**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation: Threat and Response</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</th>
<th>5e. TASK NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</th>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wieselthier, Jeffrey E. ;</td>
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<td>Nguyen, Gam D ;</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Ephremides, Anthony ;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS</th>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington , DC 20050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS</th>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington , DC 20050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PUBLIC RELEASE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                                               | Office of the Secretary of Defense     |
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14. ABSTRACT
At the dawn of the 21st Century, the United States now faces what could be called a Superpower Paradox. Our unrivaled supermacy in the conventional military arena is prompting adversaries to seek unconventional, asymmetric means to strike what they perceive as our Achilles heel.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
proliferation, threat, response
Message of the Secretary of Defense

At the dawn of the 21st Century, the United States now faces what could be called a Superpower Paradox. Our unrivaled supremacy in the conventional military arena is prompting adversaries to seek unconventional, asymmetric means to strike what they perceive as our Achilles heel.

At least 25 countries now possess—or are in the process of acquiring and developing—capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction: nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons or the means to deliver them. For example:

- North Korea is building and selling long-range missiles, has chemical and biological warfare capabilities, and may have diverted fissile material for nuclear weaponry.

- Iran, with foreign assistance, is buying and developing longer-range missiles, already has chemical weapons, and is seeking nuclear and biological capabilities.

- Iraq—which prior to the 1991 Gulf War had developed chemical and biological weapons and associated delivery means, and was close to a nuclear capability—may have reconstituted these efforts since the departure of UN inspectors from Iraq in late 1998.

- Libya has chemical capabilities and is trying to buy long-range missiles.

Also looming on the horizon is the prospect that these terror weapons will increasingly find their way into the hands of individuals and groups of fanatical terrorists or self-proclaimed apocalyptic prophets. The followers of Usama bin Laden have, in fact, already trained with toxic chemicals.

Fears for the future are not hyperbole. Indeed, past may be prologue. Iraq has used chemical weapons against Iran and its own people. Those behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing also were gathering the ingredients for a chemical weapon that could have killed thousands here in the United States.

I have been concerned about the security threats posed by proliferation from the day I took office as Secretary of Defense. Completely halting proliferation is not possible, but stemming it is both vitally important and achievable. To that end, the Department of Defense (DoD) is playing an active role in technology transfer and export controls and in the implementation of arms control and nonproliferation regimes. DoD is participating in the on-going effort to improve transparency under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DoD is implementing inspection and monitoring requirements of several U.S. treaties. And under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, DoD is assisting the states of the Former Soviet Union in preventing the further proliferation of NBC knowledge and capabilities.
However, recognizing that proliferation has and will occur, it is also essential that we do our utmost to provide protection for our forces overseas, and indeed, to take steps to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist act using such weapons here at home. I strongly believe that preparation is itself a deterrent. That is why I directed in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review that an additional billion dollars be added over the subsequent five years to the Department of Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. Through this effort, we are making important strides in improving the preparedness of our troops to operate effectively despite the threat or use of NBC weapons by an adversary:

- Combatant commanders have adapted plans to account for the threat or use of such weapons.
- Efforts continue to further enhance the full range of theater missile defense systems.
- Significant strides have been made in developing and fielding improved chemical and biological (CB) detection and protection equipment.
- Military commanders are adapting training standards, doctrine and concepts of operations to ensure the readiness of U.S. forces to carry out their missions under chemical and biological weapons conditions.

Enhancing the capabilities of our Allies and international partners is also an integral part of this Initiative. We have a mature effort underway within the NATO Alliance, and a number of bilateral activities with specific NATO allies. We also have initiated programs with friends and allies in Asia and in the Middle East, including the Cooperative Defense Initiative with Persian Gulf states.

At the same time, as part of a federal interagency effort, the Defense Department is doing its part to assist and advise cities and communities across the nation in coping with the catastrophic consequences of an attack that unleashes these horrific weapons on U.S. soil.

This new edition of *Proliferation: Threat and Response* — the second since I became Secretary of Defense — updates information about the nature of the proliferation problem and describes the policies and programs the Defense Department is carrying out to counter this growing threat to American citizens, armed forces, and allies. The race is on between our preparations and those of our adversaries. There is not a moment to lose.
# Table Of Contents

**INTRODUCTION** .................................................. 1

**SECTION I—NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES**

**NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES** ................................. 3
  - New Suppliers .................................................. 3
  - Improved Weapons ............................................ 4
  - NBC Use and Asymmetric Military Strategic ....................... 4

**EAST ASIA** ..................................................... 7
  - U.S. Goals and Interests ...................................... 7
  - Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends .......................... 8
    - North Korea .................................................. 9
    - China ........................................................ 13
  - Conclusion .................................................... 18

**SOUTH ASIA** .................................................. 21
  - U.S. Goals and Interests ...................................... 21
  - Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends .......................... 22
    - India .......................................................... 22
    - Pakistan ..................................................... 25
  - Conclusion .................................................... 30

**THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA** .................................. 33
  - U.S. Goals and Interests ...................................... 33
  - Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends .......................... 34
    - Iran .......................................................... 34
    - Iraq .......................................................... 38
    - Syria ........................................................ 42
    - Libya ........................................................ 45
    - Sudan ......................................................... 49
  - Conclusion .................................................... 49

**RUSSIA** ........................................................ 53
  - U.S. Goals and Interests ...................................... 53
  - Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends .......................... 53
  - Conclusion .................................................... 58

**TRANSNATIONAL THREATS** .......................................... 61
  - U.S. Goals and Interests ...................................... 61
  - Introduction .................................................. 61
## Contents (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of NBC Materials</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Agriculture and Livestock</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION II — DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

#### PREVENTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denial</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Office of Secretary of Defense — Critical Technology Program</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-Use Goods and Technologies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia Group</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporters (Zangger) Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD/U.S. Customs Service Counterproliferation Program</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD/Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterproliferation Program</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### PROTECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The National Security Strategy</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of and Responsibilities for Counterproliferation Missions</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within DoD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterproliferation Council</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Counterproliferation Cooperation</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ACQUISITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC)</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Development Responsive to Counterproliferation Requirements</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterror Technical Support Program</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterforce Capability Against Adversary Nuclear, Biological, and</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterproliferation Analysis Planning System (CAPS)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterproliferation Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Counterproliferation ACTDs</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Capabilities Against Hardened Targets</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Challenge of Developing Biological Weapons Detection Systems</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Countermeasures for WMD Defense</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Contents (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Preparedness Program</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Capabilities for Consequence Management</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Consequence Management</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANNEXES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A — Threat Characteristics</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear and Radiological</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Agents</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Agents</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery Means</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B — Treaty Status for Countries of Concern</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C — Biological Weapons Detection Technology</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOSSARY</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAPHICS AND TABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE REGIONAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taepo Dong 1 Launch</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential North Korean Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Chinese Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Chinese Proliferation Activity During the 1990s</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Indian Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Pakistani Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Middle East and Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iraqi Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Syrian Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Libyan Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Strategic Nuclear Warheads</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usama Bin Laden</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Livestock and Plant Pathogens Which Can Threaten</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Agricultural Productivity</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Chemical Agent Monitor</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Integrated Detection System</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Biological Agent Detector</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M93A1 NBC Reconnaissance System “Fox”</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M40A1 Protective Masks</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthrax and Other Vaccines</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark I Nerve Agent Antidote Kit</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEXES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Warfare Agents Characteristics</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Chemical Warfare Agents</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile Ranges</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonproliferation Treaty and Regime Adherence</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

In virtually every corner of the globe, the United States and its allies face a growing threat from the proliferation and possible use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery systems. In some cases, our chief concern is indigenous weapons development programs, in others it is transfer of hardware or know-how across international borders. Broadly, however, we have become increasingly concerned in recent years that NBC weapons, delivery systems, and technology may all be “for sale” to the highest bidder. In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s extensive NBC weapons program threatens Japan, South Korea, and U.S. forces and interests in the region. In North Africa and the Middle East, states of proliferation concern — Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq — remain poised to develop and use all means at their disposal to threaten U.S. and allied interests in the region and beyond.

U.S. conventional military superiority paradoxically creates an incentive for adversary states to acquire NBC weapons. Because our potential adversaries know that they cannot win a conventional war against us, they are more likely to try asymmetric methods such as employing biological or chemical weapons or threatening the use of nuclear weapons. This strategy also applies to particular terrorist groups intent on inflicting a large number of casualties or causing panic, if such groups judge that conventional means are inadequate and they do not fear political or military retaliation.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most recent strategic-level defense review, published in May 1997, concluded that the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons is a likely condition of future warfare and could occur in the very early stages of war to disrupt U.S. military operations and deployments of men and supplies into theater.

The QDR also observed that DoD had made substantial progress in preparing to deal with an adversary’s use of NBC weapons. Nevertheless, it underscored two key challenges that DoD must meet to ensure future preparedness. The first challenge is to institutionalize counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every facet of military activity planning, equipment, concepts, and training to ensure our forces can prevail against NBC-—armed adversaries. The second is to internationalize our efforts to encourage allies and coalition partners to likewise train, equip, and prepare their forces to operate under chemical or biological weapons (CBW) conditions.

The publication serves as a multi-faceted tool for decision-making by providing background on the threat and U.S. progress toward countering that threat. The first section of this report details the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems and the threat they pose to U.S. and allied forces and U.S. interest abroad. The second section of the report describes the DoD coordinated, comprehensive strategy to combat the international threats posed by the proliferation and possible use of NBC weapons and their delivery systems.
Section I

NBC Proliferation Challenges
SECTION I — NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Threats from the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and missiles come from states and non-state groups, such as terrorists. Key states of proliferation concern are continuing to try to acquire and develop these dangerous weapons, while some terrorist groups are showing increasing interest in them. The growing availability of NBC- and missile-related technologies and expertise and the sophistication of some of these technologies also highlight the threat. In addition, NBC weapons increasingly are viewed as asymmetric means to counter the West’s superior conventional military capabilities.

Russia and China are capable of directly threatening the continental United States and both continue strategic modernization programs. Moreover, U.S. forces and interests are threatened by states of proliferation concern, because of ongoing NBC weapons and missile acquisition and their development efforts. For example, the U.S. government is concerned that North Korea may have enough plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon. In addition, about a dozen states, including several hostile to the West, are actively pursuing offensive biological and chemical warfare capabilities. Lastly, while the number of states with ballistic missiles has declined with the elimination of some missile programs in Eastern Europe, over 25 countries still have these missiles available.

Moreover, the relative ease of producing some chemical or biological agents has increased concern that use of chemical or biological weapons may become more attractive to terrorist groups intent on causing panic or inflicting large numbers of casualties. For example, the reported interest of Usama Bin Laden’s network in NBC materials is a key concern in terms of possible future threats to U.S. interests.

New Suppliers

In recent years, a new proliferation dynamic has developed, with the greater availability of components, technologies, expertise, and information. This availability stems from the willingness of various state suppliers, or companies within those states, to sell such materials, and a veritable information explosion from academic and commercial sources, or the Internet. It also may be fueled by weakened security at some key NBC-related facilities in the former Soviet Union (FSU), the search for employment by unemployed scientists and technicians associated with active or formerly active Soviet programs, and the transfer or sharing of technology among states trying to develop programs.

Entities in Russia and China are the main suppliers of NBC- and missile-related equipment and technologies, especially to states of proliferation concern. In the last several years, Russian entities have exported ballistic missile and nuclear technology to Iran, and Russia also remains a potential source of biological and chemical warfare expertise. China continues to be a source of missile-related technology. Lastly, North Korea is a key source for ballistic missiles and related components and materials.

The Russian government is committed to the security of nuclear weapons and weapons-useable nuclear materials, but continuing turmoil in society, corruption, and resource shortages complicate the ability of the Russian government to safeguard these materials. The combination of lax security for nuclear materials, poor economic conditions, and the growing power of organized crime in Russia mean that the potential for the theft and subsequent smuggling of these materials will continue. This concern also extends to facilities in the FSU that house chemical or biological warfare-related materials. Further, numerous scientists and technicians previously involved in key programs face severe salary reductions or loss of employment, and they could be the target of recruitment efforts by states or non-state groups trying to establish their own weapons capabilities.

Foreign assistance, particularly from Russia, China and North Korea, continues to have demonstrable effects on missile advances around the world. Moreover, some countries that have traditionally been recipients of foreign missile technology are becoming suppliers and are pursuing cooperative missile ventures.
Section I  
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Improved Weapons

There is a growing potential for the production of new and more complex chemical and biological agents, which are more challenging for defense measures and medical treatment. While most of these agents exist only in the laboratory, their continued development raises the possibility of their acquisition by states of proliferation concern.

Biological agent development is particularly troubling because virtually all the equipment, technology, and materials needed for biological warfare agent research and development and production are dual use. Thus, biological weapons applications are relatively easy to disguise within the larger body of legitimate commercial activity, as no specialized facilities are required.

Any country with the political will and a competent scientific base can produce toxins or infectious agents, which include viruses, bacteria, and rickettsiae.

Preparation and effective use of biological agents as weapons is more difficult, at least with respect to non-state actors, than popular literature may suggest. However, even the threat of use of biological agents with crude delivery systems could have significant operational repercussions for military forces. In addition, genetic engineering is one of a growing number of biotechnologies that could allow countries to develop agents, such as modified viruses, that would make detection and diagnosis difficult and that could defeat current protection and treatments.

There has been a great deal of publicity about Russian development of a new generation chemical warfare nerve agents, some of which are referred to as “Novichoks.” These agents reportedly were designed to defeat Western detection and protection measures, and their production can be hidden within commercial chemical plants. There is additional concern that the technology to produce these compounds might be acquired by other countries, amplifying the threat.

In the area of ballistic missiles, several regional states are shifting emphasis from short-range to medium-range, and in some cases longer range missiles. In addition, some of these countries may decide to deploy their newly developed missiles with only a minimum of testing, substantially reducing our warning time and accelerating missile deployment. Because of their longer range, these newer missiles may be able to threaten additional deployed U.S. and allied forces.

Moreover, cruise missiles and other unmanned aerial vehicles are well-suited for the delivery of NBC weapons because of their potential effectiveness for disseminating chemical or biological agent over a wide area. While Russia now has the ability to deliver a nuclear warhead with its long-range land attack cruise missiles, most other states of proliferation concern have only short-range cruise missiles and other unmanned vehicles that are designed for an anti-ship role. However, some of these states could attempt to modify the missiles to deliver an NBC warhead in the future. Lastly, there are other widely available potential means of delivery for these weapons, including artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Aerial sprayers also can be adapted for use with many types of helicopters, UAVs, and aircraft.

NBC Use and Asymmetric Military Strategies

Asymmetric warfare—that is, countering an adversary’s strengths by focusing on its weaknesses—is not a new concept. Because of U.S. and allied conventional force superiority, some states may see asymmetric strategies, such as the employment of biological or chemical agents, as a means of avoiding direct engagements with dominant U.S. conventional forces and a way to “level the playing field.” This strategy also applies to particular terrorist groups intent on inflicting a large number of casualties or causing panic, if such groups judge that conventional means are inadequate and they do not fear political or military retaliation.
East Asia

China

North Korea
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

EAST ASIA

U.S. Goals and Interests

The strategic significance of East Asia remains substantial. Approximately 500,000 U.S. citizens live, work, and study in the region. U.S. businesses conduct more than $500 billion in trade annually and have invested more than $150 billion throughout the region. U.S. ties to Asian allies and friends include a range of security, economic, cultural, and political interests. The recent economic and financial difficulties faced by the region reinforce the importance of long-standing U.S. alliances and security relationships to maintain stability as Asia regains its economic footing and resumes its remarkable development.

The historic June 2000 summit between the leaders of North and South Korea has the potential to decrease tensions on the Korean peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. The two leaders discussed a variety of security, economic, social, and cultural issues and agreed to reunite some families separated during the Korean War. However, despite the dramatic meeting and other recent positive trends, legacies of the Cold War remain. In addition, numerous territorial disputes continue to burden the region, including the division of the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait dispute, and contested island claims among China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea in the North Pacific. Multiple national claims to territory in the South China Sea remain a potential source of conflict that could engage many of the region’s nations. Additionally, leadership transitions facing many regimes in the region may have significant implications for regional stability.

The United States continues to seek a stable and economically prosperous region. Strong bilateral relations with friends and allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, are the foundation of U.S. efforts to encourage regional stability. Central to this goal are the approximately 100,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen present in the region who reassure U.S. allies, deter aggression, and enhance stability. A long-term U.S. objective in the region remains the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula in accordance with the wishes of the Korean people. The United States, in close coordination with the Republic of Korea, will continue to maintain forces on the peninsula to safeguard mutual security interests into the foreseeable future.

Although the October 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea over its nuclear facilities mitigated the immediate nuclear threat, Pyongyang still possesses large conventional and special operations forces, as well as militarily significant chemical weapons and the means to deliver them. Proliferation, fueled by North Korea’s broad-based NBC weapons and missile programs, poses a significant challenge to U.S. security interests, as well as to those of U.S. allies and friends. North Korea’s launch of a Taepo Dong 1 missile in August 1998, in a failed satellite launch, heightened public concerns throughout the region over the North Korean missile threat, and led to a variety of counterproliferation responses. North Korean NBC weapons and missile programs have potential to set off destabilizing arms races and heighten tension throughout the region and elsewhere.

In the event of another war on the Korean peninsula, NBC weapons would present a significant threat to U.S. forces and the security of U.S. allies. North Korea would likely try to consolidate and control strategic
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

areas of South Korea by striking quickly and attempting to destroy allied defenses before the United States could provide adequate reinforcements. Pyongyang would most likely attempt to accomplish this with its large conventional and special operations forces and its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.

It is critically important that the United States and China continue their mutual efforts to promote regional stability, and that the U.S. policy serve to encourage China’s integration as a responsible member of the international community. The United States needs to build on its past successes in encouraging China towards joining international nonproliferation regimes. The United States will remain committed to a sustained strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual interest and proceed with a variety of confidence building measures to foster cooperation and prevent misunderstanding and miscalculation. Beijing has adopted a more responsible supply policy by adhering to international nonproliferation norms like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), by ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), by reaffirming its 1994 pledge to forego exports of complete Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-class surface-to-surface missiles, and by pledging not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, including installations in both Pakistan and Iran. On 21 November 2000, China announced it would not assist, in any way, other countries to develop ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons and to improve further and reinforce its export control system.

On the other hand, China’s absence from other nonproliferation regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) indicates that there is room for improvement. It will be necessary for the United States and the international community to press Beijing to ensure that proliferation activity by Chinese entities is proscribed—especially where U.S. security interests are involved.

Counterproliferation will continue to be a strong component of the U.S. regional strategy in East Asia as long as U.S. defense commitments and U.S. forces are threatened by the spread of NBC weapons and missiles. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 added new complications not only for South Asia but also for security calculations of East Asian and Central Asian nations. The United States has found increasingly that the major nations of the region, including Japan, China, and South Korea, have sought to address the issue of proliferation not only bilaterally but through trilateral and multilateral forums to determine common approaches to this security challenge. Such mutual efforts are vital to reducing the threat of proliferation, to the benefit of international security as a whole.

Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends

In Northeast Asia, North Korea and China remain the countries of greatest concern because of their substantial and continuing efforts to improve their NBC weapons and missile forces and because of their proliferation activities. While North Korea has been struggling with severe economic problems for several years, it has maintained a high priority for its missile forces, which presents a serious challenge to the United States and its allies in the region, despite the dramatic June 2000 summit between the leaders of the two Koreas. China has strengthened its short-range missile forces in the last few years, a move designed to increase political pressure on Taiwan. Moreover, it is modernizing and expanding its longer range missile force. Additionally, China threatens even further expansion of its missile programs in response any further U.S. missile defense initiatives.

North Korean proliferation activity involving missiles and related technology has resulted in a growing threat to U.S. forces, our allies, and interests in key regions of the Middle East and Asia. North Korea depends on these sales as a source of hard currency, which Kim Jong Il has acknowledged publicly. Since the Chinese government has taken steps to control some forms of proliferation, and in November 2000 publicly committed not to assist other countries to develop ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and agreed to promulgate a missile technology export control list, we expect Chinese companies’ support to key programs of concern in these same regions to cease.
NORTH KOREA

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

Despite the June 2000 summit meeting and meetings between high level U.S. and North Korean officials on the one hand, and economic turmoil and continued food shortages on the other, we believe North Korea remains committed to maintaining strong military forces. These forces continue to be deployed close to the border with South Korea in an offensively oriented posture, and North Korea’s NBC and missile programs likely remain key components of its overall security strategy. The most likely large-scale regional war scenario over the near term, which would involve the United States, would be on the Korean peninsula. In recent years, North Korea has continued to pose a complex security challenge to the United States and its allies. Prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea is believed to have produced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. In addition, although North Korea froze the production of plutonium in 1994, there are concerns that North Korea is continuing with some elements of a nuclear weapons program. North Korea also possesses stockpiles of chemical weapons, which could be used in the event of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. Research and development into biological agents and toxins suggest North Korea may have a biological weapons capability. North Korea has hundreds of ballistic missiles available for use against targets on the peninsula, some of which are capable of reaching targets in Japan. Its missile capabilities are increasing at a steady pace, and it has progressed to producing medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). North Korea also has continued development of even longer-range missiles that would be able to threaten areas well beyond the region, including portions of the continental United States. As a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts, however, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has maintained a moratorium on launches of long-range missiles for over one year.

Lastly, North Korea’s willingness to sell its ballistic missiles and related missile technologies and, potentially, share its NBC expertise are major proliferation concerns.

North Korea’s centrally planned economic system has been crippled over the past decade and is unable to meet the most basic needs of its people, although there is limited evidence that the economic decline may have slowed. Certainly, international food aid administered through the United Nations World Food Program has played a significant role in alleviating the food crisis. North Korea likely will continue to require international food assistance for the foreseeable future. The regime continues with its decades old policy to fund its military programs, including NBC and missile forces, at the expense of its civil economy.

Nuclear Program

The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea froze nuclear weapons material production at the Yongbyon and Taechon facilities. However, the United States believes North Korea produced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon prior to the agreement. (In any event, North Korea will have to satisfy the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as to its exact plutonium holdings before key nuclear components can be delivered for the two light-water reactors that are to be provided under the Agreed Framework.)

North Korea removed spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor in 1994. Had Pyongyang reprocessed the spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor, it could have produced enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons. As part of the Agreed Framework, the IAEA has maintained a continuous presence at Yongbyon, and IAEA personnel have monitored canning of the spent fuel from the reactor. The canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments, which was carried out by a team from the United States, under the auspices of the Department of Energy (DOE), was completed in April 2000. The U.S. team maintains a presence at the site to continue maintenance activities.

In 1998, the United States became concerned about an underground construction project at Kumchang-ni, in northern North Korea. The site was believed to be large enough to house a plutonium production facility and possibly a reprocessing plant. Through successful negotiations, U.S. officials were permitted to visit the facility at Kumchang-ni in May 1999. Based on the 1999 team’s findings, it was concluded that the facility,
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Korea: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium production at Yongbyon and Taechon facilities frozen by the 1994 Agreed Framework; freeze verified by IAEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believed to have produced and diverted sufficient plutonium prior to 1992 for at least one nuclear weapon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerns remain over possible covert nuclear weapons effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the NPT; later declared it has a special status. This status is not recognized by the United States or the United Nations. Has not signed the CTBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biological</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursued biological warfare capabilities since 1960s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possesses infrastructure that can be used to produce biological warfare agents; may have biological weapons available for use.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believed to possess large stockpile of chemical precursors and chemical warfare agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably would employ chemical agents against U.S. and allied forces under certain scenarios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has not signed the CWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missiles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produces and capable of using SCUD B and SCUD C SRBMs, and No Dong MRBM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successfully launched variant of Taepo Dong 1 MRBM in failed attempt to orbit satellite. (August 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Taepo Dong 2 ICBM-range missile; agreed to flight test moratorium on long-range missiles in September 1999; reaffirmed in June 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remains capable of conducting test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a member of the MTCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Means of Delivery Available</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land- and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; none have NBC warheads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft, fighters, bombers, helicopters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground systems: artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, sprayers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as then concurrently configured, was not suited to house graphite-moderated reactors or reprocessing operations. A second visit to Kumchung-ni was conducted in May 2000, during which the team found no evidence to contradict the 1999 conclusions.

In the summer of 1999, the United States dispatched former Secretary of Defense William Perry to consult with North Korea on key U.S. security concerns such as its nuclear and missile programs. In the North Korea Policy Review, Dr. Perry concluded that the nuclear freeze instituted at Yongbyon’s facilities remained in effect, although the U.S. remains concerned about possible continuing North Korean interest in a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, there is some evidence that North Korea has tried to procure technology that could have applications in its nuclear program. North Korea has ratified the NPT. It has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Dr. Perry recommended that the U.S. should seek the complete and verifiable cessation of testing, production, and deployment of missiles exceeding the parameters of the MTCR, and the complete cessation of export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology associated with them.

**Biological Program**

North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), but nonetheless has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s. Pyongyang’s resources include a rudimentary (by Western standards) biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of infectious biological warfare agents and toxins such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. North Korea is believed to possess a munitions-production infrastructure that would allow it to
weaponize biological warfare agents and may have biological weapons available for use.

**Chemical Program**

Like its biological warfare effort, we believe North Korea has had a long-standing chemical warfare program. North Korea’s chemical warfare capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents, using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. We believe it possesses a sizeable stockpile of these agents and weapons, which it could employ should there be renewed fighting on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea is believed to be capable of weaponizing such stocks for a variety of delivery means. These would include not only ballistic missiles, but also artillery and aircraft, and possibly unconventional means. In fact, the United States believes that North Korea has some long-range artillery deployed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and ballistic missiles, some of which could deliver chemical warfare agents against forward-based U.S. and allied forces, as well as against rear-area targets.

North Korean forces are prepared to operate in a contaminated environment; they train regularly in chemical defense operations and are taught that South Korean and U.S. forces will employ chemical munitions. North Korea has not signed CWC, nor is it expected to do so in the near future.

**Ballistic Missiles**

During the last several years, North Korea has made substantial progress with its ballistic missile forces in the areas of research and development, testing, deployment, and, most worrisome, exports. Despite efforts on the part of the United States and its East Asian allies to constrain North Korean and U.S. forces will employ chemical munitions, North Korea has not signed CWC, nor is it expected to do so in the near future.

North Korea produces SCUD B and SCUD C short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) as well as the No Dong MRBM. North Korea has over 500 SCUD missiles of various types in its inventory, and enough No Dong missiles for its own use as well as for export. In any attack on the South Korea, Pyongyang could use its missiles in an attempt to isolate the peninsula from strategic reinforcement. In addition, North Korea’s No Dong missiles, with their 1,300 kilometer range, are capable of striking targets throughout the peninsula as well as in nearly all of Japan.

In August 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 system, which it characterized as a space launch vehicle (SLV) attempting to orbit a small satellite. The launch demonstrated several of the key technologies required to develop an ICBM, including stage separation. The existence of a third stage itself was an unanticipated development in the North Korean ballistic missile program. With the Taepo Dong 1, North Korea has now demonstrated the capability to reach the entire territory of South Korea and Japan, as well as large portions of China and Russia. Potentially, a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 SLV could deliver a light payload to the United States, although with very poor accuracy.

North Korea also has moved forward with the development of other longer-range missiles, which has become a matter of growing international concern. North Korea is developing the Taepo Dong 2 (ICBM), which could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska or Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States. A three stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload anywhere in the United States. North Korea is much more likely to weaponize the more capable Taepo Dong 2 than the three-stage Taepo Dong 1 as an ICBM. During 1999, there were indications that North Korea would test the Taepo Dong 2, but Pyongyang in September 1999, announced it would refrain from testing long-range missiles while high-level talks to improve bilateral relations with the U.S. are ongoing. The DPRK subsequently reaffirmed the moratorium in June 2000, and again, in writing, in the October 2000 Joint Communique issue at the conclusion of Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok’s visit to Washington.

During Secretary Albright’s historic trip to Pyongyang 23-25 October, she discussed with DPRK Chairman Kim Jong II a range of missile-related issues, including Kim’s idea of trading long-range missile restraint for launches, outside DPRK borders, of DPRK civil satellites on non-DPRK boosters. However, significant issues remain to be resolved.
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential North Korean Ballistic Missiles

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

NORTH KOREA

Current Missile
Delivery System | Range (km) | Source
--- | --- | ---
SCUD B | 300 | Domestic Production
SCUD C | 800 | Domestic Production
No Dong | 1,300 | Domestic Production

Potential Missile
Delivery System | Range (km) | Source
--- | --- | ---
Taepo Dong 1 | 2,000 | Domestic Production
Taepo Dong 2** | 5,000 - 6,000 | Domestic Production

* Since 1997, the estimated range of the No Dong has been increased to 1,300 km, based on additional information.
** With a smaller payload, the Taepo Dong 2 could reach portions of the continental U.S.

North Korea’s long-range missiles will be able to threaten Japan and areas well beyond the region.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery

North Korea has several types of short-range land-, air- and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. In the past, North Korea has produced two versions of anti-ship cruise missiles based on Soviet and Chinese designs; these have ranges of about 100 kilometers. In the future, North Korea may try to modify some of these anti-ship missiles to extend their range or acquire the technology to do so. Moreover, it may try to develop or purchase land attack cruise missiles. North Korea also has a variety of fighters, bombers, helicopters, artillery, rockets, mortars, and sprayers available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons.

Role as Supplier

During the last several years, North Korea has been a major proliferator of ballistic missiles and related technologies. The sale of No Dong missile technology to Iran has created an immediate, serious and growing capability to target U.S. forces, and our allies in the Middle East. North Korea also has provided missile technology to Pakistan. Further, these sales have had an impact on the strategic balance in the Middle East and in South Asia. In addition, these exports could lead to additional proliferation. For example, were states like Iran or Pakistan to become missile producers, they in turn could sell the missiles to other states of concern, further upsetting regional balances of power.

In the past, North Korea also has brokered deals for missile-related technologies and components produced by third parties for customers in the Middle East. Pyongyang attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology, as these exports are one of the North’s major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development and production.

CHINA

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

Beijing continues to emerge as an increasingly active player in the region. Therefore, it is focused on becoming a world-class industrialized power through a countrywide modernization effort, which includes economic, technological, and military components of national power. Beijing already wields significant international influence by virtue of its permanent membership on the United Nations (UN) Security Council and its economic influence. China’s public support for nonproliferation regimes is motivated by several factors, including a desire to enhance its image as a responsible world power and support for nonproliferation objectives.

China’s leaders have articulated that a limited but long-range nuclear capability is a key component of national strength and prestige, a capability critical to carrying out Beijing’s independent foreign policy and to supporting its international status. China is qualitatively improving its nuclear arsenal through a modernization program and, by 2015, China likely will have tens of missiles capable of reaching the United States. Moreover, despite its ratification of the BWC and the CWC, China is believed to retain some biological and chemical warfare capabilities. Beijing also has undertaken a ballistic missile modernization effort. For example, it is expanding its SRBM force, which it likely views as an important tool for military and political influence in the region. It also is improving its ICBM capability by developing two road-mobile solid-propellant ICBMs and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Overall funding for these programs will likely reflect, in part, China’s evolving perceptions of global and regional threats and its response to changing domestic economic conditions. Beijing will be challenged to maintain the high growth rates of recent years and the defense budget is likely to vary between about 3.5 percent and 5 percent of China’s total nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Thus, funding for China’s NBC and missile programs likely will increase gradually. Projecting a realistic modest growth pattern, including expected economic fluctuations, total military funding levels are expected to average between $44 and $70 billion (in constant 1998 dollars) annually between 2000 and 2004.

China has made numerous nonproliferation pledges and ratified several key nonproliferation treaties and arms control regimes. In response to U.S. concerns that Chinese companies have provided support, not
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

specifically covered by the treaties and regimes, to
missile programs in Iran and Pakistan, China
announced in November 2000 that it would not assist
any country in the development of ballistic missiles
exceeding MTCR range/payload parameters that can
be used to deliver nuclear weapons. The United States
continues to have concerns about possible Chinese
nuclear assistance to Pakistan. Chinese behavior, in
this regard, is likely driven by strategic interests in
South Asia and the Middle East, as well as by domes-
tic economic pressures.

Nuclear Program

China currently has over 100 nuclear warheads and is
increasing the size, accuracy, and survivability of its
nuclear missile force. It is likely that the number of
deployed Chinese theater and strategic systems will
increase in the next several years. However, as its stra-
tegic requirements evolve, it may change the pace of
its modernization effort for its nuclear missile force
(particularly if the United States deploys NMD); any
warhead improvements will complement China’s mis-
sile modernization effort. China currently is not
believed to be producing fissile material for nuclear
weapons, but has a stockpile of fissile material suffi-
cient to improve or increase its weapons inventory.

