**Title:** Why is the Air National Guard Ready to Assume a Major Leadership Role in the Aerospace Expeditionary Force?

**Author:** MAJ Stephen M. Pulley

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es):**
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATTL-3WY-GD
1 Reynolds Ave., Bldg. 111, Rm. 123
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

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**Abstract:**

The Air Force has just implemented the aerospace expeditionary force. The aerospace expeditionary force will help add some predictability to deployment schedules. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command are full partners in the aerospace expeditionary force.

The Air Force is currently facing a shortage of rated officers (pilots and navigators). The shortage has already affected staffs at headquarters. This paper examines the use of Air National Guard rated officers in leadership positions in the aerospace expeditionary force. It will review the different leadership position in the aerospace expeditionary force and the responsibilities of those positions. It will also review the training of active duty and Air National Guard officers for leadership positions.

**Subject Terms:** Leadership, AEF, EAF, ANG, Total Force, Force Integration

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WHY IS THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD READY TO ASSUME
A MAJOR LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE AEROSPACE
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

STEPHEN M. PULLEY, MAJ, ANG
B.B.A., University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK 1991

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Name of Candidate: MAJ Stephen M. Pulley

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Ronald E. Cuny, Ed.D., Thesis Committee Chairman

LTC Lenora A. Ivy, M.M.A.S., Member

MAJ R. Joseph Dague, M.S., Member

Accepted this 2d day of June 2000 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

WHY IS THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD READY TO ASSUME A MAJOR LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE AEROSPACE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE? By MAJ Stephen M. Pulley, ANG, 108 pages.

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CSAF  Chief Of Staff of The Air Force
CW (P) Composite Wing (Provisional)
DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces
DOD Department of Defense
DPG Defense Planning Guidance
EAS Expeditionary Airlift Squadron
FAD Force Activity Designator
FYDP Future Years Defense Program
GCCS Global Command and Control System
IDT Inactive Duty for Training
IMA Individual Mobilization Augmentee
JAOC Joint Air Operations Center
JAOP Joint Air Operations Plan
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC Joint Force Commander
JOA Joint Operations Area
JPME Joint Professional Military Education
JTF Joint Task Force
LNO Liaison Officer
MAJCOM Major Command
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

No matter how well you apply the art of leadership, no matter how strong your unit or how high the morale of your men, if your leadership is not directed completely toward the mission, your leadership has failed. (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a)

General Curtis E. LeMay
Air Force Chief of Staff (1961-1965)

Introduction

The Air Force is implementing the aerospace expeditionary forces where the majority of the Air Force, Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserves will be divided up into ten aerospace expeditionary forces to provide air component force structure for the warfighting commander in chief; commander of a combatant command (CINC's).

The leadership of these aerospace expeditionary forces will be the primary responsibility of the active duty force. With the Air National Guard's increasing role in these contingencies, they need to be allowed to share in the leadership responsibility to offset the shortage of active duty officers.

Major General Paul Weaver, Director of the Air National Guard, stated in a speech on the Air National Guard vision:

We envision an organization that maximizes the unique capabilities of the citizen soldier that responds rapidly and effectively to the needs of the Total Aerospace Force with fully trained personnel, while looking at today's and tomorrow's missions that best fit our capabilities. (Weaver 1997)

With the current reductions of staff at the major command level, rated officers leaving the service for civilian cockpits, and increased involvement of the Air National
Guard in world deployments, the time is ripe for the Air National Guard to showcase its leadership potential.

Prior to Desert Storm, the Air National Guard’s main mission was to train for war until full mobilization of the reserve component. With the reduction of the active force structure, the Air National Guard has become an active partner in contingencies, such as Phoenix Scorpion, Desert Fox, Coronet Oak, Northern and Southern Watch, and Joint Forge to name a few, supplying fully trained aircrews and support personnel to meet the nation's needs. In one capacity or another the Air National Guard has participated in every Air Force operation in the past twenty years. The Air National Guard is fully trained and ready to deploy, as governed by regulation in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-301, Responsibilities of Air Reserve Component (ARC) Forces.

The Air National Guard has met the needs of the Air Force through both volunteerism and Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC). However, there has only been a limited opportunity for the Air National Guard to assume leadership positions in most of these operations. The Air National Guard did operate two bases during the Kosovo operation. They had some key roles during Desert Storm and continue to operate in either key positions or solely run operations like Operation Deep Freeze, Coronet Oak, and First Air Force.

AFI 10-301 states that the total force policy highlights the importance of having the Air National Guard and United States Air Force Reserves combat-ready and prepared to accomplish wartime tasks when needed. The mission of the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard is to recruit, train and provide combat ready flying units, combat support units, combat service support units, and qualified personnel
for active duty in the Air Force. It is the responsibility of the Air National Guard and AFRC to ensure that the training of their respective units conforms to the same standards established by the gaining commands for similar units of the active force.

It is also directed in AFI 10-301, that it is the responsibility of the active duty gaining major commands (MAJCOMs) to ensure the operational readiness of all gained Air Reserve Component (ARC) forces. The MAJCOMs are responsible for keeping the ARC informed of new techniques, procedures, tactics, and doctrine for inclusion in ARC unit training programs, while including ARC forces in active force programming, contingency planning, and exercise planning and execution.

There is no time required or necessary for additional training to prepare for any operation. The Air National Guard trains to the same standard as active duty units and is fully mission capable. At the 1998 Focus Conference, General Weaver commented on status of resource and training (SORTS) reporting saying:

the highest C-Status of any component - Active or Reserve - in the entire DoD. Our flying units collectively are near 90% C1 or C2. We are the only component of the entire DoD that boast of that. (Weaver 1998b)

At the 1998 Air National Guard Senior Leaders Conference General Weaver stated, that the Air National Guard logged

in excess of 370,000 flying hours, thanks to your [the commanders] efforts, we’ve made this our safest flying year in ANG history! We accomplished this with the highest number ever of “Outstanding” and “Excellent” ORI and SIOP inspections ratings. (Weaver 1998c)

The Air National Guard has a well-developed and trained force. Through active duty oversight and unit level training, the Air National Guard is well prepared for its
wartime mission. The author believes that there is potential for the Air National Guard to assume a larger role in the leadership arena.

**Thesis Question**

This research examines whether the Air National Guard is capable of assuming a leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force.

Why is the Air National Guard ready to assume a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force? In an attempt to answer this question, the author will attempt to answer the following subordinate questions.

1. What are the major aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?
2. What are the major responsibilities inherent in the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?
3. How does the Air National Guard train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?
4. How does the active USAF train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?
5. How are rated officers assigned to the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

**Background**

There is a current shortage of pilots and navigators (rated officers) on active duty. The Air Force predicts this shortage to continue well into the twenty-first century. This is the end result of a healthy economy and a high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) coupled with the Air Education and Training Command’s inability to train enough replacement pilots. The Air Force along with the other services is being stretched to the limits with
the reduction of personnel over the past ten years and the increase of the worldwide commitments and contingencies.

On 29 September 1998, General Michael Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other Service Chiefs, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. General Ryan stated that pilot retention is the Air Force’s greatest concern. He noted that the retention rate had dropped below 50 percent. The Air Force’s loss was directly benefiting the airline industry that could offer stability and better pay than the military (Peters and Ryan 1998).

Significance

Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) has shifted from the Cold War to a time where regional conflicts and instability have caused an increase in deployments. The DoD has more missions and deployments than ever before. For example the Air Force has four times as many people deployed today as they did in 1989 (Peters 1997).

The Air National Guard has been actively involved in missions ranging from Bosnia to Southwest Asia, to fighting fires in Indonesia, to providing KC-135 tankers for air refueling, to support operations all over the world.

In the mobility forces arena, the Air National Guard provides about 45 percent of theater airlift and 43 percent of the KC-135 tankers. There are 88 flying units, over 1,500 mission support units and, on average, these units deploy roughly 400 aircraft worldwide during any given month, and all this for only 6 percent of the FY 1997 budget.

With the reduction in personnel, to include the retention problem of rated officers, this author believes the time is right for the Air National Guard to focus on an expanded role in leadership in the aerospace expeditionary forces. The increased deployments and
shortage of rated officers offer an opportunity for this untapped resource. The Air
National Guard and the Air Force Reserve are critical in today's total force environment
(Peters 1997).

The Air National Guard does have a problem retaining full-time pilots (these are
20 percent of the pilot force). The strong economy and active hiring by the airlines is
also attractive to Air National Guard pilots. However, unit total strengths have not been
greatly affected. When a full-time pilot leaves for a civilian job, they usually stay as a
traditional Guardsmen.

The pilot retention problem is primarily in the ten to fourteen year group for the
active force. This does not automatically mean that there is a shortage of qualified
leadership personnel today. However, this shortage can continue into the out years. This
author believes that it would be best to start utilizing the Air National Guard leadership
now to help relieve some of the stresses on active duty personnel.

