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THESIS

COLOMBIA'S WAR ON DRUGS: CAN PERU PROVIDE THE RECIPE FOR SUCCESS?

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines counternarcotics strategies of interdiction, eradication, and alternative development used in Peru during the 1990s to determine if Peru’s success can provide the recipe for success in Colombia. It will show that Peru’s sequential approach to eliminating its economic crisis and threat posed by the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas was key to its counternarcotics success. It will show that Colombia faces a similar situation but has failed to realize success because of policy decisions regarding how to deal with guerrillas and certain peculiarities of the drug trade in Colombia that render ineffective policies that worked in Peru. It will argue that Plan Colombia will escalate the civil conflict as FARC guerrillas linked to the drug trade battle to protect this source of revenue. It will suggest that the elimination of the guerrillas either simultaneously with the elimination of the drug trade as Plan Colombia promotes, or sequentially before fully engaging the drug trade, is key to counternarcotics success.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

US and Latin American countries have had a great deal of experience in dealing with the individual threats of drugs and guerrillas. However, in recent years governments have had to address the issue of how to deal with the dual threat of drugs and guerrillas. This thesis reviews the lessons learned from decades of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency efforts. It discusses how the presence of both threats impacts the effectiveness of traditional counternarcotics and counterinsurgency approaches. It analyzes strategies for dealing with the dual, narcotrafficker-guerrilla threat in Peru and Colombia. It will examine Peru to determine if it can provide the recipe for success in Colombia.

This thesis discusses the evolutionary effectiveness of the three primary counternarcotics strategies of air-interdiction, crop eradication and alternative development used by the Government of Peru with support from the United States Government to combat the drug trade in Peru between 1990-2000. It argues that the success of air interdiction was the result of a gradual process culminating in the air-bridge denial program. The implementation of the air-bridge denial program was the final amount of pressure that persuaded drug traffickers to move to Colombia. It also argues that the elimination of the guerrilla groups was key to Peru’s counternarcotics success. It suggests that the success of eradication and alternative development programs depended upon the government’s ability to provide a secure environment in which to pursue licit trade and viable economic alternatives that caused coca farmers’ to be receptive to change. It discusses the unintended consequences the GOP’s counternarcotics success
had of forcing drug traffickers adapt their transportation methods and tactics to the increasingly threatening environment and, then, to shift the cultivation of coca from Peru to Colombia when the pressure became too great.

This thesis will then address whether or not the Government of Colombia (GOC) can repeat Peru's success. It will discuss the similarities between Peru and Colombia regarding the threat posed by guerrilla groups and paramilitary forces as well as a failing economy and their effect on counternarcotics efforts. It will also address Colombia's counternarcotics strategies of interdiction, eradication and alternative development over the last decade and then determine if the lessons learned from counternarcotics efforts in Peru are similar to those learned in Colombia.

Finally, after discussing the Peruvian and Colombian case studies, this thesis will analyze them to determine if Peru's counternarcotics success can be translated into success for Colombia. It argues that the key to Plan Colombia's counternarcotics success will be the resolution of Colombia's guerrilla problem. It further argues that the strategy used to end the guerrilla threat may cause an increase in human suffering.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, Colombia has experienced an explosion in coca cultivation as well as an increasing guerrilla threat that the government has been unable to control. Coca cultivation has expanded in part to successful counternarcotics efforts in Peru in the early 1990s that forced drug traffickers to shift their trade to Colombia. The guerrilla threat has also increased over the last decade as a result of their growing participation in the illegal drug trade and the government's decision to negotiate a peaceful end to the civil war. To counter the growth of guerrilla forces, ultra right-wing paramilitary forces have increased. As the drug trade has expanded paramilitary forces have also become involved in the drug trade. The Colombian government's inability to either reduce the drug trade that provides the guerrillas and paramilitaries with hundreds of millions of dollars a year in revenue or eliminate the guerrilla threat that has helped create an economic crisis as well as hinder counternarcotics efforts has led to insecurity within Colombia and its neighbors.

The United States has become increasingly concerned with the situation in Colombia because of its commitment to reducing the drug trade through supply-side strategies, its support for Colombia's democratic government, and its stand on reducing human rights abuses. Working together, the United States and Colombian governments devised a six year US$ 7 billion program designed to address the multiple threats. Plan Colombia argues that the illegal drug trade is at the root of Colombia's problems--by providing funds for guerrilla, paramilitary and narcotrafficker violence--and thus focuses on counternarcotics strategies. When discussing strategies for combating the drug trade
in Colombia, many policy makers and analysts have looked to neighboring Peru as a model for counternarcotics. Reducing coca cultivation by 66 percent between 1995 and 1999, Peru fell from being the world’s leading coca producer. What are the counternarcotics strategies responsible for Peru’s success? Can interdiction, eradication, and alternative development account for Peru’s success or can it be attributed to a different reason, such as the shifting of coca cultivation to Colombia? This thesis will look to Peru’s counternarcotics success to determine if it can be translated into success for Colombia.

This thesis also argues that Peru is not only a counternarcotics model for Colombia but, because of Peru’s success in dealing with its dual threat, can also be a model for defeating Colombia’s dual threat. This thesis evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of sequential and simultaneous approaches to addressing the dual threats. Can looking at Peru’s success in dealing with the dual threat of drugs and guerrillas be the recipe for success in Colombia? If so, numerous questions must be addressed. Should Colombia pursue the same sequential approach as Peru used? Did the presence of guerrillas affect counternarcotics strategies in Peru and what impact did their elimination have on Peru’s success? Is the guerrilla threat the same in Colombia and what role do they play in the drug trade?

Finally, this thesis will discuss the implementation of Plan Colombia that is intended to significantly reduce the amount of coca cultivation in Colombia over the next six years. Will Plan Colombia be the answer to resolving the dual threat? Will its focus on targeting illegal drugs succeed in reducing the drug trade and undermining the guerrillas?
A. METHODOLOGY


A case study of Colombia is used because it is the current battleground for US supported supply-side counternarcotics efforts. Peru is studied because of its success in overcoming the dual threat of guerillas and drugs that Colombia now faces.

B. THESIS ORGANIZATION

Chapter II examines the literature to determine which counternarcotics and counterinsurgency strategies have been employed most effectively in the past and then considers whether these strategies need to be adapted when the state faces a simultaneous challenge from both drug traffickers and guerillas. Chapter III examines the sequencing method used by the Peruvian government to resolve its economic crisis, guerrilla and drug threat. It addresses the impact counternarcotics strategies of interdiction, eradication, and alternative development had on reducing coca cultivation as well as the unintended consequences of these policies. Chapter IV discusses Colombia’s struggles
with resolving the dual threat. It evaluates the approach for dealing with the multiple problems in addition to analyzing counternarcotics policies. Chapter V compares the two cases. It argues that counternarcotics strategies that were successful in Peru will not meet with the same success in Colombia. It examines the sequential and simultaneous approaches for addressing Colombia’s problems and recommends that Colombia follow Peru’s example and devote more attention to the guerrilla threat. Additionally, Chapter V evaluates Plan Colombia and its potential for success.
II. THE DUAL THREAT: DRUGS AND GUERRILLAS

A. INTRODUCTION

US and Latin American countries have had a great deal of experience in dealing with the individual threats of drugs and guerrillas. However, in recent years governments have had to address the issue of how to deal with the dual threat of drugs and guerrillas. This chapter will review lessons learned from decades of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency efforts. It will then discuss how the combined presence of drugs and guerrillas impacts the effectiveness of traditional counternarcotics and counterinsurgency approaches. This analysis of strategies for dealing with the dual, narcotrafficker-guerrilla threat raises a series of questions about counternarcotics efforts in Peru and Colombia. These will be answered in the succeeding case studies.

B. ILLEGAL DRUG CONTROL DEBATE

The North American academic and policy communities have long debated the effectiveness of supply-side and demand-side drug control strategies. On the one hand, advocates of supply-side strategies view the increase in illegal drug consumption as an imported problem to be solved by controlling external supply. On the other hand, some would argue that social and economic conditions, and not the availability of drugs, are the causes behind consumption of illegal drugs and thus demand for drugs should be addressed.
1. Supply-side Policy

Supply-side strategies include both source country strategies (i.e., coordinated investigations, interdiction within the country, eradication, alternative development and crop substitution, and strengthening foreign assistance) and non-source strategies (i.e., interdiction of drugs in transit-zones, control of precursor chemicals and anti-money-laundering). Of these strategies, eradicating coca plants and interdicting cocaine base and cocaine before the journey begins towards the US are the primary focus of supply-side policy.

Proponents of supply-side policy assume the following links between supply-side counternarcotics efforts and U.S. demand: (a) that supply-side counternarcotics efforts will reduce the availability of cocaine to US consumers thus driving up the price and reducing the number of drug users, and (b) that disruption of production and trafficking will increase production costs, which will be passed on to the consumer, thus reducing demand. Unfortunately this has not been the case over the last two decades. On the contrary, cocaine prices have declined from nearly US$ 700 per gram in 1980 to less than US$ 200 per gram in 1994, while heroin prices have decline from slightly over US$ 2000 per gram in 1980 to nearly US$ 500 per gram in 1994.¹ Supply-side strategies have also failed to significantly curb the amount of cocaine available in the US. According to the 2000 National Drug Control Strategy Report, cocaine continues to be readily available in all major cities in the US. Cocaine availability in 1996 was estimated at 347 metric tons, 281 metric tons in 1997, 301 metric tons in 1998 and 174 metric tons in the first six

months of 1999. These amounts were available despite the seizures of 129 metric tons in 1996, 101 metric tons in 1997, and 118 metric tons in 1998.²

The reason supply-side counternarcotics strategies have not worked is based on two fundamental economic realities of cocaine trafficking. First, effective repression of production and trafficking in one locale will simply shift it to another. The shifting of the drug cultivation from one location to another (for example from Peru to Colombia) or the altering of drug trafficking routes to avoid interdiction is commonly referred to as the balloon effect. In the case of crop eradication programs, if eradication succeeds in reducing the supply of coca then the price for coca is driven up, thereby creating even greater incentives for increased production and for new producers to enter the market. As Figure 1.1 shows, the potential for coca expansion in South America far exceeds the ability of counternarcotics forces to reduce, let alone eliminate, production. This is because demand for illegal drugs makes it profitable to continue producing them.

The second economic reality of cocaine trafficking is that even successful disruption of production and trafficking in source countries will not influence the final price of cocaine to the consumer. A 1991 study by RAND Corporation economist Peter Reuter calculated that coca farmers receive less than 1 percent of the final retail price of cocaine while earnings for cocaine exporters and smugglers comprised less than 15 percent of the final price. Thus, source-country efforts will not drive up the retail price in the US enough to reduce significant cocaine consumption because over 85 percent of cocaine profits are made outside the source countries. According to this argument, even

if interdiction efforts were able to stop the extremely unlikely figure of 50 percent of cocaine shipments from Colombia, the price of cocaine in the US would rise by less than 3 percent.³

Opponents credit the supply-side’s policy of addressing the economic roots of coca and cocaine production and the need for effective economic development in source countries. However, they lament the reduced amount of funding that goes towards this strategy as compared to the amount that is spent on eradication and interdiction efforts.

2. **Demand-side Policy**

Demand-side policy promotes three strategies. First, educate the population about the dangers that illegal drug use poses to the general society and to themselves. Second, provide treatment to those addicted to illegal drugs. Third, strengthen domestic law enforcement to discourage drug use.

Education to prevent illegal drug use before it becomes a problem is one strategy of demand-side policy. The strategy focuses on mainly grade school and college age people, seeking to educate them about the dangers of illegal drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. The underlying belief in education is that drug use is preventable. A coalition including parents, teachers, coaches, mentors, clergy and other role models from business, entertainment, sports, and schools sectors are encouraged to join the national anti-drug effort.⁴ Though it is difficult to assess the success of drug education because of the secretive nature of drug use, overall drug use by those twelve and older has remained


⁴ ONDCP, 4.
steady at approximately 13 million since 1996 and dramatically below the 23.2 million users in 1985.\footnote{Ibid., 7.} Although statistics reflect a decline in overall drug use, success cannot be claimed when thousands of youth continue to experiment with drugs and over half a million people are considered frequent users of cocaine.

Approximately five million drug abusers are reported in the US. Treatment of drug abusers is the second strategy of demand-side policy. Promoting effective, efficient, and accessible drug treatment that helps to reduce drug-related health problems and social costs as well as ensuring there is a system that is responsive to emerging drug abuse trends are the objective of treatment. Drug dependence exacts an enormous cost on individuals, families, businesses, communities, and nations. Treatment programs are intended to reduce the self-destructive and criminal behavior many drug abusers engage in and ultimately enable the patient function in society with drugs. In 1998, drug abuse cost an estimated US$ 77.6 billion in lost earnings and US$ 11.9 billion in health care.\footnote{Ibid., 28.} The public health burden caused by drug abuse is shared by all of society either directly through taxes or indirectly. Treatment programs are an essential part of the overall demand-side policy. However, treatment can only offer an alternative to drug abusers, it is up to the abuser to want help.

The third strategy in demand-side policy is effective law enforcement targeting illegal drug users. In 1997, one third of state prisoners in the US and about one in five federal prisoners were arrested while under the influence of drugs. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for a zero-tolerance drug program that includes treatment for drug
abuse instead of incarceration for non-violent drug-related offenders. Although the strategy calls for treatment, it's primary objective is the ending of drug trafficking and corruption by linking federal, state, and local law enforcement organization together through information and resource sharing. Opponents of demand-side policy point to the cost of the policing effort, with more than a half-million arrests annually for marijuana possession alone. The bulk of police, prison and court resources is now devoted to drug law enforcement.

C. US-LATIN AMERICAN VIEWS ON DRUG CONTROL

Until the mid-1980s, US and Latin American views concerning the source of the drug problem diverged. Many in the US adopted a supply-side view, pointing to the growers, producers and traffickers of illegal drugs who made illegal drugs available in the US as the source of the problem. Latin America countries, in contrast, pointed to the illegal drug consumer in the US as the source of the drug problem and called for the reduction in consumer demand. During the late 1980s and 1990s, however, Latin American governments came to view the drug trade as a threat to national security and began to accept the US emphasis on supply-side strategies. However, as will be discussed more later, this consensus breaks down when US counternarcotics policies threaten other national security interests of the Latin American states.

7 Ibid., 4-5.


US president Ronald Reagan (1980-1988) declared drugs a national security threat in 1982 and over the course of his presidency allotted nearly 70 percent of the drug control budget to attacking the drug trade from the supply-side.\textsuperscript{10} The ability to defend the US from the drug trade by attacking it at its source, destroying coca fields and confiscating drug shipments, was politically profitable for US politicians compared to supporting demand-side strategies that admitted the US had a domestic problem with drug abuse and showed little in the way of positive gains made towards ending the drug trade.

Initially Latin American countries called the war on drugs a US problem that should be dealt with primarily in the US.\textsuperscript{11} This ambivalence towards the drug trade was due in part to the priority that Latin American governments placed on other vital interests such as democratic consolidation, curbing of political violence, and dealing with other domestic issues (e.g. economic growth, debt, poverty, and unemployment). Additionally, the drug trade was tolerated because it provided jobs for thousands of otherwise unemployed people and also infused revenue into state coffers.\textsuperscript{12} Protests by peasant farmers over government counternarcotics efforts in the 1980s and 1990s added to the political tensions Latin American governments faced. In Peru and Colombia in particular, government counternarcotics efforts had to be weighed against the possibility of pushing dissatisfied peasants into the arms of guerrilla groups.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 216.

\textsuperscript{11} ONDCP, 2.

\textsuperscript{12} Bagley and Tokatlian, 224.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, Latin American views began to converge more with the US concerning the threat posed by the drug trade. The violence of drug traffickers, increasing guerrilla involvement in the drug trade, and increased domestic consumption of drugs in Latin American countries led Latin American governments to view the drug trade not just as a US problem but also as a national security issue.

Increasing violence by drug cartels, as a result of stricter government drug policies, turned the drug trade into a threat to state security. This was particularly true in the case of Colombia when extradition of drug traffickers set off a wave of assassinations targeting government officials, judges, and political leaders. The assassination of presidential candidate, Senator Luis Carlos Galán, in 1989 topped the political violence and fueled Colombia’s commitment to fight drug trafficking, further propelling a spiral of violence between the government and those in the drug business.

In addition, increased guerrilla involvement in the drug trade has helped sustain the guerrilla’s fight against the government and has caused Latin American leaders to change their position concerning the threat drugs represent to national security. Counternarcotics efforts are designed not only to reduce the amount of illegal crops being cultivated and processed but also to undermine the strength of guerrilla forces that protect the drug trade.

Finally, as domestic consumption has increased, Latin American governments have become more concerned that drugs represent a growing problem. The drug trade, like any business looking to expand, searches for new markets for their product. New illegal drug markets not only expanded to Europe but also within Latin America where
the illegal drugs are cultivated and produced. Corruption, criminal activity, violence and drug addiction are matters of concern for these countries.

Despite the converging views between the US and Latin American concerning the need to address the drug trade this convergence is tenuous at best. Latin American countries will pursue counternarcotics strategies advocated by the US only to the extent that they contribute to state integrity and national security. Rescinding extradition of suspected drug traffickers to the US, negotiating lenient jail sentences with convicted drug traffickers, legalizing the cultivation of coca, and negotiating with guerrilla groups that are linked to the drug trade are examples of policies that Latin American countries have chosen to follow based on their national security interests, yet that oppose US counternarcotics policies.

D. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES

In addition to facing a threat from the drug trade, Latin American governments in a variety of countries have faced guerrillas seeking to overthrow the state. Four counterinsurgency strategies can be used to eliminate the threat posed by guerrilla groups: targeting guerrilla leadership, undermining guerrilla support, negotiating a settlement, and employing a military solution.

One strategy in eliminating a guerrilla group is to target the leadership. The success of this strategy depends in large part on the organizational structure of the guerrilla group (whether centralized or decentralized). In a centralized organization the guerrilla group relies completely on one person or small group of people to lead the group. The elimination of the leadership is such that the group is no longer able to function effectively. In a decentralized organization the loss of the leadership is less
likely to cause the breakdown of the organization. This is because enough autonomy has been shared with other members of the organization that they are able to fill the void keeping the movement alive. An example was the decentralized structure of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front-FMLN) insurgency in El Salvador during the 1980s that was able to carry on a war for eleven years. The five political parties that made up the FMLN maintained their individual organizations, finances, and leadership and used a unified approach that required all five parties to implement directives through General Command. As a result of this decentralized structure, the assassination of six leaders of the FMLN in 1980 had little impact on the organization’s ability to launch a major offensive in 1981.13

The second strategy to eliminate a guerrilla group is to undermine guerrilla support. This can be accomplished by either attacking a source of guerrilla material support, such as the drug trade, or by implementing civic-action programs aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the population in order to gain support for the government. In addition to kidnapping and extortion, guerrilla involvement in the drug trade has allowed them to extract millions of dollars through taxes and protection fees. These funds have enabled guerrilla groups to clothe, feed, equip, and pay their troops. In economically depressed countries the ability of guerrilla groups to provide segments of the population with basic necessities has caused many unemployed and disillusioned citizens in Latin America to join guerrilla groups. It is argued that the destruction of this

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source of revenue would limit the guerrilla’s ability to purchase war materiel and recruit supporters.