China has ratified the NPT and signed the CTBT, and
has declared it will never use its nuclear forces against
a non-nuclear weapons state. China maintains a no-
first-use pledge in its strategic nuclear doctrine and
regards its strategic nuclear force as a deterrent against
intimidation or actual attack. Thus, China’s stated doc-
trine reportedly calls for a survivable long-range mis-
sile force that can hold a significant portion of the U.S.
population at risk in a retaliatory strike. As China’s
strategic forces and doctrine further evolve, Beijing
will continue to develop and deploy more modern
ICBMs and SLBMs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has substantial stockpile of nuclear warheads and means for delivery at all ranges — short, medium and long; modernizing nuclear missile force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of IAEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Zangger Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains stockpile of fissile material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has pledged no-first-use of nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the NPT and signed the CTBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biological</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possesses infrastructure adequate to develop and produce biological warfare agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaffirmed commitment not to develop biological weapons, but China likely retains some elements of an offensive program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceded to the BWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the ability to quickly mobilize the chemical industry to produce a wide variety of chemical agents and delivery means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably has not divulged full nature of chemical warfare program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the CWC and has restricted the transfer of selected Australia Group chemicals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missiles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernizing and expanding SRBM, MRBM, ICBM, and SLBM force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a member of the MTCR, but pledged to control missile technology items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Means of Delivery Available</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles, mostly anti-ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft: fighters, bombers, helicopters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground systems: artillery, rocket launchers, mortars.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Biological Program

China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological warfare program. It is believed that China started such a program in the 1950s. China possesses a sufficiently advanced biotechnology infrastructure to allow it to develop and produce biological agents. Its munitions industry is sufficient to allow it to weaponize any such agents, and it has a variety of delivery means that could be used for biological agent delivery. China is believed to possess an offensive biological warfare capability based on technology developed prior to its accession to the BWC in 1984. China actively participates in international efforts to negotiate a BWC compliance protocol.

Since 1984, China consistently has claimed that it never researched, produced, or possessed any biological weapons and never would do so. Nevertheless, China’s declarations under the voluntary BWC declarations for confidence building purposes are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete, and there are some reports that China may retain elements of its biological warfare program.

Chemical Program

Beijing is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. China’s chemical industry has the capability to produce many chemicals, some of which have been sought by states trying to develop a chemical warfare capability. Foreign sales of such chemicals have been a source of foreign exchange for China. The Chinese government has imposed restrictions on the sale of some chemical precursors and its enforcement activities generally have yielded mixed results.

While China claims it possesses no chemical agent inventory, it is believed to possess a moderate inventory of traditional agents. It has a wide variety of potential delivery systems for chemical agents, including cannon artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, land mines, aerial bombs, SRBMs, and MRBMs. Chinese military forces most likely have a good understanding of chemical warfare doctrine, and its forces routinely conduct defensive chemical warfare training. Even though China has ratified the CWC, made its declaration, and subjected its declared chemical weapons facilities to inspections, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program.

Ballistic Missiles

China has continued to modernize its ballistic missile force over the last several years and its industrial base can support production of the full range of ballistic missiles. China’s missile force is designed to serve as a strategic deterrent against Russia and the United States. While the ultimate extent of China’s strategic modernization is unknown, it is clear that the number, reliability, survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles capable of hitting the United States will increase during the next two decades.

China currently has about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs with a range of over 13,000 kilometers, which can reach the United States. Some of its ongoing missile modernization programs likely will increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United States. For example, Beijing is developing two new-road mobile solid-propellant ICBMs. China has conducted successful flight tests of the DF-31 ICBM in 1999 and 2000; this missile is estimated to have a range of about 8,000 kilometers. Another longer-range mobile ICBM also is under development and likely will be tested within the next several years. It will be targeted primarily against the United States.

China currently has a single Xia class SSBN, which is not operational; it is intended to carry 12 CSS-NX-3 missiles; these missiles have a range greater than 1,000 kilometers. In addition, the Chinese are designing a new SSBN that will carry the JL-2 ballistic missile, which is expected to have a range of over 8,000 kilometers. The JL-2 likely will be tested in the next decade, and, when deployed, it probably will be able to target the United States from operating areas near the Chinese coast.

In addition, China increasingly sees conventionally armed ballistic missiles, such as the solid-propellant road-mobile CSS-6, with a range of 600 kilometers, as important weapons for a regional conflict and for their political and military deterrent effect. The size of this SRBM force is expected to grow in the next several
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Chinese Ballistic Missiles

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Current Missile Delivery System | Range (km) | Source
--- | --- | ---
CSS - 7 | 300 | Domestic Production
CSS - 6 | 600 | Domestic Production
CSS - 5 | 1,800 | Domestic Production
CSS - 2 | 2,800 | Domestic Production
CSS - 3 | > 5,000 | Domestic Production
CSS - 4 | 13,000 | Domestic Production

Potential Missile Delivery System | Range (km) | Source
--- | --- | ---
DF - 31 | 8,000 | Domestic Production

China is concentrating on replacing liquid propellant missiles with mobile solid-propellant missiles, reflecting a preference for diminished maintenance, improved reliability, and survivability.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

years, as China will augment it with more modern
CSS-7 road-mobile solid-propellant missiles, which
have a range of 300 kilometers. These missiles are
expected to incorporate satellite-assisted navigation
technology to improve their accuracy.

While continuing to increase the number of missiles
and launchers in its inventory, Beijing also is concen-
trating on replacing liquid-propellant missiles with
mobile solid-propellant missiles, reflecting a prefer-
ence for diminished maintenance and improved sur-
vivability and reliability.

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery

China produces several types of land-, sea-, and air-
launched cruise missiles, which are potential means of
delivery for NBC weapons. While most are short-
range and are deployed for anti-ship operations, China
is developing land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) as
well as a submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missile;
this effort appears to have a relatively high priority.
China’s research and development of LACMs is being
aided by an aggressive acquisition of foreign technol-
ogy and subsystems, particularly from Russia. The
first LACM will be an air-launched version, and may
be operational in the next few years. China has
exported several versions of anti-ship cruise missiles
to countries in the Middle East and South Asia, and to
North Korea. China also has a variety of fighters,
bombers, helicopters, artillery, rockets, mortars, and
sprayers available as potential means of delivery for
NBC weapons.

Role as Supplier

China has made numerous nonproliferation pledges
since 1992, publicly supports a number of nonp禄fi-
ration regimes, and has ratified several nonproliferation
related treaties. China has maintained that it will not
assist any country in developing nuclear weapons or
the MTCR-class missiles to deliver them, and has
taken numerous steps over the last several years to
strengthen its control over sensitive exports. Neverthe-
less, Chinese entities have supported some nuclear,
chemical, and missile programs in countries of prolif-
eration concern, driven by China’s overall strategic
interests in South Asia and the Middle East and by
domestic economic pressures.
pledge provides constraints on China’s missile exports. In consideration of China’s commitment to strengthen its missile-related export control system, the U.S. government decided to waive sanctions required by U.S. law for past assistance by Chinese entities to missile programs in Pakistan and Iran.

**Conclusion**

In Northeast Asia, North Korea and China will present serious proliferation challenges for the United States and its Allies in the region.

While North Korea is suffering from serious economic shortcomings, its leaders have chosen to continue to attach a high priority to maintaining NBC weapons and missile programs. Should a conflict occur on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang could employ these forces, threatening U.S. and allied military forces and hundreds of thousands of civilians in South Korea and elsewhere in the region. As North Korea continues to develop missiles with longer ranges, in the future it will be able to threaten wider areas of Northeast Asia, and potentially portions of the mainland United States.

As a principal means of raising hard currency, North Korea also is one of the world’s leading exporters of missiles and missile production technology, particularly to the Middle East and South Asia. These exports have added to the overall proliferation problem, and further raised tensions in these regions. Exports of production technologies have the added potential effect of creating more producers, and more suppliers in the future.

China will continue to have substantial NBC weapon and ballistic missile capabilities. Although China’s strategic forces are substantially less capable than Russia’s, China remains one of the few countries that can threaten the continental United States. China will continue its pursuit of greater influence, a key element of which is the modernization and expansion of its nuclear forces. Concurrently, China will move forward with its broad missile modernization program, focusing on both regional and strategic delivery systems. It has substantially improved its SRBM forces in recent years and eventually will be able to deploy two solid-propellant road mobile ICBMs, one of which will be able to target all of the United States.

China’s proliferation behavior has improved in the last several years and it has lived up to its pledges to forego all nuclear cooperation with Iran. China also has pledged not to assist any unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, but we cannot preclude ongoing contacts. Nonetheless, China remains one of the world’s key sources for missile-related technologies. Although China has ratified several key nonproliferation treaties and regimes and made numerous nonproliferation pledges, it likely will continue to take advantage of ambiguities in those commitments to advance its strategic and economic interests.

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**Section I**

**NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES**

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**Selected Chinese Proliferation Activity During the 1990s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Type of Trade/Cooperation</th>
<th>Implication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Chemical precursor production technology and equipment.</td>
<td>Promotes Iran’s effort to achieve a self-sufficient chemical warfare program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran, North Korea, Libya, Pakistan</td>
<td>Missile-related items, raw materials, technical assistance.</td>
<td>Enhances recipient states’ missile production efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Small nuclear research reactor, zirconium production facility, Halted sale of uranium conversion facility.</td>
<td>Enhances Iran’s knowledge of the nuclear fuel cycle. Slowed proliferation concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Previous assistance with plutonium production reactor.</td>
<td>Assists Pakistan with effort to produce plutonium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Supplied M-11 missiles.</td>
<td>Enhanced Pakistan’s missile capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
South Asia
Section I

SOUTH ASIA

U.S. Goals and Interests

The United States seeks a South Asia region at peace, both internally (among the numerous states in this diverse region), and with its proximate neighbors, China, the Central Asian states, and Russia. Regional peace and stability remain elusive. The region continues to be beset by armed conflict, as well as conventional and nuclear rivalry. The region cannot be stable until there is a just and equitable settlement of long-standing tensions between India and Pakistan including over Kashmir. The threat or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons (and their delivery by advanced aircraft and missile systems) must be deterred, the further proliferation of these weapons thwarted, and all states must become parties to outstanding nonproliferation and related arms control regimes. In addition, the triple scourge of terrorism, illicit weapons trafficking, and narcotics production within and from the region must be combated and suppressed. At jeopardy are wider international business and commercial opportunities, the viability of democratic and market institutions, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan in spring-summer 1999 highlighted the continued instability of the South Asian region and brought into sharp focus the long-term implications of the May 1998 nuclear tests conducted by both. When they undertook these tests, world reaction included nearly universal condemnation across the broad range of international fora—the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1172 on 6 June, broadly condemning these tests and declaring multilateral support for restricting non-basic human needs lending by international financial institutions.

Despite the setback of our abiding regional goals of peace and stability, the United States and the international community remained undaunted in their pursuit of effective nonproliferation and arms control measures. The P-5, G-8, and UN Security Council have called on both parties to take a broad range of concrete actions. Drawing from these concerns, U.S. diplomatic efforts have focused most intensely on attaining action by both governments on several short- and medium-term objectives: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional adherence to the CTBT; engaging in negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and, pending their conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

India—Pakistan: Dispute Over Kashmir

- Kashmir has been disputed since the partition of British India in 1947, when both newly independent countries fought to control the province.
- Currently, both countries control portions of the Muslim-majority state, although India retains the coveted heartland.
- Wars in 1965 and 1971 resulted in some modifications to the line of control, but hundreds of thousands of troops remain deployed along the line.
- Pakistani forces occupied Indian territory along the northern line of control near Kargil in early 1999, prompting a fierce conflict with India beginning in May.
- Pakistani forces withdrew in late July under heavy Indian pressure, with U.S. diplomatic assistance.
- There is potential for any hostilities along the line of control to escalate and lead to full-scale war between the two states.
- Hard-liners in both countries remain adamantly opposed to any moves toward a comprehensive settlement.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

and other explosive devices; restraint in the development of nuclear weapons and missiles (no deployment of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles); and adoption of controls meeting international standards on export of sensitive materials and technology. The United States will continue to urge both governments to make progress on this nonproliferation agenda, via diplomatic efforts in concert with our P-5 and G-8 allies, and in international fora.

Proliferation of missile delivery systems and related technologies in South Asia remains an area of keen interest and concern. In coordination w/ MTCR Partners, the United States continues to carefully control exports that could contribute to unsteadiness and fuel an arms race in South Asia. The United States strongly encourages all supplier states to act responsibly and not contribute to destabilizing South Asia. To encourage international focus on missile proliferation issues (and in the course of normal diplomatic relations), the United States continues missile nonproliferation dialogues with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and DPRK. Our nonproliferation dialogues with India and Pakistan have also aimed to encourage effective measures by both countries to prevent further spread of sensitive technologies.

The U.S. commitment to pursue these goals and to facilitate dialogue among the parties to achieve these goals, are key elements in creating the conditions we seek for this region.

Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends

India and Pakistan are now self-declared nuclear powers, having demonstrated their capabilities during nuclear explosive tests in May 1998. These tests reinforced ambitions and threat perceptions that have existed for many years in South Asia. In addition to the nuclear tests, regional tensions continue to be high due to existing political dynamics in both India and Pakistan, the ongoing conflict over the disputed Kashmir region, each sides’ ballistic missile testing, and the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani strategic programs continue to be driven by the perception of the other’s effort. In addition, India cites the threat from Chinese strategic forces and China’s overall military modernization efforts, as well as New Delhi’s perceptions of a growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. India and Pakistan are expected to continue improving their nuclear and missile forces. In effect, a slow-speed Indo-Pak nuclear and missile arms race is underway, with consequences that are difficult to predict and potential for spillover beyond the subcontinent.

While each side declares that it seeks to avoid war, they could easily stumble into conflict by misinterpreting intentions or military posture along the international border or as a result of daily military exchanges along the line of control in Kashmir. While both sides have agreed to confidence-building measures as a way of preventing inadvertent escalation, neither side adheres to these agreements. However, India and Pakistan agreed in February 1999 to notify the other in the case of future missile tests and, in fact, notifications were made prior to each state’s missile tests in April 1999.

INDIA

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 24 September 1998, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee noted that while India hoped to fully participate in international arms-control negotiations, it had no intention of scaling back its nuclear weapons program. He stated that, “Mindful of its deteriorating security environment which has obliged us to stand apart from the CTBT in 1996, India undertook a limited series of five underground tests. These tests were essential for ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent for India’s national security in the foreseeable future.” He also declared that “in announcing a moratorium (on further nuclear tests), India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT. In 1996, India could not have accepted the obligation, as such a restraint would have eroded our capability and compromised our national security.”

India’s goal of indigenous production for all its programs is another element of New Delhi’s strategy to demonstrate its technological and military achievements and to help it to establish independence from foreign suppliers and outside political influence.

The Indian economy will continue to grow moderately, with the real GDP expected to grow at an average annual rate of 5-6 percent for the next few years,
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

assuming India avoids major conflicts, pursues economic reforms, and has reasonable weather. Despite the announced 28-percent nominal increase in the 2000 defense budget, some of which reflects inflation and definitional differences, military spending is expected to increase by about 2-3 percent annually in real terms over the next ten years. Future defense budgets likely will include a focus on investments for long-term military production self-sufficiency, including those for nuclear and missile forces, in keeping with India's overall goal of achieving independence from foreign suppliers.

Nuclear Program

On 11 and 13 May 1998, India conducted what it claimed were five nuclear explosive tests. According to Indian officials, the 11 May tests included a fission device with a yield of about 12 kilotons, a thermonuclear device with a yield of about 43 kilotons, and a third test with a yield of about 0.2 kilotons. An Indian spokesman stated that the first set of tests was intended “to establish that India has a proven capability for a weaponized nuclear program.”

India claimed that its 13 May tests had yields of about 0.5 and 0.2 kilotons, which were carried out to generate additional data for computer simulations. According to the Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, the tests enabled India to build “an adequate scientific database for designing the types of devices that [India] needs for a credible nuclear deterrent.” The tests triggered international condemnation and the United States imposed wide-ranging sanctions against India.

The tests were India’s first since 1974, and reversed the previously ambiguous nuclear posture where Indian officials denied possession of nuclear weapons. Indian officials cited a perceived deterioration of India’s security environment, including increasing Pakistani nuclear and missile capabilities and perceived threats from China, to justify the tests.

India has a capable cadre of scientific personnel and a nuclear infrastructure, consisting of numerous research and development centers, 11 nuclear power reactors, uranium mines and processing plants, and facilities to extract plutonium from spent fuel. With this large nuclear infrastructure, India is capable of manufacturing complete sets of components for plutonium-based nuclear weapons, although the acquisition of foreign nuclear-related equipment could benefit New Delhi in its weapons development efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons.

India probably has a small stockpile of nuclear weapon components and could assemble and deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to a week. The most likely delivery platforms are fighter-bomber aircraft. New Delhi also is developing ballistic missiles that will be capable of delivering a nuclear payload in the future.

India is in the beginning stages of developing a nuclear doctrine. In August 1999, the Indian government released a proposed nuclear doctrine prepared by a private advisory group appointed by the government. It stated that India will pursue a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence. The document states that the role of nuclear weapons is to deter the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against India, and asserts that India will pursue a policy of “retaliation only.” The draft doctrine maintains that India “will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” The doctrine also reaffirms India’s pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear weapons. It further states that India’s nuclear posture will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based systems, and sea-based platforms to provide a redundant, widely dispersed, and flexible nuclear force. Decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his “designated successor(s).” The draft doctrine has no official standing in India, and the United States has urged Indian officials to distance themselves from the draft, which is not consistent with India’s stated goal of a minimum nuclear deterrent.

India expressed interest in signing the CTBT, but has not done so. It has pledged not to conduct further nuclear tests pending entry into force of the CTBT. Indian officials have tied signature and ratification of the CTBT to developing a domestic consensus on the issue. Similarly, India strongly opposed the NPT as discriminatory but it is a member of the IAEA. Only
Section I  
**NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES**

### India: NBC Weapons and Missile Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear</strong></td>
<td>Conducted nuclear experiment tests on 11 and 13 May 1998; claimed a total of five tests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducted a peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE) in 1974. Capable of manufacturing complete sets of components for plutonium-based nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has small stockpile of nuclear weapons components and probably can deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to a week. It can deliver these weapons with fighter aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Announced draft nuclear doctrine in August 1999 of no-first-use, stated intent to create triad of air-, land-, and sea-based missile delivery systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has signed neither the NPT nor the CTBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biological</strong></td>
<td>Has substantial biotechnical infrastructure and expertise, some of which is being used for biological warfare defense research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemical</strong></td>
<td>Acknowledged chemical warfare program in 1997 and stated that related facilities would be open for inspection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has sizeable chemical industry, which could be source of dual-use chemicals for countries of proliferation concern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratified the CWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missiles</strong></td>
<td>Has development and production facilities for solid- and liquid-propellant fuel missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three versions of liquid-propellant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prithvi SRBM: Prithvi I (Army) — 150 kilometer range (produced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prithvi II (Air Force) — 250 kilometer range (tested)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dhanush (Navy) — 250 kilometer range (unsuccessfully tested)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solid-propellant Agni MRBM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agni tested in 1994 (estimated range 2,000 kilometers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agni II tested in April 1999 (estimated range 2,000 kilometers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLBM and IRBM also under development. Is not a member of the MTCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is not a member of the MTCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Means of Delivery</strong></td>
<td>Has ship-borne and airborne anti-ship cruise missiles; none have NBC warheads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft: fighter bombers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ground systems: artillery and rockets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four of India’s 13 operational nuclear reactors currently are subject to IAEA safeguards. In June 1998, New Delhi signed a deal with Russia to purchase two light-water reactors to be built in southern India; the reactors will be under facility-specific IAEA safeguards. However, the United States has raised concerns that Russia is circumventing the 1992 NSG guidelines by providing NSG trigger list technology to India, which does not allow safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. India has taken no steps to restrain its nuclear or missile programs. In addition, while India has agreed to enter into negotiations to complete a fissile material cutoff treaty, it has not agreed to refrain from producing fissile material before such a treaty would enter into force.

**Biological and Chemical Programs**

India has many well-qualified scientists, numerous biological and pharmaceutical production facilities, and bioccontainment facilities suitable for research and development of dangerous pathogens. At least some of these facilities are being used to support research and development for biological warfare defense work. India has ratified the BWC.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

India is an original signatory to the CWC. In June 1997, it acknowledged that it had a dedicated chemical warfare production program. This was the first time India had publicly admitted that it had a chemical warfare effort. India also stated that all related facilities would be open for inspection, as called for in the CWC, and subsequently, it has hosted all required CWC inspections. While India has made a commitment to destroy its chemical weapons, its extensive and well-developed chemical industry will continue to be capable of producing a wide variety of chemical agent precursors should the government change its policy.

In the past, Indian firms have exported a wide array of chemical products, including Australia Group-controlled items, to several countries of proliferation concern in the Middle East. (Australia Group-controlled items include specific chemical agent precursors, microorganisms with biological warfare applications, and dual-use equipment that can be used in chemical or biological warfare programs.) Indian companies could continue to be a source of dual-use chemicals to countries of proliferation concern.

Ballistic Missiles

The development of Indian and Pakistani ballistic missile capabilities has raised concerns about destabilizing efforts to develop and deploy nuclear-armed missiles. India has an extensive, largely indigenous ballistic missile program involving both SRBMs and MRBMs, and has made considerable progress with this program in the past several years. For example, India now has the Prithvi SRBM in production and successfully tested the Agni II MRBM in April 1999.

India has development and production infrastructures for both solid- and liquid-propelled missiles. By striving to achieve independence from foreign suppliers, India may be able to avoid restrictions imposed by the MTCR. Nevertheless, India’s ballistic missile programs have benefited from the acquisition of foreign equipment and technology, which India has continued to seek, primarily from Russia.

India’s Prithvi SRBM is a single-stage, liquid-fuel, road-mobile, ballistic missile, and it has been developed in three different versions. The Prithvi I has been produced for the Indian Army and has a payload of 1,000 kilograms and a range of 150 kilometers. The Prithvi II has a 500 kilograms payload and a range of 250 kilometers and was designed for use by the Indian Air Force. Another variant, called the Dhanush, is under development for the Navy and is similar to the Air Force version; it is designed to be launched from a surface vessel. The Indians conducted a flight test of the Dhanush in April 2000, which failed. India’s MRBM program consists of the Agni missile, with an estimated range of about 2,000 kilometers with a 1,000 kilograms payload. An early version was tested in 1994 and India successfully tested the follow-on version, the rail-mobile Agni II, in April 1999. This missile will allow India to strike all of Pakistan as well as many key areas of China. Development also is underway for an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), which would allow India to target Beijing. Lastly, an Indian submarine-launched missile, called the Sagarika, also is under development with Russian assistance. Its intended launch platform is the “Advanced Technology Vessel” nuclear submarine.

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery

India has ship-launched and airborne short-range anti-ship cruise missiles and a variety of short-range air-launched tactical missiles, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. All were purchased from foreign sources including Russia and the United Kingdom. In the future, India may try to purchase more modern anti-ship cruise missiles, or try to develop the missiles themselves. However, funding priorities for such efforts will be well below that for ballistic missiles. India also has a variety of fighter aircraft, artillery, and rockets available.

PAKISTAN

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs are part of Islamabad’s effort to preserve its territorial integrity against its principal external threat and rival, India. Pakistan attaches a certain immediacy and intensity to its effort and likely will continue to improve its nuclear and missile forces. Pakistan is driven by its perceived need to counter India’s conventional superiority and nuclear capability, remains fearful of India’s regional and global power aspirations, and continues
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Indian Ballistic Missiles

India continues to test and improve its ballistic missile force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile Delivery System</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Domestic Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi (AF)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Domestic Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Domestic Production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pakistan, like India, is putting emphasis on becoming self-sufficient for the production of its nuclear weapons and missiles. During the last several years Pakistan has received assistance from both China and North Korea, which will help it to achieve that goal. It has continued to seek a variety of nuclear-related and dual-use items for weapons development. However, Pakistan has less of a military production infrastructure than rival India, and thus will be forced to rely on outside support for its efforts for several years.

Pakistan’s economy will recover gradually from its recent fiscal crisis and the real GDP is expected to grow at an annual rate of about 3-5 percent for the next several years. This growth assumes no major war, adequate financial assistance from lenders to meet foreign debt obligations, and progress on economic reforms aimed at controlling the government deficit. Pakistan’s defense budget will proceed on a generally upward track, with an average annual real increase of 1-2 percent expected over the next ten years. As part of its overall national security strategy, Pakistan likely will continue to attach budget priorities to the further development of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. However, part of this effort will depend on continuing support from China and North Korea, or on alternative sources of financial or technical aid.

Nuclear Program

As a response to India’s tests, Pakistan conducted its own series of nuclear tests in May 1998. Pakistan claimed to have tested six devices, five on 28 May and one on 30 May. Dr. A. Q. Khan, a key figure in Pakistan’s nuclear program, claimed the five devices tested on 28 May were boosted fission devices: a “big bomb” and four tactical weapons of low yield that could be used on small missiles. He also claimed that Pakistan could conduct a fusion or thermonuclear blast if it so desired. The United States imposed additional sanctions against Pakistan as a result of these tests.

Pakistan has a well-developed nuclear infrastructure, including facilities for uranium conversion and enrichment and the infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons. Unlike the Indian nuclear program, which uses plutonium for its weapons, Pakistan’s program currently is based on highly-enriched uranium. However, Pakistan also is developing the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use. An unsecured heavy-water research reactor built at Khushab will produce plutonium that could be reprocessed for weapons use at facilities under construction.

In the past, China supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the production of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. Pakistan also acquired a significant amount of nuclear-related and dual-use equipment and materials from various sources principally in the FSU and Western Europe. Acquisition of nuclear-related goods from foreign sources will remain important if Pakistan chooses to continue to develop and produce more advanced nuclear weapons, although we expect that, with the passage of time, Pakistan will become increasingly self-sufficient. Islamabad likely will increase its nuclear and ballistic missile stockpiles over the next five years.

Islamabad’s nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form. Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly and has aircraft and possibly ballistic missiles available for delivery.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has long been dominated by the military, a dominance that likely has continued under the new military government and under Pakistan’s new National Command Authority (NCA), announced in February 2000. While Pakistan has yet to divulge publicly its nuclear doctrine, the new NCA is believed to be responsible for such doctrine, as well as nuclear research and development and wartime command and control. The NCA also includes two committees that advise Pakistan’s Chief Executive, General Musharraf, about the development and employment of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Pakistan: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Conducted nuclear weapon tests on 28 and 30 May 1998 in response to India's tests; claimed a total of six tests.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capable of manufacturing complete sets of components for highly enriched uranium-based nuclear weapons;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>developing capability to produce plutonium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has small stockpile of nuclear weapons components and can probably assemble some weapons fairly quickly. It</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>can deliver them with fighter aircraft and possibly missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has signed neither the NPT nor the CTBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological</td>
<td>Believed to have capabilities to support a limited biological warfare research effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratified the BWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>Improving commercial chemical industry, which would be able to support precursor chemical production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratified the CWC but did not declare any chemical agent production. Opened facilities for inspection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>Has development and production facilities for solid- and liquid-propellant fuel missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solid-propellant program:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hatf I rocket — 80 kilometer range (produced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hatf III — 300 kilometer range; based on M-11 (being developed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shaheen I — 750 kilometer range claimed (tested)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shaheen II/Ghaznavi — 2,000 kilometer range claimed (in design)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liquid-propellant program:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghauri — 1,300 kilometer range; based on No Dong (tested)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is not a member of the MTCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Means of Delivery</td>
<td>Has ship-borne, submarine-launched, and airborne anti-ship cruise missiles; none has NBC warheads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft: fighter-bombers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ground systems: artillery and rockets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan’s best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India’s decision. Like India, Pakistan expressed its intention to sign the CTBT, but, so far, has failed to do so. While Pakistan has provided assurances that it will not assemble or deploy its nuclear warheads, nor will it resume testing unless India does so first; it has taken no additional steps. Pakistan has agreed to enter into negotiations to complete a fissile material cutoff agreement, but has not agreed to refrain from producing fissile material before a cutoff treaty would enter into force.

**Biological and Chemical Programs**

Pakistan is believed to have the resources and capabilities to support a limited biological warfare research and development effort. Pakistan may continue to seek foreign equipment and technology to expand its biotechnical infrastructure. Pakistan has ratified the BWC and actively participates in compliance protocol negotiations for the treaty.

Pakistan ratified the CWC in October 1997 and did not declare any chemical agent production or development. Pakistan has imported a number of dual-use chemicals that can be used to make chemical agents. These chemicals also have commercial uses and Pakistan is working towards establishing a viable commercial chemical industry capable of producing a variety of chemicals, some of which could be used to make chemical agents. Chemical agent delivery methods available to Pakistan include missiles, artillery, and aerial bombs.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Pakistani Ballistic Missiles

Pakistan has received considerable Chinese and North Korean technology and other assistance for its ballistic missile program.

* Ranges claimed by Pakistan
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Ballistic Missiles

Pakistan has placed a high priority on developing ballistic missiles as part of its strategy to counter India's conventional and nuclear capabilities. Pakistan has both solid and liquid-propellant ballistic missile programs and, during the last several years, has received considerable assistance from China and North Korea for these efforts. Pakistan's goal is to produce increasingly longer-range missiles. However, Pakistan likely will continue to require significant foreign assistance in key technologies for several years.

In its solid-propellant program, Pakistan has developed and produced the 80 kilometer range Hatf-1 that is now deployed with the Army. Pakistan also has developed the solid-fueled Shaheen-1 SRBM, which it tested in April 1999. According to Pakistani officials, the Shaheen-1 has a range of 750 kilometers and is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Pakistan also received M-11 SRBMs from China, upon which it will base its Hatf III.

Pakistan has developed and tested the liquid-propellant Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile, which is based on North Korea's No Dong MRBM. The Ghauri was successfully tested in April 1998 and 1999. Pakistani officials claimed that the Ghauri has a range of 1,500 kilometers and is capable of carrying a payload of 700 kilograms, although its range likely is the same as the No Dong, 1,300 kilometers. Also, in April 1998, the United States imposed sanctions against a Pakistani research institute and a North Korean company for transferring technology controlled under Category I of the MTCR Annex.

Following the April 1999 tests of the Ghauri and Shaheen-1, Pakistani officials announced the conclusion “for now” of “the series of flight tests involving solid- and liquid-fuel rocket motor technologies...” and called on India to join Pakistan in a “strategic restraint regime” to limit the development of missile and nuclear weapons technology and deployment. Pakistani officials also have stated that they are developing missiles called the Ghaznavi and Shaheen-II, both with an intended range of 2,000 kilometers, which would be able to reach any target in India.

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery

Pakistan has sea- and submarine-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles and a variety of short-range air-launched tactical missiles, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. All were purchased from foreign sources, including China, France, and the United States. Pakistan may have an interest in acquiring additional anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as land-attack cruise missiles, in the future but may be slowed in any such efforts by financial constraints. Pakistan also has a variety of fighter aircraft, artillery, and rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons.

Conclusion

In South Asia, India and Pakistan are in a period of accelerated nuclear weapons and missile development. Political tensions and domestic politics have driven the two countries to test nuclear weapons in 1998, and to develop and test longer-range missiles in 1998 and 1999. Tensions in the region likely will remain high, given the unsettled situation in Kashmir and each side’s perception that it must match the other’s improvements in nuclear or missile forces. Given the long-standing hostility between the two countries, even a minor conflict runs the risk of escalating into an exchange of missiles with nuclear warheads, which would have disastrous consequences for the region and beyond.

Both India and Pakistan have sizeable nuclear infrastructures, which will allow them to improve the sophistication and size of their nuclear stockpiles in the future. Additional nuclear tests are possible, although Pakistan will likely test only if India tests first. At the same time, both will continue to make advances with the SRBM and MRBM programs, where each country believes it is necessary to respond to any progress made by the other. Again, more missile tests are likely.

Lastly, the potential for the proliferation of technologies and expertise will increase in the future, as both countries become more self-sufficient in the production of nuclear weapons and missiles and subsequently become potential suppliers.
U.S. Goals and Interests

U.S. goals in the Middle East and Africa include securing a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Israel and all Arab parties; maintaining a steadfast commitment to Israel’s security and well-being; building and maintaining security arrangements that assure the stability of the Gulf region and unimpeded commercial access to its petroleum reserves; combating terrorism; ensuring fair access for American business to commercial opportunities in the region; and promoting more open political and economic systems and respect for human rights and the rule of law. In this volatile region, the proliferation of NBC weapons and the means of delivering them poses a significant challenge to the ability of the United States to achieve these goals. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, which are aggressively seeking these capabilities and increased missile capabilities, constitute the most pressing threats to regional stability.

Iran is actively attempting to acquire or produce a full range of NBC weapons and missiles. The United States believes Iran is committed to acquiring nuclear weapons, either through indigenous development or by covertly acquiring enough fissile material to produce them. During the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran initiated biological and chemical weapons programs, in direct response to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. In addition, Iran is expanding its ballistic missile programs.