In today's shrinking budgets and with the personnel deployed all over the world,
the services need to insure that their assets are being utilized to their maximum potential.
If the Air National Guard and active duty Air Force trains their future leaders in nearly
the same fashion, then one could argue that the Air National Guard should be equally
involved in leadership positions in the aerospace expeditionary force.

Operational Definitions

ADCON: Administrative Control.

Additional Flying Training Period (AFTP): One four-hour period that equals one
day of base pay and one day of any specialty pay, like flight pay. Guardsmen on flying
status have forty-eight periods per year for local proficiency flight training.
Aerospace Expeditionary Force: Ten aerospace expeditionary forces, each comprised of about 250 aircraft and personnel assigned to those aircraft based at separate airfields, will handle missions below two major contingencies. General Ryan said, "Once we reach that level, all bets are off." If two major contingencies occur, the Air Force will revert to current doctrine. But, General Ryan said, once the aerospace expeditionary force matures, he believes it will be used for major theater wars as well.

The aerospace expeditionary forces will be on call for joint deployments during one ninety-day period every fifteen months. Two aerospace expeditionary forces will be on duty at a time.

COMAFFOR: Commander, Air Force Forces

Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR): The DIRMOBFOR is the COMAFFOR's or Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC's) designated coordinating authority for air mobility with all commands and agencies both internal and external to a joint force. The DIRMOBFOR is responsible for integrating the total air mobility effort for the JFACC. The DIRMOBFOR provides direction to the Air Mobility Division (AMD) and will normally be a senior officer familiar with the area of responsibility (AOR). When intertheater air mobility forces are employed in support of a Joint Force Commander (JFC), the DIRMOBFOR should have experience in intertheater air mobility operations. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced by the theater Air Force component commander or nominated by the commander of the Air Mobility Command (AMC). To ensure close coordination with the overall theater air effort, the DIRMOBFOR should be collocated with the Aerospace Operations Center (AOC), COMAFFOR, and JFACC. The COMAFFOR exercises complete administrative control
(ADCON) over the DIRMObFOR, however, the DIRMObFOR reports operationally to the JFACC.

**Expeditionary Air Force (EAF):** EAF is a fundamental and evolutionary change for the Air Force. It is a shift to an expeditionary mind set and a vision for how the service will organize, train, equip, and sustain aerospace forces to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy and the challenges of a changing global security environment.

The EAF is designed to execute National Military Strategy must have relevant forces which are lean and agile, appropriately structured, modern and capable, trained, and ready with rapid responsiveness while operating in a constrained environment with its fiscal limitations and political realities that meet the readiness challenges.

The EAF are tailored forces for the CINCs that are an integration of the Air Force’s total force which are designed to be lighter, leaner and more lethal, while providing more stability and predictability to the personnel.

The EAF does not replace deliberate planning (the CINC OPLANs). It is also not a tiered readiness system, a substitute for base realignment and closure (BRAC), or a super-base concept. EAF will not change the baseline organizational structure.

The aircraft and crews in the Air Force will be divided up into ten aerospace expeditionary forces.

**Joint Force Air Component Commander:** The JFACC derives authority from the JFC who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure
unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The JFC will normally designate a joint force air component commander.

**National Military Strategy:** The National Military Strategy is based off of three ideas--Shape, Respond, and Prepare.

Shaping the international environment in ways that are favorable to U.S. interests, that would promote regional stability, would prevent conflicts, reduce threats, and deter aggression on a day-to-day basis in key regions.

On the respond side, DoD needs to be able to respond quickly to the entire panoply of threats that the military might likely face. They can range all the way from small-scale contingencies to major theater war.

Also, the third element of the national strategy is preparing. The military needs to prepare now for tomorrow. The service has an uncertain future, and it requires that they maintain military superiority. That path is outlined in Joint Vision 2010, which is based upon combining modern technology with new operational concepts, and DoD believes that this preparation obviously must be an elemental part of that strategy.

Shape, responding, and preparing is going to be part of that overall strategy. The national military strategy will constantly have to update and to prepare for tomorrow's threats.

**Operation Tempo (OPTEMPO):**

1. **Active Guard and Reserve (AGRs):** Full-time guardsmen on active duty either USC Title 10 or 32--all calendar days where duty “above-and-beyond the normal duty day or week” is accomplished. This includes TDYs, drill weekends, weekend alert, and others.
2. **Technicians:** Full-time guardsmen on civil service--All calendar days where duty "above-and-beyond the normal Technician duty day" is accomplished. This includes TDYs, AFTPs, UTAs, weekend duty, and more. Only calendar days are counted. "No double dipping."

3. **Traditionals:** Part-time guardsmen--All calendar days that traditional guardsmen worked in any pay status. This includes temporary duty (TDY), additional flying training periods (AFTPs), unit training assemblies UTAs, home station active duty (AD), and more. Only calendar days are counted. No double dipping.

**Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO):** PERSTEMPO is any days TDY during a month. This includes conferences, meetings, Air National Guard support tours, flying TDYs, and others. This is counted for traditionals, technicians, and AGRs. PERSTEMPO is a subset of OPTEMPO. **NOTES:** OPTEMPO is always greater than PERSTEMPO.

**Unit Training Assembly (UTA):** One four-hour period that equals one day of base pay and one day of any specialty pay, like flight pay. Each guardsman has forty-eight periods per year; which makes up the one weekend a month drill.

**Limitations**

This research will only examine the training of rated officers (pilots and navigators). This research will only include the positions of AMC, Air National Guard and related aerospace expeditionary force leadership when the positions directly affect the research question.
Delimitations

This research will not consider non-rated officers, support officers, and enlisted personnel. Nor will this research examine the positions of Air Combat Command (ACC), Space Command, AFRC, and leadership at the national level except as it directly affects the topic. The AFRC will be mentioned throughout this research because of the similarities to the Air National Guard, both are the reserve arm of the active Air Force, which together with the DoD civilians they comprise the Air Force in the total force sense.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

When things go wrong in your command, start searching for the reason in increasingly larger concentric circles around your own desk. (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a)

General Bruce C. Clarke, USA
Commander in Chief, US Army Europe (1960-1962)

Background

This chapter reviews the background concerning the aerospace expeditionary force concept and how the Air Force utilizes the Air National Guard. The focus was on the leadership aspect of the aerospace expeditionary force. Due to the aerospace expeditionary force's recent implementation, the data is limited to Air Force directives and senior leaders' writings and speeches. However, the data does spotlight the historical performance of the Air National Guard.

Specifically the literature review examined: "Why is the Air National Guard ready to assume a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?" In an attempt to answer the thesis question this review also addressed the following subordinate questions.

1. What are the major aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

2. What are the major responsibilities inherent in the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

3. How does the Air National Guard train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?
4. How does the active USAF train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?

5. How are rated officers assigned to the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

**Total Force Policy**

To understand the entire concept of the Air National Guard’s relationship with the active component, some of the history of the total force policy must be looked at.

In August 1970, Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, directed the military departments to apply a total force concept to all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping, and employing Air National Guard and Reserve forces. Then, as now, the U.S. Armed Forces were restructuring to meet the threat of a dynamic security environment while dealing with the economic realities of decreasing defense budgets. Secretary Laird reached the inescapable conclusion that increased reliance on Air National Guard and Reserve forces was a prerequisite to a cost effective force structure (Department of Defense 1996).

In 1973, DoD adopted the concept as the total force policy, which recognized that all of America’s military--active, guard, and reserve--should be readily available to provide for the common defense. Each succeeding administration has emphasized this approach. The nation has benefited from lower peacetime sustaining costs of Reserve forces, compared to similar active units that result in a more capable force structure for a smaller defense budget. Today, after thirty years, the total force concept has proven to be a clear and continuing success (Department of Defense 1996).
The Persian Gulf War required the largest mobilization and deployment of the reserve components since the Korean Conflict and was an important test of the integration of active and reserve components under the total force policy. While regional dangers and other threats have replaced the global Soviet threat, the total force policy remains the key to our nation's defense strategy (Department of Defense 1996).

Today, selected Reserve units and individuals are prepared to deploy anywhere on the globe and rapidly integrate with active force operations as they did during the Persian Gulf War. Today, the Air National Guard and Reserves provide approximately 35 percent of the armed forces while costing only 8 percent of the budget (Department of Defense 1996).

The reserve components will continue to be a strong partner, performing key missions within the total force. By being accessible and mission-ready, they enable DoD to reduce the risk associated with a smaller active force. The National Military Strategy will continue the requirement for highly trained and equipped combat-ready Reserve forces to ensure the nation's ability to fight and win. As resources continue to decline and the tempo of day-to-day military operations remains high, Reserve forces will continue to be a significant force multiplier (Department of Defense 1996).