Initiation of civic-action programs that meet the basic needs of the population such as housing, health care, and fresh water, in addition to community projects such as roads, bridges and electricity help foster good relations between the government and the population as well as address some of the root causes of war. This strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the population can shift support from guerrilla groups to the government. However, the reverse is also true. The lack of these basic necessities works in the favor of guerrilla groups and shows the government’s inability to meet the population’s needs. This was another strategy employed by the Salvadoran government against the FMLN. However, critics of the hearts and minds campaigns argue that they had little long-term impact on winning the allegiance of the population because the programs failed to address either the poverty issue or the mistrust of the military that were the underlying problems.¹⁴

In addition to “winning the hearts and minds” of the population, the government must also “protect the bodies” of the population through providing a government presence in areas where guerrilla forces operate. Despite civic-action programs that help to meet the needs of communities, if the government cannot maintain a presence, guerrilla forces can easily regain control in communities that are unwilling or unable to resist.

¹⁴ Ibid., 156.
A negotiated settlement between the guerrilla group and the government is the third strategy to eliminate a guerrilla threat. The decision to negotiate a settlement has been used to end a civil conflict that has come to the point where neither side has gained a decisive advantage. This was the final strategy used to resolve the FMLN insurgency in El Salvador in 1990. It was thought that the FMLN were on the brink of elimination in the late 1980s, however, they staged a massive offensive that sent the government reeling and brought the war to a stalemate. Convinced that there would be no military victory by either side, leaders on both sides reassessed their positions and negotiated a settlement.\textsuperscript{15}

The fourth strategy in which the state can eliminate the guerrilla threat is to opt for a strictly military solution. That is, the state can fully engage guerrillas in a force-on-force war. The use of military force to eliminate a guerrilla threat requires that the state have the resources to conduct the war, the support of the population to sustain the effort, and the military capability to fight a guerrilla war. In El Salvador, prior to peace negotiations, this type of force-on-force war contributed to over 75,000 deaths and countless human rights violations. Pressure from the public as well as internationally to resolve the conflict became factors that both sides had to take seriously. The Soviet Union’s attempt to use their conventional military might against the Afghan rebels in the late 1970s and 1980s showed that despite their resources and superior firepower the Soviets were unable to win a guerrilla war using conventional tactics.

The strategies used against the FMLN insurgency in El Salvador shows that a combination of the strategies is often necessary to eliminate the guerrilla threat, although in some cases only one strategy may be required. A government may implement a force-

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 164.
on-force strategy but find that the key to sustaining the guerrilla movement lies with the support they receive from the local population. In response, the government begins a hearts and minds strategy to undermine guerrilla support, in addition to maintaining the military pressure. As the war continues, the government may decide to pursue negotiations as another option to ending the conflict. The bottom line is that there may be one strategy that works to eliminate the guerrilla threat, however, there is the option to use a combination of strategies.

E. THE DUAL THREAT DEBATE

The preceding sections have discussed counternarcotics and counterinsurgency strategies used to deal with the threat posed by drug traffickers and guerrilla groups, respectively. However, neither set of strategies takes into account the appropriate course of action for a government faced by a simultaneous threat from both guerillas and drug traffickers. This section considers how counterinsurgency and counternarcotics strategies might be affected by the existence of a second threat: how counterinsurgency strategies are affected by the presence of the drug trade and how counternarcotics strategies are affected by the existence of guerrillas.

When determining which strategy to use to eliminate the guerrilla threat, the government must calculate what impact the presence of the drug trade will have on the success of the strategy. For example, targeting the political leadership of a guerrilla group might create more independent guerrilla groups. The loss of their leadership could supplant the ideological focus of the guerrilla with full-time drug trafficking. Particularly
in a decentralized guerrilla organization, individual fronts engaged in drug trafficking can easily survive, and might even welcome, the decline of the political leadership.

Understanding the linkage between guerrillas and the drug trade could provide the government the key to undermining guerrilla support. Guerrilla groups that rely on revenue generated from the drug trade to recruit, train, and equip their troops as well as conduct operations, could have their movement constricted if the government is able to cut-off this source of funding. The effectiveness of this strategy would be based on the percentage of funding the guerrillas received from the drug trade as compared to other forms of revenue.

Likewise, the knowledge of guerrilla involvement in the drug trade is necessary when conducting negotiations. For example, if the guerrillas are heavily involved in the drug trade, are they serious about negotiating a settlement that will likely endanger this source of revenue? Will their participation in the drug trade motivate them to drag out the negotiations or is their involvement at a low enough level that it is not an issue on which negotiations would hinge? Knowledge of the guerrilla’s position concerning the importance of the drug trade could give the government leverage when negotiating. Not understanding if the drug trade is a motivating factor for guerrillas to negotiate or not to negotiate could hinder this strategy to eliminate the guerrilla threat.

Guerrillas that are linked to the drug trade are likely to possess a more viable fighting force, a factor the group should take into account, when considering a strictly militaristic strategy. Revenue generated from the drug trade provides millions of dollars to purchase state of the art weapons and communication gear. Training and equipping of troops from drug revenue gives the guerrillas the ability to field a force capable of
conducting effective offensive or defensive operations. Lack of knowledge concerning guerrilla connections to the drug trade might result in government forces being outgunned when combat takes place.

Just as the presence of drugs affects the strategies that might be used to deal with insurgents, the presence of guerrillas must be taken into consideration before conducting supply-side counternarcotics strategies of interdiction, eradication, and alternative development. Awareness of guerrilla activity, their involvement in the drug trade, and the danger they pose to counternarcotics efforts, will help determine the course of action needed to provide a secure environment in which to conduct counternarcotics operations.

Interdiction operations originating from bases where guerrillas are active could place government assets at risk from attack. Though guerrillas do not need to have links to the drug trade to attack military installations, those that are involved in the drug trade might consider a government installation a viable target when protecting their source of revenue. Interdictions that involve the seizure of drug smuggling planes, boats, and trucks in areas controlled by guerrillas could also be jeopardized if adequate protection measures are not in place.

Knowledge of guerrilla groups operating in areas where eradication and alternative development are to take place is critical to the success of these strategies. Guerrillas involved in the drug trade provide protection to coca growers and processors and are opposed to government presence in the areas where they operate. One of the key elements to eradication and alternative development success is providing a secure environment in which these strategies can be conducted. Information of guerrilla activity will aid in deciding what measures need to be taken to protect eradication and alternative
development teams. The level of danger posed by guerrillas may require that the government address the guerrilla threat before conducting counternarcotics operations.

The growth of guerrilla groups and their ties to the drug trade have created a challenge of dealing with both narcotraffickers and guerrillas. The method used to eliminate the threats typically centers on either a sequential method of elimination or a simultaneous method of attacking the threats.

The sequential method for dealing with threats would be used for the following reasons. First, one threat might pose a greater danger to the government than another and thus must be dealt with first. Second, the elimination of a less dangerous threat may be the key to weakening a greater threat.

Eliminating guerrillas before fully engaging the drug trade has been used in Latin America where the guerrillas were a larger threat to national security than the drug trade. For example, the SL guerrillas in Peru prior to 1993 were a greater threat to the security of the state than the drug trade. Domestic actors, primarily the Peruvian military, pressured the government to address the guerrilla threat first, whereas the US pressured the government to end the drug trade first. In addition to the threat guerrillas pose to national security they also undermine the government’s capacity to conduct effective counternarcotics operations in guerrilla-controlled areas. Thus the elimination of guerrilla threat first is thought to be necessary not only to protect national security but also to attack the drug trade effectively.

Others believe that the drug trade should be targeted before the guerrillas. Though guerrillas generate revenue through kidnapping, extortion, and robbery, involvement in the drug trade, particularly the taxation of coca farmers and security for
transporting drugs, provides lucrative revenue that helps sustain their movement. As guerrilla groups become more reliant on drug revenue, the elimination of the drug trade will undermine guerrilla support. For example, the FARC and ELN guerrillas in Colombia generate between US$ 500 million and US$ 1.5 billion dollars, half of the guerrillas' annual income from the drug trade that is used to train, equip and pay their troops. The loss of this support may force guerrillas to be more inclined to negotiate with the government or weaken them to the point that the government can defeat them. Opponents contend that although drugs bring in millions of added revenue to guerrillas, the targeting of the drug trade will only cause guerrilla groups to intensify their non-drug illegal activities (like kidnapping) and increase the conflict between the government and guerrillas as they try to protect a main source of revenue.

Proponents of a simultaneous attack on the dual threats view both guerrillas and the drug trade as equally threatening to the stability of the country. Total equality in allotting resources to combat each threat is not a likely scenario in this method but the goal remains the reduction of both threats to the point that either the threat is eliminated or no longer viable. In the case of Colombia, for example, the simultaneous attack on the guerrillas and drug trade during the Gaviria administration resulted in the partial elimination of threats when the major drug cartels were disbanded and three guerrilla groups disarmed. Proponents argue that as drugs have expanded in Latin America, guerrilla groups have become more involved making it nearly impossible to separate the two threats or at least eliminate one without affecting the other. Critics of this method

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point out that while separating the threats may be hard, the division of resources to combat the dual threat simultaneously actually reduces the strength and ability of the government to effectively eliminate either of the threats.

F. CONCLUSION

Current drug control policy consists of a dual approach using supply-side and demand-side strategies. What is apparent regarding supply-side strategies is that overall it has not reduced availability or the cost of illegal drugs to the consumer. Despite this lack of success, US and Latin American countries have converged concerning the need to support supply-side strategies. Latin American countries view the drug trade as a growing threat to national security through its links to domestic drug abuse, corruption, and guerrilla activity. However, the perceived or real infringement on the integrity of Latin American states that US counternarcotics policies might have created disagreements between the US and Latin America in the past and are likely to affect agreement on future strategies used to eliminate the dual threat.

The increasing participation of guerrilla groups in the drug trade has confronted Latin American countries with a dual threat from both the drug trade and from guerrilla groups. The government’s decision to attack the drug trade and guerrillas sequentially or simultaneously depends on the degree of threat each poses to the security of the state. By using the simultaneous method the government is assured of monitoring the activity of the threat and gauging the danger they pose. However, simultaneous engagement requires the sharing of resources potentially hindering the elimination of the threats. By using the sequential method, the government will sufficiently eliminate one threat before
engaging the second. This method will provide the necessary resources to eliminate one threat. However, there is disagreement over which threat to confront first. In addition, this method might result in the failure of the government to monitor and adjust to changes in the other threat.

This review of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency strategies and the debates over how they should be combined raise a number of questions for the case studies in this thesis. Given the pessimism concerning the effectiveness of supply-side strategies described in this chapter, how can the success in Peru be explained? What counternarcotics strategies were used to achieve success? Is it possible to duplicate this success in Colombia? Did the choice of how to deal with the dual threat contribute to the success in the drug war in Peru? What strategy was employed in Peru and why was it chosen? Would a similar strategy be politically and strategically viable in Colombia?
III. PERU: A CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the United States Government (USG) estimated that Peru’s coca cultivation represented nearly 60 percent of the world’s total and provided the raw material for an estimated 80 percent of all cocaine consumed in the United States.\footnote{17 U.S. Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Peru. (March 1996). Available [Online]: http://www.usis.usemb.se/drugs1996/SAMERICA/DRGPER.HTM, [18 April 2000].} Between 1995 and 1999, Peru exhibited a remarkable 66 percent decrease in coca cultivation, from an estimated 115,300 hectares to approximately 38,700 hectares.\footnote{18 U.S. Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Peru. (February 2000). Available [Online]: http://www.usis.usemb.se/drugs1999/SAMERICA/DRGPER.HTM, [18 April 2000].} This reduction has been widely touted as a success of US counternarcotics efforts in Latin America and is being used, at least in part, as a model for US efforts in Colombia. The counternarcotics strategies of interdiction, eradication and alternate development have been the key components to combating the drug trade. Over the last decade, US officials have portrayed these strategies as successful in reducing the cultivation, processing, and transportation of illicit drugs. Robert Gelbard, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs stated in 1996 that the success of US counternarcotics efforts in Peru and Bolivia depended on the US assisting source country’s law enforcement agencies “...to control cultivation,...interdict drug shipments,...[and] eliminate the source of the illegal trade by eradication.” He further stated that military interdiction operations in Peru “...have successfully disrupted air
smuggling and raised the cost of trafficking operations.”

Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, has stated that the Peruvian program is one that the United States “…would like to recreate in Colombia.”

Ambassador Peter F. Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs, cited counternarcotics operations in Peru as the model for success in eliminating drugs in Colombia by using “…combined vigorous eradication and interdiction efforts with alternative development incentives…”

Ana Maria Salazar, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, explained that the United States would attempt to replicate in Colombia its success in Peru at cutting the “air bridge” linking coca growers and traffickers.

While these statements about counternarcotics strategies represent the popular view of Peru’s counternarcotics success, they overlook the fact that President Fujimori had to deal with a devastated economy and a thriving guerrilla movement before counternarcotics efforts could be effective. Before assessing the counternarcotics strategies of interdiction, eradication, and alternative development, it is necessary to understand the economic and security environment President Alberto Fujimori faced when he entered office in 1990. I will argue that it was critical for Fujimori to stabilize

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22 Statement made in address at the US Army War College, November 1999.
Peru’s crumbling economy, providing jobs to those that might be swayed to join guerrilla groups or drug traffickers, and eliminate the insurgency that threatened the security of the state and hindered counternarcotics efforts.

This chapter will then discuss the evolutionary effectiveness of the three primary counternarcotics strategies of crop eradication, alternative development, and air interdiction used by the Government of Peru (GOP) with support from the United States Government (USG) to combat the drug trade in Peru between 1990-2000. The success of air interdiction was the result of a gradual process that spanned five years and culminated in the air-bridge denial program. Interdiction efforts eventually succeeded in reducing coca leaf prices to levels that made alternative development programs economically viable for coca farmers.

I will argue that the elimination of the guerrilla groups was key to Peru’s counternarcotics success. The success of eradication and alternative development programs depended upon the government’s ability to provide a secure environment in which to pursue a licit trade and viable economic alternatives that caused coca farmers’ to be receptive to change. The implementation of the air-bridge denial program, rather than being the “magic bullet”, was the final amount of pressure that persuaded drug traffickers to move to Colombia. I will further argue that the GOP’s counternarcotics success had the unintended consequences of forcing drug traffickers to: first, adapt their transportation methods and tactics to the increasingly threatening environment and, then, to shift the cultivation of coca from Peru to Colombia when the pressure became too great.
B. CREATING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR SUCCESS

The sequential resolution to Peru’s economic crisis and the violent insurgency threat were key to successful counternarcotics efforts. In 1990, Peru’s economy was in shambles with skyrocketing inflation and unemployment. Many Peruvians were motivated by necessity to join the cocaine business. The illicit coca economy was a major source of jobs, employing an estimated 165,000 to 279,000 people (3 percent of the workforce). It also introduced between US $800 million to $1.2 billion dollars annually into Peru’s economy.23 Before attacking drugs Fujimori would have to draw people away from the narcotics trade by to reviving the economy. Likewise, the protection the Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupac Amaru (MRTA or Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) and Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path) guerrilla groups provided to coca growers and drug traffickers meant that they would have to be dealt with in order to provide a secure working environment for counternarcotics strategies. The reduced influence of these two factors on Peruvian society allowed for the enhancement and full implementation of counternarcotics strategies. Eradication and alternative development programs made impressive gains as guerrilla influence waned and viable economic alternatives to coca cultivation and processing were established.

1. Ending the Coca Economy

When President Fujimori was elected to office in 1990, Peru’s inflation rate had reached a staggering 7,650 percent a year. Unemployment was estimated at over 80 percent while an estimated fourteen million of Peru’s twenty-two million citizens were

living below the poverty line. Fujimori made taming inflation and revitalizing the economy his primary priority. In doing so, he would generate enough revenue so that the government could operate while at the same time restore confidence in the government. However, in the short term while Fujimori was focused on the economy, the drug trade flourished. Revenue and employment generated by the drug trade negatively impacted the government’s motivation to carry out counternarcotics efforts.

Estimates of cocaine's economic impact on the Peruvian economy differ widely among US agencies and the government of Peru. The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conservatively estimated that in 1990-1991 cocaine provided $600 million to $700 million a year to the Peruvian economy. During the same period, US Embassy economists have estimated that the amount may have been twice as much, from $1.2 billion to $1.5 billion annually, while the government of Peru's estimate was $2 billion. Between 1990 and 1995 the cocaine industry accounted for between 30 and 40 percent of Peru’s GDP, a significant factor in Peru’s economy. In 1992 alone the cocaine industry accounted for an estimated 53 percent of Peru’s exports, more than its two largest exports combined value.

The number of people employed in the cocaine industry during this period vary from year to year depending on source but estimates range between 175,000 and 300,000.

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people employed in farming and manufacturing of cocaine in 1992 to 230,000 people employed in farming, processing, trafficking and financial operations in 1995. The employment numbers do not include those people who provide goods and services to the industry. The cocaine industry was particularly prevalent in the farming sector where Peru’s coca farmers were estimated to receive about 10 percent of the total trafficking dollars earned in Peru. Illicit coca was worth, at a conservative estimate, between US $60 to $150 million annually to coca farmers during this period according to US State Department. The cocaine industry also provided an important source of employment during Peru’s economic crisis. Between 1992 and 1995 Peru’s unemployment averaged 9.2 percent while those fully employed in legitimate jobs ranged from 41 percent in 1992 to 51.7 percent in 1995. After the economy had been stabilized unemployment fell to 7.1 percent in 1996 while those fully employed rose to 52.6 percent by 1997. If Fujimori, at US urging, had aggressively pursued counternarcotics strategies during this period it is likely that the Peruvian economy would have deteriorated further.

To stabilize the economy Fujimori needed to re-establish ties with international financial institutions. In order to regain international credibility, and in doing so international aid for Peru’s devastated economy, Fujimori resumed payments on its US $5 billion debt owed to international financial institutions that had been suspended during the Garcia presidency in 1987. Though the monthly payments of between US $20 and

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27 Ibid., 14-15.


29 Data obtained from Ministry of Labor and Public Welfare: and the National Institute of Statistics and Information.
$30 million represented a fraction of the debt owed, it was a tremendous sacrifice on an economy that was already stretched too thin. The debt repayment signified Fujimori’s commitment to stabilize the economy and regain international favor. Fujimori’s economic reforms emphasized free-markets, increased foreign investment and selling of state industries in the mining, electricity, and telecommunications sectors to private business bringing in US $1.5 billion which the government would use to stabilize the economy. These reforms were more extreme than even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists recommended at the time and resulted in reducing inflation to 139 percent and a 2 percent growth in the economy in 1991. That same year a US $2.1 billion financial aid package was negotiated with the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Additional aid from a support group of developed countries that included the United States, Japan, Spain, and Germany amounted to several hundred million dollars. The United States Congress also approved a US $95 million executive branch request for 1992 for aid. Fujimori correctly assessed that international economic assistance and fiscal austerity measures were required to pull Peru out of its decline. He also understood that by pulling Peru’s economic situation out of its downward spiral his administration gained legitimacy against the challenges from guerrilla groups.