Iraq has long had NBC weapons and missile efforts. The challenges these weapons pose in time of conflict became clear during the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), when the United States and allied forces had to deal with real and potential complications posed by Iraq’s arsenal of NBC weapons and missiles. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, it had a known chemical warfare capability and a demonstrated willingness to use it (Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian troops and its Kurdish population during the 1980s) a suspected biological warfare capability, and an ongoing nuclear weapons development program that progressed despite the range of international export controls and inspection activities undertaken by the IAEA. As a result of post-war UN inspection efforts, the true dimensions and level of development in these programs became much clearer and more evident. As efforts to renew UN inspections in Iraq continue, the international community continues to maintain sanctions on Iraq, which shows no let up in its pursuit to reconstitute its pre-war weapons and missile capabilities.

Iran and Iraq have each demonstrated their intent to dominate the Gulf and to control access to critical oil supplies. In their pursuit of regional hegemony, Iran and Iraq regard NBC weapons and missiles as critical to their defense against each other and necessary to support their overall political and military objectives. Possession of nuclear weapons would likely lead to increased intimidation of their Gulf neighbors, as well as increased willingness to confront the United States.

Libya remains a significant proliferation concern. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has shown that he is willing and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against his enemies. Libya sees the United States as its primary external threat, owing to unrelenting United States opposition to Libya’s support for terrorism, NBC programs, and aggressive behavior. Although Libya’s capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi remains undaunted in his pursuit of such capabilities and might not hesitate to provide forms of these weapons to states or terrorist groups he supports and which support him in return.

Syria possesses a substantial force of ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets throughout Israel and has an active chemical weapons program. Syria views Israel as its primary external threat and sees its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as means to counter Israel’s qualitative superiority.

The U.S. defense commitments, military presence, and demonstrated ability to defend our own and allied interests against such threats are vital to achieving our goals in the region.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends

The pace of acquisition and development efforts for NBC weapons and missiles in the volatile regions of the Middle East and Africa has remained steady during the last several years. This is dangerous because of the long history of conflict that characterizes the region. Although there has been progress in the process towards a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, other dangerous trends remain. For example, some states are focused on producing their own chemical and biological agents and ballistic missiles, seeking to become independent from foreign suppliers. As these states achieve production self-sufficiency, they, in turn, may become suppliers of NBC weapons or missiles, or related technologies, decreasing opportunities to restrain proliferation and complicates nonproliferation diplomacy. There also is a trend towards developing more advanced chemical agents and longer-range missiles, increasing the risk to U.S. and allied forces deployed to the region. Iran especially has demonstrated a commitment to developing long-range ballistic missiles, which can reach deep into neighboring countries and to Israel.

Over the last few years, several states have made significant progress producing their own weapons, including Iran, a development which could result in a greater number of suppliers, and thus increase proliferation in the future. In the absence of effective UN inspections and monitoring since 1999, Iraq may have begun to reconstitute the programs it had prior to Operation Desert Storm. Meanwhile, Syria may have begun to develop the persistent nerve agent VX to add to its existing stockpile of sarin. In Africa, with the suspension of UN sanctions against Libya, Qadhafi may be intensifying procurement efforts, and Sudan has shown a growing interest in chemical warfare.

IRAN

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

Iran's national security efforts are designed to increase its influence and prestige in the Middle East and throughout the Islamic world, to deter Iraq or any other regional threats as well as to limit U.S. influence and presence in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf. Iran recognizes that it cannot match U.S. military power and therefore seeks other asymmetric means to challenge the United States. Iran's efforts include the acquisition and development of NBC weapons and missiles and use of terrorism, which it views as a means to offset its own vulnerabilities and weaknesses. With help from Russia and North Korea, it has put particular emphasis in recent years on developing medium-range missiles.

Iran is one of the countries most active in seeking to acquire NBC- and missile-related technologies. Iran's NBC and missile programs continued in the last several years notwithstanding President Khatemi's moderation of the regime's anti-Western rhetoric. To support their development, Iran has focused its acquisition efforts mainly on Russia, China, and North Korea, and these countries remain instrumental to Iran's efforts. Iran remains intent on attaining an independent production capability for all its weapons programs and has continued to make substantial progress in that regard with its chemical, biological, and ballistic missile efforts. Iran's public display of these missiles and its July and September 2000 flight tests of the Shahab-3 reflect Tehran's intent to demonstrate its ability to project military influence throughout the region.

DoD believes spending on NBC weapons and missiles has continued to receive a high priority within Iran's defense budget during the last several years. As Iran's economy is oil-based, the price of oil will influence the extent of Iran's defense spending and consequently the amount the government can spend on military programs and related NBC and missile efforts. The defense budget is believed to be almost $6 billion for the fiscal year ending 20 March 2001. It is expected to remain at about the same level for the next several years, or about 3 percent of Iran's GDP. Demographic, social, and political factors also affect the relative priority Iran puts on its national security spending.

Nuclear Program

Although a signatory to NPT and the CTBT, Iran also is seeking fissile material and technology for weapons development through an elaborate system of military
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

and civilian organizations. We believe Iran also has an organized structure dedicated to developing nuclear weapons by trying to establish the capability to produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Iran claims to desire the establishment of a complete nuclear fuel cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain whole facilities that could be used in numerous ways in support of efforts to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The potential availability of black market fissile material also might provide Iran a way to acquire the fissile material necessary for a nuclear weapon.

Iran’s success in achieving a nuclear capability will depend, to a large degree, on the supply policies of Russia and China or on Iran’s successful illicit acquisition of adequate quantities of weapons-useable fissile material. Russia is continuing work on a 1,000-megawatt power reactor at Bushehr. Although Russian officials have provided assurances that Russian cooperation with Iran will be limited to the Bushehr reactor project during the period of its construction, the United States Government is aware that a number of Russian entities are engaged in cooperation with Iran that goes beyond this project. One of Iran’s primary goals is the acquisition of a heavy water-moderated, natural uranium-fueled nuclear reactor and associated facilities suitable for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Although Bushehr will fall under IAEA safeguards, Iran is using this project to

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<th><strong>Iran: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Nuclear</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Ballistic Missiles</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Other Means of Delivery Available</strong></td>
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Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

seek access to more sensitive nuclear technologies from Russia and to develop expertise in related nuclear technologies. Any such projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development.

In the past, Chinese companies have been major suppliers of nuclear-related facilities and technology albeit under IAEA safeguards. China pledged in 1997 that it would not undertake any new nuclear cooperation with Iran and that it would close out its two existing projects—a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility, which will produce cladding for nuclear fuel—as soon as possible. (Neither of these two projects poses a significant proliferation concern.) China also agreed to terminate cooperation on a uranium conversion project. This project would have allowed Iran to produce uranium hexafluoride or uranium dioxide, which are the feedstock materials for the manufacture of weapons grade plutonium. In addition, China announced new export controls in June 1998 that cover the sale of dual-use nuclear equipment. China appears to be living up to its 1997 commitments.

Biological Program

Iran has a growing biotechnology industry, significant pharmaceutical experience and the overall infrastructure to support its biological warfare program. Tehran has expanded its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials and expertise from entities in Russia and elsewhere, ostensibly for civilian reasons. Outside assistance is important for Iran, and it is also difficult to prevent because of the dual-use nature of the materials and equipment being sought by Iran and the many legitimate end uses for these items.

Iran’s biological warfare program began during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran is believed to be pursuing offensive biological warfare capabilities and its effort may have evolved beyond agent research and development to the capability to produce small quantities of agent. Iran has ratified the BWC.

Chemical Program

Iran has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in a May 1998 session of the CWC Conference of the States Parties, Tehran, for the first time, acknowledged the existence of a past chemical weapons program. Iran admitted developing a chemical warfare program during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war as a “deterrent” against Iraq’s use of chemical agents against Iran. Moreover, Tehran claimed that after the 1988 cease-fire, it “terminated” its program. However, Iran has yet to acknowledge that it, too, used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.

Nevertheless, Iran has continued its efforts to seek production technology, expertise and precursor chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient chemical warfare infrastructure. As Iran’s program moves closer to self-sufficiency, the potential will increase for Iran to export dual-use chemicals and related equipment and technologies to other countries of proliferation concern.

In the past, Tehran has manufactured and stockpiled blister, blood and choking chemical agents, and weaponized some of these agents into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs. It also is believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran could employ these agents during a future conflict in the region. Lastly, Iran’s training, especially for its naval and ground forces, indicates that it is planning to operate in a contaminated environment.

Ballistic Missiles

Iran has increased emphasis on its ballistic missile program. Currently, Iran has several hundred SCUD Bs and SCUD Cs and Chinese-made CSS-8 SRBMs. It is now producing SCUD missiles, having received production assistance from North Korea. In recent years, Russian and Chinese entities have continued to supply a wide variety of missile-related goods, technology, and expertise to Iran. Iran is striving to indigenously produce ballistic missiles and become a supplier state. Iran’s recent efforts have been on the development of the 1,300-kilometer range Shahab-3
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Ballistic Missiles

IRAN

Current Missile Delivery System Range (km) Source
CSS-8 150 China
SCUD B 300 Libya, North Korea
SCUD C 500 North Korea

Potential Missile Delivery System Range (km) Source
Shahab 3 1,300 North Korea / Domestic
Taepo Dong 1* 3,000 North Korea
Taepo Dong 2* 5,000 - 6,000 North Korea

* Iran has made public reference to future longer range missiles such as Shahab-4 and Shahab-6; however, such missiles could be based on Taepo Dong technology.

Should Iran receive long range missiles from North Korea, or develop its own, it could threaten a much wider area.
missile, which is based on the North Korean No Dong. Iran flight-tested the Shahab-3 in July 1998 and July and September 2000. At this time, Iran likely has the capability to deploy limited numbers of Shahab-3.

Iran has built and publicly displayed prototypes of this MRBM and may have achieved an emergency operational capability for it. That is, it could deploy a limited number of the missiles in an operational mode during a perceived crisis. In fact, in July 2000, just prior to the missile’s second flight test, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps stated that Iran had formed Shahab-3 units and built launching pads for the missiles (Janes Defense Weekly). While this may overstate Iran’s current capabilities, it clearly demonstrates Iran’s intent.

In addition, Iran’s Defense Minister publicly acknowledged the development of the Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran’s Defense Minister also has publicly mentioned plans for a “Shahab-5,” which may be an IRBM or a space launch vehicle. Such statements, made against the backdrop of sustained cooperation with Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities, suggest that Tehran may intend to develop and deploy a longer-range ballistic missile capability. In addition, Iran will likely continue to seek longer-range missiles and may have ICBM ambitions. It could test a space launch vehicle, which would have ICBM applications, within the next 15 years. However, if Iran purchased an ICBM from North Korea or elsewhere, further development might not be necessary.

**Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery**

Iran has purchased land-, sea-, and air-launched short-range cruise missiles from China; it also has a variety of foreign-made air-launched short-range tactical missiles, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. Many of these systems are deployed as anti-ship weapons in or near the Persian Gulf. In the future, Iran likely will continue to focus on its anti-ship missile capabilities and may try to develop its own missiles using technology it already has as a basis for such development efforts. In addition, Tehran also could try to purchase land attack cruise missiles to complement its ballistic missile force. However, the pace of any of these efforts will be determined by Iran’s economic situation. Iran also has a variety of fighter aircraft, artillery, and rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons.

**Potential as a Supplier**

Iran has put emphasis on becoming independent in the indigenous production of various military hardware, including NBC weapons and missiles. As Iran has made progress in the last few years, particularly in the areas of chemical warfare and ballistic missiles, the potential has increased for it to export some of these weapons, related technology, or expertise to other countries of proliferation concern, such as Libya or Syria.

**IRAQ**

**Objectives, Strategies, and Resources**

Iraq believes NBC weapons and ballistic missiles are necessary if it is to reach its goal of being the dominant power in the region. Since the end of the Gulf War, Baghdad steadfastly resisted the terms of the cease-fire agreement, which required it to cooperate with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA in identifying and eliminating Iraq’s NBC and theater ballistic missile capabilities. Iraq’s policy of deception and denial sparked numerous confrontations with UNSCOM and the IAEA over the years and culminated with the allied bombing of Iraq under Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.

Since late 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 687, 707, 715 and 1284. (UNSCR 1284, adopted in December 1999, established a follow-on regime to UNSCOM called the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission [UNMOVIC]). As a result, there have been no UN inspections for over two years, and the automated monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspected Iraqi NBC and missile facilities are no longer operational. This abeyance of on-site inspections and our previous judgments about Iraqi
intentions raise concerns that Iraq may have begun such reconstitution efforts and that it will again be able to threaten its neighbors. In support of these rebuilding efforts, Iraq is known to have attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items under the guise of legitimate civil use since the end of the Gulf War.

Iraq remains largely a petroleum-based economy. Prior to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq’s petroleum sector accounted for 61 percent of its GDP and about $14.5 billion in exports; per capita GDP was $2,270. UN sanctions subsequently were imposed on Iraq, and since then there has been a significant decline in Iraqi economic output. Increased illegal petroleum product exports since 1996 and crude oil exports allowed by the UN since 1997 have led to significant growth in the industrial and petroleum sectors since 1996. However, under UNSCR 1284, Iraq can export any volume of petroleum for humanitarian needs. Nonetheless, inflation fluctuates wildly depending on supply and demand, the political situation, and regime market manipulation; inflation estimates range from 90 to almost 300 percent. While oil exports are still a dominant economic force in Iraq, Iraqi per capita GDP was reported to have dropped to $587 by 1999. Despite these severe pressures on its economy, Saddam Hussein’s government continues to devote Iraq resources to rebuilding certain portions of its NBC weapons and missile infrastructure.

**Nuclear Program**

Iraq has ratified the NPT. Nevertheless, before the Gulf War, Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons program. Iraq: NBC and Missile Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>Had comprehensive nuclear weapons development program prior to Operation Desert Storm. Infrastructure suffered considerable damage from Coalition bombing and IAEA dismantlement. Retains scientists, engineers, and nuclear weapons design information; without fissile material, would need five or more years and significant foreign assistance to rebuild program and produce nuclear devices; less time would be needed if sufficient fissile material were acquired illegally. Ratified the NPT; has not signed the CTBT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biological</td>
<td>Produced and weaponized significant quantities of biological warfare agents prior to Desert Storm. Admitted biological warfare effort in 1995, after four years of denial; claimed to have destroyed all agents, but offered no credible proof. May have begun program reconstitution in absence of UN inspections and monitoring. Acceded to the BWC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>Rebuilt some of its chemical production infrastructure allegedly for commercial use. UNSCOM discovered evidence of VX persistent nerve agent in missile warheads in 1998, despite Iraqi denials for seven years that it had not weaponized VX. May have begun program reconstitution in absence of UN inspections and monitoring. Has not signed the CWC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>Probably retains limited number of SCUD-variant missiles, launchers, and warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents. Retains significant missile production capability. Continues work on liquid- and solid-propellant SRBMs (150 kilometers) allowed by UNSCR 687, likely will use technical experience gained for future longer range missile development effort. Not a member of the MTCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Means of Delivery Available</td>
<td>Launched anti-ship cruise missiles; air-launched tactical missiles; none have NBC warheads; stockpile likely is very limited. Air systems: fighters, helicopters, UAVs. Ground systems: artillery, rockets.</td>
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Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

A development program that was focused on building an implosion-type device. The program was linked to a ballistic missile project that was the intended delivery system. From April 1991 to December 1998, Iraqi nuclear aspirations were held in check by IAEA/UNSCOM inspections and monitoring. All known weapons-grade fissile material was removed from the country. Although Iraq claims that it destroyed all of the specific equipment and facilities useful for developing nuclear weapons, it still retains sufficient skilled and experienced scientists and engineers as well as weapons design information that could allow it to restart a weapons program.

Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon. This period would be substantially shortened should Baghdad successfully acquire fissile material from a foreign source.

Biological Program

Iraq’s continued refusal to disclose fully the extent of its biological program suggests that Baghdad retains a biological warfare capability, despite its membership in the BWC. After four and one-half years of claiming that it had conducted only “defensive research” on biological weapons Iraq declared reluctantly, in 1995, that it had produced approximately 30,000 liters of bulk biological agents and/or filled munitions. Iraq admitted that it produced anthrax, botulinum toxins and aflatoxins and that it prepared biological agent-filled munitions, including missile warheads and aerial bombs. However, UNSCOM believed that Iraq had produced substantially greater amounts than it has admitted — three to four times greater.

Iraq also admitted that, during the Persian Gulf War, it had deployed biological agent-filled munitions to airfields and that these weapons were intended for use against Israel and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. Iraq stated that it destroyed all of these agents and munitions in 1991, but it has provided insufficient credible evidence to support this claim.

The UN believes that Baghdad has the ability to reconstitute its biological warfare capabilities within a few weeks or months, and, in the absence of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring during 1999 and 2000, we are concerned that Baghdad again may have produced some biological warfare agents.

Chemical Program

Since the Gulf War, Baghdad has rebuilt key portions of its industrial and chemical production infrastructure; it has not become a state party to the CWC. Some of Iraq’s facilities could be converted fairly quickly to production of chemical warfare agents. Following Operation Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a rapid reconstruction effort on those facilities to include former dual-use chemical warfare-associated production facilities, destroyed by U.S. bombing. In 1999, Iraq may have begun installing or repairing dual-use equipment at these and other chemical warfare-related facilities. Previously, Iraq was known to have produced and stockpiled mustard, tabun, sarin, and VX, some of which likely remain hidden. It is likely that an additional quantity of various precursor chemicals also remains hidden.

In late 1998, UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its chemical program. UNSCOM cited an example where Baghdad seized from inspectors a document discovered by UNSCOM inspectors, which indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many chemical munitions during the Iran-Iraq War as had been declared previously by Baghdad. This document suggests that Iraq may have an additional 6,000 chemical munitions hidden. Similarly, UNSCOM discovery in 1998 of evidence of VX in Iraqi missile warheads showed that Iraq had lied to the international community for seven years when it repeatedly said that it had never weaponized VX.

Iraq retains the expertise, once a decision is made, to resume chemical agent production within a few weeks or months, depending on the type of agent. However, foreign assistance, whether commercial procurement of dual-use technology, key infrastructure, or other aid, will be necessary to completely restore Iraq’s
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

![Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iraqi Ballistic Missiles](image)

- **Current Missile Delivery System**
  - **Al Hussein**: 650 km, Domestic Production

- **Potential Missile Delivery System**
  - **Ababil / Al Samoud**: 100 - 150 km, Domestic Production
  - **Al Abbas**: 950 km, Domestic Production

Iraq fired nearly 90 Al Hussein missiles at Israel and the Arabian Peninsula during DESERT STORM. Its current work on the Ababil / Al Samoud SRBMs allows Iraq to maintain proficiency for future longer-range missiles, which could again threaten Israel and large areas of the Arabian Peninsula.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

chemical agent production capabilities to pre-Desert Storm levels. Iraqi doctrine for the use of chemical weapons evolved during the Iran-Iraq War, and was fully incorporated into Iraqi offensive operations by the end of the war in 1988. During different stages of that war, Iraq used aerial bombs, artillery, rocket launchers, tactical rockets, and sprayers mounted in helicopters to deliver agents against Iranian forces. It also used chemical agents against Kurdish elements of its own civilian population in 1988.

Ballistic Missiles

Iraq likely retains a limited number of launchers and SCUD-variant SRBMs capable of striking its neighbors, as well as the components and manufacturing means to assemble and produce others, anticipating the reestablishment of a long-range ballistic missile force sometime in the future. Baghdad likely also has warheads capable of delivering chemical or biological agents. While Iraq's missile production infrastructure was damaged during the December 1998 strikes, Iraq retains domestic expertise and sufficient infrastructure to support most missile component production, with the exception of a few critical subelements.

During 1999, Iraq continued to work on the two short-range ballistic missile systems that fall within the 150-kilometer range restriction imposed by the UN: the liquid-propellant Al Samoud and the solid-propellant Ababil-100. The Al-Samoud is essentially a scaled-down SCUD, and work on it allows Baghdad to develop technological capabilities that could be applied to a longer-range missile program. We believe that the Al Samoud missile, as designed by the Iraqis, has an inherent potential to exceed the 150-kilometers range restriction imposed under UNSCR 687. Iraqi personnel involved with pre-Desert Storm ballistic missile efforts are working on the Ababil-100 SRBM program. Once economic sanctions against Iraq are lifted, unless restricted by future UN monitoring, Baghdad probably will begin converting these efforts into longer-range missile systems. Despite the damage done to Iraq’s missile infrastructure during the Gulf War, Desert Fox, and subsequent UNSCOM activities, Iraq may have ambitions for longer-range missiles, including an ICBM. Depending on the success of acquisition efforts and degree of foreign support, it is possible that Iraq could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery

Iraq may have a very limited stockpile of land-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles and air-launched short-range tactical missiles that it purchased from China and France prior to the Gulf War. These are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons, although their operational status is questionable due to the cumulative effects of the UN arms embargo. However, Iraq has continued to work on its UAV program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. These modified and refurbished L-29s may be intended for the delivery of chemical or biological agents. In the future, Iraq may try to use its research and development infrastructure to produce its own UAVs and cruise missiles or, should the UN arms embargo be lifted, it could try to purchase cruise missiles.

SYRIA

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

Syria’s national security objectives will not likely change following the death of Hafez al Asad. These objectives include preserving the new regime of Asad’s son, Bashir al Asad, regaining the entire Golan Heights, protecting Syrian territory, maintaining internal stability, and protecting Syrian interests in Lebanon. Damascus also seeks to avoid regional isolation and play a leading role in the Arab world. It has long perceived itself to be surrounded by hostile neighbors, and most of Syria’s armed forces are arrayed against Israel, which it perceives to be its primary external threat. Syria has sought to avoid regional isolation by maintaining strong ties with Iran and, more recently, warming relations with Iraq.

Since the loss of its Soviet sponsor a decade ago and its inability to achieve conventional parity with Israel, Syria has increasingly relied on a strategic deterrent,
based on ballistic missiles and chemical warfare capabilities, as the ultimate guarantor of regime survival against potential regional adversaries. Syria also likely sees the development of these weapons as a cheaper alternative than trying to achieve conventional parity with Israel. As a result, Damascus has continued to develop and expand its ballistic missile and chemical weapons capabilities, and, to lesser extent, biological weapons capabilities. Syria is likely to maintain and improve these capabilities over the long term.

Syria’s total defense spending has remained relatively stable at $1 billion in constant 1997 prices since the early 1990s. This spending represents nearly 6 percent of Syria’s GDP. While Syria has spent a small percentage on the acquisition of conventional hardware, it appears to have shifted emphasis to chemical, biological, and missile programs, which offer a more affordable alternative and receive a high budget priority.

In the past, Damascus has shown itself to be a pragmatic actor and to calculate carefully the results of its actions; this is likely to continue under the regime of Bashar al Asad. As a result, Syria would likely refrain from using chemical or biological weapons against Israel—especially given its fear of an Israeli response with NBC weapons—unless the regime’s survival is at stake. The new regime of Bashar al Asad likely will maintain and improve Syrian missile and chemical and biological warfare capabilities.

Nuclear Program

Syria is not pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. However, it retains an interest in nuclear technology and has a small Chinese-supplied research reactor, which is under IAEA safeguards. In addition, in May 1999, Syria signed a broad nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, which includes the construction of a small light-water research reactor, which will be subject to IAEA safeguards. Syria currently lacks the infrastructure and trained personnel to establish a nuclear weapons program. Syria has ratified the NPT, but has not signed the CTBT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syria: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is not pursuing the development of nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the NPT; has not signed the CTBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biological</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possesses adequate biotechnical infrastructure to support limited biological warfare program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believed to be pursuing biological agent development, but no major agent production effort likely is underway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed but not ratified the BWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possesses and is capable of delivering nerve agents; may be developing more advanced VX nerve agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making improvements to chemical infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has not signed the CWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missiles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains and is capable of using force of SCUD B, SCUD C, and SS-21 missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing SCUD Cs with North Korean assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making improvements to missile production infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a member of the MTCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Means of Delivery Available</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land- and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; none have NBC warheads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft: fighters, helicopters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground systems: artillery, rockets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section I  
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Estimated Ranges of Current Syrian Ballistic Missiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Missile Delivery System</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS-21</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUD B</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union / Domestic Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUD C</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>North Korea / Domestic Production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Syria's SCUD missiles allow it to threaten all of Israel and major portions of Turkey.
Biological Program
Syria has signed but not ratified the BWC but nonetheless is pursuing the development of biological weapons. Syria’s biotechnical infrastructure is capable of supporting limited agent development. However, the Syrians are not believed to have begun any major effort to put biological agents into weapons. Without significant foreign assistance, it is unlikely that Syria could manufacture significant amounts of biological weapons for several years.

Chemical Program
Syria is not a state party to the CWC and has had a chemical warfare program for many years, although it has never used chemical agents in a conflict. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles. Additionally, Syria is trying to develop the more toxic and persistent nerve agent VX. In the future, Syria can be expected to continue to improve its chemical agent production and storage infrastructure. Damascus remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. For example, during 1999, Syria sought chemical warfare-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources.

Ballistic Missiles
Syria has a combined total of several hundred SCUD B, SCUD C and SS-21 SRBMs. Syria is believed to have chemical warheads available for a portion of its SCUD missile force. Damascus continues to acquire SCUD-related equipment and materials from Iran and North Korea, including considerable North Korean help producing SCUD Cs.

During 1999, Damascus continued to work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability with help from outside sources such as Iran. In addition, foreign equipment and assistance for its liquid propellant missile program, primarily from North Korean entities but also from firms in China and Russia, have been and will continue to be essential for Syria’s effort. The Syrians are laying the groundwork for a future option to develop a modern, solid-propellant SRBM. All of Syria’s missiles are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country.

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery
Syria has a variety of Soviet-made land- and sea-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles and air-launched short-range tactical missiles, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. Because of higher defense priorities, Syria probably will not try to purchase additional cruise missiles for several years. Syria also has numerous fighter aircraft, helicopters, artillery, and rockets available.

Libya

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources
The primary objectives of Libyan leader Qadhafi have been to promote Libya as a defender of Islamic ideals against Western imperialism and to promote Pan-Arabism, and more recently, Pan-Africanism. Over the years, these goals have translated into a long history of promoting regional destabilization and terrorism. In 1992, in response to suspected Libyan involvement in the bombing of Pan American flight 103, the UN imposed sanctions on Libya. (The sanctions included an arms embargo, a ban on flights to and from Libya, a one-time freeze on Libyan government financial assets abroad, and a ban on Libyan exports of nonagricultural and nonpetroleum exports.) However, in April 1999, in response to the Libyan extradition of the two suspects to The Hague for trial, the UN suspended its sanctions. Shortly thereafter, the European Union reestablished economic relationships with Libya, and, in July 1999, Britain reestablished diplomatic relations with Libya.

Nevertheless, we believe that Qadhafi remains committed to developing or acquiring NBC weapons and improved ballistic missile capabilities. With the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya likely has increased its procurement efforts in support of its NBC weapons and missile programs. For example, in January 2000, British authorities at Gatwick Airport seized missile components from a Taiwan company that were destined for Libya; the components were labeled as auto parts. Qadhafi likely believes that these weapons will advance
his regime’s international image and serve as deterrents against the West’s more sophisticated weapons. Libya’s programs have made little progress in the last several years, due to a weak economy and an insufficient technological infrastructure. However, even though the programs have resulted only in limited capabilities, their use cannot be discounted because of Qadhafi’s history of unpredictability. On the other hand, during 1999, Qadhafi has taken a more moderate international stance and acted as host for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference in September 1999. He may be hoping that his actions will result in the permanent lifting of sanctions and an overall thaw in Libya’s relations with the West. Libya’s economy has suffered from the cumulative effects of years of socialist-oriented policies that allocate substantial resources to grandiose industrial schemes, low worker productivity, and a weak nonpetroleum industrial base. Libya does not publicly disclose its annual defense budget. Subsequent to the April 1999 suspension of UN sanctions, international petroleum prices rebounded, resulting in several billion dollars more in annual export earnings for Libya. Such factors could permit Libya to increase military spending, with a potential increased emphasis on NBC weapons and the missile program.

**Nuclear Program**

Libya has ratified the NPT, but has not signed the CTBT and has long intended to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Libya has made little progress, however, as its nuclear program lacks well-developed plans, expertise, consistent financial support, and adequate foreign suppliers. In the face of these difficulties, nonetheless, Libya likely will continue to try to develop a supporting infrastructure. Libya has a Soviet-supplied research reactor at Tajura that is under IAEA safeguards. The Russians may become actively involved in the modernization of the Tajura nuclear research center and, in 1999, Tripoli and Moscow resumed discussions on cooperation involving the Tajura reactor as well as a potential power reactor deal. Should this civil sector work come to fruition, Libya could gain opportunities to conduct nuclear weapons-related research and development. Libya reportedly also is trying to recruit foreign scientists and technicians to aid its program.

**Libya: NBC Weapons And Missile Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Nuclear**       | Has made little progress with long-standing goal of acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon; may be trying to recruit foreign experts to assist with effort.  
Ratified the NPT; has not signed the CTBT.  
Signed the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. |
| **Biological**    | Remains in research and development stage, but may be capable of producing small quantities of agent.  
Ratified the BWC. |
| **Chemical**      | Produced blister and nerve agents in 1980s at Rabta; employed chemical agents against Chadian troops in 1987; attempted to construct underground chemical agent production facility at Tarhunah.  
Rabta and Tarhunah believed to be inactive, although chemical program not completely abandoned.  
Has not signed the CWC. |
| **Ballistic Missiles** | Maintains aging SCUD missile force of limited operational utility.  
Has made only limited success with over 20-year indigenous missile production effort; may renew focus on purchasing complete ballistic missile.  
Not a member of the MTCR. |
| **Other Means of Delivery Available** | Land- and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; none have NBC warheads.  
Aircraft: fighters, bombers, helicopters, transport planes.  
Ground systems: artillery, rocket launcher. |
Biological Program
Libya has ratified the BWC, but has continued a biological warfare program. This program has not advanced beyond the research and development stage, although it may be capable of producing small quantities of biological agent. Libya’s program has been hindered by the country’s poor scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999. Without foreign assistance and technical expertise to help Libya use available dual-use materials, the Libyan biological warfare program is not likely to make significant progress beyond its current stage. On the other hand, with the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya’s ability to acquire biological-related equipment and expertise will increase.

Chemical Program
Among any of its NBC programs, Libya has made the most progress with its chemical warfare effort. However, it remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, mechanical and technical expertise, and chemical warfare-related equipment. From 1992 to 1999, UN sanctions continued to limit the type and amount of support Tripoli receives from abroad. However, following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Libya wasted no time in reestablishing contacts with foreign sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals for its program. Clearly, Tripoli has not given up its goal of reestablishing its offensive chemical warfare ability and continues to pursue an indigenous chemical warfare production capability.

Prior to 1990, Libya produced about 100 tons of chemical agents — mustard and some nerve agent — at a chemical facility at Rabta. However, it ceased production there in 1990 due to intense international media attention and the possibility of military intervention, and fabricated a fire to make the Rabta facility appear to have been seriously damaged. Libya maintains that the facility is a pharmaceutical production plant and announced in September 1995 that it was reopening the Rabta pharmaceutical facility. Although production of chemical agents has been halted, the Rabta facility remains part of the Libyan chemical weapons program, and future agent production cannot be ruled out.

After 1990, the Libyans shifted their efforts to trying to build a large underground chemical production facility at Tarhunah. However, the pace of activity there has slowed, probably due to increased international attention. The Libyans claim that the Tarhunah tunnel site is a part of the Great Man-made River Project, a nationwide irrigation effort. Libya has not become a state party to the CWC.

Ballistic Missiles
Despite the presence of UN sanctions from 1992 to 1999, Libya continued to seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise. However, the sanctions restricted the flow of ballistic missile goods and technology ultimately reaching Tripoli, although Libya has successfully obtained them, most notably from Serbia and from Indian companies. Such foreign assistance is critical to maintaining Libya’s missile development program and, with the 1999 suspension of UN sanctions, Libya may have greater latitude to seek foreign assistance. Libya continues to maintain an aging SCUD missile force, although the missiles likely suffer from poor maintenance and their operational status is questionable.

Libya has tried, with limited success, to develop its own indigenous missile, and to extend the range of its aging SCUD force for many years under the Al Fatah and other missile programs. These indigenous programs are heavily dependent on foreign support and remain in the testing phase. Similarly, Libya’s SCUD modification efforts also have shown little progress despite some foreign assistance. Tripoli also is interested in a longer-range missile, such as the North Korean No Dong MRBM, or a similarly capable system, which it may pursue in light of the suspended UN sanctions. Should Libya succeed with its effort to purchase or perhaps develop such a missile, the missile could threaten Egypt, Israel, NATO countries in southern Europe and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean region.
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Libyan Ballistic Missiles

Since the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Libya has expanded its missile technology procurement effort.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery

Libya has land- and sea-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles that it purchased from Soviet and European sources, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. Many of the systems are old and likely are suffering from maintenance problems. In the future, while Libya likely will continue to focus on its anti-ship missile capabilities, it may try to purchase land attack cruise missiles. Libya also has a variety of fighter aircraft, some bombers, helicopters, artillery, and rockets available. Libya used transport aircraft in its attempt to deliver chemical agents against Chadian troops in 1987.