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 continued the downward trend in defense spending. As the active components are downsized, the reserve components are modifying their roles, changing missions and reducing their forces as well. The capability, accessibility, affordability, and relevance of the reserve components will be key to determining their functions, roles, missions, and force
structure. In addition, the key will be our National Military Objectives (Department of Defense 1996).

Current National Military Strategy envisions flexible and selective engagement, involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment. Guarding against threats to the interests of the United States requires the appropriate use of military capabilities in concert with the economic, diplomatic, and informational elements of our national power. Our Armed Forces are engaged worldwide on a continual basis to accomplish two national military objectives: thwarting aggression and promoting stability (Department of Defense 1996).

Should war occur, our forces, in concert with those of our allies and friends, must be capable of defeating any potential adversary and establishing the decisive conditions which lead to long-term solutions. Substantial Reserve forces will be committed to combat and combat support missions early in any major regional contingency. To backfill active forces elsewhere and to prepare for unforeseen contingencies, some reserve component forces can expect to be mobilized immediately and to remain on active duty throughout the conflict, even though they are not directly involved in the operations (Department of Defense 1996).

Today, members of the reserve components keep alive the honorable tradition of taking on responsibilities greater than those required of most citizens. They willingly sacrifice many weeknights, weekends, and vacation periods to learn, train, and prepare for the day when the country might need to call on them. This tradition of dedicated service continues. As a vital partner of the total force, Reservists are a reflection of society, centered on enduring values and core competencies. The days when citizens
who put aside their tools and pick up their firearms could provide the nation's defense are
long past. Modern warfare and weapons require continuous training and preparation.
The commitment of the reserve components must be focused and powerful (Department

**Air National Guard Position on the**
**Aerospace Expeditionary Force**

The Air National Guard published a white paper on its requirements to ensure
maximum utilization of its forces while providing the utmost support towards the total
force concept (Air National Guard n.d.).

This white paper recognized that the Air National Guard will be relied upon to
shape and respond roles. Policies need to be addressed that guide Air National Guard
participation (Air National Guard n.d.).

Air National Guard units were constituted during the Cold War to train at home
and, if needed they could be activated for a deployed operations. The white paper also
recognized that the unit’s current culture and unit manning document (UMD) might not
support the continuous outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) demands of
an aerospace expeditionary force. The Air National Guard can be re-engineered to
support the aerospace expeditionary force, but some policy changes need to be made to
support such a re-engineering effort to include:

1. Unit integrity must be respected during an aerospace expeditionary force
deployment;

2. An Air National Guard unit cannot be asked to split itself between different
aerospace expeditionary forces during a fifteen-month cycle;
3. Maintain current Air National Guard end strength;

4. Deployment policy: Rotate our personnel with fifteen days in theater requirement (Depending on theater--total deployment time could be about eighteen days max);

5. Thirty days for supervisory personnel;

6. No Presidential Select Reserve Callup (PSRC)--the Air National Guard prefers to use volunteerism to support missions for maximum participation without having to activate an entire unit;

7. Air National Guard will be forward deployed--no backfill tasking for the aerospace expeditionary force; and

8. Leadership Role: The ARC, like the active duty, must have a means to groom future leaders. It is critical and necessary to insure that the ARC has an opportunity to fill aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions on an equitable basis (Air National Guard n.d.).

**Aerospace Expeditionary Force Structure**

Air Force Doctrine lays out the basic structure for the aerospace expeditionary force. Each Air Force component can refine their directives through Air Force Instructions (AFI) for their command (i.e. United States Air Forces Europe and Pacific Air Forces). Air Force Doctrine AFDD-2 describes the positions of the aerospace expeditionary wing, group, squadron, and levels below squadron and how they are structurally organized (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

An aerospace expeditionary force is an organizational structure composed of force packages of capabilities that provide warfighting CINCs with rapid and responsive
aerospace power. These force packages, together with their support and command and control (C2) elements, are tailored to meet specific needs across the spectrum of response options and will deploy within an Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force (ASET.F) as aerospace expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons. An aerospace expeditionary force, by itself, is not a deployable or employable entity (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

**Aerospace Expeditionary Wing**

An aerospace expeditionary wing is a deployed wing or a wing slice attached to an ASETF or in-place numbered air force (NAF) by G-series orders. The CINC or JFC normally delegates operation control (OPCON) of an aerospace expeditionary wing to the COMAFFOR. An aerospace expeditionary wing normally is composed of the wing command element and several groups. Aerospace expeditionary wings will carry the numerical designation of the wing providing the command element. Deployed assigned or attached groups and squadrons will retain their numerical designation and acquire the "expeditionary" designation. An aerospace expeditionary wing may be composed of units from different wings, but where possible, the aerospace expeditionary wing is formed from units of a single wing. The aerospace expeditionary wing commander will report to the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

**Aerospace Expeditionary Group**

An aerospace expeditionary group is a deployed independent group attached to an ASETF or in-place NAF by G-series orders and is the lowest command echelon of forces reporting directly to the COMAFFOR. The CINC or JFC normally delegates OPCON of an aerospace expeditionary group to the COMAFFOR. An aerospace expeditionary
group is composed of a slice of the wing command element and some squadrons. Since U.S. Air Force groups are organized without significant staff support, a wing slice is needed to provide the command and control for aerospace expeditionary forces smaller than the normal wing. The aerospace expeditionary group will carry the numerical designation of the wing or group providing the command element. Deployed assigned or attached squadrons will retain their numerical designation and acquire the “expeditionary” designation. An aerospace expeditionary group may be composed of units from different wings, but where possible, the aerospace expeditionary group is formed from units of a single wing. The aerospace expeditionary group commander reports to the COMAFFOR (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

**Aerospace Expeditionary Squadron**

An aerospace expeditionary squadron is a deployed squadron attached to an ASETF by G-series orders. The squadron is the basic fighting unit of the U.S. Air Force. Squadrons are configured to deploy and employ in support of crisis action requirements. However, an individual squadron is not designed to conduct independent operations; it requires support from other units to obtain the synergy needed for sustainable, effective operations. If a single operational squadron or squadron element is all that is needed to provide the desired operational effect (for example, an element of C-130s performing humanitarian operations), it should deploy with provision for commensurate support and C2 elements.

The structure of this ASETF would appear similar to an aerospace expeditionary group. In some operations, not all support and C2 elements need to deploy forward with the operational squadron. Some may be positioned “over the horizon,” constituting
capabilities provided through reachback. A single squadron or squadron element may deploy without full support elements if it is planned to augment a deployed aerospace expeditionary wing or aerospace expeditionary group. It would thus obtain necessary support from the larger units (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

**Expeditionary Elements below Squadron Level**

In addition to expeditionary wings, groups, and squadrons, the Air Force can deploy elements below the squadron level for specific, limited functions. They may deploy independently of other Air Force units, often to remote locations, and may operate directly with other services. For ADCON purposes, these elements should normally be attached to the commander of a recognizable Air Force entity in the region, either a deployed ASETF, an in-place NAF, or a regional Air Force MAJCOM (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

**Air Mobility Integration**

Because of the global nature of air mobility, special attention must be given to balance these resources with national requirements and priorities. At the same time, the air mobility systems performing intratheater and intertheater missions must function in close coordination with one another to provide seamless mobility to the supported combatant commander with responsive and integrated aerial movement. Command relationships must allow an interlocking arrangement to manage intratheater and intertheater air mobility operations. Normally, intratheater air mobility forces will be attached to the JFC with OPCON or tactical control (TACON) delegated to the COMAFFOR and or JFACC (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999b).
A Joint Task Force (JTF) mission will often require AMC air mobility augmentation. Air mobility ground elements attached to the JTF and in the AOR or joint operations area (JOA) normally will be TACON to the JFC, delegated to the COMAFFOR and or JFACC, and exercised through the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). In some circumstances, a limited number of intertheater air mobility aircraft may be transferred or made available for tasking on a sortie-by-sortie basis, by the COMAFFOR and or JFACC for the JFC (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999b)

**Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR)**

The DIRMOBFOR is the COMAFFOR’s or JFACC’s designated coordinating authority for air mobility with all commands and agencies both internal and external to the JTF. The DIRMOBFOR provides direction to the AMD in the AOC and normally will be a senior Air Force officer familiar with the AOR. When intertheater air mobility forces are employed in support of a JFC, the DIRMOBFOR should have experience in intertheater air mobility operations. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced by the theater U.S. Air Force component commander or nominated by the AMC commander. To ensure close coordination with the overall theater air effort, the DIRMOBFOR should work directly for the COMAFFOR and or JFACC. For operations where the preponderance of forces are air mobility assets, or for air mobility-only operations, the COMAFFOR and or JFACC may be dual-hatted as the DIRMOBFOR. The DIRMOBFOR’s specific authorities and responsibilities include:

1. Direct the integration of intertheater air mobility—assigned mobility forces.
2. Coordinate the tasking intertheater air mobility forces (air and ground) attached (TCAN) to the JFC.