Though the economic situation was improving by 1992, it had not fully recovered. At the same time, increasing political violence and the burgeoning drug trade continued

30 Bagley and Walker, 179-181.

to terrorize and corrupt Peruvian society. Fujimori attributed the lack of progress in fixing Peru’s problems to the obstinacy of Congress to pass reform measures. Having built strong ties with the military to support his position and lacking political support in Congress, Fujimori announced an *autogolpe* (self coup) on 5 April 1992 with the promise of reinstating parliament within one year. The autogolpe, which according to Bagley and Walker, was supported by an estimated 80 percent of the population, suspended the constitution, congress, and the judiciary leaving Fujimori with full authority to rule Peru by decree.\(^\text{32}\)

Though the autogolpe may have seemed like the only alternative left to Fujimori the question has often been raised as to whether or not it benefited Peru’s situation. On the one hand, it freed Fujimori to confront Peru’s challenges without political interference. On the other hand, the reaction by the international community showed their displeasure with Fujimori’s undemocratic action. International financial organizations delayed or suspended loans, such as the IDB that suspended US $220 million in loans. Meanwhile the USG suspended military and economic aid totaling US $236 million. Only humanitarian and counternarcotics aid was not affected.\(^\text{33}\) As for other counternarcotics assistance, the USG directed its military trainers and radar crews conducting surveillance operations to shut down their operations, leaving Peru without a

\(^{32}\) Bagley and Walker, 180.

detection system for tracking narcotics flights through much of 1992 until Fujimori returned power to the Congress.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite international disapproval, Fujimori, with the support of the military, refused to reinstate the constitutional government.\textsuperscript{35} After six months of negotiations and promises to hold elections for a new Congress, Peru was able to obtain an US $800 million loan to re-establish eligibility to borrow from the IMF.\textsuperscript{36} A year after the autogolpe, Peru’s economy rebounded. Foreign investment helped push GDP growth to 7 percent in 1993, 13 percent in 1994, and 6.8 percent in 1995. Inflation declined from 7,650 percent in 1990 to 10.2 percent in 1995.\textsuperscript{37} Fujimori had transformed Peru from a state run economy to a free market economy and in doing so successfully revived Peru’s economy.

2. Eliminating Guerrilla Groups

In 1990, in addition to a faltering economy, President Fujimori was also confronted with protecting Peru’s citizens and controlling the national territory from the threat posed by the SL and MRTA guerrilla groups. Guerrilla activity, including bombing, kidnapping, murder, and participation in the drug trade caused millions of dollars in damage to Peru’s infrastructure and were a hindrance to counternarcotics operations.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 176.

\textsuperscript{35} Area Handbook Series: Peru, 255.

\textsuperscript{36} Menzel, Fire in the Andes, 176.

Since the early 1980s, both SL and MRTA operated in the prime coca-growing region of the Huallaga Valley as shown in Figure 2.1. Both competed for control of the area, particularly the fertile Upper Huallaga Valley that provided the guerrillas a ready source of income to fund their fight with the GOP. By providing security to drug traffickers, extorting taxes from coca growers, and controlling an estimated 120 landing strips, SL was estimated to earn between US $10 and $100 million annually in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{38} Aside from equipping their forces, the income gained from the drug trade allowed the SL to pay their forces as much as US $500 a month during this period. The pay was five times Peru’s per capita monthly income and significantly higher than the pay received by police or military personnel.\textsuperscript{39}

Fujimori recognized that counterinsurgency operations were critical to the success of counternarcotics operations but the two sometimes worked at cross-purposes. The national police, responsible for conducted eradication operations along with the destruction of processing labs, threatened the livelihood of peasant coca farmers. The Peruvian Army, responsible for conducting counterinsurgency operations, relied on the information provided by coca growers to help locate guerrilla forces and bases. The rift this created between the police and military negatively impacted coordination and hindered counternarcotics operations and had cost the lives of police when they confronted guerrillas without military protection.

Counterinsurgency efforts paid off in June 1992 when the MRTA was virtually eliminated after the capture of leader Victor Polay. The resulting confusion and internal

\textsuperscript{38} Bagley and Walker, 182-183.

\textsuperscript{39} Clawson and Lee, 179.
conflict among the remaining members caused the MRTA to decline to such a state that the Peruvian military considered the group a minor nuisance. In September of the same year, superb intelligence work by the Peruvian National Police (PNP) led to the arrest of SL leader Abimael Guzman, his companion and second-in-command Elena Iparraguirre, and other key members in Lima. The centralized nature of SL proved to be the group’s Achilles’ heel as the capture of Guzman led to the arrest of approximately 1,200 other guerrillas over the next several months, decimating the SL ranks. Additionally, the subsequent decision by Guzman, whether voluntary or coerced, to negotiate a peace accord with the government while in jail during September and October 1993 was a turning point for SL. However, a schism arose between SL members supporting the peace accord and SL members that opposed peace because of their involvement in the drug trade. This created a splinter SL group that opted to continue the war. In 2000, this group consisted of 300 members and had been relegated to criminal activity.

SL’s violent acts fueled resistance by peasants to guerrillas and allowed government alternative development programs to be instituted in some areas as early as 1991. The SL and MRTA routinely used torture and other brutal acts against non-sympathizers regardless of their position or station in society. Between 1980 and 1996, 25,000 people died as a result of political violence with SL being held responsible for a vast majority of the killings and other violence. According to the Organization of American States, of the 24,250 people that died due to political violence between 1980 and July 1992, 2,044 were members of Peru’s security forces, 10,171 were civilians,

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11,773 were suspected subversives, and 262 were suspected of connections to the drug trade. After the capture of SL and MRTA guerrilla leaders the level of political violence took a dramatic dive as figure 2.2 depicts. By the end of 1994, the MRTA was all but eliminated and SL was a shadow of its former self.

With the guerrilla threat controlled and the economy stabilized, eradication and alternative development in tandem with air interdiction efforts could now make significant progress to combat the drug trade.

C. COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGIES

During the early 1990s, interdiction, eradication, and alternative development programs had little impact on the amount of coca cultivation in Peru. Although interdiction efforts experienced momentary periods of effectiveness in lowering coca prices, for the majority of the early 1990s, coca leaf prices remained above levels that were necessary for alternative development programs to be successful. Eradication efforts were hampered by political pressure from farmers, guerrilla presence in coca-growing areas, and the method of eradication.

The success of interdiction efforts to maintain lower coca leaf prices which led to voluntary abandonment of coca fields and crop substitution, in addition to the elimination of the SL guerrilla group and changes in eradication policy caused the reduction in coca cultivation from 1996 onward.

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1. Air Interdiction

The goal of air interdiction was to seize or destroy the means of processing and transporting coca in order to oversaturate the coca market with an abundance of coca leaves. The oversupply of coca leaves would force prices paid for coca leaves to be reduced to a level where no reasonable profit margin could be made, thus making alternative development programs more attractive to coca farmers. In addition, interdiction, led drug trafficking pilots, who faced the risk of being shot down, to increase their smuggling fees, raising transportation costs for drug traffickers and reducing profits.

Interdiction in the early 1990s did not create enough sustained pressure on drug traffickers to force coca prices lower for any sustained period of time. In addition, assets used to interdict drug traffickers were often not available because of other priorities. After the elimination of the guerrilla threat, the resolution of Peru’s border conflict with Ecuador, and the increased interdiction efforts provided by the air bridge denial program the pressure on drug traffickers forced prices for coca leaf low enough that alternative development programs became a viable alternative for farmers. Additionally, the increased emphasis on counternarcotics sped the shift in coca cultivation from Peru to Colombia causing a dramatic decrease in cultivation in Peru.

In the early 1990s, integration of US Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) ground and aerial radars provided information to the Peruvian Air Force (FAP) that allowed them to intercept drug trafficking aircraft. Shooting down a small number of planes led to the successful disruption of drug trafficker’s transportation profiles, but little impact on the amount of coca cultivated.
Prior to 1995, an estimated 1000 to 2000 drug trafficking flights a year occurred between the primary coca growing areas in Peru and the processing labs and transportation hubs in Colombia. The FAP were authorized to force down or shoot down the suspected drug traffickers. The number of aircraft forced or shot down varies depending on source. The FAP claimed to have shot down or intercepted 124 aircraft between 1991 and mid-1993, while the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report lists a total of 34 aircraft between 1990 and 1994. If we calculate the percentage of drug aircraft destroyed during 1991-1994 we see that of the 1000 or so drug flights a year from 1991 through 1994 (totaling a minimum of 4000 flights over that period), and using the FAP’s stated number of drug aircraft intercepted during that time (124), we see that slightly over 3 percent of drug trafficking aircraft were either destroyed or seized by air interdiction efforts. Though the overall percentage seems insignificant it did have an impact on the number of available pilots willing to risk their lives. As an official at the US State Department suggests, “it was the psychological impact on the drug traffickers and pilots more so than the physical destruction of a few airplanes that can account for the success of interdiction efforts.” Though only a small percentage of the total number of drug flights were disrupted, as early as 1993 drug traffickers started to alter their air transportation profile by flying at night (the FAP had little or no night flying capability).


43 Menzel, Fire in the Andes, 184.

or by flying indirect paths into and out of Peru from Brazil or Ecuador to avoid ground-based radars.45

Seizures of processed cocaine also had little impact on the drug trade during this period. Between 1990 and 1994 seizures of processed cocaine totaled 37.07 metric tons (mt) out of an estimated 2,410 mt of processed coca being produced (Figure 2.3).46 Air interdiction, seizures, and the destruction of 387 coca-processing labs had only a short-term impact on the price of coca and no impact on the amount of coca cultivation. In fact, the price paid for a kilogram of coca leaf went from an estimated $0.50 in 1990 to as high as $4.50 in 1994 as Figure 2.4 depicts, while Table 2.1 shows the area of coca cultivation rebounding after an anti-coca fungus outbreak in 1993-1994. What is of particular interest is the two periods when coca leaf prices spiked to their highest levels (August 1992 to February 1993 and June 1994 to March 1995).

The periods of coca leaf price spikes reveal that without sustained interdiction efforts coca prices would quickly increase to levels that would make alternative development less attractive to coca farmers. During the first period, August 1992 to February 1993, the shutting off of US radar and surveillance support in response to Fujimori’s autogolpe, allowed drug traffickers virtual freedom to transport their goods. This in turn caused coca leaf prices to escalate. The second period, June 1994 to May 1995, involved two events that caused coca prices to increase. First, US-manned radars as well as intelligence sharing were once again cut-off after April 1994 because of USG

45 Menzel, Fire in the Andes, 166.

fears that shooting down drug flights was against international law. The lack of radar coverage and intelligence resulted in the FAP's inability to intercept drug flights. Though the radars and intelligence sharing resumed in December 1994 the second event, the Peru-Ecuador border confrontation, kept the FAP preoccupied until February 1995.47

After years of analyzing air drug trafficking routes into and out of Peru, the United States Government (USG), the Peruvian National Police Drug Directorate (DINANDRO), and the FAP initiated a new air interdiction strategy in March 1995 that specifically targeted the air transportation corridor between Peru and Colombia. Previous air interdiction efforts did not target a specific air corridor; instead they reacted to information believed to be from reliable sources that allowed the FAP sufficient time to interdict drug flights regardless of their location. The success of the air-bridge denial program was aided by a multinational detection and monitoring system. A sophisticated network of systems was comprised of radars, joint intelligence centers, and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance aircraft and satellites that would not handle interceptions but would direct Peruvian and Colombian air force aircraft.

It is widely accepted that Peru's counternarcotics success came after March 1995 and can be attributed to the FAP's efforts, supported by US surveillance aircraft and radars, to break the air-bridge between Peru's coca growing region and Colombia's cocaine laboratories and transshipment points. 48 However, I have shown that initial interdiction efforts prior to 1995 impacted the short-term price of coca leaf and led to the

47 Clawson and Lee, 138.

48 Interviews by author with various U.S. Government Officials concerning their opinions as to the cause of Peru's counternarcotics success.
reduction of drug flights by 1995. It can be argued then that pressure on drug traffickers from interdiction efforts prior to March 1995 were stepping stones to success and that the implementation of the air-bridge denial program created the final pressure needed to cause the shift in coca cultivation to Colombia, sustain lower coca leaf prices and effectively reduce the number of annual drug flights. After March 1995, the dramatic drop in the number of drug flights detected suggests two things; first, that the air-bridge denial program was effective in closing down the major air corridor between Peru and Colombia; and, second, that drug traffickers had adapted to interdiction efforts by altering routes and flight profiles making detection more difficult.

Between 1995 and 1998 an estimated 150-300 flights took place per year for a total of between 450 to 900; of these, 371 flights were detected and 126 planes were either shot down or forced down by the FAP while the Colombian Air Force strafed or forced down at least 15 drug aircraft in 1995 alone.\(^49\) Those pilots still willing to fly increased their fees from US$ 15,000 per flight to US$ 45,000 per flight, while the reduction in the number of pilots flying created an accumulation of coca leaves waiting to be transported to processing labs in Colombia.\(^50\) This in turn reduced the price coca leaf buyers paid coca growers (Figure 2.5).\(^51\) In 1990, coca leaf was bought for between US$ .50-1.50 per kilogram. This price increased in 1994, to between US$ 1.50 - 4.40 per


\(^{50}\text{Charles Brayshaw former Deputy Chief of Mission in Peru and Charge de Affair from 1991-1994 interview by author, 27 June 2000, USSOUTHCOM HQ, Miami.}\)

\(^{51}\text{Clawson and Lee, 139.}\)
kilogram. Coca leaf prices plummeted in April 1995, a month after the air-bridge denial program was implemented, from US$ 2.50 per kilogram to US$ 1.00 in 1998, making coca cultivation less attractive to farmers while licit crops become a viable option. This is reflected in the number of hectares abandoned by coca farmers. Between 1995 and 1998 a total of 69,169 hectares of coca were either totally abandoned or replanted with licit crops, significantly surpassing eradication efforts during this period. As Figure 2.6 shows, the abandonment of coca fields coupled with increasing eradication efforts accounts for the dramatic decline in the amount of coca cultivated in Peru between 1996 and 1999.

Besides having an impact on the price of coca leaves, the air-bridge denial program also had an impact on the transportation of coca paste between Peru and Colombia. Pressure from air interdiction efforts had the unintended effect of forcing drug traffickers to adopt new transportation routes and methods to move their product. The targeting of the air corridor between Peru and Colombia resulted in the increased use of an indirect air route over Brazil. This “East Corridor” route, as depicted in Figure 2.7, shielded drug flights entry and exit into Peru and Colombia. In order to limit the amount of time the FAP and its supporting intelligence apparatus had to detect, track, and intercept drug flights, adjustments in the location of airstrips and processing labs were made. Airstrips were moved closer to the borders reducing the likelihood of detection and the amount of time the government had to react to suspected drug traffickers. In 1998 and 1999 no drug flights were detected for two reasons. First, US surveillance

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aircraft were withdrawn to meet other critical needs leaving, as it had in the past, a gap in the ability of the FAP to locate drug flights. Second, drug traffickers had adapted to GOP detection and interdiction by changing their transportation tactics and methods and using overland routes to Ecuador, Chile and Bolivia and river systems to Peru’s coastal ports. According to a US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) analyst, the drug traffickers also became more security conscious by adopting stricter operational security (OPSEC) and improving their communication security (COMSEC) thus denying the government critical information that is required to successfully intercept drug traffickers. As drug traffickers adopted new methods of transportation and new routes to move coca base out of Peru in addition to the lack of surveillance platforms to detect the movement, coca leaf prices increased in 1999 as Figure 2.8 depicts. By June 2000 prices for coca leaves had risen to US$ 3.00 per kilogram raising speculation that coca cultivation could rebound if pressure on drug traffickers could not be maintained.

In addition to altering air routes and methods, the air-bridge denial program also caused drug traffickers to increase their reliance on the extensive river system running between Peru and Colombia as an alternate way to transport their product. The Peruvian government supported by the SOUTHCOM addressed this growing issue in 1996 with a commitment to establish a five year, US$ 60 million riverine drug and chemical interdiction system that includes DINANDRO, Peruvian armed forces and Coast Guard, and multinational counterparts from the US, Colombia, and Brazil. In 1997,

53 Winneg. 16 November 1999.

DINANDRO and the Peruvian Coast Guard, with support from the US military, established several riverine counternarcotics bases and increased resources for riverine operations. To enhance interagency counternarcotics riverine efforts that are a critical component of the effort to ensure that drugs and money do not move by Peruvian waterways, a joint Peruvian riverine training center was established in the city of Iquitos. As the rivers came to play a larger part in the movement of drugs, enhancement of riverine operations included the Peruvian Navy that began coordinated counternarcotics operations with DINANDRO in late 1998. Like the air-bridge denial program, it is logical to assume that riverine interdiction, if fully implemented, will help maintain coca leaf prices below the break-even point making alternative development and field abandonment more attractive to farmers.

Effective air interdiction not only caused drug traffickers to change the tactics and methods of transportation, it also caused them to shift coca cultivation from Peru to Colombia. As shown in Figure 2.9, the shift began in 1993 as coca cultivation in Colombia began its climb from 37,100 hectares in 1992 to 122,500 hectares in 1999 while in Peru, coca cultivation reached its peak of 129,100 hectares in 1992 and declined to 38,700 hectares in 1999. The explosive shift of coca cultivation away from Peru to Colombia in 1994-1995 should have been anticipated, based on the reaction of drug traffickers to Peruvian counternarcotics efforts between 1990 and 1994 when these


efforts forced coca growers to shift cultivation away from the traditional coca-growing areas in the Upper Huallaga Valley to other departments. From 1980 through 1991 the Upper Huallaga Valley produced half of Peru’s coca. By 1994 it accounted for 27 percent, with the Aguaytia and Apurimac Valley increasing to 20 and 16 percent respectively by 1994. With increased government presence in coca growing areas drug traffickers found vast areas in Colombia void of government influence and capable of sustaining coca cultivation.

Air interdiction eventually accomplished its goal of sustaining lower coca leaf prices making coca cultivation less attractive to farmers. This led to the voluntary abandonment of coca fields along with the planting of licit crops. There are other lessons to be learned from this success. First, the unintended consequence of successful interdiction highlights drug trafficker’s ability to adapt to changing conditions. By successfully disrupting the flow of drugs between Peru and Colombia, air interdiction caused drug traffickers to alter transportation methods and tactics, and ultimately forced drug traffickers to seek new coca growing areas. In essence, air interdiction helped created enough pressure to cause the balloon effect that forced drug traffickers to move coca cultivation to Colombia. Second, the importance of sustained interdiction efforts along with the capability to detect, monitor, and intercept drug flights cannot be understated. During the periods in which the lack of surveillance platforms and radars left the FAP without adequate information to conduct interdiction missions or the withdrawal of interdiction assets allowed the drug traffickers to ply their trade unabated, coca leaf prices increased to levels that competed against licit forms of agriculture.

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57 Kay, 109.
Without sustained pressure to maintain lower coca prices the lure to increase coca cultivation hampered the overall counternarcotics efforts.

2. Crop Eradication

Since the late 1970s, one of the primary pillars of US counternarcotics strategies has been the eradication of coca. The preferred method of eradication has been by aerial spraying of herbicides because of the large coverage area. Manual eradication is also conducted although it is time-consuming, tedious work that covers a significantly smaller area than spraying. In the beginning of his presidency, Fujimori carried out little eradication for fear of driving coca farmers into guerrilla arms. Attacking coca farmers would not only be politically unpopular but would also endanger Peru’s national security.

Destroying coca fields is politically unpopular for two reasons; first, it is a traditional crop, and, second, it is a means of subsistence for poor peasants. Coca growing in Peru has a long, respected history, predating the arrival of Europeans by hundreds of years. Coca has been used for centuries for chewing, medicinal purposes, and religious rituals. It has been estimated that in order to meet the traditional needs of Peruvian society approximately 10,000 hectares of legal coca cultivation would be required. By the mid 1980s and the boom in the cocaine market, peasant farmers had grown dependent on coca cultivation in order to survive.\textsuperscript{58} Table 2.2 is a 1988 survey of coca prices and shows farmers had little incentive to grow other crops because harvesting coca provided 4 to 34 times more income than the licit crops. In addition, the infrastructure required to bring licit crops to market did not exist for many outlaying

areas where coca was grown. The lack of roads, transportation, communication, refrigeration, and storage facilities made licit crops less attractive to coca growers who did not have to concern themselves with getting coca leaves to buyers.

