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U.S. ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: TIME FOR A CHANGE?

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ABSTRACT

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Current U.S. policy in Kosovo provides stability in this troubled region, but clearly commits the U.S. Army to long-term engagement. And while this overarching policy and U.S. involvement is important to the long-term stability of Kosovo and the entire Southeastern European region, it is expensive in terms of the U.S. Army’s readiness and associated financial costs of sustaining a large military presence. It is time to review the current policy and its effectiveness in order to determine a way ahead that not only sustains critical U.S. leadership and involvement in the region, but also restructures the Army’s role in order to improve combat readiness and reinvest limited defense dollars and other resources necessary to transform the Army to meet the needs of the 21st Century.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

U.S. ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: TIME FOR CHANGE?...............................I

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................III

U.S. ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: TIME FOR A CHANGE? ...................1

THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO. .................2

THE NATIONAL INTEREST FACTOR ......................................................................2

THE REALITY OF CURRENT U.S. POLICY .........................................................3

THE U.S. ARMY SITUATION ................................................................................6

U.S. ARMY READINESS AND THE BALKANS .....................................................7

ARMY WAR-FIGHTING SKILLS .............................................................................7

INCREASED PERSTEMPO OF THE FORCE .......................................................10

COSTS OF LONG-TERM PEACE OPERATIONS ..............................................11

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS ....................................................................................12

THE EUROPEAN MILITARY OPTION .............................................................13

THE RESTRUCTURING OPTION .........................................................................15

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION .........................................................................17

ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................21

BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................27
U.S. ARMY PEACE OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: TIME FOR A CHANGE?

Building this new Europe requires real effort—by helping erstwhile Communist countries make the difficult transition to becoming market democracies, promoting human rights and the rule of law in societies where neither have been safeguarded, and opposing organized violence whenever it is used to retard the emergence of stable, secure and peaceful societies.¹

—Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon

It is clear that the post-cold war security environment is much more complicated and complex than the days of the bipolar struggle between the superpowers. This is especially evident in Europe, where a surge in nationalist violence and ethnic conflict in the former eastern bloc communist countries of Southeast Europe has created a region that is more volatile than ever and threatens the long-term stability of the entire European continent. As Daalder and O'Hanlon suggest, building a secure environment in Europe that allows open, democratic markets to thrive will require serious effort on the part of all countries with vital interests in the region. The U.S. is one such country that has long-standing, deep-rooted interests in sustaining a secure Europe. It is because of these interests that the U.S. has found itself engaged in peace operations in the Balkans over the last decade. Kosovo is just the latest flash point where U.S. troops are committed as a stabilizing force. And while this overarching U.S. strategy of military engagement in Kosovo appears to be effective and is important to the long-term stability of the region, it clearly commits the U.S. Army to peace operations of indefinite duration that have high readiness and financial costs.

These costs have engendered a continuous debate as to whether the U.S. military, and specifically the U.S. Army, should remained engaged in Kosovo. The purpose of this paper is to help resolve the debate. The first step is to examine the origins and nature of U.S. policy in Kosovo and particularly the long-term impact of that policy on combat readiness within the Army. The second step is to determine if there are options imbedded in the current situation that would allow the sustainment of American leadership and commitment in Kosovo, while at the same time permitting a reduction of the burden on the U.S. Army. When looking at feasible options, there is one fundamental assumption that must be considered: that the U.S. will remain engaged in Southeast Europe and committed to some form of U.S. and allied military presence in the region. The basis for this assumption is derived from an analysis of U.S. national interests, as well as the reality that a great power like the U.S., once committed, would lose
prestige, credibility and allied cohesion if it retreats from its international responsibilities as a world leader. Thus, this paper will examine two possible options that support varying degrees of U.S. military involvement in Kosovo in accordance with U.S. national interest in the region, while reducing the overall burden on the Army.

THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST FACTOR

It is important to clearly identify the U.S. national interests at stake in Kosovo, since they are the source of much debate and a central issue when determining a way ahead in the region. Why is the U.S. there in the first place? Is Kosovo "vital" to American national interests? If not, what are the compelling reasons for U.S. involvement in Kosovo? The answer to these questions is complex and requires an understanding of what vital interests are as defined in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the document that provides the foundation for shaping U.S. policy. The NSS defines vital interests as:

Those interests that are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of the nation. Among these are physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, the economic well being of our society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures.... We will do what we must to defend these interests, including, when necessary and appropriate, using our military might unilaterally and decisively.²

Using this definition in its broadest context, it can be argued that the U.S. has vital interests in Kosovo. First, America has a sizable economic stake in Europe. Europe is a major player in the global market and requires a stable environment for democratic markets to thrive. Moreover, since the end of the cold war, there have been significant security problems in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe to include the Balkan region. The European community, and thus the U.S., has an interest in shaping these troubled countries from an economic and security standpoint. If these areas are not attended to today, tensions will spread and potentially drag the entire European community into conflict as it has done repeatedly over the past century.³ A destabilized Europe, immersed in nationalistic and ethnic conflict, clearly jeopardizes the economic development of Europe and the global market, as well as threatening overall security. To this end, it is important to understand that what affects European security and markets, ultimately affects vital U.S. economic and security interests abroad. In addition to
these economic and security concerns, the U.S. has clear humanitarian interests in preventing widespread ethnic cleansing and human suffering, as seen in Kosovo prior to the beginning of peace operations. In this context, U.S. operations in Kosovo clearly support both vital and humanitarian interests focused on creating a Europe that is peaceful and secure in order to allow the spread of democratic open-market economies.