3. Direct the tasking of intratheater air mobility forces.

4. Coordinate with the AOC director to ensure all air mobility operations supporting the JFC are fully integrated with the air tasking order (ATO) cycle and deconflicted with all other air operations.

5. Coordinate with the tanker airlift control center (TACC), through the Air Mobility Division (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999b).

Leaders on Leadership and the Air National Guard

General Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, stated, "Leadership is what holds the force together. I believe personnel in the Air Force are all high quality. It is the leadership that makes the difference between good and bad results" (Ryan n.d.).

In a speech about the Air National Guard, General Ryan said:

It is the personal relationship gained in combat upon which our total force lays its foundation. The Air Force integrates the Guard, Reserve, and active duty better than anyone else does. I'm proud of that. We are now so intertwined, so dependent upon each other that each day we build on our enduring trust for the next generations of total force airmen. The role of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve is big; it's vital; and it's expanding.

We should not place artificial limits on the roles different parts of the total force can play. We can't afford limits. The Reserve components are part of "one team, one force, one family," not in-laws or out-laws, not distant relatives or "kissin'" cousins, but most valued brothers and sisters in this Air Force family. (Ryan n.d.)

General Ronald Fogleman a total force advocate stated:

I think everybody understands that I am a Total force advocate and in my previous capacity as commander of Air Mobility Command, I saw the value of making good use of the reserve components. They represent the United States of America in a vast number of countries every day. (Pomeroy 1995)
He added that 25 percent of Air Mobility Command’s day-to-day missions are flown by guardsmen and reservists. More than 60 percent of all strategic airlift pilots are in the Air National Guard and Reserves (Pomeroy 1995).

General Fogleman understandably stipulated that the key to the proper use of the reserve components is flexibility, because it is difficult for individual members to leave home for two months (Pomeroy 1995).

In remarks delivered by General Fogleman at the Air National Guard Association of the United States Convention in September of 1995, he commented:

I’ll tell you straight out that we consider the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve as full partners on our team. We put our money and our first-line equipment where our mouth is. We have relied very heavily on you all to help us deal with the challenges of the post-Cold War world.

We took the logical step of going back to the National Guard and the Reserve to seek additional assistance and look for new and innovative ways that they could help us with this Op tempo. The response has been tremendous. (Fogleman 1995a)

In a speech later in 1995 that General Fogleman delivered to the Air National Guard Senior Commanders Forum, he focused his remarks on the leadership, vision, and foresight of the Air National Guard. He went on to say the Air National Guard and reserve forces provided the bulk of the support to Air Mobility Command. From 1992 to 1994, the reserve components provided 56 percent of the strategic airlift crews and 34 percent of the tanker- airlift control teams, while 52 percent of the tanker units and 68 percent of the C-130 came from the Air National Guard and Reserves (Fogleman 1995b).

At the same conference General Fogleman stressed the need for “strong leadership from our commanders and supervisors” to produce an Air Force that “encourage innovation and allows people to achieve their full potential.” At the same
time the emphasis will be on continuing stability in all areas of the total force (Fogleman 1995b).

The Air National Guard and Reserves continue to play an important role in helping to meet the demands placed upon our Air Force. In fact, Air National Guard and Reservist man-days per year today are almost equal to the level of effort you had during the height of the Gulf War (Fogleman 1997).

General Fogleman believes that it is essential to have a good understanding of both the capabilities and limitations of the Air National Guard and Reserve forces, so they can properly plan their role in the future defense establishment of the United States. The Air Force must be able to come up with smart programs to capitalize on the Air National Guard and Reserves in the future (Fogleman 1997).

Like Secretary Peters, General Fogleman feels that Guardsmen and Reservists provide America with substantial capabilities in both peacetime and wartime. The reserve components do so in a manner less expensive than maintaining active-duty forces. The Air Force has been committed for years to providing the Air National Guard and Reserve forces with frontline equipment and training them to the same standards as their active duty counterparts (Fogleman 1997).

General Fogleman has said that the time has long passed when theater commanders ask whether a squadron comes from the active force, the Air National Guard or the Reserve. When the troops arrive, all they see is the Air Force uniform (Fogleman 1997).

One of the Air Force’s core competency is rapid global mobility. This capability is critical to America's largely continental United Stated (CONUS) based military. AMC
airlifters and tankers provide this unique capability for the nation. The Air Force can go places and do things no other nation on the face of the earth can do because of the air mobility forces (Fogleman 1997).

General Fogleman echoed the fact that the Air National Guard and Reserve units play a tremendous role in all this. Fifty-six percent of the strategic airlift crews and 34 percent of the tanker crews come out of the Reserves and Air National Guard. The Air National Guard operates C-130 units in thirty-four states. In addition, in the future, the Air National Guard will operate the nation's newest airlifter--the C-17 (Fogleman 1997).

General Fogleman also emphasized the fact that from the business part of the U.S. Air Force, he believes that a much better buy for the country--to use the Air National Guard and Reserves. In terms of cost savings, the Air Force can save anywhere from a third to half the cost of an active unit by using an Air National Guard or Reserve unit with similar capabilities to an active duty unit. Yet, it is fully trained and available on nearly the same time line. Therefore, this approach makes a great deal of sense for the U.S. Air Force and for the nation (Fogleman 1997).

General Fogleman presumes that there is no doubt that the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve will be delivering tons of humanitarian relief, deterring aggression, working in space operations, and sharing in the risk of combat operations well into the twenty-first century. They will be in the forefront of this strategy that says the military must shape events so they can prevent a crisis, deter a conflict, and defeat an enemy. And that will be a great buy for America. Whit Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force made the following comments about the Air National Guard. Air National Guard units are fragile and can be broken if used without great care and due regard for
our employers and the families of our guardsmen. The flight crews are averaging more than 100 days of service per year, of which about forty-five days are TDY. To set this in perspective, each day of duty is roughly equivalent to a day of temporary duty for the active component, and in the active component we have tried, with only very limited success, to limit TDY to 90-120 days per year (Peters 1998).

Total force “seamlessness” is the product of mutual respect won through hard work and consummate professionalism. Seamlessness must be earned every day between both active and reserve components (Peters 1998).

General Tony Robertson, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, at an Air Force Association symposium in 1999, said that the AMC keeps a majority of its air mobility capability in the Air National Guard and reserve components--ready for use when needed. AMC will continue to rely heavily on Reservists, Guardsmen, and civilians to work with the active duty forces, to provide global reach for America (Robertson 1999).

Air National Guard units are an incredible bargain for about 6 percent of the Air Force budget. The Air National Guard units provide about a quarter of our overall Air Mobility capability on a day-to-day basis (Peters 1998).

General Ryan, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Reserve Affairs, Major General Robert A. McIntosh, and Major General Paul A. Weaver Jr., Director of the Air National Guard, recently kicked off a future total force study. The object of the study is to chart a path toward better use of the Air National Guard and Reserves--an end state that will draw upon the strengths of each component to increase the capabilities of the total force, while reducing its cost (Peters 1998). The outcome was
Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE-05), which was completed and signed off in June of 1999.

The study was conducted to support the imperatives of engagement and leadership set in the national security strategy. The DoD has developed a strategy and defense program that promotes the nation’s interests throughout the 1997-2005 period. The strategy requires DoD to help shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interest, to respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed. The United States must size, shape, and manage its force effectively to be capable of meeting the fundamental challenge of the nation’s defense strategy. This assessment will develop additional insights and potential alternatives for employing the reserve component forces in support of the defense strategy, from homeland defense and smaller scale contingencies (SSC) through major theater wars. Additionally, the study will explore opportunities to enhance the integration of the reserve component within the scope of their total force mission (Department of Defense 1999a).

The study fulfilled the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) by studying alternative concepts for employing the reserve component forces for the future. It reviewed the full range of combat and support reserve component roles in current operational plans, and assessed current planned employment. It identified and assessed potential reserve component missions in CONUS and OCONUS in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict. The plan developed and appraised alternative reserve component employment roles and force-mix concepts, including an evaluation of costs, benefits, and risks for each option. Finally, the plan was charged with reserve component resourcing for current and recommended requirements (Department of Defense 1999a).
Due to its broad mandate, the RCE-05 study examined a wide range of issues and drew participants from virtually every organization interested in the future of the total force. Not only did the study generate a variety of new initiatives that will enhance the role of the reserve component across the spectrum of DoD missions, the study process strengthened relationships between the active component and reserve component. The follow-on studies resulting from RCE-05 will build on this enhanced relationship, and are likely to generate additional mechanisms to increase active component and reserve component integration (Department of Defense 1999a).