Eradication was also seen as a danger to national security because it could result in coca farmers joining the guerrilla movement. In an effort to quell guerrilla-supported peasant protests against government eradication efforts, President Fujimori immediately ended eradication efforts that targeted mature coca plants when he entered office in 1990. He did however continue to support seedbed eradication that was seen as less damaging by coca farmers. The goal of seedbed eradication, begun in 1988 by agents of USG-funded CORAH (Coca Reduction Agency for the Upper Huallaga Valley), was to reduce the levels of future coca cultivation. However, as Figure 2.10 shows, despite the long-term effort to reduce the amount of coca fields, in the short-term total coca cultivation area increased from 120,800 hectares in 1991 to its peak of 129,100 hectares in 1992.\textsuperscript{59} In 1993 and 1994 coca leaf cultivation dropped to 108,800 and 108,600 hectares respectively though levels rebounded to 115,300 by 1995.\textsuperscript{60} Eradication efforts in the early 1990s could not keep pace with the boom in coca cultivation. By 1997 seedbed eradication ended as eradication of mature coca plants was emphasized.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} Bagley and Walker, 181-182.


\textsuperscript{61} Jason Page, Senior Analyst, interviewed by author 27 September 2000. Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center, Washington D.C.
The drop in coca cultivation in 1993 and 1994 has been attributed to a deadly anti-coca fungus, *fusarium oxysporum*. The fungus, which severely damages or kills the coca plant, appeared first in 1987-1988 and continued to infect coca plants through 1995. Damage estimates to Peru’s coca crop around the villages of Uchiza, Los Angles, Bajo Porango, Puerto Huiete, Santa Fe, Nuevo Union and Tupac Amaru were estimated to be between 40 to 60 percent through 1995.\(^\text{62}\) The fungus has been reported to linger in coca areas for years devastating coca crops, particularly those plants over ten years old, as well as licit crops like tangerines and other broad leaf plants. The Peru Country Team in Lima reported that the fungus took such a toll in the UHV in 1993 and 1994 that there was a 33 percent drop in UHV coca cultivation alone and a 16 percent total drop in coca cultivation in Peru those years.\(^\text{63}\) Although the anti-coca fungus may have been the unanticipated ally of government eradication efforts in the short run, it caused an increase in coca-growing areas in the long run. The fungus that devastated coca leaves actually caused the migration of coca farmers out of their traditional coca growing areas into new areas. The spreading of coca fields made it more difficult for eradicators to locate all sources of coca.

Increased eradication of seedbed and mature plants contributed to the steady decline in the amount of coca cultivated beginning in 1995. Eradication of coca seedbeds totaled the equivalent of 16,912 hectares of mature coca equaling one fifth of the total planted in 1995, nearly equaling the total of all seedbed eradication from 1992 through

\(^{62}\) Clawson and Lee, 154.

\(^{63}\) Menzel, *Fire in the Andes*, 195. The author has been unable to find any reliable information on the impact of anti-coca fungus after 1995.
1994 (17,098 hectares).\textsuperscript{64} The impact of eradication efforts reduced coca cultivation in 1996 to 94,400 hectares.\textsuperscript{65} In addition to increased seedbed eradication in 1996, at the urging of the USG, there was a shift in eradication strategy when Fujimori directed CORAH to implement a manual eradication program targeting young coca plants (under two years old) in areas such as national parks and other outlying areas. By targeting coca fields outside of traditional coca growing areas Fujimori avoided protests while gradually implementing an expanding eradication program. In 1996 a total of 1,259 hectares of mature coca plants were eradicated by CORAH. The following two years the GOP continued to expand their eradication policy to include coca grown on outlying private property. Eradication for 1997 and 1998 were estimated at 3,462 and 7,825 hectares, respectively, helping to reduce the coca cultivation area to 68,800 hectares in 1997 and 51,000 hectares in 1998.\textsuperscript{66} In late 1999, eradication policy changed once again when Operation Dina CORAH eradicated approximately 6,000 hectares of coca regardless of location bringing the 1999 total to 13,800 hectares of mature coca plants destroyed that year.\textsuperscript{67} Projections for the year 2000 are for an additional 15,000 hectares of the estimated 38,700 hectares remaining to be eradicated.\textsuperscript{68}


\textsuperscript{65} Clawson and Lee, 218.

\textsuperscript{66} INCSR 1997 and 1998.

\textsuperscript{67} INCSR 1999.
Since 1995, eradication has directly accounted for an increasingly larger portion of Peru’s success. It also plays an important indirect role in reducing cultivation by reminding farmers attracted to illicit farming that their illegal efforts are subject to uncompensated destruction without notice. It is key to note that the success of eradication efforts required the establishment of an alternative development program that provided coca growers a viable means of supporting themselves once the coca was destroyed. Without an alternative development program and the technical and financial assistance that is associated with it to help farmers to transition to legitimate farming, regrowth of previously eradicated coca fields or clearing and growth of new areas is a genuine concern for the government.

3. Alternative Development

In the early 1990s alternative development was conducted on a limited basis due primarily to financial constraints as well as the influence of guerrilla groups on farming organizations in coca growing areas. During this period, alternative development efforts were also hampered by the lure of high prices farmers received for coca leaves. As coca leaf prices dropped to levels that made licit crop substitution a viable alternative, thousands of hectares of coca were either abandoned or destroyed.

Since 1991, the USG, through the US Agency for International Development (USAID), has been supporting the GOP alternative development programs. The alternative development program is controlled by the Corps in Support of Alternate Development (CADA), a division of CORAH in the Peruvian Ministry of the Presidency. CADA operates with funding and technical assistance from (USAID), the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and others in the international
community. The counternarcotics strategy of alternative development has the goal of providing coca farmers a viable licit crop that can survive in regions where drug crops are cultivated and build the infrastructure to bring those crops to markets. Alternative development has also provided economic assistance in the form of loans to farmers and communities to build the infrastructure necessary to sustain licit crop cultivation. In addition, technical assistance in the form of new planting methods and increasing crop yields is provided to farmers.

In 1992, USAID contracted a consulting firm to evaluate the receptiveness of alternative development in communities in coca growing areas. The firm concluded “...that farmers in coca growing areas will voluntarily reduce illegal coca farming if given appropriate alternative development options that provide licit sources of employment and services to improve the well-being of their families.”69 From this study a pilot project was carried out in the Ponzana Valley in the Central Huallaga to test the findings. The support of the population for alternative development assistance packages in return for voluntary coca eradication was considered decisive. The findings concluded that farmers would voluntarily reduce illegal coca cultivation if alternative development options provided licit employment as well as improved services for families. Given these alternatives, the Valley’s population opposed the drug cartel, preventing construction of an airstrip, and refused to cooperate with guerrilla groups attempting to re-establish control of the area. Coca cultivation was reduced by approximately fifty percent, from

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1,500 hectares in June 1992 to 700 hectares by December 1993. As a result of this success, alternative development was expanded to other areas.70

Though early alternative development efforts were limited, the collapse of coca leaf prices in mid-1995 as a result of successful air interdiction strategy caused an increase in the number of farmers that accepted economic alternatives to coca cultivation. In 1994, cocaine base paste (the intermediate process between coca leaves and cocaine) was worth US$ 726 per kilogram; this was followed by a steep decline in 1995 to US$ 297 per kilogram.71 Prices farmers received for coca leaves also reflected the decline. Between October 1994 and January 1995 a kilogram of coca leaves could be sold for between US$ 3.00 and US$ 4.40. By July 1995 coca leaf was worth below US$ .50 per kilogram. The sharp decline in coca leaf prices provided the economic environment necessary for establishing alternatives to coca cultivation that could earn farmers a legal living. A few of the alternatives to coca included bananas, coffee beans, pineapples, cacao and palm hearts as well as cattle ranching for meat and dairy products and forestry of valuable timber. To ensure funding was available when coca prices declined USAID pledged US$ 107 million for development in coca growing regions from 1995-2001 to assist those farmers and communities willing to abandon coca cultivation. Between 1996 and 2000 over 70,000 hectares of coca were abandoned.72

Between 1995 and 1999, US$ 64 million was invested in coca growing areas to assist farmers in growing and marketing licit crops while also providing 679 communities

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70 Ibid.
71 OGD 1998, 186.
72 Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center. Peru: 1999 Coca Estimate.
and organizations incentives to stop illicit activities. As coca prices declined and coca fields were abandoned, negotiations began in 1995-1996 between the government and coca communities to support coca reduction in exchange for sustained economic development. In 1995, 226 communities signed agreements to reduce illicit coca cultivation by approximately 15,000 hectares over five years in exchange for technical and economic assistance to increase productivity and income from licit alternate crops. Thirteen additional communities agreed to reduce coca cultivation by 1,300 hectares in 1997. A donor’s meeting organized by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in late 1998 garnered US$ 270.2 million in pledges from 19 donors to support alternative development programs from 1999-2003. To help alleviate the high cost of transporting legitimate crops, USAID’s market development strategy called for building or maintaining roads and bridges, providing storage facilities, and providing low cost trucking to transport produce to major markets. From 1996 through 1999 a total of 21 bridges and approximately 1,315 kilometers of roads were constructed or rehabilitated through funds provided by international donors as well as the government of Peru. The total number of people affected by alternative development since 1995 has reached nearly 400,000.


74 INSCR 1998.

75 Clawson and Lee, 157.


By 2000 the GOP and USAID were working with almost 700 communities and farmers organizations and more than 15,000 farmers to shift to licit crops while strengthening local governments and infrastructures.\textsuperscript{78} Funding from international donors help build and maintain roads and bridges as well as provide basic human services (schools, health posts, potable water systems, etc), all of which are key components to alternative development and help to strengthen local governments and community participation. Additionally, strengthening of local governments and broadening of community participation in the alternative development strategy resulted in the training to promote drug awareness of over 8,000 mayors, councilmen, municipal employees and community leaders in the first three years.\textsuperscript{79} The USAID-supported Center for Information and Education Against the Abuse of Drugs (CEDRO) and the Technical Committee on Drug Abuse Prevention (COPUID) provide drug awareness and drug abuse prevention material and education to in high schools throughout Peru. They also develop locally designed prevention programs in high-risk communities, including those adjacent to coca growing areas.\textsuperscript{80}

D. SUMMARY

This chapter began by suggesting that President Fujimori was required to resolve Peru’s economic and security crisis before fully engaging in counternarcotics activities. The strengthening of Peru’s economy through severe austerity measures, financial assistance from the international community and the privatization of state owned

\textsuperscript{78} INSCR 1999. \\
\textsuperscript{79} U.S. Embassy briefing, 12 February 2000. \\
\textsuperscript{80} INSCR 1995.
businesses reduced the government’s reliance on the drug trade. The elimination of guerrilla groups as a threat to the state and counternarcotics operations was critical to the expansion of eradication and alternative development efforts into areas previously controlled by guerrillas.

Interdiction efforts were key to reducing the price of coca leaf to levels that made alternative development a viable licit option for coca growers. The lack of sustained and focused interdiction from 1990 to 1995 led to volatile coca prices. After 1995, interdiction led to sustained lower coca prices because interdiction efforts had the unintended consequence of forcing drug traffickers to hone their skills and become more adaptable to an increasingly threatening environment. As the risk of transporting drugs by air increased, drug traffickers adapted their mode of transport to rivers and roads as well as changing their flight patterns and airfield locations while at the same time increasing their operational and communication security. Pressure on the drug trade from counternarcotics efforts not only caused effective transportation adaptations but it also led drug traffickers to shift to Colombia as their main source of coca. As government pressure and presence increased in Peru’s coca-growing regions drug traffickers capitalized on Colombia’s potential growing areas that are uncontrolled by the government. The shift has catapulted Colombia to the number one coca-producing country in the world.

Like interdiction, eradication efforts underwent an evolutionary process during the early 1990s. In an effort to avoid protests, especially in areas vulnerable to guerrillas, Fujimori opted to suspend eradication of mature coca and concentrate on seedbed eradication from 1990 until 1996 when eradication of mature coca was reintroduced. The
elimination of guerrilla groups and the implementation of alternative development programs were critical in reducing the resistance government eradication teams faced while also providing coca farmers incentives to switch to licit farming and abandon coca fields.

The impact of alternative development has provided the means to sustain the gains made by interdiction and eradication efforts. By strengthening local governments, providing funding for community work projects such as roads, water and electrical lines, and substituting coca crops with viable licit crops, alternative development has built support for the GOP’s counternarcotics efforts. Alternative development programs have led to the voluntary abandonment of thousands of hectares of coca fields, introducing economically viable crops. By 1998, through the successful implementation and sustained assistance of alternative development programs, licit crops had increased their value to the point that they surpassed the value of coca in at least two primary coca-growing areas (Central Huallaga and Pichis-Pachitea) while other coca-growing areas were close to reaching that plateau.\(^1\) The success of alternative development programs relies on the willingness of farmers to reduce coca cultivation and make a long-term commitment to licit agriculture. The 66 percent reduction in coca cultivation between 1996 and 2000 was the result of effective interdiction and eradication but it has been alternative development that sustains that success.

\(^1\) U.S. Embassy briefing. 12 February 2000.
IV. COLOMBIA: A CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

Coca cultivation has skyrocketed in Colombia as a result of successful counternarcotics efforts in Peru. The question that will be addressed in this chapter is whether or not the Government of Colombia (GOC) can repeat Peru’s success in reducing coca cultivation. This chapter will discuss the similarities between Peru and Colombia regarding the threat posed by guerrilla groups and a failing economy to counternarcotics efforts. It will also address Colombia’s counternarcotics strategies of interdiction, eradication and alternative development over the last decade and determine if the lessons learned from counternarcotics efforts in Peru are similar to those learned in Colombia. It will argue that the although the GOC supports vigorous interdiction, eradication and alternative development programs it has not implemented a policy that sequentially eliminates the threats it faces as was the case in Peru. By not doing so, the GOC is faced with conducting an expanding multi-front war with dwindling resources.

B. OBSTACLES TO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS

During the 1990s, several developments increased the obstacles that the GOC has faced in its counternarcotics efforts. First, the explosion of coca cultivation and cocaine production in response to counternarcotics efforts in Peru has outpaced counternarcotics reduction efforts. Second, the elimination of the main drug cartels has caused the decentralization of the drug business into the hands of hundreds of smaller independent traffickers making the elimination of the drug trade extremely difficult. Third, the growth of guerrilla groups and their expanding links to the drug trade have complicated
not only peace negotiations but also the elimination of the drug trade. Fourth, paramilitary groups with ties to the drug trade have increased their drug trafficking and counterinsurgency activities in response to the growth of the guerrillas, thus further complicating counternarcotics efforts while adding fuel to the civil conflict. Lastly, Colombia’s economy is in its first recession in 25 years and the deepest in 70 years, restricting resources to conduct counternarcotics operations while causing many unemployed to seek jobs in guerrilla or paramilitary ranks or in the drug trade. The following sections discuss each of these obstacles in turn.

1. Growth of Coca Cultivation

The expansion of Colombia’s coca cultivation in the 1990s, as a result of successful counternarcotics efforts in Peru, has outpaced counternarcotics efforts to stop the trend. Figure 3.1 shows the rise in coca cultivation in Colombia beginning with a modest increase in 1993 of 2,600 hectares over 1992 levels. In the following six years, as air interdiction, illicit crop eradication, and alternative development programs became more successful in Peru drug traffickers adapted to the government’s pressure by finding alternative locations to grow coca within Peru while also steadily increasing cultivation in Colombia. In response to Peruvian counternarcotics pressure coca cultivation rapidly increased in Colombia from an estimated 45,000 hectares in 1994 to 50,900 hectares in 1995. The area under cultivation increased 16,300 hectares in 1996 to 67,200 and by 1999 an estimated 122,500 hectares were under cultivation.82 This number is anticipated to reach 200,000 hectares in 2000 and possibly 500,000 hectares by 2002. In conjunction

82 Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center. Colombia: 1999 Coca Estimates.
with the jump in coca cultivation and the increased yield of coca leaves, the amount of cocaine produced also increased. As shown in figure 3.2, Colombia produced an estimated 230 metric tons (mt) of cocaine in 1995. This amount increased significantly in four years to an estimated 520 mt by 1999.

Colombia’s coca yields have increased dramatically not only as a result of the increase in coca cultivation area but also due to the introduction of a higher yielding coca plant.\textsuperscript{83} A USG study on coca yields showed that along with the increase in coca cultivation in Western Caqueta and Putumayo Departments from 1987 to 1998, plant samples taken revealed the introduction of Erythroxylum coca variety coca, or “upland” coca in 1996-1997. The ipadu coca variety, commonly referred to as “lowland” or Amazonian coca, had been the dominant variety of coca grown in Colombia (primarily in Guaviare and Eastern Caqueta Departments). Upland coca yields more leaves as well as produces more cocaine alkaloid. Data revealed that lowland coca leaf yields 0.8 metric tons per hectare per year while upland coca leaf yields 1.7 metric tons per year per hectare. The study showed that 400 kilograms of upland coca leaf could produce 1 kilogram of finished cocaine hydrochloride where as it takes 500 kilograms of lowland coca leaf to produce 1 kilogram of finished cocaine hydrochloride. As the cultivation of upland coca spreads and young plants are ready to harvest after a two-year maturation period, along with increasing cocaine-processing efficiency, cocaine production in Colombia will increase by an even greater amount.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{83} Joint memorandum by U.S. Government Crop Experts from the Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. \textit{Colombian Coca Yields: An Update} (CN 99-40010), February 1999.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
2. Narcotraffickers

Narcotraffickers have shown the ability to withstand government efforts to eliminate them while carrying out acts of violence. Strengthened anti-drug policies in the 1980s and 1990s such as increased arrests, extradition, seizures of property, and the destruction of drug laboratories, caused the drug cartels to retaliate with various acts of violence against public officials in an effort to force the government to desist in its war on drugs.  

85 The Medellin cartel alone was reported as sponsoring more than 600 assassinations, including the bombing of a commercial airliner that killed 107 persons and a car bomb in front of the national intelligence service headquarters that killed 60 persons, displaying their resistance to government counternarcotics efforts.  

86 By 1990 the government and drug cartels were at a stalemate, with the government maintaining a hard-line approach to drugs and the drug cartels using terror tactics in retaliation.

The administration of Cesar Gaviria (1990-94) announced a shift in the strategy towards drug traffickers. Instead of direct confrontation with the drug cartels, Gaviria’s government changed its anti-drug strategy to one of appeasement, offering immunity from extradition and reduced sentences to drug traffickers who surrendered and confessed their crimes. Many of the major drug bosses of the Medellin cartel accepted this offer and surrendered by 1992.


With the gradual elimination of the Medellin cartel, the Cali cartel, ignored by the government for years, increased its hold on the drug trade. Unlike the Medellin cartel, however, the Cali cartel avoided acts of violence and instead attempted to pass themselves off as legitimate businessmen. This ploy was initially successful as the Cali cartel generated billions of dollars in drug revenue and remained virtually unchecked.\(^\text{87}\) However, the combined efforts of the Colombian National Police and the United States Drug Enforcement Agency paid off with the collapse of the Cali cartel in 1995.

The collapse of the major cartels opened the door for other experienced drug traffickers to swiftly seize the opportunity to increase their own share of the drug trade. Instead of crippling the drug trade by eliminating the major cartels, the kingpin strategy fragmented the drug trade to many smaller, more elusive drug lords. By mid-1998 the CNP had counted 43 independent trafficking groups centered on the departmental capitals of Medellin and Cali.\(^\text{88}\) The new independent drug traffickers are difficult to track because of their small organizational size and use of legitimate businesses as fronts for their drug operations. In addition, guerrilla and paramilitary groups have stepped into the void left by the cartels, generating hundreds of millions of dollars to fuel their war effort.

