

**NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE RESERVE FORCE:
REORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT FOR
INTEGRATION AND SUPPORT OF THE ACTIVE COMPONENT
BY**

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This monograph examines the current organizational structure and employment of the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Reserve Force, to research the possibility of increasing force readiness through command reorganization and implementation of a reserve employment strategy. The historical significance of the Reserve Component illustrates the changes in the reserve force imposed by a changing strategic environment. Important to this study was the role the Reserve Component has played throughout history and its ability to adapt to world wars and peacetime environments. The end of the Cold War created a change in the strategic environment that required the military to adapt to full spectrum operations around the globe. The Department of Defense initiated the Total Force Policy as a method to integrate all resources, Active, Reserve, and National Guard, and meet increasing objectives with a smaller force. This monograph examines the current reserve force structure and employment of the Army and Navy to illustrate the service commitment to the Total Force Policy. The Army and Navy organize their Reserve Components to assume a more active role and reduce the operational tempo of the active force. The U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) organizes and employs reserve forces in the same manner as the active SF Groups. The SF methodology for organization and employment offers possible changes for NSW to implement. The current NSW organizational structure and employment strategy illustrate the underutilized reserve resource and the possibility of applying the lessons learned from the SF. This monograph concludes that NSW can enhance force readiness through the reorganization and employment of its reserve force. The total NSW force active and reserve components, can provide better support to theater CINCs. Properly represented, NSW can assign missions to the reserve force that will reduce operational tempo and enhance readiness of the active force. This study proposes that NSW consider an organizational structure, which provides reserve force representation at the major command level. Representation provides the active component with a knowledgeable source to recommend the most effective method of reserve employment. This monograph also proposes that NSW develop an employment strategy to reduce the operational tempo of the active component and assign missions that meet the skill level and required timeline of the reserve component. Skilled and valuable personnel are resident in the reserve force with capability to plan and execute NSW missions.

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Abstract

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This monograph examines the current organizational structure and employment of the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Reserve Force, to research the possibility of increasing force readiness through command reorganization and implementation of a reserve employment strategy. The historical significance of the Reserve Component illustrates the changes in the reserve force imposed by a changing strategic environment. Important to this study was the role the Reserve Component has played throughout history and its ability to adapt to world wars and peacetime environments. The end of the Cold War created a change in the strategic environment that required the military to adapt to full spectrum operations around the globe. The Department of Defense initiated the Total Force Policy as a method to integrate all resources, Active, Reserve, and National Guard, and meet increasing objectives with a smaller force. This monograph examines the current reserve force structure and employment of the Army and Navy to illustrate the service commitment to the Total Force Policy. The Army and Navy organize their Reserve Components to assume a more active role and reduce the operational tempo of the active force. The U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) organizes and employs reserve forces in the same manner as the active SF Groups. The SF methodology for organization and employment offers possible changes for NSW to implement. The current NSW organizational structure and employment strategy illustrate the underutilized reserve resource and the possibility of applying the lessons learned from the SF.

This monograph concludes that NSW can enhance force readiness through the reorganization and employment of its reserve force. The total NSW force active and reserve components, can provide better support to theater CINCs. Properly represented, NSW can assign missions to the reserve force that will reduce operational tempo and enhance readiness of the active force. This study proposes that NSW consider an organizational structure, which provides reserve force representation at the major command level. Representation provides the active component with a knowledgeable source to recommend the most effective method of reserve employment. This monograph also proposes that NSW develop an employment strategy to reduce the operational tempo of the active component and assign missions that meet the skill level and required timeline of the reserve component. Skilled and valuable personnel are resident in the reserve force with capability to plan and execute NSW missions.

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Government or the Department of Defense.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.

Title 10 U.S. Code, Sec. 10102.

During the Cold War the Reserve Component remained ready to mobilize in response to war or national emergency. The change in threats to national security following the Cold War required the U.S. to respond to a full spectrum of operations. Full spectrum operations transformed the role of the Reserve Component from a static force to an employed asset of the armed forces. The utility of this force is even more apparent today, evident from the twelve and one half million man-days contributed by reservists in 1999.¹ While most of the US military reaps the benefits of an integrated reserve force, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) continues to execute the majority of its missions with active duty personnel. To meet the operational challenges of the twenty-first century and provide Theater CINC's with the best trained units, NSW will be required to employ the entire force, active and reserve components. Title 10 U.S.

¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Military Personnel Subcommittee, Hearing on sustaining the All Volunteer Force and reserve component issues, "Statement of the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, The Hon. Charles L. Cragin," 106th Cong., March 8, 2000, 4-7. Internet accessed, [<http://www.house.gov/hasc/schedules/2000.html#Mar00>], October 5, 2000.

Code indicates that the purpose of the reserve force is to respond to the full spectrum of operations in peace and war.

The Total Force

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Charles Cragin observed, “During the Cold War, our forces were easily identified as being either Active or Reserve.”² This segregation of the reserve component is a characteristic of the U.S. military from its inception. The active component consisted of professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, while the “other” service members who occasionally trained and remained ready for recall to active duty constituted the reserve component. The U.S. commitment to global engagement in full spectrum operations prohibits the active component from accomplishing national military objectives alone. To meet contemporary challenges, the Department of Defense instituted the “Total Force.” Joint Vision 2020 defines the total force as active, reserve, guard, and civilian members combined.³ Present conditions, however, negate the Cold War philosophy of maintaining a ready reserve force in the event of a major theater war. A smaller active force, restrictive personnel tempo, and increased requirements complicate the mission for today’s military planner. The total force offers planners additional resources to overcome these hurdles and meet military objectives.

The total force concept is not new to U. S. national military strategy planners. In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird initiated a “Total Force” policy as a means to integrate active and reserve components during the Cold War.⁴ Successive defense secretaries have continued Secretary Laird’s policy, to include Secretary Cohen’s 1997 “watershed memorandum”, which

² Charles Cragin, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, “Address to the Command and General Staff College Reserve Component Graduating Class,” (Ft. Leavenworth, KS. December 17, 1999), Internet accessed, September 20, 2000, [<http://raweb.osd.mil/publications/speeches>].

³ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Vision 2020,” U.S. (Washington DC, Government Printing Office, June 2000),2. Internet accessed, [<http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/jv2020.doc>], September 27,2000.

⁴ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “Secretary Cohen signs Memorandum Emphasizing Increased Reliance on the Reserve Components,” (Washington DC: Public Affairs, September 11, 1997), 4. Internet accessed, [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news>], October 5, 2000.

stated, “Today, I ask each of you to create an environment that eliminates all residual barriers for effective integration within our Total Force.”⁵

Background

Essential to the success of the total force is integration. The Honorable Charles Cragin, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs defined integration as, “. . . changing the way we think about the nature and purpose of our reserve forces.”⁶ A condescending attitude of the active component towards the reserve force has been detrimental to previous reserve employment strategies. Frequently referred to as “weekend warriors” and a “force of last resort,” this ubiquitous attitude existed throughout the military.

Regular Army Officers from United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) have referred to reserve utility through comments such as, “if we can’t use them, what good are they. . . .?”⁷ This mentality exemplifies the active component’s disconnect from the reserve force. The reserve force can be used, but a certain amount of communication and coordination is required between the active and reserve components. NSW’s organizational structure hinders the communication and coordination with its reserve force. The employment of NSW reservists is encumbered by the lack of an employment strategy. Reserve Force integration will require NSW to consider its organizational structure and employment strategy for connectivity between active and reserve components.

Research Problem

In response to Secretary Cohen’s directive for a total force, each of the armed services has made significant organizational changes to achieve Reserve Force integration. Each service provides quality personnel to the Reserve components, but a USSOCOM responsibility is to

⁵ Ibid., 4.

⁶ Charles L Cragin, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, “Milestones on the Road to Integration,” 2. Internet accessed, [<http://raweb.osd.mil/news/articles>], September 20, 2000.

⁷ Wayne J. Morgan, LTC, Special Forces U.S. Army Reserve, “Reserve Component Special Forces. Integration and Employment Models for the Operational Continuum,” (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 1.

organize, train, and equip SOF Reservists.⁸ USSOCOM executes its mission through the service component commanders, US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC), and US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The component commanders have the responsibility of carrying out Secretary Cohen's directive of total force integration. This is an especially difficult task, since most SOF missions require highly specialized personnel who maintain the highest state of combat readiness. This monograph researched the possibilities for structural and employment changes for reserve integration of NSWC.

Monograph Hypothesis

This monograph examines the following hypothesis: Reorganization of Naval Special Warfare Reserve forces will facilitate integration of the total NSW force. The research question is, can NSW better integrate its reserve component to enhance the combat readiness of units supporting Theater CINCs? This monograph offers an alternative organizational structure for NSW to implement as a means to achieve reserve force integration.

Methodology

Research began with a historical analysis of the reserve force. From the establishment of an initial defense force through post Cold War activities, a historical perspective illustrates the development of today's reserve force. The analysis identifies significant organizational and legislative changes within the state militia, National Guard, and Army and Navy Reserves. An understanding of the previous changes to the reserve system is important to understand why proposed changes would benefit the current system. Additionally, research confirms why the U.S. maintains the two different components and established the relevance of the reserves and requirement for integration.

⁸ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. SOF Posture Statement 2000. (Washington DC: GPO, 2000), 12.

Research of current reserve organizations illustrates how reserves are organized and employed throughout the US military. As a model of comparison, the research focused on the Special Forces because its mission most closely resembles NSW's mission.

