CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF EUROPE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CZECH MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

A Thesis Submitted to University of Denver

In Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts

John D. DuMond

March 2001

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

20010417 042
CONTENTS

1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 1

2. Security Environment ........................................................................... 4
   2.1. New Character
   2.2. New Threats
   2.3. Security Structures
   2.4. Future Prospects

3. Security Strategy of the Czech Republic .............................................. 26
   3.1. Purpose and Goal
   3.2. Content
       3.2.1. Czech Security Environment
       3.2.2. National Security Policies
       3.2.3. Means for Providing Security
   3.3. Influence on Czech Military Strategy

4. Military Strategy of the Czech Republic .............................................. 33
   4.1. Purpose and Goal
   4.2. Content
       4.2.1. Strategic Context
       4.2.2. Missions, Goals, and Characteristics of the Armed Forces
   4.3. Influence on Military Force Structure

5. The RMA, NATO, and European Armed Forces .................................. 40
   5.1. The RMA
   5.2. Factors Influencing Force Modernization
   5.3. European Militaries Today
   5.4. Possibilities for NATO
   5.5. New Missions, New Characteristics
   5.6. The Netherlands Armed Forces
   5.7. French Armed Forces

6. Czech Military Force Structure ............................................................ 60
   6.1. Current Status
   6.2. Trends/Future Outlook
   6.3. Options for the ACR
       6.3.1. Traditional Design
       6.3.2. Specialized Design
       6.3.3. Combination Design

7. Recommendations & Conclusion ......................................................... 73

8. Appendix ............................................................................................. 76

9. Bibliography ......................................................................................... 77
1. Introduction

The security landscape of Europe, like much of the world, has dramatically changed in the past ten years. This transformation has been far reaching, and encompasses not only the political and economic spheres, but the cultural and societal ones as well. The bi-polar power distribution which characterized the preceding decades since the end of the Second World War has given way to a more diffused and decentralized multi-polar one which the states of Europe are still working to come to grips with.

Set amidst these changes in the security environment is the realization that not only has the character of the threats changed, but that the traditional approaches and means of safeguarding against them may no longer be as effective or even relevant. These include the existing collective defense organizations, the national security and military strategies, as well as the individual military force structures.

Like many of its neighbors in central and eastern Europe, the Czech Republic has undergone a major transformation since the “Velvet Revolution” of 1989, and the “big divorce” with Slovakia three years later. Today with a democratically elected government, a free market economy, and a new circle of allies, the Czech Republic shares in the evolution of the new European security environment. Responding to these changes, Czech policy makers have reformulated their country’s National Security and Military strategies. As a result of these documents, they have also set out to re-engineer their military force structure.

The current force structure of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) is not compatible with the new roles and missions it must carry out as established by the
country's new security and military strategies. This disconnect must be addressed, and sweeping changes in force structure design must be instituted if the ACR is to remain a relevant and useful instrument of Czech foreign policy. The purpose of this work is to identify the appropriate military force structure for the Czech Republic given the current and anticipated security environment of Europe. In order to carry out a systematic and thoughtful analysis this paper will follow the logic that real world security concerns should shape a nation's security strategy. From the security strategy a coherent military strategy is formulated. The military strategy establishes the missions, goals and characteristics of the armed forces. These then drive the force structure necessary to carry out the nation's military strategy. (See figure 1).

![Security Environment Diagram](image)

Figure 1.

In light of the preceding logic, this work will begin with a look at the character of the new security environment, the threats, and the relevant collective security structures. Then it will examine the Czech Republic's new National Security Strategy and the subsequent National Military Strategy. From there it will discuss
the current and future requirements for European armed forces from the perspective of the emerging Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the evolving role of NATO, and the transformations occurring in other European countries. Next it will identify the current status of Czech military forces, the modifications that are underway, and trends most likely to affect them in the future. Finally, three possible force structure designs will be proposed, (size, types of forces, modes of employment, and readiness levels), with a recommendation on which design best fits the country’s new security position.
2. Security Environment

2.1. New Character

The changing security environment of the Czech Republic is best viewed within the wider context of the dramatic political, economic and social transformations occurring across Europe during the past decade. The democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, served to dissolve the decades old division between the NATO countries of the West, and the Warsaw Pact countries of the East. Political ideologies are no longer a major source of conflict, and even the competition between the centrally planned communist and free market economic structures is a thing of the past. European societies are now far more open, transient, and are converging. State structures are weaker in comparison to their cold-war forms, and center-left reform parties have come to power in even some of the most conservative states, such as Germany.

A major feature of today’s European states is their inability or reluctance to maintain social welfare programs at previously sustainable levels. In spite of greater integration through the European Union, this problem is becoming most acute in the Western European states where slow economic growth, unemployment, and disproportionate demographics have combined to make funding for social programs increasingly difficult. Global trade and finance is fueling the emergence of economic competitors around the world. European producers are finding their markets increasingly saturated by cheaper, faster, and better goods and services from competitors. In addition, the proportion of citizens of retirement age is growing each
year in relation to the numbers of workers paying into state systems. Birth rates across Europe are in most cases very low, and in some states are actually in decline. Slow economic growth and this demographic imbalance are combining to make it increasing difficult for states to meet their “social contract” obligations to their populations. This has led in many cases to reductions in social services and pension benefits, increasing people’s distrust of their political leaders, and disillusionment with the existing political-economic establishments.

A second trend in Europe is the increasing inability of governments to draw on the patriotism and “national will” of their people to legitimate the programs and functioning of the state. More and more people are seeking and strengthening their identities along ethnic, cultural and religious lines. In many cases, and particularly in multi-ethnic societies, this phenomenon creates divisions between previously unified groups. Where these competing identities strongly manifest themselves, states have great difficulty forming policy consensus, legitimating their actions, and relating to other states in a unified and coherent manner. Taken to extremes, these difficulties have even led to ethnic-religious warfare (such as in the former Yugoslavia).

A final significant feature of contemporary Europe is the great economic disparity that exists between East and West. Amid the euphoria of the democratic revolutions that swept Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990’s, was a feeling of exuberant optimism about the possibilities for rapid economic growth and prosperity. In the haste to build market economic structures many harmful actions were taken by the new governments. The motives for such actions
were sometimes benign, while others were more malicious. Many state industries were sold (often given away), to incompetent and/or unscrupulous individuals and groups who promptly sold off the profitable components of the operations, or drove them into bankruptcy. The so called “Czech Miracle” of the early 1990’s quickly gave way to the realization of the mistakes that were made in the clamor for privatization, and the recognition that economic transformation was not going to occur automatically, or overnight. A decade following the “Velvet Revolution”, the Czech economy still struggles, generating a per capita GNP only one ninth that of its neighbor Austria (a country of comparable size and population).\(^1\) The problems associated with the adjustments to market economies are widespread among the new democracies of Europe. However, even among this group there is significant disparity. Generally speaking, within Europe, the further east and south a country is situated geographically, the weaker the economy and the lower the quality of life for the common people is likely to be. In fact, political and economic instability in the southern and eastern regions of Europe are at the forefront of the difficulties facing the member states of the European Union, and the continent as a whole.

In summation, political ideology is no longer an important divisive force within Europe. In spite of greater political and economic integration, ideology has been supplanted by frictions resulting from domestic economic strains and inter-European economic disparities. Along with these has come a rise in ethnic, cultural and religious identities that in some cases have weakened governmental influence, and in others brought about the collapse of states. These are the new sources of friction in the region.

---

\(^1\) Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1998 ed., Grolier Interactive Inc, Danbury CT, “Austria”.
2.2. New Threats

With the collapse of the Soviet Union the threat of a large scale conventional war being fought across the European continent has all but disappeared. The armies that represented the military arm of the bi-polar power arrangement were reduced and withdrawn from their forward positions in response to dramatic changes in the political landscape. Replacing this decades old balance of power, and the accompanying probability of full scale armed conflict, came a number of less defined threats which had in the past been given little attention.

The very character and origin of these new threats is fundamentally different. Many of them are “transnational” in that they are international in scope, but are not due to the direct actions of governments. These threats include terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of organized international crime, weapons and technology proliferation, sudden massive refugee flows, and various environmental problems.\(^2\) Other threats may directly involve governments. These include regional armed conflict, civil wars, insurgencies, man-made environmental disasters, and intimidation by rogue leaders with control over precious resources and/or access to weapons of mass destruction. These threats to stability present themselves around the world, and Europe is not immune.

The Czech Republic recognized these new threats in its 1998 Military Strategy, which stated:

---

The basic security problems in the European area remain unstable internal-political and economic situations in some eastern and southern European regions... the unsolved security situation in the former Yugoslavia and the possible expansion and carry over of local conflicts into other parts of Europe.³

Further recognition of the new security situation is found in this statement:

The probability of direct military aggression against the Czech Republic is reduced, however it isn’t possible to exclude the escalation of security risks in the future. The Czech Republic doesn’t feel threatened at the current time, or in the near future, by any neighboring states, however it can be infiltrated by serious threats of various size and character, especially terrorism and international crime, arriving through the land of neighboring states.⁴

One of the most persistent and growing security threats “infiltrating” the Czech Republic is illegal migration. It is part of a larger, pan-European problem. The International Organization of Migration, based in Geneva, estimates that in 1999 close to half a million illegal immigrants entered Western Europe in an effort to escape political and economic chaos around the world.⁵ For the Czech Republic, the uncontrolled influx of illegal migrants has varied over the past decade, but increased steadily from 1994 to 1998, (details for 1999 and 2000 are not currently available, but preliminary data suggests the trend is continuing). In 1998 the Czech Republic apprehended, or took into custody from neighboring states, a record


⁴Ibid.

4,672 people (see figure 2), who were detected illegally crossing the Czech border, or were found illegally present within the country.\(^6\)

![Graph showing illegal migration across the state borders of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and the Czech Republic since 1991.](image)

**Figure 2.**

The majority of persons (32,260 or 73.6\%) caught illegally crossing the border were traveling from the Czech Republic in the direction of the Federal Republic of Germany (see figure 3). This number is due in large part to the highly effective border controls of Germany’s Bundesgrenzschutz. The second most significant area of transit was the border with the Slovak Republic. In this area, 3,865 people, or 8.7 percent of all those detected, were apprehended as they attempted to cross into the Czech Republic. These numbers are indicative of a larger phenomenon observable across Europe, which is the uncontrolled migration of people from Eastern Europe and the Middle East, to the west. It also illustrates that the great majority of people

\(^6\) It should be noted that experts estimate that only five to ten percent of illegal migrants transiting the Czech state borders are caught, meaning that their actual number may be far greater than the available data portrays.

illegally crossing the Czech state borders are transiting through the country en route to Germany and other EU states.