The Study covered several areas regarding this thesis:

1. Increase reserve component participation in smaller-scale contingencies using the expeditionary aerospace force.
2. Lifting the 180-day limit requirement for reservist not activated.
3. Establishing a Joint Professional Military Education course for the reserve component.
4. Creating more reserve component staff positions at headquarters.
(Department of Defense 1999a)

**Air Force Career Path**

The Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) gives different jobs an outline to help individuals to plan and achieve their Air Force career goals. There are no definitive, concrete steps or squares that need to be achieved to reach rank or position. The need of the Air Force is the primary determinant for assignments and utilization. The key to success in an Air Force career is solid performance. Members should discuss their goals with their supervisor or commander during career counseling. The aviators have the experience and insight to help further develop and achieve their goals (U.S. Air Force 2000).
Aviators, whose most recent major weapons experience is in the C-130 or KC-135, are managed as part of the major weapon system (MWS). Development as a future Air Force leader is an on-going process, and decisions made today will affect the future. It is imperative personnel work with their peers, supervisor, and most importantly your commander to get the best possible advice. The Air Force assignment system (AFAS) gives the freedom in planning for future, but also the responsibility to balance Air Force needs with personal desires. Every person’s career takes unique twists and turns, and there is no “school-approved solution” (U.S. Air Force 2000).

When first assigned to the MWS as a copilot or navigator, individuals will gain technical experience in aircraft systems and the unit’s various missions for an average of three years before upgrading to aircraft commander for pilots and instructor for navigators. Upgrade to instructor pilot (IP) or flight examiner is an important indication of the expertise and leadership that are required for further supervisory positions. Upgrade may not be available at a pilot’s current location. A permanent change of station (PCS) may be necessary (once an officer has met time on station requirements) for the opportunity to upgrade to IP. Pilots should seek to attain aircraft commander status in a MWS before PCSing to other tours (U.S. Air Force 2000).

There are limited staff positions that a mid- to senior-level captain can choose for a broadening tour. In these jobs, the officer builds a strong foundation of experience (U.S. Air Force 2000).

The majority of rated officers will complete their third flying gate (144 months of flying duty) before they volunteer for a staff job. There is a continuing need for expertise

About 20 percent of those officers selected for major will be identified as candidates for resident Intermediate Service School (ISS). Many ISS students will go to a challenging joint-duty staff assignment, commander, MAJCOM, or Air Staff level job upon graduation. Officers not afforded the opportunity to attend Professional Military Education (PME) in residence should complete PME by correspondence or seminar to remain competitive in their Air Force career progression (U.S. Air Force 2000).

Not all aviators choose to leave their operational cockpits as they finish their third gate or when they are promoted to field grade rank. However, those who have only flown during their career and elect to continue to fly at this point rather than gaining staff experience are decreasing their chance to serve in leadership positions later in their career. Technical expertise peaks at the major or lieutenant colonel level. Further advancement assumes this technical expertise as the emphasis shifts to staff and leadership experience. After completion of a staff tour, field grade aviators can return to a cockpit (U.S. Air Force 2000).

Those officers who do not return to fly can continue up the staff track and compete for promotion and leadership positions through higher-level key staff assignments in USAF, MAJCOM, or joint level billets (U.S. Air Force 2000).

After a successful leadership or staff tour, officers selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel or colonel will also have the opportunity to vie for in-residence attendance at Senior Service School (SSS) (U.S. Air Force 2000).
This outline did not suggest that all rated officers should strive to be senior officers or that there is one ideal path to that level. Historically, however, the paths to senior positions include a strong operational background enhanced by a staff management tour in an operations related position and a return to fly in squadron leadership position before promotion and further staff and leadership opportunities (U.S. Air Force 2000).

The Air National Guard is comprised of about 80 percent personnel who have served on active duty; this includes all career fields, officer and enlisted. The rated officers that leave active duty and join the Air National Guard usually do so between their eight-to-fourteen year points (Air Mobility Command 1998).

The Air National Guard rated officer does not PCS from unit to unit or assignment to assignment. The officer usually stays with the initial unit they join. Career progression is done within the unit. The officer will work as an augment to the primary staff officers, functioning at the squadron, group, or wing. This is done before assuming the job full time. The Air National Guard does benefit from the experiences gained from members that have served on active duty and continues to build on the experience (Smith, 2000).

**Leadership Training**

An Air Force leader is flexible enough to meet changing circumstances, competent enough to perform under adverse conditions, courageous enough to lead at the risk of life or career, and honest enough to stand on principle and to do what is right. Leadership principles are guidelines that have been tested and proven over the years by successful leaders. Some key principles of leadership are:
1. Take care of people;
2. Motivate people;
3. Be a follower;
4. Know your job;
5. Know yourself;
6. Set the example;
7. Educate yourself and others;
8. Equip your troops;
9. Communicate;
10. Accept responsibility;
11. Develop teamwork; and
12. Read, study, watch, and prepare (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

These are the principles from which all Air Force and Air National Guard leadership courses are developed. These principles operate as a framework for all subjects taught to develop future leaders (Damon 1999).

The Air National Guard Senior Leader Development Course is for senior personnel who are or will to be assigned as a wing commander or senior staff member. The focus of the program is on the unique challenges of command (Air National Guard 1999a).

Experienced field commanders present the course for new commanders or personnel who may soon assume command or mid-level staff responsibilities. Materials are presented in an experiential adult learning format to include lectures, guided discussions, case studies, and field trips to explore commanders’ perspectives. This is a
fifteen-day course, which includes three days of training with and for the spouses (Pradia 2000).

The Air National Guard Senior Leader Development Course is intended to provide personnel with an understanding of their role within the organization and as a senior leader in the Air National Guard. It will give them the tools for handling a broad spectrum of issues that include anything from our commitment to mission readiness and satisfying organizational goals, to fairness in dealing with our most valuable resource—people (Air National Guard 1999a).

The Senior Commanders course is taught at the Air National Guard Readiness Center at Andrews AFB, Maryland. This gives senior National Guard Bureau staff an opportunity to greet and share their visions with the new leaders from the field (Pradia 2000).

The Air National Guard Squadron and Flight Commands Course is for senior personnel who are or will to be assigned as a squadron or flight commands. This is a portable course, offered at various locations throughout the country, designed to enhance the effectiveness of Air National Guard Squadron and Flight Commanders regardless of the type of unit.

Experienced field commanders and functional experts present the course for new and current commanders or personnel who may soon assume command responsibilities. Materials are presented in an interactive format to include guided discussions, scenario, case studies, and exercises. This is a one-week course (Pradia 2000).

The course sets up different leadership situations; students will determine the best courses of action by using methods described in class. The students will then discuss the
likelihood of near and long-term success. The exercises are conducted in a time and resource constrained simulated environment (Air National Guard 1999b).

The AMC Pre-Command Course is intended to provide personnel with an understanding of their role within the organization and as a senior leader in the AMC. It will give them the tools for handling a broad spectrum of issues. The course is two weeks long and is taught at Headquarters AMC. Briefings and seminar discussions are lead by senior staff members from headquarters (Duckett 2000).

The AMC Pre-Command Course is for senior personnel who are or will to be assigned as a wing commander or senior staff member. The focus of the program is on the unique challenges of command (Air Mobility Command 1999).

Secretary Cohen’s, 4 September 1997, memorandum on a seamless total forces called for the integration of the reserve and active components. It provides four key principles to measure our progress. These are:

1. Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the total force by the senior leaders throughout the total force;
2. Clear and mutual understanding on the mission for each unit--active, Guard and Reserve--in service and joint or combined operations, during peace and war;
3. Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions;
4. Leadership by senior commanders--active, Guard and Reserve--to ensure the readiness of the total force. (Peters 1998)

“At the end of the day, the common denominator of these four points is leadership--the leadership of all of us in this room.” (Peters 1998)

Conclusions

This chapter reviewed the background concerning the aerospace expeditionary force concept, and how the Air Force proposes to utilize the Air National Guard. The
author focused on the leadership aspect of the aerospace expeditionary force. Due to the aerospace expeditionary force's recent implementation, the data is not extensive. However, the existing data does spotlight the historical performance of the Air National Guard.