The purpose of the research was to answer the question, how should the NSW reserve force be organized to best integrate and support the active component? Research of the NSW organizational structure and employment policy highlights current problems and areas of improvement. This monograph explores questions on the training and employment of NSW Reserve Forces. Specific lessons learned and reserve integration successes supported the development of alternative NSW reserve organizational structure and employment policy.

Review of previous reserve force studies provided information to develop a background and understanding of the purpose and intent of a reserve force. Department of Defense policies provided information on current reserve integration issues. Primary sources of information included speeches, addresses, and correspondence from government and military officials. Active and Reserve personnel from NSW and SF, responsible for the integration of reserves into the total force, contributed the most relevant and significant data for this monograph.

CHAPTER TWO

RESERVE FORCE HISTORY

The concept of a reserve force can be traced as far back as the Roman Cincinnatus. The Cincinnatus were citizen soldiers willing to abandon homes and fields to take up arms in defense of their country.⁹ The modern U.S. reserve force, however, is a product of the colonial militia system. The objective of this chapter will develop an understanding of why the U.S. maintains a military reserve force through an analysis of the evolution of reserve force organization and employment.

The Militia

In the late eighteenth century, the U.S. was a new nation, with a new government, and a focus on expansion and development within the territorial boundaries. From 1790 until the early 1900s, U.S. national interests were on the developing states. With state and national interests aligned, the states retained the responsibility for development of a defense system. Although a national defense was required to protect the borders, a robust portion of the country's defense resided in the ability to mobilize its citizens.

The colonists organized citizen soldiers into militias for the sole purpose of providing an immediate defense of the local community. The organized and dedicated militia, however, did not develop until the early 1770s. On the eve of the American Revolution, and in response to British military intervention, the U.S. military began to take shape in the form of a reserve force, the Minuteman Militia.¹⁰

Following the American Revolution the 1777 Continental Congress authorized provisions for a national defense under the federal government. The Militia Act of 1792, however, mandated

⁹ James B. Whisker, The Citizen Soldier and United States Military Policy, (North River Press, 1979), 2.

¹⁰ Robert K. Wright, Jr., Capt., Virginia Army National Guard, and Renee Hylton-Greene, National Guard Bureau Historian, A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard, (Washington, DC, Departments of the Army and the Air Force Historical Services Branch, July 1986), 3.

the terms and conditions for a militia. This Act created a volunteer militia as the ready reserve, and the common militia, which constituted those, able bodied citizens capable of serving in a defense force.¹¹ The Militia Act created an organizational structure that is the basis of the modern Reserve Force. Today terms volunteer and common militias do not apply to components of the Department of Defense; however, the selected reserves, ready reserves, and national guardsmen carry out similar functions.

In addition to establishing defense forces, the Militia Act delineated authority and control of the militia. Aside from changes made in 1795 and 1808 to permit presidential call-up and authorization of federal funds, the Militia Act bestowed upon the individual states full control of the militias.¹² An emphasis on state sovereignty and the general fear of a strong federal government set the conditions for empowering states with full control of the militia.

The War of 1812

The newly formed militia system received its first test during the war of 1812. The defense plan to mobilize state militias to respond to threats of national security failed. The states, with control of the militia, opposed the call for 100,000 men.¹³ The state's failure to answer the federal call to duty demonstrated a flaw in the organizational structure of maintaining the reserve of the nation's defense at the state level. Additional incidents such as the refusal of the militia under Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn to invade Canada bolstered later arguments for a federal reserve force.¹⁴ The war of 1812 exposed a rift between the Regular Army and state militias that is still present.

The Civil War

Internal turmoil of the Civil War created the need for both North and South governments to call upon the state militias. State national-guard units were responsible for many of the notable

¹¹ Ibid., 9.

¹² Ibid., 10.

¹³ Richard B. Crossland, LTC USAR and James T. Currie, MAJ, USAR, Twice the Citizen, (Washington, DC, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 7.

¹⁴ Ibid.

and critical victories throughout the war. Colonel Joshua Chamberlain and the citizen soldiers of the Maine militia were responsible for the defense of Little Round Top, a important hill vital to Union victory at Gettysburg.¹⁵

The Civil War illustrated, from both North and South perspectives, how a regular force could quickly expand through the mobilization and integration of a ready reserve force. Additionally, post-war conditions demonstrated how a nation could quickly reduce itself to a small standing Army and maintain the bulk of its manpower residing in a reserve force. The regular Union Army in May of 1865 with 1,000,516 officers and men was reduced to 199,553 by December 1865, while individual states continued to maintain the militias.¹⁶

The Naval Militia

Mobilization efforts from the Civil War identified critical organizational problems for the Navy Department. Before the Civil War, the Navy did not have the ability to rapidly assemble a maritime defense force. Quantity and quality problems plagued U.S. naval capability of the late nineteenth century. The Union Navy, charged with blockading Southern Ports and achieving local maritime superiority, had 26 of its 30 ships deployed to protect Americans abroad.¹⁷ While the North and South relied heavily upon the militia to support the regular Army, no system was in place to support the underdeveloped Union Navy. The Navy increased its manning from 7,000 men to 51,000 over the course of the Civil War, but operational readiness was degraded by the inability to recruit and retain quality personnel with the necessary technological skills needed for steam-powered gunboats.¹⁸ Retention of quality personnel is a common problem, but for the Navy in 1861, deployed forces, an impending war, and the lack of a reserve force, further compounded this problem.

¹⁵ Ibid., 20.

¹⁶ Ibid., 21.

¹⁷ James E. Watters, CDR, USNR, Walt Johanson, CDR USNR, Mel Chaloupka, Capt USNR, "U.S. Naval Reserve: The First 75 Years," (Newport, United States Naval War College, September 30, 1992), 7.

¹⁸ Ibid., 8-9.

Civil War experiences accentuated the inability of the U.S. to field a formidable maritime defense. Naval strategist, Captain Steven Luce, initiated efforts in 1880 to reform and rebuild the Navy. Luce emphasized the necessity of a federal Naval Reserve force, however the federal government was unable to pass legislation which resulted in reliance upon the state sponsored naval militias.¹⁹ As the naval militia system developed inherent weaknesses became apparent such as, second-hand unserviceable equipment, poor funding, inadequate organizational control, and a demoralized force.²⁰ Indifferent to these problems, the U.S. remained unwilling to establish a federal reserve system, which directly supported the regular Navy. State militias continued to constitute the preponderance of the reserve force throughout the nineteenth century.

Spanish-American War

The Second Amendment to the Constitution states, “A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”²¹ Throughout the nineteenth century state controlled militias were important to respond to local security threats. As the U.S. entered the twentieth century changes to national interests required the need for military reform. The Spanish American War was the first opportunity for the U.S. to exercise its military power over seas. The substantial amount of volunteers from state militias demonstrated the popular support for the declaration of war. Additionally, these militia volunteers were well-organized, trained and prepared for war; the President, however, could not legally federalize these forces. National Guardsmen volunteered as individuals and attempted to retain unit integrity by reorganizing together in federal service.²²

Many of the victories from the Spanish-American War were attributed to integration of the citizen soldier. The first U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, known as the “Rough Riders,” consisted of Texas and New Mexico Guardsmen and commanded by former New York National Guard

¹⁹ Ibid., 33-34.

²⁰ Ibid., 41-42

²¹ U.S. Constitution, amend. 2.

²² Crossland, 22.

officer, Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.²³ As the citizen soldier was fighting alongside the regular Army soldier in the Caribbean, the U.S. presence in the Philippines was almost exclusively a National Guard effort. Three-quarters of the 5,000-man force sent to the Philippines to hold the islands from the Spanish were National Guardsmen.²⁴ The lack of the federal government to effectively mobilize the militias during the Spanish-American War established the need for military reform and the creation of a federal reserve force.

Twentieth Century Military Reform

The Spanish-American War demonstrated the U.S. willingness to commit military forces in order to protect national interests overseas. The development of national interests created new threats to national security that existed beyond national boundaries and required military reforms. Leading the reform was Secretary of War Elihu Root, tasked with the responsibility of rebuilding the defense force. Additionally, the force should possess the capability for global responsiveness.

At the start of the twentieth century, the regular Army and Navy faced were insufficiently manned. The foremost debate among military reformers was how to organize a reserve force to augment the regular Army and Navy. Impressed by the Prussian's ability in 1866 to mass forces and defeat Austria, Emory Upton advocated the establishment of federally controlled and commanded reserve.²⁵ Root, who understood America's aversion to the creation of a federal reserve force to perform the same functions as the National Guard, drafted in 1903 Public Law 57-33, also known as the Dick Act.²⁶ The Dick Act formalized through legislation a common defense to be coordinated between federal and state defense forces. The defense system under this legislation increased federal control of militia by officially establishing the National Guard as the reserve force, with authority given to Regular Army officers to inspect unit training and

²³ Ibid., 23

²⁴ Ibid., 24

²⁵ Crossland, 11.

²⁶ Ibid., 13.

readiness.²⁷ As national security concerns extended beyond the capability of the states, it appears the public apprehension of a strong federal government begins to diminish.

The Dick Act was only the first in a series of legislative affairs which resulted in a federal reserve force manned by states, but subordinate to the federal government. Between 1903 and 1916, military reformers argued how to use the state militias as federal reserve forces and what specific span of control was to be exercised by the regular Army. The Militia Act of 1908 increased federal funding and consolidated militia affairs under the Regular Army through the creation of the Division of Militia Affairs.²⁸ The Navy, under newly appointed Secretary Truman Newberry, also drafted legislation in 1905, 1908, and 1909, similar to the Dick Act to attain control of state naval militias.²⁹ Although congress remained reluctant to relinquish state control of militias, these series of legislative actions exhibited the need to align state defense forces with the regular military.