![Illegal Migration across the State Borders of the Czech Republic in 1998](image)

**Figure 3.**

The transit character of the Czech Republic is demonstrated by the data, which shows that 31.5% of aliens illegally crossed the border in the direction out of the country on the day of their arrival in the Czech Republic. Another 25% tried to do so on the 2nd-5th day after entering the territory of the Czech Republic.\(^8\)

The majority of illegal migrants attempt to cross the state borders *unassisted*, and in groups usually made up of people of the same ethnic or national origin. The average group size was 21 persons. However, a growing number of migrants (22.1%) are being “facilitated” by organized traffickers. Payment for such services ranges from hundreds to thousands of Deutsch Marks. Many migrants are

---

\(^{8}\) Ibid, 3.

\(^{9}\) Ibid, 7.
transported in deplorable conditions, often being crammed into close quarters for several days. The Alien and Border Police Service estimates that 79.3% of those involved in the illegal trafficking of migrants are nationals of the Czech Republic.\(^\text{10}\)

For them and other smugglers across Europe, it has become a very profitable activity. Of further interest is the large number of migrants who are apprehended during repeated attempts to illegally cross the border. Some migrants state they are only trying to reach relatives that have already immigrated to the West. For others, these repeated attempts may simply be a function of their strong desire to escape political, economic, ethnic or religious repression in their countries of origin.

Prior to 1998, the record for illegal migrants crossing the Czech state borders was set in 1993 when 43,302 people were apprehended or taken into custody. These high numbers correspond directly with instability in the former Yugoslavia. The 1993 numbers can be attributed to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the 1998 numbers are associated with repression of the ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo. In 1998 illegal migrants from 99 different countries were taken into custody. However, as previously mentioned, the greatest number originated from Eastern Europe (57%), and the vast majority of those came from the Federal republic of Yugoslavia (35% of the total) (see figure 4).

Another trend of note has been the increasing number of migrants from Afghanistan (see figure 5). This is thought to be a result of the civil war that has raged between the fundamentalist Islamic Taliban, other ethnic factions, and the Afghan government forces.

\(^{10}\) Ibid, 8.
Increasing violence and general instability came to a head in 1998 when the Taliban consolidated their victories and took control over most of the country. They now carry out repressive policies against other groups such as the Shia ethnic minority, and are condemned by many in the international community for their treatment of women. In light of these events, it is not surprising to find large numbers of migrants fleeing such instability for a better life in the West.

---

11 Ibid, 4.

Changes in the Security Environment of Europe and Their Implications for Czech Military Force Structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of illegal migrants detected at the state borders of the CR</td>
<td>43 302</td>
<td>20 480</td>
<td>19 172</td>
<td>23 705</td>
<td>29 339</td>
<td>44 672</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4 529</td>
<td>1 766</td>
<td>3 202</td>
<td>3 569</td>
<td>16 052</td>
<td>35,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>2 311</td>
<td>4 959</td>
<td>11,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4 096</td>
<td>1 299</td>
<td>1 488</td>
<td>2 378</td>
<td>3 879</td>
<td>4 372</td>
<td>9,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>1 093</td>
<td>2 105</td>
<td>1 682</td>
<td>1 741</td>
<td>3,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4 723</td>
<td>2 380</td>
<td>2 079</td>
<td>1 936</td>
<td>1 929</td>
<td>1 691</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>1 372</td>
<td>2 326</td>
<td>1 587</td>
<td>3,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.13

As the preceding discussion illustrates, instability in all its forms, be it political, economic, or other, has the effect of displacing people when it rises beyond their threshold of tolerance. This is particularly true in the former Yugoslavia where a decade of war, repression and economic destitution have combined to force the mass movement of people to the West. In recognition of this situation, the member states of the EU along with several of the Central European countries, have established asylum laws for the protection of displaced persons. Generally speaking, refugees are granted asylum only when they have fled from what is deemed to be political or ethnic persecution by state agents. However, many migrants simply seek to escape from economic hardship, which does not usually entitle them to protection under existing asylum provisions. Many migrants from Eastern Europe fall into this later category.

The Czech Republic currently has readmission agreements with all its neighboring countries. These provisions call for the hand over of immigrants to authorities of bordering states from which they illegally entered. For example, a person apprehended by German authorities while attempting to cross the Czech border into Germany, will be expelled and transferred to the custody of the Czech authorities. If, it is subsequently determined that the person illegally entered the Czech Republic from the Slovak Republic, they will then be remanded to the Slovak authorities, and so on and so on. An acute complication for all countries involved is that in a significant number of cases (16% for the Czech Republic), the migrant’s national identity and/or country of origin cannot be determined.

Another problem for the Czech Republic is that some 45.4 percent of persons apprehended illegally entering a neighboring country (usually Germany), are in the Czech Republic legally. Some are asylum seekers awaiting final disposition by the Czech authorities, others are aliens with work permits, and still others are traveling on tourist visas. The illegal intentions of such persons are very difficult to determine since they can easily move about the country and generally have more time and greater access to resources than migrants illegally transiting the country.

Contributing factors to the influx of migrants are the actions taken by the Czech Republic’s neighbors. For instance, Austria recently began the deployment of its army along the state borders to reinforce the border police. This counter-immigration measure has had the result of funneling more migrants to the north, through the Czech Republic, en route to Germany. A second contributing factor was

14 Ibid, 9.
15 Ibid, 6.
the acceptance by Germany and a number of other EU members of refugees from
the war in the Balkans during the early and mid 1990s. Later on, many of these
migrants sent for their family members that remained in the former Yugoslav
Republics. However, Germany and others are no longer so eager to host further
asylum seekers and have tightened their immigration policies. These two factors
have resulted in: a) and increase of refugees transiting the Czech Republic, and b)
an increasing number of them remaining in the country after having been denied
entry to neighboring Austria or Germany. Geography clearly plays an important role
in exacerbating this situation.

The foremost foreign policy goal of the Czech Republic is accession into the
EU. The benefits of admission are numerous, and center in large part on the
economic growth and prosperity that are expected to accompany membership.
However, illegal migration threatens fulfillment of this goal because of the harmful
effects it has on relations with neighboring states within the Union. One of the most
problematic areas of preparation for accession is the requirement to bring the
country’s visa policy, protection of state borders, rules governing resident aliens,
asylum policies, expulsion and readmission procedures in line with the EU’s 1993
Schengen Agreement. It was this measure that removed most internal border
controls between the EU member states.\textsuperscript{16} In order for the Czech Republic to meet
the provisions of this agreement, it must prove that it has the capability to act as an
effective external border. It must also demonstrate it can sufficiently combat the
abuse of existing asylum procedures, and stem the flow of people which enter the

\textsuperscript{16} David Rocks, “Migration-Czech Republic: Midnight On New Europe’s New Border.” \textit{World
News, Inter Press Service 17 August 1998} [electronic journal] [cited 23 October 2000]; available from
country legally, but later illegally migrate to neighboring states. The previously discussed numbers of migrants apprehended by the German border authorities does not give the EU members much cause for confidence in the Czech Republic’s measures to combat illegal migration. Unless a way is found to correct this situation, the country’s internal security will become increasingly diminished and EU accession may be indefinitely delayed. Both of these outcomes would seriously undermine the country’s primary foreign policy goal.

A second problem associated with illegal migration is the involvement of domestic and international criminal syndicates. These organizations which participate in the smuggling of aliens, are also known to be involved in other illegal activities such as arms and drug smuggling, automobile theft, robbery, prostitution and protectionist rackets. This is not to say that the trafficking of migrants leads to involvement in these other activities, but the factors that enable the organized smuggling of people, also facilitate many other illegal activities. Insufficient border controls are first among these factors. In addition, immigrants who remain illegally in the country are at great risk of exploitation by organized criminal entities, and are extremely reluctant to report abuses for fear of expulsion. Due to the many problems associated with integration into society, some immigrants themselves will turn to illegal activities to support themselves financially. Others will do so to obtain sufficient money for payment to smugglers facilitating their onward migration to the west, or to aid family members in joining them.

The true impact of illegal migration on domestic crime levels in the Czech Republic is not really known. However, some inferences can be drawn from the
experiences of other European states. For example, throughout the 1990’s Switzerland experienced an influx of over 180,000 immigrants escaping the instability in the former Yugoslavia. Following this, statistics show that 50% of the violent crime in Switzerland is caused by this relatively small group of illegal immigrants.\textsuperscript{17} The Swiss experience is probably not an isolated one, and more research needs to be conducted to determine the true effect of illegal migration on domestic crime levels in the Czech Republic.

Another problem brought on by illegal immigration is the negative impact it has on the Czech Republic’s social services system. Housing and care for illegal migrants taken into custody is very costly, and the country’s primary detention facility is only able to handle 324 persons.\textsuperscript{18} Those migrants which remain in the country, either in a refugee status, or as an illegal resident, place increased strain on the already over burdened healthcare and education systems. In accordance with EU standards, asylum seekers are provided free food, accommodation, basic health and mental health care, and pocket money. For those immigrants not granted refugee status and who go undetected by the authorities, the lack of adequate employment or local relatives to draw support from, means that the state will inevitably assume responsibility for them should they remain in the country long enough.

A key contributor to the Czech Republic’s problem with illegal migration is the inability of the Alien and Border Police to effectively carry out their responsibilities. These include: maintaining the state borders, enforcing visa control policies, and processing illegal aliens that are apprehended within the state territorial boundaries.

\textsuperscript{17} Strategic Assessment 1997, 29.

\textsuperscript{18} “Information on the Migration Situation in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 1998,” 10.
At present, the Alien and Border Police are undermanned, under funded, poorly equipped, and untrained in modern border protection techniques. In some areas, along the well-traveled boundary with Slovakia for example, four man foot patrols are responsible for 16-kilometer stretches of the border. Their communication equipment is old and in disrepair, they are allocated only one week's worth of fuel per month for their vehicles, and they have no holding cell for the persons they apprehend. In comparison, the German border patrols have four-wheel-drive vehicles, helicopters, and electronic monitoring equipment at their disposal. In 1998 the Czech Republic received a grant of 2.5 million ECU from the EU to improve its border control operations. The money was used to purchase new communications, night vision, and detection equipment, as well as for enhanced training programs. ¹⁹ In the short term, this led to improvements in border control operations, but without further financial resources and increased emphasis by the Czech government, a general decline in effectiveness is anticipated.

In short, the Czech Republic appears fully aware of the new realities of the European security environment, including the problem of illegal migration. It recognizes both their complexities and the importance of cooperative strategies necessary to effectively deal with them. Later in this work the countermeasures the Czech Government could employ to combat these threats will be presented.

