FINDING RELEVANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL CORPS AFTER ARMY TRANSFORMATION

A Monograph
by
Major Jeffrey W. Brlecic
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**AUTHOR(S)**
Brlecic, Jeffrey W.;

**PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS**
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
School of Advanced Military Studies
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

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14. ABSTRACT
The Army Vision for the Objective Force calls for revolutionizing the way in which Army forces are supported. Streamlining procedures, improving efficiency, and reducing the support footprint have become top priorities for the Combat Service Support community. These mandates are particularly fitting for the Adjutant General (AG) Corps, whose antiquated personnel support systems and redundant Cold War bureaucracy have become more of a liability than an asset to the combat commander. To remain relevant to the force, the AG Corps must streamline its personnel support doctrine and organizational design. This monograph explores the possibility of accomplishing this by including the AG officer in the multifunctional logistician family. In doing so, this monograph searches for relevance of the Adjutant General Corps on the battlefield and ultimately answers the question: Should the Adjutant General Corps officer be aligned with the Functional Area 90 (FA90) Multifunctional Logistician? This monograph traces the evolution of the terms ?logistics? and ?Combat Service Support? demonstrating how the synonymous use of the terms resulted in confusion as to how to organize the Army?s support forces. A clear case in point being the exclusion of AG officers from the Multifunctional Logician Career Field even though they are routinely categorized as logisticians. By comparing and contrasting current and emerging support doctrine, organization, and leader development this monograph provides insight into why AG officers are currently excluded from the Multifunctional Logician Career Field, and whether or not alignment would be desirable in the future. The monograph concludes that aligning the Adjutant General Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logician Career Field is not desirable for four reasons. First and foremost, AG officers should not align with the Multifunctional Logician Career Field simply because they are not logisticians. Second, the CSS structure does not support alignment. Third, aligning the career fields is not cost effective. Finally, alignment of the two career fields would not provide equitable career progression for AG officers.

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Major Jeffrey W. Brlecic

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Approved by:

________________________________________ Monograph Director
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

________________________________________ Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
COL Robin P. Swan, MMAS

________________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Program
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT

FINDING RELEVANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL CORPS AFTER ARMY TRANSFORMATION by MAJ Jeffrey W. Brlecic, USA, 52 pages.

The Army Vision for the Objective Force calls for revolutionizing the way in which Army forces are supported. Streamlining procedures, improving efficiency, and reducing the support footprint have become top priorities for the Combat Service Support community. These mandates are particularly fitting for the Adjutant General (AG) Corps, whose antiquated personnel support systems and redundant Cold War bureaucracy have become more of a liability than an asset to the combat commander. To remain relevant to the force, the AG Corps must streamline its personnel support doctrine and organizational design. This monograph explores the possibility of accomplishing this by including the AG officer in the multifunctional logistician family. In doing so, this monograph searches for relevance of the Adjutant General Corps on the battlefield and ultimately answers the question: Should the Adjutant General Corps officer be aligned with the Functional Area 90 (FA90) Multifunctional Logistician?

This monograph traces the evolution of the terms ‘logistics’ and ‘Combat Service Support’ demonstrating how the synonymous use of the terms resulted in confusion as to how to organize the Army’s support forces. A clear case in point being the exclusion of AG officers from the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field even though they are routinely categorized as logisticians. By comparing and contrasting current and emerging support doctrine, organization, and leader development this monograph provides insight into why AG officers are currently excluded from the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field, and whether or not alignment would be desirable in the future.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The Army Vision for the Objective Force calls for revolutionizing the way in which Army forces are supported and for reducing the CSS footprint in the battlespace. To keep pace with this transformation and remain relevant to the force, the Adjutant General (AG) Corps must update and streamline its personnel support doctrine and organizational design. Current personnel support doctrine relies on antiquated automation systems and redundant business practices that are unresponsive and cumbersome to the warfighting commander. Additionally, the personnel support organization is a multi-layered, understaffed Cold War bureaucracy that must rely on outside assistance for protection, life support, and movement. As a whole, personnel support has lost its relevancy on the battlefield by becoming more of a force protection problem than a force support asset. One possible way of regaining relevancy and improving personnel support may be through aligning the AG Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field.

Responding to a similar call for revolutionizing support and reducing the CSS footprint after Operation Desert Storm, the Army created the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field to develop officers to the grade of colonel who are “competent in planning and directing multifunctional logistical operations from the factory to the foxhole, across the entire spectrum of logistical functions….”1 As currently designed, the career field only concerns itself with the tactical logistics functions of arming, fixing, fueling, moving, and some elements of sustaining (general supply, health, and field service support). It does not encumber itself with the so-called logistics function of manning and some other elements of sustaining (personnel service support and quality of life).2 As such, the career field embraces officers from the Transportation,

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2 (1) FM 100-5, Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash D.C., 14 June 1993), chapter 12 identifies six tactical logistics: manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems. (2) FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash D.C., 3 October 1995), calls them CSS support functions. See chapter two of this monograph for a discussion on the synonymous use of the terms logistics and CSS.
Ordinance, Quartermaster, Medical Service, and Aviation Logistics Corps while excluding Adjutant General Corps officers even though they are purported to be logisticians. By including AG officers, the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field may provide both the Combat Service Support (CSS) community as a whole, and the AG community specifically an opportunity to reduce their battlefield footprint and improve efficiency as called for by the Army Vision.

In regards to revolutionizing the manner in which personnel support is provided and reducing the overall CSS footprint, this monograph explores the possibility of including the AG Corps officer in the multifunctional logistician family. In doing so, this monograph searches for relevance of the Adjutant General Corps on the battlefield and ultimately answers the question: Should the Adjutant General Corps officer be aligned with the Functional Area 90 (FA90) Multifunctional Logistician?

This monograph utilizes historical, comparative, and qualitative description and analysis to logically synthesize and interpret the information gathered from both primary and secondary sources. Chapter one presents the problem and briefly explains the organization of the monograph. Chapter two traces the evolution of the terms Combat Service Support and logistics demonstrating how they entered the Army terminology as distinct concepts but over time became synonymous, thus inhibiting the Army’s ability to establish a division of labor so as to efficiently organize its support forces to sustain combat forces in time of war. Chapter three describes and analyzes Legacy Force tactical CSS doctrine and organization to determine why Adjutant General Corps officers are currently excluded from the Multifunctional Career Field. The chapter also compares and contrasts Legacy Force doctrine with emerging Objective Force doctrine to provide an indication of the feasibility of inclusion in the future. Finally, chapter four analyzes the facts and findings against selected evaluation criteria so as to provide a basis for conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

EVOLUTION OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TERMINOLOGY

Ascertaining if AG officers are logisticians is fundamental to determining whether or not they should align with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field. Unfortunately, Army doctrine is not clear as how to categorize AG officers. Two schools of thought prevail in relation to their identity. The most influential school, which is supported by the Army’s operations doctrine, finds its genesis in the writings of Clausewitz and Jomini. It holds that AG officers are clearly logisticians because they are not involved in direct combat but do support it by providing services and supplies on the battlefield. The simple belief is that anything not combat must be logistics. This provides a tidy means of dealing with the intricacies of supporting military forces while not detracting from the business of tactics and strategy. The other school, which is articulated in the Army’s current support doctrine, believes that because the services and supplies provided are uniquely human vice commodity oriented, AG officers are not logisticians but rather they are personnel specialists with unique skills and characteristics not commensurate with the roles and responsibilities of true logisticians. As such, this latter school embraces the notion that AG officers are part of a larger CSS family of which logistics and personnel are two subordinate elements. These divergent schools of thought are the by-products of nearly a half-century of yet unsettled bickering within the Army as to the concept of logistics versus the concept of CSS.

To establish a common understanding and provide a basis for determining if the Adjutant General Officer Corps should align with the Multifunctional Career Field, it is instructive to conceptually define the terms logistics and Combat Service Support by tracing and analyzing their application throughout the second half of the 20th Century. This approach is necessary because during the time-period in survey, more often than not, concepts and definitions for

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logistics and CSS in the Army's cornerstone doctrinal manual, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, 
*Operations*,4 were not in concert with concepts and definitions for the same terms in FM 100-10, 
*Combat Service Support*,5 the keystone doctrinal manual for support. This dichotomy left the terms open to wide interpretation, allowing anyone with a vested interest to selectively apply the concepts for parochial aggrandizement in efforts to garner resources and power within the Army establishment.6

Due to decades of skewed interpretation and misapplication, the terms, although vaguely distinct in official definition, have become conceptually synonymous, thus eliminating the capability to distinguish between the two. As a result, many support functions commonly lumped under the concept of logistics, such as personnel support, do not receive adequate attention during war plan development. George C. Thorpe, in his 1916 book entitled *Pure Logistics*, warned against this very thing when he wrote, “There is something more than academic interest in correctly defining Logistics [and CSS], for the purpose of the definition is to establish a division of labor, and if two divisions are properly drawn while the third is not, there will be either duplication of effort or some functions will be overlooked entirely, with the result that certain preparations for war will not be made.”7 Heeding Thorpe’s counsel, this survey concludes by providing distinct conceptual definitions for logistics and CSS, which in turn provide a basis for determining if AG officers are logisticians and whether or not they should align with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field.