The Reserve Components Established - 1916

War in Europe and the impending threat of U.S. involvement prompted significant Reserve Component legislation. Concerns over mobilization capabilities initiated Army and Navy efforts to create a reserve force separate from the state militia system. The National Defense Act of 1916 defined the Army as, “Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard while in the service of the United States.”³⁰ Although the nucleus of the reserve system remained the National Guard, this legislation authorized more federal control, Presidential call-up, and official offices of the Officer and Enlisted Reserve Corps.³¹

The Department of the Navy made significant advances towards a federal reserve component through 1916 legislation. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Roosevelt, began to prepare

²⁷ Crossland, 14.

²⁸ Wright, 27.

²⁹ Watters, 60-61.

³⁰ Crossland, 28.

³¹ Ibid., 28-29.

legislation to establish a federal Naval Reserve system.³² The FY 1916 Navy Appropriation Bill established the Naval Reserve to be composed of former enlisted men.³³ Due to insufficient number of retired naval personnel, the Navy Appropriation Bill for FY 1917 increased funding and created six classes of naval reservists consisting of Fleet Reserve, Naval Reserve, Naval Auxiliary Reserve, Naval Coastal Defense Reserve, Volunteer Reserve, and a Naval Reserve Flying Corps.³⁴ As the U.S. entered WWI, military reforms constructed a national defense that supported a reserve system under federal control.

Reserves in WWI

The National Defense Act of 1916 enabled the Army to mass manpower in event of national crisis, but did not provide for a trained force. Approximately 80,000 soldiers from the Enlisted Reserve Corps and 89,476 officers from the Officer Reserve Corps served in WWI, however commanders had doubts about the readiness of the reserve force.³⁵ Regardless of the Regular Army reservations, Reserve Force contributions were critical to American success throughout the war.

The Navy's problem upon the U.S. intervention in the war resembled the Army's problems; lack of sufficiently trained personnel. The Navy mobilized its reserve force to include the Naval Reserves, Naval Militias, and Merchant Marine, and still fell short of adequately trained personnel. The Navy's solution to manpower requirements was to integrate fully capable reservists in times of crisis. However, inability to meet manpower strengths in 1917 required the Navy to build a force from untrained personnel.³⁶ Rear Admiral Leigh Palmer, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, devised a plan to train reservists by using active duty ships and personnel.³⁷ Although use of active component assets was undesirable, Palmer expressed, "I think

³² Watters, 74.

³³ Ibid., 76.

³⁴ Ibid., 77-78.

³⁵ Crossland, 31-32.

³⁶ Watters, 88-89

³⁷ Ibid., 91.

it is not best for me, my battleships, but it is best for the way we have got to win the war.”³⁸

Improper force management, by Navy planners prior to 1917, created a predicament where combat ready assets were used as training tools rather than weapons of war.

Inter-War Reserves

Reform of the Reserve Components during the inter-war period is important because the environment closely resembled current conditions; reduced force structure, expanded national interests abroad, and a nation reluctant to commit funds to military spending. The post-WWI demobilization required organizational reform to the structure of the U.S. Army. Reform, accomplished through the National Defense Act of 1920, redefined the Army as the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves.³⁹ Although the Army imbedded the reserves in its organizational structure, there was no Reserve Force representation at the senior decision-making level to ensure adequate training opportunities.⁴⁰ Without representation, the increasing animosity between the Regular Army and Reserve Component impeded successful integration.

Naval reformers confronted with a congress unwilling to provide funding for expansion, argued that lessons learned from the war validated the need to maintain a reserve of trained personnel. Post-war initiatives resulted in the passing of the Naval Reserve Act of 1925 and focused naval reserve responsibilities to shore and training establishments.⁴¹ The objective of the Navy was to enable the active component to focus on warfighting skills.

WWII Reserves

Threat of war in 1940 influenced congress to authorize a presidential call-up of the Reserves, National Guard and the conscription of civilians.⁴² Although reservists achieved success during the war, pre-war mobilization plans did not facilitate reserve force integration. As National

³⁸ Ibid., 91

³⁹ Ibid., 34.

⁴⁰ Crossland, 38.

⁴¹ Watters, 111.

⁴² Crossland, 66.

Guard units entered federal service, the War Department's policy did not plan for the "mobilization of Organized Reserve units prior to the Declaration by Congress of a national emergency."⁴³

The Navy, however, identified Japan as a threat as early as 1936, and began planning for a reserve capability.⁴⁴ The Naval Reserve Act of 1938 authorized a ten-year plan to increase naval reserve to mobilization strength.⁴⁵ The Navy began a volunteer mobilization of the reserves in 1939 and by the summer of 1941 had recalled all navy reservists to active duty.⁴⁶ Implementing the lessons of WWI, the primary mission of the naval reserve force in support of mobilization was to train the force and make the regular Navy forces available for operational commands.⁴⁷ Advanced planning and mission focus enabled the Navy to successfully integrate its reserve force at the start of WWII.

The Cold War Reserves

The U.S. assumed a position of world power after WWII, and required a military capable of containing a global threat, communism. War Department Circular 347, the official postwar policy of the Army, described the Army as ". . .a professional establishment, no larger than necessary to meet peacetime requirements, while the war army is created from organized units drawn from a citizen army reserve. . ."⁴⁸ Lack of funding to support the small professional establishment and the citizen reserve endangered the readiness of the Army. The lack of attention to military readiness was evident by the inability of the regular Army to respond to North Korean aggression in 1950. Army Secretary Frank Pace referred to the U.S. reserve mobilization as, "our sole immediate source of manpower."⁴⁹

⁴³ Harry L. Twaddle, BGEN, ACS/-3, "RG 319, Entry 343, Box 104, memorandum to BGEN Frank Lowe," (August 1941), quoted in Crossland 66.

⁴⁴ Watters, 128.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 141.

⁴⁶ Watters, 157.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 169

⁴⁸ Ibid., 245.

⁴⁹ Crossland, 96.

Time afforded the U.S. time to mobilize in the previous World Wars. As a world super-power and with lessons learned from Korea, it appeared that U.S. forces would be first to respond to national security threats. To establish a force to meet this requirement the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 required all services to maintain a Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.⁵⁰ The Eisenhower Administration amended this Act with the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which most importantly raised the ceiling of Ready Reserves from 1,500,000 to 2,900,000.⁵¹ To ensure the U.S. was capable of providing a legitimate military response, a large reserve force would serve to fill the gap until an adequately trained civilian force mobilized. Perpetuated throughout the Cold War was the mindset of maintaining a reserve force to respond to fill gaps in time of war.

Deterrence became the defense policy of the Cold War. While the US stockpiled atomic and nuclear weapons, the reserves served to demonstrate national will. During the Berlin Crisis from June 1961 to June 1962, President Kennedy demonstrated to the Soviet Union and the world, U.S. resolve to contain communism in Europe through a series of highly publicized Reserve call-ups.⁵² Changing threats, changing weaponry and changing national military strategies emphasized the need to build the active force and limited employment of the Cold War Reserve Component.

The Total Force

Events surrounding the Vietnam War did not promote military service in the 1970s. The Department of Defense realizing the eventual end of the draft sought a military strategy to man a force to continue the Cold War with limited man power. In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird proposed a “total force” composed of a voluntary active force, reinforced by reliable reserves.⁵³ Essential to the total force was the full integration of Reserve Components into each service. The Total Force Policy became reality in 1973 when Secretary of Defense James

⁵⁰ Ibid., 100.

⁵¹ Ibid., 123.

⁵² Crossland, 138.

⁵³ Watters, 304.

Schlesinger terminated the draft.⁵⁴ While the total force concept appealed financially to Washington decision-makers, military leaders had concerns about readiness. General William Westmoreland, like his predecessors in 1916 and 1920 rejected a reliance on the civilian reservists and recommended a cadre similar to the Prussian system of the nineteenth century. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the military struggled with Reserve Force integration. Force structure reductions and missions specialized for the Active Component did not facilitate integration.

Chapter Summary

History demonstrates the requirement for the U.S. to adapt its defense force in response to the strategic environment. The citizen soldier in the U.S. Defense Force evolutionary process began as the key element, transformed into a supporting role of the Active Component, and returned to being an essential component of a total force. In post conflict period the Reserve Force financially appealed to national policy-makers. Wartime demonstrates that, although not always at the highest state of readiness, the reserves are essential to America's military strategy and heritage. The Reserve Component has traditionally responded to change by adapting its organizational structure and employment strategies to new threats and developing national interests.

The U.S. is currently in a period of change. The end of the Cold War has created diverse and sometimes unidentifiable threats. Technology has created international markets, which have, potential of becoming national interests overnight. Drastic reductions in manpower and equipment are results of cutbacks in defense spending.

The historical analysis of the Reserve Force provided background knowledge necessary to understand its relevance to the National Military Strategy. Secretary Laird's concept of the total force considered the historical development of the reserves. The total force, however, has been in a continuous stage of development since the 1970s. Addressing the CGSC Reserve Component

⁵⁴ Ibid.

graduating class of 1999, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Charles Cragin described the posture of the reserve force during the Cold War, “waiting in reserve, ready for recall to active duty if or when some strategic catastrophe struck in Europe or Asia.”⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Cragin, “Address to the Command and General Staff College Reserve Component Graduating Class.”