2.3. Security Structures

Throughout the Cold War the two primary security structures of Europe were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Warsaw Pact. With the elimination of the Warsaw Pact from the scene at the beginning of this decade,

NATO remained as the predominate organization in the European security environment. This is somewhat surprising, given that historically collective security organizations and alliances have almost always dissolved following the disappearance of the threat that initially brought about their creation. Having said this, we should recognize that the NATO of today is not the same organization it was during the Cold War.

In 1991, with the Cold War definitively in the past, NATO took stock of the new realities of the European security environment and adopted a new Strategic Concept. In the new cooperative security environment the alliance revised its strategy to undertake not only traditional collective defense, but also tasks such as peacekeeping missions, and assisting the humanitarian relief efforts of the UN and other international organizations. In addition, the alliance opened its doors to new members that held similar political and economic views and embraced the same democratic ideals. This initial expansion of the organization occurred in March 1999, when the Czech Republic, along with Poland and Hungary, formally joined the alliance.

In its new Strategic Concept, NATO established four basic security tasks. The first being to:

- [p]rovide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
Changes in the Security Environment of Europe and Their Implications for Czech Military Force Structure.

The second is to:

[s]erve as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that
effect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for
members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of
common concern.

The third task is to, “deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the
territory of any NATO member state”. The broadly defined final task is to, “preserve
the strategic balance within Europe.”

Even today, NATO continues to revise its Strategic Concept, and adapting
itself to a new security environment. In April of 1999 the leaders of the alliance once
again met and continued to modify the organization’s charter, embracing concepts
and priorities far different from those which guided NATO in the past. This
adaptation appears to represent a departure from the Alliance’s primary role as a
collective defense organization, to a new role of collective security. This is important
to consider, because it will impact greatly on how the alliance defines itself in the
future, and on how far reaching it’s involvement will be in areas which until now were
left mostly to the policy decisions of individual countries. NATO embarks on this
transition with the recognition that the new threats to Europe are the turmoil and
instability in the eastern and southern regions, along with the transnational problems
mentioned earlier. As a full NATO member the character and focus of the Czech
Security and Military Strategies are, of course, founded in these same
understandings.

Two other European Security Organizations of Importance to the Czech
Republic are the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security

---

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The WEU is evolving into a structure for organizing European-only missions, while still using NATO assets. It was decided in 1996 that the WEU would operate in conjunction with the NATO alliance. Later, in 1999 the WEU was absorbed into the European Union (EU) structure. The details of how it will function, and what role it will play in the European security environment remains to be seen. Although the Czech Republic is not currently a member of the EU, accession to the union remains its primary foreign policy goal, which many expect to come to fruition sometime during the remainder of this decade. This is important to consider because it could increase the possibility that the Czech Republic may participate in EU/WEU sponsored missions outside of it’s own traditional area of interest. This would impact on the Czech Republic’s future planning regarding both security and military strategies.

The OSCE is recognized under the UN charter as a regional organization. In the past it was involved in resolving humanitarian crisis, establishing codes of conduct relating to international law and human rights, providing confidence building measures and serving as an important channel for east-west communication. In recent years it has worked to transform itself from a consultative body, to an operational European security organization.\textsuperscript{21} The OSCE is now involved in arms control issues, enforcement of sanctions, and numerous ongoing crisis in places like Albania, Bosnia, Chechnya, and most recently with observers in Kosovo. As a member country of the OSCE, it can also be assumed that the Czech Republic will continue to participate in similar operations, which may include the involvement of the Czech Military.

\textsuperscript{21} Strategic Assessment 1997, 31.
2.4. Future Prospects

From a political viewpoint, there does not appear to be reason to expect any major security policy changes occurring in the next few years within the Western and Central European countries. One trend in this region, which many thought would have an impact on the security environment, has been the relative shift of political power from traditional parties, to more reform minded “populist” ones. For example, in 1999 within Germany the conservative Christian Democratic party, which had ruled the country for 16 years, lost power to the Social Democrats who built a coalition with the once marginalized Green party to form a new government. Another example is Hungary where fair and free elections in May 1998 were dominated by the center-right Fidesz-MPP (Young Democrats/Civic Party), who ran on a populist platform of increased social spending. They displaced the Socialist party, in power since 1994, which had suffered from a wide spread perception of corruption and unwanted influence by former communists. However, like most of their Western and Central European Neighbors, no major foreign or defense policy changes occurred in either country.

A couple of interesting exceptions to this relative maintenance of the status quo may be found in the traditionally neutral countries of Austria and Switzerland. In Austria for example, the government recently came out in favor of participating in a European security forum outside of NATO, and has been in support of a European defense identity within the NATO structure. With the expansion of NATO to the east, there exists a perception within the Austrian government that they are being left behind by the changing European security situation, and are eager to increase their
presence in these organizations in order to influence the decision-making which will inevitably impact on them.  

In Switzerland, the foreign and security policies are undergoing re-evaluation and revision. The new Swiss strategic security document will be based on the theme “security through cooperation”. This is a departure from the traditional Swiss security thinking which was based on self-reliance and territorial defense. The influx of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, to include some 180 thousand Kosovaran Albanians, has forced the country to consider issues of security outside their own borders. This new approach is controversial for a country with a very strong “neutral” tradition. However, instability elsewhere in Europe has forced them to re-examine whether neutrality continues to serve their political aims. In fact, in the near future, the Swiss Army may form an active duty brigade for the purpose of performing peace-keeping operations. In the big picture though, these examples of national introspection about individual roles in the new European security environment are of lesser significance to Europe as a whole.

An issue of major importance to the security concerns of European countries will be the relationship between the NATO alliance and the former Soviet states, particularly Russia. With the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the alliance in March of 1999, the debate over future plans for NATO expansion

---

22 Deborah Cavin, Political Officer; US Embassy, Vienna Austria, interview by the author, 21 December 1998.

continues. At stake are the fragile ties developed between the Western Allies and Russia since the end of the Cold War.

As the primary focus of NATO decision making for some four decades, it is understandable that today Russia remains a matter of concern. With a vast array of both conventional and nuclear forces, Russia continues to be the single largest national military force on the continent. NATO has for many years publicly announced its formal policy of constructive engagement with Russia. The hope of the alliance is to maintain a positive and cooperative relationship, so that Russia can remain a force for stability in Europe.

The single largest point of contention threatening these relations is NATO’s plan for continued enlargement. As the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia outlined recently at a symposium on the subject, those who argue against a second round of expansion point to a number of reasons to support their call for caution. Among these are:

1) Enlargement presents an increased military challenge to Russia, particularly if it involves new deployments of forces closer to its borders.
2) Enlargement may further exclude Russia from European security decision-making, as NATO becomes the dominant security organization.
3) The Article 5 guarantee of indivisible security for alliance partners may only encourage the adventurism among new members and cause anxiety for those states outside of NATO.
4) Enlargement may create a new and permanent dividing line in Europe.
5) Enlargement may undermine democratic reform in Russia by strengthening the anti-western forces there.\textsuperscript{24}

It is obvious that at some point NATO will have to reconcile these arguments with the popular call by a number of alliance members for a further round of expansion. It

is also certain that only through a continuing atmosphere of positive engagement and reassurances will the possibility of enlargement continue without damaging the critically important relations with Russia and threatening the stability of Europe.

This is the security environment that the Czech Republic now finds itself, and will have to contend with in the future. As a NATO member country, its strategies, policies, and military decision making must now take into account a broader perspective of security concerns, and be in concert with its allies.
3. Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (CR)

3.1. Purpose and Goal

Most security strategies are based on a country’s perceptions of its security environment, political and economic conditions, historical experiences, and even cultural influences. The aim of a workable national security strategy is to consider the relevant threats, identify the possible means to meet them, and establish the basic security policies that express the strategic goals and objectives for specific situations.

3.2. Content

At this point a review of the components of the Czech Security Strategy is in order, beginning with the environmental influences on its structure, then the specific policy goals, and concluding with the concepts bearing on the development of its military strategy. In the introduction of the Security Strategy the authors defined their document as such:

(it) is the basic conceptual security policy document which identifies the Nation’s interests, general security threats, and from them the resulting risks for the CR. It defines the long-term guidance and means whose goal is to secure the conditions for peaceful development and economic prosperity of the CR and securing its inhabitants from external and internal threats and risks. The security strategy flows from the complex notion of security, the basic feature of which is the conscious connection and mutual dependence between political, military, economic and internal order, and protection of inhabitants. The text of the document is based on respecting basic human rights and freedoms and on the principles of the legal state.25

The strategy is divided into three main components; the security environment, the security policies of the state, and the principles/means of ensuring security.

---

3.2.1. Czech Security Environment

In the characterization of the security environment, the document describes the geographical and political position of the country in relation to the rest of Europe. It states that, “the main assumption for the security environment of the CR is a stable security situation in Europe.” It goes on to outline that, “reaching such a condition is the essential goal of the CR’s integration into the Transatlantic and European political, economic, and military structures.”

In the next section, the fundamental security interests are said to be: “securing the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic foundations” along with; “protecting the lives and health of citizens, material and spiritual values and the natural environment.” It is also here we find a new feature of Czech political thinking, namely the admission that the country must prepare to protect not only its own sovereignty, but also that of its allies (i.e. NATO members).

Further on, the distinction is drawn between those interests considered “vital” and those considered “strategic”. The vital interests are: state sovereignty and territorial integrity, security of inhabitants, and institutional order and democracy.

Among the strategic interests are:

1) Uninterrupted growth of a free market economy, and minimizing the dependence on only one source for strategic raw materials.
2) Preservation of the vital interests of allies and other European countries.
3) Reliable alliances with organizations embracing the principle of collective security.
4) Continued European integration.
5) Strengthening transatlantic relations.

---

26 Ibid, 4.
27 Ibid, 5.
6) Friendly and cooperative relationship in the security area with neighbors and other European states.
7) Functional and efficient structure of collective and cooperative security, the ability to prevent conflict, and in some cases solve conflict, prevention of new divisions in Europe, and the management of threats to international peace in security.\textsuperscript{28}

Taken as a whole, this expression of interests seems appropriate for almost any modern European state. Of special note are the references to the preservation of the vital interests of allies, and the management of threats to international peace. This seems to imply a more active role in engagement and crisis prevention than the Czech Republic has carried out in the past.

In the section titled “Security Threats and Risks”, the strategy document identifies a wide range of security related concerns. These include threats from societal, political, military, economic, ecological and criminal sources. Following the identification of these risks and threats, we find an acknowledgment that the effective prevention, management, and resolution of them is a matter which exceeds the capabilities of the Czech Republic alone. For this the strategy assumes a reliance on cooperation with other countries, as well as international organizations and institutions. However, it concludes with the assertion that the effective handling of these threats is dependent on the quality of “internal” preparations. This clearly demonstrates that although the Czech Republic will rely on the support of allies, it acknowledges full responsibility for ensuring it’s own security.