It was important that the history of the total force policy to how it began be looked at. It also explains how the total force might grow or the direction they might continue on in the future. There is plenty of data from Air Force leadership comment on the Air National Guards performance and how it integrates with the active duty. This data will be further analyzed in chapter 4.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

I had [the general] assemble his whole staff and tried to give them a picture of New Guinea. That was where the war was and it was not moving to Australia. Those youngsters up there were our customers and customers are always right. Our only excuse for living was to help them. We might work ourselves into having stomach ulcers or nervous breakdowns, but those things were not fatal. The work those kids in New Guinea and at Darwin were doing, however, had a high fatality rate. They deserved all they could get. Most of the crowd appreciated what I was talking about. The others would go home. (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a)

General George Kenney
Air Commander for General MacArthur (1942-1945)

This research examined whether the Air National Guard is capable of assuming a leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force. The thesis discussed whether the Air National Guard is capable of assuming leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force. The author looked at the way the Air National Guard trains and prepare its leaders. The focus was on rated officers in AMC’s gaining units. Although the Air National Guard has many well-trained officers and enlisted personnel alike, the focus is limited to one command. The other commands were looked at as a reference. The squadron commander and wing command positions were also focused on.

The research focused on the thesis and subordinate questions to try and determine whether the Air National Guard was ready to assume a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force? In an attempt to answer the thesis question, an attempt will be made to answer the following subordinate questions.

1. What are the major aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?
2. What are the major responsibilities inherent in the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

3. How does the Air National Guard train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?

4. How does the active USAF train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?

5. How are rated officers assigned to the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

Research Design

The active Air Force officer was compared and contrasted with the Air National Guard officer. The Air National Guard's Squadron Commanders Course, the Air National Guard's Senior Leaders Course and the AMC’s Pre-Command Course as a possible guide for leadership development were used as a references.

According to Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, qualitative data analysis consists of a basic four-step model: data collection, data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Because of the interactive, iterative nature of qualitative data, the date reduction; data display and conclusion, phases can be conducted simultaneously during the analysis process (Miles and Huberman 1984).

Carl von Clausewitz made the same point about the interactive nature of qualitative data in his book, *On War*. Carl von Clausewitz, however, used a three-step process in his critical analysis: (1) the discovery and interpretation of equivocal facts, (2) the tracing of effects back to their causes, and (3) the investigation and evaluation of means employed (Clausewitz 1989).
In Carl von Clausewitz first step, he accomplishes what Miles and Huberman later
call their data collection and reduction processed. The second step covers data reduction
and display, and step three integrates data reduction: data display and conclusion drawing
and verification.

A threefold approach to gathering data was used. Initially, the current literature
about the topic was examined. Interviews with experts on the Air National Guard, its
leadership, and the aerospace expeditionary force concept were conducted. Finally, the
data from the Air National Guard Senior Leadership, Squadron Commanders, and AMC
Pre-command courses were consolidated and evaluated. A comparison of the data
provided the basis of the research conclusions.

Due to the relatively short time the Air Force has been working with the
aerospace expeditionary force concept and how the Air National Guard fits into the
aerospace expeditionary force, there is very little literature on this subject. Therefore, in
order to add to the body of knowledge, a comparison was made of what senior Air Force
leaders and Air National Guard leaders have said about the aerospace expeditionary force
and Air National Guard. Next, a study of leadership positions in the aerospace
expeditionary force was made to determine their roles and responsibilities. Finally,
commander level courses were evaluated for the AMC and the Air National Guard to
understand their position(s) on this subject.

In conducting the literature search, varieties of sources were used. To begin with
the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth conducted a
background information search. On-line databases, particularly DefenseLINK News
Achieves, Air University Library, and Air Force Doctrine websites provided further data.
To obtain data from the many databases used in this research the following search terms were used: AEF, Air National Guard, Areospace Expeditionary Force, Leadership, and EAF.

Although the periodical databases provided valuable information, the Internet proved to be the most favorable source of the literature search. Not only did the internet contribute the largest amount of literature, but is also presented the most up-to-date data available. To conduct the internet search, Dogpile was used. Dogpile is a Web toll that combines results from several search engines to create a comprehensive list of Web resources for any query. Finally, interviews with Air National Guard leaders were conducted.

Once the data was collected, it was combined and analyzed. One must be aware that this data analysis model is interactive. The process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the raw data into pertinent information is a continuous process. Grouping the data into the five subordinate questions of the thesis eased the process.

First, the issue of Air National Guard leadership and how the Air National Guard has performed in the past was made. Comparisons were also made of what Air Force senior leaders have said about the Air National Guard and aerospace expeditionary force concept.

Next, the empirical data was analyzed. The goal was to find the similarities and differences between how the Air National Guard and AMC train their future leaders. This was accomplished by reviewing the Air National Guard and AMC pre-command courses.
An organized assembly of information that allows for ease in data interpretation and analysis is known as data display. This research used a basic narrative approach. The original research questions were restated followed by the responses from the web sources and interviews. Once again, data display is a part of the analysis process. Therefore, deciding which information to include and how to present it is part of the continuous process.

Finally, what the data means and how it supported the stated and implied conclusions was determined.

This information provided the data for the conclusions that are discussed in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

LeMay approached leadership with three basic principles in mind. . . He believed, first, that supervisors and associates must recognize the importance of each man's job or task, as well as of the man himself. Second, some progress, however small, must be made toward an established goal, otherwise serious dissatisfaction will develop. Lastly, commanders and supervisors must recognize and demonstrate real appreciation to those who have accomplished their assigned tasks. (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a)

Harry Borowski
A Hollow Threat

Introduction

Civilians call it "occupational stress," "the rat race," or "burnout." For Air Force members of the 1990s, the term of art is "the OPTEMPO problem"—shorthand for the collective stresses and strains afflicting an overworked Air Force. The problem affects not only members sent overseas with aerospace expeditionary forces but also fellow troops who are forced to work longer and harder (Callander 1998a).

"Why is the Air National Guard ready to assume a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?" In an attempt to answer the thesis question the following subordinate questions were addressed.

1. What are the major aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

2. What are the major responsibilities inherent in the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

3. How does the Air National Guard train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?
4. How does the active USAF train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?

5. How are rated officers assigned to the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

**Analysis**

What are the major aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions? The aerospace expeditionary force is built upon the basic Air Force structure: wing, group, and squadron. The major leadership positions are aerospace expeditionary wing, aerospace expeditionary group, and aerospace expeditionary squadron commanders. There are also major leadership positions for expeditionary elements below squadron level that are usually referred to as mission commanders or detachment commanders (DETCO) (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000). These positions range in rank from brigadier general to major.

The literature noted that aerospace expeditionary wing commander is usually a brigadier general, however the position may be filled with a colonel. Most active duty wings commanders are brigadier generals while most Air National Guard commanders are colonels. The organization size determines the rank (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

The aerospace expeditionary group commander is a colonel while the aerospace expeditionary squadron commander is a lieutenant colonel. There is no disparity between the active duty and the Air National Guard in these positions. Mission commanders are either a lieutenant colonel or major. The rank of these positions is dependent on the size
of the operation. It is acceptable to go up one rank depending on the availability of personnel (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

The Air National Guard has agreed to provide the people and planes for 10 percent of every aerospace expeditionary force, according to officials here. That means supplying enough people to handle about 2,500 jobs within each total force that will number about 25,000 people, or 25 percent of the Air National Guard force structure every fifteen-month cycle of the aerospace expeditionary force (Haskell 1999).

What are the major responsibilities inherent in the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions? An aerospace expeditionary wing may be composed of units from different wings, but where possible, the aerospace expeditionary wing is formed from units of a single wing. The aerospace expeditionary wing commander will report to the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000). The commander is responsible for the wing organization and management of the personnel as would a normal unit (Smith 2000).

The aerospace expeditionary group is a deployed independent group attached to an ASETF or in-place NAF by G-series orders and is the lowest command echelon of forces reporting directly to the COMAFFOR. An aerospace expeditionary group can also be part of an aerospace expeditionary wing, then the aerospace expeditionary group commander would report to the wing commander (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

An aerospace expeditionary squadron is a deployed squadron attached to an ASETF by G-series orders. The squadron is the basic fighting unit of the U.S. Air Force. Squadrons are configured to deploy and employ in support of crisis action requirements. However, an individual squadron is not designed to conduct independent operations; it
requires support from other units to obtain the synergy needed for sustainable, effective operations. As such, an individual squadron or squadron element should not be presented by itself without provision for appropriate support and command elements. If a single operational squadron or squadron element is all that is needed to provide the desired operational effect, then it should deploy with provision for commensurate support and C2 elements. An example of this would be an element of C-130s performing humanitarian operations (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000). The commander reports to the group commander and is responsible for the leadership and management of the squadron (Smith 2000).