CHAPTER THREE

RESERVES IN THE 21ST CENTURY


Change in threats to national security over the past thirty years, have created changes within the military and the planned purpose for a reserve force. The National Military Strategy, “Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now” is the Joint Chief of Staff’s response to the National Security Strategy. The Cold War permitted the Reserves to support from the standby status described by Assistant Secretary Laird. The environment of the twenty-first century requires a more active reserve force, engaged across a full spectrum of operations. The National Military Strategy identifies an additional requirement for the Reserve Component to counter the twenty-first century threat, “. . . provide a rotational base to ease the tempo of unit and individual deployments for the Active Component.”⁵⁶ Due to force reductions and an indistinguishable threat the additional role, also known as Reserve Force integration, has become critical to the success of the U.S. military.

Naval Special Warfare (NSW) has not demonstrated a dedicated effort to integrate its reservists into the total NSW Force. As a result NSW pushes, and sometimes exceeds, the limits of operational and personnel tempo. Before the development of a proposed change in reserve force structure and employment strategy for NSW, it was prudent to analyze reserve force integration policies of other military units. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to analyze the organization and employment of reserves from other services and units. NSW characterized by both land and maritime aspects, required the study of reserve integration policies of the US Army and US Navy. Additionally, the organization and employment of the US Army Special Forces (SF) was examined in detail because the NSW mission closely resembles the SF mission. The development of the proposed concept for NSW Reserve reorganization and reemployment plan applied the success and lessons learned from reserve force integration.

⁵⁶ Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, (Washington, DC, GPO, 1997). Internet accessed, [<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/>] September 27, 2000.

US Army Reserves

General Eric Shinseki emphasized the Army's dedication to reserve force integration in his comments upon assumption as Army Chief of Staff in 1999, "Today I declare that we are THE Army, totally integrated with a unity of purpose - no longer the Total Army, no longer One Army. We are THE Army, and we will march into the 21st century as THE Army."⁵⁷ The elements of THE Army are Active Component, Reserve Component (USAR), and the Army National Guard (ARNG). The U.S. Army has a streamlined chain of command architecture, with federal control of all USAR forces. The legacy of the 1792 Militia Act, however, remains present through state control of National Guard forces. Joint command and control of the ARNG complicates the Army's organizational structure for Reserve Component programs. Figure One depicts both USAR and ARNG command and control structures.



⁵⁷ Cragin, "Statement Before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services."




Fig 1 Army National Guard and Reserve organizational structures⁵⁸

The National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 modernized the Army Reserve Force that evolved from the state militia system. The Reserve Component, manned from the National Guard and the Army Reserves supports the needs of the Army. Figure One suggests that because the direct authority of the USAR, the Army would prefer to employ USAR assets over ARNG. However, the Army’s reliance on its reserve forces has overcome the bureaucratic problems associated with state and federal controls.

The Army’s reliance on Reserve Component integration is evident by the amount of support provided by reserve units; 97% of civil affairs, 85% of medical brigades, 82% of public affairs, 81% of psychological operations units, 70% of engineering battalions, and 66% of military police battalions.⁵⁹ Additionally, the Army has innovative plans for its total force. In an effort to achieve unit stability through the Reserve Component, the Army is testing the formation of multi-component units comprised of AC, RC, and ARNG soldiers.⁶⁰ Stability is achieved by reserve

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of Defense. Reserve Forces Policy Board. Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 2000. (Washington, DC, GPO, March 2000), 144-145.

⁵⁹ Cragin, “Statement Before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services,” 11-12.

⁶⁰ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, “Final Report of the Reserve Component Employment Study – 2005,” (Washington, DC, June 1999), 24.

personnel permanently attached to the unit, and military expertise provided by rotation of active duty personnel.

US Naval Reserves

Title 10 USC 10102 defines the mission of the Naval Reserve as, “. . . provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires”⁶¹ OPNAVINST 1001.21B amplifies this mission statement by stating that, “The shift in emphasis from global war to readiness for regional conflict and forward presence operations affords greater flexibility in meeting mobilization training requirements. This new flexibility in turn offers enhanced opportunities for the Selected Reserve (SELRES) to provide peacetime support to the active component for forward presence.”⁶² The Naval Reserve Force, unlike the ARNG, is organized and controlled to provide direct support to the active component. Figure Two illustrates the streamlined organizational structure for the Naval Reserve Component:




Fig 2 – Naval Reserve organizational structure⁶³

⁶¹ Declaratory Judgment Act, U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 10102 (August 10, 1956). Internet accessed [<http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10>], September 11, 2000.

⁶² Commander, US Navy Surface Reserve Force, COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 3502.1C, (Washington, DC, 1999), I-2-1.

⁶³ Department of Defense, “Reserve Component Programs FY 99”, 146

This study examined the Ready Reserve of the Naval Surface Reserve Force, the component responsible for NSW Reserves. The majority of reservists that train and provide support to the fleet are comprised of SELRES. Within the SELRES reside full time support (FTS) reservists assigned to the Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) program. The mission of the TAR program is to “. . . provide full-time training and management of the Naval Reserve, optimize effectiveness of the Navy total force through mobilization and augmentation planning, optimize readiness of the Naval Reserve for mobilization or peacetime support of active forces and, facilitate Navy access to Naval Reserve assets.”⁶⁴ TAR personnel provide continuity between the Active and Reserve Components. Reservists are assigned to commissioned reserve units that are self-supportive or augmentation units that rely upon the support of gaining commands to conduct active duty training.⁶⁵ The Naval Reserve structure aligns augmentation units directly with the gaining commands. This relationship affords the reserve unit and the gaining command direct liaison and is intended to provide efficient support to both commands.

The Navy’s command and control of the reserve force is streamlined, but other problems exist that complicate reserve force integration efforts. One of the most difficult problems for the Navy in reserve force employment is the deployment cycle. James Russell Soley, a Naval Academy professor during the post Civil War period, argued that a militia was more important to the Navy than the Army since naval officers and enlisted men are required to be proficient in military matters as well a nautical matters.⁶⁶ Soley’s point was not intended to create inter-service rivalry, but illustrated the inherent difficulty for the naval service to maintain a trained and ready reserve force. The Naval Reserve’s systemic restrictions, drill limitations, unit placement, billet location, and unit composition are not compatible with the sea going

⁶⁴ Commander Naval Personnel Command (COMNAVPERSCOM, NPC-92), “MILPERSMAN 1001-020, Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR) Officer Program,” (Washington DC, 2000), Internet accessed [<http://www.bupers.navy.mil/pers4417/milpersman%201001.doc>], October 10, 2000.

⁶⁵ COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 3502.1C, I-2-1.

⁶⁶ James Russell Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers*, in *The Navy in the Civil War*, vol 1, (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 10-11.

requirements.⁶⁷ Technological advances have significantly enhanced ships since the late nineteenth century, but the requirement for the Navy to deploy to sea remains constant.

The priority for Naval Reserve Force is to prepare for mobilization by training the individual reserve sailor. Maintaining trained personnel and a readiness to mobilize, however, does not exclude the Naval Reserves from providing peacetime support to the active component. The Commander Naval Surface Reserve Force instructs, “providing peacetime support is an essential part of the Naval Reserve’s mission and clearly contributes to the Reservist’s mobilization readiness.”⁶⁸ The Navy is trying to increase Reserve Force integration while maintaining the Reserves’ mission for mobilization. The Naval Reserve Force demonstrated its capability to support the fleet in Bosnia and Kosovo operations and is contributing 80% of the Navy’s augmentation force.⁶⁹ The Navy will continue to integrate its reserve force to alleviate short-term problems, but the active component will focus on overseas deployments.

US Army Special Forces

U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) is responsible for the readiness of seven Special Forces Groups, Airborne, SFG(A), of which two are ARNG units. Former USASFC Commander, Major General Boykin’s perspective, however, was all SFG(A)s under his command were of equal importance with equal capabilities.⁷⁰

Each SFG(A) is responsible for a geographic region to execute its assigned missions. Twentieth Group, one of the ARNG units, is assigned the to support Commander in Chief Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) and has the same command mission as Seventh Group an active component command. Both groups are responsible to “plan, prepare for, and when ordered, execute Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), and specified special operations forces (SOF) Collateral

⁶⁷ COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 3502.1C, I-2-3.

⁶⁸ Ibid., I-2-4.

⁶⁹ Cragin, “Statement of the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,” 13.

⁷⁰ David P. Burford, COL, USAR, Commander, 20th SF Group, interview by author, October, 6, 2000.

Activities in support of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.”⁷¹ Following MAJ. GEN. Boykin’s policy and to ensure that there was no disparity among the groups, all units were trained to one common standard.⁷² Additionally, USASFC’s command structure supports the concept of one SF Command with seven equal SF Groups while recognizing state control of the ARNG SFG(A)s. Figure Three is the USAFSCOM command structure:




Fig 3 – USASFC Reserve organizational structure

Prior to Operation DESERT STORM, 20 SFG(A) successfully completed an Intensive training cycle to check its wartime mission essential tasks list (METL) and receive deployment certification from USASFC.⁷³ USASFCOM and 20 SFG(A) continue to build upon reserve capabilities to eliminate the Cold War reserve model; a force to be held in reserve and used to augment the active component. In support of geographic CINCs, USASFC created an environment which employed National Guard SF Groups in the same roles as the active groups. This employment strategy required 20 SFG(A) to assume some of the operational and personnel tempo typical of a SOF command. Equally represented at SOUTHCOM planning conferences 7th and 20th SFG(A)s received missions to plan, train, and execute based upon Military Group

⁷¹ David P. Burford, COL, USAR, Commander, 20th SF Group, “Twentieth Special Forces Group Command Brief,” as of September 2000, provided by Group Commander on CD-ROM, 2000).

⁷² Burford, interview.