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3. Guerrillas

Over the last decade, guerrilla groups have become a serious threat to Colombia’s national security. Additionally, increasing participation in the drug trade by guerrillas has not only provided revenue for their fight, but has become an obstacle to counternarcotics efforts. In 1989 and 1990 under President’s Virgilio Barco (1986-90) and his successor Cesar Gaviria (1990-94), reconciliation between the government and guerrilla groups seemed at hand. Three guerrilla groups, the M-19, EPL, and Quintin Lame, motivated by the governments’ offer’ to participate in the Constitutional Assembly in addition to amnesty, agreed to disarm.89 The M-19’s inclusion in the political system, particularly their role in writing a new constitution, appeared to shepherd in a new political era for Colombia and optimism rose that the two major guerrilla groups, the FARC and ELN, would follow suit. However, opposition to inclusion of guerrilla political parties resulted in the 1990 assassination of the M-19’s presidential candidate. This act of violence added to the murder of nearly 2000 politicians associated with the FARC in the mid 1980s has discouraged the FARC from putting down their weapons to participate in politics.90

The guerrillas escalate their attacks on the government administration of Ernesto Samper (1994-98). Samper’s weak political standing, as a result of his party’s links to drug money discredited his administration, making negotiations with guerrillas virtually

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impossible. Additionally, the government’s support of counterinsurgency paramilitary forces gave the guerrillas another reason to distrust the government.

By 1996, President Samper attempted to end USG criticism over his links to the Cali drug cartel. As a result, counternarcotics efforts by military and police forces accounted for more arrests, drug seizures and illegal crops eradicated than in previous administrations. However, these efforts fueled the conflict between the guerillas and government in two ways. First, guerrilla groups used Samper’s attempts to comply with US counternarcotics goals to discredit his administration by arguing that Colombian anti-drugs policy was subordinate to the US’ anti-drug objectives. Their position was supported when, despite Samper’s counternarcotics successes, the USG decertified Colombia in 1996 and again in 1997. Decertification was based on what the USG called Colombia’s failure to fully cooperate with the US to control illegal drug production and trafficking. Decertifying Colombia was intended to pressure Samper to step-up counternarcotics efforts but instead it demoralized Colombia’s armed and security forces that had been successful bringing down the Cali cartel in 1995. The FARC refused to recognize the legitimacy of Samper’s drug-tainted administration and called for Samper’s ouster before peace negotiations began. The guerrillas seized upon Samper’s political weakness to swell its membership. In response, Samper resorted to renewed militarization of the conflict, supporting paramilitary forces and reigniting the cycle of violence, negotiation, and renewed fighting that had been ongoing since the 1980s.

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91 Melo, 77.
Second, Samper’s counternarcotics efforts posed a threat to one of the guerrilla’s sources of funding. Increasing involvement by guerrillas in the drug trade has often blurred the lines between guerrillas and drug traffickers. Increasing prosperity from the drug business assures the FARC and ELN access to advance technology such as encrypted communications equipment and surface-to-air-missile systems that equal or exceed the military’s capability. Annual income estimates from cultivating, processing, and selling marijuana, cocaine and heroin are between 500 million and 1.5 billion dollars, half of the guerrillas’ annual income. In 1998, guerrilla forces targeting multiple high-profile objectives launched a coordinated and simultaneous general offensive. The escalation in the guerrilla’s capability to wage high-intensity warfare has given the guerrillas a position of strength at the negotiating table from which they have won concessions from the government.

The discrediting of Samper and the subsequent increase in guerrilla forces, in conjunction with the immense accumulation of funds due to the drug trade, has increased the guerrilla’s ability to wage war. Since 1987, the FARC have increased in strength from an estimated 6,000 fighters organized into at least 27 different fronts to approximately 15,000 fighters—the largest guerrilla group in the Western Hemisphere—and operating with as many as 80 fronts throughout Colombia by the end of 1999.


ELN operate primarily in the Northern oil field regions with approximately 5,000 fighters conducting sabotage, extortion, and kidnappings to fund their operations.94 The ELN believe that “...wealth belonging to the Colombian people [and] is looted by American imperialists” and for this reason target primarily foreign businesses.95 From 1986 to 1998 the ELN has conducted an estimated 636 bombings on oil pipelines resulting in a loss of 1.5 billion dollars in revenue.96 From January 1998 to March 1999 an additional 105 attacks against the Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline have been conducted.97

In 1998, President Andreas Pastrana (1998-present) was elected into office on the popular platform of reemphasizing the need for peace negotiations to end the civil war. In particular the negotiations would center on the two primary guerrilla groups, the ELN and FARC. Like Samper before him, Pastrana has had to cope with the increasingly powerful guerrilla threat and the consequences of successful counternarcotics operations in Peru and Bolivia that shifted coca cultivation, processing and production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, particularly to the areas controlled by guerrillas.

A demilitarized zone (DMZ) covering 16,000-17,000 square miles in the departments of Meta and Caqueta in southern Colombia was established in November 1998 by the GOC to facilitate negotiations with the FARC and has been extended


95 Loveman and Davies, 246.


indefinitely as President Pastrana’s peace process is hindered by delays.\textsuperscript{98} This sign of good faith by Pastrana was a precondition to conducting peace negotiations, though the military and other skeptics opposed any forfeiture of territory to the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{99} In 1999, as shown in figure 3.3, much of the coca cultivation and cocaine production occurred in the outlaying departments of Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo in southern Colombia as well as two additional growing areas in Norte de Santander and San Lucas departments in Northern Colombia, although there are smaller amounts of coca grown in many areas. Figure 3.3 also shows that the DMZ is situated on the border of primary coca growing areas in Guaviare and Caqueta. In 1999, the CIA located approximately 1,800 hectares of new coca growth in La Macarena that lies within the DMZ. The discovery of new coca growth within the FARC-controlled DMZ shows the guerrillas are expanding their position in the lucrative drug trade while continuing to defend coca growers against eradication efforts. Negotiations have been suspended numerous times by both sides and “[p]olls indicate that a vast majority of Colombians dislike the group [FARC] and regard it as nothing but a terrorist band interested in increasing its take from drug trafficking.”\textsuperscript{100} The FARC continues to emphasize its demands for agrarian reform, increased social spending by the government, and reform of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{101}


\textsuperscript{101} Chernick, 166.
In 1999, representatives of Colombian society met with the ELN in hopes of reaching an agreement on ending the violence. An agreement was made to schedule periodic meetings between the government and ELN to discuss peace and social issues. In an effort to bring the ELN to the peace negotiation table the Pastrana administration has explored the possibility of a second DMZ in northern Colombia where the ELN operate. Ironically the location of the second DMZ is situated in the coca-growing region near San Lucas.

Guerrilla involvement in the drug trade has provided them with funding that has allowed them to greatly expand their ranks and given them the strength to control 40 percent of Colombia’s territory. Their increased strength over the last decade has provided them with leverage to win concessions like the DMZ from the government, thus giving the guerrillas a safe haven from which to consolidate their operations while continuing to extract large amounts of money from the drug trade that helps fuel their fight. Guerrilla protection of coca growers, drug traffickers and their own drug operations has hindered government counternarcotics efforts, endangering eradication teams and threatening alternative development programs.

4. Paramilitary Forces

Unlike Peru, the GOC also has to contend with paramilitary forces that not only target guerrillas but are also participating in the drug trade. In response to the failure of government forces to eliminate guerrilla groups, local communities with the endorsement and support of the government, took it upon themselves to band together to form self-defense (paramilitary) groups “…filling the vacuum created by the state’s weak capacity
to counter the insurgent threat.”102 Since official sanctioning of paramilitary groups in 1965, government support for these forces has been inconsistent.

During their first twenty years, paramilitary forces were trained and equipped by the government to augment the GOC’s counterinsurgency effort. By 1989 and the expansion of the drug trade, paramilitary forces, like guerrillas, were participating in the drug trade by providing protection to drug traffickers. Their participation in the drug trade brought them into conflict with government counternarcotics efforts and resulted in their being outlawed by the GOC. During Samper’s administration, government support for paramilitary forces resumed in order to counter the increased strength of guerrillas. An ultra right-wing paramilitary group known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia, formed in the 1980s by Carlos Castaño, went on the offensive in the late 1990s, rooting out and combating guerrilla groups, most often by targeting civilians thought to be sympathetic to guerrillas.

In 1998, ties between government armed forces and paramilitaries once again were officially severed when President Pastrana signed accords that pitted government armed forces against illegal paramilitary groups in an effort to afford protection to civilians and stem mounting human rights violations.103 Human rights groups regularly condemn paramilitary organizations for the atrocities they commit in the course of fighting guerrilla groups or while conducting drug related activities. It has been reported


that is not unusual for paramilitary troops to enter a village or town and drag citizens from their homes and workplaces after consulting a list of guerrilla sympathizers. Those found guilty of supporting the guerrilla cause are almost always executed, either immediately or later somewhere in the jungle.\textsuperscript{104} According to Human Rights Watch, "...76 percent of human rights abuses in Colombia are committed by paramilitary forces...".\textsuperscript{105} Colombian army figures estimate that in the first seven months of 1999, paramilitaries murdered 361 people accused of aiding guerrillas.\textsuperscript{106}

Despite the official severing of ties and their participation in the drug trade, guerrilla groups and other critics assert that elements in the government or armed forces continue to sponsor the AUC with weapons and intelligence information.\textsuperscript{107} Recently the Colombian government has publicly denounced paramilitary groups, and has issued several warrants for the arrest of their leaders. However, decisive action by the government against paramilitary groups has yet to transpire the way it has against guerrilla groups and drug traffickers, raising speculation that elements within the government, particularly the military, still support paramilitary groups.\textsuperscript{108} To counter these charges President Pastrana, in December 1999, fired four generals linked to


\textsuperscript{106} Saavedra, 5.


paramilitary massacres in an effort to show his commitment to ending illegal government association with paramilitary groups.109

Opinion concerning the use of paramilitaries in the civil conflict varies depending on one's position in the government. Armed Forces Commander General Fernando Tapias and other high-ranking military and government officials publicly group the paramilitaries into the same category as guerrillas, stating that paramilitary groups are operating outside of the law. Others, mostly local military commanders, consider the paramilitary groups as allies against the threat of guerrilla attacks. In 1999, paramilitary forces were estimated to number between 5,000-7,000 and control an estimated 15 percent of Colombia's territory. However, AUC leader Carlos Castaño, head of the largest paramilitary organization, has said his forces number 11,200 and possess Cessna aircraft, cargo planes, and helicopters.110 As depicted in figure 3.4, the operating areas of the AUC in 1999 primarily overlap that of the FARC and ELN making the AUC a potentially valuable government ally against guerrilla groups. However, the AUC has been accused of being directly involved in the processing and transportation of cocaine, further complicating the government's counternarcotics efforts.111 Castaño denies his group's involvement in the transportation of cocaine but he freely admits that his

109 Andersen, 2.

110 Serafino, 11.

organization collects taxes from coca producers as well as traffickers. It is estimated that revenue generated from this business finances 70 percent of the AUC's operations.\textsuperscript{112}

Paramilitary participation in the drug trade has added another obstacle to government counternarcotics efforts. As the government prepares to go on the offensive to reduce the drug trade, paramilitary forces providing protection to drug traffickers will likely encounter government forces. Depending on the level of commitment the paramilitaries have towards protecting this source of revenue, the government will not only have to eliminate guerrillas but paramilitary forces as well if eradication and alternative development is to be successful.

5. **Declining Economy**

The decline in Colombia's economy is the result of overspending during the Samper administration and the increasing guerrilla violence. Samper's attempts to gain support for his crisis ridden administration through civic action programs failed to curb the increase in guerilla support while creating a fiscal imbalance that the Pastrana administration has been unable to correct. Increasing guerrilla attacks on domestic and international business has caused an exodus of domestic and foreign revenue further straining the country's resources and its ability to fund counternarcotics efforts.

As in Peru, poverty in Colombia has played a major role in the amount of support guerrilla groups and drug traffickers received from the population. During the 1980s up to 70 percent of the rural population and 35 percent of Colombia's urban population were reported to be living in a state of poverty. To improve their economic situation many of

\textsuperscript{112} Serafino, 12.
the impoverished turned to the drug trade for employment. During this period an estimated 500,000 out of a total population of 30 million people depended on the drug trade for a living.\textsuperscript{113} Colombia, unlike Peru, was economically healthy and less dependent on the drug economy through the 1980s and early 1990s with a reported GNP of US$ 40 billion annually and approximately US$ 6 billion earned through foreign exchange. By 1990 the drug economy had increased its share of Colombia’s total export earnings to between US$ 900 million and US$ 1.3 billion, or about 20 percent.\textsuperscript{114} The drug trade in Peru, on the other hand, represented between 30 to 40 percent of the country’s export earnings until the early 1990s.

Like Peruvian President Fujimori, Colombian President Gaviria saw the state of Colombia’s economy as the pivotal point to defeating both the guerrillas and drug traffickers in the early 1990s. It was from Colombia’s economically weak sectors that guerrilla groups and drug traffickers found their recruits. In response to a plea for increased economic assistance by Colombia, Bolivia and Peru at the Cartagena II summit held in 1991, the USG passed the Andean Trade Preference Act in late 1991 that reduced US tariffs on US$ 325 million worth of imports from the region. However, by the end of 1993, 46 percent of Colombia’s population still lived in poverty. Guerrilla groups used this point and the fact that millions of Colombians still did not have basic necessities such as potable water as a way to recruit new members. Despite President Gaviria’s efforts to boost Colombia’s economy by lowering tariffs from 53 percent to 12 percent, privatizing

\textsuperscript{113} Clawson and Lee, 17.

\textsuperscript{114} Menzel, Cocaine Quagmire, 12.
state-owned companies, and the easing of restrictions on foreign investments causing it to double in two years, the poor remained unaffected.\textsuperscript{115}

Colombia’s economy was also damaged by activities conducted by guerrilla groups. Destruction of oil pipelines throughout the 1990s accounted for hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenue as well as repair costs. In 1992 and 1993 alone bombing of oil pipelines accounted for the loss of 29,400 and 80,000 barrels, respectively, of oil per day of the approximate 240,000 barrels being produced per day.\textsuperscript{116} Guerrilla attacks on foreign companies also made Colombia a less attractive investment opportunity. Kidnapping of foreign businessmen as well as Colombians that could be ransomed also caused many foreign businesses to reconsider investment in Colombia while many Colombians fled the country to avoid the rising wave of kidnappings. In 1999, abductions increased 33 percent over 1998 levels, once again giving Colombia the dubious honor of being the world record holder of kidnappings.\textsuperscript{117}

In 1999, despite the government’s decade-long effort to privatize many public-sector entities and liberalize trade and financial activity, Colombia’s economy has been suffering through its first economic recession in 25 years and the deepest in 70 years. For the first time in its modern history Colombia experienced a negative growth of 6 percent in 1999 while unemployment peaked at 20 percent, a record high, although it had

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 144.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 133.

declined to 18.1 percent by the end of the year.\textsuperscript{118} Factors that contributed to the current recession began during the Samper administration. After four years of economic liberalization Samper practically ended the process for two years (1994-1996) in an effort to reduce some of the economic dislocation caused by the rapid change. At the same time the \textit{Salto Social} program, targeting Colombia’s poor, who constituted over a third of the population, was initiated. The program provided pork barrel projects to Congressional representatives who were voting on whether or not to keep Samper in office. The funds were to be used for infrastructure projects in the areas of health, education and housing, which aimed at creating jobs and increasing public services over a four-year period. Increased spending in conjunction with tax revenue shortfall resulted in the government operating with a budget deficit during 1995 and 1996. The policy of deficit spending kept interest rates high, contributing to the slowdown in economic growth in 1996. Unemployment increased dramatically as the economy slowed, reaching 15.9 percent by the end of 1998. The Pastrana administration has attempted to strengthen Colombia’s economy by seeking support from the IMF. However, as recession weakened government revenues, the fiscal deficit continued to widen from 3.9 percent of GDP in 1998 to 6.2 percent GDP in 1999.\textsuperscript{119}

The loss of foreign investment and raising unemployment levels in the wake of a declining economy has driven thousands to seek employment in the drug industry or


enter the ranks of guerrilla and paramilitary groups increasing the security risk to the Colombian government. The severity of Colombia’s economic crisis has fueled and bolstered the country’s guerrillas, whose criminal actions (kidnapping, extortion, and sabotage) have aggravated the country’s economic decline. Additionally, Colombia’s economic instability raises doubt as to the ability of the GOC to raise the US$ 4 billion it has pledged for Plan Colombia, though the US Embassy officials expect Colombia to try and raise some of the funds through international loans.120

In sum, the obstacles to counternarcotics efforts have increased greatly since the beginning of the Samper administration in 1994. Coca cultivation has increased dramatically as a result of a shift in cultivation from Peru to Colombia and higher yielding coca plants, outpacing counternarcotics efforts. The decentralized nature of drug trafficking organizations as well as their adaptability to counternarcotics efforts have caused the number of drug trafficking organizations to expand, to include guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The increasing participation of guerrillas in the drug trade has resulted in a physically powerful, financially secure threat that not only hinders counternarcotics efforts but endangers the security of the state. Likewise the increasing involvement of paramilitary forces in the drug trade could pit allies in the counterinsurgency war against each other in future counternarcotics efforts. Compounding the problems facing the government’s counternarcotics efforts is an economy in decline, making participation in the drug trade a viable economic option for

thousands of Colombians who are unemployed and raising doubt as to the government’s ability to fund its counternarcotics efforts.

C. COLOMBIA’S COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGIES

As was the case in Peru, a multi-pronged approach to fighting the drug trade has been implemented in Colombia. Interdiction, alternative development, and eradication have been three of the primary counternarcotics strategies used in Colombia since the late 1970s that continue to be used in the 1990s. In conjunction with these three strategies, aggressive law enforcement targeting the heads of the major Colombian cartels has also been used in an attempt to eliminate the drug industry. As already noted, this strategy had the unintended consequence of creating more, though smaller, drug trafficking networks as well as increased the participation of guerrilla groups that have expanded the drug trade in Colombia. The other three strategies—interdiction, alternative development, and eradication—have also failed to reduce the drug trade in Colombia. This section attempts to explain why these three strategies succeeded in Peru but not in Colombia. An understanding of the reasons behind the lack of success is necessary because a significant emphasis as well as amount of resources embodied in Plan Colombia is devoted to these three strategies.

Colombia’s lack of success with interdiction, alternative development, and eradication of the trade can be attributed to several factors. First, interdiction efforts have been hampered by the GOC’s limited identification capability and the number of available surveillance assets to detect drug flights, a no-shoot-down policy to deter traffickers, and the ability of drug traffickers to adapt transportation and routes to defeat interdiction efforts. However, even if interdiction operations were carried out
successfully, they would not have the same impact in Colombia as in Peru because of peculiarities of the coca market in Colombia. Second, alternative development programs that rely on the government’s ability to provide a viable economic alternative to the illicit drug trade have been hindered by the ineffectiveness of interdiction to lower coca prices, the inability of the government to provide a secure environment in disputed coca-growing areas, and the lack of funding due to Colombia’s economic decline. Third, eradication efforts have been unable to keep pace with the boom in coca growth due in part to the shift in cultivation from Peru to Colombia, guerrilla and peasant resistance to eradication, and the lack of adequate spray techniques and equipment.

1. Interdiction

Interdiction of drug traffickers in Colombia was intended to have the same effect as it eventually did in Peru: the lowering of coca prices within regional growing areas to a low enough level that farmers would abandon coca fields and turn to licit crop substitution. However, in Colombia only 10 percent of the coca leaf is transported by air outside of the coca field to be processed. The majority of coca leaf is processed into cocaine in the same area in which it is grown making interdiction of coca leaf virtually impossible.\footnote{Peter Felsted, Flows Analyst, Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center telephone interview by author. 15 November 2000, Washington, D.C.} Without creating a glut of coca leaf that would lower the price farmers received, there is little economic incentive to stop growing coca.