Lastly, and from a "realist" standpoint, the United States has no choice but to remain engaged in Kosovo. Once NATO aircraft, led by the United States, began bombing Kosovo in April 1999, the United States committed itself to improving the situation in Kosovo. Debate on initial American involvement in Kosovo is long past due and should have occurred prior to the air campaign in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, Reforming Multinational Peace Operations. This presidential directive, signed by President Clinton in May 1994, provides a comprehensive framework for U.S. decision-making on issues of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The directive prescribes steps used to ensure that military commitment is "selective" and only for "well defined" peace operations that are not open-ended, but linked to concrete political solutions.4 Whether such steps occurred in this detail prior to the bombing is debatable, but no longer relevant. The U.S. is already committed in Kosovo. The question now is whether the current policy is effective in terms of fulfilling American interests and where the U.S. should proceed from here?

THE REALITY OF CURRENT U.S. POLICY

The air war over Kosovo ended on 11 June 1999 with the accomplishment of U.S. and NATO aims: the withdrawal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo; the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to Kosovo; and the deployment of an international security force to protect all people of Kosovo. The follow-on U.S. policy objective is continued engagement in Kosovo in order to establish a stable environment that provides for the security and dignity of all people of Kosovo. General, overarching ways to meet these objectives include: addressing humanitarian needs; easing ethnic tensions and protecting minority rights; and strengthening democracy and supporting civil society within Kosovo.5 This policy is in concert with UN Security Counsel (UNSC) Resolution 1244, which outlines a combination of political and economic means to ensure stability in Kosovo. It is also tied to a larger U.S. and European Community policy of economic and diplomatic engagement in the entire Southeast European region in order to facilitate democratic ideals, economic growth and long-term regional stability.6

3
To support this overall policy, the Clinton Administration adopted a series of options embodying all the elements of power. There are two primary political ways in which the U.S. implements the overarching policy. The first is by staying actively engaged in diplomacy throughout the entire Southeast Europe region, to include Kosovo. The second way is by ensuring that U.S. efforts in Kosovo are in concert with the international community in order to maintain legitimacy and support for U.S. actions. The means used to implement these concepts include: support of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1244; participation in the European Union (EU)-sponsored Southeast Europe Stability Pact (SESP) that focuses on the larger reconstruction issues of the region; and providing political assistance to the newly elected President of Serbia, Vojislav Kostunica.  

The SESP was initiated by the EU and strongly supported by the Clinton administration, with the intent of integrating several emerging democracies in Southeast Europe (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia) into the European mainstream. The plan addresses regional security, economic development, promoting democratic ideals and other forms of society building that adds to the stability of the region. This plan is viewed as similar to the Marshall Plan following WW II, in which the U.S. and other major powers of the time focused on reconstruction of Europe through a balanced use of all the elements of power. The creation of the SESP is a major step in providing the much needed stability and economic assistance to the region. Additionally, and of major significance to the region, Serbia was recently admitted as a member of the organization due to the election of President Kostunica and to his stated goal of moving Serbia towards a more democratic and open society. While Serbia’s European neighbors are taking a wait and see approach to that country’s commitment to peace and democracy, the move clearly signals a major shift toward peace in a region where Serbia has been responsible for starting four nationalistic and ethnic-related conflicts since 1990.  

The military ways used in Kosovo are primarily focused on the commitment of U.S. forces in support of UNSC Resolution 1244. The U.S. troops are under the command and control of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and are assigned a sector of operations that includes other NATO and non-NATO peacekeeping forces. The specific military objectives are to: establish a secure environment, to include public safety and order; monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the conditions of the Military Technical Agreement; and to provide assistance to the UNMIK. The military means include approximately 7,500 U.S. ground
troops (the vast majority Army), as well as additional intelligence, logistical and transportation support to KFOR as a whole. 9

Economic ways are closely tied to the political and military ways and are focused in two broad areas. The first is to provide near-term funding for humanitarian requirements and the sustainment of U.S. forces in Kosovo on a daily basis. The second is to establish long-term initiatives that encourage U.S. and international private organizations (POs) and businesses to invest in Kosovo in order to create a stable, democratic market-based economy. The primary economic means used to support U.S. military operations in Kosovo comes from the operating budgets of the armed services, with reimbursement through congressionally approved supplemental spending bills. Funding for near-term humanitarian assistance programs has come from a variety of sources within the U.S., to include government, non-government and private organizations, such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army. The primary means of long-term economic stability is by encouraging business investment in the region, as well as by providing up-front funds through the U.S. Trade and Development Agency for start-up costs. With U.S. Leadership, approximately $2.3 Billion in "quick start" assistance was raised in the first year of peace operations. Finally, the U.S. is actively working with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for both near-term humanitarian funding and long-term investment in Kosovo. 10

Informational approaches are concerned with fostering a free and independent media in Kosovo based on a strong message tied to building democracy. Informational means include the use of military psychological operations, assistance programs for civilian TV, radio and newspapers, and the creation of a private/public Internet Information Center that provides technical assistance and training in Kosovo. In addition, President Clinton and other senior administrative officials used press releases and visits to Kosovo to reinforce the information objectives intended to influence the people of the region, particularly to send a message to the leaders and people of Serbia that their move towards democracy and elimination of Milosevic were in the best interests of everyone. 11

This concerted and focused informational effort, coupled with economic and diplomatic means initiated through the SESP, has sparked many positive trends in the region. For example, specific efforts to encourage Montenegro to move towards sovereignty and a market-based democratic economy put additional pressure on Serbia's nationalist leadership.
Montenegro is a province of Serbia, like Kosovo, which has also experienced years of repression under Milosevic. This support of Montenegro's struggle against Milosevic helped send a strong message to the people of the region. This democratic-oriented message coming out of Montenegro, along with the Clinton Administration's persistent anti-Milosevic message, helped create a ground swell of support for the more democratic platform of Vojislav Kostunica. He went on to defeat Milosevic in elections in Serbia, marking a significant shift away from repression and conflict in the region. It is clear that information ways employed since the beginning of the Kosovo crises were key during Serbia's elections and continue to be an integral part of the U.S. strategy in the region.