⁷³ Assistant Commander for Force Integration, Office of Lessons Learned, “20th Special Forces Group Successfully Completing Validation for Deployment into an Operational Theater,” (San Antonio; Army Medical Department Center & School, Feb 1991). Internet accessed

(MILGROUP) and Special Operations Command (SOC) requirements.⁷⁴ For FY 00, 20th SFG(A) deployed 250 personnel to train 570 HN personnel from twenty-two nations.⁷⁵ A significant departure from the traditional method of employing reserve forces, National Guard units were now employed in support of CD and Theater Engagement Plans. Additionally, 20th SFG(A) continued to provide traditional support to the European theater. To support 10th SFG(A) missions, 20th SFG(A) provided six personnel in Kosovo and four personnel in Turkey.⁷⁶ Full integration of the reserve component into USASFC's mission supported geographic CINCs through unit and individual augmentations.

Chapter Summary

The Army and Navy employ and integrate the reserve forces to attain a total force. The Army has identified certain critical skills that will only reside in the Reserve Component and that significantly enhance the capabilities of the Army. The Navy has identified specific missions which can ease the burden of six month deployments when assigned to the reserves. SF Groups have demonstrated, that properly represented, reserve augmentation not only supports the individual shortfalls, but also can provide unit response to theater requirements. Additionally USASFC's ability to integrate its reserve component demonstrates a technique for using forces with small units assigned selective missions. Reserve force employment has demonstrated the effective and efficient integration to support the active component. NSW can draw upon the organizational styles and employment strategies of both the Army and the Navy to create a plan for its reserve force.

[<http://enterpriseconsultancy.cs.amedd.army.mil/lessonlearned/archived/11001461.htm>], July 27, 2000.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Burford, "20th Group Command Brief."

⁷⁶ Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE RESERVE FORCE

The Army and Navy, two dissimilar forces, employ reserves in different environments, yet successfully integrate forces to achieve common objectives with increasing demands. Naval Special Warfare (NSW), also confronted with increasing demands, must reassess the organization of its total force. An underutilized resource, NSW Reserve Component, has potential to significantly enhance the overall NSW mission. The purpose of this chapter is to propose a potential organizational structure and employment strategy to integrate the Reserve Force into the NSW mission.

Naval Special Warfare

To understand the recommended changes for NSW, it is first important to become familiar with NSW, its organizational structure, and methods of reserve employment. As the maritime component to USSOCOM, Commander Naval Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM) is responsible for the organization and employment of all NSW active and reserve personnel. Approximately 20% of the NSW manpower resides in the reserve component. The purpose of the Reserve Support Department, within the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), is to “determine, develop, coordinate, advise, monitor, and liaison all NSW Reserve issues concerning personnel, administration, training, readiness, operations, plans, and peacetime support relating to the use and conduct of NSW Reservists.”⁷⁷

Four of the major NSW commands (NSW Group ONE, NSW Group TWO, Special Boat Squadron ONE and Special Boat Squadron TWO) have the responsibility to provide operational forces to Theater CINCs to conduct maritime SOF missions. NSW Groups are responsible for the SEAL/SDV Teams and NSW Units. The Special Boat Squadrons have the responsibility for the Patrol Coastal Craft and Special Boat Units. Missions of the major commands differ only in area

⁷⁷ Elizabeth Garcia, YNC NAVSPECWARCOM, Reserve Force Coordinator, interview by author, August 12, 2000.

of responsibility and assets to employ. COMSPECBOATRON ONE's mission is "prepare, equip, train and deploy assigned units, craft and crew to successfully conduct maritime Special Operations (SPECOPS) in littoral and riverine areas, in support of Theater Commanders, conventional naval forces and Country Teams during all conditions of War and Peace."⁷⁸ The major commands essentially become the force providers to the geographical CINCs and their subordinate commanders.

The mission of the SEAL Teams, SDV Teams, and Special Boat Units (SBU) is to man, train, and equip SEAL platoons, SDV task units and SBU detachments to conduct maritime SPECOPS in support of Theater Commanders. While higher commands have the overarching responsibility for employment of NSW forces, the specific mission of preparing the warfighters belongs to these commands.

SEAL platoons, SDV task units, and SBU detachments undergo vigorous and comprehensive special operations training before deployment to a theater of operations. Upon completion of pre-deployment training the NSW unit receives a "ready -to-deploy" certification and transfers its operational control to a theater SOC, Carrier Battle Group Commander, Amphibious Ready Group Commander, or Task Force Commander in support of a theater or joint force commander.

NSW is structured to provide optimal support to SEAL platoons and Special Boat Unit. Figure Four is the NSW command structure with the assigned reserve augmentation unit.

⁷⁸ Commander Special Boat Squadron ONE (CSBR-1), "Command Mission Statement," provided by Roger Meek, CSBR-1 Reserve Force Coordinator, interview by author, September 13, 2000.




Fig 4. Naval Special Warfare Organizational Structure

Figure Four also illustrates the distribution of reservists throughout the force. A product of Cold War mentality, the NSW Reserve mission, is to “provide augmentation and backfill support to all active NSW commands” when mobilized.⁷⁹ Reserve augmentation of the major commands (NSW Groups and Special Boat Squadrons), typically assigns reservists to headquarters staff positions, vacant billets during annual exercise, and special projects.⁸⁰ Aligned directly with each SEAL Team, Special Boat Unit, and Theater NSW Unit, the Naval Reserve SEAL Teams provide required augmentation.

COMNAVSPECWARCOM made the first step in breaking the Cold War mentality through its most recent reserve employment policy statement. It stated that reserves, “. . . provide professional augmentation to gaining commands for peacetime support, exercises, contingency operations, and general war.”⁸¹ This policy expands the responsibility for reserve support to the full spectrum of operations. The policy statement provides guidance, but does not address the specifics of how to employ the reserve force. Without an employment strategy, it appears the

⁷⁹ Commander Naval Special Warfare Command, “Fact File, Naval Special Warfare,” (Coronado, CA, NSWC, April 1998), 18.

⁸⁰ Mike Patota, Naval Special Warfare Group TWO Reserve Force Coordinator, interviewed by author, September 6, 2000.

⁸¹ Commander Naval Special Warfare Command, “NSW Reserve Force Employment Policy,” (COMNAVSPECWARCOM official message traffic DTG 192300ZJAN00).

purpose of the NSW reserve force is to alleviate manpower shortfalls. NSW requires an employment strategy, to define how NSW components should employ assigned reserve units.

COMNAVSPECWARCOM's policy statement also requires the reserve force to “. . . maintain essential warfare skills and qualifications to prepare them for forward deployed, direct support to task organizations.”⁸² The NR SEAL Team commander is responsible for the training of his personnel, but it is the responsibility of the gaining command to provide the training assets and opportunities. This relationship between the reserve unit and gaining command requires a significant amount of prior planning to maximize and synchronize the training requirements of the reservists with the operational objectives of the gaining commands.

NSW has not demonstrated a strong aptitude for advanced planning between active and reserve components. The SDV Team TWO operations officer expressed the frustration of short-notice assignment of reservists to conduct AT, which is more disruptive than supportive to the command.⁸³ The SEAL Team operations officer, whose focus is the manning, equipping and training of operational platoons for deployment, does not place reserve training as a high priority. The responsibility for NSW's inability to coordinate advance planning of reserve AT, however, does not lie solely on the gaining command. Directed by the Naval Surface Reserve Force, the reserve unit commander is “responsible for planning, scheduling, executing and analyzing all training for their reserve unit.”⁸⁴ The excessive operational and personnel tempo of the NSW command requires reserve units to coordinate in advance for all AT activities.

A system that is not conducive to reserve force integration creates neglect for advanced planning of reserve affairs. Experience from the inter-war period between the world wars identified the inability to effectively employ the reserve component without proper representation. The NSW reserve units (echelon VI commands) administratively report to reserve

⁸² COMNAVSPECWARCOM “Reserve Employment Policy.”

⁸³ James Marvin, LCDR USN, SEAL Delivery Team TWO Operations Officer, interview by author, September 28, 2000.

⁸⁴ COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 3502.1C, I-2-1.

centers (echelon V) with oversight provided from a reserve readiness command (echelon IV).⁸⁵ The echelon IV and V reserve commands are not NSW units and cannot properly represent the NR SEAL Teams. The NSW organizational structure does not offer suitable reserve force representation to coordinate and synchronize reserve integration. Within NSW, the reserves have augmentation units, but no command exists to voice the interests and requirements of the reserve force. A single department within NAVSPECWARCOM cannot represent the interests of reserves across the force. Recently NAVSPECWARCOM approved a reorganization plan to implement NSW Force XXI, which optimizes the use of human resources to accomplish the NSW mission. A strategic reorganization of the reserves with a defined employment strategy would further enhance the NSW total force.

NSW Reserve Reorganization

As an underutilized resource, the NSW Reserves have the potential to significantly enhance the overall NSW mission. To do this a reorganization of the NSW Reserve will be required. A reorganized NSW Reserve Force will be in better position to execute a revised employment strategy.

The success of Reserve Component integration in the Army, Navy and Special Forces, suggests NSW should consider reorganization of its reserve force structure. The Army and Navy are required to build a command infrastructure to properly represent the Reserve Component, but this is not required of subordinate commands. However, USASFCOM illustrated that organization of reserve commands parallel with the active force supports integration and reserve support.