4 *This manual has had three titles since 1954. Originally entitled Field Service Regulations. Operations, it was changed in 1968 to Operations of Army Forces in the Field. Finally, in 1976 it adopted its current title Operations. Hereinafter this manual will be referred to as either FM 100-5 or ‘the operations manual.’*  
5 *This manual has had two titles since 1954. Originally entitled Field Service Regulations. Administration, it was changed in 1968 to its current title Combat Service Support. Hereinafter this manual will be referred to as either FM 100-10 or ‘the support manual.’*  
(2) Jack C. Fuson, *Logistics: One Man’s Story*. (Department of the Army, Center of Military History, Wash D.C., 1994).  
Section 1: WWII to 1968

The terms ‘logistics’ and ‘Combat Service Support’ are relatively recent additions to the official U.S. Army doctrinal lexicon. Although the concept of providing support to armies is not new, the terminology currently used by the U.S. Army to express the concept found recognition only in the middle of the 20th Century. Through the first half of the century, soldiers in the field used the terms ‘Administration’ or ‘Administrative Support’ to describe any military activity outside the realms of ‘tactics’ and ‘strategy.’ Before its introduction to the field in 1949, use of the term ‘logistics’ was fashionable primarily in academic and War Department General Staff circles. Likewise, the term ‘Combat Service Support’ received attention in General Staff circles, but it did not become vogue with the ordinary soldier until introduced to the field in 1962. Since their introduction to the Army at large, the fundamental concepts underlying each term have undergone considerable convolution, emerging in today’s doctrine as synonymous, distinguishable only slightly in definition, but not at all in application.

Prior to WWII, the Army narrowly defined logistics as “the art of planning and carrying out military movement, evacuation, and supply.” By war’s end, Army-wide acceptance of the term resulted in an expansion of the concept as reflected in the 1949 version of FM 100-10 where logistics was defined as, “… that branch of administration which embraces the management and provision of supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, and services.” The last word in the definition, services, opened the door to vast interpretation and the tendency to apply the

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8 FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations – Administration, (Headquarters, War Department, Wash D.C., December 1944) – Defines Administration: “When unqualified, administration includes all phases of military operations not involved in the terms “tactics” and “strategy.” It comprises supply, evacuation, sanitation, construction, maintenance, replacements, transportation, traffic control, salvage, graves registration, burials, computations pertaining to movements, personnel management, quartering, military government, martial law, censorship, and other allied subjects.”

9 Millett, 53-54.


11 Army Regulation 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash D.C., 1944) 106.

12 FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations – Administration, (Headquarters, War Department, Wash D.C., December 1949), 366-367.
term logistics to all noncombatant military activities. While officially, ‘logistics services’ activities were limited primarily to maintenance, labor and construction; in practice the whole concept of logistics, under the guise of ‘logistics services’ took on whatever meaning was convenient to a particular user. James A. Huston, an historian and author of the eminent work on logistics, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953*, expressed his consternation with this unabashed expansion of the concept of logistics when he cynically wrote, “From that point [1944] various people, like Humpty Dumpty, began making it mean whatever they wanted it to mean.”

Huston, who narrowly defined logistics as the “three big M’s of warfare – materiel, movement, and maintenance,” saw in this expansion of the definition of logistics the usurping of the Administrative Support field, of which logistics was a branch. This movement toward defining all noncombatant military activity as logistics provided both a pragmatic approach to the exponential growth of the Army support system during WWII and an opportunity for those with ambition to build an empire. It achieved its greatest momentum with the consolidation of all administrative, personnel, and logistics functions under the command of one organization, the Army Service Forces (ASF), during the middle years of WWII. The ASF became an onerous, unwieldy organization unable to provide efficient support across the entire spectrum of support functions. Shortly after the war the Army disbanded the ASF. Although the ASF failed, its final report defined logistics “largely in terms of its own functions,” which were in essence the same functions assigned to the term Administrative Support to which logistics was actually a subordinate activity. This report provided unwarranted credibility to the idea that all support activities could be managed in the same manner as the logistics functions of supply, maintenance, and movement.

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15 Leighton and Coakley. The authors provide a detailed survey of the growth of the Army support system from peace in 1939 to full-scale mobilization by 1943. Additionally, they expose the machinations of various personalities whose ambitions and self-interests were sometimes at odds with the efficient organization of the Army’s support system.
The disbanding of the colossal ASF did not curtail the ever-expanding concept of logistics. In 1954 the Army created the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (ODCSLOG) which subsumed the duties of the ASF. By 1962 the new organization became so involved in directing all Administrative Support activities that it neglected its real mission of planning the logistics activities of supply, maintenance, and movement. The ODCSLOG justified its expansion by pointing to the 1954 version of FM 100-10, which defined logistics as:

In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (2) movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and (4) acquisition or furnishing of services. It comprises both planning, including determination of requirements, and implementation.

This definition proliferated the concept of logistics to encompass the entire spectrum of materiel, movement, and maintenance from the factory to the foxhole. Although by official definition, the ‘acquisition or furnishing of services’ again was limited in scope, in practice the phrase gave license for the term logistics to be applied with “joyous abandon, and its meaning [logistics] lost what little stability it had possessed” prior to entering the common language of the ordinary soldier. The ODCSLOG’s impulse to “lump all [support activities] under a single name [logistics] implied a unity that did not in fact exist,” resulting in an unclear division of labor for soldiers who had to organize and administer these activities in the field.

Attempting to rectify this the Army, in 1962, undertook a major reorganization of its support activities. Labeled COSTAR (Combat Support to the Army), the reorganization aimed at reestablishing the pre-WWII distinction between logistics and personnel support by severely

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16 Ibid, 12.
17 (1) Fuson, p. 94. (2) McDevitt, Combat Service Support for the Army in the Field 1953-1965 (Headquarters, United States Army Combat Developments Command Combat Service Support Group, Fort Lee, VA June 1967), pp. 71 & 138-139. This changed with the 1962 Army reorganization under COSTAR (combat support to the Army), which severely restricted the ODCSLOG and created the ODCSPER.
18 FM 100-10, 1954, 186.
19 FM 100-10, 1954, Ibid.
20 Leighton and Coakley, 11-12.
restricting activities of the ODCSLOG and introducing the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (ODCSPERS). Under this new structure, the ODCSLOG concentrated on logistics planning while the ODCSPER focused its efforts on personnel planning. COSTAR signaled the failure of the ODCSLOG to provide efficient support to the Army, betraying the widespread myth that all support functions could be technically administered in the same fashion as logistics activities.

Reinforcing the notion that support activities were more than merely logistics, the Army introduced Combat Service Support (CSS) as the overarching official term to describe all assistance given troops outside the realm of tactics and strategy. Concomitant with COSTAR, the 1962 version of FM 54-1, *Logistics Command*, introduced Combat Service Support as:

> …used in this manual the term “Combat Service Support” embraces the assistance given to troops in the management and execution of military matters not included in tactics and strategy. Such assistance consists of personnel management, interior management of units, logistics (AR 320-5), and civil affairs.

Officially, this definition aimed at subordinating all support activities to the broader field of Combat Service Support. In reality, this was the same definition given to the term Administrative Support – the one used by the Army for the first half of the 20th Century. Victim to nothing more than a semantic shell game, the new term, in effect, had little impact on dispelling the one-size-fits-all myth of logistics. Additionally, contemporary versions of the Army’s keystone doctrinal manuals for operations and support did nothing toward establishing CSS as a new overarching support concept. FM 100-5, published in 1962 and FM 100-10, published in 1963 did not recognize, let alone define this new term. Furthermore, FM 100-5 grouped all support activities, including personnel services, under the title “Functions of Logistics” but did not provide a definition of logistics. Meanwhile, FM 100-10 grouped all support activities under the old term

21 Ibid, 11.
22 McDivitt, 138-139. COSTAR did centralize CSS under a single commander in the field, but the organization was for command and control purposes only, not for technical policy and procedure.
“Administrative Support,” which was further divided between “Logistics” and “Personnel,” and maintained the definition of logistics introduced in the support manual’s 1954 version.\(^\text{24}\) The failure of both doctrinal manuals to recognize the term CSS, coupled with contradictions between the two in how to define logistics and group support activities laid the groundwork for half a decade of complexity in establishing CSS as an overall support concept.

**Section 2: 1968 to 1993**

Experiencing initial resistance, the term Combat Service Support did take on popular usage when the 1968 versions of FM 100-5 and FM 100-10 concurrently introduced the term to the Army at large.\(^\text{25}\) Although both manuals presented the term during the same year, they differed in their definitions and fundamental concepts of support. FM 100-10 described CSS as one of the three major subdivisions of military activity – combat, combat support, and Combat service support – defining it as “…the assistance provided operating forces primarily in the fields of personnel and administrative services, civil affairs, construction, labor, maintenance, supply, transportation, and other logistical services.”\(^\text{26}\) FM 100-5 did not specifically define CSS but provided a list of CSS activities different than that found in the FM 100-10 definition.\(^\text{27}\) The 1968 manuals also differed in their divisions of labor. Continuing in the tradition of its 1963 version, FM 100-10 separated the subordinate activities within CSS between logistics and personnel functions. Whereas FM 100-5, in collaboration with its 1962 version, grouped all support functions under the single heading of CSS, explaining the notion under the title “Concept for Modern Logistics.” Explaining CSS as a concept of logistics provided the first indication that the concepts would become synonymous in future operations manuals. Finally, the manuals did not agree on defining logistics. FM 100-10 again carried forward its 1954 definition, whereas FM 100-5 used the term abundantly but, as with the previous operations manual, failed to define

\(^{24}\) FM 100-5, 1962, p. 163 and FM 100-10, 1963, 8-1.  
\(^{25}\) FM 100-5, 1968, p. 4-14 and FM 100-10, 1968, 8-1.  
\(^{26}\) FM 100-10, 1968, 1-1.  
\(^{27}\) While omitting personnel activities, the FM 100-5 list added chaplain, food, finance, legal, medical, and military police support activities.
it. These contradictions overshadowed the simultaneous introduction of the term Combat Service Support. Reflecting the impact of its 1962 debut, again the term did little to negate the paradigm that all support activities could be treated as logistics. Instead of clarifying the Army’s support concept, the term became embroiled in a long running dispute during which the operations and support manuals would constantly provide incoherent support doctrine with little concrete guidance on how to organize and administer CSS.