SUDAN

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

Sudan likely will remain beset with civil war, at least in the south, for the next year. Recent political and diplomatic actions in Khartoum indicate that the National Congress Party (NCP) is attempting to moderate and change its public image. Nonetheless, this has created no momentum towards peace. President Bashir had been locked in an internal struggle with former NCP ideologue Turabi, who is now the head of a second, competing political party. In December 1999, Bashir moved against Turabi, removing him as Secretary General of the NCP. Bashir is concentrating on consolidating power, while his supporters believe the course he is setting for Sudan — breaking out of regional and international isolation and undercutting the effectiveness of southern and northern armed opposition — most likely will enable the NCP to remain the dominant political force in the country.

Even with Sudan’s new political direction and increasingly savvy dealings with the international community, it is unlikely that cosmetic reforms will bring an end to the country’s southern rebellion. Sudan’s internal conflict will continue to destabilize the region due to the resulting humanitarian crisis and to the varying degrees of support for the rebels provided by bordering states.

Chemical Program

Sudan has been interested in acquiring a chemical warfare capability since the 1980s and has sought assistance from a number of countries with chemical warfare programs. We believe that Iraq, in particular, has provided technical expertise to Khartoum. In addition, the finding of a known VX precursor chemical near a pharmaceutical facility in Khartoum suggests that Sudan may be pursuing a more advanced chemical warfare capability. Sudan acceded to the CWC in 1999, although allegations of Sudanese chemical warfare use against rebels in southern Sudan have persisted. These, and prior allegations of chemical warfare use, have not been confirmed. Further, Khartoum’s desire to present a more moderate image and alleviate its international isolation will cause Sudan to proceed with its chemical warfare program with caution.

Conclusion

Several states in the Middle East and Africa remain committed to the development or acquisition of NBC weapons and missile delivery systems. During the last few years, some of these states have made significant progress towards an independent production capability. As these states achieve production self-sufficiency, they, in turn, may become suppliers of NBC weapons or missiles, or related technologies, decreasing opportunities for effective counter-proliferation and complicating arms control diplomacy. In the Middle East, while some tensions have been reduced by progress in the peace process, the region as a whole remains volatile with a long history of conflict. This volatility increases the chances that some of these dangerous weapons will be used should a new conflict occur in the region, threatening key U.S. interests and putting U.S. and allied military forces at risk. Many, but not all, states have ratified key arms control regimes and treaties, but adherence is questionable in some cases, and some countries have denial and deception programs to conceal their efforts.

In the Middle East, we believe that Iran’s actions, within the last year or so, demonstrate that it remains intent on developing or acquiring NBC weapons and missiles as part of a strategy to increase its influence in
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

In the region and beyond. These actions include substantial progress, especially in the areas of chemical warfare and ballistic missiles. Although Iraq remains under UN sanctions, there have been no UN inspections since 1999, and Iraq may have begun to reconstitute its NBC weapons and missiles programs, which again could become a threat to Iraq’s neighbors in the region. Syria is improving its chemical warfare program and could deliver chemical agents with missiles.

In Africa, while Libya’s progress had been slowed by UN sanctions in the past, now that these sanctions have been suspended, Libya may renew procurement activity to support its NBC weapons and missile programs. Further, as long as Qadhafi remains in power, we will be concerned about Libya’s efforts. Lastly, Sudan’s interest in chemical warfare, and Khartoum’s links to Iraq and Usama Bin Laden, will remain a cause for concern.
U.S. Goals and Interests
The United States has a tremendous stake both in the democratization and reform of Russia, Ukraine, and other New Independent States (NIS) and in the further normalization of U.S. relations with NIS governments, militaries, and other institutions. Given the Soviet legacy of weapons of mass destruction, these states, and especially Russia, are key to the stability of the future regional and international security environment. Through increasing ties to these countries, the United States is contributing to continued and lasting reductions in and effective Russian control over the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the associated weapons-related technologies and technical expertise.

The United States seeks to deter strategic nuclear threats against its citizens and territory. In addition, through its various programs and activities with the NIS, the United States seeks to ensure that Russia, Ukraine, and the other nations of the region become stable market democracies that are cooperative partners in promoting regional stability in Europe and elsewhere. Integral to this goal is U.S. support to efforts to reduce the numbers of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and to prevent the proliferation of those weapons and the technologies that support their manufacture. The United States desires Russia to play a constructive role in European affairs, in partnership with NATO, and to maintain friendly relations with an independent Ukraine. Ultimately, the United States hopes that the NIS will resolve any ethnic and regional tensions through peaceful means.

In bilateral interactions with all the NIS, the DoD seeks to impart the principles of civilian leadership, defense transparency, and military reform and restructuring. The Department will continue to broaden military and civilian defense contacts and support the ongoing reduction of weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure.

Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends
Russia retains a significant strategic nuclear force capability, despite the decline in overall force size since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and despite apparent defense budgetary shortfalls and system aging. Russia also inherited sizeable biological and chemical warfare establishments from the FSU, and some components of these programs remain largely intact. Russian entities have exported various nuclear and ballistic missile technologies to states of proliferation concern, and Russia also remains a source for offensive biological and chemical warfare technologies and expertise.

There is little threat from FSU-sponsored NBC weapons and missiles in Eastern Europe. Regional states are focused on joining the Western community, and three former Warsaw Pact states in neighboring Central Europe have already joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, most states in the region have eliminated or will eliminate all NBC weapon or missile capabilities that they had as members of the Warsaw Pact. (Serbia is an exception, and it may retain some chemical warfare capabilities). In addition, all tactical nuclear weapons were returned to Russia by 1992.

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources
The Russian leadership generally agrees that Moscow should maintain strong nuclear forces particularly in light of the reduced capability of Russian conventional forces in recent years. The overall reduction in Russian military capabilities, especially the conventional forces, has caused Russian military planners to emphasize Moscow’s threat to use nuclear weapons to deter a large-scale conventional attack, a policy that Moscow stated in its military doctrine published in October 1999 and reiterated in January 2000 and again in April 2000. Russia is prepared to conduct limited nuclear strikes to warn off an enemy or alter the course of a battle.

Russia’s strategic offensive forces are experiencing serious budget constraints but will nonetheless remain the cornerstone of its military power. These forces will
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

remain formidable through and beyond 2015, although the overall size of the force will likely continue to decrease, primarily as a result of economic factors and system aging. Despite its ratification of biological and chemical weapons conventions, there are serious concerns about remaining offensive Russian biological and chemical warfare capabilities.

The Russian government has passed new export control legislation to punish wrongdoers and created institutional foundations to implement it. The challenge is whether the Russian leadership can build on that foundation, ensure that dangerous transfers stop, and use these new tools to crack down on violators.

Russia’s defense spending also has declined steadily since the late 1980s. Although evidence of the need for reform is overwhelming, the key question is whether the Putin government will show the requisite political will to implement long-overdue reform measures. Macroeconomic improvements are already visible, but these will not address the underlying problems of the Russian economy unless matched by a strong push on structural reforms. Consequently, Russian funding for its strategic forces, and any remaining biological and chemical warfare efforts, will in part be limited by the state of its economy.

Russian Nuclear Forces

Moscow increasingly has stated it will rely more heavily on its nuclear forces for deterrent purposes, especially given the serious deterioration of their conventional forces’ capability. Russia conditionally ratified (START II) in May 2000, which, once it enters into force, will limit the number of operational launchers and deployed warheads to 3,000-3,500. In June 1999, former President Yeltsin proposed discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russia: NBC Weapons and Missile Programs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biological</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missiles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Means of Delivery Available</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with the United States for further force reductions in the context of a START III Treaty, with proposed force levels of 1,500-2,000.

The Russian nuclear warhead stockpile is being reduced as a result of tactical nuclear warhead reduction initiatives, while the START I treaty (which entered into force in December 1994) and system aging have resulted in the reduction of deployed strategic warheads. In December 2000, the stockpile was estimated to be well under 25,000 warheads, a reduction of over 11,000 warheads since eliminations began in 1992. By the end of 2010, the overall stockpile likely will be further reduced, depending on the economic situation in Russia, Moscow’s willingness and ability to abide by tactical nuclear warhead reduction pledges, and future arms control agreements.

Moscow has consolidated many of its strategic and tactical warheads at central storage locations, and numerous warhead storage sites for holding warheads have been deactivated since the early 1990s. While this consolidation has improved security, current resource shortages have subjected the nuclear storage system to new stresses and risks for which it was not designed. Indeed, warhead reductions have had the collateral effect of increasing near- to mid-term fissile material storage requirements, pending the long-term elimination of relevant weapons-usable fissile materials.

**Strategic Nuclear Forces**

While Russia’s strategic nuclear forces will retain considerable capability over the next ten years and will serve as its primary means of deterrence, the overall force is expected to continue to decrease because of arms control, economic constraints, and aging equipment. Within ten years, the number of operational strategic warheads will continue to decline. At the same time, however, production of warheads will continue into the 21st century as new strategic missile systems are deployed and obsolete warheads replaced.

For strategic delivery, Russia retains a significant strategic ballistic missile force of some 1,130 operational ICBMs and SLBMs. There no longer are any operationally deployed ICBMs in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. More than 1,250 FSU ICBMs and SLBMs have been removed from the overall force since 1991. This force is likely to decline further as a result of systems aging, chronic funding problems, and arms control agreements. On the other hand, Russia has begun deployment of a new ICBM, the SS-27 (TOPOL-M), and has other missiles planned for deployment in the 21st century. Russia has ratified the NPT and the CTBT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Strategic Nuclear Warheads</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7,327</td>
<td>5,870*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10,280</td>
<td>5,870*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 43 percent reduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>1,207**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,509</td>
<td>1,207**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Includes silo- and submarine-based ballistic missiles and air-launched systems.
** 52 percent reduction

**Tactical Nuclear Forces**

Because of economic and other difficulties facing Russia and its armed forces, tactical nuclear weapons will remain a viable component of its general purpose forces for at least the next decade. Russia likely believes that maintaining tactical nuclear forces is a less expensive way to compensate for its current problems in maintaining conventional force capabilities.

In late 1991 and early 1992, Russia agreed in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives to a dramatic reduction in its tactical nuclear forces, including the elimination of its ground-launched tactical weapons. Russia still has significant numbers and types of delivery systems capable of performing the tactical nuclear mission. For example, Russia continues to have large inventories of tactical SRBMs (SS-21s), deactivated SCUDs, and a variety of artillery capable of delivering NBC weapons. In fact, Russia employed its tactical
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

SRBMs (with conventional warheads) against the Chechens in the fall of 1999. Air systems include fighter aircraft and bombers. Naval tactical nuclear systems include torpedoes, anti-shippping and anti-submarine warfare missiles, and air-launched munitions carried on naval aircraft. Further, Russia’s industrial base can support production of the full range of solid- and liquid-propellant ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and all associated technologies.

In November 1993, the Russian Ministry of Defense formally dropped its wholly declaratory “no first use” of nuclear weapons policy. In its place, the Ministry of Defense published its Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in which it articulated its current nuclear policy:

“The Russian Federation will not employ its nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, dated 1 July 1968, which does not possess nuclear weapons except in the cases of (a) an armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces, other troops, or its allies by any state that is connected by an allegiance agreement with a state that does not possess nuclear weapons or; (b) joint actions by such a state with a state possessing nuclear weapons in the carrying out or in support of any invasion or armed attack upon the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces, other troops, or its allies.”

The current Russian doctrine and strategy involving the use of nuclear weapons, reiterated in October 1999, states that “the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons has not been excluded if the situation deteriorates during the course of conventional war.” A revised version of this document was approved by then-Acting President Putin in January 2000, which further lowers the threshold for nuclear use in order to protect Russia’s national interests and territorial integrity; it states: “The application of all forces and means, including nuclear weapons, if necessary to repel armed aggression, if all other measures for resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proven ineffective.” In April 2000, the Russians elaborated on this threshold, stating that “the Russian Federation retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons, or other types of weapons of mass destruction against itself or its allies, and also in response to large scale aggression with the use conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.”

Biological Warfare

The FSU offensive biological program was the world’s largest and consisted of both military facilities and civilian research and development institutes. According to Ken Alibek, the former Deputy Director of BIO-PREPARAT, the principal Soviet government agency for biological weapons research and development, by the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had developed a biological warfare employment doctrine, where biological weapons were categorized as strategic or operational. Alibek stated that they were not to be employed as tactical weapons. Strategic biological agents, those to be used on “deep targets,” such as the continental United States, were the lethal variety and included smallpox, anthrax, and plague. Operational agents, those intended for use on medium-range targets, but well behind the battlefront, were the incapacitating variety and included tularemia, glanders, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. For both strategic and operational employment, the Soviet goal was to create large numbers of casualties and extensive disruption of vital civilian and military activities.
The former Deputy Director further stated that although the Soviet Union became a signatory to the 1972 BWC, it continued a massive program to develop and manufacture biological weapons. Alibek claims that in the late-1980s and early-1990s, over 60,000 people were involved in the research, development, and production of biological weapons in the Soviet Union. The annual production capacity of all of the facilities involved was several thousand tons of various agents.

The Russian government has publicly committed to ending the former Soviet biological weapons program and claims to have ended the program in 1992. Nevertheless, serious concerns remain about Russia’s offensive biological warfare capabilities and the status of some elements of the offensive biological warfare capability inherited from the FSU.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, more extensive downsizing and restructuring of the program have taken place. Many of the key research and production facilities have taken severe cuts in funding and personnel. However, some key components of the former Soviet program may remain largely intact and may support a possible future mobilization capability for the production of biological agents and delivery systems. Despite Russian ratification of the BWC, work outside the scope of legitimate biological defense activity may be occurring now at selected facilities within Russia, and the United States continues to receive unconfirmed reports of some ongoing offensive biological warfare activities.

Chemical Warfare

Moscow has acknowledged the world’s largest stockpile of chemical agents of 40,000 metric tons of agent. The Russian chemical warfare agent inventory consists of a comprehensive array of blister, choking, and nerve agents in weapons and stored in bulk. These agents can be employed by tube and rocket artillery, bombs, spray tanks, and SRBM warheads. In addition, since 1992, Russian scientists familiar with Moscow’s chemical warfare development program have been publishing information on a new generation of agents, sometimes referred to as “Novichoks.” These scientists report that these compounds, some of which are binaries, were designed to circumvent the CWC and to defeat Western detection and protection measures. Furthermore, it is claimed that their production can be hidden within commercial chemical plants. There is concern that the technology to produce these compounds might be acquired by other countries.

As a state party to the CWC, Russia is obligated to declare and destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and to forego the development, production, and possession of chemical weapons. However, we believe that the Russians probably have not divulged the full extent of their chemical agent and weapon inventory. Destruction facilities are being planned at Shchuch’ye and Gorny, two of the seven declared storage locations for the Russian chemical warfare stockpile; these efforts are being funded in large part by foreign assistance programs. Nevertheless, Russia admitted it could not meet its first obligation to destroy one percent of its stockpile by April 2000. Subsequently, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) granted Russia an extension until April 2002, but with the stipulation that it must also meet 20 percent destruction deadline by the same date, as called for under the CWC. However, international experts agree that it will be extremely difficult for Russia to destroy its huge chemical arsenal by 2007 as mandated by the CWC. Even if Russia were to be granted a five-year extension by the OPCW, it is unlikely that Russia’s declared stockpile will be completely destroyed because of serious technical, ecological, financial, and political problems.

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery

Russia has a variety of land-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles. Many are designated as short-range anti-ship weapons, although other tactical cruise missile systems have ranges of up to 500 kilometers. All of these systems were produced by the FSU and many were exported to numerous countries worldwide. Russia also has long-range land-attack nuclear capable cruise missiles. While Russia may have plans to develop new land-, sea- or air-launched cruise missiles, funding problems and other priorities likely will delay deployments. In addition, Russia has a variety of fighter aircraft, helicopters, artillery, rockets, and SRBMs available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons.
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Role as Supplier

Russia expresses public support for various nonproliferation regimes and treaties and has ratified key arms control treaties. (See Annex B.) Some Russian entities have provided ballistic missile and nuclear technology to states of proliferation concern. Entities also have been a source of dual-use biological and chemical expertise and technology.

Russia has been a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily focused on the Bushehr nuclear power plant project. This assistance provides cover for Iran's nuclear weapons development efforts. Because of the dual-use nature of many nuclear technologies involved, even the transfer of civilian technology may be of use in Iran's nuclear weapons program. In addition, Russia supplied India with technologies and materials for its unsafeguarded civilian nuclear program.

Russian entities have been key sources of biotechnology and chemicals for Iran. Russia's world-leading expertise in biological and chemical weapons makes it an attractive source for Iranians seeking technical information and training on biological and chemical warfare agent production processes.

During the last two years, Russian entities supplied a large quantity and variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran and India. For example, Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian and North Korean companies accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-1 MRBM, which was flight tested in July 1998 and again in July and September 2000. Russian entities provided substantial missile-related technology, training, and expertise to Iran, which has helped to accelerate Iranian efforts to build new indigenous ballistic missile systems. As a result, during 1998 and 1999 the United States imposed penalties against ten Russian entities for their assistance to the Iranian missile and nuclear programs. These penalties remain in place.

Further, during the 1999 Moscow air show, the Russians unveiled a missile called the Iskander-E, which may be the export version of a new SRBM. The Russians claim that it has a range of 280 kilometers and a payload below 500 kilograms and therefore, sales would not violate the MTCR. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has not sold any finished ballistic missiles to any country.

In recent years Russia has issued export control measures — including a July 1999 law prohibiting the export of items that can be used for the development of NBC weapons- or missile-related materials. It has begun developing the foundation for a modern export control system. Despite these actions, Moscow's commitment, willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remain uncertain. Moreover, economic conditions at many facilities continue to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian entities to circumvent export controls to gain hard currency.

Conclusion

Despite the significant decline in the number of its operational strategic nuclear warheads and associated delivery vehicles since 1991, Russia retains sizeable and capable strategic nuclear forces. However, Russia has indicated a desire for additional reductions of strategic forces in the future. On the other hand, Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear warheads that it is unlikely to dismantle soon and that are not subject to current arms control agreements. Recent Russian public statements about their willingness to use nuclear weapons indicate that Russia's threshold for the use of these weapons is lower, due to the decline of the capabilities of its conventional forces.

Although Russia has ratified the BWC and the CWC, there are still serious questions about the former Soviet biological and chemical warfare programs. At the same time, Russian military leaders may view the retention of at least some of these capabilities as desirable, given the decline in Russia's conventional forces. Russia's large NBC weapon and missile arsenals, even if deactivated, together with questionable security for at least a portion of these weapons, make Russia a prime source for technologies, materials, expertise and information for states of proliferation concern, such as those examined in previous chapters. The ongoing economic and political turmoil in Russia, together with questions about the central government's ability to enforce export controls, adds another dynamic to the serious potential for the proliferation of NBC- and missile-related technologies from Russia.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

U.S. Goals and Interests

The number one U.S. goal in the never-ending struggle of combating terrorism is the protection of the American people and our facilities. We will accomplish this through deterrence and punishment. Whenever possible, we use law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight against terrorism, but there have been, and will be, times when those tools are not enough.

The United States takes terrorist organizations and threats very seriously. In 1998, acting on convincing information from a variety of reliable sources that the network of radical groups affiliated with Usama Bin Laden had planned, financed, and carried out the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and planned future attacks against Americans, the United States carried out strikes on one of the most active terrorist bases in the world. Located in Afghanistan, it contained key elements of the Bin Laden network's infrastructure and has served as a training camp for literally thousands of terrorists from around the globe. The U.S. military also struck a plant in Khartoum, Sudan, that was linked by intelligence information to chemical weapons and to the Bin Laden terror network. The strikes were deemed a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against Americans, and demonstrated that the U.S. government will seek out terrorists around the world, no matter where they try to seek refuge.

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Introduction

Transnational proliferation includes those NBC threats that cross national or regional boundaries or are not otherwise easily categorized. The possible acquisition or use of NBC materials by terrorists, inadequate security of NBC materials, and threats to agriculture and livestock are some of the issues that greatly concern the United States and its allies.

Terrorism

Many of the technologies associated with the development of NBC weapons, especially chemical and biological agents, have legitimate civil applications and are classified as dual-use. The increased availability of these technologies, coupled with the relative ease of producing some chemical or biological agents, has increased concern that use of chemical or biological weapons may become more attractive to terrorist groups intent on causing panic or inflicting large numbers of casualties. In addition, the proliferation of such weapons raises the possibility that some states or entities within these states could provide NBC weapons to terrorists or to state-sponsored operatives for use abroad.

The likelihood of a state sponsor providing such a weapon to a terrorist group is believed to be low. It is possible, however, that groups, especially extremist groups with no ties to a particular state, could acquire and attempt to use such weapons in the future. Some groups, especially those motivated by distorted religious and cultural ideologies, have demonstrated a willingness to inflict greater numbers of indiscriminate
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

casualties. Other less predictable but potentially dangerous groups have also emerged. Those groups may not adhere to traditional targeting constraints. For example, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group attacked the Tokyo subway with the chemical nerve agent sarin in 1995, although it had failed in several reported attempts to carry out biological attacks, probably because of difficulties in agent production and dissemination. In addition, the Usama Bin Laden network, which was responsible for the conventional weapons attack on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, is known to be interested in NBC weapons; in fact, Usama Bin Laden has spoken publicly about acquiring such a capability and likened his pursuit of those weapons to a religious duty.

Aum Shinrikyo continued efforts to rebuild itself in 1999. The group’s recruitment, training, fundraising — especially a computer business that generated more than $50 million — and property acquisition, however, provoked numerous police raids and an extensive public backlash that included protests and citizen-led efforts to monitor and barricade Aum facilities.

In an effort to alleviate public pressure and criticism, Aum leaders in late September announced the group would suspend its public activities for an indeterminate period beginning 1 October. The cult openly pledged to close its branch offices, discontinue public gatherings, cease distribution of propaganda, shut down most of its Internet web site, and halt property purchases beyond that required to provide adequate housing for existing members. The cult also said it would stop using the name “Aum Shinrikyo.” On 1 December, Aum leaders admitted the cult conducted the sarin attack and other crimes — which they had denied previously — and apologized publicly for the acts. The cult made its first compensation payment to victims’ families in late December 1999.

Japanese courts sentenced one Aum member to death and another to life in prison for the subway attack, while trials for other members involved in the attack remain ongoing. The prosecution of cult founder Shoko Asahara continued at a sluggish pace, and a verdict remained years away. Japanese authorities remained concerned over the release in late December 1999 of popular former cult spokesman Fumihiro Joyu, who served a three-and-a-half-year jail sentence for perjury and is expected to return to the cult as a senior leader. The Japanese parliament in December passed legislation strengthening government authority to crack down on groups resembling the Aum and allowing the government to confiscate funds from the group to compensate victims. The Public Security Investigation Agency stated that it would again seek to outlaw the Aum under the Anti-Subversive Activities Law.

The Usama Bin Laden network’s reported interest in NBC materials is a key concern in terms of possible future threats to U.S. interests. The network’s interest in NBC materials has been noted since the early 1990s and, in 1999, Usama Bin Laden made public statements defending the right of the Muslim community to pursue NBC capabilities. The bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August 1998 underscored the global reach of Usama Bin Laden — a longtime sponsor and financier of extremist causes — and brought to full public awareness his transition from sponsor to terrorist. A series of public threats to drive the United States and its allies out of Muslim countries foreshadowed the attacks, including what was presented as a fatwa (Muslim legal opinion) published on 23 February 1998 by Bin Laden and allied groups under the name “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.” The statement asserted it was a religious duty for all Muslims to wage war on U.S. citizens, military and civilian, anywhere in the world.

The seventeenth son of Saudi construction magnate Muhammad Bin Laden, Usama joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. He played a significant role in financing, recruiting, transporting, and training Arab nationals who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan. During the war, Bin Laden founded al-Qaeda (the Base) to serve as an operational hub for like-minded extremists. The Saudi government revoked his citizenship in 1994, and his family officially disowned him. He moved to Sudan in 1991, but international pressure on Khartoum forced him to move to Afghanistan in 1996.
Section I
NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

The Usama Bin Laden network’s reported interest in NBC materials is a key concern in terms of possible future threats to U.S. interests. The network’s interest in NBC materials has been noted since the early 1990s and, in 1999, Usama Bin Laden made public statements defending the right of the Muslim community to pursue NBC capabilities. Bin Laden has stated publicly that terrorism is a tool to achieve the group’s goal of bringing Islamic rule to Muslim lands and “cleanse” them of Western influence and corruption. To this end, Bin Laden in 1999 led a broad-based, versatile organization. Suspects named in the wake of the Embassy bombings — Egyptians, one Comoran, one Palestinian, one Saudi, and U.S. citizens — reflect the range of al-Qaida operatives. The diverse groups under his umbrella afford Bin Laden resources beyond those of the people directly loyal to him. With his own inherited wealth, business interests, contributions from sympathizers in various countries, and support from close allies like the Egyptian and South Asian groups that signed his fatwa, he funds, trains, and offers logistic help to extremists not directly affiliated with his organization. He seeks to aid those who support his primary goals — driving U.S. forces from the Arabian Peninsula, removing the Saudi ruling family from power, and “liberating Palestine” — or his secondary goals of removing Western military forces and overthrowing what he calls corrupt, Western-oriented governments in predominantly Muslim countries. His organization has sent trainers throughout Afghanistan as well as to Tajikistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen and has trained fighters from numerous other countries, including the Philippines, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and Entrea.

Using the ties al-Qaida has developed, Bin Laden believes he can call upon individuals and groups virtually worldwide to conduct terrorist attacks. In December 1998, Bin Laden gave a series of interviews in which he denied involvement in the East Africa bombings but said he “instigated” them and called for attacks on U.S. citizens worldwide in retaliation for the strikes against Iraq. Bin Laden’s public statements then ceased under increased pressure from his Taliban hosts. Nonetheless, in 1999, Bin Laden continued to influence like-minded extremists to his cause, and his organization continued to engage in terrorist planning. His Egyptian and South Asian allies, for example, continued publicly to threaten U.S. interests.

Security of NBC Materials

Security of weapons-usable nuclear materials in Russia is another serious concern. While the Russian government is committed to nuclear security, continuing turmoil in society, corruption and resource shortages complicate this commitment. The combination of lax security for nuclear materials at some facilities, poor economic conditions and the growing crime in Russia mean that the potential for the theft and subsequent smuggling of these materials will continue to cause concern. At the same time, the Russians have taken seriously the threat from a potential Chechen insurgent attack on a nuclear power facility and have made security upgrades.

In the past, there have been incidents of weapons-usable materials being diverted from Russian nuclear facilities. The largest seizures of such materials outside of the FSU occurred in 1994, where 2.7 kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) were found in the Czech Republic and about 360 grams of plutonium was seized in Germany. However, confirmed incidents of smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear materials, primarily plutonium and HEU, have declined but continued at a low rate. This decrease may be due to several factors: decreased smuggling through Western Europe, where detection is more likely; shifting of smuggling pathways through the southern tier of former Soviet states, where detection is highly unlikely; or improved security at Russian nuclear facilities.

Nevertheless, reports of theft of nuclear materials continue to emanate from the former Soviet block countries. For example, in September 1999 one kilogram of reportedly uranium-235 (enrichment unconfirmed) was seized in the Republic of Georgia. In another recent case, 10 grams of weapons-grade HEU was confiscated in Bulgaria. In addition to reports of actual nuclear materials being offered for sale, there have been numerous accounts of radioactive isotopes such as californium-252, strontium-90, and cesium-137.
Section I

NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

being stolen from industrial and research facilities. In the short run, reports of nuclear theft, whether real or scams, will continue. However, in the longer term, the implementation of the U.S.-sponsored Material Protection, Control, and Accountability Program at Russian nuclear facilities likely will lead to a reduction of the number of incidents of diversion of weapon-grade materials.

- HEU and plutonium are also being recovered from Russia’s ongoing warhead elimination effort, although a considerable degree of uncertainty remains about the overall security of Russia’s large inventory of nuclear material. Several programs are under way to alleviate the security problems for this material.

- First, the U.S. DOE is assisting former Soviet states with physical security improvements at nuclear facilities in an effort to institute accurate accounting procedures for nuclear materials.

- Second, pursuant to a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) implementing agreement with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, DoD is helping to build a state-of-the-art storage facility for long-term secure storage of HEU and plutonium from disassembled nuclear weapons. This facility is located at Mayak, about 1,400 kilometers east of Moscow near the Ural mountains.

- Third, the United States is purchasing 500 metric tons of HEU derived from disassembled Russian warheads. This material is being blended down in Russia into low-enriched uranium suitable for use in nuclear power reactors. Shipments to the United States began in 1993 and will continue over the next 20 years; as of mid-2000, about 100 tons of HEU had been transferred from Russia to the United States.

- Finally, Russia has agreed to shut down its remaining plutonium-producing reactors.

Concern about security is not confined to nuclear items, but extends also to facilities in the FSU that house chemical or biological warfare-related materials. In addition, numerous scientists and technicians previously involved in key programs face severe salary reduction, complete loss of pay, unemployment. States, such as Iran, that are seeking to establish their own weapon capabilities may try to exploit the situation by attempting to recruit such individuals. However, Western programs, such as the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) are expressly designed to address this “brain drain” problem.

Threat to Agriculture and Livestock

The potential threats to U.S. agriculture and livestock can come from a variety of pathogens and causative agents. With one in eight jobs and 13 percent of the gross national product dependent on U.S. agricultural productivity, economic stability of the country depends on a bountiful and safe food supply system. Similar to the human population, the high health status of crop and livestock assets in the United States creates a great vulnerability to attack with biological agents. Attacks against U.S. agricultural assets, might be tempting, due to the perceived relative ease of attack, the plausible deniability toward accusations, and the limited number of plant seed varieties in use. Indeed, the Soviet Union apparently planned to target U.S. agriculture and livestock as one element of a larger disruptive process and developed a range of biological agents that would be effective in this capacity.
Consequences of compromising the productivity and safety of the U.S. food supply are primarily economic in nature. Disrupting the supply lines for food stocks or threatening the safety of those items supplied also may erode military readiness.

Highly infectious naturally occurring plant and animal pathogens exist outside the U.S. borders and some agents are readily transported, inadvertently or intentionally, with little risk of detection. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is the regulatory, first-response agency responsible for the diagnosis and management of all suspicious agricultural disease outbreaks. As a result of binding international agreements, select plant and animal disease outbreak confirmation, regardless of magnitude, can immediately have an impact on export trade. Depending on the agent, APHIS authority includes property seizure and total eradication of all plant or animal hosts within concentric zones of quarantine. Public trust in government and political stability can be threatened depending on the extent of disease transmission, the success of regulatory response procedures, and the duration of time to restore normalcy. Additional impacts include:

- U.S. livestock markets would be vulnerable to the causative agents of diseases including anthrax, Q fever, brucellosis, FMD, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, hog cholera, African swine fever, avian influenza, Newcastle disease, Rift Valley fever, and rinderpest.
- Soybean rust, which can easily be introduced and spreads quickly, could cause U.S. soybean producers, processors, livestock producers, and consumers to lose up to $8 billion annually, according to USDA estimates.
- An outbreak of FMD, which is also easily introduced, highly contagious, and persistent-in the U.S. livestock industry could cost as much as $20 billion over 15 years in increased consumer costs, reduced livestock productivity, and restricted trade, according to the USDA.