Additionally, interdiction was intended to raise the cost drug traffickers paid to conduct their business by seizing or destroying processing equipment, transportation assets, and personal property. However, as the increase in coca cultivation over the last
decade attests, interdiction has not worked. Aside from seizing a fractional amount of the total cocaine produced and shipped to the US and Europe as well as basically harassing drug traffickers by destroying or seizing property, interdiction has produced no long-term successes in Colombia’s drug fight.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s air, river, maritime and land interdiction operations have consisted of a series of joint cross-border operations between Colombia and its neighbors as well as interdiction efforts within the “transit zones” of the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. For these operations the USG has provided intelligence to target laboratories, airstrips and transportation routes in addition to coordinating interdiction efforts with Colombian military and police. Though interdiction efforts disrupted the flow of cocaine transported through Colombia for short periods of time, intercepts of cocaine shipments are estimated to account for only 5 percent total amount of cocaine being transshipped.122

Interdiction in Colombia has had moments of tactical success such as between 1989 and 1993 when the GOC, supported by the USG, conducted surge operations called Support Justice, Support Justice II, Support Justice III and Support Justice IV. Each operation was conducted over a period of several months with the intent of disrupting or cutting off drug trafficker’s flight routes, similar to operations conducted in Peru. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) surveillance assets as well as Colombian air controllers and US Customs’ aircraft provided both ground and air intelligence on drug production and transshipment operations in addition to detecting and monitoring

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122 Menzel, Cocaine Quagmire, 45.
trafficking networks. These assets provided an accurate picture of drug trafficker’s flight patterns that led to the interdiction and capture of 42 out of approximately 1,700 probable trafficker aircraft between 1991 and 1992. The low number of aircraft seized can be attributed to a number of factors.

First, the start of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 resulted in the withdrawal of all US AWACs aerial surveillance platforms for approximately six months hampering counternarcotics detection and tracking capabilities. The shortage of aerial surveillance platforms throughout the 1990s would continue to plague counternarcotics efforts throughout Latin America.

Second, Colombia’s refusal to amend the restrictions imposed by the Chicago Agreement on Colombian Air Force (FAC) pilots prohibited the shoot down of drug flights. Subscribing countries to the Chicago Agreement agreed not to shoot down any aircraft flying over their respective airspace unless the aircraft provoked an attack. Peru, unlike Colombia, did not subscribe to the Chicago Agreement and shot down any suspected trafficking aircraft. This meant that the FAC had to employ non-lethal means to force drug trafficking aircraft down. Of the 42 aircraft captured between six and ten were reported as forced down by the FAC while the remaining aircraft were intercepted already on the ground. This policy would change in March 1994 when the GOC modified the Chicago Agreement to allow the FAC to shoot down suspected trafficking aircraft that failed to file a certified flight plan, disregarded radio communications and ignored instructions to land for inspection. However in May 1994, the USG, with no prior warning or coordination with its Andean partners, stopped providing intelligence

123 Ibid., 102.
data from its radars and aerial platforms for approximately six months. Concerned about the possibility that US intelligence might cause a shoot down of a civilian aircraft and thus create a human rights uproar against the US triggered the response.\textsuperscript{124} This action, undertaken only two months after the GOC had authorized the FAC to shoot down suspected drug aircraft that did not meet certain criteria, further hindered the FAC’s ability to intercept suspected drug traffickers.

Third, as in Peru, drug traffickers had the ability to thwart interdiction efforts by altering their method of operations. Despite only a small number of trafficking aircraft actually being interdicted the drug traffickers responded by altering their flight profile and routes in order to maintain the flow of drugs. As in Peru, after 1991 nighttime drug flights steadily increased to take advantage of the FAC’s inability to interdict at night. Drug flights during the day flew close to treetop levels to avoid radar detection. Drug traffickers also developed new trafficking routes in Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina and Chile. In an effort to combat the expanding trafficking routes, Support Justice III and IV used available intelligence to coordinate air, land and riverine interdiction efforts along the Peru, Ecuador and Colombian border. To assist in the coordination effort liaison officers from Peru, Ecuador and Colombia frequently flew in SOUTHCOM sponsored aerial surveillance aircraft.

During the same period Support Justice operations were underway in 1991 and 1992, effective air interdiction efforts occurred between the Peru to Colombia north-south air corridors by the FAC, supported by USSOUTHCOM radars and aerial surveillance platforms, disrupting the flow of drug traffickers. This in turn caused traffickers to alter

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 141-142
their method of transportation as well as their flight profile. Rather than risk interdiction, some drug traffickers switched to maritime routes causing a reduction in the number of flights flying into and out of Colombian airspace. Other traffickers continued to fly but adapted to aggressive air interdiction efforts by shortening their supply lines from Peru and jumping from airfield to airfield limiting their visibility to radar. Between 1997 and 1999 the FAC had improved it interdiction rate from 25 percent to 40 percent due to improved training techniques and the amount of available surveillance assets. In 1997, 231 flights were detected. However, by 1999 that number had fallen to less than 100 flights, indicating that drug traffickers were once again adapting the method of transportation increasing their reliance on maritime and ground transportation or improving their ability to remain undetected.

Indications that interdiction efforts were having an impact on the cocaine trade, at least temporarily, was the fact that during the first quarter of 1991 a kilogram of cocaine sold for US$ 25,000 on US streets, but that towards the end of the year the price had dropped back again to between US$ 14,000 to US$ 23,000 per kilogram. The price jump was the result of DEA’s Operation Snowcap that resulted in the capture of 53 mt of cocaine, 700,000 gallons of precursor chemicals, and the destruction of 300 processing labs (29 were considered major cocaine refining facilities) in 1990.125 However, even though interdiction has had an impact on the method of transporting coca products as well as a temporary effect on the price of cocaine, the overall number of aircraft continuing to transport drugs has not diminished over the decade and is estimated to be

125 Ibid., 88-90.
between 1,300 to 3,000 annually posing a daunting task for surveillance and interdiction assets.\textsuperscript{126}

Riverine interdiction operations patrolling Colombia’s 26 major river arteries also helped to disrupt drug trafficking. The USG built and supported riverine operations base at San Jose del Guaviare on the Guaviare River was the staging point for Colombian Navy and Marine assault units. These units numbering approximately 10,000 personnel used a variety of ocean going coastal patrol vessels, fast moving assault boats and occasionally helicopters conducted successful attacks on cocaine processing labs along the Putumayo, Orinoco, Atrato, and Arauca Rivers. Confrontations between the US Navy special operations forces trained Colombian riverine forces and the FARC guerrilla groups also occurred on the inland waterways. Exactly how much of Colombia’s river system is used to ply the drug trade is uncertain but in 1996 it was estimated that 15 tons (20 percent) or more of cocaine moved along the Orinoco River’s 150 tributaries and 3,000 channels to the Atlantic Ocean.\textsuperscript{127}

Interdiction efforts have been unable to create the same success as realized in Peru for a number of reasons. First, Peruvian interdiction efforts were eventually refined to focus on a specific air corridor that, when broken, caused coca leaf prices to plummet. This in turn gave coca farmers an economic incentive to cultivate alternative crops. However, the shifting of coca cultivation to Colombia has significantly affected the impact of air interdiction on coca cultivation. Because the majority of coca cultivation and processing occur in the same area, a limited amount of coca leaf trafficking is

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 115.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 116.
conducted by air. Thus interdiction does not affect the price of coca leaf and give coca farmers an economic incentive to find alternative crops.

Second, though interdiction is necessary in order to disrupt the flow of cocaine, drug traffickers have learned to overcome interdiction efforts by finding routes and methods of transporting their product that makes them difficult to identify from legal commercial air traffic. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, it is extremely difficult to identify drug flights and flight patterns due to the target density in Colombia's airspace. Unlike Peru where flights crossing the Peruvian border could be suspected of trafficking drugs if there were no official flight plan filed or the route and profile fit a known pattern for drug flights, drug flights in Colombia usually remain within Colombian airspace and are difficult to distinguish from domestic legal flights. Given the large number of domestic flights in Colombia, "less than .5 percent of Colombia’s domestic flights are potential drug traffickers."¹²⁸ In other words, identifying a drug flight in Colombia is akin to the old adage of trying to find a needle in a haystack.

Third, the growth of coca cultivation and production in Colombia as a result of counternarcotics success in Peru has outpaced the GOC’s ability to stop the transportation of drugs. Despite successes in interdiction in 1991 and 1998, the shifting of coca cultivation to Colombia has concurrently increased the amount of cocaine being produced. Added to this increase the ability of drug traffickers to adapt to government interdiction efforts and the success of 1991 and 1998 appear hollow.

Fourth, in addition to the remoteness of coca cultivation and production, the threat of guerrilla groups has hindered interdiction efforts. As the case was in Peru during the
early 1990s, guerrilla forces have protected the drug trade in their territory. Over the last decade guerrilla forces in Colombia have damaged, and on at least one occasion shot down, interdiction aircraft. As Colombia’s economy has weakened, the GOC has been hard pressed to commit the resources necessary to combat the combined threat of drug traffickers and guerilla forces involved in the drug trade.\textsuperscript{129}

Without a successful interdiction effort to create an environment that welcomes an alternative to the illicit drug trade, it is unlikely that alternative development programs will be able to be as effective as those in Peru.

2. Alternative Development

Alternative development programs rely on creating an environment that is ready for change. Interdiction efforts in Peru created such an environment by reducing the price coca farmers received for coca leaves making crop substitution and coca field abandonment attractive options. Neither a successful interdiction effort nor a viable alternative development program has been realized in Colombia.

As in Peru, organized coca farmers in Colombia have protested government eradication efforts because there have been no economically viable alternative crops that compare to marijuana, coca and poppy plants. In addition to the lack of competitive licit crops, the remoteness of drug-growing regions, the lack of infrastructure, and the expense of transporting licit products to market from the coca growing areas make it less likely that farmers will shift away from coca. The presence of guerrilla and paramilitary forces

\textsuperscript{128} Adrian "Zek" Wolfberg and Thomas F. Villacres, Intelligence Analysts, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Office for Counterdrug Analysis interviewed by author. 27 June 2000, Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{129} INCSRs 1993-1999.
in areas where alternative development would take place is also an obstacle to these efforts. Despite this, alternative development efforts by the GOC, with USAID support, continue to be one of the major strategies for reducing illicit crops since the GOC initiated the National Plan for Alternative Development (PNDA) in 1995. In an address to the US House Committee on Government Reform in February 2000, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, General Barry McCaffrey singled out alternative development programs as "...a key factor in recent, record-level reductions in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia...it is imperative to expand our efforts to provide licit economic opportunities in all three of the coca source countries...".

Alternative development efforts in Colombia are similar to the stick and carrot approach used in Peru. The GOC offers coca farmers economic incentives if they choose to switch to licit crop cultivation that could help maintain the farmer’s standard of living. Those farmers that continued to grow coca would face criminal charges as well as lose their coca crop, their land, and any equipment used to farm coca. To fund their economic incentive program $150 million had been designated in 1994 for alternative crop substitution.

In 1996, the GOCs four-year alternative development program PLANTE (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo), approved in 1994 became operational. The program

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included matching funding of $2.5 million from the UNDCP and GOC as well as a loan of $94 million from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The goal of PLANTE was to assist approximately 35,000 small farmers substitute approximately 30,000 hectares of illicit crops. Since 1996, PLANTE has assisted peasant farmers cultivating illicit crops on 1-3 hectare plots to switch to licit agriculture after eradication had destroyed their crops. PLANTE also provided nearly $7 million in credits to over 2,000 peasant families.\textsuperscript{132} Though the PLANTE credits helped ease the suffering of many peasant farmers and some began to farm licit crops, reports from a variety of sources revealed that a majority of peasant farmers would simply take the credits, move to a new location and begin planting coca using the credits given to them by the government.\textsuperscript{133}

In 1998, with the inauguration of President Andres Pastrana a new national drug control strategy was issued that placed new emphasis on alternative development. Like previous alternative development programs, Pastrana’s Integrated Drug Policy for Peace program focused on assisting peasant farmers to switch to licit agriculture and away from illicit crops, thus depriving guerrilla groups a major source of funding and increasing their receptiveness to peace negotiations. However, as in Peru, alternative development programs rely on three factors in order to be effective. First, the area in which alternative development is to take place has to be free of guerrilla and paramilitary forces. Second, alternative crops must be able to compete economically with illicit crops. Third, alternative development funds need to be available and delivered in a timely manner. To

\textsuperscript{132} INCSR 1996.

\textsuperscript{133} Various U.S. Government Officials and Dr. Bruce Bagley, Professor of International Studies, University of Miami interviewed by author. June and September 2000, Washington, D.C. and Miami.
date these factors have not been realized and have been a factor in delaying the implementation of Plan Colombia originally scheduled to begin in the fall of 2000. However, this does not mean that there are no alternative development programs underway in Colombia. USAID Officials in Colombia can point to at least one community in the Putumayo department where the program has been effective in reducing illicit coca and poppy cultivation, though this effort should be seen for what it is, a drop in very large bucket.\textsuperscript{134}

3. **Eradication**

Despite increased eradication efforts in the 1990s, they were unable to keep pace with burgeoning cultivation after 1993 (see Figure 3.5). In addition, resistance from guerrilla groups who control large coca-growing regions and coca farmers who rely on coca to make a living have hampered eradication efforts.

Coca eradication became a serious concern when cultivation increased from an estimated 22,960 hectares in 1987 to 41,000 hectares in 1990.\textsuperscript{135} After a three-year reduction in coca cultivation from 1990 to 1992 totaling less than 3,000 hectares, due mostly to the outbreak of an anti-coca fungus, the amount of coca cultivation has skyrocketed from 39,700 hectares in 1993 to 122,500 hectares in 1999. Coca eradication

\textsuperscript{134} USAID provided $15 million in August 1999 to farmers to end their coca and poppy cultivation and switch to raising cattle for dairy products, plant heart of palm plants in order to produce palm oil, and replanting forests to harvest rare timber. It was reported that 10-15 percent of operating cost went towards providing security for these operations.; Harry Wing, Director, Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo, USAID interview by author. 28 June 2000, Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{135} INCSR 1996.
has been hindered by poor aerial eradication techniques, the presence of guerrillas in coca-growing areas, and peasant protests.

In 1994 President Ernesto Samper’s attempt to distance himself from allegations that his presidential campaign was funded, at least in part, by drug money resulted in his intensification of Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts. Coca eradication from 1994 through 1997 totaled 28,260 hectares, a significant increase over the 4,954 hectares destroyed in the previous seven years. Yet the total area under cultivation rose from 44,700 hectares in 1994 to 79,500 hectares in 1997 far outpacing these efforts and making Colombia the world’s leader in coca cultivation.\(^{136}\)

Increased eradication was the result of the GOC’s 1994 decision to authorize the CNP to begin aerial spraying of the herbicide *glyphosate* against coca crops instead of manual eradication. With this change in policy, coca eradication jumped from 793 hectares in 1993 to 4,910 hectares in 1994.\(^{137}\) In 1996 and 1997, despite USG decertification, counternarcotics aid grew to an estimated $100 million, a five-fold increase between 1996 and 1997. Along with the increased funding, eradication of coca plants during those years also increased from 5,600 hectares in 1996 to 19,000 hectares in 1997. The CNP was able to increase the amount of coca area sprayed in 1998 (65,000 hectares) by approximately 50 percent from that of 1997, and in 1999 an additional 50,000 hectares was destroyed. However, aerial spraying does not mean that all the plants sprayed have been eradicated as shown by the increase in coca cultivation by 28 percent in 1998 to 101,800 hectares and an additional 20 percent in 1999 to 122,500

\(^{136}\) INCSR 1999.

\(^{137}\) INCSR 1996.
According to the CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center, aerial spraying often is affected by poor weather that dilutes the herbicide or washes it off, over spray that misses the coca fields, and overlapping spray that saturates one area while barely touching another area. Over spray and overlapping spray can be overcome by improved spraying technique.\(^{139}\)

In 2000, the GOC has set a goal to destroy 75,000 hectares of coca. This ambitious goal however is faced with a shortage of spray planes and escort helicopters that often are diverted to other missions or unable to fly due to poor weather conditions. Civil unrest in coca growing areas and frequent ground fire attacks on spray planes also continue to hinder eradication efforts. Eradication efforts through July 2000 have accounted for approximately 25,000 hectares and are likely to fall short of projected goals. In addition, coca cultivation is projected to rise to 200,000 hectares in 2000 and may reach 500,000 hectares by 2002 if expansion continues at it current rate.\(^{140}\)

The inability of the GOC to control large portions of its territory is a major to obstacle eradication, in contrast to Peru where the government eliminated the guerrilla threat prior to eradication efforts. With most coca cultivation occurring in guerrilla-held territory in Colombia, eradication teams faced extremely hazardous conditions and have to be supported by the heavily armed Colombia Army (COLAR) and CNP personnel. The threat to government eradication forces by guerrilla groups was so great that the

\(^{138}\) INCSR 1999.

\(^{139}\) Jason Page interviewed by author.

eradication forces could not stay in the field more than two days without risking guerrilla attacks. The threat to government eradication teams by guerrilla forces was noted during Operation Splendor when three helicopters had been shot down and twelve others damaged while conducting fumigation in 1994. An additional consequence of not maintaining a government presence in areas that have been eradicated is the reconstitution of coca fields and labs after government forces depart.

Guerrilla attacks against government forces were not only intended to reduce the government’s ability to conduct eradication but also to draw more government assets away from counternarcotics efforts leaving the financially lucrative coca fields undamaged and able to support the insurgency’s efforts. Additionally, limiting government presence in coca-growing areas enables guerrillas to protect their source of recruits as well as provide maneuvering room for guerrilla forces to operate.

The final obstacle to government eradication efforts has been farmer protests. Eradication not only destroy the farmer’s means of making a living, but in the case of herbicides, could also damage the environment making it impossible to grow any crops. Protestors have been supported by guerrilla forces fearing eradication efforts would deprive them of a very lucrative source of funding.

In Colombia, protests to government eradication efforts occurred in both 1994 and 1995. During that period approximately 20,000 coca farmers in the Guaviare department, supported by armed FARC guerrillas, protested the government’s aerial fumigation program. During the confrontations two CNP helicopters were forced to the ground by small arms fire. The government dispatched a commission to the department to facilitate negotiations with the farmers. The commission reached an agreement whereby
individual farmers were authorized to grow up to three hectares (7.5 acres) of coca without fear of government fumigation.\textsuperscript{141} The agreement to basically legalize coca cultivation undermined eradication efforts in hopes of reducing the amount of support guerrillas were receiving from dissatisfied peasant farmers. Despite the government’s agreement, peasant farmers continued to protest in an effort to totally halt government fumigation. Protests spread to the Putumayo department where roads were blocked to several villages and US$ 2.5 million in lost revenue was reported due to damage caused to an oil pumping station. Government promises to fully fund crop substitution fell on deaf ears as farmers refused to switch to licit crops.

In response to failed negotiations with peasant protesters, as well as USG pressure to increase eradication efforts, the GOC announced a two-year plan to destroy all coca and poppy in Colombia. The implementation of Operation Splendor, a $300 million eradication and crop substitution effort, began in mid-1994. This operation effectively nullified the government’s earlier agreement with coca farmers and inflamed peasant protests throughout southern Colombia. The USG increased its support to the effort by providing twelve additional fumigation airplanes, helicopters and glyphosate herbicide.