As the dispute unfolded, FM 100-10 stood fast, in four versions over twenty years (1968-1988), on both its overarching concept of CSS with the subordinate activities of logistics and personnel and on its long-standing definition of logistics. On the other hand, during the same period FM 100-5 renamed and redefined its support concept four times in as many versions of the manual. During the continuous renaming, the operations manual established two prevailing trends. First, in 1976 the manual began inconspicuously using the terms CSS and logistics interchangeably. Second, the 1976 manual introduced a system of separating support activities that by 1986 evolved into what became known as the “sustainment functions” of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protecting. The overwhelming acceptance of the operational concepts in the 1986 version of FM 100-5, led to the unquestioned acceptance, by association, of the manual’s sustainment concepts.

In an unprecedented move, the 1988 version of FM 100-10 abandoned its twenty-year history of separating CSS activities between logistics and personnel and adopted the 1986 operations manual’s so called “sustainment functions.” Additionally, after having done so for twenty-four years, the 1988 support manual no longer provided a definition for the term logistics. Ostensibly these moves were an effort at building consensus; in reality they provided the final impetus for

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28 The 1968 version of FM 100-5 lumped all support activities under the single title CSS functions. The 1976 version consolidated all CSS tasks under the four broad tasks of Arm the System, Fuel the System, Fix the System, and Man the System. Six years later the manual dropped the four broad tasks in favor of listing eight CSS operations: ammunition, petroleum, oil, lube, other supplies, maintenance, personnel, and transportation. This categorization lasted only four years when in 1986 the manual introduced six sustainment functions: Manning, Arming, Fueling, Fixing, Transporting and Protecting. CSS tasks, CSS functions, CSS operations, Sustainment functions.

29 Albeit FM 100-10 renamed them “CSS Tasks” – a feeble effort to stem logistics inevitable envelopment of CSS.
the operations manual to elevate logistics over CSS. Adopting the operations manual’s division of labor only perpetuated the synonymous use of the terms CSS and logistics. Moreover, FM 100-10’s failure to define the term logistics created a void that the next version of FM 100-5 filled to the detriment of CSS.\textsuperscript{30}

**Section 3: 1993 to present (Legacy Force)**

Capitalizing on the support manual’s acquiescence, the Army’s current version of FM 100-5, published in 1993, attempted to deliver CSS a coup-de-grace. The new manual professed that logistics was an overarching function embracing all support activities across the full range of military operations. The manual described CSS as nothing more than the tactical application of logistics, in essence, inverting the traditional support roles making CSS subordinate to logistics.\textsuperscript{31} Undergirding this, the operations manual changed its label for support activities from ‘sustainment functions’ to ‘tactical logistics functions’ thus reinforcing the notion that all support activities, including personnel support, fell within the purview of logistics. As with the 1986 version, the overwhelming acceptance of the operational concepts in the 1993 operations manual led to the widespread unquestioned acceptance of the manual’s newly developed logistical support concepts.

In defiance, the Army’s current version of FM 100-10, published in 1995, attempted to reassert CSS’s supremacy by seizing the doctrinal high ground and declaring CSS the overarching function of support encompassing all activities that sustain forces across all levels of war.\textsuperscript{32} The declaration was to no avail. The paradigm that logistics encompassed all support activities, including personnel, was well established in the minds of most soldiers. Additionally,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{30}] The manual no longer defined logistics as it had for the past FM 100-10 had provided a definition of logistics for 24 years.
\item [\textsuperscript{31}] The 1993 version of FM 100-5 defined logistics as “…the process of planning and executing the sustainment of forces in support of military operations. It includes the design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, equipping, distribution, and evacuation functions of supply, field services, maintenance, health service support, personnel, and facilities. Accordingly, it is an overarching function that occurs across the range of military operations. At the tactical level it focuses on the traditional CSS functions of arming, fixing, fueling, manning, moving, and sustaining the soldier and his equipment.” pg 12-1.
\item [\textsuperscript{32}] FM 100-10 defined CSS using the same definition as Joint Publication 4.0.
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uncreative word-smithing provided a simple means by which the new support manual used nearly the same language to describe CSS as the operations manual used to describe logistics. In doing so, the support manual entered a quagmire whereby the concepts of logistics and CSS became indistinguishable.\textsuperscript{33} This quagmire, in association with the continued inability of the keystone doctrinal manuals to agree on a conceptual framework for organizing the Army’s support functions, only served to create a doctrinal defect that continues to prohibit a clear understanding of how the Army intends to organize and administer its support activities during war. A clear case in point is the exclusion of AG officers from the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field even though they are routinely categorized as logisticians.

Section 4: Future Support Doctrine (Objective Force)

The Army is attempting to rectify this defect in future support doctrine by bringing both the operations and support manuals into complete conformity in definition and concept.\textsuperscript{34} Setting aside nearly half a decade of disagreement, draft versions of both manuals endeavor to establish the supremacy of CSS over logistics by presenting a unified front returning logistics to its subordinate role in support doctrine. The current draft operations manual changes the name of its support chapter from “Logistics Support” to “Combat Service Support” reflecting the same title given to the Army’s keystone support manual for over 30 years. Additionally, both manuals are in absolute accord on support definitions.\textsuperscript{35} More importantly than titles and definitions, both manuals are in complete harmony on the overall conception of CSS. The manuals mutually support each other by agreeing on the division of labor, organization for support, and the general orchestration of the CSS effort. The manuals divide CSS into various subordinate support functions, including logistics and personnel, thus representing CSS as an umbrella concept embracing all aspects of all support functions from the industrial base to the soldier in the

\textsuperscript{33} The manual actually uses the same diagrams as FM 100-5 but merely changes the word logistics to CSS wherever used.

\textsuperscript{34} FM 3.0 replaces FM 100-5 and FM 4.0 replaces FM 100-10.

\textsuperscript{35} Both manuals adopt the exact definitions for support terms published in Joint Publication 1-02.
This new partnership by and large returns logistics to its rightful position as subordinate to CSS and on par with personnel support. Although a move in the right direction, it will take time to completely expunge the paradigm of personnel support as a logistics function established by nearly four decades of confusing and often contradictory support doctrine.

Section 5: Conclusion

The preceding survey reveals how a half-century of incoherent support doctrine has led to the widespread notion that AG officers are logisticians. Prior to WWII, the term logistics was used to identify only the activities of supply, maintenance, and movement, it did not include personnel management activities. The rapid expansion of the Army’s support structure during WWII developed a tendency to apply the term to all noncombatant activities. Inefficiencies associated with trying to administer all support activities as a logistics function became evident in the failure of both the Army Service Forces and the original Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics. In an effort to improve efficiency, the Army returned to its pre-WWII support concept by introducing the idea of CSS with the subordinate activities of logistics and personnel management.

The concurrent introduction of the term CSS in the Army’s keystone support and operations manuals did little to curtail the expansion of the concept of logistics to incorporate all support activities. Although both manuals introduced the term, they were not in agreement as to the concept of CSS. The support manual held fast for twenty years to the idea that CSS provided an overarching concept of support to which logistics and personnel support were subordinate functions. The operations manual, on the other hand, changed its concept of support four times in the same twenty-year period. With each change the operations manual undercut the concept of

36 FM 3.0 and FM 4.0. Emerging CSS functions are maintenance, transportation, supply, combat health support, field services, explosive ordnance disposal, human resource support, finance management operations, religious support, legal support, and band support.

37 Student Text 63-1, Division and Corps Logistics, (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 July 1999). An example of this is found in the primary logistics class taught at the Command and General Staff College. The Student Text used in the logistics class still considers presents ‘manning’ as a ‘tactical
CSS as presented in the support manual. Eventually the support manual acquiesced and abandoned its long history of separating CSS activities into logistics and personnel functions. Capitalizing on the support manual’s acquiescence, the Army’s current operations manual firmly established the notion that all support activities fell in the realm of logistics by declaring, without explanation, that CSS was nothing more than the tactical application of logistics. The support manual put forth a half-hearted effort to reestablish CSS as the overarching concept of support, but it failed. This failure led to nearly a decade of time where AG officers were incorrectly identified as logisticians.