Foot and Mouth Disease

The foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is a member of the Picornovirus family, and the disease is endemic in many areas of the world. However, the United States has not dealt with the FMD virus since the 1920s. Therefore, few veterinary practitioners currently have the ability to recognize early stages of FMD infection. This agent is somewhat unique, as the animal becomes infective shortly after exposure and prior to the onset of clinical symptoms. To disseminate the agent, the mere transport of sloughed nasal vesicular tissue and modest preservation in transport could easily start an epidemic. For example, a single infected cow, or particularly a pig, can generate enough viral particles to infect vast geographical areas in a short period of time. FMD is characterized by a sudden rise in temperature, followed by an eruption of blisters in the mouth, nostrils, other areas of tender skin, and on the feet. The blisters grow larger and then break, exposing raw, eroded surfaces. Eating becomes difficult and painful, and because the soft tissues under the hoof are inflamed, the animal invariable becomes lame. Livestock raised for meat lose much weight, and dairy cattle and goats give far less milk. FMD usually kills very young animals and causes pregnant females to abort. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) does not permit imports of FMD sero-positive animals. Considerable progress has been made toward developing an effective vaccine against FMD, but the cost (approximately $1 billion annually) of vaccinating all susceptible animals would be prohibitive. Moreover, the vaccine would not eradicate the disease. Consequently, the slaughter and incineration of all exposed animals is the only presently effective countermeasure to FMD. During an outbreak in the United Kingdom in 1967 and 1968, one example, more than 430,000 animals were destroyed.
Conclusion

The transnational nature of the threats examined in this chapter, together with the growing worldwide availability of various technologies and materials needed to make weapons, emphasizes the importance of a coordinated, broad-based response. The actions of the Aum Shinrikyo and the Usama Bin Laden groups are clear demonstrations of the dangers we face from groups that have access to critical information, expertise, and materials, as well as to ample financial backing. These groups are motivated by fanaticism and they have attempted to cause large numbers of casualties; they are not subject to the traditional moral constraints that affect nation-state actors. The possibility that such a group could acquire and use fissile, or radiological, material is one of the main reasons we are concerned about the security of nuclear materials in Russia. Poor economic conditions, growing power of organized crime, poor pay for security personnel at key nuclear facilities as well as at facilities formerly dedicated to biological and chemical warfare, and Russia’s lack of enforcement of existing export controls increase the potential for the theft or smuggling of NBC-related materials. Lastly, there are a wide variety of pathogens and causative agents that, if used by a terrorist group, could pose a serious threat to U.S. agriculture and livestock. These pathogens and causative agents are readily available and can be transported easily undetected; they also could be attractive to terrorist groups, or even states of proliferation concern, because of the ease of deniability of their use.

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<th>Animal Disease</th>
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<td>Foot and Mouth Disease</td>
<td>Soybean Rust (Soybean Plant)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vesicular Stomatitis</td>
<td>Ear Rot (Corn)</td>
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<td>Rinderpest Gibberella</td>
<td>Karnal Bunt (Wheat)</td>
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<td>African Swine Fever</td>
<td>Ergot (Sorghum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza</td>
<td>Bacterial Blight (Rice)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rift Valley Fever</td>
<td>Ring Rot (Potatoes)</td>
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<td>Lumpy Skin Disease</td>
<td>Wimega Blotch (Barley)</td>
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<td>Bluetongue</td>
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<td>Sheep and Goat Pox</td>
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<td>Swine Vesicular Disease</td>
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<td>Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia</td>
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<td>Newcastle Disease</td>
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<td>African Horse Sickness</td>
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Foreign Livestock and Plant Pathogens which Threaten U.S. Agricultural Productivity

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Radiological, material is one of the main reasons we are concerned about the security of nuclear materials in Russia. Poor economic conditions, growing power of organized crime, poor pay for security personnel at key nuclear facilities as well as at facilities formerly dedicated to biological and chemical warfare, and Russia’s lack of enforcement of existing export controls increase the potential for the theft or smuggling of NBC-related materials. Lastly, there are a wide variety of pathogens and causative agents that, if used by a terrorist group, could pose a serious threat to U.S. agriculture and livestock. These pathogens and causative agents are readily available and can be transported easily undetected; they also could be attractive to terrorist groups, or even states of proliferation concern, because of the ease of deniability of their use.
The potential for proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and missiles—is one of the top security concerns for the Department of Defense (DoD). DoD has undertaken a coordinated and complementary set of responses to counter the threat.

In response to the growing WMD threat, the United States leads international efforts to develop and sustain global norms against the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery means. It actively engages in dialogues with states around the world to persuade them not to acquire these capabilities or to eliminate capabilities already developed. The United States also works with states to combat proliferation by assisting them in gaining and assuring greater control over sensitive dual-use equipment and technology. DoD continues to support international arms control agreements and nonproliferation regimes and to roll back proliferation through efforts such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is facilitating the dismantlement of the WMD infrastructure in the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU).

In spite of these efforts, the threat of WMD use is a fixed part of the international security environment. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that chemical and biological weapons use will be “a likely condition of future warfare.” In response, the QDR directed DoD to integrate counterproliferation into every aspect of military activity, including planning, acquisition, intelligence, and international cooperation. The department has made substantial progress toward this goal since Proliferation: Threat and Response was last released.

DoD reorganized in October 1998 and consolidated many counterproliferation missions into a single organization—the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)—whose mission is to safeguard America and its friends from weapons of mass destruction by reducing the present threat and preparing for the future threat. In addition, counterproliferation as a mission area has been fully embedded into key planning documents.

The United States’ primary goal continues to be stopping proliferation. Because efforts to prevent, stop, or reverse proliferation may not always succeed, DoD is undertaking a variety of programs and activities, in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies, to deter the use of NBC weapons against U.S. and allied forces, as well as against the territories of the United States and its friends and allies. The effectiveness of these efforts will depend on close interagency coordination, close cooperation with our allies, sound program management of resources, and integration and institutionalization of the counterproliferation mission and capabilities within DoD. Through these efforts, we attempt to influence the perceptions and assessments of potential aggressors who possess NBC weapons regarding the resolve and capabilities of the United States to deal with such threats. Indeed, the knowledge that the United States has a powerful and ready nuclear capability, as well as global reach standoff precision-guided, conventional munitions, a highly trained, equipped, and motivated special operations force, and global intelligence and law enforcement, are significant deterrents to the use of these weapons.

Effective deterrence will depend on a range of nuclear and conventional response capabilities, as well as active and passive defenses, counterforce and consequence management capabilities, and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence. In particular, military preparations for operations in an NBC environment will make clear that the threat or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from applying military power in defense of its national interests. The United States is substantially improving its ability to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means, thereby decreasing the coercive value of NBC weapons against us and deterring adversaries from threatening or using such weapons.

DoD plays a vital role in supporting all facets of national counterproliferation policy. This section outlines steps the Department is taking to respond to the challenges of proliferation and to deal with the military
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

threats posed by NBC weapons. The DoD response to proliferation takes three forms: prevention/deterrence; protection of U.S. civilians and military forces if faced with the threat or use of NBC weapons, including missile defenses; and possessing the ability to respond in emergency situations where WMD are implemented.

None of these efforts alone will halt the spread and use of WMD. Together, they form a framework that allows the United States and its allies to mitigate this central, post-Cold War threat.

PREVENTION

The President’s 1999 National Security Strategy points out the importance of shaping the international environment to enhance U.S. security, including through the prevention and reduction of the diverse threats we face today. To supplement diplomatic efforts to achieve this goal, the United States provides international assistance, supports arms control efforts, and engages in intelligence, law enforcement, technology transfer and export controls, and military activities. DoD is involved in each of these efforts.

International norms, rules, and standards make an important contribution to proliferation prevention. They attempt to provide an atmosphere of restraint and often are useful frameworks that include tools (e.g., inspections) relevant to impeding proliferation. These international norms, rules, and standards can be specifically incorporated into arms control agreements or they can result from informal arrangements between states.

Denial

Export control policy has two principal objectives: first, to stop — or at least retard — the transfer of those technologies that could permit states of concern to design, manufacture, or acquire NBC weapons their delivery systems, or other dangerous armaments; and, second, to monitor the flow of dual-use technologies which have legitimate commercial applications but which, if diverted or applied to military end uses, could have a negative impact on U.S. national security interests. A policy of denial involves carefully targeted export controls and the halting, where possible, of trade in weapons and technology transfers to countries of concern.

DoD/Office of Secretary of Defense — Critical Technology Program

The DoD Critical Technology Program develops and publishes the congressionally mandated list of Military Critical Technologies. This list is a detailed compendium of the technologies that DoD assesses as critical to maintaining superior U.S. military capabilities. It applies to all mission areas, especially efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The list is used as a technical foundation for U.S. export proposals, most notably those made within the Wassenaar Arrangement, and as a technical reference. The document is divided into three parts:

- Part I, Weapons Systems Technologies, includes those with technical performance parameters at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S. military systems.
- Part II, Weapons of Mass Destruction, includes those technologies required for the development,
integration, or employment of WMD and their means of delivery.

Part III, Developing Critical Technologies, includes those technologies which, when fully developed, will produce superior military performance or maintain a superior capability at lower cost.

The list is updated regularly to ensure key technologies are included, thus capturing new technologies applicable to proliferation concerns.

Intelligence provides critical information on how some countries attempt to acquire sensitive technologies and materials through covert procurement networks, including important information on pending or ongoing foreign shipments of critical materials. They also provide technical assessments of materials and whether they are intended for legitimate civilian use or for military applications.

Intelligence capabilities also contribute to ongoing efforts to focus and strengthen key multilateral export control regimes, as well as support diplomatic approaches and international inspections. Accurate and timely information on the activities and intentions of a country of concern can be used to build a global consensus where concerted action is necessary or desirable.

DoD also plays a leadership role in the implementation of many arms control and nonproliferation regimes. For example, DTRA conducts research to identify technologies that will ensure verification technologies used to implement arms control agreements meet stringent DoD safety and operational requirements. DTRA is also responsible for implementing inspection, escort, and monitoring requirements under the verification provisions of several U.S. treaties and agreements.

Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative

The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) enables the U.S. government to require an export license for all items, even those not on the control list in the Export Administration Regulations, if the exporter knows, or has reason to know, that the item will be used directly or indirectly in a nuclear, missile, chemical or biological weapons program. This provision, referred to as a “catch-all” provision, is useful in addressing concerns not otherwise covered by law or regulation. The EPCI regulations supplement these controls on computers since they provide the capability to require a license for any computer, irrespective of its performance level, to any country, if destined for an end user involved in NBC weapons and/or missile development activities.

Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies came into existence in 1996. The principal objectives of the regime are to promote transparency, responsibility, and, where appropriate, restraint in the transfer of conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, particularly to countries and regions of concern. These regions include areas where member states might face hostile military action. The Wassenaar Arrangement is now comprised of 33 member states, including Russia and several other former Warsaw Pact states.

Often compared to its predecessor, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), Wassenaar differs in that it does not formally target any particular country or group of countries. Members, however, can agree to take measures to prevent the acquisition of armaments and dual-use items for military end-use if a state is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern to the Wassenaar Agreement participating states. States currently considered to be in this category are Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.

Wassenaar’s basic approach includes:

- Lists of significant arms and dual-use commodities that warrant multilateral scrutiny.
- Procedures for sharing information on exports and export requests.
- Provisions to meet regularly to consult on export controls and related export policies.

DoD played a key role in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement and
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

continues to figure prominently in the consultation sessions where problematic transfers and trends are discussed. DoD believes that the Wassenaar Arrangement fills a significant gap in multilateral export controls, complementing nonproliferation regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)

The BWC, signed in 1972, entered into force in 1975. It prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological weapons. The United States was an original state party to the BWC. The BWC has no provisions for verification or enforcement. However, the United States continues to work with state parties to strengthen the treaty by negotiating a legally binding protocol on compliance and transparency. The United States is promoting measures that provide increased transparency of potential biological weapons-related activities and facilities in an effort to deter violations of and enhance compliance with the BWC. The United States and other BWC states parties agreed at the 1996 Review Conference to seek to conclude a BWC protocol as soon as possible before the next review conference in November 2001. DoD participates in the BWC Ad Hoc Group negotiations, the multilateral forum in which the protocol is being developed.

Australia Group

The thirty-two nation Australia Group nonproliferation regime has developed harmonized export controls over materials and equipment that can be used to produce chemical and biological weapons. At recent plenaries, the participants reaffirmed that universal adherence to and compliance with the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will be the most effective way to rid the world of Chemical Biological Weapons (CBW). They also reaffirmed that implementing national export licensing controls on CBW-related items is an important way of meeting their national obligations under the CWC and BWC by striving to prevent the intentional or inadvertent supply by their nationals of materials or equipment to CBW programs.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

Created in 1987, the MTCR is an informal political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering WMD and related technology, and currently has thirty-two members (Partners). Over the course of the MTCR’s thirteen-year history, the MTCR Guidelines and Annex have become the international standard for responsible missile nonproliferation behavior, and the Regime has made important strides in slowing missile proliferation worldwide. Its efforts have induced most major suppliers to responsibly control their missile-related exports and reduced the number of countries with MTCR-class missile programs. The MTCR also has facilitated international cooperation to halt numerous shipments of proliferation concern.

These successes are the result of the MTCR Partners’ efforts over time to better equip the Regime to combat missile proliferation. For example, since 1993, the Partners have worked to reorient the Regime’s focus from ensuring only that members have adequate export controls to taking additional steps to address the spread of missiles and related equipment and technology worldwide. In addition, the Partners increasingly engage in policy coordination and information sharing and also have established a purposeful outreach program for nonmembers. This has increased awareness of the missile proliferation threat and convinced a number of key countries, including South Korea and Israel, to unilaterally adopt MTCR controls. Moreover, through MTCR workshops, seminars, and round tables, the Partners are working side by side with non members to better understand key proliferation concerns and to develop ways to better address them.
In 1993, the Regime also broadened the scope of the MTCR Guidelines from their original focus on the nuclear delivery vehicles to missiles capable of delivering all types of WMD, including a new requirement to subject exports of all missiles and all MTCR Annex items to a strong presumption of denial if they are intended for WMD delivery. Furthermore MTCR partners also periodically amend the MTCR Annex to increase clarity and reflect technical advances, thereby ensuring the control list keeps pace with proliferation trends.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Exporters (Zangger) Committee

The NSG and Zangger Committee are informal groups, comprised of over 30 countries that seek to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, both nuclear-specific and dual-use. According to the guidelines, nuclear exports should only go to states where IAEA safeguards and/or inspections are applied. Russia is a member of both groups; China is just a member of the Zangger Committee. The United States’ position is that observance of NSG and Zangger guidelines for nuclear exports by all potential suppliers, irrespective of their decision to join the groups, is crucial for controlling the flow of nuclear materials and technologies. The United States is active in reviewing the “trigger lists” of relevant technologies during the meetings of these groups and implementing the guidelines for U.S. exports.

NPT Review Conference

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970. Every nation is a party to the NPT except four—Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan—and North Korea claims a special status, which we do not recognize. In the NPT, the nuclear weapons states (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) agreed to not transfer nuclear weapons to any other state; transfer technologies relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to NPT states parties in good standing; and eventual general and complete nuclear disarmament.

The nonnuclear weapons states agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification that they use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. The IAEA has taken a number of important steps in recent years to strengthen its verification system. The United States continues to be a strong supporter of the NPT, IAEA, and their objectives. In 1995, the NPT parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely and continue to hold review conference every five years.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference opened amid widespread doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament due to Senate rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), United States requests to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, lack of progress in the Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, and expectations that the United States would deploy National Missile Defense (NMD). The United States successfully resolved doubts about its support for the goals of the NPT, and the conference ended with a historic agreement. The final document, agreed by consensus, included a reaffirmation by all five nuclear weapons states to total nuclear disarmament (without a timeline); practical steps toward such nuclear disarmament; questioning of Iraqi and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) compliance with the Treaty; and a call for the four remaining nonadherents to join the treaty as nonnuclear weapons states. U.S. leadership and flexibility on nuclear disarmament and in securing a last minute agreement on the very difficult Middle East issue contributed substantially to the overall success of the conference.

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

With passage of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Senators Nunn and Lugar established a farsighted program to respond to the threat of proliferation of the FSU arsenal of nuclear and chemical weapons and biological weapons materials and expertise, on the territories of several New Independent States (NIS). The legislation designated the DoD as the executive agent for what has become the CTR. Over the past nine years, Congress has authorized approximately $3.2 billion for the CTR program as part of the annual DoD budget. The CTR program is an important element of our national security strategy.
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

for the 21st century in that the Department is pursuing the following programs in the NIS: dismantling strategi
cic weapons and associated delivery systems; improv
ning the security of thousands of WMD and weapons ma
terials; preventing the proliferation of weapons technolo
gies and technical experts; and facilitating defense and military contacts to encourage military reduc
tions and reform.

In the FY 2000 budget submission, the President initi
ated the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI), pro
viding an additional $1.1 billion for CTR as well as ad
ditional funds for the Departments of State and En
ergy. Approximately 25 percent was identified for DoD CTR program execution. The CTR program is a mecha
nism through which a significant percentage of the President’s ETRI will be funded and executed by DoD. The Presidents’ budget through the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) included $4.5 billion for essen
tial U.S. assistance programs under the ETRI. Future implementation of the ETRI program will build on the se
curity cooperation and partnerships established by DoD through the CTR program.

CTR Program Execution

The Department faced the challenge to establish rela
tionships with former Cold War enemies and to create a program to effectively execute CTR funding in accordance with legislative objectives. A series of gov
ernment-to-government umbrella agreements were nego
tiated with NIS nations to establish the legal frame
work for CTR assistance activities and to pro
vide a system of rights, exemptions, and protections for U.S. assistance personnel and for CTR program activities. The agreements designate DoD as the U.S. execu
tive agent and various ministries in recipient states as execu
tive agents for CTR program implement
ation. Furthermore, umbrella agreements authorize executive agents to conclude implementing agree
ments, which develop more detailed terms for specifi
ced assistance projects. Umbrella agreements are in place for Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldova, and Uzbekistan (Belarus has not been eligi
ble to receive CTR assistance since 1997); others may be concluded with additional NIS states certified as eligi
ble for CTR program assistance in the future.

DoD CTR program funding since the original Nunn
Lugar legislation has increased significantly over the in
tervening years. However, total CTR funding, in cluding the recent infusion of ETRI funding, in FY
2000 remains at less than two tenths of one percent of the total Defense budget.

Past Accomplishments: Thus far, in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the CTR program has been critical to the deactivation of 5,014 nuclear warheads and the elimination of the following systems (current as of 1 June 2000):

- 394 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
- 365 ICBM silos and launch control centers
- 13 ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs)
- 256 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers
- 123 SLBMs
- 62 heavy bombers

CTR is actively enhancing security for dangerous bio
logical agents and has initiated a project to enhance
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

security for stored chemical weapons. The CTR program is also assisting in the design and has demonstrated proof of concept for the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia.

Looking to the Future: All areas of CTR’s activities for the future relate directly to the above five objectives. Objective 1, assistance to Russia, reflects success in implementing the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program to fund the elimination of up to 31 strategic submarines and their associated missile launchers, and related projects. In the outyears, Objective 1 assistance will focus ICBM launcher elimination, ICBM missile elimination, and SLBM elimination to support START II and the Helsinki Summit implementation. We plan to assist in eliminating an additional 541 ICBMs, 105 ICBM silos and launch control centers, 23 SSBNs, 280 SLBM launchers, and 503 SLBMs.

Objective 2 assistance will sustain the Department’s efforts to complete safety, security, and accounting improvements for Russian nuclear weapons at over 100 nuclear weapons storage locations, and provide secure transport of the weapons to security enhanced storage or dismantlement. DoD is also prepared to build a second wing for the Mayak fissile material storage facility, as well as more directly support the preparation of fissile material from weapons for long-term secure storage of up to 50,000 containers of fissile material, and to eliminate weapons-grade plutonium production.

Objective 3, CTR projects in Ukraine, include the elimination of 14 SS-19 and 54 SS-24 missiles, 29 missile launcher, launch control centers, and 23 bomber aircraft, and 493 air-launched cruise missiles. In addition, projects for nuclear and biological capabilities infrastructure elimination are planned in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Objective 4 assistance represents support for the elimination of the chemical weapons (CW) and biological capabilities of the NIS. Under the CW category in Russia, CTR is focusing on three efforts: establishing an analytical monitoring capability to support Russia’s CW destruction capability, developing security enhancements for CW stockpiles, and demilitarizing former CW facilities. A fourth CW activity, the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, is vital to U.S. security and nonproliferation interests. This project is subject to Congress lifting its construction prohibition and the Russian Federation agreeing to meet a variety of conditions. If the ban is lifted, CTR hopes to complete the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, which is capable of destroying 500 metric tons of nerve agent per year. It would also support the President’s commitment to assist Russia in eliminating these weapons and facilitate Russia’s implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition to the CW projects under this objective, Congress and the Administration have demonstrated increased support for preventing the proliferation of biological weapons and associated capabilities inherited by the states of the NIS. CTR is prepared to expand significantly its biological weapons proliferation prevention program through collaborative research, securing dangerous pathogens at a number of facilities, and dismantling capacity that is not needed for peaceful purposes.

Objective 5 funding will support a sustained DoD and military contacts program of approximately 350 annual exchanges, as requested by the U.S. Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Other program support funds continue program implementation in areas that are not unique to established projects, to include the congressionally mandated audits and examinations program.

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program Summary

Over the years, the CTR Program has valued strong bipartisan congressional support in recognition of the fact that U.S. assistance to the FSU, implemented through the DoD CTR Program, sustains the U.S. leadership role in reducing the threat from, and proliferation of WMD in, the international community. The DoD CTR Program is considered by many as a first line of defense against the threat of unauthorized use or theft of nuclear weapons, fissile materials, or other WMD from the post-Soviet Union arsenal. It is important to note
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

that success, as it has in the past, cannot be achieved without established goals and objectives and full, positive Russian and other NIS cooperation and participation, including cost sharing (either direct funding or other in kind financial support). The continued, high-level commitment to CTR Program implementation by FSU nations remains essential to future U.S. and allied support. The CTR Program has been judged a program of “defense by other means,” which, with a modest investment of DoD dollars, returns high payoffs in strengthened U.S. and global security.

DOD/U.S. Customs Service Counterproliferation Program

The International Border Security Counterproliferation program, authorized by the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, is operated by DoD in consultation with the U.S. Customs Service. Its purpose is to train and equip customs officers and border guard officials in the FSU, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states to prevent, deter, and investigate incidents involving the trafficking of NBC weapons and related materials.

The objectives of the International Border Security Counterproliferation Program are:

- To assist in the continuing establishment of a professional cadre of border enforcement personnel.
- To enhance the ability of customs and border guard officials to interdict NBC weapons and related material.
- To establish a long-term and mutually beneficial working relationship between U.S. government agencies and the customs/border guard officials in participating states.

The DoD/Custums program focused initially on Southeastern Europe, including Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria, and supported temporary duty customs advisors in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as to the IAEA. Bringing the program into these nations complemented work carried out by U.S. Customs and other agencies elsewhere in Eastern Europe and also complemented activities under the DoD/FBI Counterproliferation Program. Since its inception, the program has expanded to include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Slovakia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Moldova. It should be noted that this program is exempt from Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which is a congressional restriction on assistance to Azerbaijan.

To date, this program has provided customs border enforcement support equipment to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Moldova; WMD advisors to Bulgaria, Romania, and the IAEA; and advanced WMD materials detection and interdiction training to Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia, and Armenia. This program also sponsored attendance of Azerbaijani officials at the WMD seminar held at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary.

Key to a country’s full participation in this program is a DoD requirement to have a government-to-government counterproliferation agreement in place prior to delivery of equipment. Negotiation of these agreements serves as an opportunity to engage foreign governments in a counterproliferation dialogue, help create a political will within these governments to counter the proliferation of WMD and related materials, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to counterproliferation. Agreements are in place with Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. The agreements with Azerbaijan and Slovenia have been signed and are awaiting parliamentary ratification. WMD agreements are in various stages of negotiations with Bulgaria, Armenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

DoD/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Counterproliferation Program

Congress provided authority in the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization Act for up to $10 million in reprogrammed DoD funds to develop a joint program with the FBI to expand and improve efforts to deter, prevent, and investigate incidents involving the trafficking of NBC weapons and related material. The result is the DoD/FBI Counterproliferation Program.
This program trains and equips the community of officials responsible for NBC interdiction in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and the FSU.

As developed jointly by DoD and FBI, the program’s objectives are:

- To assist in the continuing establishment of a professional cadre of law enforcement personnel and other officials capable of interdicting and investigating NBC threats and incidents.
- To assist in developing appropriate legislation, laws, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms for deterring, preventing, and investigating NBC threats and incidents.
- To assist in building a solid, long-lasting bureaucratic and political framework in participating nations capable of implementing the above two objectives.

The program consists of three basic elements: policy consultations and assessments, training and technical assistance, and equipment procurement. In consultation with the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that, initially, the program would focus on providing assistance to the community of officials responsible for NBC interdiction in the southern tier of the FSU, particularly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The program has expanded to include the Caucasus and Eastern/Central Europe.

Program activities include a two-week basic course for officials responsible for NBC interdiction, usually held at the ILEA. Also planned are specialized WMD courses, WMD practical exercises, and WMD legal/legislative seminars in the participating countries.

To date, the DoD/FBI Counterproliferation Program has conducted six large WMD basic training seminars at ILEA. These seminars are typically attended by 30-40 mid- to senior-level officials judges and justice officials, customs, law enforcement, and national security and defense/military officials. This training has been provided to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia (two seminars), Moldova, and Slovenia. Additionally, a WMD legal dialog began with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan through legal colloquia held in Washington. A follow-on legal workshop took place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

**PROTECTION**

DoD recognizes that a country determined to obtain NBC weapons and their delivery systems, and willing to violate global nonproliferation norms, might succeed despite the strongest prevention efforts. Because experience has shown that countries armed with NBC weapons can use these weapons to challenge U.S. security interests, U.S. forces must be prepared to deal with the military threats posed by NBC proliferation.

Protection against CBW must provide an effective defense against the complete spectrum of new or novel agents in gaseous, liquid, or solid aerosolized form that may be produced or acquired by potential enemies. This would include any agents not listed on the CWC schedules but which violate the provisions of the CWC and BWC.

**The National Security Strategy**

As the 1999 National Security Strategy notes, the United States must be prepared to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means against us—unconventional approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities. Because of our conventional military dominance, adversaries are likely to use asymmetric means, such as WMD, information operations, or terrorism. Such asymmetric attacks could be used to disrupt the critical logistics pipeline—from its origins in the United States, along sea and air routes, at in-transit refueling and staging bases, to its termination at airfields, seaports, and supply depots in theater—as well as our forces deployed in the field.

We are enhancing the preparedness of our Armed Forces to effectively conduct sustained operations despite the presence, threat, or use of WMD. Among these many efforts include development, procurement, and deployment of theater missile defense systems to protect forward-deployed military personnel, as well as improved intelligence collection capabilities,
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

heightened security awareness and force protection measures worldwide.

Integration of and Responsibilities for Counterproliferation Missions Within DoD

Counterproliferation (CP) refers to the full range of military preparations and activities to reduce, and protect against, the threat posed by nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their associated delivery means. Major elements of counterproliferation include: maintaining a strong deterrent; supporting diplomacy, arms control, and export control; developing capabilities to identify, characterize, destroy, and interdict the production, storage and weaponization of NBC; developing active defenses; training and equipping our forces to operate effectively in an NBC-contaminated environment; developing the ability to manage the consequences of NBC use; and encouraging our allies and coalition partners to make counterproliferation a part of their military planning.

This comprehensive CP strategy is articulated to combatant commanders through the Joint Strategic Planning System and through joint doctrine. Among key CP documents that provide strategic guidance, operational concepts and doctrinal principles to support planning for and conducting operations under CBW conditions, include CONPLAN 0400-96 (Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Joint Publication 3-11 (Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 0400-96 serves as the campaign plan for U.S. military efforts to counter the spread of WMD. It provides a range of options for countering the proliferation of NBC weapons during peacetime and crisis. It informs commanders of the full range of their CP responsibilities and provides guidance for conducting CP operations. CONPLAN 0400 addresses all available means, including counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. Additionally, CJCS CONPLAN 0400 directs combatant commanders’ planning to implement national-level CP policy in terms of operational objectives and supporting tasks within their areas of operations. As a part of a continuing process to improve CP activities, and consistent with Joint Strategic Planning System requirements, CJCS CONPLAN 0400 is under revision and scheduled for publication in the fourth quarter of FY 2001.

Joint Publication 3-11 sets forth principles to enable combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to plan for, train their forces for, and execute their assigned missions against a varied set of NBC-capable adversaries. It emphasizes that military planning to assure sustained operations in potential NBC environments must include joint, multinational and interagency dimensions. Successful combat operations in NBC environments require integrated planning and realistic training and exercises to ensure synchronized execution of all elements of military capabilities, including specific NBC defense assets. This joint doctrine is directed at strategic and operational issues, and addresses the full spectrum of military operations (including operations other than war) — peacetime preparedness and planning, transition to operations, sustained combat operations, logistics and rear area operations, health service support, conflict termination, and post-conflict operations.

Counterproliferation Council

In July 1996, the Secretary of Defense established the DoD Counterproliferation Council (CPC). Its mission is to ensure that the DoD broad counterproliferation policy objectives are being met and that the implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) is integrated and focused. The CPC is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and its members include the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretaries of the military departments, the Vice Chiefs of the military services, the Director of DTRA, and the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction serves as Executive Secretary for the Council. The CPC monitors departmental progress in developing
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

the strategy, doctrine, and forces necessary to effectively execute counterproliferation objectives, as well as DoD-wide efforts at training, exercising, and equipping U.S. forces for this task. The CPC also oversees DoD counterproliferation activities in interagency and international fora.

The CPC meets on a regular basis, focusing on the potential impact, threat, or use of NBC weapons on DoD’s ability to accomplish its missions. In 2000, one of the CPC meetings addressed CINC and Service related issues focusing on how forces are organized, trained, and equipped to sustain operations under such conditions. The Council also focused on the preparations of U.S. and allied forces to sustain operations under the threat or use of CBW, issues of particular concern to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Forces Japan. Another CPC meeting featured a combined Senior Readiness Oversight Council/CPC forum that addressed the topic of Chemical Biological Defense (CBD) operational standards and readiness reporting. As a result, a study group was created with the mission to identify possible improvements in existing CBD training/operational standards and readiness reporting so that the Secretary of Defense and CJCS have increased visibility into the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win in a CBW environment. With this effort, the Services and CINCs can effectively identify and address deficiencies in CBD equipment and training. After extensive research, the study groups recommended that the CINCs fully utilize the Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) and Operational Plans (OPLANS)/CONPLANs to set standards and articulate requirements and also to have Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff facilitate Service development of CBD Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Building on the DoD Defense Reform Initiative to improve DoD efficiency, DTRA was established in October 1998. The mission of DTRA is to safeguard America and its friends from WMD by reducing the present threat and preparing for the future threat. DTRA was established through the merger of the Defense Technology Security Administration, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the On-Site Inspection Agency, and elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. More than simply the sum of its parts, DTRA brings technical and operational synergy to the full spectrum of DoD efforts to understand, prevent, deter, and defend against nuclear, biological, chemical, advanced conventional, and special weapons, thus ensuring that America and its friends remain safe in the face of present and future dangers. In the words of former Deputy Secretary John Hamre, DTRA will provide “a coherent, focused organization that will create the intellectual infrastructure for a new approach to deal with the weapons of mass destruction challenge by bringing into one organization the principal Department of Defense organizations with weapons of mass destruction expertise.” This expertise encompasses technology security activities, cooperative threat reduction programs, arms control treaty monitoring and on-site inspection, force protection, NBC defense, and counterproliferation. As a combat support agency, DTRA efforts focus on providing the warfighter effective options for conducting and countering operations on the ground, often in combat situations, as well as providing products, services, and technology development to support improved military capabilities for deterring, countering, and responding to the spectrum of WMD threats.

DTRA serves as the technical and field agent on force protection, within its assigned areas of cognizance, for the CJCS. Such areas may include, but are not limited to, vulnerability assessments, technology development, and training.

DTRA Force Protection Program

On 25 June 1996, the attack on U.S. forces housed in the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, changed the attitudes on the protection of U.S. personnel from terrorist attack. Prior to September 1996, there was no formal requirement for an antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) program at any level within the DoD. While this critical program was given high priority, there was a considerable variation in the effectiveness of AT/FP planning and evaluation. As a result of the Downing Commission Report, the Secretary of
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

Defense accepted responsibility for AT/FP efforts within DoD, and designated the Chairman, CJCS, as the focal point for the DoD AT/FP Program. To assist the CJCS in fulfilling his force protection responsibilities, the DTRA was designated as a combat support agency and tasked to provide integrated expertise as a catalyst to effect a change in the force protection posture within DoD. The DTRA Technology Development Directorate (which was reorganized from the Counterproliferation Support and Operations Directorate) program includes:

- Assessing DoD installations worldwide through the conduct of Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVA). JSIVA is a program in which installations are assessed to determine antiterrorism/force protection vulnerabilities and provides options that assist installation commanders in overcoming or mitigating those vulnerabilities.
- Providing a reachback capability and technical assistance throughout DoD to mitigate gaps in policy, doctrine, training, and education, and influence technology development.
- Conducting education and training assistance to CINCs/Services for establishment of assessment teams and improvement of core AT/FP knowledge base.
- Maintain the capability to conduct special assessments and response to worldwide incidents and crisis situations. This will include assessments of DoD and other U.S. government units at fixed facilities as well as units deployed to temporary or transient facilities.

DTRA Chemical and Biological (CB) Directorate

The DTRA CB directorate’s primary mission is to develop a coordinated, jointly integrated and internationally recognized CB defense program. The program supports force protection and domestic emergency response initiatives to combat terrorist use of CB agents. Additionally, the program provides technical support for acquisition of CB defense equipment for DoD specialized response units and other federal agencies.

