year 1989 because of the cumulative impact of several legislative and administrative actions. The three categories covering withholdings are (1) due to appropriation shortfalls, (2) aimed at stimulating reforms, and (3) keyed to specific UN activities to which the United States objects.77

Public Law 99-177, commonly referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, is an example of appropriation shortfall and illustrates concerns.

It requires across-the-board spending reductions, or sequestration, if federal outlays exceed annual deficit ceilings. In fiscal year 1986, $18 million was withheld in compliance with the 4.3 percent Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequestration. Second, in fiscal years 1985 and 1987, the U.S. withheld about $125 million to stimulate reforms in the UN system, primarily changes in budget decision-making procedures and in fund assessments. Third, from fiscal years 1980 through 1989, the U.S. withheld about $15 million as its proportionate share of costs related to specific UN activities to which it objects, such as those providing benefits to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People's Organization.78

Some observers believe this is an example of national political agenda and partisan politics with little regard for agreements with the UN and international promises. However, there is something deeper to this issue than partisan politics between different political parties or branches of government. The issue is the lack of efficiency, limited effectiveness, budget concerns, and perceived duplicative and outdated programs in the UN.

Also between fiscal years 1981 and 1983, "the U.S. changed its method of paying annual contributions from quarterly installments to a lump-sum payment in the fourth quarter of the calendar year. The UN fiscal period is the calendar year. Since then, the United States has paid its calendar year assessments with funds appropriated for the following U.S. fiscal year. For example, calendar year 1989 assessments, which were due at the beginning of 1989, was paid with the fiscal year 1990 appropriation."79

In summary, UN assessments have changed dramatically for the U.S. and will affect other member states. "The United States has already had its dues lowered over the years from a high of 46 percent when the UN was founded, U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke points out. In actual terms, the reduction would mean that about $34 million of the 2001 budget would have to be redistributed among about 30 countries whose economies have changed since the current scale was set in 1973."80
U.S. PAYMENTS OF UN PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS

In 1995, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas) requested a comprehensive review of U.S. funding provided in support of UN resolutions. “The total was an astounding $6.6 billion for fiscal years 1992 through 1995. The State Department (the traditional source of funds for UN peacekeeping activities) accounted for about $1.8 billion. However, the Defense Department accounted for about $3.4 billion, the U.S. Agency for International Development about $1.3 billion, and other federal agencies the remainder.”

Each member country is supposed to send its contribution to the UN at the start of the new calendar year. The 1995 payment was not appropriated by the U.S. Congress until April 1996 and created a severe cash crisis within the UN. Congress imposed a series of complex conditions on all contributions to the UN and in 1996 the U.S. was $1.5 billion in arrears for UN peacekeeping operations. At that time, the five-year budget recommendation of the House and Senate proposed ignoring this debt. This provides introspection to the degree of concern that the U.S. legislature has concerning the spiraling increase in peacekeeping costs. Congress sees UN peacekeeping expenses and U.S. sponsored peacekeeping mission costs spiraling out of control.

U.S. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS

Voluntary contribution is a hard area to quantify with a high degree of accuracy that is agreed upon by all parties to the issue. That task is a research project alone and is outside the scope of this paper. However, what is evident without further review is that the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture administer multiple programs that assist other nation states develop; deter war by addressing the populace’s basic needs; and recover from war around the world. As an example, USAID’s Fiscal Year 2000 budget was $7.738 billion and supported a myriad of programs including $1.2B for Development Assistance (DA) and $800 million for the Food for Peace Program. The Food For Peace Program funding is actually provided by the Department of Agriculture, but administered by USAID. Identifying what percentage of USAID and Department of State funding actually gets out of the U.S. and into the hands of the people from other countries that need it would be the subject of another research paper.

The U.S. position is that discussions of what the U.S. owes to the UN should give consideration to all U.S. government funds provided to foreign governments and international organizations that support UN activities. The Department of State traditionally funds the majority of foreign aid, but DOD funding of missions in support of UN resolutions has not been
considered in the UN debt equation. As an example of the scope of DOD indirect support, “The Washington Times reported that the Pentagon had spent $3 billion in 1997 alone for U.S. military operations to implement UN Security Council resolutions on Bosnia and Iraq. The story noted that critics of the UN contended that such incurred expenses “far exceed” any claimed U.S. debt to the world organization.”