The Army’s future support doctrine sets aside nearly thirty years of disagreement between the concepts of logistics and CSS as played out in its keystone doctrinal manuals. Returning once again to the pre-WWII concept of separating logistics and personnel, the Army’s future operations and support manuals seek to reestablish the preeminence of CSS over logistics. Unlike the first attempt at concurrently introducing the concept of CSS, this time both manuals are in complete agreement as to titles, definitions, division of labor, organization, and general orchestration of the Army’s support effort. In the new manuals, CSS is an overarching concept of support at all levels of war. Its primary goal is providing sustainment to all operational forces on the battlefield. Logistics, on the other hand, is a subordinate CSS function with the associated activities of supply, maintenance, transportation, service support (field services and tactical post exchange), and combat health support. The future CSS concept presents personnel support (also referred to as human resource support) as a subordinate CSS function distinct and separate from that of logistics. In returning to this pre-WWII concept of support, the Army’s future support doctrine definitively establishes the fact that AG officers are not logisticians.

logistics function,’ even though the new support concept of CSS is being taught in other classes using Student Text 3.0, Operations.
CHAPTER THREE

DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION, AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

This chapter compares and contrasts Legacy Force CSS doctrine, leader development, and organization with emerging Objective Force doctrine first, to determine why AG officers are currently excluded from the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field and second, to determine if alignment is desirable in the future. FM 100-10, *Combat Service Support*, provides the Legacy Force with authoritative doctrine by which the tactical CSS system sustains combat forces across the full range of military operations. FM 4.0, *Combat Service Support*, replaces FM 100-10 in the Objective Force, and as such, will provide the Objective Force with the same doctrinal precepts. These two manuals, in conjunction with subordinate logistics and personnel support doctrine and other emerging support concepts found in CSS proponency literature provide the basis of discussion for this chapter.

Section 1: CSS Doctrine

FM 100-10 categorizes the components of Legacy Force CSS by both functional area and tactical-level functions. Although similar in name, the manner of categorization is significantly different. The former represents single purpose separation, whereas the latter represents a systems approach. Stressing purpose and utility, the functional area categories of CSS are supply, transportation, maintenance, combat health support, personnel support, and field services. Although represented as distinct entities, the functional areas of CSS are components of a larger interrelated CSS network. Multifunctional logisticians orchestrate their portion of the CSS network by bringing together under one field of supervision the traditional logistics functional areas of supply, transportation, maintenance, field services, and combat health support. Adjutant General officers on the other hand are responsible for synchronizing all elements of the personnel support function. Alternatively, representing a systems approach, the tactical-level functions of CSS are manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the soldier and his systems.
Multifunctional logisticians orchestrate the arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and portions of sustaining the soldier and his systems. AG officers focus their efforts on the manning and the remaining portions of sustaining the soldier and his systems. Whether applying a functional or systems approach, Legacy Force CSS activities are, by way of the division of labor, organized into the broader categories of logistics and personnel.

Objective Force CSS doctrine, as articulated in the draft FM 4.0, completely dismisses the Legacy Force systems approach of categorization, adopting instead a functional approach that identifies eleven interrelated components similar to the functional areas of the Legacy Force FM 100-10. Keeping the traditional logistics functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, combat health support, and field services, as well as the personnel function of human resources support (formerly called personnel support), the manual adds explosive ordnance disposal support, financial management operations, religious support, legal support, and band support. Clearly, multifunctional logisticians maintain responsibility for the traditional logistics functions with the addition of explosive ordnance disposal support and financial management. Likewise, Adjutant General officers maintain responsibility for personnel support and coordinating oversight of band, religious, and legal support. As with the Legacy Force CSS functions, Objective Force CSS functions are separated, again by a functional division of labor, into distinct logistics and personnel categories.

The clear segregation of logistics and personnel activities inherent in the division of CSS labor indicates that multifunctional logisticians and Adjutant General Corps officers each have a distinct mandate taken for granted in CSS doctrinal jargon. The distinction is made evident by

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38 FM 100-10, 1995.
39 FM 100-5, 1993. Sustaining the soldier and his system includes the logistics activities of health services, field services, quality of life, and general supply support and the personnel activity of personnel service support, chapter 12.
40 FM 4.0, Combat Service Support (draft), Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 18 November 2000.
41 Human Resources Support is the same as Personnel Support, except band, religious, and legal support are separate CSS functions, yet they remain under G1 staff coordination.
considering the core responsibility of each. Caring for people is paramount to the Adjutant General officer, whereas commodity management governs the multifunctional logistician. Adjutant General Corps officers are responsible for the human dynamic of warfare, whereas multifunctional logisticians operate in the realm of inanimate materiel. This distinction is more than academic blather; instead, it provides the basis for understanding why the Adjutant General Officer Corps is not aligned with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field.

Soldiers are the heart and soul of the Army and the Adjutant General officer is charged with their well-being. As such, the Adjutant General officer is responsible for oversight of the human dimension of war, which encompasses providing personnel support to both soldiers and commanders. Adjutant General officers ensure that soldiers are unencumbered by concerns for their future and their families. As important, Adjutant General officers ensure that commanders are provided with timely, relevant, and accurate personnel information they need in order to execute their warfighting mission and care for their soldiers. Together these most important responsibilities form the crux of a complex personnel support system that requires special management by officers who are technical experts well versed in the nuances of the unpredictable human dimension of warfare.

Commodity managers, on the other hand, although no less important, do not concern themselves per se with the well-being of their materiel things. Although tracked within the distribution system, once a particular supply is boxed, shipped, and labeled its physical and mental well-being are forgotten until it reaches its final destination. Additionally, multifunctional logisticians operate in a relatively predictive environment. Logistics data such as lift capabilities, 

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transportation time/distance tables, bridge and port capabilities, ammunition and food consumption rates, and maintenance schedules provide the multifunctional logistician with various types of planning tools, the likes of which are not available for personnel planning.

Whereas the AG officer’s focus is on the unpredictable human dimension of warfare, the most important responsibility of the multifunctional logistician is to synchronize the myriad of logistics activities to ensure a seamless distribution system delivers the right materiel, at the right place, at the right time.

Section 2: CSS Leader Development

Leader development is a cumulative process of cultivating competent officers who are experts in their field and confident in their abilities. Because the Army promotes from within, the goal is to nurture capable officers for potential advancement and positions of greater responsibility. This is accomplished through three pillars of experience: self-development, institutional training, and operational assignments.

Self-development is the responsibility of the individual officer in the Legacy Force as well as the Objective Force. All officers are expected to have a general knowledge of military history, keep abreast of current events, and understand current and emerging doctrine. Officers develop themselves through reading books and professional journals; enrolling in graduate courses; taking military-related correspondence and distance learning courses; studying other branch, service, and joint literature; by getting on the job training; and by cultivating interests outside their military duties. Officers are expected to set the example in their units for self-development, which is an important element of their professional conduct and will remain so in the Objective Force. Self-development also provides an important bridge between each stage of institutional training.

Institutional training spread over a twenty-year career for Legacy Force multifunctional logisticians and AG officers typically includes attendance at an officer basic course, a captains career course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. One significant difference between the two career fields is found in their respective captains career
courses (formerly known as the advanced course). AG officers attend a branch specific captains career course focusing primarily on personnel support. Upon graduation, AG officers are prepared to assume duties related to the personnel support function only. Multifunctional logisticians, in contrast, attend a Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (CLC3). This course instructs multifunctional logisticians in all areas of traditional logistics as well as providing six weeks of branch specific training. Upon graduation, multifunctional logisticians are prepared to assume duties across multiple logistics disciplines. Whether an officer is AG or multifunctional, Legacy Force institutional training prepares all for future operational assignments and will continue to do so in the Objective Force.

Operational assignments provide officers with vast hands-on experience. It is one of the best methods for preparing officers for positions of greater responsibility. In the Legacy Force, command for all officers at any level, lieutenant through colonel, is desirable. The Army as an institution believes successful command is the *sine qua non* for promotion. The rule of thumb for the Legacy Force officer is to command anything, anywhere, anytime. For AG officers this will no longer be the case in the Objective Force. Conversely, for multifunctional logisticians it will remain a truism. Staff positions, on the other hand, are less desirable, but are as important as command for leader development, career progression, and promotion opportunities. Although others exist, the most important branch qualifying staff positions for Legacy Force multifunctional logisticians include support operations officer; chief, division or corps materiel management center; chief, division or corps movement center; and executive officer. The most important branch qualifying staff positions for Legacy Force AG officers are battalion executive officer; group S3; or chief, enlisted personnel management. Critical staff positions for multifunctional logisticians will remain relatively unchanged in the Objective Force. Critical staff positions for AG officers will change dramatically. Battalion executive officer and group S3

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46 *e.g.* Transportation officers attend six weeks of transportation specific training.

47 Although the logistics management centers at division and corps will consolidate into one center at each level, being
positions will no longer exist. The most important branch qualifying staff positions for AG officers in the Objective Force will include division and corps deputy G1; division and corps G1; and chief, personnel management (enlisted or officer). Reasons for these dramatic changes are explained below.

Section 3: Personnel Support Doctrine, Organization, and Leader Development

Adjutant General Corps Officers are primarily responsible for managing and providing the personnel support function of CSS. FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine, is the keystone doctrinal manual for Legacy Force personnel support. The manual identifies the functional area of personnel support as the umbrella term used to describe the systems and functions of manning and personnel services. The manning system includes the subordinate activities of personnel readiness management, personnel accounting and strength reporting, casualty operations management, and replacement management. Personnel services include postal operations management, MWR/community support, and essential personnel services. All total, there are more than 1170 subordinate tasks and functions that constitute Legacy Force personnel support and over 350 information management systems used to gather and distribute personnel information to commanders and soldiers on the battlefield.

Objective Force personnel support includes the same support activities as the Legacy Force, the primary difference not being what support is provided, rather how it is provided. Emerging Objective Force personnel support doctrine significantly reduces the number of subordinate tasks and functions by updating processes, eliminating redundancy, and decreasing the number of automated systems. Future personnel support automation architecture replaces existing systems.