International Counterproliferation Cooperation

The Department continues to work with America’s long-standing allies around the world to develop common approaches to chemical, biological, and nuclear defense. Notably, the United States cooperates with allies and coalition partners in Europe, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and in Northeast Asia.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Counterproliferation Cooperation: Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP)

DoD plays a leading role in keeping NBC defense at the top of NATO burgeoning agenda. The NATO DGP, co-chaired by the United States and a European ally (currently Denmark), was established in 1994 to address defense issues associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and delivery means. DGP achievements represent a quiet success story for NATO and provide tangible evidence of all nineteen allies working to safeguard the alliance’s military effectiveness by addressing a common security challenge. The long-term DGP program to counter emerging NBC threats was enhanced in 1999 with the adoption of a new Strategic Concept, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative (WMDI), and the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) launched at the summit marking the 50th anniversary of NATO.

The DGP has built consensus within NATO about NBC threats and identified improvements in capabilities needed to counter them. The DGP identified steps to accelerate the development of critical defenses and response capabilities for countering chemical and biological weapons and injected NBC defense force goals into the NATO force planning process. As part of the NATO strategic reorientation toward greater security responsibilities beyond Europe, the DGP recommended steps to improve the capabilities of allied forces operating beyond NATO periphery where the military dangers posed by NBC are greatest. To complement these recommendations, the DGP developed policy guidelines for military operations in an NBC environment that directed the revision of NATO operational doctrine, planning, training, and exercising to take account of likely chemical and biological asymmetrical threats. A 1998 “stocktaking” assessed
progress being made and set the stage for future work, including a two-day seminar on chemical and biological weapons proliferation at the group’s October 1999 meeting in Mallorca, Spain.

The DGP has worked to continue NATO’s progress in building strong chemical and biological defense capabilities. The DGP followed up its Mallorca seminar with a seminar in Budapest, Hungary, in July 2000 that focused specifically on biological defense. The consensus of the participants was that the DGP would work to improve NATO’s preparedness against this proliferation threat. As a result, the DGP will host a second biodefense seminar in the United States in the summer of 2001 to address the unique characteristics of biodefense, in particular doctrine, capabilities, training, and exercises. The DGP is working to update its policy guidelines for military operations to address, specifically, the biological aspects of defense preparedness, and working with the various NATO groups to assess progress made in enhancing NATO’s capabilities to counter future challenges Allied forces may face in operating in an NBC environment.

NATO Strategic Concept

The DGP was instrumental in the treatment of proliferation-related defense issues in the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which recognizes the direct threat to allied populations, territory, and forces posed by WMD. The Strategic Concept’s guidelines for Alliance forces stress the importance of improving NATO’s defense posture to reduce operational vulnerabilities, strengthen deterrence, and maintain flexibility despite the presence, threat of use, or use of NBC weapons.

WMD Initiative

The WMDI, which builds on work underway at NATO since 1994, is designed to expand the Alliance’s understanding of the proliferation issue and focus appropriate political and defense attention on WMD risks. Under the WMDI, the Alliance will:

- Operate a WMD center to integrate and coordinate ongoing work to address the risks posed by WMD proliferation. The center, comprised of a multidisciplinary mixture of political, defense, intelligence, and military experts, contributes to the development of a common understanding of political and defense risks and promotes more active and regular intra-alliance debate.
- Increase information and intelligence sharing on the nature and evolution of the WMD threat to promote a better informed dialogue on WMD issues and permit development of stronger common understanding of emerging issues based on shared data. The center will maintain information in a classified WMD collection that will serve as a common resource for Alliance decision-making bodies responsible for WMD issues.
- Develop a balanced information strategy to raise public awareness of WMD issues and demonstrate strong allied support for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation efforts that enhance overall Alliance security.
- Maintain a matrix of bilateral WMD destruction and management assistance programs as a means of avoiding overlap and identifying gaps.
- Examine ways in which NATO, which has always dealt with the possible effects of conflict on our populations, might coordinate national and collective preparations against the potential of WMD use against civilians. NATO will establish arrangements to exchange information on national capabilities for protecting civilian populations against WMD risks so that, where required, nations can cooperate in anticipation of WMD events and, if necessary, provide emergency assistance to other allies in the aftermath of a WMD attack. An inventory of national capabilities, maintained by NATO, could serve as a foundation for a coherent Alliance contribution to national civil authorities.
- Build on work undertaken by the DGP to increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and deter and protect against potential WMD use. NATO will accelerate NBC defense programs and research, improve WMD-related play in NATO and national training and exercises, and design a series of Biological Warfare (BW) and CW seminars to develop our collective knowledge and ability to address WMD issues effectively.
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

Improving NATO Counterproliferation Capabilities

From the outset, DoD has emphasized the need to embed counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every facet of Alliance defense activity. In 1996, NATO initiated a special, “fast-track” effort within its force planning process to create and approve new force goals, or planning targets, to enhance NATO forces’ capability to operate in a WMD environment. These goals represent a core set of integrated capabilities that will provide a basis for improvements as NBC risks evolve. This core set of capabilities includes:

- Standoff and point BW and CW detection, identification, and warning.
- Extended integrated air defenses, including theater ballistic and cruise missile defense for deployed forces.
- NBC individual and collective protective equipment.
- Automated and deployable command, control, and communications.
- Continuous, wide-area ground surveillance.
- Strategic and operational intelligence, including early warning data.

To supplement this nucleus of capabilities, NATO is pursuing other means—including layered defenses against Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) attack, special munitions for NBC agent defeat and hardened NBC targets, computer modeling and simulation, and medical countermeasures—to strengthen the Alliance’s overall counterproliferation abilities. All of these force goals, which are now updated regularly within the NATO force planning process, should be accepted and implemented by nations to provide the best possible WMD defenses and support deterrence. The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) provides strong emphasis for the acquisition of these capabilities as part of a greater Alliance effort to adapt to the challenges of the future. The DCI objective is to improve defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment, with a special focus on improving interoperability. The DCI provides needed political impetus for nations to implement force goals required to enhance the Alliance’s defense posture against NBC weapons risks.

Bilateral Cooperation in Europe

The Department also conducts bilateral counterproliferation dialogue with European allies as part of ongoing defense consultations. Notably, in June 1998, Secretary William Cohen and then Secretary of State for Defense George Robertson called for senior-level staff talks to enhance cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States to combat chemical and biological weapons (CBW). The Joint Venture Oversight Group (JVOG) was subsequently formed to conduct regular bilateral policy consultations regarding the preparedness of our military forces to conduct and sustain operations in a CBW environment. The JVOG seeks greater common understanding of the overall implications of the threat of use, or use, of CBW on complex combined military operations and supports enhancement of defense technical cooperation through joint consideration of policy issues to which such cooperation gives rise. It also addresses intelligence requirements and focuses operational analysis as required to address a range of policy issues. Subordinate working groups supplement the JVOG when tasked to pursue specific activities.

Middle East and Persian Gulf Cooperation

The Southwest Asia Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) against weapons of mass destruction is a DoD effort to enhance the ability of the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Jordan, and Egypt to prepare their forces to operate in a CBW environment. The CDI also seeks to improve these states’ capabilities to manage the consequences of CBW use on ports, airfields, and population centers. It involves educating our coalition partners about CBW threats and available responses, identifying requirements for active and passive defenses, ascertaining the training needed to put those systems to proper use, developing realistic plans to procure equipment, and initiating and validating training programs through bilateral and multilateral exercises. The Office of Counterproliferation Policy (CPP) in OSD and U.S. Central Command are leading the initiative in close coordination with the Near East and South Asia office in OSD.
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

CDI activities discussed or scheduled for the coming year include developing a system for shared early warning of ballistic missile launches, assessing the protective equipment inventories and medical response capabilities of individual countries, using international military education and training funds to send personnel to CBW defense and related schools, including military medical personnel in U.S. satellite courses on CBW casualty management, and using more CBW defense scenarios in combined exercises.

**Bilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region**

DoD counterproliferation efforts in the Asia-Pacific region focus on the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. These efforts are aimed at establishing an ongoing dialogue with each of these allies to discuss proliferation concerns in the region, improve military capabilities in the face of NBC threats, and identify areas for cooperation in counterproliferation programs and activities.

**Korea**

DoD places a high priority on counterproliferation cooperation in Korea, in particular, since it faces the greatest military threat of NBC use in the form of North Korea’s considerable inventory of chemical weapons and means of delivery. The United States and the ROK have formed a Combined Counterproliferation Working Group to serve as a forum for discussion of policy issues and a source of guidance for an affiliated CP Operations Group, co-chaired by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and ROK Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) military experts. Several operationally focused subgroups meet regularly to improve U.S. and ROK WMD-related defense capabilities. The working groups address operational NBC defense issues associated with ground force equipment and operations, air base and sea port operations, medical defenses, modeling and simulation, and consequence management. Their focus is on practical measures to improve combined operations in a CBW environment. The ROK has demonstrated its commitment to address the threat through increased spending on CB defense capabilities for its military forces. USFK has also launched a Family and Force Protection Initiative to extend CB protection to dependants of U.S. military service members, civilian DoD employees, and their families through the distribution of protective masks and hoods.

**Japan**

The Tokyo subway sarin attack in March 1995 and the 31 August 1998 Taepo Dong I multi-stage missile launch over Japanese territory captured worldwide attention and led the government of Japan to steadily increase its capability to respond to NBC incidents. Under the auspices of the long-standing U.S.-Japan Security Consultation Committee, the United States and Japan are exploring opportunities for cooperation to improve both nations’ consequence management and WMD defense capabilities.

**ACQUISITION**

The DoD Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) is a DoD-wide effort to meet the defense challenges posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and associated delivery systems. It was established to ensure that U.S. forces are prepared to successfully conduct military operations, even in an NBC-contaminated environment. DoD has budgeted nearly $5.8 billion in FY 2000 for Research and Development (R&D) and acquisition activities and programs directly related to countering proliferation. These investments are focused on seven key functional areas: proliferation prevention, strategic and tactical intelligence, battlefield surveillance, passive defense, active defense, counterforce; and countering paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist NBC threats.

**The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC)**

The CPRC was established by Congress in the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The CPRC was a follow-on effort of the earlier Nonproliferation Program Review Committee, which reviewed non-proliferation and counterproliferation efforts across the broad spectrum of Executive Branch departments and agencies. The scope of the CPRC was modified to review responsibilities on nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities and programs...
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

of DoD, Department of Energy (DOE), and the Intelligence Community. The CPRC is chaired by the Secretary of Defense and is comprised of the Secretary of Energy (as Vice Chair), the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPRC membership is indicative of the high-level, interdepartmental response necessary to achieve national policy and strategy objectives to counter the proliferation of NBC weapons and associated delivery systems and potential threats of NBC terrorism. The Deputy Secretary of Defense was designated by the Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated November 1996, to perform the duties of the Chairman of the CPRC consistent with the CPRC charter. This action served to equalize the level of representation of CPRC principals among the CPRC-represented organizations, particularly regarding DoD, where the Deputy Secretary chairs the DoD internal Counterproliferation Council.

In the 1997 NDAA, Congress extended the authority of the CPRC until the year 2004 and designated the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) as the Executive Secretary of the CPRC. It also amended the purposes of the CPRC to include ensuring the development and fielding of technologies and capabilities “to negate paramilitary and terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction.”

The CPRC Standing Committee was established in November 1996 by the CPRC. The purpose of the Standing Committee is to enable the CPRC to be more proactive in fulfilling its responsibilities under the law. It meets regularly and is actively working to perform the duties and implement the recommendations of the CPRC. The Standing Committee is comprised of the ATSD(NCB) (as Chair); the Director, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, DOE (as Vice Chair); the Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation; the Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Plans and Policy, J-5); and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SO/LIC). The Standing Committee expanded in 1999 to include the following members: the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction (ASD/STR); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/CC3I); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)); the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD-CS); Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy; and Department of State, Director of Technology and Assessments, Bureau of Verification and Compliance (VC/TA). The decision to include these organizations was based on the recognition of their significant contributions to the overall counterproliferation mission and responsibilities embodied within the CPRC. The addition of these organizations also enhances the level of coordination within the CPRC and between the CPRC and other government organizations, such as the Interagency Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group (WMDP).

CPRC Duties and Responsibilities

Congress directed the CPRC to make and implement recommendations regarding interdepartmental activities and programs to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter proliferation, as well as countering paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats. A key focus of the CPRC is to eliminate redundancies and ensure the integration of DOE programs into the operational needs of DoD and the Intelligence Community. Congress also directed the committee to annually assess its actions and the status of CPRC recommendations, and to report its findings to Congress.

The CPRC annually assesses progress in addressing interagency counterproliferation needs/priorities. To assist in the process, the organization has developed Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACEs). The ACEs were established to characterize those areas where progress is needed to enhance both the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs and the overall ability to satisfy the demands of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy. They prioritize the counterproliferation-related responses to interdepartmental policy needs and, in particular, reflect the operational requirements of the Unified Commands for countering proliferation.
A key initiative implemented by the CPRC was the establishment of working groups in three important technology areas related to countering proliferation: establishing validation standards for NBC hazard prediction models; developing an integrated R&D/acquisition plan for unattended ground sensors; and chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition. These working groups either provide, or participate in, fora in each of their respective areas that facilitate interagency coordination. The CPRC also closely coordinates its activities with organizations such as the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), the Nonproliferation/Arms Control Technical Working Group (NPAC TWG), the newly established Counterproliferation Mission Support Senior Oversight Group (CP-MS SOG), the interagency Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group (WMDF), and numerous other intra-departmental or interagency organizations.

The findings and recommendations of the CPRC 2000 annual program review are presented in the Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, its seventh annual report to Congress, released in April 2000.

The Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program

Issues/Shortfalls

Following Operation Desert Storm, DoD identified many issues and shortfalls in supporting operations in a CB warfare environment. In its 1992 report, Conduct of the Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, DoD identified the following requirements related to CB defense capabilities:

- Lightweight CW/BW protective clothing and defensive equipment to reduce degradation, especially in desert climates.
- Integration of CW/BW protection and cooling systems into combat vehicles.
- Procurement of stand-alone transportable collective protective shelters for sustained operations in a CW/BW environment.
- Greater emphasis of BW defenses in DoD programs. Inadequacies exist in detectors, vaccines, and protective equipment.
- To ensure effective contamination avoidance on future battlefields, additional NBC reconnaissance vehicles and early warning of CB contamination.
- Continued efforts to replace the water-based decontamination system.
- Continued force modernization in individual and collective protection, medical support, detection, identification, warning, and decontamination systems to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment under CW/BW battlefield conditions.

The ability of U.S. equipment to survive and operate in an NBC environment on future battlefields continues to be a major item of concern. DoD Regulation 5000.2-R requires all mission essential systems to be survivable to those threat levels anticipated in their operating environment. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the use of NBC weapons on a future battlefield will not disarm U.S. forces. All force modernization efforts should continue to incorporate NBC survivability in equipment designs. Failure to field NBC survivable equipment will severely degrade the ability to fight and win future conflicts. U.S. forces must be able to continue their assigned missions even in a contaminated battlespace.

Accomplishments and Initiatives

Chemical and biological defenses are conducted within the framework of four operational concepts: contamination avoidance, NBC battle management, protection, and decontamination. Contamination avoidance consists of capabilities and procedures to detect, identify, and conduct reconnaissance of the battlespace for CW/BW threats. The information from contamination avoidance systems is fed into NBC battle management systems to provide commanders with a view of the battlespace to enable them to determine appropriate protective posture and planning steps. The Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) consists of interface hardware and applications software designed to link nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) detection systems into command and control systems providing a near real-time NBC warning, reporting, and situational awareness capability to the warfighters. When contamination cannot be avoided, protection provides capabilities to survive, fight, and
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

win in an NBC contaminated environment. Protection consists of individual protection, collective protection, and medical programs. Finally, decontamination provides critical capabilities to allow the sustainment of operations in a contaminated environment. Detailed descriptions of the capabilities described in the following sections are provided in the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress, March 2000.

Contamination Avoidance

Multiple systems are in development, production, or in the field for early warning or point detection of CW/BW threats. Since 1991, there have been several critical technological and operational advances. The Army and Marine Corps have fielded the M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) to provide standoff detection of nerve and blister agents. The hand-held Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) provides all deployable units with a rapid and easy-to-use chemical agent monitoring and identification capability for nerve and blister agent vapors.

In October 1996, the Army fielded its first-ever biological defense unit equipped with state-of-the-art biological detection capabilities, the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS). In 1999, a second unit was fielded with the BIDS Phase II Pre-Planned Program Improvement (P3I), which provided technology insertion from concurrent development efforts to upgrade the Phase I (4-agent detection capability) core configuration to 8-agent detection capability, automated detectors, and computerized integration of detection equipment outputs.

In addition, the Army has fielded the Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System (LR-BSDS), used for remote detection of aerosols and particulates. Also, the Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD) has been installed on selected Navy ships to provide a mobile biological point detection capability.
The M93A1 NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) "Fox," used by the Army and the Marine Corps, is a dedicated system for NBC detection, warning, and sampling equipment integrated into a high-speed, high-mobility armored carrier capable of performing NBC reconnaissance on primary, secondary, or cross-country routes throughout the battlefield. The NBCRS can find and mark chemical and nuclear contamination. Its crew is protected by an onboard overpressure system. It also can detect chemical contamination vapors within 5 kilometers using the M21 RSCAAL standoff detector. The NBCRS integrates contamination information from sensors with input from onboard navigation and meteorological systems. It then rapidly transmits hazard warnings via a central data processor and integrated digital jam-resistant communications.

Several new technologies that enhance CB detection and warning have been demonstrated and are in the final stages of development. Key programs include:

- The Lightweight Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance System (LNBCRS) provides Marine and light division field unit commanders with real-time data that can be used to assess the field for NBC hazards while on the move.
- The Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector provides chemical agent detection and mapping of chemical agent clouds on the move, in 360 degrees, and at up to 5 kilometers in range.
- Modifications to the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) automates NBC warning and reporting throughout the battlefield and links digital data into the Command, Control, Communication (C3) system.
- The Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS), in the final R&D stages, collects and identifies biological warfare agents and will become the biological detection suite aboard BIDS and, at the unit level, dismounted and aboard various platforms.
- The Joint Chemical Agent Detector program will provide a combined portable monitoring and small-point chemical agent detector for aircraft, shipboard, stand-alone, and individual soldier applications.

A number of procurement activities are planned within the contamination avoidance mission area:

- DoD will procure and upgrade existing BIDS with the JBPDS, which increases the detection threshold, number of agents detected, and allows for on-the-move detection of biological agents. In its initial configuration, JBPDS will allow the simultaneous detection of 10 agents in 20 minutes and in the follow-on, Block II variant, it will detect 26 agents.
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

- Procurement for the Automatic Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm (ACADA) will continue. The ACADA provides a point-detection capability to detect blister agents; provides improved sensitivity, improved response time, and interference rejection; and is programmable for all known CW threat agents.

- Funding continues for modifications to the NBCRS that add first-time capabilities for standoff CW agent detection using the RSCAAL and communications links to the digital battlefield.

- Procurement continues in FY 2001 for the AN/UDR-13 Pocket Radiac, which provides the first- ever capability to both detect and indicate prompt and residual radiation doses received by troops.

- Improved (Chemical Agent) Point Detection System (IPDS) for surface ships continues to be procured as a replacement to the older Chemical Agent Point Detection System and provides on-the-move, expandable point detection of CW vapors, including nerve and blister agents.

- The Portal Shield Biodetection System (XM99), formerly known as the Airbase/Port Biodetection Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, is an interim capability for biological detection being produced and deployed for use at high-value fixed sites. The system uses an innovative network of sensors to increase the probability of detecting a BW attack.

Protection

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has made significant strides in developing and fielding improved CB protection. Fielding of the Joint Service Light-weight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) to all the services began in FY 1998. JSLIST is a joint Service program to field a common chemical protective ensemble (suit, boots, and gloves), that uses a selectively permeable membrane technology that eliminates the bulkiness of previous superactivated charcoal-based systems. Future improvements in individual protection will include developing protective clothing integrated into the standard duty uniform rather than requiring a separate overgarment.

A number of other procurement activities are planned within the individual protection mission area. They include:

- The M40A1 protective masks will allow continued replacement of the aging masks currently in the field.

- Additional M41 Protection Assessment Test Systems that ensure proper mask fit and functionality.

- The Army will purchase a new aircrew mask, the M45 Air Crew Protective Mask. This mask enhances flight safety and provides full compatibility with night vision goggles and weapon sighting systems while improving aircrew comfort.

- Continued procurement of the CB Respiratory System, an aircrew respiratory system for Navy and Marine Corps tactical rotary wing and land-based fixed wing aircraft.

- Procurement of the Aircrew Eye/Respiratory Protection mask, a second generation CB oxygen mask.

Within collective protection, the CBDP supports continued procurement of the Chemical Biological Protective Shelter, a highly mobile, self-contained collective protection system that can provide a contamination-free working area for medical and other units. The Navy has retrofitted the Selected Area Collective Protective System into several ships, designed collective protection into new construction in four classes of new ships and built and installed a collective Protection System, utilizing standard shipboard components, for the
Joint Operations Center U.S. Navy Central Command (NAVCENTCOM). The Advanced Integrated Collective Protective System (AICPS) is a modular system that will integrate new NBC filtration technologies with environmental controls and power source components for tactical and combat systems. AICPS provides reduced weight, size, and cost, as well as improved maintainability over current capabilities.

Decontamination

Over the past year, there have been several accomplishments in decontamination development programs. Procurement is underway for a lightweight decontamination system and a modular decontamination system that will reduce the logistics burden compared to existing systems. Significant strides have been made in replacing the existing aqueous, corrosive, and environmentally hazardous decontamination solutions with a Sorbent decontaminant. A critical shortfall in developing a decontaminant for sensitive equipment (e.g., electronics) remains with further research and development investment necessary. New concepts and technologies continue to be investigated for decontamination of large areas such as ports or airfields.

Technology Development Responsive to Counterproliferation Requirements

DoD needs a spectrum of capabilities to accomplish its counterproliferation mission. No single system or set of systems, current or proposed, can provide all of the operational capabilities needed for the complete counterproliferation mission. Just as counterproliferation has been integrated into planning for military operations, technology development directed at improving counterproliferation capabilities has been integrated into DoD R&D and other acquisition activities. Most development efforts involve the adaptation of existing systems and technologies to respond to counterproliferation mission requirements.

DoD has established procedures to ensure that its science and technology investments are directed at priority requirements identified by warfighters. To this end, DoD has designated a set of Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives (JWCOs) that focus on critical joint warfighting capabilities. Technology development in support of chemical and biological defense and protection and countering weapons of mass destruction is one of the eleven JWCOs.

Counterterror Technical Support Program

The Counterterror Technical Support (CTTS) Program develops technology and prototype equipment that address requirements having direct operational application in the national effort to combat terrorism, to include terrorist use of NBC weapons. It integrates DoD advanced development efforts with government-wide and international efforts. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict executes the CTTS Program, which addresses requirements identified by the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), an interagency forum for combating terrorism. The TSWG was established as a working group of the National Security Council’s Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism and acts as its technology development component. The CTTS and TSWG focus on the rapid development of equipment to address critical multi-agency and future threat counter- and anti-terrorism requirements. A significant portion of the CTTS funding and development efforts and TSWG technology requirements are directly related to countering NBC weapons.

Counterforce Capability Against Adversary’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Infrastructure

The combat air forces have issued a standing mission need statement, in response to urgent warfighting CINC requirements, to detect, characterize, and defeat NBC facilities with minimal collateral effects. U.S. forces must be able to interdict an adversary’s biological and chemical capability during each stage of the agent’s employment. Counterforce operations include, but are not limited to, attacking agent production facilities, storage complexes, and deployed mobile weapon platforms.

The U.S. Air Force is conducting the Agent Defeat Weapon (ADW) program to develop the capability to destroy, neutralize, immobilize, or deny an adversary
access to biological and chemical agents with little or no collateral damage. The effort is currently in concept exploration. Studies are being performed to identify and evaluate concepts to satisfy the mission need, with the goal of fielding an NBC-specific strike capability. All concepts must comply with relevant arms control treaties. Analysis tools being developed to support ADW include agent release models, internal dispersion and venting models, and a lethality model to evaluate inventory and conceptual weapon effectiveness against NBC weapons and associated delivery systems.

Improved Capabilities Against Hardened Targets

Hardened targets are facilities that have been designed and constructed to make them difficult to defeat using current conventional weapons. Such facilities increasingly are being used to house NBC weapons, materials, and production capabilities. In some cases, these facilities might be used for other related support activities, e.g., command and control centers.

Hardened, fixed targets fall into two broad categories. Many are hardened by using soil, concrete, and rock boulders atop the structure once it has been built. These cut and cover facilities are often built into an excavation and then covered. The second category includes tunnels and deep shafts, where the protection is provided by existing rock and soil. There is a depth threshold at which it becomes more economical to tunnel rather than to excavate and cover. Below this threshold, costs generally are constant regardless of the depth of the tunnel below the surface, so tunneled facilities can achieve functional depths of hundreds of meters. For this reason, tunnels often are referred to as deeply buried facilities.

The limitations of weapons capabilities during the Gulf War, as well as the increasing availability of advanced tunneling technologies, have brought about a clear worldwide trend in tunneling to protect facilities. Hardened surface and cut and cover facilities may be vulnerable to current air-to-surface conventional penetrators but remain a substantial challenge when standoff attack is desired. Facilities housed in tunnels, however, are nearly invulnerable to direct attack by conventional means. For most tunneled targets, disruption must come by means other than direct weapons penetration into the facility.

Developing Improved Capabilities for Defeat of Hardened Targets

Responding to mission need statements by Air Combat Command and USSTRATCOM, DoD is conducting the Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability (HDBTDC) program. The objective of the HDBTDC effort is to develop intelligence and conventional weapons systems capable of denying access to, disrupting operations of, or destroying defended hard and deeply buried facilities. An analysis of alternatives was performed that provided insights for future investments in penetrator weapons and intelligence. The HDBTDC effort is supported by Intelligence Community resources directed at finding and characterizing these facilities worldwide. Attaining the HDBTDC objective requires the organized efforts of the Services, DoD agencies, the Intelligence Community, and national laboratories.

The DTRA Hard Target Defeat projects are a key component of the DoD capability acquisition efforts and are an example of ongoing national technical efforts to develop the capability to defeat hard and deeply buried targets. Examples of research efforts within these projects include:

- Geomechanical modeling to identify the key aspects of geology impacting strike weapons penetration and damage propagation.
- Advanced simulation and testing to improve understanding of weapons effects and effects-target coupling.
- Development of an operations-friendly automated target planning tool for tunnel defeat.
- Development of improved capabilities to understand target characteristics and functions, facilitating the identification of specific vulnerabilities that may be exploited.

DTRA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are embarking on a comprehensive Tunnel Defeat
Section II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

Demonstration Program. The program seeks to develop, assess, and demonstrate end-to-end targeting capabilities (from detecting, identifying, and characterizing facilities to targeting, attacking, and performing damage assessment) across all warfighting options. A series of tunnel facilities, of varying design and function, will be constructed and operated at the Nevada Test Site as demonstration beds. The program will include the evaluation and demonstration of current and near-term capabilities and longer-term research initiatives.

Counterproliferation Analysis Planning System (CAPS)

CAPS provides unique Chemical Protective (CP) operations planning information to the CINCs. CAPS is a United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and DTRA program based at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California, where resident lab NBC facility engineering experts analyze NBC weapons/delivery system production/storage programs for countries of proliferation concern. They conduct nodal analysis and identify critical nodes at the country, production/support facility, and individual building levels. CAPS products are viewed by CINCs and Services in a Netscape™ format via secure computer networks.

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs)

ACTDs, a component of acquisition reform, are programs that focus mature technology on high-priority operational needs. From the inception of any ACTD, technologists work closely with warfighters to demonstrate technologies, evaluate military utility, and transition new military capabilities. ACTDs also allow the warfighter to develop and refine operational concepts to take full advantage of the new capability. They are deliberately designed to develop limited numbers of weapons and other systems that are given to the warfighting command partner at the conclusion of the effort. This delivers initial products to customers in months to a few years, as opposed to the decade-long periods required for some Cold War era system acquisition programs.

Counterproliferation Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

The Counterproliferation ACTD develops, demonstrates, and delivers improved counterforce capabilities. DTRA serves as the lead for technology development, coordinating the contributions of multiple DoD components and the United States European Command serves as the primary operational sponsor. Priorities include improved capabilities for characterization and defeat of NBC targets, enhanced capabilities for forecasting and limiting collateral effects that might be associated with such attacks, and assisting the warfighter in the development of operational concepts.

In a conventional attack against an NBC facility, collateral effects may be due primarily to the response of the target, not the direct effects produced by the weapon; e.g., as might occur if a conventional bomb hits a chemical weapon storage bunker. Using the best experimental data available, plus lessons learned during the Gulf War, DTRA developed the munitions effectiveness assessment tool for weapons employment and combat assessments, and the hazard prediction assessment capability for prediction of collateral effects. These products have been transferred to multiple warfighting commands. The Joint Staff has recommended that they be accepted as the NATO standard for planning and assessing NBC facility attacks.

A hard-target smart fuze is being evaluated which will optimize weapons detonation location to maximize lethality with minimum collateral effects. The fuze has had several successful tests of varying types, including live drops from both Air Force and Navy aircraft against surrogate targets. An advanced unitary penetrator was demonstrated that will increase the penetration capability of a 2000-pound class warhead by a factor greater than two.

Additional development and evaluation efforts involve a new inertial terrain-aided guidance capability, a weapon-borne sensor, and tactical unattended ground sensors. Improved sensors and guidance are important as enabling conditions for better characterization of
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

targets and more effective and discriminate attacks against NBC facilities.

Restorations of Operations (RestOps) ACTD

Operations at fixed installations, including seaports and aerial ports of embarkation and debarkation and tactical airbases, are critical for U.S. strategic mobility and power projection. The consequences from a CB weapons attack on these essential fixed sites could seriously restrict the capability of U.S. forces to prosecute the warfight. Forces at these sites must be able to mitigate the effects of such an attack and quickly restore operational capability.

The RestOps ACTD, which began in FY 2000 and will continue through FY 2003, will demonstrate those mitigating actions taken before, during and after an attack to protect against and immediately react to the consequences of a CB attack. These actions aim to restore operating tempo in mission execution and movement of individuals and material to support combat operations at a fixed site. The RestOps ACTD user sponsor is U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Central Command is the supporting CINC; and U.S. Forces Korea is the supporting sub-unified command. The U.S. Air Force is the lead service, and DTRA is the executing agent for RestOps. Osan Air Base is the site at which the demonstrations will be conducted, the first in February 2001. The objectives of the RestOps ACTD are:

- Integrate and demonstrate mature technologies and tools used to mitigate adverse effects and restore operations at a fixed site before, during, or after an attack of either chemical or biological weapons.
- Develop, improve, and integrate concepts of operations (CONOPS) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for executing RestOps contingencies at a fixed site.
- Capture lessons learned for incorporation into joint, multi-service, and service doctrine.
- Evaluate the science and technologies available to support identification of potential improvements in current U.S. policy for CONUS and OCONUS RestOps scenarios.

Additional Counterproliferation ACTDs

- The Airbase/Port Biodetection ACTD, Portal Shield, has developed and delivered a network of detection systems to protect high-value fixed sites against biological weapon attacks. Due to the success of the demonstration, DoD budged for the procurement of additional systems for installation at critical facilities on the Korean peninsula and in Southwest Asia.
- The Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System (JBREWS) ACTD, which networks several sensor types that are remotely deployed to increase warning time and minimize exposure, will finish in FY 2001. Residuals are unmanned point detection systems.

There also are non-ACTD demonstrations that are part of the chemical and biological defense program. Some focus on specific technological needs, and others are open-ended and seek to evaluate any new or emerging technology for potential CB defense application, such as the Annual Joint Field Trials at Dugway Proving Ground.

The Challenge of Developing Biological Weapons Detection Systems

Because of the dual-use nature of BW technology, it is extremely difficult to prevent BW proliferation. No matter how good individual protective equipment and collective protective structures become, their utility is limited unless there is adequate warning to mask and seek cover. This fact places a premium on developing effective battlefield BW detection systems. Currently available equipment can be broadly divided between point detection/identification systems and standoff systems. Point detection and identification of biological agents in the field is done with vehicles and shelters containing manually operated, commercial off-the-shelf technology that use reagent processes, fluidics and spectrometry. Standoff systems, which can either be stationary or mounted on platforms like helicopters, rely on Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) technology to spot clouds of suspect particulate matter in the atmosphere from a distance. Both types of systems are capable of providing early warning, though point
Section II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

detection systems must be remotely deployed in an ensemble well upwind of friendly forces to be most effective.