The current U.S. strategy in Kosovo is achieving the short-term objectives of providing humanitarian assistance and security to that province. While there are still ethnic tensions and significant civil administrative challenges, the people of Kosovo are clearly better off today than ever. This is primarily due to the tremendous efforts on the part of the international community, KFOR and many PO/NGO. While the UNMIK has been slow to respond and has not met its goals of putting a viable civilian police (CIVPOL) and judicial system in place, that organization is making steady progress.\textsuperscript{12} The use of U.S. political, economic and especially military means has been a vital component to the success achieved to date and will continue to improve the stability in Kosovo over time. This is especially true when tied to the wider strategy established in the SESP, which calls for aggressive diplomatic and economic initiatives in the region.

THE U.S. ARMY SITUATION

Currently the U.S is responsible for the Multinational Brigade East (MNB-E) sector, which consists of approximately 8,800 troops from the U.S., Greece, Italy, Jordan, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. These forces are led by the U.S. and are designated Task Force Falcon (TFF), which is responsible for all peace operations in MNB-E. The U.S. Army provides the bulk of the force in the sector with approximately 7,000 troops in Kosovo, and another 500 at a staging base in Macedonia. The Army contingent currently consists of:

- One division headquarters minus (currently 1st Armored Division), led by one of the division's Assistant Division Commanders (ADC) and consisting of many of the division staff officers, augmented with individuals from other units and the reserve/National Guard components;
• one combat maneuver Brigade Headquarters;

• three maneuver battalions (Infantry/Armor), with one light battalion from a stateside division (currently 101st Air Assault Division);

• numerous slice elements from the division’s support and service support units, such as signal, intelligence, engineers, artillery, military police, and numerous Division Support Command (DISCOM) units; and

• numerous non-divisional units and specialties, such as medical, civil affairs and other special purpose forces.

The last two categories are considered low-density, high-demand (LD/HD) assets because there are only a few of these specialized units that are in high demand during peace operations. Their specialized skills best translate into civil support and sustainment operations, which predominate in such operations. Because the majority of these units are in the reserve component, that component also plays a major role in supporting operations in Kosovo.13

U.S. ARMY READINESS AND THE BALKANS

The U.S. can most likely sustain support of the non-military initiatives indefinitely without great difficulty. However, a review of Army requirements for long-term operations in Kosovo highlights potential problems in war-fighting readiness and the associated costs of supporting long-term military operations in the region. Specific readiness and financial issues include the inability to train high intensity war-fighting skills necessary to execute a major theater war (MTW), the high personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) of the force, which has a negative impact on troop morale and retention, and the costs of sustaining indefinitely a large force with weaponry and equipment in the region.

ARMY WAR-FIGHTING SKILLS

The impact of continuous peace operations on a unit’s ability to hone its MTW war-fighting skills is a subject of much debate and concern. This is especially true today with a National Security Strategy that requires the military to fight two MTWs nearly simultaneously. The primary concern is that the Army is 36% smaller today than 11 years ago when it successfully executed Operation Desert Storm, but is deployed more often in support of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The large commitment to peace operations for instance,
has had an impact on the Army's ability to train for the next large, high intensity contingency, thus raising serious concerns about its ability to support the current strategy. As early as the summer of 1999, then Secretary of Defense Cohen acknowledged that the entire defense department was having a hard time juggling simultaneous crises worldwide. In this regard, Cohen emphasized that peace operations were not the U.S. military's primary activity and that they involved, "a different type of training and capabilities...not necessarily consistent with the war-fighting mission we've had in the past."  

To put it into context, an Army combat unit engaged in peace operations requires approximately four months of intensive training prior to deployment, followed by another four to six months recovery to regain its MTW war-fighting edge. This means realistically that this unit is not available for an MTW for approximately 14-16 months as it makes the transition through the "prepare-deploy-retrain" cycle. While this cycle of supporting peace operations is keeping segments of the force from properly training to an MTW war-fighting standard, the Army's current concept for meeting its two MTW commitment does not address this reality, but requires that a unit apportioned to a Commander-in-Chief (CINC) for an MTW be extracted from a peace operation and deployed directly to an MTW. Because of the very different skills required to conduct peace operations, this concept of extraction and deployment to a high intensity combat zone is seriously flawed and would place soldiers and the mission at great risk.

The key to the transition of a unit to a war-fighting status is sustaining its wartime mission essential task list (METL) proficiency while on peace operations. This is normally not a problem for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units, since Army CS and CSS troops execute their wartime mission essential tasks daily during peace operations. Combat arms soldiers, however, do not. In fact, many combat arms soldiers are not deployed on peace operations with their combat weapon systems, such as the M1 Abrams or M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. In many cases when the combat systems are deployed, they are not used because the peace mission or the operating environment does not require or accommodate this heavy equipment. Even when such systems are used as a show of force and stabilizing factor, they are not operated at the intensity necessary to sustain those critical war-fighting skills necessary to win and survive on the high intensity battlefield. In addition, training and sustaining high intensity war-fighting skills during peace operations is usually very difficult. In Kosovo for example, there are no quality live-fire ranges that allow combat crews to maintain the requisite
gunnery competencies. Additionally, there is little time during peace operations to seriously train war-fighting skills because of the continuous 24-hour a day mission requirements.