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with a relational, web-based Integrated Total Army Personnel Database (ITAPDB). The ITAPDB eliminates redundancy and duplication of effort by providing one time input with data verification at the source. Additionally, the ITAPDB streamlines processes by allowing the paperless submission and tracking of personnel actions and reports. Finally, the ITAPDB will empower commanders and soldiers by providing them with real-time information and allowing them access wherever the World Wide Web is available.

The ITAPDB is the cornerstone of Objective Force personnel support. It improves personnel readiness by streamlining the tactical personnel structure and putting personnel support assets in the hands of the supported commander. The Legacy Force tactical personnel structure, on the other hand, divides the personnel support workload between personnel management centers (PMC) and tactical personnel units. Personnel management centers, located at the battalion, brigade, division, and corps level, are designed to manage critical personnel systems. Tactical personnel units are designed to execute the personnel support mission across the battlefield. Together the two form an integrated network of personnel support designed to maintain personnel readiness throughout the battlefield. In contrast, the Objective Force tactical personnel support structure directs most of the workload into the personnel management centers, removing most tactical personnel units from the battlefield. The Objective Force PMC will become the mainstay of personnel support by providing the full range of personnel support functions as well as by synchronizing the personnel systems of all organizations within its area of responsibility.

Maude/Mulch. Also, SIDPERS 3.

ITAPDB will integrate the reserve components and tie into the GCS-A system.

Colonel Ruth A. Collins, Personnel Redesign: A White Paper (Draft), (Adjutant General School, Fort Jackson, SC, 7 July 2000), slides 4-6, white paper.

Lieutenant General Timothy J. Maude and Colonel Patricia Mulcahy, Executive Summary: Personnel Transformation, (Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Wash D.C., 12 October 2000). The DCSPER has recommended reinvesting $1.26B designated for the Legacy Force -SIDPERS 3 system to turn on the web-based ITAPDB within the next 2 years.


Personnel Management Centers

The Legacy Force S1 section is the PMC at battalion and brigade level that manages the personnel system, providing personnel support at the unit level. The section is divided into three elements: unit support, legal support, and personnel support. Unit support responsibilities include postal; morale, welfare, recreation (MWR); equal opportunity (EO); sponsorship; alcohol and drug abuse, prevention and control (ADAPC); line of duty (LOD) investigations; and information management support. Legal support includes reviewing transfers and discharges and UCMJ actions. The personnel support element is responsible for all battalion (Bn) and brigade (Bde) level personnel functions.\(^4\)

Except for separate brigades, AG officers generally do not fill the S1 position at battalion or brigade level. Generally Bn S1 officers are captains from the branch of the particular type unit in which they are working (i.e. Infantry officers fill infantry Bn S1 positions). The officer normally fills the Bn S1 position while waiting for assignment as a company commander. The Bde S1s, on the other hand, are generally majors with a Human Resource Functional Area designation. These officers carry a basic branch of the particular type unit in which they are working. This Legacy Force personnel support structure has proven inadequate due to insufficient resources and officer training, lack of personnel management experience, and high turnover of officers serving in the S1 position.\(^5\)

Neither Bn nor Bde S1 positions are considered critical leadership development positions for Adjutant General officer career progression or promotion.

The Objective Force personnel support structure seeks to remedy this. Future personnel doctrine returns the AG officer to the S1 position. AG captains (basic branch or detailed) will fill

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\(^4\) FM 12-6, p. 10-1. These functions include personnel accounting and strength reporting, readiness management, data base management, casualty reporting, replacements, personnel actions, evaluations, retention, promotions and reductions, awards and decorations, military pay and leaves, safety, command info activities, chaplain activities, stress management, and straggler control. (FM 12-6, pg 10-1)

Bn S1 positions, while AG majors will fill Bde S1 positions.\textsuperscript{56} These moves will ensure trained personnel officers with sufficient experience will occupy the critical S1 positions. As these officers will not be in waiting for command, they will be able to remain in their positions for extended periods providing stability and institutional knowledge. In the Objective Force, the Bn and Bde S1 positions will be considered key leader development positions for AG officer career progression and promotion.

The Legacy Force division G1 section manages the personnel support system at the division level. The G1 section is divided into the personnel operations branch and the personnel readiness management branch. The personnel operations branch is responsible for casualty management, postal operations, MWR, and essential personnel services. The personnel readiness management branch oversees personnel accounting and strength reporting as well as a replacement section. Together the two branches make up the division personnel management center whose mission is to ensure all personnel support is synchronized and executed at the division level.\textsuperscript{57} The G1, normally a senior AG lieutenant colonel, is the senior personnel officer in the division. A combination of AG and Human Resource officers fill other officer positions in the division G1 section. Normally officers assigned to the G1 section remain in position for two years providing stability and institutional knowledge. Division G1 responsibilities will increase in the Objective Force, but the organization will remain unchanged. The Legacy Force division G1, deputy G1, and personnel management officer positions are not considered critical leader development positions for AG officer career progression or promotion. In the Objective Force division, these positions will be considered critical leader development positions for AG officer career progression and promotion.

Responsibility for Legacy Force corps personnel support is divided between the corps G1 and the corps AG who also acts as the corps personnel group commander. The corps G1 integrates all

personnel support activities within the corps and establishes corps unique personnel policies. The corps AG directs the personnel system and synchronizes the personnel network through the workings of the corps personnel management center. As the personnel group commander, the corps AG has direct control over personnel units responsible for providing personnel support to the corps. The AG and the G1 together are responsible for ensuring all personnel activities support the corps commander’s intent.\(^{58}\) The corps G1 is normally a Human Resource colonel with limited experience and little formal personnel training. Both AG and Human Resource officers man the remainder of the officer positions within the corps G1 section. Typically these officers remain in position for at least two years providing stability, but the latter are often serving in a personnel position for the first time, thus they bring very limited experience to the position. The corps AG, on the other hand, is an AG colonel with vast experience and considerable formal personnel training. Additionally, all officers serving on the AG staff are AG officers with broad experience and formal personnel training. As such, the influence of the corps AG is traditionally greater than that of the corps G1. This arbitrary separation of responsibilities between the corps G1 and AG often creates a disjointed personnel network that does not provide efficient support to soldiers and commanders. The primary change for the G1 office in the Objective Force will be the addition of the AG responsibilities along with the required staff, which includes the corps personnel management center (CPMC) described below. Positions within the Legacy Force corps G1 are not considered critical leader development positions for AG officer career progression or promotion. Conversely, positions within the Objective Force corps G1/AG will be considered some of the most prestigious and critical branch qualifying and leader development positions necessary for AG career progression and promotion.

\(^{57}\) FM 101-5, 1993 and FM 12-6, 1994
\(^{58}\) FM 101-5, 1993 and FM 12-6.
Tactical Personnel Units

The personnel group (PG) sustains Legacy Force corps personnel readiness by managing and synchronizing the tactical personnel network. It exercises command and control over assigned personnel units and provides the personnel required to operate the CPMC. A flexible headquarters organization, the personnel group adapts to mission requirements by varying the number and type of personnel units assigned. Assigned units include personnel services battalions, replacement companies, and the corps band.\(^{59}\) The CPMC operates the corps personnel information and actions systems and manages the corps personnel data-base under the direction of the corps AG, who is also the personnel group commander.\(^{60}\) The personnel group commander is an AG colonel with the same authority as other major subordinate commanders in the corps. AG officers fill all staff positions in the personnel group except the S4 position, which is normally filled by a quartermaster officer. The commander, deputy commander, deputy AG, and S3 positions are all considered critical AG leader development positions for career progression and promotion in the Legacy Force.

This will change dramatically in the Objective Force. The personnel group will not exist in the Objective Force. The Corps G1/AG will assume responsibility for all personnel group technical functions. All command functions will cease. Personnel related positions in the Legacy Force personnel group will move to the Corps G1/AG office or to unit S1s. Excess positions will return to the Army for use elsewhere. Objective Force AG leader development will not emphasize personnel type unit command and staff positions for career progression and promotion. Rather, the corps G1/AG, deputy AG, and deputy G1 positions will increase in importance in the Objective Force becoming critical branch qualifying and leader development positions required for career progression and promotion.\(^{61}\)

\(^{59}\) This monograph will not address the band as it has no bearing on AG aligning with the FA 90

\(^{60}\) FM 12-6, chapter.

The Legacy Force personnel services battalion (PSB) provides the direct support aspect of personnel information and casualty management and provides essential personnel services to soldiers and commanders. The PSB is a modular headquarters that commands and controls personnel detachments and postal companies and exercises operational control over attached or collocated replacement companies. The PSB is responsible for data-base management, personnel accounting and strength reporting, casualty operations, personnel information management, and essential personnel services. The PSB is commanded by an AG lieutenant colonel who also serves as a personnel officer. In that capacity, the PSB commander is responsible for synchronizing the personnel network between and among units within the PSB AOR and for coordinating with the supported command’s G1 or S1. AG officers fill all command and staff positions within the PSB. The commander, executive officer, and S3 positions are all considered critical AG leader development positions for career progression and promotion in the Legacy Force.62

Objective Force personnel doctrine changes dramatically. The PSB will not exist in the Objective Force. The Division G1/AG and unit S1s will assume responsibility for all PSB technical functions. All PSB command functions will cease. Personnel related positions in the Legacy Force PSB will move to the Division G1/AG office or to unit S1s. Excess positions will return to the Army for use elsewhere. Objective Force AG leader development will not emphasize personnel type unit command and staff positions for career progression and promotion. The division G1 and deputy G1 positions will replace the PSB command and staff positions as critical branch qualifying and leader development positions essential for promotion and career progression.63

The Legacy Force personnel detachment (PD) executes the direct support personnel mission. It provides essential personnel services, casualty management, and personnel information.