The lack of sensitivity to low concentrations of biological aerosols and slow processing speed are the most critical shortcomings of our currently fielded point sensors. Since contamination can only be avoided with early warning, a sensor that reacts quickly to the earliest manifestation of a biological agent is the sine qua non of survival on the battlefield. Although an indication of the presence of agent can be provided very quickly by the Aerosol Particle Sizer (APS) component of the system, there is no way to tell whether the particles activating the trigger are harmful until the collection and identification functions are completed. This process takes from 15 to 45 minutes for high concentrations of agent. Low concentrations of agent require even longer detection cycles for the sensor systems. The extraordinary potency of these pathogens at even minute counts of agent containing particles per liter of air suggests that troops are very likely to be exposed to disease causing concentrations of them for some time before current point detection systems provide the warning to mask. But, as the impracticality of detecting to warn makes detecting to treat look like a more probable outcome of responding to a biological attack, medical technology assumes ever more importance in the attempt to counter bio warfare.

The difficulty of relying only on established technologies or BW detection can be illustrated with an example. One recently proposed system involved distributing throughout the area of operations large numbers of point particle sensors linked to a sensor network command post—essentially a computer with algorithms to sort out the implications of alarms at different locations. An analysis of this system estimated that one false alarm per week per brigade with the allotted 24 sensors would result in the average divisional soldier being masked for 15 hours a week. To achieve this low a rate, already very disruptive to operational tempo, the system could allow no more than 0.006 false alarms per sensor per day—a standard not approached by contemporary capabilities. These concerns resulted in the elimination of the particle sensing units from the system.

While the rate of improvement in sensor performance against biological materials does not at present appear particularly promising, there are some grounds for encouragement due to the rapid and steady increase in the speed of information processing. It should, in theory, be possible to increase the efficiency of detection technology by linking networks of sensors. Digitized information networks, for a start, are faster than the analog networks they are replacing, and sensors incorporating some computing ability may eventually be able to pick out critically relevant returns rather than transmitting volumes of unprocessed data.

The use of programmed algorithms to process returns in sensor network command posts has been pursued as a promising application of information processing technology to the detection and warning problem. This was the approach taken in the system discussed earlier that sought to link large numbers of particle sensors to a central unit. The hope was that this technology would permit the prediction of directional trends and speeds of agent clouds. But the potential for such systems is stunted by the stubborn limitations of the sensors themselves, and the likelihood that marginal improvements in them will be more than matched by substantial changes and improvements in the agents they are attempting to detect. Though the continual drama of advances in information technology seems to have given life to a generalized optimism about the prospects for across the board improvements in military technology, this case suggests that there are some defense problems not susceptible to the solutions offered by the information revolution.

The difficulties posed by the proliferation of biological weapons may demonstrate that, contrary to popular expectations, technical challenges do not of necessity generate increasingly ingenious technical responses in an unceasing reciprocal process. The likelihood that the detection problem will experience only gradual improvement means that some areas of technology, like information technology, may be limited in the contributions they can make to it, while others are made more important. The possibility that proliferating states may developing new agents such as modified viruses makes it desirable that the limited set of classical agents available for presumptive identification with the current
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

antibody-based identification technology be expanded. There are also gene-based systems in the inventory that use well-established polymerase chain reaction techniques to provide highly sensitive and specific identification of putative agents. These systems are two to three times slower than small, cheap handheld assays, and their size, weight, and power requirements have until recently been thought to render them impractical for the field. They have now been operationally deployed with encouraging results in Theater Army Medical Laboratories (TAML), where they can be operated and maintained by experienced technicians. Their identification technology is able to identify most classical agents within their incubation periods, except for the fast acting toxins. These latter agents are, in any case, more appropriately analyzed by more rapid immunoassay technologies such as the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) or the even faster, more sensitive electro-chemiluminescence (ECL), both of which can be deployed with the TAML.

Medical Countermeasures for WMD Defense

DoD is committed to a force health protection strategy that will enable our most important weapons system—the individual warfighter—to survive, fight, and win in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN) contaminated environment. The U.S. military also will be called upon to respond to the increased risks of nonwarfighting scenarios involving bioterrorism, environmental toxicological events, or radiological disasters. Service personnel are provided with technologically advanced and sound defenses that promote survivability and sustainability in the formidable environments resulting from adversary employment of WMD. Safe and effective vaccines, antidotes, and treatments will negate or minimize the effects of exposure to CBRN effects. Maintenance of human health through safe and effective medical countermeasures translates into the highest level of human performance despite the stress of the battlefield or other military operations involving defense against WMD.

The threat posed by the proliferation of CBRN weapons will be exacerbated with continued and more frequent deployment of U.S. forces worldwide. Therefore, it is paramount that we maintain a credible, robust capability to protect our forces and provide them with the capabilities required to operate effectively in a chemically, biologically, or radiologically contaminated environment.

Overcoming medical threats and extending human performance have been a means to significantly increase military effectiveness in the past and hold the potential to facilitate future force improvements. Medical R&D advances provide the tools to sustain unit effectiveness by conserving the fighting strength of our forces and enhancing their ability to operate despite the presence, threat of use, or use of CBRN. Medical defense, including R&D products, provide a foundation for a flexible, sustainable, and modernized force prepared to operate across the full spectrum of conflict. Integral to medical preparedness is a vigorous research program to develop more effective defenses against existing agents, endemic diseases, and new or novel agents that may be produced or acquired by potential enemies.

There are serious but not insurmountable organizational and medical obstacles to the success of post-exposure treatment. The number of known bioagents to which U.S. personnel in either Southwest Asia (SWA) and Northeast Asia (NEA) are considered most likely to be exposed is at least as high as ten. The daunting logistical prospect of procuring vaccines, prophylaxes, and other treatments for all these agents suggests, at first glance, that the availability of appropriate medical countermeasures is the first and principal limiting factor on the post-exposure strategy; and, of course, the medicines must be supplied in the right place and at the right moment to all personnel who might have been exposed. But the applicability of certain treatments to multiple diseases (doxycycline, for instance, can be used against plague, tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and Q-fever) would lighten the logistical burden.

The research being done to develop polyvalent or multidisease resistant vaccines could eventually make a valuable contribution to our medical countermeasures, particularly in meeting the unpredictable threat of modified viruses. But this would only be the case if scientists succeed in creating vaccines that could actually
short circuit the pathogenic mechanisms common to all agents. A limited number of conventional, single-disease vaccines (anthrax, smallpox, plague, and botulism) should be adequate to protect U.S. forces against most biological weapons currently suitable for large-scale operational use. Though this would establish a major element of force protection, the engineering of novel viruses for military use could be a matter for increasing concern in the future.

Medical Biological Defense

Medical prophylaxes, pretreatments, and therapies are necessary to protect personnel from the toxic or lethal effects of exposure to all validated threat agents, as well as other potential threats. DoD has fielded a number of medical countermeasures that greatly improve individual protection, treatment, and diagnoses. Vaccines are the most effective and least costly protection from biological agents. There has been significant progress within the area of biological defense vaccine policy and development. The Department has established policy, responsibilities, and procedures for stockpiling biological agent vaccines and determined which personnel should be immunized and when the vaccine should be administered. DoD also has identified biological agents that constitute critical threats and determined the amount of vaccine that should be stocked for each threat. Other preventive and therapeutic measures, such as broad-spectrum antibiotics, may be used for treatment following a biological attack with bacterial agent.

The biological warfare threat of anthrax presents a potential danger to U.S. Service personnel. Anthrax is a biological warfare agent that has been produced and weaponized by adversaries of the United States. A small amount of anthrax spores, distributed under proper conditions, can generate a large number of fatalities among individuals who are not properly protected. While protective clothing and gas masks provide excellent front-line defense against anthrax and other biological agents, their effective use requires rapid and early detection of the agent. Current detection devices may not provide enough time for personnel to don protective equipment before exposure. Ideally, the United States should be able to deter the use of anthrax. As Secretary of Defense William Cohen warned in 1998, if any state “even contemplates using WMD against our forces, we will deliver a response that’s overwhelming and devastating.” In the event deterrence fails, however, an added level of protection must be provided to our forces. For protection against anthrax, there is a safe and effective vaccine licensed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

On 15 December 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen approved the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP), a plan to immunize the Total Force against anthrax. This plan was contingent on four conditions: (1) supplemental testing of anthrax vaccine lots in the stockpile to assure their potency, purity, sterility, and safety, consistent with FDA standards; (2) approval of the Services’ implementation plans for execution and communication; (3) implementation of a system for fully tracking anthrax vaccinations; and (4) review of the health and medical aspects of the program by an independent expert. Each of these conditions was subsequently fulfilled, and DoD began a 3-phase anthrax vaccine immunization program in March 1998.

Phase I was initiated in August 1998, immunizing forces expected to deploy to high-threat areas. These forces include Service members and mission-essential DoD civilians assigned or deployed to Joint Staff-designated high-threat areas in SWA and NEA and surrounding waters. Phase II of the program will include immunization of Active and Reserve Component
personnel supporting early deploying forces to SWA and NEA. Phase III will immunize the remainder of the force, to include the Active and Reserve Components and new personnel. Eventually, all 2.4 million military Service members will receive the FDA-licensed anthrax immunization and subsequent annual anthrax vaccine boosters.

The A VIP initially used vaccine from the stockpile produced by the Michigan Department of Public Health. The state-owned facility and vaccine license was then sold to a private concern, the BioPort Corporation, in 1998. Plant renovations, resulting in an expanded-capability vaccine production suite, are pending FDA biologic license application supplemental approval of the new facility. However, because the stockpile is currently below that needed to continue Phase I as initially established, the scope of the vaccination effort is refocused to maintain the vaccination program in areas of the highest threat. As of November 2000, only those U.S. military personnel, emergency-essential civilian employees and contractor personnel assigned or deployed on the ground in Southwest Asia for thirty days or more are receiving the vaccine. Once assured supply of vaccine is available, Phase I will resume and eventually proceed with the subsequent phases to accomplish the vaccination of the entire force. In the meantime, the rest of our force health protection package, including the use of field detectors, protective gear, and antibiotics will remain in place.

DoD is using a vaccine that is both proven safe and effective against all known strains of anthrax. It has been approved by the FDA for nearly 30 years. To date, 13 safety studies have established the safety of the anthrax vaccine. These include focused and broad-based, and short-term and long-term studies. These studies uniformly concluded that adverse reactions associated with anthrax vaccine involve local injection site reactions or minor, transient, self-limited, systemic events like malaise, muscle ache, or headache. The anthrax vaccine clearly has a side-effect profile comparable to, or better than other known vaccines. One of the studies involves an independent civilian panel review of reports to the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS). This review looks for rare, unexpected events that are temporally associated with the vaccination. At the request of DoD, the Department of Health and Human Services convened a civilian panel, the Anthrax Vaccine Expert Committee (AVEC), to review each VAERS report submitted for the anthrax vaccine. After two years, in which almost 1,200 reports and medical records have been reviewed, the AVEC continues to report that they have identified no unexpected events and no disease syndromes associated with the anthrax vaccine. More than 487,000 Service members have received over 1.9 million vaccinations and are today benefiting from this protection.

Medical Biological Defense R&D

Medical countermeasures for biological threat agents are limited but improving. A Joint Medical Biological Defense Research Program is developing countermeasures to protect U.S. forces and thereby deter, constrain, and defeat the use of biological agents. A primary objective is the development of vaccines, drug therapies, diagnostic tools, and other medical products that are effective against biological agents. Efforts are focused on maintaining the technological capability to meet present requirements and counter future threats, providing individual-level prevention and protection and providing training in medical management of biological casualties. A research program directed at the development of safe and effective antiviral drugs is also in progress. Current medical biological defense program research involves pre- and post-exposure BW countermeasures as well as diagnostics, including the following:

- Characterize the biochemistry, molecular biology, physiology, and physical structure of BW threat agents.
- Investigate the disease mechanisms and natural body defenses against BW agents.
- Determine the mechanism of action of these threat agents in animal model systems.
- Develop and compare potential vaccine candidates and characterize their effects in animal models.
- Establish safety and efficacy data for candidate vaccines.
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

- Develop medical diagnostics to include field confirmatory and reference laboratory techniques.
- Develop effective casualty treatment protocols using antitoxins, antibiotics, antivirals, and other pharmaceuticals to prevent death and maximize return to duty.

The Department awarded a Prime Systems Contract in November 1997 to Dynport to manage advanced development of biological defense products, obtain FDA licenses, and produce BW vaccines using the U.S. pharmaceutical industrial base. Dynport serves as an integrator for all of the processes associated with developing, licensing, producing, storing, testing, and conducting post-marketing surveillance of medical biological defense products. The prime contract approach has the advantage of flexibility and allows the market to respond to DoD requirements. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts are underway to develop vaccines against all validated threat agents, including plague, smallpox, and tularemia, although it will take a number of years to successfully complete all of these vaccines.

There are a number of medical biological defense products transitioning to advanced development and in varying stages of review for licensure by the FDA. These include vaccines for botulinum and Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE), plague, brucella, Marburg (filovirus) and a common diagnostic system for rapid biological agent identification and agent prophylaxis. Medical Biological Agent Diagnostics

The need to have diagnostic tests directed at both endemic organisms and BW agents has become more apparent, since nonspecific symptoms of naturally occurring diseases (e.g., fever, fatigue, or respiratory complaints) may be identical to initial symptoms of biological agent infection. Technological advances have allowed for the development of rapid diagnostic tests for specific biological warfare agents, to include naturally occurring and bioengineered microbial organisms.

Detectors that sample environmental organisms may not be sensitive or specific enough to identify "new" or emerging agents that have epidemic potential in a military or public health setting. In addition, with the advent of genetically manipulated variants, the need to have rapid and accurate means to determine antibiotic sensitivities, genomic sequences, and virulence factors, especially in bioengineered organisms, may become more important. Confirmatory evaluation at established reference laboratories within the United States requires a highly responsive system involving well-defined procedures in the collection, preparation, handling, and shipment of diagnostic specimens. The Theater Army Medical Laboratory (TAML) is a group of professionals who deploy before or with military units to survey and sample the environment and determine the conditions. Samples are either evaluated by the deployed team in the field or packaged and shipped to reference laboratories for additional testing.

DoD continues to identify appropriate technologies to bring the best tools to the warfighter through such institutions as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). Prototype systems are being developed and fielded at the installation and unit levels. The biological defense program aggressively pursues technology advances in standoff detection, remote early warning detection, sensor miniaturization, and improved agent identification sensitivity. The technologies are directed at those biological agents having the greatest impact on the individual warfighter’s health and the unit’s effectiveness in the conduct of military missions.

Medical Chemical Defense

The greatest chemical warfare threats to our forces are agents that affect the central nervous system and cause convulsions and respiratory failure (nerve agents), and those that have a blistering effect (e.g., mustard). The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

Defense provides a department focus to improve warfighter protection against chemical weapons.

Protective clothing and protective masks with appropriate filters will afford protection to service personnel by preventing exposure. If an individual were to be exposed to a nerve agent, the MARK I Nerve Agent Antidote Kit with its two autoinjectors, one containing atropine and the other 2-PAM chloride, are effective counters against the physiological effects of various nerve agents and are issued to deployed forces. Three MARK I kits are issued to each individual with specific instructions on usage following exposure. A disposable autoinjector with an anticonvulsant drug (Convulsant Antidote for Nerve Agents, or CANA) is also issued to troops and is administered by a buddy following the administration of the third MARK I kit when the three MARK I kits are used. In addition, personal skin decontamination kits (M291), to be used by the individual in the event of exposure to chemical agents, are issued to the troops.

When faced with a soman or tabun nerve agent threat, another drug, known as pyridostigmine bromide (PB), is available and would be employed at the direction of the military Commander in Chief following established procedures. Soman and tabun bind very quickly and irreversibly in the body to the enzyme necessary for nerve conduction. This rapid and irreversible binding phenomenon, known as “aging,” can be lessened if PB is already circulating in the body through pretreatment. PB can and does interfere with the permanent binding of these agents, and can, therefore, improve the chances for survival of exposed individuals who have not had enough time to don full protective gear with masks or were unaware of the presence of soman.

DoD is seeking FDA approval to use PB, coupled with the standard post-exposure treatment using the MARK I kits, as a pretreatment adjunct when forces are faced with the soman or tabun threat. PB has been approved for human use by the FDA as a safe and effective treatment of certain neuromuscular disorders, such as myasthenia gravis (a disease that affects neuromuscular control); however, PB has not yet been approved in the United States for human use as a nerve agent pretreatment. While it would be unethical to test PB in humans for efficacy against nerve agents, the effectiveness of PB against soman and tabun has been well-documented in animal models.

Medical Chemical Defense R&D

Critical issues of medical chemical defense include the ability to protect U.S. warfighters from the very rapidly acting nerve agents and persistent blistering agents, as well as choking and respiratory agents. A Joint Medical Chemical Defense Research program seeks to maintain the technological capability to meet present requirements and counter future threats, provide individual-level prevention and protection to preserve fighting strength, and provide medical management of chemical casualties to enhance individual survival and return to duty. Medical chemical defense R&D materiel solutions under evaluation or development include:

- CW Agent (CWA) Scavengers — Human enzymes that have been genetically engineered to destroy nerve agents are being developed.
- Advanced anticonvulsants that are water-soluble and long-acting are being evaluated for control of nerve agent-induced seizure activity.
- Reactive topical skin protectant creams are being developed that not only prevent penetration of CWA but will also destroy them.
Antivesicants are countermeasures that provide reduction in mustard-induced tissue swelling, ocular opacity, and skin damage.

Effects of Exposure to Non-Lethal Levels of CWA — The incidence and probability of chronic medical effects of single and multiple low-level exposures to CWA are being investigated.

Novel Threat Agents — Current medical regimens used for protection against the conventional nerve agents are being evaluated as countermeasures for novel threat agents.

Cyanide Countermeasures — Medical compounds (e.g., methemoglobin formers and sulfide donors) are being evaluated for safety and efficacy as pretreatments for cyanide poisoning. An external, noninvasive, personal exposure monitor is being transitioned for development and fielding to track the levels of these cyanide pretreatment compounds.

Chemical Casualty Management — Technologies to assist in the diagnosis, prognosis, and management of chemical casualties in a medical treatment facility are being developed.

Respiratory Agent Injury — Mechanisms of respiratory agent injury are being determined and medical countermeasures for respiratory agent casualties are under investigation.

A medical chemical defense product coming out of the R&D program for which an FDA license is pending is the Topical Skin Protectant (SERPACWA), a barrier cream effective against nerve and vesicant agents.

Nuclear (Radiological) Defense Medical Countermeasures

The U.S. military remains vulnerable to the effects of nuclear weapons and harmful radiative environmental contamination as U.S. forces deploy throughout the world. The core of the military’s treatment and management radiological expertise resides at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) in Bethesda, Maryland, a center of excellence that holds courses on the medical effects of radiation and provides consultative and response support to radiological disasters. AFRRI continues to apply the latest advances in medicine in the treatment of blood disorders, radiobiological and chemotherapy, and wound healing to the pre- and post-exposure treatment of ionizing radiation exposure.

Medical Countermeasures

Significant progress has been made in recent years within the biological, chemical, and nuclear defense medical readiness establishment. Department programs are responding to the requirements, priorities, and resources of the Services, as well as taking advantage of newly emergent technologies. Interagency collaboration to eliminate duplication of efforts will result in achieving the most effective use of limited resources. Continued congressional support and implementation of current medical defense plans will improve overall joint force readiness now and in the future.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is responsible for developing and fielding militarily effective ballistic missile defenses. To accomplish this mission, BMDO provides central BMD management, defines the system architecture and design, integrates requirements and technology, develops budgets and allocates resources, ensures integration with other U.S. and international defense capabilities, ensures systems are interoperable, and coordinates Theater Missile Defense (TMD) with National Missile Defense (NMD) programs and systems. BMDO is organized to develop an interoperable family of TMD systems as a tiered defensive system against adversary ballistic missiles. This missile defense approach includes lower-tier, upper-tier, and boost phase defense systems. In addition to a TMD system, BMDO is the Acquisition Executive for the NMD program. This program is an effort to develop, integrate, and deploy the necessary components to defend the United States from a limited ballistic missile attack by a country of proliferation concern. These two components are backed by an advanced technology program, which improves the performance of current or legacy systems. The advanced technologies program also leads to innovative research activities to develop the technologies necessary to keep the United States in the
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

forefront of missile defense technologies for future
missile defense systems. BMDO also collaborates on
missile defense programs with allied countries to
share technologies and provide support during the
development phases of these technically challenging
programs.

Theater Missile Defense (TMD)

TMD is designed to protect deployed troops, allies,
and friends against theater ballistic missiles (TBMs).
TMD systems must be able to deploy rapidly and
move with the troops. Since the TMD threat is diverse
with respect to range and capability, no single system
can perform the entire TMD mission. This leads to a
family of systems approach to defeat successfully the
theater missile threat. The family of systems approach
will ensure a defense in depth, utilizing both lower-tier
systems, those that intercept at relatively low altitudes
within the atmosphere, and upper-tier systems, those
that intercept missile targets outside the atmosphere
and at longer ranges.

Lower-Tier

The U.S. lower-tier systems provide for a low-leakage
defense of theater critical assets, protection of U.S.
forces, friendly nations/allies, forced entry operations,
and TBM defense for ports and underdeveloped thea-
ters of operation. Lower-tier systems include
Patriot Advanced Capabilities (PAC-3), which will
replace the current PATRIOT system. The first unit
will be equipped with PAC-3 starting in 4th quarter
2001. The Navy Area Defense (NAD) is expected to
first enter the fleet in 1st quarter 2003 and the Medium
Extended Air Defense Systems (MEADS) is projected
to become operational in 2012. The NAD and PAC-3
systems provide for near-term defense through
enhancement of currently fielded systems. MEADS is
being developed as a follow-on system that will pro-
provide for a fully integrated 360-degree system that is
strategically and tactically mobile.

PAC-3 provides the land-based, lower-tier component
of the BMD architecture. This includes defending the
troops and fixed assets from short- and medium-range
TBMs, cruise missiles, and other air-breathing threats
such as fixed or rotary wing aircraft. To accomplish
this mission, the PAC-3 system is designed to be a
highly advanced missile defense system that can
destroy enemy threats with hit-to-kill accuracy in the
terminal phase of the missile flight. The PAC-3 system
is planned to be interoperable with other Army and
Joint systems, to provide a seamless missile defense in
derth; and be air transportable to support rapid
deployments. All PAC-3 systems have four basic com-
ponents: a radar set, an Engagement Control Station
(ECS), a launching station, and interceptors. The radar
station provides warning and tracking of incoming
threats. It also provides a continuous update link with
in-flight interceptors. The ECS computes fire solutions
for the interceptor, and provides fire control and a
communications link with other PATRIOT units. The
ECS is the central nervous system of PAC-3 fire unit
operations. The launch station transports, protects, and
launches the missiles. The launch stations will be
equipped with the PAC-3 missile, a highly maneuver-
hit-to-kill interceptor which destroys its target
with a catastrophic collision.

Navy Area Defense System

The mission of the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Mis-
sile Defense system is to provide U.S. and allied
forces, as well as areas of vital national interest,
defense against TBMs. AEGIS cruisers and destroy-
ers, equipped with a modified AEGIS Combat System
(ACS), will detect and track short- to medium-range
TBMs and engage them with the Standard Missile-2
(SM-2) Block IV A interceptor. The Navy Area Pro-
gram consists of modifications to the AEGIS AN/SPY-
1 radar to enable detection, tracking, and engagement
of TBMs using a modified SM-2 and minor changes to
existing command and control systems. The Navy will
have the flexibility to forward deploy sea-based TMD
forces to potential crisis spots in regions where U.S.
land-based forces could not so readily deploy. This
provides an effective defense capability that can be in
place before hostilities erupt, or before land-based
defense systems can arrive in theater. Additionally,
sea-based TBM defenses will greatly alleviate the
demand on our air- and sealift capabilities. This will
allow the theater commander to concentrate available
lift on anti-armor, tanks, troops, ammunition, and
other reinforcements needed to stop an enemy advance.

**Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)**

The MEADS is a highly mobile, tactically deployable lower-tier system jointly being developed by the United States, Germany, and Italy to protect the maneuvering forces from multiple and simultaneous attacks from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, low-radar cross-section cruise missiles, and other air-breathing threats. MEADS will provide 360-degree protection of critical maneuvering force assets throughout all phases of tactical operations, while operating in the division area of the battlefield outside the umbrella of an upper-tier defense system. It will be capable of rapid deployment of a minimum battle element by C-130 aircraft, and its mobility will be commensurate with the maneuver forces. It will utilize a distributed architecture and modular components to increase survivability and flexibility of employment in a number of operational configurations. MEADS will provide increased capability against a broad threat spectrum while greatly reducing manpower and logistics requirements. When developed, MEADS will replace the current PATRIOT system.

**Upper-Tier**

The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system has upper-tier capabilities. The first unit to be equipped with THAAD is expected to be fielded by 2007 and the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system is expected to enter the fleet in the 2010 time frame; upper-tier programs also include the Airborne Laser. These systems, combined with the lower-tier systems, provide defense in depth in theater. The upper-tier systems are designed to engage longer-range threats in a larger engagement envelope, both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric.

**Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)**

The THAAD system represents a land-based, upper-tier system that will engage short-, medium- and long-range TBMs in both the endo-atmosphere and exo-atmosphere. THAAD’s ability to intercept missiles at long range and high altitudes will give U.S. forces the best chance to shoot down incoming missiles far enough out so that post-intercept debris will not harm our troops. In addition, THAAD’s endo/exocapability will typically allow multiple-shot opportunities, which increases the system’s overall effectiveness. The THAAD system consists of four principal segments: interceptors, truck-mounted launchers, the THAAD radar system, and the THAAD battle management/command, control, communications and intelligence (BM/C3I) system.

The mobile launcher will protect and transport the interceptors, in addition to firing them. Interceptors will consist of a single-stage booster and a kinetic kill vehicle that will destroy threats using hit-to-kill technology. The THAAD radar supports the full range of surveillance, target tracking, and fire control functions, and provides a communications link with THAAD interceptors in flight. The BM/C3I system will manage and integrate all THAAD components by providing instructions and communications, and by processing sensor data. BM/C3I systems will also link the THAAD system to other missile defense systems in theater to provide a seamless, multi-tiered, interoperable TMD architecture.

**Navy Theater Wide (NTW)**

The NTW TBMD system is being designed to provide an exo-atmospheric intercept capability from the Navy’s AEGIS weapons system. The NTW system will provide an intercept capability against medium- and long-range TBMs near the enemy TBM launch site. This happens to affect ascent phase intercepts along the TBM trajectory as it passes over water or along the coast. It will also affect midcourse intercepts near the defended area which provide descent phase intercepts to achieve an additional layer of defense for lower-tier systems. NTW will be able to take advantage of the mobility of Navy AEGIS-equipped ships and provide BMD protection to U.S. and allied forces throughout the world. This is especially important in the early stages of a conflict when land-based forces are being established in hostile environments.

The NTW system uses the AEGIS Weapon (AWS) with the newly designed Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
missile. This missile is configured as a four-stage missile with a separating kinetic warhead (KW). The KW is guided to the threat missile system in the exosphere using an infrared (IR) seeker and solid divert and attitude control systems (SDACS) to perform a direct hit-to-kill engagement. The current NTW program is performing a series of risk reduction activities (RRA). The primary RRA is the ongoing AEGIS LEAP intercept (ALI) program that will demonstrate the ability of the AWS and SM-3 to hit a TBM target in the exosphere. Other risk reduction activities include the areas of lethality, propulsion, discrimination, divert, kill warhead sensor, ship systems, BM/C3I, and systems engineering. These activities will be integrated into the NTW program as it matures into the Navy’s “tactical” exoatmospheric TBMD capability.

Airborne Laser (ABL)

The ABL will be the world’s first operational high energy laser weapons system when it becomes available in 2007. It is being developed for the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command as a TMD weapon; the ABL mission is to kill TBMs in their boost phase of flight. Boosting TBMs are easy to detect and track due to their bright plumes and are under tremendous dynamic stresses, making them vulnerable to laser weapons. Because ABL is lethal against TBMs hundreds of kilometers away, it can fly over friendly territory and kill TBMs as they are launched, giving ABL standoff capability and providing great employment flexibility. ABL will serve as a powerful deterrent to use of WMD and will help save American and allied lives in regions of conflict because destruction of TBMs early in flight can cause missile debris, including the warhead, to fall back on the aggressor. ABL engages the TBM, using its laser weapon to cause a rupture or hole in the missile’s fuel tank. The result of this engagement is either a rapid leak of missile fuel or an actual catastrophic failure of the missile. In either case, the missile is defeated and falls short of its intended target. ABL will also provide quick and accurate missile launch point estimations to offensive counter-aircraft attacking TBM launchers, assist midcourse and terminal systems by passing trajectory data on TBM “leakers,” and alert passive defenses by providing early missile launch and impact warnings.

ABL main armament is a flight-weighted, megawatt class (million watt) Chemical Oxygen-Iodine Laser (COIL) in the rear of the aircraft. Fourteen COIL modules make up the operational laser weapon, along with sufficient chemical fuel for 20-40 TBM kills. A sophisticated optical system transports the laser beam up to the aircraft nose, where a 1.5 meter diameter mirror in a ball turret points the beam at the target. This optical system contains low-power lasers, sensors, steering mirrors, and adaptive optics (deformable mirrors) to precisely track targets and correct atmospheric distortions, thereby increasing the high energy laser beam’s intensity on target and ABL lethal range. ABL aircraft platform is a modified 747-400F. Several AN/AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) units mounted on ABL’s exterior provide 360° surveillance coverage and initial TBM target tracking out to many hundreds of kilometers. A dorsal mounted Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared Night (LANTIRN) targeting pod includes a laser range finder to compute target positions for ABL fire control and reporting to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The ABL crew selects and prioritizes targets for engagement according to JFACC rules of engagement, manages each individual laser firing, and communicates with outside military assets through HF and VHF/UHF/SATCOM radios and intelligence systems. First flight of the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) ABL, with the battle management suite only, is scheduled for spring 2001. The optics and laser weapon systems will be built up and tested on the ground at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) in FY 2001-02, then installed in the 747. First flight of the full Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) prototype will be made in spring 2002.

National Missile Defense (NMD)

The NMD program is tasked to develop, demonstrate, and, if ordered to do so, deploy an NMD system to defend all fifty states against limited strategic ballistic missile attacks from a country of proliferation concern. Should a decision be made to deploy the NMD system, DoD expects to achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) shortly after 2005. DoD is pursuing a fixed, land-based architecture for the NMD program, which includes five fundamental building blocks:
Section II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

ground-based interceptor (GBI) consisting of a kill vehicle (KV) and a commercial off-the-shelf booster, X-Band Radar (XBR), Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR), space-based sensors comprising Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites; and a Battle Management/Command, Control and Communications (BM/C3) system.

**Family of Systems/Interoperability**

Some BMD activities, specifically Joint Theater Missile Defense programs, provide direct support to many separate programs. This introduces greater efficiency by accomplishing efforts that otherwise would have to be achieved separately by each program. These include interoperability in BM/C3, which is essential for joint and combined TMD operations.

BMDO, working with the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense (JTAMD) organization, has developed an architecture upon which all the Services can build. This includes improving early warning and dissemination, ensuring communications interoperability, and upgrading command and control centers. In addition to BM/C3, the other activities include test and evaluation, modeling and simulation support, CINC's TMD Assessment program, the U.S.-Israel Arrow Deployability Program, and cooperative engagement capability analysis. These activities are critical to the success of the overall U.S. TMD system. They act as the glue that holds the architecture together and will ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The primary goal is to provide the warfighter with an integrated TMD capability by building in the interoperability and flexibility to satisfy a wide range of threat scenarios. From its joint perspective, BMDO oversees the various independent weapons systems development efforts and provides the timing for equipment and system integration, and analysis to integrate the multitude of sensors, interceptors, and tactical command centers into a joint theater-wide TMD architecture.

**Allied Programs**

The United States is collaborating on programs with allied governments to develop missile defense systems. These include the PATRIOT system with Germany and the Netherlands, the Arrow program with Israel, and MEADS with the Italian and German governments. These programs allow our allies to benefit from U.S. expertise in the area of missile defense while providing the United States with flight test data as further risk reduction measures in U.S. TMD development. This cooperation also provides the foundation for developing coalition interoperability capabilities in TMD. In addition, BMDO provides the facilities for coalition training in each of the theaters through the CINC's assessment program. Furthermore, as part of broader efforts to enhance the security of U.S., allied, and coalition forces against ballistic missile strikes and to complement U.S. counterproliferation strategy, the DoD cooperates with friends and allies on other programs to enhance TMD capability. These include shared early warning, key technology development, and cooperative planning.