To further exacerbate the situation, there is normally one similar size Army combat unit in each of the phases in this “prepare-deploy-retrain” cycle simultaneously, thus tripling for each deployment the number of units not ready to participate in an MTW. What this means to the Army, which shoulders the burden of peace operations is that it will take three combat Brigades to sustain one brigade on a peace operation mission in Kosovo. Moreover, most peace operations have a large command and control (C2) requirement due to the political and international implications of peace operation missions. Normally a division headquarters provides this C2 structure for its subordinate brigades. With the requirement to support consecutive six-month rotation cycles of its subordinate brigades, it is very difficult for a single division to provide the assets internally without recycling staff members and critical LD/HD units. This places an additional burden on the rest of the force by compelling a division to request a large number of individual augments from non-divisional units, from other active forces and from the reserve component to fill shortfalls that cannot be filled internally. Such augmentation has an impact on the leadership ranks that predominately man the C2 nodes, further impeding the effectiveness of the division to adequately support simultaneous operations in theater and at home station. These augments also reduce the effectiveness of those units that provide them and which now must also operate at reduced manning levels. Finally, the PERSTEMPO of these critical division C2 personnel is extremely high and adversely affects morale and long-term retention of these valuable officers and NCOs.

These problems in balancing MTW war-fighting readiness with support to continuous peace operations were demonstrated in Europe during the first U.S. Army rotation in Kosovo, and continue today with the second rotation. Since the beginning of peace operations in that region, the European-based U.S. divisions (the 1st Infantry Division, and now the 1st Armor Division) each used one-year rotations. Within this one year division commitment, there were two, six-month rotations for the subordinate combat brigades and other support units. The division elements not deployed (60-65%) during the 1st Infantry Division’s rotation remained at home station either preparing to relieve the elements in Kosovo or retraining following a return from Kosovo. This cycle of “prepare-deploy-retrain” required the division to conduct high-tempo split-based operations between Kosovo and home station, normally placing a significant burden on the division as it attempted to sustain operations in the main effort at Kosovo, while trying to
maintain high levels of personnel, equipment and training readiness back in Germany to meet the MTW war-fighting mission essential task list. As a result of these problems in juggling readiness requirements, the 1st Infantry Division reported that it was “not mission ready” to perform its MTW mission. 18

INCREASED PERSTEMPO OF THE FORCE

Army personnel are leaving the service in larger numbers due to the high PERSTEMPO that they experience as a result of the constant “prepare-deploy-retrain” cycle. This is especially true of the mid-grade NCOs and junior officers, who historically have provided the experience and war-fighter leadership at the tactical levels and are thus critical to success on the next battlefield. Between 1998 and 2001, as a case in point, the Army loss of Captains has been well above the historical norm, creating a critical shortage throughout the service. Surveys taken of these officers, as well as of the rest of the force, indicate that a major reason for leaving the Army is because of the lack of personal and family time, and of predictability and job satisfaction – all associated with the high PERSTEMPO as a result of the “prepare-deploy-retrain” cycle. 19 And while this continuous cycle impacts on the junior officers and NCOs, it has been especially hard on LD/HD soldiers of all ranks, particularly those LD/HD specialists in the logistics, maintenance, law enforcement, engineer, medical and civil affairs career fields. Because these soldiers are limited in number, but critical to the success of most peace operations, many deploy at a significantly higher rate than their combat arms counterparts. In fact, it is not uncommon for LD/HD soldiers to do consecutive peace operation tours. At the same time, these LD/HD soldiers are critical for sustaining normal peacetime training and operations at home station for the combat arms units not deployed. Because of this dual requirement, the military is forced to outsource much of the home station support requirements, further adding to the overall cost of supporting peace operations.

As with the dilemma on war fighting skills, PERSTEMPO problems also apply to the total Army, not just to the active duty soldiers that are deployed. In addition to the division headquarters (minus) serving in Kosovo today, for example, there is also a larger division command and control structure serving in Bosnia. With only 10 active divisions, this continuous and simultaneous commitment of assets from two divisions stretches the Army by involving six divisions in the “prepare-deploy-retrain” cycle at any given time: three focused on Bosnia and three focused on Kosovo. To help alleviate this burden, beginning in the summer of 2001, rotations to Kosovo will include CONUS-based divisions in order to provide a break to the
European units, which have shouldered the bulk of the peace operation duties in the Balkans since 1995. To further reduce the burden on the active force as a whole, reserve and National Guard (NG) divisions are now being assigned to duty in Bosnia, freeing the active divisions for duty in Kosovo only. The 49th Infantry Division (NG) from Texas, for instance, recently completed a rotation in Bosnia and will be followed by numerous other reserve and NG divisions beginning in October 2001 with the 29th Infantry Division from the Virginia National Guard.20

Although the use of the reserve component and the NG does reduce the burden on the active force, the substitution only shifts the pain to those components, which have not been historically used for long-term operations not associated with a national crisis. It is likely that such deployments to peace operations will eventually have an impact on long-term retention and the morale of the reserve and NG force. Overall, it is clear that for the Total Force, the “prepare-deploy-retrain” cycle associated with peace operations is having a negative impact on personnel readiness, with adverse consequences for morale and retention. “We have a situation here where we have a smaller force and we have more missions,” Secretary Cohen testified, "We are wearing out our systems. We are wearing out our people.”21

COSTS OF LONG-TERM PEACE OPERATIONS

The high costs of sustaining a military presence in Kosovo, as well as routine training and maintenance at home station, limit the dollars available to modernize and prepare the military for the future. It is estimated to have cost the U.S. military over $1.5 billion in the first year of peace operations in Kosovo. This did not include much of the unforecasted costs of preparing follow-on forces for subsequent rotations and outsourcing home station support requirements, which came out of the armed services operations and maintenance (O&M) budgets without reimbursement. This is especially troubling to the Army, which has a $9 Billion shortfall in the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), for transformation into a lighter, more responsive force in the future. At the same time, overall defense dollars are expected to increase only modestly in the next few years. What this means to the Army is that it will be difficult to continue to fund peace operations at their current levels, modernize and re-capitalized the legacy force and meet future transformation goals. This fiscal dilemma will challenge the Army’s senior leaders and force them to make tough choices during future budget cycles.22