62 FM 12-6.
management to soldiers and commanders. A modular organization, it can support up to 6000 soldiers. If necessary, it can form three cohesive support teams that are able to provide personnel support apart from the detachment headquarters as long as the supported unit provides life support to the team. Each team is capable of supporting up to 2000 soldiers. The AG captain who commands the PD also serves as a personnel officer. In that role, the PD commander synchronizes critical personnel support and information between units. The PD commander is the only commissioned officer in the detachment. Command of the PSD is considered a critical AG leader development position for career progression and promotion in the Legacy Force, but not so in the Objective Force. The PSD does not exist in the Objective Force. The Division G1/AG and unit S1s will assume responsibility for all PSD technical functions. All PSD command functions will cease. Personnel related positions in the Legacy Force PSD will move to the Division G1/AG office or to unit S1s. Excess positions will return to the Army for use elsewhere. Objective Force AG leader development will not emphasize the PSD command position for career progression and promotion. Rather, AG captains will seek Bn or Bde S1 positions as well as positions within the corps and division G1 offices.

The Legacy Force postal company is a modular organization that provides command and control of postal platoons tailored to provide area postal service support on the battlefield. Postal platoons provide basic mail processing capabilities ensuring the timely receipt and delivery of soldiers’ mail. There are two types of postal platoons: operations and services. Operations platoons handle mail in bulk. Services platoons provide customer service on the battlefield in a manner similar to a civilian post office. Postal platoons are reliant on external transportation assets to deliver mail to unit support areas. The military postal system is an essential part of the CSS distribution network delivering official mail as well as repair parts and medical supplies. AG officers fill all officer positions in the postal company. Command of the postal company is considered a key leader development and branch qualifying position for AG captains in the Legacy Force. Except for a projected reduction in the volume of mail due to technological
advances, current projections are that the postal company will remain unchanged in the Objective Force. If so, command of the postal company will remain a key leadership development position in the Objective Force, but it will not be critical for career progression and promotion like command positions are in the Legacy Force.

The Legacy Force replacement company is the basic replacement-processing unit in the corps. It sometimes operates as part of the personnel group in a direct support role, but often it collocates with a PSB for ready access to the personnel database. A DS replacement company can feed and house up to 400 soldiers per day. Its design allows it to operate long distances from its parent unit. However, the replacement company has little internal support capability. It requires external assets to equip and deliver replacements. Additionally, replacement companies must coordinate externally for medical, DS maintenance, and communication support. As such, the replacement company is best collocated with COSCOM units that can provide this type of support. AG officers fill the two commissioned officer positions (commander and executive officer) in the replacement company. Command of the replacement company is considered a key leader development and branch qualifying position for AG captains in the Legacy Force. The replacement company will remain unchanged in the Objective Force according to current emerging doctrine.


Although, there is a discussion that its functions may be divided between management and support. Management includes deciding replacement status, assignments, and unit requirements; activities that could be accomplished at the PMC. Support includes the actual care and movement of the replacements; activities that are more in line with logistics functions than personnel functions. As such, a logistics officer may better command the replacement company. See Collins, Personnel Redesign: A White Paper, 11-12.
in the Objective Force, but it will not be critical for AG officer career progression and promotion like command positions are in the Legacy Force.\textsuperscript{67}

Section 4: Logistics Support Doctrine, Organization, and Leader Development

Officers from the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field are primarily responsible for managing and providing the logistics support functions of CSS. FM 63-3, \textit{Corps Support Command}, is the keystone doctrinal manual for providing logistics support to Legacy Force operational and tactical units.\textsuperscript{68} The manual details how integrating the logistics functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, field services and medical service supports the CSS systems of arming, fixing, fueling, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems (less personnel services). Arming is a munitions supply and distribution system that ensures the right type and quantity of ammunition, mines, and explosives are at the decisive time and place as designated by the combat commander. Fixing is a maintenance system that ensures operational readiness by repairing and returning weapon systems and equipment to the battle as soon as possible. Fueling is a petroleum supply and distribution system that ensures tactical forces have sufficient fuel to maintain movement about the battlefield. Moving is a transportation system that ensures the rapid movement of troops and equipment throughout the battlefield. Finally, sustaining the soldier is a system that provides soldiers with rations, water, clothing, individual equipment, protective gear, and shelter. Additionally, sustaining includes providing construction, barrier, and fortification materials to provide protection and increase survivability. All of these systems rely on multifunctional logisticians to synchronization them within the tactical logistics structure. Objective Force logistics support includes primarily the same activities.\textsuperscript{69} The primary difference

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Field Manual 63-3, \textit{Corps Support Command}, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash D.C., 30 September 1993). There is no Army doctrinal manual for logistics per se. FM 700-80, Logistics, provided strategic guidance, but was rescinded July 2000. However, FM 63-3, \textit{Corps Support Command}, does provide broad procedural guidelines for corps logistics support. The corps being the highest unit assigned tactical mission, it can be subsumed that this is the Army’s governing manual for tactical logistics.
\textsuperscript{69} Although explosive ordnance disposal is considered a distinct logistics function in FM 4.0, it is actually not new. It was an ordnance activity in the Legacy Force.
between the current and future doctrine lays not in what logistics support is provided, but more in how it is provided.\textsuperscript{70}

The tactical logistics structure divides the logistics support workload between logistics management centers and tactical logistics units. Logistics management centers, located at the battalion, brigade, division, and corps level, manage critical logistics systems. Tactical logistics units execute the logistics support mission across the battlefield. Together the two form an integrated network of logistics support that ensures logistics readiness throughout the battlefield.

Logistics Management Centers

The S4 section is the logistics control center at battalion and brigade level. The S4 section coordinates and executes logistics support at the unit level. The section is divided into three sections: supply, transportation, and field services. Additionally, the support platoon leader works for the S4. The supply section coordinates the requisition, receipt, and delivery of supply classes II, IV, VII, and IX. The support platoon does the same for classes I, III, and V.\textsuperscript{71} The transportation section coordinates all unit transportation requirements. The field services section coordinates and directs unit field service activities. The S4 is normally a quartermaster captain at the Bn and major at Bde. The support platoon leader and any other commissioned officers in the S4 section are from the branch of the particular type unit in which they are working. The Objective Force S4 section does not change except that the support platoon leader will not work directly for the S4. Rather, the support platoon leader will work for the forward support company described below. The Bn and Bde S4 positions are important leader development positions in the Legacy Force structure for career progression and promotion and will remain so in the Objective Force. Additionally, the support platoon position will become important for logistics officers in the Objective Force.

\textsuperscript{70} (1) Field Manual 63-4, \textit{Theater Support Command (Final Draft)}, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash D.C., 1 July 1999. (2) Field Manual 4-0/FM 100-10, \textit{Combat Service Support (Coordinating Draft)}, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash D.C., 18 November 2000).

\textsuperscript{71} Classes of supply are: I – rations; II – clothing and individual equipment; III – petroleum; IV – construction material; V – ammunition; VI – personal demand items; VII – major end items; VIII – medical materiel; IX – repair parts; and X
The division and corps G4 offices are, by and large, mirror organizations operating at different echelons. Both manage the logistics support system at their level. They plan, coordinate, direct, and synchronize the arm, fuel, fix, and move operations of the division and corps logistics support network. The G4 office normally divides functionally into the operations and plans section, petroleum section, ammunition section, support and services section, and the transportation or movement office. The division G4 works closely with the Division Support Command (DISCOM) while the corps G4 works closely with the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) to ensure the logistics management control centers at both levels operate in harmony with the commander’s intent. The G4 principles at both the division and corps are multifunctional logisticians. Within the G4 office at the division, the plans officer is a multifunctional logistician major, while the other section chiefs are logistics branch specific captains or majors functionally aligned with their duty positions (e.g., the division transportation officer is a transportation officer). Within the G4 office at the corps, the section chiefs are multifunctional lieutenant colonels except for the transportation officer who is a transportation branch lieutenant colonel who may or may not carry a multifunctional logistician designation. Subordinate to the section chiefs are logistic branch specific captains and majors functionally aligned with their duty positions except for one multifunctional major who works in the plans section. All positions within the Legacy Force corps and division G4 offices are important for leader development, but they are not as critical for promotion and career as are unit command and executive officer or S3 positions. Neither the corps nor division G4 office structures or roles change significantly in the Objective Force. The importance of the corps and division G4 positions for multifunctional logistician leader development, career progression, and promotion opportunities will remain the same in the Objective Force as it is in the Legacy Force.
Tactical Logistics Units

The Legacy Force corps support command (COSCOM) sustains corps logistics readiness by managing and synchronizing the tactical logistics network. It exercises command and control over assigned logistics units and provides the personnel required to operate the corps logistics management control centers. A flexible headquarters organization, the COSCOM adapts to mission requirements by varying the number and type of logistics units assigned. Assigned units can include forward and rear corps support groups, a medical brigade, and a transportation group. The COSCOM operates two functional logistics management control centers – the corps materiel management center (CMMC) and the corps movement control center (CMCC). Under the staff supervision of the COSCOM support operations officer (SPO), the centers carry out COSCOM policies and directives by appropriately tasking and regulating subordinate COSCOM units. The CMMC is responsible for providing centralized stock, commodity, and maintenance management and control. The CMCC is responsible for providing centralized highway regulation and movement control of all personnel and materiel in the corps area of responsibility. The idea behind the two control centers is centralized control and decentralized execution.