3.2.2. National Security Policies

In the third section of the Security Strategy, the document outlines the fundamental national security policies. These are divided into foreign, defense,
economic, and internal security policies. Along with these divisions, two types of foreign policies are discussed. The first type deals with the Czech Republic's bi-lateral relationships, which form the basic structure of the country's ties with other states. Although the Czech Republic declares its equality, it acknowledges the realities of its small size and the importance of its alliances with the US and Western European countries. Also, the relationship with Russia is characterized as friendly, with priority given to the development of mutually advantageous economic/business relations. Furthermore, special note is made of the ongoing cooperative efforts with Russia in the areas of managing organized crime and illegal migration.

The second type of foreign policy is described as “multi-lateral relations”.

These include the alliances between the Czech Republic and the UN, OSCE, NATO, WEU, EU, and the World Trade Organization. It also makes note of the international agreements on controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The role of many of these organizations was previously discussed in the chapter on Security Structures. However, of particular interest in this section of the Security Strategy is a statement relating to the Czech Republic's responsibilities as a new NATO member country. "The CR must be prepared to commit military forces, in cooperation with allies, anywhere in Europe where threats to the peace and security of NATO members present themselves." Here again we find an important statement of policy with repercussions on the Czech Republic's Military Strategy, which we'll examine later.

---

29 Ibid, 12.
The next policy area covered is that of defense. The strategy states that the starting point for the defense policy is the membership of the Czech Republic in NATO. It goes on to state that with membership comes the necessity of building a modern army with sufficient personnel and equipment for use within the alliance. Furthermore, we find the statement that the level of interoperability will be gradually increased in order to fulfill the Czech Republic’s NATO obligations.

Under the heading of “Goals in the Military Field of Defense”, the strategy outlines that along with the requirement to defend the territorial integrity of the Czech Republic and that of its allies, the Czech Armed Forces must also “share in the maintenance of international peace outside the NATO countries.”30 This is important from a conceptual standpoint as it clearly broadens the security responsibilities of the Republic far beyond its own borders. For a small country situated in the heart of Europe, this is a dramatic statement of their intent, and implies a willingness to participate in the management of global peace and security.

The section on economic policies characterizes the Czech economy as being open, highly dependent on the import of raw materials, and having a small domestic market. The goal of the economic policies is to support growth and increase the transparency of the economic environment in order to promote market competition and encourage integration with the international economy. For maintaining national security, the strategy outlines the importance of maintaining balanced economic expansion, and the growth of efficient, competitive industries. Through these developments, along with integration into the international economy, the Czech

---

Republic seeks to decrease the probability of internal disorder and conflict with other states.\textsuperscript{31}

The final policy section deals with matters of internal security. Among the problems outlined in this section are: the security of state secrets, organized crime, uncontrolled immigration, terrorism, political extremism, and corruption. The primary means discussed for addressing these security concerns are more effective police organizations to include border control services. Emphasis is also placed on the importance of developing effective working relationships between international organizations such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL, in order to address those threats that originate outside the country, or which the Czechs have little experience with.

3.2.3. Means for Providing Security

The fourth and final section of the Security Strategy deals with the various aspects of security management. These include components such as: the security system and crisis control, the structure of the security system, and the elements supporting the security system. Much of this section is dedicated to outlining the responsibilities of various governmental agencies in the planning, management, and supporting functions of the security system. These areas are somewhat outside the scope of this work, so will not be covered in detail. However, a mention of the section dealing with defense planning is warranted.

Under the heading of defense planning we find that by definition it includes all the functions related to decision-making, control procedures, operations and force structure design. In short, it deals with all the activities bearing on the fulfillment of the requirements for national defense, collective defense, and the maintenance of

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 16.
international peace with the goal of determining the most effective use of national resources to ensure the state is capable and ready. Emphasis is placed on the integrated process of defense planning between the Czech Republic and NATO. In particular, NATO’s role in proposing military force structure and equipment requirements for its member states.

3.3 Influence on Czech Military Strategy

It is important to consider each of these primary components of the Czech Security Strategy in light of their influences on other spheres of defense planning. We should recognize that the CR has not developed its security concepts and policies in a vacuum, but rather has taken careful consideration of its place within the overall security architecture of Europe. Furthermore, the Czech government has integrated its strategy into the larger framework of the NATO alliance. From NATO’s viewpoint, this is a requirement of all its alliance members in order to ensure the 19 different national defense plans maintain at least a minimum level of policy and goal integration. As we’ll see, these factors bear directly on the development of the Czech Military Strategy.
4. Military Strategy of the Czech Republic

4.1. Purpose and Goal

The fundamentals of most national military strategies are derived from the goals and objectives established in the relevant national security strategies. In this way, a national military strategy can be thought of as the plan of execution of the security strategy, from the viewpoint of the nation’s military component. The goal of the military strategy is to establish the fundamental requirements, structural make-up, preparation methodology, and guiding principles for the employment of the armed forces.

4.2. Content

The Czech Military Strategy defines itself as:

[a] declaration of the complex principles and foundations connected with the security of the state, (concerned) with reducing military threats and repelling military attacks, with sharing in the collective defense of the CR and its allies, and with the collective defense of international security.\[32\]

The Military Strategy is divided into two main chapters, which we’ll consider in detail.

4.2.1. Strategic Context

The first chapter is titled “strategic context” and contains the following sections: the principles and goals of the Military Strategy, the risks and threats of the security environment, the defense system and its main goals, and defense planning and resourcing.

---

\[32\] Vojenska Strategie Ceske republiky (Military Strategy of the Czech Republic), (Prague, Czech Republic, 1998), 2.
The stated foundations of the Military Strategy are:

1) the irrevocable determination to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity in every situation", and 2) thorough political will to secure both its own, and the international security of all democratic states, professing the same principles and values.\textsuperscript{33} It goes on to say that the republic's strategy is of a defensive character, and that at this time there are no identified external enemies.

The scope of the Czech's definition of "defense" is found in this statement: "Military defense of the CR includes the creation, preparation and use of adequate forces and means to repulse aggression, deter potential enemies, to eliminate non-military and mixed threats, and to conduct strategic defense of the state."\textsuperscript{34} This appears to imply the Czech Republic's intent to conduct an active strategy of strategic defense, not unlike its much larger NATO allies. Creating the military capabilities that support such a strategy will certainly be a challenge for the Republic's military leadership. This may be their intent because they go on to express that their armed forces must be prepared for participation in a wide range of possible NATO led operations, and to share in the responsibilities of other security organizations.

In the next section the various security threats are discussed, along with the statement that "the identification and classification of these threats is a continuous process recognizing that they may be of a political, economic, societal, military,

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 2.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 3.
ethnic, historical, religious or ecological origin." It goes on to say that the results of this identification process will be transmitted to military planners via the stated policy objectives contained within the National Security Strategy. It is appears evident that the Czech government has clearly defined a systematic approach to the development of its military planning, based not on abstract notions of defense requirements, but on the actual evolving security environment.

Following an outline of the goals of the defense system, and the controlling responsibilities of various state agencies, the Military Strategy outlines the executive and supporting elements of the defense system. The executive elements include the Czech Army (encompassing both its ground and air forces), the Civilian Defense Service, the Castle (capital) Guard, and the Border Patrol Service. The supporting elements are together called the "Integrated Protection System" and include the police forces, the prison and customs services, the civilian media groups, and emergency response services.  

4.2.2. Missions, Goals, and Characteristics of the Armed Forces

The second chapter of the National Military Strategy deals with the missions, goals, and characteristics of the armed forces. As discussed earlier, the fundamental mission of the armed forces is to protect and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, mostly against external threats. In addition to this basic task, the Military Strategy establishes that in the current security environment the most probable use of the armed forces will be for the purpose of

---


36 Ibid, 7.
peacekeeping missions, outside the republic's territorial boundaries. Furthermore, the document spells out that the armed forces must be prepared to carry out these tasks in all security situations to include in peacetime, emerging situations, impending crisis, and war. Like earlier statements of intent regarding the role of the country in the resolution of threats to security, this has definite implications on the development of military forces.

In the next section of the Military Strategy, the principles of development, preparation, and use of the army are laid out. Here we find the goal of development defined as:

- to form modern, conventionally armed, flexible and highly functional groups, battalions and brigades, with a growing level of professionalization, and with the capability for rapid and versatile deployment in joint operations with NATO and other security organizations.

From an operational perspective, the Czech Armed Forces (known as “The Army of the Czech Republic” or ACR), are divided into immediate reaction forces, rapid reaction forces, and main defense forces. There is substantial overlap among these three groups, and conceptually they may be thought of as different “packages” whose employment depends on the specific conditions in a given crisis or situation.

The immediate reaction forces are comprised of ground and air elements that are gradually becoming fully professionalized (not made up of soldiers serving their mandatory military enlistment). They are supposed to be a ready and decisive element of the national defense in peacetime and in times of crisis, with a call-up capability of less than 10 days. Part of the force is dedicated for use in NATO

---

37 Ibid, 9.
38 Ibid, 11.
operations and have their own organic logistical support, while another part is assigned to domestic crisis response. In the case of general mobilization of the army, they become part of the *main defense forces.*

The *rapid reaction forces* have similar characteristics as the *immediate reaction forces*, but maintain a call-up capability of less than 20 days. Part of this force is also dedicated for use with NATO. In the case of general mobilization, they become the nucleus of the *main defense forces.*

The *main defense forces* are designated to respond to military threats of a regional or global nature. Their equipment in peacetime remains in “mobilization storage” or is used in various training capacities. This force has a call-up capability of over 30 days. Manning of this force is accomplished through partial mobilization (which roughly equals a doubling of the size of the army, or about 110,000 personnel), or full mobilization (which equates to a 4X increase in size, or about 220,000 personnel). Parts of this force are used to fill out elements of the *immediate reaction* and *rapid reaction forces.*

From an *organizational* structure perspective, the ACR is divided into ground forces (subdivided into regular “ground troops” and territorial defense forces), air forces, and supporting services. The ground forces are the main defensive arm of the state, which along with other arms are tasked with the active defense of the country. Their nucleus is made up of the *immediate* and *rapid reaction forces.*

---

39 Ibid, 12.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
wartime they form "operational groups" for tactical employment. The air forces are tasked with defending the national airspace, protecting important areas and other forces from air attack, and providing direct support of ground forces and territorial defense forces. They are formed from command elements, reconnaissance elements, military aircraft elements, and anti-aircraft elements that are part of the immediate and rapid reaction forces. The mission of the territorial defense forces is to provide sustained defense of important sites within the country. They are tasked with the training of reserve forces and support elements, along with providing mobilization, training, and services support to all elements of the ground and air forces. The other supporting elements of the armed forces include; logistics, military intelligence service, military police, and military health services.