The current reserve force structure, as depicted in figure Four, creates a burden on SEAL Teams, SDV Teams and Special Boat Units; the commands required to execute CINC requirements. The responsibility of the gaining command to train assigned reservists requires the command to allocate valuable resources such as equipment, manpower, and training time. With a

⁸⁵ COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 3502.1C, I-2-1.

zero sum gain, resources to train reserves come from operational units preparing for overseas deployment. Consolidation of all NSW reserve detachments at the major command could alleviate the drain of resources on SEAL Teams and Special Boat Units. Consolidation of the NSW Reserve detachments at the major command level could utilize the following organizational structure:




Fig 5 – Proposed NSW Reserve organizational structure

The new organizational structure would create a Reserve Group at the major command level to provide oversight, instruction, guidance, and assistance to the NR SEAL Teams and Detachments that are regionally aligned with east or west coast NSW commands. Requirements for reserve support are submitted to the NSW Groups and Special Boat Squadrons, while the NR SEAL Teams and Detachments submit training and readiness requirements to the NSW Reserve Groups. The NSW Groups, Special Boat Squadrons and NSW Reserve Groups would be responsible to coordinate efforts and ensure synchronization of requirements. A SEAL Team that requires small boat operations to support combat swimmer training can employ a NR SEAL Team that needs to requalify coxswains in maritime operations.

This organizational structure gainfully employs reserves from the TAR program. The NSW TAR program like the reserve component is an underutilized asset. TAR personnel have the unique perspective that is best suited to understand both needs and requirements of active and reserve components. The NSW Reserve Group as a TAR command, is the appropriate conduit to reserve force integration.

NSW Reserve Employment Strategy

Full spectrum operations require a force with a diverse mixture of skills. SOF have a specialized mission and the size of its forces does not afford units to train to a wide variety of capabilities. A GAO report conducted in May 1997 solicited opinions from over 200 senior level SOF officers and enlisted persons indicated that excessive requirements have degraded SOF readiness.⁸⁶ Excessive requirements can jeopardize the objective of NSW, to provide Theater CINCs and Joint Force Commanders with the best-trained units. An integrated and employed reserve force, however, can alleviate operational tempo and enhance readiness.

NSW reserve employment has been limited to temporary assignment of personnel to fill vacant staff positions or exercise billets. For example, Special Boat Squadron ONE relies heavily on reserve support to fully man Combined Task Force 771 as part of the annual PACOM exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS (UFL).⁸⁷ UFL is an annual exercise, scheduled months in advance with numerous planning conferences, however reserve augmentation continues to be coordinated on short notice. The COMNAVSPECWARCOM reserve employment policy provides a general purpose and direction for the reserves, but without an employment strategy, it is difficult for the active and reserve components to develop an effective method for reserve employment.

The Navy, which attempts to offset six-month deployments by keeping personnel at home twice the amount of deployed time, reported only three exceptions in 1997, a ship, submarine and

⁸⁶ U. S. General Accounting Office, "Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse," (Washington, DC, May 15, 1997), Internet accessed [<http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/nsi97085.htm>], July 28, 2000.

⁸⁷ Roger Meek, LCDR USNR, CSBR-1 Reserve Coordinator, interview by author, September 13, 2000.

SEAL unit.⁸⁸ NSW a low-density, high-demand assets has experienced excessively high personnel tempo in recent years. Deployed and CONUS based active duty forces have been the primary units for NSW mission tasking. The SEAL platoon is an appropriate assets for employment during combat and contingency operations, but in today's peacetime environment, the mission does not always necessitate a combat ready asset. Consider the SOF collateral activities; coalition support, counterdrug, humanitarian demining, humanitarian assistance and security assistance.⁸⁹ The NSW reservist has the basic skills to prepare and execute these activities. Additionally, the deployed or ready to deploy NSW unit is frequently tasked to conduct demonstrations and static displays for the public and VIPs, which is of vital interest to NSW, but can degrade the combat readiness. NSW reserve units can alleviate the operational tempo of the active force by augmentation of units to execute selected collateral activities and administrative duties.

An employment area that NSW can initially focus its reserve employment is in support of the CINCs Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). The Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCET) is a means by which SOF supports the CINCs TEP. Increases in JCET requirements keeps deployed NSW forces fully employed. The JCET mission, however, does not always ensure the sustainment of NSW units. Skills required for JCET missions range from basic SOF skills to advanced tactics depending on the requirements and capabilities of host nation forces. Deployed NSW assets, fully engaged JCET missions, may not have sufficient time to conduct sustainment training. The NSW Reserve employment strategy should consider the JCET missions that have potential to degrade the readiness of active duty deployed forces. Missions the active component cannot execute due to insufficient personnel or threat to readiness should consider assignment to a

⁸⁸ Alicia K. Borlik, Staff Sgt. USA, "DoD Tracks Military Deployments," (Washington, DC, American Forces Press Services, Feb 1998). Internet accessed [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb1998/n02061998_9802065.html], July 27, 2000.

⁸⁹ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. SOF Posture Statement 2000, 5.

reserve unit. With advanced planning, reserve forces can train and prepare for the basic JCET missions to accomplish required objectives.

To implement an NSW employment strategy a decision-making process for assignment of missions must consider all available assets. Figure Six demonstrates a hierarchical method of decision-making, which accounts for CINC and NAVSPECWARCOM requirements and assigns missions based upon forces available, readiness of force and duration of mission.




Fig. 6 – Decision method for reserve employment

The method in Figure Six does not address every concern and cannot apply to all situations, but it demonstrates that an employment strategy can integrate the reserve force with proper planning. Inclusion of the reserve assets into the overall employment of NSW forces allows decision-makers an additional opportunity to assign the mission prior to evaluation and reprioritization of missions.

A New Mindset

Reorganizing the force and an employment strategy only partially resolves NSW's problem with Reserve Force integration. Secretary Cohen, in his 1997 memorandum asked the services "to create an environment that eliminates all residual barriers – structural and cultural for effective integration within our Total Force."⁹⁰ The barriers that Secretary Cohen refers to, include deep-rooted attitudes and opinions that have been incorporated into our defense structure over the past 100 years. Russell Weigley described the attitudes of two senior military and political figures from the 1800s, Emory Upton, Commandant of Cadets at West Point and John Logan, U.S. Senator and Major General. Upton endorsed a strong regular force because of his "disdain and distrust of the citizen soldier."⁹¹ Conversely, Logan claimed, "that a genuinely American military system shaped the characteristics of American citizen soldiers . . . the United States could develop military power superior to the professional armies of Europe."⁹² A mindset, which recognizes the reserves as an asset not a liability must replace the common reference to reservists as "weekend warriors." The mindset of the reservist must also adapt to the new working environment. The duty, commitment, and dedication of the reservist must be every bit as strong as the active component.

Chapter Summary

The NSW organizational architecture aligns its reserve assets directly with the commands responsible for its most critical mission. Although the intent is to ensure these commands receive the utmost support, in reality these commands assume the burden of developing training plans, allocation of training assets, and man power support to ensure the reserves forces receive annual training. The concept of active commands supported by augmentation units is lost, and active commands have become the component providing support. A shortfall in the system is the ability to conduct long range planning and coordination on the part of both active and reserve

⁹⁰ Cragin, "Milestones on the Road to Integration," 2.

⁹¹ Russell F. Weigley, Towards and American Army, (Columbia, University Press, 1962),114-116.

components. A reserve employment strategy would articulate potential mission and operational considerations for reserve employment. Without a strategy reserves will continued to be employed piecemeal which resolves short-term problems, but does not utilize the total NSW force to support the CINCs.

⁹² Ibid., 136.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS

NSW forces train for a highly specialized mission, which predicates the selective use of this SOF asset. It would be absurd to consider readiness and capabilities of a reserve unit comparable to a unit that trains on a daily basis. The nine principle SOF missions continues to require SEAL platoons and SBU detachments to train for war. Emerging collateral activities, however, afford the opportunity for NSW to integrate its reserve force. The previous chapters analyzed historical and current Reserve Component programs as a method to develop an organizational structure and employment strategy for NSW. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the feasibility of implementing the proposed reorganization and employment strategy for the NSW reserve force. Successes within SOF and NSW illustrate the possibility of providing better support to Theater CINCs through reserve force integration. Additionally, support of reserve force integration by experienced NSW personnel indicates that a conducive mindset is resident within a portion of the active component.

The assignment of the 49th Division of the Texas Army National Guard to the American sector in Bosnia exemplified the Army's commitment to reserve force integration.⁹³ The Army SF demonstrated its commitment through the successful integration of 19 SFG(A) to 1st SFG(A) for Exercise FOAL EAGLE 99.⁹⁴ The SF reserve employment strategy employs its reservists as individuals and as units assigned with a particular mission.

Initially, employment of SF reservists resembled NSW's current practice – individual replacements for active duty shortfalls. Following DESERT STORM, the personnel from 20 SFG(A) volunteered to remain active in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, used as

⁹³ Cragin, CGSC graduation, 5.

⁹⁴ U.S. Army Reserve Command, "Army Reserve units and soldiers play important role in FOAL EAGLE 99 success." (USARC, December 1999). Internet accessed [http://www.usarc.army.mil/news/foaleafl.htm] July 27, 2000.

“individual fillers.”⁹⁵ The 20th SFG(A) disputed this strategy and today Colonel Burford, Commander, 20 SFG(A), has a different perspective on employment of SF reservists. COL Burford, recognized the requirement to support the active component with individuals to fill gaps, but emphasized the importance of 20 SFG(A) as a unit in support of SOUTHCOM’s JCET program. In FY 00, 20 SFG(A) support to SOUTHCOM included two JCS exercises, TRADEWINDS and CABANAS, which employed more than 250 reservists.⁹⁶ The 20 SFG(A) is a fully functional ARNG unit, with the responsibility to plan, train, and execute SOUTHCOM missions.