The Congress is also looking closely at this issue of long-term costs, as well as the European allies’ commitment to pay their fair share for operations in Kosovo. Two recent
proposals that would limit U.S. military involvement in Kosovo have already been debated. In the first one, the House introduced a requirement for the President to monitor and report to Congress on the allied efforts to fulfill their financial commitments in Kosovo. This amendment also authorizes the Congress to terminate funding for U.S. deployments after 1 April 2001 if a report is not received. In addition, the amendment places a ceiling on the percentage of U.S. financial commitment in Kosovo at 15% of the overall combined costs of UN and NATO operations. This would require the UN and its member nations to shoulder 85% of the overall costs of continued operations in Kosovo. This amendment passed the house and is currently being considered in the House-Senate Conference Committee. The second piece of legislation was the Warner-Byrd Amendment to the Senate’s Defense Appropriations Bill on 9 May 00. This amendment called for terminating the funding for U.S. forces in Kosovo after 1 July 2001 unless the President submitted for debate a plan to reduce overall U.S. commitments in Kosovo. Although this legislation was defeated in the Senate, it is just one of many indications that Congress is seriously examining the issues associate with the military commitment in Kosovo. 23

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS

The overall strategy and use of the military element of power in the Balkans appears effective. It is clear however, that the U.S. Army will have significant challenges in retaining its war-fighting readiness if required to sustain long-term peace operations in Kosovo. In examining the feasible options for this dilemma, there is one fundamental assumption that was addressed in the introduction: that America will remained engaged in Southeast Europe and remain committed to some form of continued U.S. and allied military presence in that region. The U.S. has important, if not vital, interests tied to Europe in Balkan security. Moreover, now that the country is committed, it would be difficult to retreat without losing prestige, credibility and allied cohesion. At the very least, then, America will continue to provide support for the SESP with economic and diplomatic assistance and for KFOR with critical military capabilities possessed only by the U.S. ranging from strategic intelligence and lift to specific logistical systems.

As for the U.S. Army, there are several other assumptions that apply. To begin with, the requirement to fight at least one MTW will be retained in any future national security strategy. Allied to this is the assumption that the U.S. will not have time or strategic latitude to extract ground forces from peace operations in order to meet even a one MTW requirement. And finally, in terms of peace operations, it is assumed that there will be a continued reliance on
innovative outsourcing initiatives when possible to reduce the burden on LD/HD soldiers and sustain readiness at home station. In the context of these assumptions, there are two feasible options that support U.S. interests in the Balkans, while reducing the burden on the U.S. Army.

THE EUROPEAN MILITARY OPTION

The United States should take steps to turn the Kosovo peacekeeping operations over to our European allies. NATO undertook the Kosovo mission with an understanding that Europe, not America, would shoulder the peacekeeping and reconstruction duties. The United States, with its outstanding military forces and weaponry, effectively won the war; the European allies were to keep the peace.  

—Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.VA.)

The first option supports Senator Byrd’s desire and calls for the European community to take over the majority of military responsibilities using a combination of the new NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Headquarters and troops from the proposed European Security Defense Identity’s (ESDI) Rapid-REACTION Force. The CJTF is a NATO-sponsored command and control headquarters that is mobile, flexible and capable of operating outside the Alliance’s borders. One purpose of the CJTF is to provide a command and control vehicle for NATO participation in crisis management and peace operations in support of the ESDI initiative. While there will probably be American staff officers and NCOs assigned to the organization, they will be limited in number and will normally serve in a subject matter expert capacity. This program is currently being exercised within the present NATO structure and clearly enables the Europeans to assume a more active leadership role and to take over a greater share of the responsibility for collective security in Europe. At the same time, the ESDI plan is to build an autonomous European Rapid-REACTION Force within the European Union by 2003. The force would consist of approximately 60,000 European troops with skills ranging from combat arms to logistics and intelligence specialties. Although there is on-going debate on the ESDI’s role with respect to NATO, the U.S. does generally support this rapid-reaction initiative.

This option allows America to withdraw ground forces from the region by the end of 2003, but to remain engaged militarily by providing those critical military assets possessed only by the U.S. Additionally, by staying engaged through the Southeast European Stability Pact, the U.S. will continue to provide important leadership in the region, but without the long-term military commitment. This option would significantly reduce the overall costs required to sustain a large ground presence in the region, while allowing U.S. Army units to get back to the war-
fighting training need to sustain overall MTW combat readiness. Along with improved combat readiness, breaking the “prepare-deploy-retrain” paradigm would enhance soldier and family morale and retention. Returning predictability back into the training and operational tempo of the force would also improve the effectiveness of unit planners and leaders, who currently face the conflicting priorities of peace operations and war-fighting requirements. Lastly, this option also addresses Congressional concerns with European burden sharing. The European allies clearly carry the lion’s share of the burden in terms of costs and numbers of troops in this option.

At the same time, there are also disadvantages to the European option. First, the ESDI force is not scheduled for activation until 2003. Even though this would allow adequate time for the U.S. to properly plan and execute a smooth transition of the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) sector to another country, it also allows time for European countries to back out. In fact, there is evidence that many EU countries have declining defense budgets that do not demonstrate the actual commitment to ESDI despite the EU rhetoric. Germany’s actions are a case in point. Although that nation has allocated soldiers to the ESDI force, it has cut military spending by $10.4 Billion through the year 2003, an action obviously not designed to meet the increased defense requirements entailed in the rapid-reaction force. In two years time, the EU’s ability and desire to execute the ESDI initiatives may be significantly less than it is today.