The readiness requirements of the ACR, addressed in the next section of the Military Strategy, flow from the goals established in the National Security Strategy. In it, the ACR must be prepared to operate in various operational and geographical conditions including the wide spectrum from combat through peace keeping, to humanitarian operations. Furthermore, it must be prepared to organize its elements to facilitate their inclusion in multi-national operational groups. Along these lines, the document states:

The main use of the Army is in the active defense of the CR and its allies in the framework of the NATO alliance. This requires sustained preparedness enabling the forces to enter into high intensity conflicts, to deploy wartime numbers of personnel, maintain depth within the membership of its formations, and to defend the territory and airspace of the state before the initiation of enemy hostilities.

---

42 Ibid, 13.
43 Ibid.
It goes on to state that:

... the Army must be prepared to share in the elimination of non-military and mixed threats on its own territory and outside of it in the framework of coalition commitments and agreements...\footnote{Ibid, 14.}

4.3. Influence on Military Force Structure

Like many of the concepts expressed in the Security Strategy, the Military Strategy contains many statements, which appear to demonstrate the intent of the Czech Republic to commit its forces in response to a wide range of internal and external threats far beyond its traditional security concerns. As mentioned before, this has far reaching implications for the further development of the country's military force structure. Like many of its European allies and even the US, the Czech Republic must take into account a great number of variables related to the wide range of possible threats and corresponding missions and tasks which it will expect its armed forces to carry out.
5. The RMA, NATO, and European Armed Forces

In sections 1 and 2 of this work we discussed the unique position of the Czech Republic in the evolving security environment of Europe. In sections 3 and 4 we examined the new security and military strategies of the Czech Republic, which establish the framework in which the armed forces must operate. In order to better understand the influences and possible outcomes of these factors on military decision making, it will be helpful at this point to consider the changing nature of warfare and the implications of an emerging phenomenon known generally as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

5.1. The RMA

Military forces that seek to successfully carry out operations in the post Cold War security environment, must exhibit a new set of required characteristics and capabilities. Technology is playing an increasingly important role. As stated in the US Army’s primary doctrinal manual:

> Micro processing, miniaturization, communications, and space technologies have combined to permit almost real-time intelligence and information sharing, distributed decision making, and rapid execution of orders from a wide variety of forces and systems for concentrated effect.\(^\text{45}\)

The influence of these advances in technology on the application of military forces has brought about what is described as a “revolution in military affairs”.

---

The hypothesis is that a military force utilizing RMA technologies will in the future have the ability to:

Identify and locate in near ‘real time’, virtually all friendly, neutral, and opposing forces, facilities, machinery, weapons, vehicles, and units that are militarily significant. That will provide the basis for much more timely and accurate situational awareness than an opponent can obtain—a condition referred to as “dominant battlespace awareness [DBA]”.  

Furthermore, forces which employ RMA technologies to gain DBA will be inherently more agile, flexible and adaptable, and be able to move faster from more dispersed locations.

Throughout history many “revolutions” have fundamentally changed both the ways in which armies fight, and even the ways in which nations have conducted their foreign relations. An early example of such a revolution was the great changes brought about by the widespread use cannons by 15th century European armies. With the newly developed ability to rapidly destroy an enemy’s fortifications, warfare was forever transformed into a far more mobile activity. Four centuries later, an equally dramatic revolution occurred through the invention and application of the telegraph and railroad. These innovations enabled civilian and military leaders to quickly and reliably communicate across great distances and effectively plan and direct their campaigns. Moreover, they allowed for the movement of forces at the critical times and to the critical places where they could be used to greatest effect.

Although recent technological advances have enabled the current military revolution to occur, they are not in themselves the only element. A leading thinker on RMAs, Andrew Krepinevich, states that all military revolutions contain four important elements: “technological change, systems development, operational

---

46 Strategic Assessment 1997, 262.
innovation, and organizational adaptation." This recognizes the importance of technologies, but as he so accurately put it, "To realize their full potential, these technologies typically must be incorporated within new processes and executed by new organizational structures." This observation holds true in light of a number of cases where the deciding element between combatant forces was not the technology itself, but rather the way in which it was utilized.

A well-known example of this was the German "Blitzkrieg" into Belgium and France in the early phases of WWII. Contrary to popular belief, the German tanks around which they built their offensive doctrine, were no better than those of the French defenders. In fact, in many respects they were inferior, particularly in the area of armor protection. However, the Germans enjoyed great success through a number of innovations, not directly resulting from technology. The first was the way in which they incorporated their tanks into "combined arms" formations of both armor and infantry, supported by ground attack aircraft. The combination of these three arms had a synergistic effect, and gave them over-all capabilities that allowed them to quickly overwhelm the more traditionally organized allies. Another doctrinal innovation of the Germans was the way in which they systematically by-passed smaller pockets of resistance in order to maintain the momentum and shock effect of their assaults. In addition, their decision to employ radios inside the tanks and other vehicles of their formations, gave them the ability to rapidly exploit successes and maintain the initiative in their attacks.

---


48 Ibid, 36.
In a manner similar to the German Armies of WWII, modern militaries must find the most effective ways to incorporate RMA technologies through doctrinal and organizational innovations. This may call for radical changes in order to ensure they have the requisite agility, flexibility and adaptability we'll discuss later. Units with these characteristics could be smaller than are currently found, and might be organized for more specific missions. In short, the new focus on the RMA and the changes it is bringing about, suggests that highly specialized formations utilizing new technologies and new procedures, would shift their focus from the control of territory or populations to the decisive attack of an enemy’s critical nodes (such as command, control, communications, and intelligence), in order to defeat him with the least expenditure of resources. We can therefore think of an RMA based army as a “qualitatively superior” military force, as opposed to a “quantitatively” based, conventional one.

5.2. Factors Influencing Force Modernization

Recognizing that an RMA is underway is not enough. Any nation seeking to ensure the relevance if its armed forces must move to adapt itself to the new realities of warfare. There are a number of important considerations influencing the selection of which strategy a given country should choose. The first among these is the source and nature of the emerging threats to security. Accurately ascertaining these is inherently difficult, especially over the long term. However, the determination of a realistic ‘threat focus’ is essential to all the policy decisions that follow.
A second variable is the economic potential of the state, and the possibilities for allocation of resources towards defense. No matter how imminent particular threats may appear, economic strength both current and future, will unquestionably guide the possible alternatives for building effective forces capable of meeting them. In the competition for finite resources, it may well be budgetary constraints on defense that most influence a nation’s choice of which strategies to pursue. However, states would do well to keep in mind that cost is only one factor bearing on the decision. As Christopher Gunther pointed out, from a historical perspective, “[e]conomic strength and size of defense budget have proven to be irrelevant factors in the success or failure of nations which have undergone previous RMAs.”

The variables mentioned above are specific to each state’s particular circumstances, and are certainly important to consider. However, in addition to these are a number of more general considerations. One important choice is whether a country should build military forces that focus on conventional high-intensity war fighting, or on operations other than war (OOTW). Again, this depends primarily on threat focus, but also on how the nation intends to meet its threats. Must the armed forces have the capability to work independently, or will they operate in conjunction with one or more allies? This is an important point because a force that must perform all possible operational tasks must have a full range of combat, combat support, and service support capabilities. However, if it must only have the ability to act within a coalition environment, then it may have the opportunity to specialize in one type of warfare, or to perform only specific functional tasks.

---

Changes in the Security Environment of Europe and Their Implications for Czech Military Force Structure.

Another important choice involves the role of and balance between active and reserve forces. This choice really boils down to a trade-off between cost and readiness. To begin, reserve forces are generally cheaper to maintain than active forces. Most reservists receive the same initial training as their active counterparts, but then only train periodically according to their particular country’s policies. Because they are often similarly equipped, the real difference between the two lies in the costs associated with training, and the effect it has on readiness. Although cheaper to maintain, reserve forces often require substantial call-up and train-up periods in order to perform their assigned missions to standard. This is true whether that mission is some form of high-intensity conflict, or a more benign OOTW operation. For this reason, country’s that face serious and imminent threats to their security, generally maintain a larger portion of their forces in an active/ready condition. Given the inherent trade-off between cost savings and readiness, when threats do not appear imminent there is a strong propensity to rely on the reserve component as a basis for force structure. This is true of most European countries today, a fact that we’ll discuss in more detail in the next section. Important elements of the active versus reserve debate are the following questions: To what extent should reserve forces be modernized to meet the requirements of an increasingly complex battlefield? Should they be modernized along with their active component, with the ability to function alongside them as seamless replacement units? Or, could they play an entirely different role, with capabilities and missions separate from those of the active forces? One possible use of the reserves might be in supporting homeland-defense, freeing active units for use as projectable forces.
Changes in the Security Environment of Europe and Their Implications for Czech Military Force Structure.

A further consideration is the nation's defense industrial base. Does it have the capacity to provide the necessary weaponry and supporting systems for force modernization? If not, can the required materials be acquired from reliable allies, which would ensure security of supply? In the past, research and development funded by and carried out for the military, often had "spin-off" applications in the civilian sector. With recent advances in areas such as miniaturization, telecommunications and software design, militaries are increasingly benefiting from "spin-on" applications from products developed for civilian markets. This is leading to increased acquisition of military relevant technologies from commercial off the shelf (COTS) products. This phenomenon would appear to encourage militaries to closely monitor emerging product lines, experiment with combining various technologies, and finding new applications for military use.

A serious concern for many nations is the continued survival of their domestic defense related industries. In today's highly competitive world, defense companies are struggling to adapt to shrinking government budgets. They are being forced to consolidate with other defense contractors; to diversify their product base into the civilian market, and seek international markets for their products. These developments make it harder for governments to direct the creative energies of contractors towards military applications. It also drives the per unit cost of products higher since manufacturers can no longer rely on long production runs from defense contracts and must scale their operations towards long term profitability in the civilian market.
Yet another factor affecting modernization is the question over whether the state should choose an evolutionary or revolutionary strategy. An evolutionary track has the benefit of enabling the maintenance of current force structures, weapons systems and operational doctrines. It would direct progress incrementally, seeking to improve on existing systems, and enhancing modes of operation more on the margins, without major turmoil. In an environment of insecurity, this cautious method allows for the continual maintenance of reliable defensive measures. One major draw back of such an approach is that other states, particularly rivals or enemies, may move in a much more aggressive direction. They may radically modernize their forces, dramatically increasing their capabilities at the expense of those states left behind. In contrast, the country that proceeds along a revolutionary path may trade short-term vulnerability and disruption for capabilities which could dominate future battlefields. Additionally, for those who choose to go this revolutionary route, they must decide whether it is more advantageous to lead the pack as a 1st mover, or proceed as a 2nd or 3rd mover once future uncertainties become more concrete. Obviously, the risk of conflict in the short term must weigh heavily on such a decision.