“Maintaining powerful, ready forces is expensive in terms of money and the burdens placed on service members. If the nation is to protect its interests, it must bear these costs.” The U.S. is committed to peace and has paid billions towards many peace operations often times without UN reimbursement. In that regard, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson said that it would be inappropriate to be reimbursed for “non-blue helmeted peacekeeping operations that we choose to undertake, such as the Gulf War, because they serve our national interests.”

In some circles the U.S. military is considered the military force of choice to rapidly deploy in support of UN resolutions. Often, these could be Title VII missions that are not reimbursed. U.S. military participation in peace operations drains resources away from the primary reason for existence and results in a degraded war-fighting capability or added burden to U.S. allies. As of January 2001 there are less than 40 U.S. military personnel deployed under UN control. There are thousands deployed on peace operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Africa, and other countries on missions not under direct UN control, but as a result of UN desires for peace.

**IMPASSE OR REFORM**

**UNITED NATIONS POSITION**

Payment of assessments is a financial obligation that has to be honored by each and every member state under the Charter. The financial difficulties of the Organization are caused by the large amount of arrears accumulated by a small number of countries, and in particular the major contributor. All member states should pay their dues in full, on time and without conditions.

In June 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan set out a bold new vision for the UN. His blueprint inspired the world, prompting leaders around the world to unite around a set of goals that are ambitious and concrete. During the Millennium Summit, 150 heads of state, succeeded in harmonizing competing priorities, values, and beliefs to lay out a shared plan. However, the UN is in crisis, partly because of political jockeying, but principally because member states—including the United States—have failed to pay their bills.
Arguably, the most pressing issue of the UN 55th General Assembly was the U.S. desire to lower the regular budget and peace operations assessment rate. This issue has festered for over 15 years and worsened to the point where the UN is potentially fractured beyond repair without scale of assessment reform. The U.S. Congress successfully enacted laws that forced UN reform on operations and budgetary controls, but has not achieved its objective of reducing the rate of regular and peace operations assessments. "The UN has held to a commitment of no real growth in the regular budget for nearly ten years and, for the last year, no nominal growth."90 As a result of continued congressional pressure, and Ambassador Holbrooke and Secretary General Annan's efforts prior to and during the Millennium Summit the UN made 2000 the year in which this essential argument would be debated in the Fifth Committee and reviewed by the General Assembly. The Fifth Committee is responsible for administrative and budgetary issues.

The Fifth Committee has a pivotal role in the UN System as it handles budgetary matters. The Fifth Committee will set out to create new, modern and more equitable financial structures for the UN. If there is one thing the Millennium Summit's targets have in common, it is that each will require that the UN have the means to deliver on its mandates. This is not easy because the UN has over the past decade been in a financial straight jacket.91

There are "16 peacekeeping operations currently underway around the globe" and peacekeeping capacity is outpaced by demand. Fourteen of these peace operations are funded from the peacekeeping assessment resulting in a crisis in peacekeeping financing.92 The peacekeeping surge and resultant increase in assessments over the 1990s has caused more constitutional concern and review of the entire assessment scale inclusive of both the normal and ad hoc peace operations scale.

Many of the UN member states have expressed concern over the U.S. refusal to pay assessments and arrears. In early October 2000, the European Union rebuffed the U.S. request to have its UN dues lowered because collectively the EU contributes 36.6 percent of the regular budget, which is considerably more than its national wealth.93 "The ad hoc scale was established in 1973 in a context fundamentally different from that of today. "Peacekeeping is currently funded by an ad hoc system of apportionment that concentrates overwhelming responsibility for UN financing in the hands of a very small number of members."94 "On average, only 36 percent of peacekeeping dues are paid in the first three months of a mission."95 As of 30 December 1999, the UN debt to troop contributors amounted to $800 million.96
Member states shared position is that the “current difficult financial situation of UN peacekeeping could be resolved if member states, in particular the major contributor, took concrete action to settling their arrears and honor their Charter obligations by paying their contributions in full, on time and without conditions.” Many nations, especially European ones have been working overtime to keep the U.S. from drifting farther away from international organizations just as world trends become more global. It appears that more thought has gone into the U.S. contention that the economy has improved for many and the capacity to pay is higher as “over 75 member states from every region and political allegiance joined together to call for revisions of the UN’s ad hoc peacekeeping scale of assessment.”