COL Burford credits successful unit employment of 20 SFG(A) to three factors; long range planning, common standard, senior leadership support.⁹⁷ Although all three factors contributed to the success of 20 SFG(A), senior leadership support appears to be the catalyst for change within USASFC. Support of reserve force integration within SF from leaders such as MAJ. GEN. Boykin, helped change the overall mindset towards the reservists. A division between active and reserve components is expected, but SF has demonstrated at the willingness and support of senior leadership to employment of reserves can mitigate the effects of this division.

NSW Success with Reserve Employment

Exercising innovation and forethought, Naval Special Warfare Unit FOUR (NSWU-4) placed itself at the forefront of NSW reserve force integration. NSWU-4 accomplished on a unit level a strategy this project proposes for the NSW force. Excessive operational requirements and limited manpower required NSWU-4 reassess its available resources. Specifically, the Counter Drug Training Support (CDTS) Mission in support of USCINCSO’s peacetime theater engagement plan requires a small maritime CD force.⁹⁸ In response to the shortage of personnel, NSWU-4 tasked 33 reservists from the NSWU-4 and SEAL Team FOUR and 20 SFG(A) to train 383

⁹⁵ Morgan, “Reserve Component Special Forces” 11.

⁹⁶ Burford, 20 SFG(A) Command Brief.

⁹⁷ Burford, interview.

personnel from the Regional Security System Caribbean Community Battalion in Exercise TRADEWINDS 2000.⁹⁹ Exercise TRADEWINDS after action report, annex A, details the skills required of the NSW reservists to perform this mission. All NSW reservists have completed the rigorous Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) course and served a minimum of 4 years active duty. The NSW reserve may not be at the highest state of combat readiness but has the basic skills required for exercises such as TRADEWINDS.

NSWU-4 recognizes the support of complete reserve units and intends to assign the FY 01 CDTS mission in the Bahamas to NSWU-4 reserve unit for planning, coordination and execution.¹⁰⁰ NSWU-4's intended strategy coincides with the DOD Reserve Component Employment Study 2005. The DOD study, suggested that an increase in reserve component participation in counter-drug missions would considerably relieve the operational tempo of the active component.¹⁰¹

The NSW Community Mindset

As expected, there are skeptical opinions within NSW in regards to the utility of reservists as a force multiplier. The active component's view of the reserves as "weekend warriors" is present within NSW. A reservist is a SEAL who is not current on his operational skills and only afforded two weeks of annual training time to shoot, dive and parachute. This minimal training time does not gain the confidence of the active duty SEAL.

Successful execution of TRADEWINDS 2000 by NSW reservists validates the proposed concept, but more importantly the Commanding Officer of NSWU-4 drafted a revolutionary letter to COMNAVSPECWARCOM, annex B, which proposed the utilization of reserve forces to

⁹⁸ Tom Brown, CDR, USN, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Unit FOUR, "Proposal for Reserve Force Employment," (Memorandum from NSWU-4 to COMNAVSPECWARCOM, 5401, SER N3, September, 2000).

⁹⁹ Mike Giuffreda, LT, USNR, NSWU-4, "After Action Report for Exercise TRADEWINDS 2000," Memorandum from Officer in Charge, NR-Naval Special Warfare Unit FOUR to Major Clayton Cobb, SOCSOUTH, April 6, 2000.

¹⁰⁰ Brown, NSWU-4 reserve employment letter.

¹⁰¹ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, "Final Report of the Reserve Component Employment Study – 2005," 14.

support the Theater CINC.¹⁰² As the commanding officer of a NSW unit, in direct support of a theater CINC, his opinions reinforce the proposed concept of this project. NSWU-4 CO, stated in his letter, “NSW reserve forces contain a wealth of experience and capability that could be brought to bear on NSWU-4 Theater Engagement goals. I propose to task NR Unit FOUR with engagement in the English-speaking Caribbean Islands for the CINC as coordinated and supervised by NSWU-4.”¹⁰³

The SDV Team TWO Operations officer, responsible for operational readiness of three SDV task units, fully supports the integration of the reserve force to enhance operational readiness. An additional responsibility of the operations officer is to fully employ reservists during annual training periods. Coordination problems he has experienced include reservists arriving short noticed and either not qualified to support the command or in need of requalifications not relevant to ongoing command training exercises.¹⁰⁴ Stationed at Little Creek Amphibious Base are five NSW commands with more than 20 platoons in the process of a predeployment training. In addition to the SDVT-2 Operations officer, the four other operations officers are simultaneously coordinating annual training with reservists. It would be beneficial to SDVT-2 if a system were in place for the command to leverage support from all reserve forces assigned to augment commands in the Little Creek area. The proposed command structure would better support the training plans of all NSW commands.

Chapter Summary

The US Army Special Forces have achieved successful reserve force integration as individual reservists and as organized units assigned specific missions. NSWU-4 has validated the concept of NR SEAL Team employed as a unit to execute NSW missions. Success of reserve employment in SF and NSW illustrates the capabilities of the total force concept. The total force is better suited to provide support to theater CINCs. Integration of reservists not only increases

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

the force size but also eases the burden of the active component. As the reserve component assumes some of the peacetime and administrative responsibilities, the active component enables NSW to provide combat ready forces, which has honed its warfighting skills without distractions.

Success of reserve force integration depends on the commitment of NSW personnel to support the concept. Testimony from active NSW personnel in support of reserve integration supports the aim of this research project. Positive feedback from personnel within the active component indicates that there is an awareness of the reserve force and its capabilities. Most importantly to this research and NSW is that personnel with command authority are willing to deploy and employ the reserve force.

¹⁰⁴Marvin, interview.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

Summary

Reserve force integration is feasible and suitable for conventional forces, but is it logical for NSW. The purpose of this research project was not to suggest that NSW could substitute the active force with the Reserve Component. The intent of this project was to validate the hypothesis, reorganization of Naval Special Warfare Reserve forces will facilitate integration of the total NSW force. To validate this hypothesis research analyzed the question; Can NSW better integrate its reserve component to enhance the combat readiness of units supporting Theater CINC's?

History reveals that as the strength of the active force increases and reduces with respect to the threats to national security. In time of war, such as the World Wars, it was imperative to increase the active force in defense of the nation. The swift demobilization following war, however, is indicative of the public reluctance to maintain a defense force at full strength. The reserves have been the backbone of the US defense force dating back to the American Revolution. While laws have shaped the reserve force structure and authorized the use of citizen soldiers, the purpose of the reserve force is to economically maintain trained forces to respond to national emergencies.

Throughout history, national emergencies were evident and reserve employment was required. As the US enters the twenty-first century, a national emergency is an ambiguous term. Without a peer competitor full-scale war is not expected. Lack of full-scale war, however, does not suggest reserve employment is not necessary to national security. The DOD has committed its reserves to the total force concept. The total force concept does not keep reservists in standby roles, but makes active use of military skills resident in the reserve force.

The Secretary of Defense directed all services to make efforts towards reserve force integration to attain the most capable total force. Employment of the reserve force from the service perspective of the Army and Navy is a prudent decision based upon force sized and mission requirements. Conversely, SOF is a relatively small force with a unique mission, which requires employment of individuals with select skills. USASFC, the Army component of USSOCOM, fully embraced the total force concept, and employed the reserve component with missions essential to theater the CINC objectives. NAVSPECWARCOM, the Naval component of USSOCOM, has not demonstrated success in the integration of its reserve force. Limited to the use of reserves to backfill vacant staff billets, the NSW organizational structure and employment strategy does not facilitate the employment of its reserve force. Aligned directly with the SEAL Teams and Special Boat Units, the Naval Reserve SEAL Teams lack sufficient representation to leverage support for its employment. Additionally, the mindset within the active component of NSW viewed the reserve component as an ineffective force that is a liability not an asset.

Conclusions

Reorganization of the NSW Reserve Component will facilitate integration of reserve units into the total NSW force. Implementation of a reserve employment strategy, designed to allocate available NSW resources to force requirements, will enhance the overall readiness of the total NSW force. The total NSW force, reorganized and strategically employed, provides the best possible support to theater CINCs and Joint Force Commanders. The active component is poised to respond to combat, contingencies and select missions as directed by the CINC. The reserve component continues to augment the active force, but also is responsible to plan, prepare and execute NSW missions.

Recommendations

A detailed plan for the reorganization and employment of the NSW Reserve Force will be required. NAVSPECWARCOM should investigate the feasibility of creating a NSW Reserve

Group to directly support reserve component efforts at the major command level. Additional research is suggested to identify the costs of implementing an organizational structure which requires the creation of NSW Reserve Groups co-located with the NSW Groups. It is recommended that commanders at all levels of NSW, in both active and reserve components evaluate the potential of an integrated reserve force. Specifically, active component commanders should identify current missions and responsibilities that detract from readiness and are suited for the reserve force. Specifically the NSW Units responsible for the support of JCET missions should identify possible missions for reserve units. Reserve force commanders should evaluate resident capabilities and organize unit structure to respond to assigned NSW missions. Finally, NAVSPECWARCOM should consider a reserve employment strategy. The employment strategy can be developed from the concepts of this project or the NSWU-4 proposal. Regardless an employment strategy should coincide with the current employment policy.