The COSCOM structure is slightly altered in the Objective Force. In it everything remains the same except that the CMMC and CMCO are consolidated into a corps distribution management center (CDMC). This new structure does not alter the idea of centralized control and decentralized execution. Nor does it alter the command structure. A logistics general officer commands the COSCOM in the Legacy Force and continues to do so in the Objective Force. In the Legacy Force the SPO and chiefs of both control centers are multifunctional logisticians. These positions will be consolidated in the Objective Force. The Legacy Force centers have branch specific and multifunctional logistician coded positions throughout each, providing general knowledge and specific expertise. These positions will remain when the centers are

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72 This monograph will not address the medical or transportation brigades, in that they have no bearing on multifunctional alignment of AG officers due to their functional missions.
consolidated. The positions of COSCOM commander; SPO, Chief, CMMC; and Chief, CMCC are highly sought Legacy Force leader development positions which greatly broaden a multifunctional logistician’s experience base as well as provide excellent career progression and promotion opportunities. These positions will remain important in the Objective Force. However, in the Objective Force, the position of chief, CDMC will supplant the CMMC and CMCO chief positions as critical for leader development and career progression.

Corps support groups (CSG) come in two types – forward and rear. Both command and control from four to seven corps support battalions (CSB) that provide area support to units in or passing through their AOR. The forward CSG provides primary logistics support (less medical) to nondondivision forces operating in the division AOR and reinforcing support to the division. The forward CSG task organizes multifunctional CSBs with functional companies tailored to the requirements of the units they are supporting. One CSB provides only direct support (DS) support in the division area, while the remainders provide both DS and general support (GS) to units employed behind the division sector. The rear CSG contains one or more multifunctional CSBs and several functional support battalions. The multifunctional CSB provides DS support on an area support basis to units in or passing through its AOR. Additionally, the CSB acts as the logistics nucleus during regeneration operations for supported units. The functional battalions provide corps-wide logistics support to divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments (ACR) as well as reinforcing support to the forward CSGs. Multifunctional logisticians fill both the commander and support operations officer positions in the forward and rear CSGs as well as the CSBs. Other staff positions throughout the CSGs and CSBs carry functional and multifunctional codes. The functional battalion commanders and all the company commanders in the COSCOM are branch specific officers functionally aligned with their duty.

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74 The rear CSG has at least one CSB and could also have the following functional battalions (mission dependent): service and supply, ammunition, petroleum, transportation, aircraft maintenance, water, and base support.
positions. The positions of CSG commander, either type support battalion commander, CSG deputy commander, support battalion executive officer, and support operations officer of either the CSG or support battalions are highly sought positions which greatly broaden a multifunctional logistician’s experience base as well as provide excellent leader development, career progression and promotion opportunities. The functional company command positions are critical Legacy Force branch qualifying and leader development positions. These positions will remain as important in the Objective Force as they are in the Legacy Force.

The Legacy Force Division Support Command (DISCOM) sustains corps logistics readiness by managing and synchronizing the division logistics network. It exercises command and control over assigned logistics units and provides the personnel required to operate the division logistics management control centers. A fixed headquarters organization, the DISCOM provides logistics support to the division through three types of units – an aviation support battalion, a main support battalion, and several forward support battalions. The DISCOM operates three functional logistics control centers – the division materiel management center (DMMC), the division movement control office (MCO) and the division medical operations center (DMOC). The centers, under the staff supervision of the DISCOM support operations officer (SPO), carry out DISCOM policies and directives by appropriately tasking and regulating subordinate DISCOM units. The DMMC is responsible for supply management (less class VIII), ASL and PLL oversight, property book maintenance, equipment status reporting, material readiness, and maintenance management programs. The MCO is responsible for managing movement throughout the division AOR. The DMOC is responsible for planning, synchronizing, and monitoring the division combat health services requirements and capabilities. Like the corps logistics control centers, the idea behind the division control centers is centralized control and decentralized execution.

75 Field Manual 63-2, Division Support Command, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash D.C., 20 May 1991). FM 63-2. One FSB per maneuver brigade assigned to the division. Because of its specialization, the Avn Spt Bn
The DISCOM structure is slightly altered in the Objective Force. In it, the DMMC and DMCO are consolidated into a division distribution management center (DDMC). This new structure does not alter the idea of centralized control and decentralized execution. A multifunctional logistician colonel commands the DISCOM. The SPO, and chiefs of the DMMC and MCO are multifunctional logistician majors. The chief of the DMOC is a health services officer who may or may not have a multifunctional logistician designation. The positions of DISCOM commander; SPO; chief, DMMC; and chief, MCO are highly sought leader development positions which greatly broaden a multifunctional logistician’s experience base as well as provide excellent career progression and promotion opportunities. The command position will remain an important leader development and branch qualifying position in the Objective Force. However, the position of chief, DDMC will supplant the DMMC and MCO chief positions as critical for leader development, career progression, and promotion.

Legacy Force division support battalions come in two types – forward and main. Both command and control functional logistics companies that provide support to division units in their AOR. The forward support battalion (FSB) provides DS logistics support to habitually related brigade and division units operating in the brigade’s AORs. It provides support through functional supply, maintenance, and medical companies. In the Objective Force the FSB replaces its functional logistics companies with multifunctional forward support companies (FSC). Additionally, all logistics assets from the maneuver unit, except the S4, are consolidated under the FSB. The FSB takes on the responsibility of providing the entire spectrum of logistics support to the maneuver unit.

The other type of Legacy Force division support battalion, the main support battalion (MSB), provides logistics support to units in the division rear and reinforcing logistics support to the FSBs. It provides support through its assigned supply and services, transportation motor transport, electronic maintenance, heavy maintenance, and medical companies. A division

has no bearing on aligning AG officers with Multifunctional Logisticians, thus will not be discussed.
support battalion (DSB) replaces the MSB in the Objective Force. The DSB mission remains the same except for the type of reinforcement it provides to the FSB. In the Objective Force, the DSB will only provide Class III bulk reinforcement to the FSB.

Multifunctional logistician lieutenant colonels command both the main and forward support battalions. The support operations officers of both units are also multifunctional logisticians. Other staff positions throughout the battalions carry functional and multifunctional codes. All the company commanders in the DISCOM are branch specific officers functionally aligned with their duty positions. The positions of FSB or MSB commander, executive officer, and support operations officer are highly sought leader development positions which greatly broaden a multifunctional logistician’s experience base as well as provide excellent career progression and promotion opportunities. These positions will remain as important in the Objective Force as they are in the Legacy Force.

The Forward Support Company (FSC) is the most significant change to tactical logistics support in the Objective Force. The FSC does not exist in the Legacy Force structure. In the Objective Force it replaces the three FSB functional companies, absorbing a portion of each. As such, it moves multifunctional logistics capabilities one echelon lower, from the battalion to the company level. Additionally, the FSC consolidates all logistics assets formerly controlled by the maneuver commander, taking on the responsibility for the entire spectrum of logistics support at the battalion level. As such, the maintenance officer and support platoon leader are under the command and control of the FSC commander. The FSB has one FSC assigned for each maneuver battalion supported. The FSC has a headquarters platoon, a DS maintenance platoon, a services and supply platoon, and a medical platoon capable of providing level I and II support. The functional platoons will provide critical leader development and career progression for basic
branch lieutenants. Command of the FSC will prove one of the most important leader development and career progression commands for multifunctional logistics captains.\textsuperscript{76}

Section 5: Conclusion

Legacy Force CSS doctrine bears witness as to why AG officers are not aligned with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field. The division of CSS labor between logistics and personnel functions is not one of arbitrary convenience. Clearly, this division suggests distinct roles and responsibilities that indicate AG officers are not logisticians. The basic distinction lies in the fact that multifunctional logisticians deal primarily with inanimate objects and indirect support of soldiers, while AG officers deal with the direct support of soldiers and their personal concerns. Additionally, logistics functions, although intricate, are measurable and predictable requiring management by officers schooled in such matters as the use of movement tables, ammunition consumption rates, and equipment repair requirements. Personnel functions, conversely, are susceptible to complex unpredictable human factors requiring management by officers schooled in such matters as understanding ill-defined and tough-to-solve soldier problems and balancing these human factors with mission requirements.

Legacy Force CSS organization, leader development, and training underscore the different roles and responsibilities of the two career fields. Although management centers and tactical units administer both Legacy Force logistics and personnel support, the similarities end there. Personnel management centers and tactical units are single function organizations that focus only on personnel support. Leadership development and career progression for Adjutant General officers focuses on becoming technical experts within only the personnel support field in order to staff and command these single function organizations. Logistics management centers and tactical units, conversely, are functional and multifunctional organizations that provide support across a broad spectrum of logistics functions. Leadership development and career progression

\textsuperscript{76} Field Manual 63-4, \textit{Theater Support Command (Final Draft)}, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash D.C., I July 1999).
for multifunctional logisticians does not encourage functional specialization, rather after
go graduation from the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, a multifunctional career path is
the only one available to transportation, ordnance, and quartermaster officers.