Another area of concern is the impact of ESDI on the relationship between the U.S., NATO and the EU? Supporters of ESDI believe that it will strengthen the transatlantic link by providing a stronger European military pillar to the NATO alliance. This would allow the European NATO members to have a greater role in providing their own security when the U.S. and NATO as a whole are not willing to commit. Others believe, however, that having a stronger European defense capability and the authority to use it without requiring America to play a leading role would change the dynamics between U.S. and its European allies. Under the ESDI concept, EU members would have a larger say on the commitment of their NATO apportioned forces, possibly leaving the U.S. on the sidelines in determining important security issues in the region. There is also a proposal from France to create a separate C2 structure outside of NATO alliance to command and control the EU rapid-reaction force. Although not supported by most NATO EU members as being too costly, redundant and having to potential to conflict with NATO priorities, the proposal does signal a desire by some EU members to limit America’s influence and leadership role in addressing European security issues. Lastly, there is the question of whether the European community has the leadership and resources to seriously handle an
operation of this magnitude without significant U.S. help? This concern is especially compelling if examined in light of the dominant, yet tardy, U.S. role in brokering peace in the Balkans. Without U.S. leadership and military power to back it up, it is questionable whether the Dayton Accords, the air campaign and peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, would have been possible. Additionally, a close examination of the European burden sharing issue reveals that the Europeans are already providing the bulk of the force (approximately 80%) and operating costs (approximately 75%; 13% for the U.S.) for peace operations in the Balkans today.²⁸ The real question is, can the Europeans seriously go it alone and take on more of the burden than they do today?

THE RESTRUCTURING OPTION

An alternative is to focus on the American ground forces that have already been so successful in conducting peace operations in Kosovo. The intent would be to retain a large U.S. Army contingent in the region, but with major restructuring that would allow the units to realize significant improvements in combat readiness and cost savings. First, the option requires a realignment of the U.S. Army in the Balkans under one operational headquarters, responsible for both Bosnia and Kosovo. This restructuring would use only one division headquarters for the entire Balkan region, thus reducing command and control and logistical overhead costs and redundancies, as well as the overall burden on the active divisions. Second, the option calls for stationing U.S. forces in the region on a permanent basis, similar to Korea, by moving a division-equivalent structure to the Balkans and creating a separate peace operation force. This acknowledges a long-term commitment at the outset and allows the “Balkan Force” to focus training and resources on peace operations. This will allow the rest of the Army to focus on MTW war-fighting skills. Finally, this option has the potential to support the U.S. Army transformation initiatives by restructuring the two peace operation brigades in accordance with the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) concept. By exchanging the heavy equipment currently in theater with the lighter combat systems being fielded in the IBCT, the Balkan Force will be better aligned in term of capabilities with the current operating environment and mission in Kosovo.²⁹

The major advantage of this approach is that it retains an already proven strategy. Not only does it continue to demonstrate U.S. leadership and commitment in the region with a strong military contingent, it also breaks the “prepare-deploy-retrain” cycle by allowing the rest of the force to focus training on war-fighting skills. This option also reduces the overall
PERSTEMPO, thus improving morale, retention and again overall combat readiness of the rest of the force. Soldiers and their families in this approach will know that when soldiers rotate out of the Balkan Force, they will not be assigned to a unit preparing for a rotation to the Balkans. This option will also reduce the overall deployment costs associated with rotating major units every six months. Equipment would remain permanently in place while the troops would be rotated individually as in Korea today. Lastly, this option could provide the opportunity to support Army transformation efforts by identifying requirements for the objective force at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Fielding, then assessing the equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures associated with the IBCT during peace operations in Kosovo, could provide insight useful in determining the way ahead for the objective force.

A disadvantage to this option is that the start-up costs in terms of dollars and personnel turbulence would be high as a result of the initial restructuring of equipment and personnel to meet the requirements of the Balkan Force. Although no longer required to fund the movement of large formations of equipment and soldiers twice a year, the Army's base operation costs would continue to be relatively large compared to the European military option and thus still divert some dollars away from re-capitalization and transformation efforts. Additionally, the personnel turbulence necessary to sustain a short-tour force could detract from the readiness of the peace operation force in Kosovo. A commonly held concern of leaders in Korea today is that the force is not stable enough to properly train and sustain critical unit-level collective skills. Moreover, unlike Korea, soldiers returning from peace operations in the Balkans would require refresher training prior to being reintegrated back into a war-fighting unit. 30

Another significant disadvantage of this option is that the Army would have to commit one of its 10 active divisions in order to create a separate Balkan Force. Although it is likely the Army will receive more defense dollars in the coming years and possibly additional soldiers as a result of the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it is unlikely that either will be enough to establish an additional division-size organization in the Army (11 active divisions). In addition to force structure challenges, a separate organization focused solely on peace operations as opposed to war-fighting will require some adjustment in an Army rightly focused on the larger threat to U.S. national security associated with MTWs. Part of that adjustment is evolving in current versions of capstone Army doctrine manuals that
include military operations other than war (MOOTW). Nevertheless, the question remains: Is the Army ready to embrace an option that dedicates forces strictly to peace operations?

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Although there may be other possible solutions, restructuring the U.S. Army in the Balkans would best meet the overall U.S. objectives in the region and help in the long-term readiness of the force. The restructuring option continues a successful strategy, but improves military readiness and reduces overall costs by providing a more efficient force, better able to meet the demands of the peace operation mission. While the European option appears to be the simple answer to the concerns of Congress and the American public, it is premature to count on the ESDI concept due to numerous unanswered questions. Will the European allies have the financial ability and the national will and desire to execute the concept as envisioned? More importantly, is the U.S. prepared to lose some of its influence in NATO derived from its leadership role in such operations as those in the Balkans? Because of U.S. leadership and a strong military presence, the current strategy is working. Can the mission continue to be successful without that same level of U.S. commitment and is America ready to allow others to dictate policy in the region? Moreover, the allies are already shouldering the bulk of the burden in Kosovo. Can they realistically be expected to add to their already large commitment to that province and remain effective?