Annex A

5401
Ser N3/

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Special Warfare Unit FOUR
To: Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
Via: Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group TWO

Subj: PROPOSAL TO BETTER UTILIZE NSW RESERVE FORCES TO SUPPORT
THEATER CINC

Ref: (a) USCINCSO Theater Engagement Plan FY 01-07
Engagement for the U.S. Southern Command Theater
of 1 APRIL 1999
(b) USCINCSO CD Campaign Plan FY 00-08 of 31 May 1999
(c) SOCSOUTH NSWU-4 Mission Letter of 9 April 1999

Encl: (1) Annex E to SOCSOUTH Mission Letter for NSWU-4
Reserve Unit Requirements (Draft)

1. Purpose. Propose change to NSW Reserve organization, mission and training to better support USCINCSO.
2. NSWU-4 has fully tasked theater assigned NSW forces in support of USCINCSO peacetime engagement goals per references (a) and (b). "Precision engagement" or FID is a primary mission of NSWU-4 per reference (c). The majority of NSW theater engagement takes the form of Counter Drug Training Support (CDTS) Missions in the Andean Ridge or "Source Zone." The small nations in the Caribbean or "Transit Zone" are also important CD partners. NSWU-4's ability to support the CINC's plan here is limited by a shortage of forces. This is a problem because NSWU-4 is one of only a handful of agencies in SOUTHCOM capable of effectively engaging these small maritime CD forces.
3. The training needs of our "precision engagement" target nations and forces in the Caribbean are modest. The small boat and police forces of Jamaica, Bahamas and the RSS need work in small boat handling and maintenance, weapons, mission planning and VBSS. The METL's and proficiency required of the NSW Training "Team" are basic and easily achieved. AT/FP concerns, HR vetting, mission duration (14-21 days vice 30-40), transportation and logistics are less difficult in the Caribbean than elsewhere in theater.
4. NSW reserve forces contain a wealth of experience and capability that could be brought to bear on NSWU-4 Theater Engagement goals. I propose to task NR NSWU-4 with engagement in the English-speaking Caribbean Islands for the CINC as coordinated and supervised by NSWU-4.

Subj: PROPOSAL TO BETTER UTILIZE NSW RESERVE FORCES TO SUPPORT
THEATER CINC

5. NR NSWU-4 does not have sufficient numbers of SEAL and SWCC personnel to execute training missions. Their billet structure is roughly aligned with NSWU-4 which suits them well for the heavy planning and coordination role they would play in a role analogous to that played by NSWU-4.

6. "NSW Force 21" reorganization plan provides a useful model for better organizing our reserve component to support the warfighting CINCs. One way to support the 'force provider' needs of NSWU-4/NR NSWU-4 for precision engagement in the Caribbean would be assignment of one or more dedicated NR SEAL platoons and NR SBU/MST detachments as a standing "Naval Reserve NSW Task Element Caribbean (NR NSWTE CARIB)." Exactly how Reserve SEAL and SWCC 'force providers' would be identified and organized to support this concept is beyond the scope of this paper.

7. NR NSWU-4, using NSW Training Teams (Platoons and detachments) from NR NSWTE CARIB would conduct precision engagement in the Caribbean. This proposal would accomplish engagement in support of CINC goals that would otherwise not take place. It will also allow NSWU-4 and the active duty force providers to more fully concentrate on the Source Zone. Other advantages include the increased specialization in those specific target countries that the reserve force could achieve with annual or repeat deployments by NSW units to the same location. Collateral benefits of this proposal would be improved long term relationships between NSW and HN personnel, a streamlined process for incorporation of lessons learned from past deployments, and ease of planning and execution.

8. NR NSWTE CARIB. Reserve SEAL and SBU components would likely maintain their co-location at their current gaining commands for access to equipment and training. Unit training objectives would include maritime operations, small boat handling and basic maintenance, small unit tactics, and marksmanship. If more advanced skills are required, NSWU-4 would augment from active component with required skill or qualification. NR NSWU-4 would focus on staff and task unit functions as well as oversee and monitor training/METLs of NR NSWTE CARIB to include USCINCSO required AT/ED and Human Rights training.

9. 20th SFG (National Guard) carries out responsibilities for Army SOF Engagement in the Caribbean and Central America as a force provider for SOCSOUTH. NSWU-4 very successfully executed Exercise TRADEWINDS 2000 with a combination of NSW Reserve Units

Subj: PROPOSAL TO BETTER UTILIZE NSW RESERVE FORCES TO SUPPORT
THEATER CINC

NR NSWU-4, NR SEAL Team FOUR, and NR CNSWG 2 DET 308 augmented by active duty CNSWG-2 CSST personnel. NSWU-4 is going to assign a FY-01 Counterdrug Training Support (CDTS) mission in the Bahamas to NR NSWU-4 for planning, coordination and execution to further exercise this concept.

10. I am fully aware of the capabilities and limitations of utilizing the reserve component to its fullest. Over the past year we have had in excess of 500 (non-NSW) Naval Reservists from across the United States provide more than 6,000 mandays of departmental, rate-related and facilities support at NSWU-4. However, I think we can do even better in involving the Naval Reserve in meaningful work in support of a Theater CINC

11. Decision and opinion on the following is requested from Commanders, Naval Special Warfare Group TWO and Naval Special Warfare Command:

a. Comments on concept as proposed.

b. If there is general concurrence with concept, request advise on how to officially task NR NSWU-4 with proposed mission in ADCON chain of command. Enclosure (1), is draft mission letter. NSWU-4 would coordinate this proposal with Operational Chain of Command and likely seek approval through SOCSOUTH mission letter process. Mission letter is a good place to institutionalize in theater the reserve component's important new role.

c. How to best identify, organize and task NSW reserve forces that have sufficient SEAL and SWCC personnel to form NSWTE CARIB; or identify other such mechanism to provide trained SEAL/SWCC personnel to NR NSWU-4. Our plan right now is to work toward a goal of being able to execute three CDTS missions per year. Require between 6-12 MSW qualified personnel for each mission, utilizing their AT (and at times some additional AT where budget and time supports) for mission execution.

12. My point of contact is CDR G. Rosholt, USNR at (703) 602-9035 Extension. 124 or e-mail RosholtGW@navsea.navy.mil, and LT W. Current at (787) 865-3815, DSN 831-3815, or SIPRNET: Wilsond@nswu4.nswlant.socom.smil.mil; or e-mail wilcurrent@hotmail.com.

T. L. BROWN, II

Copy to:
COMSOCSOUTH (J3)
COMSPECBOATRON TWO (N10)
NAVMARCORESCEN MIAMI
NR NSWU-4

Annex B

06 April, 2000

From: Officer in Charge, NR- Naval Special Warfare Unit Four
To: Major Clayton Cobb, SOCSOUTH

Subj: AAR FOR EXERCISE TRADEWINDS 2000

1. Mission Summary:

- (a) Composition: A 33 man contingent of NR - Naval Special Warfare Unit FOUR, NR- SEAL Team FOUR, and 3/20th SFG(A) coupled with a 4 man element from the British Royal Marines deployed to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, P.R. to conduct Exercise TRADEWINDS 2000. Training consisted of water survival skills, drownproofing, treading water, survival strokes, maritime navigation, Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC)/Outboard Motor (OBM) familiarization, and beach landing procedures.
- (b) Units Trained: 383 personnel from the Regional Security System (RSS)/Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Battalion. Skill levels ranged from introductory to advanced. Many of the students including the RSS instructor staff had participated in previous Tradewinds Exercises.
- (c) Training Area: Training was conducted in two areas. Camp Santiago (Puerto Rico National Guard Base) and Naval Station Roosevelt Roads.
- (d) Student Motivation: All RSS/CARICOM Battalion personnel were assessed as highly motivated.

2. Training Schedule: Inclusive Dates: 22 Mar-02 April 2000

<u>Day/Date</u>	<u>Activity/Event</u>
22 Mar 2000	Deployment
23 Mar 2000	Exercise Prep
24 Mar 2000	Exercise Prep
25 Mar 2000	Exercise Prep
26 Mar 2000	Exercise Prep
27 Mar 2000	Basic Water Survival
28 Mar 2000	Maritime Operation Classroom
29 Mar 2000	Maritime Practical Exercise
30 Mar 2000	Basic Water Survival
31 Mar 2000	Maritime Operation Classroom
01 Apr 2000	Maritime Practical Exercise
02 Apr 2000	Basic Water Survival
03 Apr 2000	Maritime Operation Classroom
04 Apr 2000	Maritime Practical Exercise
05 Apr 2000	Debrief/Downstage
06 Apr 2000	Hotwash/AAR
07 Apr 2000	Departure

3. Observations/Recommendations

Observation: Training had to be tailored to the lowest common denominator, i.e. weakest swimmers, those with the least experience with small boat operations, etc. Although this level of training could be considered refresher training to those students who have had prior experience, many would have benefited from more advanced training. Time constraints and resources did not allow this.

Recommendation: Better define training requirements, student skill levels, and logistical issues in the earliest planning stages.

Observation: Initially, the 32 hour time block allotted for boat operations at NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads did not include providing 400+ RSS/CARJCOM personnel with Navy Exchange (NEX) privileges. Upon completion of the first 3-day training period, the policy was changed to include NEX privileges. Although this additional requirement was fulfilled, it was untimely at best, as we had not initially budgeted our resources to accommodate this change in plan.

Recommendation: If a significant issue arises during the execution phase of training that impacts a units ability to support it, that issue should have been identified and addressed at the earliest stages of planning. Otherwise, execute the mission as planned.

Observation: Training would have run more efficiently had we known in advance of the first day of actual training precisely how many students were to be trained. Additionally, advanced identification of non-English speaking students would have better prepared the trainers in providing special needs or translators.

Recommendation: Require an accurate list of participants to include number of students, country of origin, rank, and any special requirements at the earliest possible planning stages.

P.O.C. M.N. Giuffreda, LT, USNR NSWU-4

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