The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Geneva Group have called for revisions to the UN’s regular and peacekeeping scales of assessment by the end of 2000. The Brahimi report gives us the lever and the rationale and a very impressive set of recommendations, which cannot be carried out unless financial restructuring accompanies them. The joint statement of the P5 members of the UN Security Council at the Millennium Summit in September 2000 is indicative of the need of improved resourcing of the UN:

“Only by strengthening our dedication to the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter, and by endowing the UN with the means to deliver on its many commitments, can we fulfill our obligations to ensure that the UN can achieve its full potential. We pledge to support measures to broaden the resource base for this institution through financial structures that are equitable, transparent and reflective of current realities for the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget, and the financing of UN activities. We recognize the need to adjust the existing peacekeeping scale of assessments, which is based on the 1973 system, in light of changed circumstances, including countries’ capacity to pay.”

U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION

UN dues should reflect current realities

—Ambassador Richard Holbrooke

Ambassador Holbrooke has been a drum major in leading the charge that the UN is a viable organization worthy of U.S. support. In Senate Foreign Relations Committee field hearings held at the UN in January 2000 he said the UN “plays an essential role in some areas of the world and on some problems that no nation can tackle alone.” This is a point of view that is not shared wholeheartedly or taken on faith by all members of the U.S. government.
Senator Jesse Helms made it expressly clear in a first ever visit of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the UN in January 2000 that there was deep frustration in America with the UN. Americans know “that the UN lives and breathes on the hard-earned money of the American taxpayers. And yet they have heard comments here in New York constantly calling the United States a ‘deadbeat.’ Senator Helms asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to assess just how much the American taxpayers contributed to the UN in 1999. Here is what the GAO reported:

Last year, the American people contributed a total of more than $1.4 billion dollars to the UN system in assessments and voluntary contributions. That’s pretty generous, but it’s only the tip of the iceberg. The American taxpayers also spent an additional eight billion, seven hundred and seventy nine million dollars from the U.S. military budget to support various UN resolutions and peacekeeping operations around the world.”

Senator Helms was very direct in his opinion with the UN General Assembly membership in explaining that “under the U.S. Constitution, Congress is the sole guardian of American taxpayers’ money and as the representatives of the UN’s largest investors – the American people – we have not only a right, but a responsibility, to insist on specific reforms in exchange for their investment.” To force reform in UN operations, continued control of budgetary growth and reduce UN regular budget and peacekeeping assessments to the U.S. the Helms-Biden law was approved by the U.S. Senate in November 1999 by an overwhelming margin of 98-1. “You should read that vote as virtually a unanimous mandate for a new relationship with a reformed United Nations.”

The U.S. position was a point of much debate previously between the executive and legislative branches. It is now obvious that the period of internal U.S. debate has concluded with a consolidated position that revision of the regular and peacekeeping scale of assessments must occur in 2000. The U.S. position is that times have changed, economies of many nations have improved, some other member states capacity to pay has changed, and over reliance on one member state is unhealthy. The U.S. has forced reform on the UN over the 1990s by the power of the purse and now seeks a reduction in the regular budget assessment rate from 25 percent to 22 percent and a revision in the 27-year old ad hoc, peacekeeping scale of assessments. Under the Helms-Biden legislation reducing the U.S. share of the UNs regular budget from 25 percent to 22 percent and its share of the peacekeeping assessments from about 31 percent to 25 percent would free $582 million already set aside to pay U.S. arrears to the UN in 2001 and another $244 million in 2002.”
The 2000 regular budget assessment scale was based on economic data as much as ten years old with the result that some countries pay too much and others too little. "In a membership organization of equals, everyone should pay their fair share." Ambassador Holbrooke says:

"Ability to pay can no longer be measured in data that is 10 years old. We need to broaden the UN's tax base by introducing a sliding gradient that better reflects the ability to pay of the world's powerhouse developing economies. The UN must leave behind the unhealthy practice of placing excessive reliance on a single contributor. Since 1946, the U.S. has recognized that the principle of 'capacity to pay' – and the whole UN has recognized that the principle of capacity to pay—must be modified by other critical imperatives: a limitation of reliance on any one single member state, that is the ceiling; appropriate acknowledgement of the status of those who have very limited capacity to pay, that is the floor; and, a mitigation of commitment to pay for those whose economies are still developing, that is, a gradient."