Eradication efforts intensified in 1995 in Colombia’s southern departments and particularly in Putumayo department along the Ecuadorian border where a US$ 45 million effort to eliminate coca plantations was implemented. Protests by coca farmers supported by FARC guerrilla forces continues through mid-1996, but the GOC held firm in its eradication policy while also offering some negotiating room for those farmers that were willing to switch to alternative crops. Besides the stepped-up eradication policy that

\textsuperscript{141} INCSR 1994.

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threatened the livelihood of many farmers, protests against the government were also based on the government’s failure to provide previously promised crop substitution funding. In the Caqueta department an estimated 75,000 farmers protested against the government. This brought more promises by the government for further funding of crop substitution, improved health care and education, and other public works projects. The government initiated a program that supported both its eradication policy and alternative crop policy by offering to pay coca farmers US$ 2,300 for each hectare that was eradicated. An additional US$ 1,800 was to be given to each farmer that switched to licit farming in order to cover the period required for the new licit crops to grow and be marketed.\footnote{Menzel, Cocaine Quagmire, 161.} In spite of these attempts to persuade coca farmers to shift to licit agriculture, protests and demonstrations by coca farmers have continued through 2000.

D. SUMMARY

Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts have not realized the same success as those achieved in Peru. In fact, Colombia has undergone a 140 percent growth in coca cultivation since 1995 greatly outpacing counternarcotics efforts. Concomitantly with the growth in coca cultivation, the amount of cocaine produced in Colombia has increased from 230 mt in 1995 to 520 mt in 1999, a 126 percent increase. The increase in cocaine production has occurred in part because of the shift in coca cultivation from Peru to Colombia and because of higher yielding coca plants.

Several reasons can be given as to why Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts have been ineffective. First, unlike Peru, interdiction efforts in Colombia have virtually no
impact on coca leaf prices. This is because the cultivation and processing of coca occurs within a small area reducing the need to transport coca leaves by air, as was the case in Peru. The inability to lower coca leaf prices to levels that make alternative crops an economically viable option for coca farmers gives them little incentive to switch.

Second, interdiction is necessary to disrupt the flow of cocaine, but as was the case in Peru, drug traffickers have adapted to interdiction efforts by altering transportation routes and methods effectively circumventing government efforts to disrupt the flow of cocaine. The lack of a robust surveillance capability to detect and track domestic drug flights in Colombia has added to the difficulty of simply identifying potential drug flights. Even with occasional successes, drug traffickers have used Colombia’s extensive river system as well as land routes to maintain the flow of drugs. Once again, limited resources and the adaptability of drug traffickers have caused the government to be reactive to drug traffickers, giving them the advantage of setting the time, place, and method of transporting their product.

Third, the use of aerial spraying to eradicate large areas of coca should have given the Colombian government some measure of success compared to what was experienced by the Peruvian government and their use of manual eradication. However, since eradication occurred prior to the success of interdiction efforts in lowering coca prices and the effective administration of alternative development programs capitalizing on lower coca prices in Peru, Colombian coca farmers simply moved to new areas outside of the spray zone and started anew. The lack of a viable economic alternative development program gives coca farmers and others in the drug industry no incentive not to start new coca fields or return to previously eradicated fields.
Fourth, the success of the Peruvian government in eliminating the threat of guerrilla groups was crucial to counternarcotics efforts. The Colombian government, on the other hand, has promoted the process of a negotiated settlement with guerrilla groups in an effort to end four decades of violence. While a negotiated settlement may save lives in the short term it has also given the guerrillas the opportunity to grow in strength and influence making them a larger threat to the stability of the government in the long run. The policy has also provided the guerrillas the time to expand their participation in the drug trade that provides them with the resources necessary to equip and train their forces. The push into southern Colombia, as part of Plan Colombia, will inevitably pit government forces against guerrilla elements and possibly paramilitary units that will try to maintain their control of the coca growing areas. Whatever way the government decides to deal with guerrillas, it is critical to the success of eradication and alternative development to provide a secure guerrilla-free area in which to operate.

Fifth, over the last two years the Colombian government has had to contend with a declining economy that has strained its available resources to combat its growing problems. These problems have been exacerbated by the thousands entering the ranks of either the illegal drug trade or join guerrilla and paramilitary groups in an effort to survive. The increasing threat posed by guerrillas to the government’s stability as well as the deteriorating security environment for the general public has caused foreign investment as well as domestic talent to flee Colombia, adding to the worsening economic condition of the country. The economic downturn being experienced in Colombia is the reverse of the situation in Peru in which the government was able to first end the economic downslide thus giving the government more resources to combat
guerrillas and the drug trade. The Colombian government’s recovery from this economic decline is critical to their counternarcotics efforts.

In sum, the challenges Colombian counternarcotics efforts face in reducing a growing drug trade are similar to those faced by Peru: flexible drug traffickers, the spread of coca cultivation in response to government eradication efforts, the presence of guerrilla groups linked to the drug trade, peasant protests to counternarcotics operations, and a failing economy. Unlike Peru, however, the Colombian government also faces a more difficult interdiction task, the added threat of paramilitary forces, and the decision by the government to pursue a negotiated peace settlement with its guerrilla groups instead of confronting them outright. In essence, Colombia’s increasing problems have placed them in a downward spiral from which it will be extremely difficult to recover.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

After discussing the Peruvian and Colombian case studies, we can now analyze them to determine if Peru’s counternarcotics success can be translated into success for Colombia. Why were interdiction, eradication, and alternative development strategies successful in Peru during the 1990s but not in Colombia? Did the choice of strategy to deal with the dual threat contribute to the success in the drug war in Peru? Why was it chosen? Would a similar strategy be politically and strategically viable in Colombia? What impact will Plan Colombia have on both the drug trade and the guerrilla threat?

B. WHICH COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGIES WILL WORK IN COLOMBIA?

Peru fully engaged the drug trade only after resolving the country’s economic decline and guerrilla threat. The combination of interdiction, alternative development, and eradication significantly reduced coca cultivation making Peru a model for successful counternarcotics efforts. Analysis of counternarcotics strategies used in Peru and Colombia reveals two important differences that do not bode well for Colombia’s success unless resolved. First, interdiction efforts will not have the same impact on lowering coca prices in Colombia as it had in Peru because of the differences in the cocaine production process. Second, the presence of guerrillas in Colombia will hinder the success of alternative development and eradication efforts. Overcoming these obstacles will significantly enhance Colombia’s chances of duplicating Peru’s success.
1. **Interdiction**

Interdiction efforts have two objectives that if reached would impact coca cultivation levels. First, the objective is to intercept as many drug flights as possible in order to disrupt the flow of drugs and raise the operating cost for drug traffickers. The second objective is to create a glut of coca leaves by intercepting enough drug flights so that pilots will refuse to fly. The build-up of coca leaves would cause prices farmers received for coca leaf to decrease to the point that would make crop substitution programs a viable economic alternative to growing illegal crops. The Peruvian case points out that successful interdiction efforts provide enough pressure on drug traffickers to achieve these goals. However, in the case of Colombia interdiction efforts will not have the same impact on drug traffickers.

In the case of Peru, I have argued that pressure from early interdiction efforts caused drug traffickers to begin finding alternative transportation methods and routes within Peru. Interdiction also caused drug pilots to raise their fees because of the increased risk of being shot down. The implementation of the air-bridge denial program, in conjunction with increased eradication efforts, disrupted the flow of drugs to the point where drug traffickers shifted a majority of their coca cultivation to Colombia.

The disruption of drug flights in Colombia will be more difficult than in Peru where drug flights could be identified by flight profile and location as traffickers crossed Peruvian borders. In Colombia, drug flights are nearly impossible to differentiate from legitimate flights for two reasons. First, the density of domestic and international air traffic makes tracking drug flight nearly impossible. Second, the transportation routes flown by drug traffickers resemble authorized domestic and international air routes.
Isolation of drug trafficking routes as well as identification of drug flights is paramount to the successful disruption of drug trafficking.

Even if interdiction could be carried out somewhat effectively in Colombia, there is reason to believe that drug traffickers may not modify their operations as rapidly as they did in Peru. In Peru, drug traffickers began establishing alternative ways to maintain the flow of drugs after only a small amount of pressure from early interdiction efforts (only one percent of drug flights were intercepted). Given that many of the drug traffickers were Colombians who ran established trafficking networks from Colombia and who did not have a big stake in coca cultivation in Peru, it is easy to understand why they transitioned to Colombia when government pressure increased. When that decision was made the Peruvian government had won and all that was required to maintain this success was to sustain the pressure. It is likely that drug traffickers will resist government efforts with force in Colombia because cultivation, processing and transportation are combined into a highly streamlined illegal drug network. In other words, the drug traffickers in Colombia are so entrenched that the amount of pressure required to uproot them will be significantly more than what was required to force drug traffickers out of Peru.

In addition to disrupting the flow of drugs, interdiction efforts in Peru also impacted the price of coca leaf. I have shown that during early interdiction efforts, coca leaf prices rose sharply during periods when US radar and surveillance assets were withdrawn for political reasons. This is because drug traffickers were able to avoid interdiction assets that were unable to vector in on them without radar guidance. Upon reactivation of these assets, coca leaf prices plummeted as interdiction assets homed in on
drug flights. The end result of interdiction efforts was the lowering of coca leaf prices to the levels where crop substitution and coca field abandonment significantly reduced coca cultivation.

However, in Colombia, interdiction efforts are likely to have little impact on coca leaf prices, thus making alternative development programs less economically competitive with coca cultivation. Why is this? Because in Colombia, unlike Peru, cultivation and processing of coca leaf into cocaine is by and large conducted in the coca fields. Combining the entire process into one location eliminates the step of transporting coca leaf that in turn does not permit interdiction efforts to create a glut of coca leaf and force prices lower. Without lowering coca leaf prices, field abandonment and voluntary eradication, major contributors to Peru’s success, will not occur because there will be little economic incentive for farmers to stop cultivating coca.

2. Alternative Development

Alternative development programs provide viable crop substitution and civic action programs that sustain gains made by eradication efforts. Three factors are required for alternative development programs to succeed. First, the area in which alternative development is to take place must be in the control of the government and free of guerrilla forces. Second, alternative crops must be able to compete economically with illicit crops. Third, alternative development funding must be available to farmers in a timely manner.

In Peru, several factors including the elimination of the SL guerrillas, the success of interdiction efforts that drove coca leaf prices down, and the availability of funding for community civil work projects such as roads, water and electrical lines, as well as crop
substitution combined to make alternative development successful following the recovery of the economy. Successful alternative development programs led to the voluntary abandonment of thousands of hectares of coca fields and the introduction of economically viable crops.

In Colombia, however, the three factors required for a successful alternative development program are still absent. First, guerrilla forces continue to operate in or control areas in which alternative development programs are underway. Second, as has previously been mentioned, interdiction efforts will not impact coca leaf prices as they had in Peru making alternative crops an economically viable alternative for farmers. The government has attempted to provide economic incentives for farmers to abandon coca cultivation, however, reports indicate that some farmers have taken the money provided by the government and simply moved to another area and continued cultivating coca. The government has also promoted the raising of cattle as well as the growth of valuable timber however the infrastructure, not to mention providing security to ensure the products make it to market, is not robust enough to deliver the products to markets and thus provide a comparable economic alternative to coca cultivation. Lastly, a funded alternative development program ready to meet the needs of farmers whose crops have been eradicated has yet to been realized in Colombia and will likely be difficult to accomplish given the downturn in the economy and limited resources.

Resolving the guerrilla issue, lowering coca leaf prices thus providing an economic incentive to abandon or voluntarily eradicated coca fields, and funding of alternative programs are key to Colombia’s alternative development success.
3. Eradication

For eradication to have an impact on levels of coca cultivation two factors must be present. First, the government must possess the political will to conduct eradication while also providing eradication teams a secure area in which to operate. Second, lower coca leaf prices and an economically viable alternative development program must provide the incentive for farmers who have had their crops eradicated to turn to legal crops rather than merely replanting coca. In Peru the government succeeded in providing these factors. In Colombia however, these factors have not materialized.

In the early 1990s, the Peruvian government was confronted with peasant protestors and hostile guerrilla forces that attempt to protect the drug trade, often harassing or killing eradication teams. Eradication efforts also suffered from the government’s decision to appease protestors by using manual eradication, first on seedbeds and later on mature plants, that was extremely slow and labor intensive. The decision to eradicate coca seedbeds rather than mature coca plants soothed protestor anger but allowed coca farmers to continue earning a living on the drug trade.

The elimination of the SL guerrillas enabled eradication teams to operate in previously guerrilla-controlled coca-growing areas. The lack of guerrilla opposition also provided a secure area in which alternative development programs could take hold. However, without low coca leaf prices eradication efforts simply led farmers to move to new areas in Peru and begin growing coca again. The success of interdiction in lowering coca leaf prices after 1995 spurred coca farmers to switch to licit crop cultivation, abandoning thousands of hectares of coca as well as voluntarily destroying the coca plants. The decision by the Peruvian government to slowly step up manual eradication
that included mature coca plants was aimed at avoiding peasant protests while conforming to US request for increased eradication. The combination of increased eradication and coca field abandonment reduced the amount of coca cultivated by approximately 51,000 hectares in 1996 to nearly 30,000 hectares in 1999.

Eradication efforts in Colombia have encountered the same obstacles as Peruvian efforts. First, even though coca eradication in Colombia is conducted primarily through aerial fumigation, eradication efforts are still threatened by guerrilla groups. Spray planes conducting fumigation over guerrilla-controlled territory are often shot at and damaged by ground fire. Securing the ground prior to eradication is crucial not only to protecting eradication efforts but to insuring reconstitution of previously eradicated areas does not occur.

The second obstacle to overcome is protests conducted by farmers against government eradication efforts. These protests center on two issues: damage to licit crops and lack of alternative development programs. First, farmers and farming communities have protested aerial fumigation because over-spray of illicit coca cultivation has destroyed licit crops. Second, coca farmers state that the government does not provide a viable economic alternative after eradication has taken place not only depriving farmers of their income but causing them to move to new areas outside of the spray zone to begin coca cultivation again.

The implementation of Plan Colombia, discussed later, is intended to address both the issue of ensuring that eradication efforts provide protection against guerrillas as well as providing alternative development programs for those areas affected by eradication efforts. If these issues are resolved, as they were in Peru, coca cultivation levels will
have a better chance of being successfully reduced. However, since interdiction efforts have no impact on coca leaf prices the issue of creating an environment that makes alternative development programs a viable option will have to be resolved if Colombia is to experience the same level of success as Peru.

C. A WAR ON MANY FRONTS: WHICH TO ADDRESS FIRST?

Colombia today, like Peru before her, faces multiple challenges: a faltering economy, an aggressive guerrilla force, and a growing drug trade. During the early 1990s, Peru’s economic decline and the threat posed by violent guerrilla groups affected the ability of the state to carry out counternarcotics efforts. Peru could not have been successful without first resolving the economic crisis and eliminating the guerrilla threat before fully engaging the drug trade.

Peru’s failed economy limited the government’s ability to provide for its citizens, creating high levels of inflation and unemployment and bolstering guerrilla claims that the government was illegitimate. Unemployment caused thousands to seek work in the illegal drug trade while others chose to join the guerrillas. Through severe economic austerity measures rule by decree that allowed the bypassing of obstacles to reforms. President Fujimori reversed Peru’s economic decline.

At the same time, the SL guerrilla group in the early 1990s posed a very real threat to the security and stability of Peru. Bombings, kidnapping, and murder were terror tactics used by the SL in their efforts to undermine the government. Additionally, protection provided to coca growers and drug traffickers by the guerrillas often hindered government counternarcotics efforts to reduce the drug trade and endangered the lives of
eradication teams. Superior police and intelligence work resulted in the capture of SL’s leadership as well as over a thousand other members. The highly centralized structure of the SL leadership was key to its demise as the capture of their leaders disrupted the organization to the point at which it could no longer function as an effective fighting force.

Peru was financially as well as physically unable to fully engage the challenges posed by its economic crisis, the guerilla threat and the drug trade simultaneously. However, the resolution of Peru’s economic crisis and guerrilla threat freed resources to combat the drug trade, undermined the drug trade and guerrillas source of labor, and eliminated the threat to both the state and counternarcotics forces, thus enabling the government to make significant strides against the drug trade.

In Colombia, the Pastrana administration has taken a simultaneous approach to resolving guerrilla and paramilitary groups, the drug trade, and the declining economy. Yet, the pressure being applied to each has not been enough to eliminate any of the problems and so far has failed to halt Colombia’s downward spiral. Could the sequential elimination of the problems be the answer for Colombia? Should the Colombian government follow Fujimori’s example and focus on the threats from guerrillas and the declining economy before turning his attention to the drug trade? Or are drugs the key to all of Colombia’s problems, as many US policymakers argue, thus requiring a focus on counternarcotics strategies before all else? Or should the simultaneous approach be refined and given more time? The question of which problem to eliminate first—guerrillas, the economy, drugs, or paramilitary forces—would have to be decided.

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1. Guerrillas First Strategy

Eliminating the guerrilla threat first, as occurred in Peru, would undoubtedly facilitate counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. However, the dilemma is how to eliminate the guerrilla threat in Colombia. A strategy similar to that used in Peru, the targeting of the leadership structure, is unlikely to have a debilitating effect on guerrillas in Colombia. The FARC’s decentralized organization provides front commanders the freedom to fund, equip, and conduct operations independently from the central leadership.

The autonomy of front commanders is also likely to undermine alternative methods of dealing with the insurgents. If the government negotiates a settlement with the FARC leadership, it is doubtful that all of the FARC fronts will disband. Given that each front generates their finances independently, some are more heavily involved in the drug trade than others making it less likely that they would negotiate an end to the conflict if it also included the end of their involvement in the drug trade. It can be envisioned that in spite of a negotiated settlement between the guerrilla leadership and the government, some FARC fronts would remain autonomous for the purpose of pursuing the drug trade.

Eliminating the FARC by targeting drugs will be difficult because, as previously mentioned, counternarcotics efforts will not be successful without first eliminating the threat guerrillas pose to eradication teams and alternative development programs. Guerrilla protection of the drug trade will not only hinder counternarcotics efforts but will likely result in a force on force confrontation.
A military solution might be the only strategy effective in eliminating the FARC although the Colombian and US governments currently support a peaceful end to the conflict. The current policy of negotiation and concession used by the Colombian government has failed to end the conflict. The use of military force could provide the pressure required to persuade the guerrillas to take negotiations seriously. On the other hand, escalating the conflict will undoubtedly cause the war to spread throughout Colombia and possibly to neighboring countries. As the war engulfs Colombia’s urban centers, pressure from Colombian citizens against both the government and guerrillas will mount. Though there is no guarantee that a military solution will bring about negotiations with the guerrillas, options for ending the conflict have run out.

2. **Economy First Strategy**

Colombia’s economic decline was created during the Samper administration. Government overspending on civic action programs to bolster support for his presidency as well as draining resources to combat both the drug trade and guerilla threat caught up with Colombia in 1998. Although not as severe as Peru’s 1990 economic crisis, Colombia’s economic decline is a growing concern for the government because domestic and foreign businesses are leaving Colombia adding to the economic downward spiral.

Currently Colombia’s economic decline is not as severe as Peru’s. However, the failure of the government to eliminate the guerrilla threat has created an insecure environment that will cause the economic situation to deteriorate further. Because the economic crisis is still in its infancy, the Colombian government can simultaneously resolve the economic and guerrilla issue. By providing a secure environment domestic and foreign business will return generating revenue and providing jobs that will help the
government in its battle against the guerrillas and drug trade. By addressing the economic crisis, in part through US continuation of the Andean Trade Preference Act, the Colombian government will generate the funds needed to sustain Plan Colombia.