5.3. European Militaries Today

Acknowledging the importance of operational doctrine and organization in maximizing the capabilities of new technologies, let us turn our attention to how contemporary militaries are coping with the changes brought about by the RMA, in the context of the post Cold War security environment. Of particular interest to many within the U.S. Defense establishment, are the military postures of the European
NATO Allies. The recent NATO actions in Kosovo sparked a great deal of debate over their contribution to the operation. Given that the majority of both combat and support missions were conducted by U.S. forces, it has provoked new calls for more equitable burden sharing. However, some question whether the Allies are really up to the task, in light of the negative impacts of their on-going military force structure changes.

Like the Czech Republic, many European countries have made major revisions to their security concepts and policies throughout the 1990s. Almost without exception, these changes have led to large-scale modification of military strategies, and force structures, far different from their Cold War forms. The first and maybe the most dramatic of these changes has been the reduction of expenditures on defense. For example, the NATO member countries have in recent years cut their defense budgets by an average of 22%, in the hopes of applying this “peace dividend” to their many social and economic problems.\footnote{Jan Peterson, “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept,” 20.} Furthermore, by the mid 1990s, most of the Central and Eastern European countries had reduced their military expenditures to just over 1 percent of their GDPs.\footnote{Strategic Assessment 1997, 34.} What made these cuts problematic, were the increased demands on the armed forces brought about by their requirement to deploy and support a growing number of traditional and non-traditional missions. These included participation in UN and other coalition operations in places like Kuwait, Bosnia, Central Africa, and Haiti. The tempo and frequency of these missions has drained budgetary resources away from the
training, maintenance, and modernization efforts of the armed forces. An additional issue for the Czech Republic and the other new member countries of NATO, is the requirement to dedicate resources to further their interoperability efforts, and ensure they become truly integrated into the alliance’s military framework. These efforts include a wide range of equipment acquisitions and modifications, individual and collective training programs, and reorganization of force structures.

A second and related change has been the reduction in size of standing armies. By 1998, NATO member countries had reduced their forces by an average of 37%. In addition, the over-all capabilities of these forces has declined. The European NATO Allies have responded to the new security environment by developing military forces with mostly local defensive capabilities, and rely primarily on the alliance for the remainder of their security needs. In contrast, the United States has focused its strategy on global power projection, continuing to modernize while at the same time reducing its forces. In their 1998 Strategic Assessment, the National Defense University in Washington, DC stated that this decline in European military capabilities is “creating an imbalance within the Alliance” and that “without modernization of the military or investment in their defense industries, European allies will find it increasingly difficult to act in conjunction with the United States.”

This problem speaks directly to the U.S.’s recognition of the RMA, and its progress in incorporating it into its military forces.

52 Jan Peterson, “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept,” 20.
53 Strategic Assessment 1997, 245.
A look at the comparative means of the US compared with the rest of NATO, reveals a mismatch in the commitment of budgetary resources (see figure 6). While the European NATO member countries (with Canada) have a greater economic potential than the US, as evidenced by both their populations and GNPs, as a whole they spend only 59% as much as the US does on defense. This is not surprising when one considers their regional security focus, as compared to the global security interests of the US. However, what is most revealing is the portion of their defense budgets that they commit to research and development. In 1998 they spent only 8 percent of their budgets on R&D, which was less than one fourth of the US expenditures. Within the perspective of the RMA, and the likely budgetary outlays necessary to capitalize on it, it appears unlikely that the European Allies will pursue it with the same vigor as the US. This too may exacerbate the growing capabilities gap on either side of the Atlantic. It is apparent that tough decisions must still be made by the European countries as to the best ways to reduce force size while continuing modernization efforts geared towards maintaining capable militaries.

A third fundamental change as been in the make-up of European armies. During the cold war years, the Western European countries relied heavily on conscript soldiers to fill their ranks. They maintained a relatively small cadre of professionals split between those responsible for training and employing the conscript force, and those holding technical skills in various specialty fields such as communications, aviation, and logistics.
Changes in the Security Environment of Europe and Their Implications for Czech Military Force Structure.

Comparative Resources*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>NATO (Excluding U.S.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP ($ trillion)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Expenditures ($ billion)</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Development (as a percentage of total defense expenditures)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Duty Forces (millions)</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1997 data

Figure 6.

Today, the trend is toward the professionalization of armies with a decreased dependence on conscription. Countries such as Great Britain and the Netherlands have eliminated conscription altogether, and those countries that maintain it have reduced the term of service to as little as 6 months. Short terms of service like this make specialized training and utilization of conscripts very difficult. This problem is further exacerbated by the increased technological sophistication of modern military hardware and weaponry, requiring increased specialization. These influences have helped drive the armed forces toward further professionalization.

55 Strategic Assessment 1999, 83.
5.4. Possibilities for NATO

Over all, the European NATO members contend that they seek to transform their militaries with the goal of increasing their force mobility and power projection capabilities. Given their current lack of capability in the areas of intelligence collection, out of area command and control, strategic lift, and precision strike, they seek to improve these functions while at the same time relying on the US for support during the interim. Both France and the United Kingdom have recognized these shortfalls and have called for a strengthening of the European leg of NATO. This initiative has been termed the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). It is founded on the notion (supported by the U.S.), that the European Allies should have the ability to better support NATO missions, and be able to carry out other operations within the organizational structure of NATO, without the direct involvement of the U.S. However, this does not adequately address the growing gap in capabilities between the U.S. and the Allies, especially in light of U.S. advances in RMA technologies. So what should the Allies do? Some experts have observed that, “[n]o western European state has the economic capacity and will to shape a national response to the RMA”.56 This would suggest that a collective response is necessary. It may involve a collaborative effort by a small group of countries dedicated to pursuing a European branch of the RMA, or possibly involve the entire EU as the concept of ESDI evolves. Either way, there are some fundamental questions that must be addressed if NATO is to survive as a viable transatlantic body capable of actively ensuring European security.

Among the decisions the NATO member countries must make is what will the alliance’s future military structure look like, and how will it function in practice. As mentioned earlier, the European Allies have made statements to the effect that they seek to improve the power projection and mobility of their forces, so as to better carry their weight within the alliance. Recognizing the current shortfall in Allied capabilities, the U.S. advocates a comprehensive and balanced approach to their modernization plans. This would require the Allies to build a common force structure on par with U.S. plans, committing equal resources to the task.\(^{57}\) However, as previously discussed, the Allies are at present spending only a fraction of what the U.S. does on R&D, and do not seem likely to substantially increase their spending in the future.

A second strategy for NATO might be to adopt a division of labor whereby the Allies handle contingencies for which their conventional “legacy” forces are best suited, while the U.S. handles higher intensity operations better performed by their advanced RMA based force.\(^{58}\) This option has the advantage of facilitating burden-sharing, but is recognized as leaving the Europeans with “second class” military forces. Although there are many outspoken opponents of this strategy within Europe, the static evolution of their militaries in comparison with the U.S. are already turning their fears of being left behind into a reality.

A third possibility may be for NATO to allow for specialization between its members. Unlike the second option discussed above, the alliance forces would still perform their missions in a combined and joint environment, at all levels across the

\(^{57}\) Strategic Assessment 1999, 85.

\(^{58}\) Ibid.
conflict spectrum. However, they would do so within the context of a functional
distribution of responsibilities. In this way, each country could concentrate on areas
in which it enjoys a comparative advantage, perhaps derived from their leadership in
certain domestic scientific and technological fields. For example, the U.S. might
provide space based intelligence and strategic lift capabilities. France might supply
advanced command and control. Germany might contribute focused logistics. The
U.K. might bring precision strike platforms, and Poland might provide ground forces.
This scheme certainly goes against the traditional methodology of the alliance, but
has the benefit of significant cost savings as a result of reduced redundancy. It
allows the Allies to forego building cookie cutter replicas of each other's militaries,
and also allows smaller countries to specialize in areas where they can make a
useful contribution.

5.5. New Missions, New Characteristics

From the new threats to European security discussed in chapter 2, comes a
new range of tasks and missions expected of the armed forces comprising NATO.
These may include combat missions such as: conventional warfare both within the
region and outside of it, counter insurgency, counter terrorism and counter drug
operations, embargo enforcement and stability operations. Non-combat missions
may include: peace enforcement and peace-keeping, support to domestic civil
authorities, disaster relief, arms control and treaty verification.

In order to conduct operations across this wide spectrum of conflict, European
militaries must have certain characteristics. They should be robust in order to deter
aggressors and carry out sustained operations should deterrence fail and lead to
prolonged armed conflict. They should be **agile**, able to move quickly to crisis areas. They must be **flexible**, able to respond to changing situations. Finally, they should be **adaptable**, able to change their methods and configurations to optimize their forces for different missions.⁵⁹

Taking into account the new security environment along with the corresponding characteristics necessary for successful future employment of military forces, these organizations will need to be modified from the heavy conventional forces of today. On the contrary, they should have the capabilities to:

- Provide detailed monitoring of the battlefield in near real time.
- Provide precise targeting information to strike systems.
- Attack from a stand-off position, away from the majority of enemy firepower.
- Employ firepower without relying on large fixed targets like ports, airfields, depots and terminals.
- Deploy rapidly from one theater to another.
- Operate in dispersed units while maintaining overall mission co-ordination.⁶⁰

Towards these ends, several European countries have recognized the need for military forces with these characteristics and capabilities, emphasizing highly mobile forces, utilizing advanced technologies, ready to deploy rapidly and in concert with allies to any region of conflict. Among these countries are The Netherlands and France.

⁵⁹ *Strategic Assessment 1997*, 244.
⁶⁰ Ibid, 258.
5.6. The Netherlands Armed Forces

The Netherlands has reduced its armed forces by about 43%, to 71,200 personnel (36,450 in its ground forces), since it began a general draw-down and reorganization in 1990. For the purposes of context, the Dutch carried out these force structure changes while spending about $8.2 billion annually, representing approximately 2.1% of their $316.4 billion GDP (1995 figures), on military expenditures.61

The Dutch are in the process of a modernizing their ground forces with the very latest in technology. For example, they are acquiring the Apache-D model attack helicopter, upgraded air defense systems, new artillery fire control systems, remotely piloted reconnaissance aircraft, all new Command-Control-and Communication (C³) equipment, transport and light strike vehicles for airmobile operations, light wheeled-armored vehicles for peacekeeping duties, and long range ATACMS missiles for their Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS).