Ambassador Holbrooke, praised the work that had been done to strengthen the UN’s peacekeeping abilities, but stated, "we must focus that same degree of creativity and partnership on the ... crisis in peacekeeping financing. Without the resources to back it, the best reform plan is just a set of empty aspirations." To enter 2001 with the existing ad hoc system in place – devised in 1973 to fund a single, six month, $30 million operation in the Sinai and never intended to set a precedent—would be untenable. This system concentrates 98 percent of financial responsibility for peacekeeping with just 30 member states, leaving the other 159 paying only token amounts regardless of their economic circumstances.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Engagement in international affairs is not a favor we do the rest of the world, it is a matter of cold-blooded protection of our interests.

The U.S. Congress, has the power of the purse in the U.S. Government, and will not continue to fund the UN without continual reform and reduction in the UN assessments. On December 11, 2000 Senator Bill Frist a Republican Senator from Tennessee, reminded the UN General Assembly of Senator Helms' January 2000 visit when he stated "that negotiations on changing dues assessments were at a now or never point."

The U.S. supports the fundamental principles of the UN Charter that must underpin any revision of the scale: first, that peacekeeping expenses are the collective responsibility of all
member states; second, that the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility to support peacekeeping; and third, that low income developing countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute. All member states must contribute according to their means. The new scale cannot be predicated on political divisions and preconceptions. Per capita income represents a useful and credible basis for determining fair contribution levels. "GNP, the very basis of the regular budget scale calculation must also remain a fundamental determinant of ultimate rates."¹¹⁴

The current peacekeeping "rate structure where countries poised to increase their contributions must move from 20 percent to 100 percent in a single step, ignores political and fiscal realities. A rigid distinction between the wealthy developed and poor developing countries no longer holds—there are many shades in between, and countries do not remain in one place perpetually. In order to allow countries to increase their contributions on a more graduated basis that reflects their actual means, we support the creation of an intermediate group for middle income countries—a new tax bracket, so to speak—comprised of those able to pay something more than a nominal amount, but less than 100 percent of their regular budget rates. Under any such system there must be automatic updates so that when countries get richer they move up, and when they experience economic difficulties, they can move down with no questions asked."¹¹⁵

The U.S. cannot possibly withdraw from its position as the lone superpower and its requisite position of world leadership without suffering grave consequences. Therefore, the idea of maintaining status quo is without merit and does not achieve the U.S. strategic goal of ensuring other member states with the capacity to pay more, do so. This is especially true as the U.S. faces a possible economic downturn and reduction in financial capabilities. Likewise, the UN cannot afford for its strongest fiscal supporter to continue its tardiness of payments or survive unilateral decreases in revenue without seeking offsets from other member states. Since the U.S. needs a strong UN to face the global challenges of the post-Cold War environment and the UN cannot achieve strength without sufficient resources something other than status quo is required.

"Any scale revision will mean that some countries will bear greater financial responsibility for peacekeeping than they do today. Many have already come forward to say as a demonstration of their commitment to the UN, and out of recognition of their current economic circumstances, they are ready to play an expanded role. Other countries, including some with limited means, have agreed voluntarily to increase their financial participation in peacekeeping under the scale. They are (18): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Malta, Oman, the Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, and UAE."¹¹⁶
Nine of these member states were among fifteen of the wealthiest countries paying a reduced assessment in 1991. These eighteen member states’ 1999 GDP and per capita income (PCI) GDP are listed in the table below. Each member state listed receives either an 80 percent discount (i.e., Group C) or a 90 percent discount (i.e., Group D).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>PCI GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>$.5B</td>
<td>$8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>$8.6B</td>
<td>$13,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>$34.9B</td>
<td>$4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>$9.0B</td>
<td>$15,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>$7.9B</td>
<td>$5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>$79.4B</td>
<td>$7,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>$105.4B</td>
<td>$18,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>$625.7B</td>
<td>$13,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>$44.8B</td>
<td>$22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>$9.8B</td>
<td>$4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>$5.3B</td>
<td>$13,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>$19.6B</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>$282.0B</td>
<td>$3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>$12.3B</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>$87.4B</td>
<td>$3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$191.0B</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>$21.4B</td>
<td>$10,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>$41.5B</td>
<td>$17,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. GDP - PER CAPITA INCOME (Selected Member States)

From October to December 2000, most member states came to consensus that changing the assessment scale was key to viability of the organization. The time is right to craft changes to the scales of assessment and the U.S. recommendation has merit and is a viable option to pursue. Specifically on the regular budget, increase assessment rate for newly prosperous countries with increased GDP per capita; reduce the ceiling to 22 percent for regular budget; lower the discounts and raise the floor; and reduce the 7.5-year base “gradient” period to 3 years thus relying on accurate, up-to-date economic data. On the peacekeeping assessment scale, reduce the ceiling to 25 percent; maintain P5 special obligation to pay; reduce member
states discounts by ensuring capacity to pay in terms of GDP per capita is factored in; ensure the continuation of current 80 to 90 percent discount levels for all low-income countries; use the 3 year gradient for calculation of GDP; and revise categories as needed.