A single squadron or squadron element may deploy without full support elements if it is planned to augment a deployed aerospace expeditionary wing or aerospace expeditionary group. It would thus obtain necessary support from the larger units (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

As part of its aerospace expeditionary force concept, the Air Force envisions substantial reserve component participation in SSCs. Increased reserve component participation will be critical to sustaining an adequate rotational base. Beginning in January 2000, when the first two Aerospace Expeditionary Forces will be operational, reserve component crews and personnel will start rotation into SSC operations on a ninety-day deployment basis (with fifteen day in-theater reserve component personnel swaps). The Air Force concept makes broad use of reserve component capabilities in SSCs, and the study recommended that as the Air Force fully implements the Aerospace Expeditionary Force program, it continue to refine reserve component participation in these types of operations (Department of Defense 1999a).
The Reserve Component Employment study’s resourcing panel also examined resource challenges for reserve component employment. The study appraised more than thirty resource issues confronting the reserve component, including their accessibility, utilization, mobilization, training, staffing, and management (Department of Defense 1999a).

One issue the study addressed was lifting the 180-day limit requirement. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 115(d)(6), states that volunteer Reservists who have been on active duty for more than 180 days must be counted against the active military end-strength levels, which are set by law. The services are unwilling to violate the Congressional end-strength authorizations. Because of this, the services are often hesitant to use Reservists where their employment might otherwise be clearly beneficial. In some cases, the services have terminated active duty tours for Reservists near the end of the fiscal year to avoid violating the end-strength authorizations, even if this disrupted mission performance. Lifting this restriction would facilitate greater and more effective use of the reserve component, particularly in cases where reserve component personnel are providing tempo relief for active component personnel. As a result, the study supports the proposal in the DoD FY2000 Omnibus to modify this legislation. The modification would allow reservists to serve for 181 days or more as long as the total number of Reservists on active duty does not exceed .2 percent of the authorized active duty end-strength (Department of Defense 1999a).

When Reservists are ordered to active duty for special work voluntarily in support of military operations for more than 180 days, their strength is included in the active component strength subject to grade limitations by Congress. In some cases, this means
that the Services cannot have the grades they want because the total of active component and active duty, reserve component personnel exceeds the grade ceilings. However, grade ceilings were established based on the active component strength and may be inappropriate when reserve component augmentation is sought for a military operation. The Air Force and the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) report that they have been unable in some instances to obtain enough experienced aviators for operational support because of this challenge (Department of Defense 1999a).

How does the active USAF and Air National Guard train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary forces? Air Force doctrine provides leadership principles as guidelines for use in the development of the core curriculum for leadership course. These principles have been tested and proven over the years by successful leaders. Some key principles of leadership are:

**Take Care of People:** People are our most valuable resource. The time and effort a leader spends taking care of subordinates and coworkers will be amply rewarded in increased unit morale, effectiveness, and cohesion (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

**Motivate People:** A leader’s challenge often is motivating others to set and achieve high standards. The ability to generate enthusiasm about the mission may be the single most important factor in leadership (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

**Be a Follower:** The Air Force expects all its leaders first to be followers. Good followers also understand and take personal pride in their contribution to the total Air Force mission; they have the strength of character to be gratified by the collective pride
in a team effort without seeking individual reward (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

**Know Your Job:** Airmen will follow a competent person who has the knowledge necessary to complete the mission. Part of a leader’s responsibility is to ensure subordinates know their jobs. The Air Force leader must have a broad view of the mission, and should ensure all members understand how their efforts contribute to mission accomplishment (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

**Know Yourself:** Successful leaders know their own strengths and weaknesses. They capitalize on their strengths by developing a leadership style that complements them (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

**Set the Example:** Leaders should set a high standard for themselves and those around them (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

**Educate Yourself and Others:** Professional military education, professional development (continuing civilian education), off-duty education, technical training schools, and on-the-job training are formal means to train airmen. Greater efficiencies are possible with a highly trained and skilled force. Education must be a top priority (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

**Equip Your Troops:** Good leaders ensure their troops have the right tools to perform the mission. A well equipped force can capitalize on its extensive training and requires fewer personnel or less time to accomplish its mission (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).
Accept Responsibility: Leaders are responsible for performing the mission. If successful, the unit deserves praise; if it fails, the leader is accountable for the consequences (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

Develop Teamwork: A good leader works to build airmen into a cohesive team that works together to accomplish the mission. Only a true team will avoid the trap where only one person in the unit is able to accomplish any one aspect of the mission (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

Read, Study, Watch, and Prepare: Should an airman someday be privileged to command, their leadership abilities, matured through a career of learning and acting, are critical to the new responsibilities (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a).

Secretary Cohen addressed the Reserve Forces Policy Board with his ideas on PME. The conditions in today's world demand that DoD seeks nothing less than the power and professionalism of the total force. DoD needs to achieve a more total force approach for all military education programs. The initiative is another important step to integrate the military active and reserve forces into a “truly seamless total force.” Education will focus on developing a professional military education system that will ensure our leaders throughout the DoD have a genuine understanding of the role and contributions of the Air National Guard and Reserves to our national security (U.S. Air Force 1999).

The Air Force will continue to insist on strong leadership from our commanders and supervisors. Our leaders must create a quality Air Force, a quality total force that encourages innovation and allows people to achieve their full potential. They must also
provide a leadership commitment and an operating style that inspires trust, teamwork, and continuous improvement (Ryan n.d.).

The Air Force is trying to determine the areas where it will continue to evolve and what kind of experience and skills will be expected of people when they reach leadership positions. The junior officers of today need to be more concerned about their preparation for the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel for they are the senior officer leaders of the Air Force of the future. The professional education program will try to provide these officers with the right blend of skills the Air Force thinks are necessary to lead it in the twenty-first century” (Bosker 2000).

The AMC Pre-Command Course is intended to provide personnel with an understanding of their role within the organization and as senior leaders in the AMC. It will give them the tools for handling a broad spectrum of issues. The two-week course is taught at Headquarters AMC. Briefings and seminar discussions are led by senior staff members from AMC headquarters (Duckett 2000).

The Air National Guard Senior Leader Development Course is for senior personnel who are or will be assigned as wing commanders or senior staff members. The focus of the program is on the unique challenges of command (Air National Guard 1999a).

The Air National Guard Squadron and Flight Command course sets up different leadership situations; students determine the best courses of action by using methods described in class. The students then discuss the likelihood of near and long-term success. The exercises are conducted in a time and resource constrained simulated environment (Air National Guard 1999b).
Both the AMC and Air National Guard courses teach relatively the same material. They focus on what a commander needs to know to be successful. The topics center around the personnel they are about to lead, and include subjects on counseling, mortuary affairs, diversity, safety, higher headquarters directorate briefings, discipline and adverse actions, and topics which increase the individuals knowledge base. The course instructors are leaders from the field or from the headquarters, with a wealth of knowledge and experience (Damon 1999).

One difference is the diversity issue. While both commanders are concerned with diversity, Air National Guard commanders are charged with responsibility of trying to mirror the diversity in the community. Another issue is labor relations. Active duty commanders will have civil servants that work on their base, however, that number is small compared to the number of active duty personnel. Whereas the Air National Guard commander is faced with a full time staff that is mainly civil servants with a smaller number of AGRs; same issues different prospective.

The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE-05) looked at establishing a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) course for the reserve component. While there is a professional military education program to prepare active component personnel for service in joint assignments, a similar program for reserve component personnel does not exist. As a result, many reserve component personnel who serve in joint assignment begin those duties less prepared than is desirable. While reserve component personnel in joint billets do receive some on-the-job training in joint assignments once they arrive, these experiences rarely provide a solid or standardized foundation in the fundamentals of joint operations. To address this concern, DoD has
proposed in its FY 2000 Omnibus Legislation that a professional military education course for the reserve component on joint assignments be established, specifically focused on the JPME Phase II program. Currently no billets are allocated to the reserve component for JPME Phase II. The proposal also calls for an increase in reserve component billets for JPME Phase I curriculums (Department of Defense 1999a).

Greater reserve component participation in professional education programs would satisfy increasing DoD needs for highly trained professionals at every echelon, especially in the joint arena. Other benefits include enhanced integration with the active component, improved retention, and expanded qualification for joint service. Increasing the throughput of the courses would cost money and time in personnel assets, and take reserve component faculty from other tasks until recruiting could fill the gap (Department of Defense 1999a).

It called for the development of a JPME accreditation program for reserve component members recommended for assignment to or actually assigned to joint staff or command billets (Department of Defense 1999a).

The study also addressed the creation of more reserve component staff positions at Headquarters. Unfamiliarity within the active component regarding reserve component mission, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hamper the ability of the DoD to use the reserve component most effectively. Increasing the integration of the reserve component leadership into the decision-making processes within the DoD would reduce this unfamiliarity and facilitate more comprehensive and effective employment of the reserve component. To integrate reserve component leadership personnel more fully into DoD, the study recommended increasing the number of full-
time Air National Guard and Reserve officers and senior noncommissioned officers into unified command headquarters and joint activities. The study also recommended raising the number of Air National Guard and Reserve general and flag officers serving in these organizations. The Reserve Forces Policy Board supports both of these recommendations (Department of Defense 1999a).