The Dutch have also adapted their organizational structure to form three active duty brigades, one mechanized, one light (both are elements of the German-Dutch Corps), and one airmobile brigade. In addition they maintain two mobilizable reserve mechanized brigades.62 The mechanized brigade provides the heavy combat power of the Dutch Army, and consists of one infantry battalion and two armored battalions with supporting field artillery, engineer, air defense battalions, as

---

61 E. Van der Schraaff, Commodore, the Netherlands Armed Forces, briefing to GEN Shalikashvili, "Developments in the Netherlands Armed Forces since the End of the Cold War," July 1997, 12.

well as logistics support companies. It has a strength of 4,600 personnel, and is equipped with the 120mm Leopard 2 tank; YPR armored tracked vehicle; mechanized anti-aircraft guns; and 155mm self-propelled howitzers.

The light brigade is similarly equipped, but is smaller and more mobile (hence their use of the term “light”). It trains to carry out crisis management missions and operate with allied forces. It has some 3,500 personnel and is organized into one reconnaissance, one armored infantry, one tank and one artillery battalion, with supporting engineer, air defense artillery, and logistics companies.63

The airborne brigade emphasizes mobility and flexibility with some 2,700 personnel utilizing both transport and attack helicopters to rapidly deploy troops, weapons, equipment and provisions. It consists of 3 infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, an air defense artillery battery, along with engineer and supporting logistics companies. It is equipped with light terrain vehicles, portable anti-tank weapons and state-of-the-art communications means.64

Through combining a “mix” of heavy, light, and airborne forces, with a range of modern weapons and equipment, the Dutch Army seeks to maximize its capabilities for employment in a wide range of possible missions. By joining with the German Army to form a bi-national corps, its forces compliment the capabilities of their ally, and benefit from the increased size and depth that are by-products of their mutual interoperability.

63 Ibid, 2.
64 Ibid.
5.7. French Armed Forces

Like the Dutch, France is also on a path of force structure change. France is in the process of reducing its ground forces strength from 230 thousand in the early 1990s to about 138 thousand. It is spending approximately 2.2% of its GDP on defense or about $48 billion.\footnote{Ministere De La Defense, Defense and the Armed Forces of France, Special issue-Information Report (Paris, France, 1998), 16.} It plans to phase out conscription by 2002, and is undergoing a major overhaul of its organizational structure.

At the heart of the French reorganization is a plan to convert from a heavy mechanized force to one which is more adaptable and quickly deployable. The new organizational principle is called “modularity” and emphasizes the ability to form special task forces tailored to particular missions, enemies, and terrain. They are doing away with the 38 operational regiments which were once the core of their combat strength, and reforming their units into more specialized formations without large organic support elements.\footnote{Ibid, 21.}

In the future, operational task forces of various combat and supporting units will be assembled and deployed according to specific mission parameters. For example, during a true combat operation they may have a conventional mix of heavy maneuver and fire support assets, supported by various logistics elements. In contrast, for peacekeeping, monitoring, or humanitarian relief operations, they may put together a logistics heavy taskforce supported by a relatively small number of conventional combat or combat support units. “Modularity” is built into the system by the absence of habitual support relationships between the component brigades, until
the mission parameters are established and the participating units selected. In short, the French military has taken on the task of completely reorganizing its doctrine and organizational structure to better fit the new roles and missions it must perform.
6. Czech Military Force Structure

Up to this point we have addressed military force structure from the perspective of their operational use or organizational design. For the purposes of further discussion the term "force structure" will encompass these elements, along with characteristics such as size, types of forces, modes of employment, and even readiness levels. This relatively broad view may help us to avoid becoming entangled in unnecessary detail while at the same time allowing for a comprehensive consideration of various force structure design options. As discussed in section 4 of this work, the term "Army of the Czech Republic" or ACR, refers to the ground forces, air forces, and territorial defense forces. Any reference to the ACR will be in this context, however we will concentrate our attention primarily on the active duty ground forces, as they are the core of the Czech military's combat capability.

6.1. Current Status

As previously described in section 4 (on the National Military Strategy of the Czech Republic), the ACR is divided along functional lines into three main groups. They are ground forces, air forces and support elements. Manning this force are approximately 54 thousand uniformed personnel, of which about 40% are career soldiers and the remainder conscripts who have a service obligation of 12 months. In 1997 units of these forces had about a 82% fill rate (number of actual soldiers filling authorized positions).\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{67} Czech Republic Ministry of Defence, \textit{Promptly about the Army}, (Prague, Czech Republic: Military Information and Service Agency, 1997), 7.
The main combat units of the ground forces include: the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade, 2nd Mechanized Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, along with units of the 3rd and 6th Training and Mobilization Bases. The territorial defense forces are comprised of units from the 1st and 2nd Mobilization Bases. At current manning levels, the total of these forces represent about 3 active NATO equivalent combat brigades. They are equipped with a variety of weapon systems, primarily of Soviet and Czech design, including the T-72 tank, BMP-2 combat infantry vehicle, 152mm SPGH M77 self-propelled howitzer, and the 122mm RM-70 rocket launcher.\textsuperscript{68}

The main air forces include units of the 4th and 32nd Tactical Air Bases, 34th Training Base, 33rd Helicopter Air Base, 6th Transportation Base, along with the 41st and 42nd Air Defense Rocket Brigades. At current manning levels, the total of these forces represents about 3 NATO equivalent squadrons of fixed wing attack aircraft, 1 squadron of fixed wing transport aircraft, 1 battalion of attack helicopters and 1 battalion of medium lift transport and observation helicopters. They are equipped with various aircraft of Soviet and Czech design including; MIG-21 fighters and SU-22 fighter bombers, L-39 trainers, L-410 transports, Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters, and Mi-17 transport helicopters.\textsuperscript{69}

The elements that make up the supporting services include logistics supply and maintenance, military intelligence, military police, and military medical services. Many of these units are tactical and serve in a direct supporting role to the ground and air forces. Other units, particularly those that provide higher levels of logistical support, operate from fixed bases throughout the country.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, 4.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid, 4.
The ACR can be characterized as a conventional force, made up of mostly heavy mechanized brigades within its ground component, and squadrons of light tactical attack aircraft in its air component. Its primary weapon systems are mostly of Soviet design from the 1960’s and 70’s, which have in many cases been subsequently upgraded and modified to take advantage of newer technologies.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the Czechoslovakian Armed Forces were organized, equipped, and trained to conduct high intensity combat operations using heavy mechanized formations in the Central European Theater as part of the Warsaw Pact. Their doctrine emphasized the counter-attack and the importance of offensive operations. Following the pro-democracy revolution and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces in the early 1990s, the Czechoslovakian Security Strategy shifted to emphasize territorial defense. At that time, the military establishment was slow to adapt itself to the new political realities, and held on to its Warsaw Pact orientation. This phenomenon was apparent among a number of the East-Central European states, including Poland, Hungary, and Romania.70 Gradually though, the Czechoslovak (and later the Czech), military forces did adopt a new doctrine, which better reflected the focus on defensive operations.

Just as during the country’s previous political transformation, the Czech military is once again lagging behind the shift in security thinking. As previously discussed, the orientation of the new Security Strategy is towards collective defense and coalition operations. The ACR’s Warsaw Pact era equipment and doctrine

---

based on territorial defense are ill prepared to support the more dynamic and complex range of missions called for in the new Security Strategy. Although NATO doctrine is now widely taught within Czech military schools, and modifications are underway to their organizational force structure, it is clear that a dramatic departure from these earlier models must be embarked upon and institutionalized by the ACR.

6.2. Trends/Future Outlook

In the years leading up to the entrance of the Czech Republic into NATO in April 1999, the ACR began to reorganize its forces to make them more complimentary, or to better “fit” with the existing NATO military structure. These steps continue today and are focused on “interoperability”. It is a process by which armies work to ensure their forces are mutually supporting and can be employed together to conduct operations. Specific measures towards interoperability include creating forces whose operational doctrine, organizational structures, C³, and even weapons systems are complimentary, to the greatest extent possible.

Along with the changes in organizational structure, the ACR continues to plan and carry out modernization of its weapon systems and equipment. However, it is hampered by limited budgetary resources stemming from a relatively apathetic government and electorate who place little emphasis on defense spending. For example, the Defense Ministry’s budget steadily declined from 2.6% of the country’s GDP in 1993, to just 1.6% in 1997. In 1999 defense expenditures rose to 1.9% and were programmed to reach 2.0% by the year 2000, where they are expected to remain into the near future. ⁷¹ This figure is about the average for European armies.

today. However, these budgetary constraints has been exacerbated by a slowing economy, and an inflation rate that has not declined as previously forecast.

Further complicating the ACR’s efforts towards reform and modernization is their requirement to maintain relatively high levels of expenditures on personnel (approx. 45% of defense budget) and infrastructure or “overhead” (approx. 34% of defense budget).\textsuperscript{72} Having inherited a large force structure from the pre-revolution era, the ACR continues to wrestle with a reduction in their personnel force and further base closures, in order to invest more funds for readiness and modernization.

In consideration of these factors, the ACR can assume that at least into the near future, the next 5 years or more, they will not see any significant increase in their budgets. At the same time, by virtue of their entrance into NATO, and the fundamental revisions to their security and military strategies discussed previously, they will be called on to perform an increasingly varied range of missions. Missions which their heavy conventional mechanized forces may not be suited for. As we covered in section 5 of this work, the roles and responsibilities of European armed forces today, and in the future, may be greatly different from those which drove the development of the ACR’s current forces. For these reasons, Czech policy makers need to seek out alternative force structures which will be better suited to the new realities of the European security environment.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, 54.
6.3. Options for the ACR

Admittedly, any consideration of a new Czech military force structure is a difficult task. It is made inherently complicated by the many variables that must be taken into account. As alluded to in section 5, these include:

- The probable types and intensities of future operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to full scale conventional war.
- The probable location of future operations, from within the Czech territorial borders to out of area operations in regions outside of Europe.
- The capabilities of possible adversaries, ranging from those who are technologically inferior, to those with superior capabilities.
- Probable warning and preparation times for future conflicts, ranging from immediate threats which appear without warning, to those developing over weeks or months.

Although force structure re-design is complicated, we can draw some lessons from recent disputes that can help guide the process. The first lesson is that the spectrum of possible conflicts is widening, and requires that military forces be inherently flexible and adaptable enough to contend with such uncertainties. Secondly, advanced technologies and weaponry are becoming increasingly easy to obtain and measures must be taken to maintain an advantage over possible adversaries. Finally, recent military conflicts have arisen very quickly, (within a matter of weeks), and only trained and ready forces capable of rapid deployment to conflict areas will be able to respond effectively to counter similar threats in the future. These characteristics are only possible if forces are fully manned, sufficiently
armed and equipped, highly trained and capable of operating in any region of possible conflict. For the Czech Republic, these forces need not be overly large or completely self sufficient as they will invariably be committed as part of a NATO force or in a coalition context. In light of these variables and influences, along with the threats, strategies and constraints previously discussed, we can now consider possible design options for the ACR’s force structure.