These recommended changes will benefit the U.S., but will also benefit member states whose capacity to pay has changed, but they are stuck for a lengthy period (i.e., ten years) in a higher assessment category. "South Africa is an example of our failure to adapt the ad hoc scale to changing realities. Placed in Group B in 1973, South Africa has been stuck there, despite a per capita income level that is now below the world average."\(^{118}\)

The U.S. is insistent on changes to the UN scales of assessment before the 55\(^{th}\) session of the General Assembly adjourns. This research supports the need to spread more of the organization's expenses among more member states to improve and restore UN viability. UN member states with an improved capacity to pay should accept their responsibility; relinquish unnecessary discounts; and pay their fair share. Without a change to the assessment levels that incorporates current realities of member states' economies the U.S. will probably unilaterally and negatively impact many UN programs that receive the majority of its funding from voluntary contributions. In fact, Congress has made it clear that it will block all payments to the UN if the organization continues with discussions to tax American citizens or business enterprises in order to raise revenue. Since the U.S. provides much more in voluntary contributions than the assessed dues, preventing any payments would strangle the organization. The UN General Assembly must work with its member states that have acknowledged the need for a change to the scales of assessment.

**CONCLUSIONS**

"The capacity of the UN to maintain international peace and security is directly related to the sound financing of its peacekeeping operations."\(^{119}\)

A healthy and creative United Nations diminishes the pressures for direct American intervention and allows for a much broader sharing of the costs.\(^{120}\) To have a financially stable UN ensures capacity to respond to new challenges and prepare for unanticipated ones. The U.S. was correct in forcing reform on the UN as this is the one global organization that 189 member states and other countries around the world will turn to in volatile and complex times ahead. To bring the issue of changing the regular budget and peacekeeping assessments to a head was critical in ensuring recognition of the new realities of the world economy and member
states capacity to pay. The method used to bring this issue to a vote (i.e., the power of the purse) although seen in many quarters on the world stage as heavy handed is an example of the American system of governance and it works.

The U.S. is the lone world superpower and has a moral responsibility to lead the quest for peaceful existence, but should not continue to resource the UN and its peacekeeping operations at the level it has in the past especially since other member states capacity to pay has improved. The U.S. has a responsibility to ensure payments to international organizations are for the right reasons and acknowledge other member states capacity to pay.

POSTSCRIPT

This research project began in September 2000 during a time when many UN member states were adamantly opposed to decreasing the U.S. assessment level. The European Union (EU), and Group of 77 countries, and China to name a few made public announcements of its opinion on any change to the regular budget and/or peacekeeping assessment. Most of the rhetoric was counter to the U.S. position through most of November 2000. Gradually, with small signs of change seen in October 2000, member states began to shift their views with eighteen volunteering to increase their assessment level. This recognition of changed economic capabilities provided an opportunity to work toward a consensus on eliminating an impasse between the U.S. and the UN.

On December 23, 2000 the UN's Fifth Committee recommended and the General Assembly approved a change to the assessment rates. This of course was the focus of this research project and genesis of its recommendation. This voluntary adjustment of the assessment rates reaffirms the principle that it is the collective responsibility of all UN member states to pay the organization's peacekeeping expenses. The UN agreed to lower the ceiling rate for the regular budget assessment "from 25 to 22 percent of the budget and revise the 1973 ad hoc peacekeeping assessment by establishing 10 levels of assessment depending on countries' per capita income." The table below details the new peacekeeping scale:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Threshold</th>
<th>$ Thresholds (2001-2003)</th>
<th>Target Discount Percent</th>
<th>Transition Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Perm Members of Sec Council</td>
<td>Premium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>All Member States (Except Level A)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Under $9,594</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Below 2X AVG PCGNP of all member states (Exc. Level A)</td>
<td>Under $9,594</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Below 1.8X AVG PCGNP (Exc. LVL A)</td>
<td>Under $8,634</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Below 1.6X AVG PCGNP (Exc. LVL A)</td>
<td>Under $7,675</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Below 1.4X AVG PCGNP (Exc. LVL A)</td>
<td>Under $6,715</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Below 1.2X PCGNP (Exc. LVL A)</td>
<td>Under $5,756</td>
<td>80 (or 70 on a voluntary basis)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Below AVG PCGNP</td>
<td>Under $4,797</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Least developed countries (EXC LVL A)</td>
<td>Under $4,797</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3. UN PEACEKEEPING SCALES LEVELS**