The restructure option also carries with it major challenges. However, there are ways to mitigate some of these and still realize the substantial advantages outlined for this option. First, instead of creating additional structure for the Balkan Force, use a current division from Europe. Restructure that division to meet the peace operations requirements and move it to the Balkans permanently. This could be integrated into the Army’s transformation efforts by transforming the division’s two combat brigades into IBCTs. The IBCT is being designed to obtain the characteristics of the Objective Force (responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability), but within the constraints of available “off the shelf” equipment. This means that the IBCT will be lighter and not as lethal as today’s legacy systems because technology is not yet available to give the Army the full characteristics desired in the Objective Force. Because of this, the IBCT will operate at the lower end of the conflict spectrum most of the time, such as in peace operations and other SSCs. The Balkans would serve as an excellent operating environment for such a force, as well as providing the Army some insight for
determining requirements at that part of the spectrum dealing with peace operations and SSCs.\textsuperscript{32}

The Army should them begin a normal attrition of soldiers from the division in Kosovo based on permanent change of station (PCS) dates or a staggered cycle (3 months, six months, or longer) to eventually create a one-year short tour. Although this initiative would initially cause personnel turbulence, it would stabilize the force and save dollars in the long-term by not moving large units and equipment every six months. Additionally, troops would eventually depart Kosovo on a permanent change basis knowing they would not be transferred to another unit earmarked for peace operation duties in the Balkans. This would add predictability to the personnel system that does not currently exist. In a similar manner, procedures could also be established for retraining soldiers returning from Balkan peace operation duties, such as refresher training enroute to the next duty station or at the gaining unit depending on the required skills. Similar procedures are in effect for the Korean tour today. Moreover, as already indicated, CS and CSS troops perform their war-fighting functions during peace operations and therefore would not require this retraining.\textsuperscript{33} Lastly, the training readiness of the peace operation force will be a challenge to U.S. Army leaders in Kosovo, similar to that currently faced by American leaders in Korea due to the high turnover of personnel associated with the short tour. However, this is mitigated by the fact that this option does not require the Balkan Force to support an MTW scenario. Since peace operation skills are much less difficult and less costly to train and sustain than those required for war-fighting, this option will significantly reduce the training focus and resources necessary to maintain a high level of readiness in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{34}

One last question to consider with the restructure option is that of future peace operations outside the Balkans. Does the U.S. create a permanent force every time it is faced with a long-term peace operation? Does such a move in the Balkans obligate the U.S. to create a permanent “protectorate” in other failed states in the future? The answers are only academic at this point since each mission has its own unique situation and set of issues. The U.S. has very important, if not vital interests in securing a lasting peace in every region of Europe, thus making long-term American engagement in Kosovo acceptable. Future peace operations must also be subject to the same critical analysis to identify the intensity of interests at stake in order to determine if military forces are required. The litmus test for commitment must come from a serious examination of American interests and
objectives for each peace operation in the future and not based on what was done in Kosovo.

In the final analysis, the underlining fact is that the U.S is currently committed to peace operations in Kosovo in order to maintain stability in the Balkans and thereby in Europe as a whole. These operations have no defined timeline for completion. The U.S. Army provides an important element of this stability with forces in Kosovo – an element unlikely to be replaced effectively by ESDI or other potential alternatives. Nevertheless, America’s involvement does place a drain on Army war-fighting readiness and is expensive in term of sustaining such a large force in the region for an extended period. It also places a heavy burden on soldiers faced with the high PERSTEMPO of the “prepare-deploy-retrain” cycle associated with Balkan peace operations. The restructuring option as identified for the Army forces in the Balkans will reduce the burden on military readiness, while continuing a successful strategy. Equally important, this option offers the best chance of success in a region that will continue to need American leadership and commitment. Without U.S. Army forces on the ground in the region to bolster this commitment, long-term success is questionable.

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ENDNOTES


3 Strobe Talbott, “The Balkan Question and the European Answer,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Washington, D.C., August/September 1999. This document provides an excellent examination of why Europe’s stability is an important U.S. national interest. The article puts continued U.S. involvement in the region in historical context and demonstrates how and why the Balkans have been a source of European conflict for centuries.


5 Clinton, NSS, 30-31. Also see the fact sheet released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary called, “Winning the Peace in Kosovo: A Progress Report,” released on 23 November 1999, which also stated these concepts, reaffirming the stated objectives found in the NSS.

6 United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 1244, adopted by the Security Council, 4011th Mtg, 10 June 1999, 3. The U.S. brokered this resolution, which supports the principles of the Helsinki Final Act ending the Kosovo War and authorizes the establishment of an interim administration in Kosovo under the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Helsinki Final Act called for the termination of NATO air strikes based on Serbia’s agreement to withdraw from Kosovo and allow a NATO-led peace force into the region.


10 Pickering, "The Bell Has Rung." This address calls for the international business community to investment in Southeast Europe as a whole, and specifically in Kosovo.


12 Clinton, NSS, 31. UNSC Resolution 1244 calls for member nations to provide civilian police (CIVPOL) in order to relieve KFOR of the civil law and order functions. The total numbers were supposed to be 4,700 within a few months of the beginning of peace operations in Kosovo. Not until April 2000 did UNMIK begin taking over the majority of civil law enforcement functions, but still have significant shortages of CIVPOL. KFOR continues to augment UNMIK CIVPOL activities, but at significantly reduced levels.


15 USAREUR, USAREUR Training, USAREUR Regulation 350-1 (Heidelberg, Germany, November 1999), Reintegration Training Plan ANNEX. USAREUR units go through an extensive "prepare-deploy-retrain" cycle that takes approximately 14-16 months. What complicates this process is that many combat units do not use their combat systems while on peace operations, but conduct patrolling and security missions in a light configuration. This requires the reintegration training to begin at the very basic soldier-level with reintroduction to the soldiers primary weapon system. Large soldier turnover rates following rotations further complicate the training challenge.