Objective Force CSS doctrine, organization, and leader development exacerbate the
dichotomy between logistics and personnel support, further discouraging alignment of AG
officers with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field. Although the roles and responsibilities
of the AG officer remain the same as in the Legacy Force, the organization and means of
providing personnel support in the Objective Force is radically different. Most significantly, the
personnel group, personnel battalion, and the personnel detachments will disappear from the
battlefield. Only replacement companies, postal companies, and bands will remain. The corps
AG function, currently with the personnel group commander will return to the corps G1 along
with the personnel designated to carry out the AG mission. The functions and responsibilities of
the corps and division G1/AG will not change significantly. The S1/G1/AG will become the
mainstay for providing human resource (personnel) support on the battlefield. The disbanding of
tactical personnel units and the increase in importance of the personnel technical staff
underscores the need to develop and train leaders as functional experts in personnel matters rather
than trying to broaden their scope as multifunctional logisticians.

Objective Force CSS logistics support, on the other hand, makes multifunctionality the
centerpiece of logistics support in two important ways. First, the Objective Force logistics
structure combines the corps and division materiel management centers and movement centers
into a single organization at each level. These new multifunctional Distribution Management
Centers become the focal point for coordinating logistics at each level. Secondly, and more
significantly, the Forward Support Companies move multifunctional support down one echelon
from the Legacy Force multifunctional logistics battalions. As such, transportation, ordnance,
and quartermaster officers must become competent in multifunctional logistics earlier in their
The formation of the Forward Support Company and the combining of logistics management centers into single centers underscore the need to develop and train leaders as multifunctional experts across the full spectrum of supply, maintenance, and movement activities without the additional encumbrance of learning the complexities and nuances of personnel support.

The final analysis suggests that neither Legacy Force nor Objective Force CSS doctrine, organization, nor leader development are conducive to aligning AG officers with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field. There are no indications that alignment would improve support to the Army. Rather, alignment would hinder efficiency by diluting the technical expertise of personnel specialists who are organized and trained to manage the complexities and nuances associated with soldiers and their personal concerns. This is true in the Legacy Force and even more so in the Objective Force as tactical personnel units leave the battle space and are replaced by highly functional personnel centers requiring management by leaders with greater technical expertise. On the other hand, broadening the responsibilities of multifunctional logisticians would detract from their ability to manage the already numerous and intricate logistics systems and procedures for which they are trained and organized. This assessment is true in the Legacy Force and even more so in the Objective Force as multifunctionality moves to the company level and logistics officers are required to become competent multifunctional logisticians earlier in their career.

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CHAPTER FOUR
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

The focus of this monograph is on whether or not the AG Corps officer should align with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field. Determining the answer requires evaluation of the proposal using criteria focused on improving support to the Objective Force. The criteria for evaluating if improvement is likely are described below.

Section 1: Criteria

I. Commonality: This criterion asks if AG officers are logisticians. It qualitatively compares and contrasts the roles and responsibilities of each to determine if the two career fields have redundant systems and common functions. If there is a large measure of redundancy and commonality, then alignment would improve the proposed Objective Force CSS structure. If the two career fields are not redundant nor common, then alignment would not improve the proposed structure.

II. Supportability: This criterion asks if the proposed Objective Force CSS tactical unit structure is designed to accommodate alignment of the two career fields. It is a qualitative assessment of whether or not there would be improvement in efficiency by merging the personnel and logistics tactical support structures in the Objective Force. No or negligible improvement would not warrant alignment. Much improvement would warrant alignment.

III. Affordability: Change within the Army is resource dependent. The resource-constrained environment demands that proposed changes are zero-sum, meaning that proposed changes cannot rely on additional resources. This criterion is a quantitative comparison of resources available against resources required to align the career fields. If additional resources are needed to facilitate alignment of the two career fields, then alignment would not be desirable. If no additional resources are required, then alignment would be desirable.
IV. Equitability: The Objective Force has a small multifunctional command and control structure that must continue to provide equal opportunities for all officers to serve in branch qualifying jobs. This criterion is a quantitative measurement of potential branch qualifying jobs available to each branch aligned with the Multifunctional Career Field. If the alignment of the two career fields provides an equal number of branch qualifying jobs to all multifunctional branches, then alignment is desirable. If not, then alignment is not desirable.

Section 2: Evaluation

I. Commonality: Are AG officers logisticians? Is there sufficient commonality and redundancy between the functions and systems of the Adjutant General Corps and the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field to warrant aligning the two? Although historically personnel functions often assumed a subordinate role in doctrinal language, practical divisions of labor have kept personnel and logistics separate. Although Legacy Force logistics subsume CSS, personnel functions and systems remain separate. The separation is not one of simple convenience. Rather, multifunctional logisticians deal in the intricate, yet predictable realm of inanimate objects where AG officers work in the complex, unpredictable dimension of human affairs. This does not change in the Objective Force. Other than the requirement for transportation to deliver mail and replacements, both Legacy and Objective Force logistics and personnel communities do not have sufficient redundant systems or common functions to consider AG officers as logisticians. As such, it is not desirable to align the Adjutant General Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field.

II. Supportability: Is the CSS tactical unit structure designed to accommodate alignment of the Adjutant General Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field? Although the design of the Legacy Force personnel structure closely reflects the design of the logistics structure in that both use management control centers and tactical units to accomplish their missions, Legacy Force personnel units are not part of the multifunctional logistics structure and vice versa. The Objective Force personnel structure widens the chasm by removing nearly all
personnel support units from the battlefield.\textsuperscript{78} Furthermore, the different missions of Objective Force personnel and logistics management centers do not support consolidation. The logistics distribution management centers will synchronize the movement of commodities and control of logistics units on the battlefield. Personnel management centers, on the other hand, will synchronize personnel systems and provide personnel services to soldiers and commanders. The two types of centers have no common functions and consolidating them would not provide improved CSS efficiency. As such, it is not desirable to align the Adjutant General Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field.

III. Affordability: Is the alignment of the two career fields affordable? Would there be a cost or savings if the two career fields were aligned? This criterion weighs positively in favor of not aligning the AG Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field. Consolidating personnel resources in the S1 and G1 management centers allows the Adjutant General Corps to return to the Army significant numbers of personnel slots for use elsewhere to include filling the over 900 unfilled valid S1 positions in the Legacy Force.\textsuperscript{79} The possibility of saving spaces of this magnitude is unlikely if the Adjutant General Corps were aligned with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field. Even if the personnel units were removed, personnel positions would need to be created within the multifunctional structure to ensure personnel experts were on staffs and commanding units. These positions would be diverted from savings projected in the proposed Objective Force personnel structure.\textsuperscript{80} As such, it is not desirable to align the Adjutant General Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field.

IV. Equitability: Would equitable numbers of branch qualifying jobs be available to both career fields if they were aligned? This criterion weighs positively in favor of not aligning the

\textsuperscript{78} Collins white paper: Postal and replacement companies may or may not will remain on the battlefield, and AG officers may or may not command them. See Chapter Three for discussion on these units.
\textsuperscript{79} Proffitt, slide 3.
\textsuperscript{80} Precise savings and/or costs are unavailable due to the recency of the personnel redesign proposals. Estimates are 5500 space savings if sixteen Personnel Services Battalions, four Personnel Groups, and two Theater PERSCOMs are removed from the inventory. Adequately manning the division and corps G1 sections would require about 600 spaces. More precise numbers will become available after the Personnel Leaders Conference scheduled for April 2001.
AG Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field. Alignment of the two branches does not ensure that branch qualifying jobs will be equally available to each branch aligned with the Multifunctional Career Field. Because there are no personnel units in the multifunctional structure, AG officers would not likely receive consideration for command of multifunctional battalions or groups, COSCOMs or DISCOMs, or staff positions in any of the units. AG officers would fill S1/G1 positions, which would give them excellent personnel experience, but it would not make them competitive for promotion against other multifunctional logisticians. In the Objective Force, command is still critical for promotion for multifunctional logisticians. As such, it is not desirable to align the Adjutant General Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field.

Section 3: Conclusion

This survey illustrates that aligning the Adjutant General Officer Corps with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field is not desirable for four reasons. First and foremost, AG officers should not align with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field simply because they are not logisticians. The basic difference rests in the fundamental responsibility unique to each branch. Multifunctional logisticians have stewardship of the Army’s materiel commodities, while AG officers have stewardship of the Army’s soldiers. The fact that AG officers are not logisticians is the fundamental reason why they were never included in the multifunctional career field from its inception. Second, the CSS structure does not support alignment. The Objective Force logistics structure is command and control heavy, whereas the personnel structure is embedded in the maneuver unit and has no unit structure of its own. Aligning the two career fields would provide no efficiency to either the logistics or personnel structure on the battlefield. Third, aligning the career fields is not cost effective. Alignment would require either moving personnel positions from the maneuver units to the multifunctional support units or creating new positions for the personnel officers in the multifunctional units. Neither option is acceptable

Several working-groups are scheduled to analyze the cost/savings of the personnel redesign proposal.
when the proposed Objective Force personnel redesign looks to not only fill the current 900-plus vacancy in the Legacy Force S1s, but to return additional positions to the Army for use elsewhere. Finally, alignment of the two career fields would not provide equitable career progression for AG officers. The Objective Force logistics structure provides multifunctional logisticians with command opportunities, while the Objective Force personnel structure provides only staff positions. This would put multifunctional logistician AG officers at a severe disadvantage when competing for promotion in that successful command will remain the single most important determinate of future potential in the development of Objective Force multifunctional logisticians. Clearly the Adjutant General Officer Corps has relevance in the Objective Force as members of the maneuver commander’s staff, not aligned with the Multifunctional Logistician Career Field based on a misplaced paradigm that all support functions are logistics.
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