The revised peacekeeping assessment scale for 2001 – 2003 is effective 1 July 2001. It assigns member states to the lowest level of contribution with the highest discount it is eligible for; uses the average GDP PCI of $4,797 based on the period 1993 to 1998; allows transition periods of two years if moving up two levels and three years if moving up three levels; and request an update of the composition levels on a triennial basis.122

This adjustment bases the UN peacekeeping assessment on the regular budget assessment scale; ensures the P5 are assessed at a higher rate than the UN regular budget; and spreads discounts provided developing countries amongst the P5. Of course the expansion from four categories under the 1973 ad hoc scale to ten categories increases some member state contribution levels and a few countries have volunteered to move into higher categories than their respective average PCGNP dictates. Member states in Level “A” remains at five; but
Level "B" expands from 21 to 25 countries exclusive of two member states that have volunteered to move into this higher category. Level C through H accounts for 19 member states. Level I has 92 countries and Level "J" includes 48 countries. These ten levels of assessment effectively reduce the U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate from 31 percent of costs to 28 percent. Collectively, both the changes to the regular budget and peacekeeping assessment levels would "save taxpayers $170 million a year."\(^{123}\)

The UN decision did not fully meet the U.S. demands in regards to the peacekeeping scale, but Congress felt that the UN reform is sufficient and the revised assessment scales are acceptable. On 8 February 2001, the U.S. Senate voted without dissent to repay $582 million of the U.S. debt to the UN as part of the deal that reduces the U.S. share of the UN regular operating and peacekeeping costs.\(^{124}\)

The recent actions by the UN and U.S. Government settles the most pressing concern for continued viability of the world's principal organization chartered to pursue peace. However, although not as critical, there is still more work on fiscal support required. For instance to strengthen the organization with consistent cash flow, the UN should continue to work with member states to gain approval of quarterly payments of assessments. The Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing recommended as far back as 1993 that the UN should require its member states to pay their dues in four quarterly installments, instead of a single lump sum at the beginning of the year.\(^{125}\) Member states could manage a quarterly payment schedule better and it would ensure consistent funding for the UN.
ENDNOTES


3 Defense Intelligence Agency, DoD Futures Program, 7.


5 Kozaryn, 33.


7 Carol Lancaster, “Redesigning Foreign Aid,” *Foreign Affairs* Volume 79, Number 5 (September/October 2000): 75.


9 Kozaryn, 33.

10 Council on Foreign Relations, 27.


12 Ibid.


15 Ibid., 7.

16 Ibid., 9.

17 Ibid., 10.

18 Ibid., 9.

19 Ibid., 11.

20 Council on Foreign Relations, 22.


26 Ibid., 36.

27 Sohn, 11.

29 Sohn, 11.


33 Kincaid, 9.


36 Ibid.


43 Ibid.


Kincaid.

Ibid.


Shijuro Ogata and Paul Volcker, 6.

Sohn, 68 - 69.

Council on Foreign Relations, 35.


Shijuro Ogata and Paul Volcker, 9.

Ibid., 7.

Sohn, 68 - 69.

Ibid., 69.


67 Shijuro Ogata and Paul Volcker, 21.

68 Council on Foreign Relations, 34.


70 Sohn, 30.


72 Council on Foreign Relations, 34.

73 Kincaid.
74 Ibid.


77 Ibid., 7.

78 Ibid., 7-8.

79 Ibid., 9.


81 Kincaid.

82 Council on Foreign Relations, 11.


84 Kincaid.

85 Kozaryn, 33.

86 Kincaid.


89 Council on Foreign Relations, 4.

90 Ibid., 33.


95 Shijuro Ogata and Paul Volcker, 17.


97 Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


112 Kozaryn, 33.


115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.


120 Council on Foreign Relations, 10.


124 Ibid.

125 Shijuro Ogata and Paul Volcker, 10.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


"Legislative Efforts: Helms-Biden Legislation." Available from:


Byman, Daniel, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, and Matthew Waxman. Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations. Santa Monica, CA.: RAND.