3. **Drugs First Strategy**

The elimination of the drug trade would deprive the guerrillas and paramilitaries of a valuable source of funding that could limit their capability to conduct operations or even reduce their troop levels. The reduction in capability to continue their fight could result in the guerrillas either negotiating a settlement to the conflict or weaken them to the point that government forces would be capable of eliminating them as a threat. However, it should be emphasized that during the Samper administration, sequentially addressing the dual threat resulted in the increase of both. Samper pursued a drug first strategy to try and show that there was no link to drug cartels in addition to succumbing to US pressure to increase counternarcotics efforts. Samper also turned his attention to reducing the drug trade first after his efforts to negotiate with the FARC and ELN failed because of his weak political standing and support of paramilitary forces. His focus on the drug trade—specifically the destruction of the Cali cartel—contributed to increased guerrilla involvement in drugs as they helped fill the void left by the cartel. Samper’s disregard for guerrillas while focusing on the drug trade permitted the guerrillas to increase in strength, expanding their control to over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory.

The FARC’s involvement in the drug trade runs deep and a drug first strategy could escalate the civil conflict. The FARC’s hold on the drug trade has grown from providing protection to drug traffickers as well as taxing coca farmers, processors, and traffickers, to actually running the cocaine business from cultivation to domestic
transportation.\textsuperscript{143} Their involvement may extend to international transportation of cocaine but this is only speculation at this point. Government attacks on the drug trade, while reducing guerrilla revenue, involves the direct confrontation between government and guerrilla forces and could lead to an all out war that is not restricted to just the coca-growing regions. If this were to occur, emphasis would have to shift away from attacking the drug trade to fully engaging the guerrillas, as the guerillas would be considered a greater threat to state security.

Opposition by the FARC to the government’s impending counternarcotics push into southern Colombia has already been noted as recently as November 2000 when guerrillas forces blocked all roads to a small town for a period of two months virtually straggling it.\textsuperscript{144} The government meanwhile prepares to send two battalions of soldiers to protect counternarcotics teams. The ensuing battle for control of the south will without a doubt take Colombia’s civil conflict to a new level.

The response from paramilitary forces to a drug first strategy is difficult to determine given their historical connection to government forces. As their involvement in the drug trade expands, their willingness to avoid confrontation with government forces may wane, creating a second front against which the government would have to contend. However, this is not an issue at the moment because Plan Colombia does not target the areas where paramilitary forces have drug operations.


4. **What to Do With the Paramilitary?**

The situation in Colombia is more complicated than that in Peru because of the presence of a strong autonomous paramilitary forces. What to do with the AUC paramilitary force is a concern that must be addressed by the Colombian government if for no other reason than to protect citizens from the violence carried out by paramilitary forces in their quest to defeat the guerrillas. The issue of dealing with the paramilitaries is difficult because on the one hand they are providing a service to the government, albeit an illegal one, by confronting guerrillas in areas the military does not maintain a presence. On the other hand, human rights abuses committed by paramilitary forces as well as their involvement in the drug trade make them a politically undesirable ally and potentially future enemy.

Though paramilitary forces tend to steer clear of government forces in an effort to avoid conflict, when the Colombia government begins to combat coca cultivation in paramilitary-controlled areas in northern Colombia conflicts will likely occur. If the government is unable to control, disband, or negotiate with the paramilitary before these counternarcotics efforts begin it should be prepared to add a third front to its war against drugs.

5. **A Simultaneous Approach to the Dual Threat**

An argument for simultaneously attacking the dual threat can be made when threats are so great or so interlinked that they require simultaneous attention. A simultaneous approach to eliminating guerrillas and drugs, such the one being implemented in Plan Colombia, could be conducted in specific areas rather than on a
global scale. Although not specifically targeting guerrilla forces during the eradication push into southern Colombia, it is very likely that government forces will encounter guerrillas protecting their drug interests. Battling narcoguerrillas has the advantage of resolving both the drug ad guerrilla problems in a given area, returning it to being a secure and productive part of Colombia thus generating revenue while expanding the government’s hold over its territory. On the other hand, simultaneously attacking both threats in a localized area provides the dual threats the opportunity to expand in other areas.

D. IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE ANSWER?

Does Plan Colombia resolve Colombia’s counternarcotics deficiencies discussed earlier in this chapter? How does it address the dual threat? After a brief description of the Plan, these questions will be addressed.

In September 1999, Colombian President Andres Pastrana, released a document entitled “Plan Colombia.” The Plan provided a general strategy for dealing with Colombia’s multiple problems, focusing on the peace process, the economy, counternarcotics, judicial reform and human rights, and democratization and social development. The Plan was expected to cost US$ 7.5 billion of which Colombia would provide US$ 4 billion, the US would provide US$ 1.5 to 2 billion and the European Union and international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, and IDB) would deliver the rest.\textsuperscript{145} In July 2000 the US Congress appropriated US$ 860 million for fiscal years

2000 and 2001.\textsuperscript{146} The aid package was added to the US$ 330 million previously appropriated for Colombia in the FY 2000 budget. The total US counternarcotics assistance to Colombia in the next two years almost doubles the amount provided during fiscal years 1996-2000 (US$ 763 million). Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of the US$ 860 million aid package that directly supports Plan Colombia over the next two years.

Though the government would prefer a peaceful settlement to the conflict, the main thrust of Plan Colombia is to train and equip three counternarcotics battalions, made up of approximately 3,000 Colombian soldiers to provide a secure environment for counternarcotics operations. The purchase of 30 UH-60 Blackhawk and 33 UH-1 Huey helicopters will facilitate the Colombia soldier's movement into southern Colombia where the majority of coca growth occurs. The Colombian forces, including 15,000 army, navy, air force, and police will destroy coca plantations, labs, and distribution networks in joint operations with the CNP.\textsuperscript{147}

The push into southern Colombia is Phase II (Decisive Operations) and is key to providing a secure area that will facilitate alternative development programs, humanitarian assistance, and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{148} Despite US Congress assurance that counternarcotics assistance will not be used to aid the Colombian military's counterinsurgency operations, it is likely that this will occur given the involvement of

\textsuperscript{146} U.S. aid provides $1.3 billion, but approximately $440 million is allocated for other Andean countries and for US agencies involved in drug interdiction and law enforcement.


\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 9.
guerrillas in the drug trade and the difficulty of distinguishing a guerrilla from a drug trafficker in southern Colombia.

The Plan provides for a simultaneous approach towards reviving the economy, eliminating the guerrilla threat, and reducing the illegal drug trade. First, the Plan calls for the stabilization of Colombia’s economy, though it does not provide a strategy to do so. What is known is that Colombia’s economy is critical to raising the revenues it needs to finance the Plan, while providing licit employment to replace the illicit alternatives. Colombia’s first recession in 25 years, the result of fiscal imbalances and weakening of investment confidence related to the increasing threat of guerrilla and paramilitary activity, as well as the displacement of its population make conditions ripe for guerrilla and paramilitary forces and narcotic-traffickers to recruit new members.

Repairing the economy, as was the case in Peru, is important to the long-term success of counternarcotics operations. It will not only provide funding required to carry out the Plan, but it will decrease the lure of the drug trade and other illicit activity. What is clear is that the key to fixing Colombia’s economy lies in providing a secure environment for domestic and foreign businesses to operate. Without resolving the guerrilla threat to some degree, whether sequentially or simultaneously, Colombia’s economy will continue its downward spiral and Plan Colombia will die on the vine.

Second, Plan Colombia uses a combination of three strategies discussed in Chapter 2 for dealing with the guerrilla threat: negotiations, undermining guerrilla support, and force on force. The Plan promotes the ending of the civil conflict that is viewed as central to solving Colombia’s problems. The Colombian government desires a negotiated end to the conflict that would stabilize the nation, speed economic recovery,
and help assure the protection of human rights. For its part the government has awarded concessions to the guerrillas in order to facilitate negotiations. However, because the guerrillas and government often fail to even agree on the agenda for discussions or the guerrilla’s security issue of disbanding the paramilitary as well as halting government counternarcotics efforts in guerrilla controlled areas, the talks routinely stall.

The Plan concentrates its counternarcotics activities in the areas controlled by guerrilla forces in an effort to undermine one of the key sources of funding for guerrilla groups. If successful, the Plan could provide the necessary pressure to keep the guerrillas at the negotiating table or it could escalate the conflict as government and guerrilla forces clash over control of coca-growing regions. However, even if the Plan is successful there is no guarantee that a negotiated settlement will include all FARC fronts. As previously stated, the highly autonomous nature of FARC fronts may result in the formation of numerous splinter groups that exist solely for the drug trade.

Despite the Colombian government’s desire to pursue peaceful negotiations with the guerrillas, the reality is that when government troops begin counternarcotics operations in the south, an area controlled by the FARC and increasingly the site of conflict between the AUC and FARC forces, the level of violence will increase and the likelihood of successful negotiations to end the conflict will decrease. Indeed, the staging of offensive counternarcotics operations in southern Colombia could cause the FARC to respond with their own offensive, destroying Colombia’s infrastructure, increasing kidnapping and assassinations, as well as mobilizing peasants to protest government eradication efforts. According to Eder Sanchez, the head of a farmers’ union in
Putumayo, the rebels do not like the government’s plan to eradicate coca fields and says the rebels have said, “What needs to be done [is] to gear up for the coming war.”

Phase I of Plan Colombia is the preparation stage for conducting operations and has already elicited guerrilla reaction. In October and November 2000, the FARC flexed its muscles to show its displeasure to Plan Colombia by surrounding a town of 38,000 people in southern Colombia and cutting off all roads in to and out of the town. As food has dwindled and electricity has been cut, the government has responded by airlifting supplies to the town, avoiding a direct confrontation with the FARC as preparations to conduct Plan Colombia continue.

In addition to the inevitable increase in conflict between the government and guerrillas, the peasant population will also suffer. Conscious of the likelihood of increased human rights violations and the heightened awareness during the push into southern Colombia, President Pastrana asked that US aid not be tied to human rights. Some members of the US Congress however appear to be determined to link US aid to human rights records. Despite this, on 23 August 2000, President Clinton determined that it was in the national security interest of the US to begin furnishing assistance to the


GOC and so waived certification requirements concerning Colombia’s human rights programs, potentially unleashing a wave of human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{152}

Third, Plan Colombia is a bold effort to attack the drug trade by reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent over six years using interdiction, eradication and alternative development strategies.

Interdiction efforts center on disrupting drug trafficker’s ability to move cocaine out of Colombia. The Plan calls for the improvements in government interdiction aircraft, additional ground-based radars, upgrades to US Customs Airborne Early Warning Radar equipped P-3 aircraft, and upgrades to air bases near drug-producing regions. These improvements are intended to increase the government’s ability to detect and intercept drug flights.\textsuperscript{153}

Though the Plan calls for an air-bridge type denial program similar to the one that was successful in Peru, the impact of interdicting drug flights transporting cocaine will have no impact on lowering coca leaf prices and thus are not able to make alternative development programs more attractive to coca farmers. Interdiction efforts will likely result in drug traffickers altering their methods and routes for transporting cocaine. In anticipation of this, the Plan funds improvements in riverine, maritime, and ground interdiction efforts to prevent traffickers from finding alternative transportation methods.

\textsuperscript{152} U.S. State Department, \textit{White House Memorandum of Justification in Connection with the Waivers Under the Section 3201 (a)(4) of the Emergency Supplemental Act, as Enacted in the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001}. 23 August 2000.

and routes. It also provides aid to neighboring countries, to improve border security and stop drug trafficking.

Eradication efforts will include the aerial eradication of industrial-size coca fields as well as the establishment of voluntary eradication by small-scale peasant farmers through alternative development programs. During the first two years there will be no reduction in coca cultivation; the goal is simply to contain coca growth and establish a baseline for gauging future eradication efforts. In years three and four a 10 percent reduction is expected each year and in years five and six the remaining 50 percent is to be completed.¹⁵⁴ In September 2000, the GOC revised its goals upwards to include a 50 percent reduction of coca cultivation in Putumayo department alone and a 30 percent reduction over the rest of the country within the next two years.¹⁵⁵ As previously discussed, eradication success will hinge on the government’s ability to secure the areas from guerrillas where eradication and alternative development are to take place.

Before eradication begins, eight communities have been identified for alternative development programs, including Villa Garzon, Puerto Guzman, Puerto Asis, and Orito. Through this program, the communities will be given the opportunity to eradicate their illegal crops voluntarily as part of their development projects with the intent of speeding the reduction of coca cultivation.¹⁵⁶ Strengthening of local governments as well as implementing social infrastructure projects will provide incentives for the coca farmers to

¹⁵⁴ Colombian Initiative, 14.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.
voluntary eradicate their coca fields, although voluntary eradication will test the willingness of coca farmers to participate and comply with reduction standards given that coca leaf prices will remain high. Communities in the alternative development area in southern Colombia that opt not to participate in the voluntary eradication program will be subject to possible aerial eradication after a 12 month grace period. According to Fernando Medellín, the head of Colombia’s National Solidarity Network that is working on the alternative development projects for Putumayo, “The most important thing about the plan is that we will not fumigate without having a social plan that is implemented at the same time or prior to fumigation.”\textsuperscript{157} This in fact seems to be the case. As of this writing the planned push into southern Colombia has been delayed from its December 2000 start date until alternative development programs are ready to be implemented, possibly in early 2001.

Guerrillas currently control over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory, much of which is the primary coca-producing regions of southern and eastern Colombia. The bulk of the US assistance (US$ 642 million) in Plan Colombia goes towards equipping and training the military and police to conduct counternarcotics operations in the south. As has been mentioned, the government’s ability to control and maintain a presence in areas where eradication and alternative development programs are being conducted is key to success, as are interdiction efforts to disrupting the flow of drugs. Alternative development programs and eradication efforts will have short-term success in areas that are secure from guerrillas. However, lapses in government presence and the continuation

\textsuperscript{157} Dudley, 2.
of high coca leaf prices will continue to either draw farmers back to reconstitute coca fields or shift to new areas, further spreading coca cultivation.

Although the government's major offensive to push into southern Colombia could provide a secure environment for eradication and alternative development programs it will also escalate the violence in Colombia potentially setting off increased bombings, kidnappings and assassinations not to mention the human rights violations that are sure to occur around the main area of the conflict. Both FARC and government forces will suffer losses, but the overall affect will be an increase in suffering by peasants caught in the crossfire.

Once Plan Colombia is initiated there are likely to be tens of thousands of displaced peasant coca farmers in the FARC-controlled areas, potentially swelling the ranks of the guerrilla movement or adding to the AUC paramilitary force operating in those areas. In addition, thousands are expected to flee across the porous borders to Ecuador, Peru and Brazil creating a security and refugee nightmare. Ecuador may be at greater risk and is bracing for as many as 40,000 refugees. Many of those fleeing will be FARC sympathizers and will increase the ranks of the guerrillas that have used the province of Sucumbios as a safe haven and re-supply area for the last three decades. According to El Universo, the Ecuadorian daily newspaper, FARC leaders have warned the Ecuadorian government to maintain strict neutrality when FARC units cross the border.¹⁵⁸ Ecuador may very well feel the brunt of FARC attacks because of the presence of US surveillance aircraft based at the Manta airport forward operating location

providing intelligence to combat drug traffickers. In anticipation of hostilities the government of Ecuador has stationed more than 5,000 soldiers along the Colombian border, comprised of three battalions, a special-forces unit, a jungle regiment and a helicopter regiment. Ecuador will spend US$ 150 to $ 200 million over the next three years to strengthen its border. The government has also requested international assistance to help set up camps for the anticipated influx of refugees.

Brazil is also anticipating a shift in the drug trade to parts of the Amozonas state as well as a flood of refugees. Though the FARC will attempt not to anger the Brazilian government, an opponent of Plan Colombia, FARC units frequently rest and re-supply in Leticia across the border from the Brazilian town of Tabatinga heightening the tension in the area. Already these two towns lie along a major route for transporting drugs and fears that coca cultivation and criminal activity will spillover with the infusion refugees. Additionally, the Brazilian government opposes the use of aerial eradication because of the toxic chemic run-off that might poison the river systems.

Plan Colombia will have its share of tactical successes, however, overall success in reducing the drug trade will depend on the government’s ability to eliminate the guerrilla threat. A negotiated settlement will not occur given the fervor that is growing from the guerrilla camp over the government’s military preparations to push into southern

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161 Ibid.
Colombia. If negotiations continue to falter, a military solution or some combination of force and negotiations might be the answer. The death toll will not be limited to government, guerrilla and paramilitary forces but will also include peasants who are managing to eke out a living and already account for the largest percentage killed in the conflict. The displacement of thousands of peasants fleeing from the ensuing conflict as well as eradication efforts will undoubtedly lead to more human suffering and the spread of the drug trade. However, to maintain the status quo or fall further behind prolongs the suffering that has already taken place.
VI. APPENDIX A

A. FIGURES

Figure 1.1 South America: Potential Coca Growing Areas
From source: CIA, Crime and Narcotics Center
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Ref source: INCSR 1999 and CIA, Crime and Narcotics Center
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From Ref: Clawson and Lee, *The Andean Cocaine Industry*

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From source: CIA Crime and Narcotics Center, Peru: 1998 Coca Estimates
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Ref Source: CIA Crime and Narcotics Center

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From source: CIA Crime and Narcotic Center

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Ref Source: U.S. Department of State, INCSR 1999
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From source: INCSR 1999 and CIA Crime and Narcotic Center

B. TABLES

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<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>323</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cacao</td>
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<td>Coffee</td>
<td>271</td>
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<td>Achiote</td>
<td>1,085</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coca</td>
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Table 1.2 1988 Peru: Crop Prices Per Hectare ($US)
Ref source: Sewall H. Menzel, *Fire in the Andes*, p. 137
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<tr>
<td>Coca Cultivation (ha)</td>
<td>121,300</td>
<td>120,800</td>
<td>129,100</td>
<td>108,800</td>
<td>108,600</td>
<td>115,300</td>
<td>94,400</td>
<td>68,800</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>38,700</td>
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Table 2.1 Coca Cultivation in Peru, 1990-1999
Ref source: INCSR 2000 and CIA Crime and Narcotics Center

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<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>$519</td>
<td>Equipment and training assistance to support Colombian military counternarcotics operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>$123</td>
<td>Assistance to support counternarcotics efforts of Colombian National Police operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$69</td>
<td>Alternative Development projects in drug-producing areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$58</td>
<td>Judicial reform and rule of law initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$51</td>
<td>Strengthening human rights organizations within Colombia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$37</td>
<td>Assist displaced person as a result of counternarcotics operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3</td>
<td>Peace process initiatives.</td>
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Table 4.1 US Appropriations to Plan Colombia for FY 2000 and 2001, in million of US$ |
From Ref. GAO Draft Report (GAO CODE 711503), September 18, 2000
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<th>ACRONYMS</th>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia/United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADA</td>
<td>Corps in Support of Alternate Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDRO</td>
<td>Center for Information and Education Against the Abuse of Drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNP</td>
<td>Colombian National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLAR</td>
<td>Colombian Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>Communication Security</td>
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<td>COPUD</td>
<td>Technical Committee on Drug Abuse Prevention</td>
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<td>CORAH</td>
<td>Coca Reduction Agency for the Huallaga Valley</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DINANDRO</td>
<td>Peruvian National Police Drug Directorate</td>
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<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional/National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Colombian Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Peruvian Air Force</td>
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<td>Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional/Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>Government of Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>Government of Colombia</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MRTA</td>
<td>Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupac Amaru/Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement</td>
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<td>Operational Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANTE</td>
<td>Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo/National Plan for Alternative Development</td>
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<td>Sendero Luminoso/Shining Path</td>
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<td>UHV</td>
<td>Upper Huallaga Valley</td>
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<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>United States Dollars</td>
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<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>USOUTHCOM</td>
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