16 Neil Baumgartner, "Shinseki: Division Readiness Problems Due to Deployments," Defense Daily, Vol.204, Issue 29 (12 November 1999); 2. The National Military Strategy (NMS) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) also state that a unit apportioned to a CINC for an MTW may be extracted from other military operations in order to support the JSCP required
contingency plan during a multiple-MTW scenario. While the classified JSCP is more definitive on extracting forces to meet any MTW requirements, the NMS is less so, but does state that, “More than likely, we would have to disengage from activities and operations not deemed vital in order to better posture our forces to deter or defeat aggression in a second MTW. Responding to multiple concurrent contingencies requires careful consideration to ensure our forces are not dissipated and therefore either unable, or perceived as unable to respond to more critical threats” (NMS, page 15). These two documents provide the basis for the Army’s requirement to extract forces from other military operations in order to meet its two MTW responsibilities. In order to meet these Army requirements in the future, General Shinseki is creating a strategy to address this dilemma of balancing forces needed to support the NSS and NMS. For the CSA, the “two MTW strategy is high risk,” because many of the apportioned units for the second MTW are engaged in peace operations (ibid, page 2). As a result, the CSA is requiring that the Army develop a detailed concept for the re-deployment and extraction of AC units from peace operations so that they can meet their MTW responsibilities, while identifying other units (AC and RC) to substitute in the future for those units on peace operations. However, this does not solve the problem of extracting a unit from a peace operation and deploying them to an MTW in a timely manner. There is a requirement to mobilize, train and deploy the RC unit for peace operations before the AC unit can be extracted, redeployed and begin training for the MTW. While the time necessary to do this will depend on both the AC and RC unit’s current personnel and training readiness posture, it is clear that the longer a unit is on a peace operation, the more time it will take to retrain and deploy that unit to the MTW fight. The bottom line is that the CSA’s concept for extracting forces only mitigates risk to the soldier and mission if there is sufficient time, which is rarely the case in a national emergency.


18 Baumgartner, 1. Also see A Posture Statement of the United States Army, pages 18-20; General Shinseki’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 21 Oct 1999 and 10 February 2000 and the classified Unit Status Reports (USR) from 1st ID for July 99, which addresses the “not mission ready” rating reported to the department of the Army.


21 Seigle, p 221. Secretary Cohen’s statement was made when he testified before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in March 2000. There are ongoing studies designed to gage the impact on retention and morale caused by deployments to peace operations.


23 Ibid. John Kasick (R-OH), the House Budget Committee Chairman, introduced the Kasick amendment (H.R. 4205). The Warner-Byrd Amendment (S. 2521) was defeated in the Senate by a close 53 to 47 vote.

24 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 168.


26 Ibid, 11. Also see “Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP – Table E-5,” 11 February 2001, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2000/E-5.html; Internet accessed on 11 February 2001. This chart shows all NATO country Defense spending compared to their total GDP since 1990. The average NATO country spends 2.6% (NATO Goal is 3%), but there are 7 countries under 2% GDP, with two countries below 1% (Spain and Luxembourg). There are 10 countries that have decreased defense spending since 1999 when the EU agreed to support ESDI.


28 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 166-167.

29 Caldera and Shinseki, 18-20.

30 There are no unclassified documents that directly addresses the concern of leaders in Korea that the constant turnover of personnel associate with the one year short-tour prevents them from training and sustaining their critical unit-level collective skills, but it is common knowledge that this a reality. Having spent time in Korea and talking to leaders about unit-level training, as well as discussing this restructure option with other officers with years of experience in Korea, it is a serious concern with the training readiness of their units because of the inability
to stabilize their unit for an entire annual training cycle. It is also logical to assume that any organization that has a personnel turnover rate above 90% a year will not be able to train and sustain those complex collective skills that require months of combat weapon crews coordination and the continuity of key leaders at all levels.

31 Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual (Draft) 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 October 2000), 1-2. This capstone Army manual clearly reinforces the Army's priority as "war-fighting." Specifically, the opening paragraphs of the document say that, "Army Forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. The Army organizes, trains and equips its forces to fight and win the nation's wars and achieve directed national objectives. Fighting and winning the nation's wars is the foundation of Army service; it is the non-negotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation." While this document does address MOOTW, the primary focus is on fighting an MTW in the future. This same theme is carried down through all levels of Army doctrinal and training literature, thus reinforcing a need for the Army to adjust its thinking in order to accept a force that is strictly focused on peace operations.

32 Caldera and Shinseki, page xiv. The intent of the IBCT is to provide a near-term capability to rapidly respond to crisis and to generate insight (equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures) to assist the transformation to the objective force. Because the IBCT will be lighter, less lethal and not as robust in CS and CSS support than today's legacy force, it is not intended to go face to face with a heavy enemy force, such would be the scenario in Korea and the Middle East. To overcome this temporary shortfall in fighting a heavy force before the Objective Force is fielded, the Army will retain the legacy force to use in case of a heavy, MTW threat. The IBCT as currently being structured, will not be sent to an MTW environment unless augmented with legacy force capabilities (M1 Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Air Defense Artillery systems, Combat Engineers, etc). Also see the Army Transformation Chain Teaching Briefing prepared by the Department of the Army and provided to the field in August 2000.

33 Combat arms soldiers may require a refresher course if going to a weapon system not used during the peacekeeping operation. However, if it is the same equipment as the IBCT or objective force in the future, additional training may not be necessary.

34 Department of the Army, Training the Force, Field Manual 100-101 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, October 1996. Army training doctrine requires that unit training be "battle focused," meaning all training is focused on the unit's mission essential task list (METL). If a unit's METL is focused on fighting an MTW, then the collective and individual tasks required include advanced gunnery skills of all weapons systems, as well as survival skills necessary to survive on a high intensity battlefield. These tasks are significantly different than those tasks required to perform purely peace operations. Today, a unit on a peace operation mission must not only be trained on those specific skills, but also for its MTW METL in case it is extracted to support a MTW. If a unit only has to focus on peace operations, then it does not have to worry about the MTW METL training requirements.
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