6.3.1. Traditional Design

The first force structure option is to maintain the current organizational design of the ACR, with its heavy ground and territorial defense forces, and air forces. The ACR will remain primarily focused on the defense of the Czech homeland, and will retain the capability to deploy in defense of its central European NATO allies, or with the aid of alliance partners deploy in support of operations out of sector (outside central Europe). In addition, as is done today, it will have the capability to form from its combat units ad hoc task forces for participation in low intensity operations such as peacekeeping as part of a coalition force.

This option assumes the retention of conscription to maintain the personnel force strength at near current levels. Further it assumes the retention of the mechanized brigades with their current primary weapons systems. Modernization efforts will necessarily be focused on continued upgrading of aging equipment, and a very gradual replacement of systems reaching the end of their operational life.

These forces will train for conventional medium and high intensity conflicts, and will require specialized preparations prior to participation in other types of operations. Readiness of this force will follow the current tiered pattern with one
maneuver brigade prepared for short notice employment, with the remainder requiring longer periods of preparation (as much 6 months).

In short, this design supports a relatively large and conventionally organized, equipped, and trained force, capable of employment for traditional defense of the state, with limited projectability for out of sector operations. It favors size over readiness and specialized capabilities.

Advantages of this option are:

- It does not require immediate large outlays for equipment or replacement weapon systems.
- It retains a character and structure familiar to the leadership of the ACR and is supported by current doctrine.
- It allows for relatively independent actions within the ACR’s traditional area of responsibility (without support from NATO allies).

Disadvantages of this option are:

- Modernization will be slowed by the requirement to maintain the large personnel and equipment infrastructure.
- It limits the ability of the ACR to project forces in out of area missions because of its heavy mechanized structure.
- It limits the ACR’s ability to maintain the entire force at a high level of readiness.

6.3.2. Specialized Design

The second force structure option is a radical departure from the traditional one. It would discard the heavy armored formations that currently characterize the ACR. In their place would be highly specialized combat units (possibly of battalion
size), and combat support units, which are designed to work in conjunction with other NATO forces to fulfill specific requirements. For example, these could include motorized or light infantry units trained and organized to perform long-range reconnaissance, peace keeping, or urban warfare operations. Along with these, combat and service support units could be organized to perform highly technical functions such as nuclear, biological, and chemical protection operations, or possibly battlefield intelligence gathering utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Czech Republic is recognized for its technical and operational expertise in both of these areas. Another field may be the creation of mobile medical detachments to support a wide range of operations from field surgery to humanitarian relief. Here again, the Czech’s enjoy a certain level of knowledge and experience. The selection of types and functions of these units would depend on the actual needs of the country in coordination with its NATO allies.

In this design, territorial defense forces would be eliminated as an unjustifiable burden on limited resources supporting national security. Air forces would be retained to the extent that they support the specialized units. Of particular usefulness may be the tactical mobility provided by helicopter assets.

The focus of such a force would be to provide critical “niche” support for alliance operations, both within and outside of the European region. They would be readily projectable to crisis areas and would routinely operate in conjunction with larger NATO alliance task forces. They would also have the capability to deploy semi-independently in support of UN or other coalition operations.
The over-all size of the ACR with such a design would be much smaller than the conventional one, possibly comprising only 15-20 thousand uniformed personnel or roughly one third of today’s force. Such a force would embrace many of the RMA design features discussed in section 5 and would be equipped with advanced technologies, employing the very latest tactics, techniques and procedures in given fields.

This option assumes a completely professional force manned by highly skilled experts. The training and preparation of these personnel would be conducted both at home and abroad and would take advantage of the best schools and training available worldwide. The expertise maintained by such a force may also prompt the establishment of training centers within the Czech Republic to aid in the preparation of allied forces.

In summary, the specialized design supports a relatively small but highly skilled force with world class equipment and unsurpassed readiness, capable of world wide deployment. It favors specialized capabilities and readiness over size.

Advantages of this design are:

- It allows for the focusing of limited defense budgets away from maintaining a large force structure, and towards creating and maintaining capabilities critical to the country’s collective security efforts.
- It helps guarantee the ACR remains an important contributor to stability both in Europe and around the world, in accordance with the Czech Republic’s new Security Strategy.
- It allows the ACR to concentrate on its strengths, enhancing the capabilities of coalition taskforces through a carefully planned division of labor.

Disadvantages of this design include:

- The ACR will lose a portion of its operational independence, and the Czech Republic will need to rely heavily on NATO for conventional defense of its territory.

- Forces optimized to perform one type of mission are not well suited to perform in other roles, and are therefore less flexible and adaptable.

- It requires the adoption of a completely new military doctrine, unlike any that the leadership of the ACR is familiar with, and **MUST** be fully integrated in the broader force structure plans of NATO.

### 6.3.3. Combination Design

A third force structure option is a combined approach, bringing together elements of the *Traditional* and *Specialized* designs. It would include ground forces consisting of a mixed brigade of armored, mechanized, motorized and light infantry battalions, conventionally equipped and supported by traditional logistics and service elements. This brigade would maintain the capability to operate in support of both local and out of area operations as part of an alliance task force. In addition to this unit, the territorial defense forces would retain one mechanized brigade conventionally equipped and capable of performing its traditional roles as discussed in section 4. The air forces would retain a small contingent of fixed wing and helicopter assets capable of providing direct support of ground forces and participation in other coalition missions. They would also retain sufficient numbers of
fighter aircraft to carry out their traditional airspace defense role (possibly three squadrons of multi-role fighters).

Another important element of this force structure design would be the creation and maintenance of the service support units described in the Specialized design option. Utilizing RMA type technologies and employment strategies, this portion of the force would have the capability to support committed ACR formations, provide critical "niche" support to NATO forces, or participate in UN or other coalition missions (see Appendix).

The focus of this structural design would be the application of forces in a wide range of possible operations from conventional warfare to humanitarian relief missions. The over-all size of the ACR under this option would be smaller than the Traditional design, but larger than the Specialized. It could contain 30 thousand uniformed personnel, or about half of today's force. Conscription might be retained as a means to fill the ranks of the territorial defense brigade, however the remaining forces would be entirely professional. Conscription may also provide a useful means of training reserve forces for use in case of a large scale wartime mobilization.

This option represents a compromise between size, capability, and readiness. Advantages of this option include:

- It allows for the application of military forces over a wide spectrum of operations due to their mixed organization and capabilities.
- The reduction in the over-all force size permits an increased level of expenditures for modernization and readiness.
Changes in the Security Environment of Europe and Their Implications for Czech Military Force Structure.

- It better supports the new Czech Security Strategy with its greater emphasis on participation in non-conventional NATO missions.

Disadvantages of this option include:

- The Czech Republic will have a reduced capability for traditional defense of its territory and will rely more on cooperation with its NATO allies.

- It will require the acquisition and sustainment of new and expensive technologies to equip the specialized elements of the force.

- It requires major modification of the current Czech Military Strategy.
7. Recommendations & Conclusion

In view of the relevant advantages and disadvantages of each of the presented force structure options, and in consideration of the requirements placed on the ACR by the Czech Republic's new Security Strategy, it seems prudent to adopt the *Combination* design. This option has the desirable characteristics embodied by the mixed structure of the Royal Netherlands Army and furthermore lends itself to the flexible employment doctrine embraced in the "modularity" design of the French Armed Forces.

This *Combination* approach creates the force structure that best maintains the critical characteristics of **robustness, agility, flexibility** and **adaptability** which epitomize the ideal for European armed forces today. It also has the advantage of requiring only a modification of current Czech military doctrine, representing a more gradual approach than is demanded by the *Specialized* design option. Furthermore, should the security environment of the future change its fundamental features with a new and unanticipated group of threats, these force structure modifications are both expandable and reversible, enabling an appropriate response.

In addition to the advantages listed earlier under the heading "Combination Design", this option enables the ACR to retain sufficient force structure to assist the Alien and Border Police in combating the problem of illegal migration. While this involves a certain level of disruption in the ACR's efforts to increase interoperability with its NATO allies, the operational distraction and financial commitment could be minimized by utilizing elements of the Territorial Defense Forces, rather than those of the active ground forces. These "reserve" units are already manned, equipped,
and come with their own command structure. They are already capable of
performing war-time border security functions, and could be trained with moderate
effort in modern apprehension and processing techniques. This last requirement is
important if the Czech Republic is to successfully adhere to EU and UNHCR
procedures governing human rights and the treatment of “displaced persons”. Units
of the Territorial Defense Forces could perform their functions on a rotational basis
in accordance with their existing duty obligations. Operationally, they could be
integrated into the structure of the Alien and Border Police Service, which would
ensure oversight by experienced border security personnel. Another option, one
that involves less organizational modification, would be to assign designated areas
along the state border to the Territorial Defense Forces who would have sole
responsibility for security within their sector. Either way, the Ministry of the Interior
would have at its disposal increased manpower and equipment resources to
reinforce the mission of the Alien and Border Police. It should be recognized that
this approach of strengthening the state borders serves only to combat a symptom
of the larger problems of political and economic instability, which are the true causes
of illegal migration. However, in light of the critical importance the Czech Republic
has placed on accession into the EU, strengthening of the state’s border controls
should immediately go forward.

Taking into account the evolving security interests of the state, the
government should focus its long-term strategy on transforming the ACR (as
outlined under the Combination Design heading), to better enable it to carry out, in
concert with its allies, the broader and more ambitious foreign policy goals of a
modern European country. Only through this pro-active solution can the Czech Republic ensure it makes an effective contribution to combating the problem of illegal migration over the long term.

Like its geographic position in Central Europe, today the Czech Republic stands at an historic crossroads. Recognizing the last decade’s new political landscape, it sought to ensure its security through joining NATO and by embracing free market and democratic ideals. Along with the transformation of their economy, the Czechs continue to redefine their security role and work towards developing a more effective military. Where these efforts will eventually take them is uncertain. However, which ever direction the Czech Republic decides to proceed with the evolution of its armed forces, it will invariably be a result of its economic potential, its own historical perspective and its strategic position on the European continent. It must recognize that given the new level of security it enjoys as a NATO member country it has the unique opportunity to choose a new and possibly revolutionary path. As a small country positioned among “giants”, the Czech Republic is now poised to not only enhance its own security, but also to becoming a force for stability across all of Europe.
APPENDIX

Combination Force Structure Design

Active Ground Forces

Territorial Defense Forces

Specialized Combat Support Brigade

LOG

LOG

SB

EW

MP


E. Van der Schraff, Commodore, the Netherlands Armed Forces. Briefing to GEN Shalikashvili. “Developments in the Netherlands Armed Forces since the End of the Cold War.” (July 1997).