**Arrow Deployment Program**

The United States and Israel are cooperating on the development of the Arrow interceptor and launcher and their integration with the other Israeli-developed system elements that make up the Arrow Weapon System (AWS). The Arrow interceptor is an Israeli-developed, two-stage vehicle launched from a mobile launcher that kills incoming ballistic missiles by using a blast fragmentation warhead. The Arrow has an engagement footprint somewhere between the U.S. PAC-3 and THAAD. An important objective of U.S. involvement is to foster interoperability between the AWS and U.S. TMD systems. The AWS accomplished a successful integrated, full-system intercept test against a surrogate ballistic missile on 1 November 1999. Should Israel continue to field the U.S.-built PATRIOT systems in conjunction with its deployment of the AWS, they will possess a formidable multi-tier national missile defense capability. This robust missile defense capability greatly enhances the security of an important U.S. ally and provides protection to U.S. forces, if they are deployed to the region. The Arrow initial operational capability will occur in 2000. The
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

first unit was stood up by the Israeli Air Force on 14 March 2000.

Advanced Technologies
The BMDO technology investment strategy is straightforward, anticipating the future missile threat and pushing technologies in response. DoD leverages other federal and industry R&D investments where appropriate to aid missile defense and integrates emerging technologies in modest systems demonstrations that seek to identify their merits. With this approach, DoD ensures that BMD technology thrusts help develop near-term improvements or technology insertions to current acquisition programs, or provide an advanced BMD capability to address evolving missile threats. The BMDO technology efforts include:

- Advanced sensor technology (focal plane arrays, laser radar, and image processing algorithms) to improve detection and tracking of missiles.
- Advanced interceptor technology (improved sensor windows, projectile structures, guidance and control, and seekers) to improve hit-to-kill capabilities.
- Directed energy (chemical laser) to provide an option of space-based, global coverage with a powerful boost phase intercept defense capability.
- Phenomenology and missile plume signature measurements to assist in readily identifying and tracking and discriminating missile threats.

Models and Simulation
BMDO uses a wide range of models and simulation tools to provide insight into the effectiveness of the BMD systems. BMDO and other organizations employ these tools to support system engineering analyses, architecture trades, and test and evaluation support for the various BMD systems.

Wargame 2000
The Wargame 2000 System development is sponsored by BMDO as a real-time, interactive, discrete event, command and control air and missile defense simulation. The Wargame 2000 System will provide a simulated combat environment that will allow warfighting commanders, their staffs, and the acquisition community to examine air and missile defense concepts of operation (CONOPS), doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures as an integral part of larger combat environments through the use of human-in-control experiments. The Wargame 2000 System is intended to provide a robust, flexible, easy-to-use architecture, which incorporates current and evolving weapons characteristics and threat scenarios to conduct missile and air defense investigations for both NMD and TAMD programs.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
Consequence Management (CM) refers to actions taken to respond and assist in the mitigation of damage and collateral hazards from the deliberate employment or accidental release of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials or high-yield conventional explosive (CBRNE) weapons in a domestic or foreign environment. While DoD may provide support to domestic consequence management operations under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in its Lead Federal Agency (LFA) status, for a foreign consequence management operation, DoD may provide support to the Department of State (DoS) as LFA.

Domestic Consequence Management
In the event of a domestic incident on American soil resulting in the release of CBRNE, the local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical personnel who are first to respond may become rapidly overwhelmed by the magnitude and lingering effects. In that instance, a governor may request a Presidential disaster declaration for the state and assistance from the federal government through the LFA. If DoD assistance is requested, the DoD has many unique capabilities, both technical and operational, which could support civil authorities to mitigate and manage the consequences of such an incident.

Due to the increasing volatility of the threat and time sensitivities associated with providing effective support, the Federal Response Plan assigns the FEMA as the LFA for CBRNE consequence management of a
Section II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

A domestic incident. The Secretary of Defense appointed an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD-CS) to serve as the Department’s focal point for the coordination of DoD efforts in preparation for requests for assistance from civilian agencies. Through coordination of the DoD WMD Preparedness Group, the ATSD-CS ensures that DoD efficiently marshals its consequence management resources and its many capabilities in support of the LFA in accordance with the Federal Response Plan. The ATSD-CS also represents DoD in the interagency consequence management policymaking body led by the President’s National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism.

DoD Capabilities for Consequence Management

For both domestic and foreign consequence management, the Department has specially trained and equipped units capable of performing detection and decontamination, providing command and control, exercising mortuary duties, transporting contaminated personnel, performing medical functions, and operating in a CBRNE environment. Several DoD elements have a 24-hour, on-call emergency response capability with personnel trained in biological, chemical, and explosive ordnance disposal operations. These personnel perform render-safe procedures; provide damage limitation, reconnaissance, recovery, sampling, mitigation, decontamination, and transportation; and provide or recommend final disposition of weaponized and nonweaponized nuclear, chemical, and biological materials.

In recognition of the unique nature and challenges of responding to a domestic CBRNE event, the Department established a standing Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS), subordinate to United States Joint Forces Command to provide command and control of DoD support to the LFA for CBRNE CM events in the continental United States (CONUS). On a day-to-day basis, JTF-CS will be involved in CBRNE consequence management doctrine development, training and exercise management, plans development and review, and requirements identification. The United States Pacific Command and the United States Southern Command have parallel responsibilities for providing military assistance to civil authorities for states, territories, and possessions outside CONUS. The United States Joint Forces Command, in turn, provides technical advice and assistance to geographic commanders in chief conducting consequence management operations in response to CBRNE incidents outside CONUS.

In addition, DoD has also established 27 WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs), composed of 22 well-trained and equipped full-time National Guard personnel. Upon completion of training and certification in FY 2001, one WMD CST will be stationed in each of the ten FEMA regions around the country, ready to provide support when directed by their respective governors. Their mission will be to deploy rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the precise nature of an incident, provide expert medical and technical advice, and help pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on military support. Unless federalized, the CSTs will remain state National Guard assets that can be quickly accessed by proximate governors. By congressional direction, DoD is also training 17 additional WMD CSTs whose certification is anticipated in FY 2002. Congress authorized an additional five teams to be established in FY 2001. Their training and certification is also anticipated in FY 2002.

The U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) develops technological countermeasures and equipment that provide rapid warning and facilitate quick response in the event of a chemical or biological incident. Under SBCCOM, the Edgewood Research and Development Center also maintains a rapidly deployable mobile environmental monitoring and technical assessment system, the Mobile Analytical Response System. This system provides state-of-the-art analytical assessment of chemical or biological hazards at an incident site.

On order, SBCCOM deploys the Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team (CBR-RRT). The mission of the CBR-RRT is to coordinate and manage all DoD technical capabilities tasked to support a crisis response or consequence management operation.
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

Also under SBCCOM is the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, which is a specialized unit with missions of escorting the movement of chemical or biological material and finding and destroying chemical or biological munitions. This unit maintains a 24-hour, on-call alert team that will be tailored specifically to a current situation for both crisis and consequence management responses.

- Under the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, the USAMRIID develops strategies, products, information, procedures, and training for medical defense against agents of biological origin and naturally occurring diseases of military importance that require special containment. USAMRIID has many existing capabilities that can be employed for evaluating terrorist incidents from initial communication of the threat or incident to its resolution. These capabilities include:
  - Assisting in the evaluation of threat capability in relation to a specific agent or agents.
  - Assisting in the evaluation of delivery methods and their impacts.
  - Identifying biological agents (infectious and toxic) in samples from an incident.
  - Providing special vaccines for limited numbers of personnel who respond to or are the target of such incidents.
  - Handling specialized transport of a limited numbers of biological casualties under containment conditions to a receiving medical facility.

A key capability of USAMRIID is its staff of physicians, who are experienced clinicians and also understand the unique diagnostic and therapeutic challenges posed by biological warfare agents, information with which most physicians are not familiar.

Navy Explosive Ordnance Groups can be tasked to eliminate hazards from explosives that jeopardize operations conducted in support of the National Military Strategy. Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) detachments are structured for a relatively small footprint and rapid response in a variety of environments, both afloat and ashore, and are capable of responding to underwater and surface ordnance, nuclear, biological, chemical, and improvised explosive device (IED) threats.

U.S. Navy Environmental and Preventative Medicine Units (NEPMU) provide the occupational medicine technical expertise and assessment skills necessary to mitigate the long-term effects of a CBRNE incident but do not provide individual patient medical treatment. NEPMU deployable teams, called Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Environmental Defense (CBRED) teams, are on alert for rapid response. CBRED teams are available to advise the C/B-RRT and public health authorities and to augment other C/B-RRT medical assets.

Defense Technical Response Group (DTRG) is a deployable team of civilian DoD scientists who provide specialized one-of-a-kind equipment and on-scene technical advice to EOD operators during a CBRNE incident. DTRG also provides support to military EOD technicians in the field at all command levels. Primary duties include providing safe access routes to suspect ordnance, training, and liaison support to other agencies.

The Navy Medical Research Center Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP) defends members of the Armed Forces against a biological threat in a theater of operations. BDRP has developed a capability that consists of a transportable biological field laboratory. The field lab is composed of four basic components which combine to provide a capability to identify bacteria, viruses and toxins. Furthermore, the program conducts hand-held screening assays and immunoassays for clinical and environmental samples that can be deployed globally.

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is the Navy’s corporate laboratory, which conducts multidisciplinary programs of scientific research and technology. NRL is capable of providing uniformed microbiologists specifically trained in the use of Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC) laboratory equipment and tests in order to augment NMRC. All NRL microbiologists are trained to work with chemical/biological threat agents.
Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

The Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) is a deployable force capable of performing chemical or biological consequence management following a terrorist attack. CBIRF has been most effective when forward deployed in response to a credible threat to domestic or overseas installations, or to protect events of national significance from the consequences of chemical/biological incidents. A panel of military and civilian experts in chemical and biological agents supports CBIRF. These experts assist in the training and development of CBIRF and are linked to CBIRF operationally through electronic communications. CBIRF is capable of deploying on short notice, as an element of the Joint Task Force-Civil Support, in support of the Federal Response Plan. CBIRF capabilities include decontaminating victims into treatable patients, stabilizing patients, and treating chemical and biological casualties.

The Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT) consists of three separate Unit Type Codes (UTCs): Nuclear Incident Response Force (NIRF) Team 1, NIRF 2, and the Radioanalytical Assessment Team (RAT). The teams are located at Brooks Air Force Base, TX and are assigned to the Air Force Material Command (AFMC). The AFTAT NIRF 1 and 2 provide rapid global response to a wide range of radiological incidents and accidents, providing the supported medical authority rapid to ensure proper force protection. The RAT provides the supported medical authority with rapid and accurate evaluation of environmental and occupational samples. The generated data is analyzed and presented to provide the medical authority with expert guidance on effective force protection and consequence management. This UTC can deploy as a stand-alone team, or as a follow-on capability to the AFRAT NIRF teams.

Air Force medical group capabilities vary from unit to unit and, are divided between patient care, NBC medical specialty teams, medical laboratories and preventive medicine. CBRNE-CM units include the following: Medical Biological Augmentation Teams, Bioenvironmental Engineering NBC Teams, Medical Patient Decontamination Teams, Medical Theater Epidemiology Teams, Medical Infectious Disease Teams with Augmentation, Medical Nuclear Incident Response Forces, Medical Radioanalytical Assessment Teams, and Medial Radiology Augmentation Teams.

Air Force medical laboratory and technical capabilities, assets, and units are maintained at the Air Force Institute for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health Analysis (AFIERA), Brooks Air Force Base, TX. The mission of AFIERA is to enhance mission effectiveness, protect health, improve readiness, and reduce costs through the assessment and management of risks to human health and safety, operational performance, and the environment. Its capabilities include a wide range of analytical, consultative, and monitoring services focused on the assessment of operational, radiological, chemical, and biological risks to deployed populations. They also include laboratory support for the identification of biological agents of clinical concern; medical samples and select environmental samples; and analysis of numerous chemical compounds and radioactive elements in soil, vegetation, tissue, excreta, industrial materials, and air.

When requested, DoD could also contribute general assets such as mobile field hospitals, logistics, communications, civil affairs units, mortuary units, military police, search and rescue teams and chaplains.

DoD will provide its unique and extensive resources in accordance with several key principles.

First, DoD will ensure an unequivocal chain of responsibility, authority, and accountability for its actions to assure the American people that the military will follow all relevant laws when an emergency occurs. To this end, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support will provide full-time civilian oversight for the domestic use of DoD CBRNE consequence management assets in support of other federal agencies.

Second, during a CBRNE event, DoD will always play a supporting role to the LFA in accordance with the Federal Response Plan and will ensure complete compliance with the Constitution, the Posse Comitatus Act, and other applicable laws. The Department routinely
provides support and assistance to civilian authorities and has considerable experience balancing the requirement to protect civil liberties on one hand with the need to ensure national security on the other.

Third, DoD CM equipment and assets are largely resident in its warfighting capabilities. However, many of these capabilities can be dual-use. Military units specializing in decontamination, medical support, logistics, transportation, and communications, for example, could assist in the domestic arena as well. DoD will also emphasize its natural role, skills, and structure in support of the LFA, such as the ability to rapidly mobilize and provide mass logistical support.

Fourth, whereas active duty forces are the U.S. forward-deployed assets overseas, DoD will employ the Army Reserve and National Guard as the forward-deployed units for consequence management in the domestic arena. In the event of a domestic CBRNE event, certain units would be able to respond rapidly due to their geographic dispersion and proximity to major American cities. Moreover, many of the applicable capabilities such as decontamination, medical support, transportation, and communications are already contained in Reserve and National Guard units.

Fifth, DoD will deconflict LFA requests for support against ongoing warfighting requirements. Before providing support, DoD will consider whether requested military capabilities are available domestically and whether the Department has the sufficient legal and budgetary authorities to provide the support to civil authorities.

In collaboration with other federal agencies, DoD has also undertaken preparatory activities. The Department has implemented the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act), which required DoD to enhance the capability of federal, state, and local emergency responders regarding terrorist incidents involving CBRNE. The Domestic Preparedness Program consists of four elements: the City Train-the-Trainer Program, the Exercise Program, the Expert Assistance Program, and the Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team. Since 1996, DoD has trained over 28,000 first responder trainers in over 105 cities through the City Training Program, which also included training equipment loans to 68 cities. Consistent with the DoD role in support of the designated LFA, DoD transferred major portions of the Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice on 1 October 2001.

**Foreign Consequence Management**

DoD is also prepared to assist DoS in the event a CBRNE incident occurs outside the United States, its territories, or its possessions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD P) is responsible, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), for crisis management, both domestic and abroad. ASD (SO/LIC) also serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the USD P and the Secretary for Defense for anti-terrorism and force protection policy and ensures compliance with the DoD instruction 2000.16 entitled DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards. This instruction implements policy and assigns responsibilities for all activities reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense for protection of personnel and assets from acts of terrorism.

With regard to international CM support, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for policy promulgation, preparedness for CM international support missions, policy oversight of operations and coordination of LFA requests for CM support. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will coordinate all international CM response actions with the ATSD(CS). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01 (CJCSI 3214.01), Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management, outlines the structure of the DoD response:

- Only the National Command Authorities (NCA) may order military forces to execute foreign CM missions.
- DoS is designated as the LFA for foreign CM operations in support of a foreign government not limited to a military installation.
- All DoD support will be coordinated through the responsible Chief of Mission.
All DoD support for foreign CM operations will be provided in accordance with either a Host Nation assistance request through the DoS, approved by the NCA, and directed by DoD, or as part of an international relief effort that the NCA directs DoD to support.

The geographic combatant commands are tasked to develop CM plans, identify and train military forces to support CM operations, and, when directed, respond to foreign CBRNE incidents within its assigned areas of responsibility.

To guide combatant commanders in the planning and conduct of foreign CM operations, DoD has undertaken several initiatives:

First, DoD has undertaken a revision of CJCS CONPLAN 0400, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This significantly enhanced revision includes guidance to the combatant commanders for the planning and conduct of foreign CM.

Second, DoD has developed a comprehensive Foreign Consequence Management Planner’s Guide. The guide contains information important to task force commanders and other tactical commanders tasked with support to CM. The Foreign Consequence Management Planner’s Guide will be published early in FY 2001.

Third, DoD has developed a database listing and providing detailed information on all DoD units and assets that can support CM operations. The database and an instruction summarizing it and governing its maintenance, CJCSI 3110.16, Military Assets and Units for Consequence Management Operations, were published early in FY 2001, at which time DTRA assume responsibility for maintaining the database.

CONCLUSION

The proliferation and potential use of NBC weapons and their delivery means is not a hypothetical threat. More than 25 countries have, or may be developing, NBC weapons and the means to deliver them; a larger number are capable of producing such weapons, potentially on short notice. While the 1990s witnessed a considerable reduction in the threat from the countries of the FSU and the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the security challenges posed by the continuing spread of WMD remain daunting. In addition, the NBC proliferation threat has become transnational and now has the potential to come from terrorist organizations or organized crime groups. Proliferation of NBC weapons and associated delivery systems presents a daunting challenge. The United States will need perseverance, patience, and imagination to combat this threat.

This section of the report has described in detail the three components of the DoD response to NBC proliferation—preventing proliferation from occurring, protecting U.S. forces and citizens against NBC weapons, and being able to respond against attacks by those who would use NBC weapons against the United States. Prevention of proliferation is the first priority. DoD provides critical support to national and international prevention efforts. However, DoD understands that the United States will not be successful in preventing proliferation all the time and in all places. When proliferation occurs and U.S. interests and commitments are threatened, the United States must be in a position to prevail on the battlefield, even against opponents who possess NBC weapons. DoD has unique responsibilities for the military responses needed if prevention fails: active defense, passive defense, counterforce, and countering paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist NBC threats.

Development of a coherent, effective national response has required policy initiatives, adaptation of military planning and operations, acquisition of new capabilities, new intelligence community programs, and international cooperation. Much progress has been made, but much more remains to be done.
Annexes
ANNEX A — THREAT CHARACTERISTICS

Nuclear and Radiological

Nuclear weapons, even the simplest of the devices that have been developed by various proliferant countries, have an enormous potential for physical damage. Such weapons can destroy or damage major portions of a city or, if used in a different manner, could greatly impair the communications and electronics infrastructure of a large area. Military forces deployed against an adversary with nuclear capabilities must also take precautionary measures to try to limit the effects of a nuclear blast. Logistics centers, such as airfields and ports, are especially vulnerable because of their value as reinforcement points.

The acquisition of fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) is the key to a nuclear weapons capability. The production of fissile material, even the amount required for a very small nuclear weapons program or a research and development program, requires a significant effort on the part of the proliferant country, and the signatures of the necessary production facilities can be difficult to identify. Other nuclear threats, possibly from non-state organizations, include the theft or outright purchase of a nuclear weapon.

The threat posed by terrorist construction and deployment of a radiological dispersion device (RDD) is real, but limited. An RDD is a device designed to utilize

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Agents *</th>
<th>Untreated Effect</th>
<th>Potential for Epidemic Spread</th>
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<td>Botulinum toxin</td>
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<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ricin toxin</td>
<td>Lethal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staphylococal Enterotoxins</td>
<td>Incapacitant</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mycotoxins</td>
<td>Incapacitant-lethal</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine Neurotoxins</td>
<td>Incapacitant-lethal</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aflatoxin</td>
<td>Incapacitant-lethal</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bioregulatory Peptides</td>
<td>Incapacitant-lethal</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viruses</td>
<td>Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis</td>
<td>Incapacitant-lethal</td>
<td>Possible</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smallpox</td>
<td>Lethal</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marburg/Ebola</td>
<td>Lethal</td>
<td>Possible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In many cases the more commonly known diseases is listed rather than the actual causative agent.
ANNEX A — THREAT CHARACTERISTICS

Radioactive material to cause disruption, damage, or injury. However, RDDs do not include nuclear weapons such as those described above. The widespread use of radioactive materials in medicine, industry, and research makes it entirely plausible that terrorists could acquire radioactive material, and the requirements for design of such a device are not beyond that of a terrorist group. The military utility of RDDs is much smaller than that of chemical and biological weapons. Historically, RDDs have been generally envisioned as having a role in attempts to achieve area denial, although cheaper and more effective substitutes are widely available.

Biological Agents

The biological warfare threat is expected to grow over the next decade as some twelve countries are now believed to have biological warfare programs, as examined in this study, and as more states, and possibly terrorist groups, develop capabilities. There is an increasing availability of biological warfare-related technology, materials, information and expertise, and publicity about potential vulnerabilities. Genetic engineering is one of a growing number of biotechnologies that could allow countries to develop agents, such as modified viruses, that would make detection and diagnosis difficult and may defeat current protection and treatment protocols. Because of the dual-use nature of all the materials needed to produce biological warfare agents, any country with the political will and a competent scientific base probably could produce agents. However, the preparation and effective use of these agents by hostile states or groups is more difficult than some popular literature suggests.

Chemical Agents

Like the threat from biological warfare, the threat from chemical warfare also could grow in the coming years. Many states have chemical warfare programs, as examined in this study, and there is a danger that these capabilities will spread to additional states. The increased availability of related technologies, coupled with the relative ease of producing some chemical agents, has increased concern that their production and use may become more attractive to states or terrorist groups in the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Agents</th>
<th>Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blister</td>
<td>Mustard Nitrogen Mustard Lewisite</td>
<td>Causes large skin blisters; respiratory damage; long-term debilitating injuries, including blindness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choking</td>
<td>Phosgene</td>
<td>Death from lack of oxygen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood</td>
<td>Hydrogen Cyanide Cyanogen Chloride</td>
<td>Interferes with body’s oxygen supply, causing death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nerve</td>
<td>Tabun Sarin Soman Cyclosarin VX Fourth generation</td>
<td>Loss of muscular control, respiratory failure, and death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>TFMN BZ**</td>
<td>Penetrates air filters; incapacitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*TFMN: trifluoronitrosomethane
**BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate
Delivery Means

Once a nation has one of these types of NBC weapons, various delivery means are available. Some of the delivery means most challenging for defenses are ballistic and cruise missiles and unconventional delivery means.

More than 25 countries worldwide possess ballistic missiles. Russia and China nuclear armed missile forces continue to present the greatest potential for catastrophic damage to the United States. However, North Korea is developing an ICBM, and Iran and Iraq may have similar ambitions. The threat from Russia will remain the most robust and lethal, considerably more so than that from China, and orders of magnitude more than the threat posed by other states. In addition, some regional states are shifting emphasis from SRBMs to MRBMs, as shown by MRBM tests in Iran, Pakistan, India, and North Korea within the last two years. However, such states may choose not to conduct robust testing programs, which may hasten the pace to early missile deployment. Because of their longer range, these newer missiles may be able to threaten a wide range of deployed U.S. and allied forces. In addition, the extended range of these missiles allows an attacker the ability to fire from points deeper within its territory.

OPERATIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

Operational ballistic missiles are deployed in silos, on submarines, and on land-mobile launchers, including trucks and railcars. Mobile missiles are favored by many nations because they can be hidden, which greatly increases their survivability.

Cruise missiles are another option for delivery of NBC weapons. They may be even less expensive and more accurate than ballistic missiles, which may make them attractive to states or non-state groups. Further, they may be more difficult to defend against than manned aircraft because of their lower flight profiles and smaller radar cross-sections. While most cruise missiles now in countries’ arsenals are designed for an anti-ship role, some states of concern may decide to modify the missiles for NBC delivery in the future.

Other widely available potential delivery means include artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars. Aircraft, including fighters, fighter-bombers, helicopters, transport planes, and converted unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) also are potential delivery vehicles. Aerial sprayers can be adapted for use with many types of helicopters, UAVs, and aircraft.

Lastly, an NBC attack by unconventional means may be more attractive to either a state or a non-state actor. These may include aircraft, boats, trucks, or cars equipped with aerosol sprayers, or other improvised dissemination devices.
ANNEX B — ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND REGIMES FOR COUNTRIES OF CONCERN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NPT</th>
<th>CTBT</th>
<th>NSG/ZC</th>
<th>BWC</th>
<th>CWC</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>MTCR</th>
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<td>R</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>–/M</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–/–</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>–/–</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–/–</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–/–</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–/–</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–/–</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
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<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>MM</td>
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<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>H</td>
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<td>–/–</td>
<td>R</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<tr>
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<td>R</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* China has agreed to export restrictions for complete missiles but not to the MTCR technical annex that addresses exports of missile technologies.

**Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)**
- Nonnuclear weapon member states forswear the right to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Exporting nuclear materials to nonnuclear weapon states is prohibited unless the material is safeguarded.
- Nonnuclear weapon states that are NPT members agree to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at all nuclear sites.

**Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**
- Signatories undertake not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or other nuclear explosion.

**Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)**
- Members agree informally to control exports of nuclear materials and to establish tight controls on enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

**Zangger Committee (ZC)**
- Developed list of safeguarded trigger items that NPT members will export only to facilities under IAEA safeguards.

**Australia Group (AG)**
- Informal group whose members have adopted export controls on specific chemical precursors, microorganisms, and related production equipment with chemical and biological weapons applications.

**Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)**
- Bans development, production, stockpiling, retention, or acquisition of biological agents or toxins that have no justification for peaceful purposes.
- Treaty in force but has no verification or monitoring mechanisms.

**Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)**
- Bans chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use.
- Requires adherents to declare and destroy stockpiles and production plants within 10 years. Entered into force in April 1997.
**ANNEX B — ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND REGIMES FOR COUNTRIES OF CONCERN**

**Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)**

- Voluntary regime with 32 members states; no control over nonmembers; no enforcement authority.
- Main goal is to halt or slow the spread of missiles and UAVs that can deliver a 500-kilogram or larger payload to 300 or more kilometers.
- Members agreed to control two categories of exports related to missile development, production, and operation:
  - **Category I:** whole missiles and UAVs with 500 kilometer/300 kilometer payload/range; and complete subsystems such as guidance and engines.
  - **Category II:** equipment and technology related to warheads and re-entry vehicles, missile engines, guidance technology, propellants and missile and UAVs with a 300km range but less than a 300 kilometer payload.
ANNEX C — BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

All BW detection systems currently fielded or in testing need additional work on their detection algorithms and require manual interpretation of raw data. The technical challenges of interrogating particle clouds for biological content are considerable and will require large increases in weight and power consumption that may lessen the operational attractiveness of the short-range detection systems.

Point detectors can only sense biological agents when they are enveloped in the aerosol plume. The process through which they must go to provide reliable warning of the presence of an agent is similar in most fielded systems. Air is first sucked into a component known as an Aerosol Particle Sizer (APS). This device sizes and counts particles to determine if there has been a change in the aerosol background that might indicate the presence of an agent. The APS functions as a trigger to initiate the next stage of analysis, generally referred to as detection. This is often performed by examining the intake for biological fluorescence, a process combined in newer equipment with the triggering function.

The point detector proceeds to the identification stage of analysis when it is satisfied that there is a high probability of the presence of suspect biological material. This determination is made in most systems when two networked sensors are able to reach a kind of mathematical consensus about the significance of their intake, which can only happen if the sensors detect increased particulate material within a period of time allowed by an algorithm that is based on wind speed and direction. The systems then inject and analyze their intake.

In the final stage of the detection cycle, a suspect aerosol is concentrated and analyzed to arrive at a presumptive identification. The intake is typically suspended in buffered water and run over a ticket containing a reagent, usually an antibody. If no agent is identified, the sample is dumped. A presumptive identification, which is usually limited to a preselected set of agents, allows a general warning to be issued and provides the basis for forensic analysis of the agent sample. It is possible that the presence of an agent at levels that are low, but still sufficient to cause infection, may trigger the detection algorithm and then be dumped because the system is not sensitive enough to make an identification at low levels of concentration. Additionally, the identification technologies tend not to have internal controls to monitor whether the assays they perform are reacting correctly.

The near- and mid-term approaches to remediating these deficiencies tend to be incremental or to involve multiplication and reorganization of the sensor system components. The magnitude of the increases in sensitivity and speed that would be provided by such solutions, which often involve unacceptable tradeoffs, is insufficient to lessen significantly the likelihood of exposure to biological agents that are currently recognized and understood. The near certainty that more potent and elusive agents are now under development and will soon be weaponized amplifies the gravity of the challenge.

There are more novel approaches to the problem of identification that may yet hold some promise for the eventual attainment of effective solutions. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has two such programs. One involves the development of technologies that use up-converting phosphors to improve detection sensitivity and enhanced multiplexing to reveal on a single chip the family, genus, and species of a biological agent. In this project, called the BW Defense Environmental Sensors Program, a miniaturized and ruggedized mass spectrometer is also being developed to identify biological agents without the use of fluids and consumables. These environmental sensors are intended to operate automatically so that they can be left unattended on the battlefield.

In another experimental project known as the Tissue-Based Biosensors Program, DARPA is exploring the use of biological cells and tissues as detector components for sensors that will report both biological and
chemical toxins. The reaction of biosensors provides information about the mechanisms and activity of a wide spectrum of agents, whether they are living or dead, or have been bioengineered and are currently undetectable by other means, such as antibodies and nucleic acid sequencing. The program has a number of challenges to overcome and is currently focusing on engineering cells and tissues to satisfy sensor performance requirements and fabricate prototype devices for testing.

While point detection systems have a large role in countering the use of bioagents, standoff systems also make an important contribution to detection. The Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) technology of these systems projects electromagnetic beams to illuminate aerosolized clouds of particulate matter, producing return radiation that can be evaluated for particle size and density, as long as the line of sight between sensor and target is unobstructed. Systems that use infrared wavelengths can detect particulate matter at distances as great as 30 to 50 kilometers, but cannot distinguish between biological particles and materials of nonorganic origin. Systems that rely on ultraviolet wavelengths cause organic components in airborne materials, such as proteases, to fluoresce, and are thus able to distinguish biological aerosols from dust and other contaminants. The range of these systems, however, is limited to a few kilometers at best due to the relative opacity of air to ultraviolet light.

The infrared standoff capability is able to spot what is arguably the most disastrous contingency foreseeable in biological warfare, the long line release. But the impossibility of distinguishing with infrared returns, biological from nonbiological particles, and the great distance at which the clouds can be spotted, give rise to a collection of associated difficulties in employing the long-range asset. The particle clouds that can be detected at distances measuring in the tens of kilometers are of a size that could envelop very large units upon their eventual arrival. But at such distances, it is difficult to predict when and where the suspect clouds will arrive along a corps or divisional frontage. The decision to go into a protective posture based on such distant data could entail a substantial degradation in performance of the better part of a force in theater for as many hours as it would take for prevailing breezes to waft the clouds within reach of more informative sensors.

The short-range, ultraviolet standoff detection capability, which operates at distances of one to three kilometers, would seem to hold greater operational promise for the field commander than infrared systems. There are obvious tactical advantages to the ability to interrogate clouds for biological content at a distance that still affords some reaction time, but reduces the uncertainty about the movement of air masses. Unfortunately, the ultraviolet systems suffer from technical weaknesses that compromise their reliability. They perform poorly in detecting particles in moderately low concentrations, which might reasonably be expected of a release that had originated from some distance. They tend to have a relatively high false positive rate. One recent analysis has concluded that the optimal use of current standoff detection capabilities would be to couple nondiscriminating infrared cloud detectors to deployable point detectors.
Glossary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABL</td>
<td>Airborne Laser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACADA</td>
<td>Automatic Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTD</td>
<td>Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Areas for Capability Enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADW</td>
<td>Agent Defeat Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIOPS</td>
<td>Advanced Integrated Collective Protective System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Aerosol Particle Sizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIDS</td>
<td>Biological Integrated Detection System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM/C3I</td>
<td>Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMDO</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Biological Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWC</td>
<td>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control, and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>Chemical/Biological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBW</td>
<td>Chemical and Biological Warfare or Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Chemical and Biological Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBIRF</td>
<td>Chemical Biological Incident Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Counterproliferation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM-MS SOG</td>
<td>Counterproliferation Mission Support Senior Oversight Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRC</td>
<td>Counterproliferation Program Review Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTTS</td>
<td>Counterterror Technical Support</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons or Chemical Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>DARPA</td>
<td>Defense Advanced Research Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defense Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGP</td>
<td>NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTRA</td>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPCI</td>
<td>Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDA</td>
<td>Food and Drug Administration</td>
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### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDBTDC</td>
<td>Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (Range: greater than 5,500 kilometers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAM</td>
<td>Improved Chemical Agent Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>International Law Enforcement Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPOS</td>
<td>Improved Point Detection System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (Range: 3,000-5,000 kilometers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPDDS</td>
<td>Joint Biological Point Detection System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSVA</td>
<td>Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments</td>
</tr>
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<td>JSWIST</td>
<td>Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology</td>
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<td>JWCO</td>
<td>Joint Warfighting Capability Objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>LACM</td>
<td>Land Attack Cruise Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNBCRS</td>
<td>Lightweight Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>LR-BSDS</td>
<td>Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System</td>
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<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTOPS</td>
<td>Million Theoretical Operations Per Second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBCRS</td>
<td>NBC Reconnaissance System</td>
</tr>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>New Independent States</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defense</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>P3I</td>
<td>Pre-Planned Product Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC-3</td>
<td>PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSCTAAL</td>
<td>Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBIRS</td>
<td>Space based Infrared System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLV</td>
<td>Space Launch Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short Range Ballistic Missile (Range: 1,000 kilometers or less)</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBI</td>
<td>Theater Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Theater High Altitude Area Defense</td>
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<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theater Missile Defense</td>
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### GLOSSARY

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>TSWG</td>
<td>Technical Support Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>UN Special Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMDI</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative</td>
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