Air National Guard uses a more even mix of prior-service members and new recruits. For Fiscal Year 1998, for example its target was to bring in 4,560 prior-service and 3,444 non-prior-service enlisted recruits. Toward the end of the year, it had more than met the overall target but was short in the non-prior-service category (Callander 1998a).

The majority of Air National Guard lieutenant colonels and colonels today have completed ISS and or SSS PME by correspondence or by seminar. JPME Phase II would be helpful for individuals going to work on joint staff during an Aerospace Expeditionary Force at the JAFCC or JFC level. Most of the command positions that are being proposing are at the unit level (wings, groups, or squadrons), which does not require JPME Phase II (Damon 1999).

"At the conceptual level, there is agreement that we're moving in the right direction," said Major General Norton A. Schwartz, Air Force Director of Strategic Planning. However, there is less consensus about specific initiatives, he said, although the general reaction has been "positive" (Correll 1999).

There are several reasons why the Air Force is considering these unusual variations in the force mix. Among the motives are what Schwartz described as "top-down imperatives," in which the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chief of
Staff have urged all of the services to make better use of their reserve components.

(Correll 1999)

Another factor is the success of several force mix experiments. "It became apparent that there was promise in doing things outside the norm," Schwartz said (Correll 1999).

The possibilities were also expanded by the adoption last year by the Air Force of the expeditionary aerospace force concept, under which units will know well in advance the times during which they will be on tap for contingency deployments. Making the deployment schedules more predictable will bring greater participation in contingency operations within reach of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserves (Correll 1999).

"This is the biggest cultural change in the Air Force since the separation from the Army (in 1947)," observed Colonel Larry Brooks, Air National Guard Deputy Director of Operations (Haskell 1999).

General Ryan feels that leadership is what holds the force together. He also believes that personnel in the Air Force are all high quality. The leadership makes the difference between good and bad results. To be an effective leader, you must not only know the Air Force core values and champion them; you must live them. (Ryan n.d.)

How are rated officers assigned to the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions? Aerospace Expeditionary Forces are not deployable units, and do not have a command authority. Aerospace Expeditionary Wings, Aerospace Expeditionary Groups, or Aerospace Expeditionary Squadrons are deployable units tailored from the capabilities in an Aerospace Expeditionary Force pair. These units deploy with tactical-level
command and control. When deployed, Aerospace Expeditionary Wings, Aerospace Expeditionary Groups, or Aerospace Expeditionary Squadrons align to joint command structures, normally as an ASETF, under the command of the COMAFFOR. Total Force integration of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve people and their frontline combat and support aircraft allow better force and personnel tempo management (U.S. Air Force 1999).

Commanders are assigned to the aerospace expeditionary force based on the structure and preponderance of the force. If a wing were tasked then the commander of that aerospace expeditionary wing when deployed would be the commander of the deploying unit (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 2000).

In the case of the Kosovo operation (Allied Force) where wings and group were formed from separate units, the commander was selected at the headquarters level; during Allied Force for AMC, the commanders were approved by the commander of AMC. The selection was based on the preponderance of forces (Smith 2000).

For Air National Guard units, the selection process involves the Director of the Air National Guard, the Air National Guard Assistant, and Advisor to the Commander of AMC for nominations of commanders and approval by the AMC commander. The nomination usually was the commander who had the majority of the forces assigned to deploy. The Air National Guard Assistant is a traditional guardsman in the rank of major general. The Air National Guard Advisor is a full time position in the rank of colonel (Smith 2000).

During Operation Allied Force, the Air National Guard forward deployed forty-seven KC-135 aircraft and 2,116 personnel in support of the operation. Several
aerospace expeditionary groups were formed from these assets, which the Air National Guard commanded. An aerospace expeditionary wing was formed that consisted of active, Guard, and Reserve “rainbowed” units under the leadership of an active duty commander. Units at all levels performed in an outstanding total force manner (Smith 2000).

Why is the Air National Guard ready to assume a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force? Airmen have never suffered from a lack of visionary thinkers. Airmen are not known for lacking the courage of their convictions. What airmen have been criticized for is making an unsubstantiated claim, seemingly acting on faith much more that plans. A strategic vision document taps into the vision of our leaders, clearly states our convictions, and provides an avenue to attaining our goals for the future (Faulkenberry 1995).

An Air Force memo called for: 1) Clear ownership of the Total Force by senior leaders; 2) Clear missions for each unit; 3) Commitment to resources; and 4) Dedication to the readiness of the entire total force. Finally, the memo called for “full integration of the reserve and active components.” During the past year, military leadership seemingly took steps to do just that (Boorstin 1998).

The Air Force announced this summer the creation of the expeditionary aerospace force, which puts the Air National Guard “on board” for seamless integration, said Major General Gordon Stump, the new National Guard Association of the United States president. “The National Guard will be embedded within the active-duty force” (Boorstin 1998).
With a blistering OPTEMPO, the Air Force found itself hard-pressed to keep
good pilots and airmen in the force. The new Air Force structure will rely on the Air
National Guard, along with plenty of forewarning and specific plans for deployments, to
solve this problem (Boorstin 1998).

"It doesn't get any better than this," said Air National Guard Director Major
General Paul Weaver. The Air National Guard has been on the "ground floor" for the
development and future of the total force, he said (Boorstin 1998).

One reason for this success is the Air Force's ability to solve disagreements
"behind closed doors," he said, giving the Air Force the ability to speak with "one voice,"
and building a cohesive environment. "The total force works in the Air Force because of
trust and respect," Weaver said (Boorstin 1998).

The strength of the reserve component and the quality of the reserve component
personnel are important factors in the ability of reserve component members and units to
train effectively in peacetime and perform effectively when mobilized. Meeting
authorized staffing levels in a high OPTEMPO environment is a major factor in
maintaining the effectiveness of the reserve component (Department of Defense 1999a).

There are constraints on the availability of reserve component members for active
duty tours because the heavy demands on their available time are poorly understood.
Reservists are being used more than ever before to perform operational mission in
peacetime. This is happening because the high OPTEMPO to meet the missions assigned
to the services by Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the CINCs exceeds the capability of
the AC. Up to now, the reserve component missions have been assigned and accepted
without a firm understanding of just how much active duty the reserve component can

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perform without impacting seriously on the ability of the reserve component to retain old members and recruit new ones (Department of Defense 1999a).

Although the reserve component is providing more peacetime augmentation to their respective active component than ever before, little is known about the impact of this high demand on their continued availability for active duty and their retention in military service.

Predictability—advanced knowledge of an operation in time to permit coordination with families and employers—helps reservists to go on active duty. The Air Force has attempted to meet the need for predictability by instituting the expeditionary aerospace force concept (Department of Defense 1999a).

Reserve component leaders are not integrated into the decision-making process at the appropriate level. The panel participants concluded that the reserve component could be used more effectively if they were represented appropriately at all levels of the decision-making process that considers reserve component mission, structure, resourcing, and employment. They suggested that there be an increased number of full-time Air National Guard and Reserve officers and senior non commissioned officers at unified command headquarters and joint activities. There should be more assigned Air National Guard and Reserve general and flag officers to unified command headquarters and joint activities (Department of Defense 1999a).

An ongoing study called “Future Total Force,” currently making the rounds of the Air Staff, has raised the possibility of regularly assigning elements of the Air Reserve Components (the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) to active duty wings—
well as putting active duty associate units in the Air National Guard and Reserve wings (Correll 1999).

The active duty Air Force will be short almost 1,400 pilots by the end of this year, with the shortfall soon expected to reach 2,000. If present trends continue, active duty fighter wings face a situation in which they will be unable to fill their cockpits. Barring some miracle in pilot retention, there will be no way to solve that problem with pilots coming along in the active duty system (Correll 1999).

The pilot shortage—which is driven both by internal factors and by the lure of flying for the airlines—occurs at a time when a strategy of Global Engagement has pushed the peacetime OPTEMPO to an all-time high (Correll 1999).

The Air Force has too few pilots chasing too many contingency deployments. That hurts retention, which leads to even fewer pilots staying in the service to help carry the OPTEMPO. It is a downward spiral that feeds on itself (Correll 1999).

Pilots with between six and eight years of service are of special concern. They are approaching the end of their active duty service commitment, after which they will be eligible to separate (Correll 1999).

They are the largest concentration of pilots in the force, with an average of more than 1,100 pilots in each year group. The ranks coming along behind them, those with between one and five years of service, are much thinner by comparison, with an average of only about 500 pilots in each year group (Correll 1999).

The unfortunate prospect is that many of the pilots from the sixth through the eighth year groups will get out and be lost to the Air Force. The ARCs are not in a
position to pick them up. ARC units are fully manned with pilots and already have many qualified applicants for every cockpit that becomes available (Correll 1999).

**Summary of Research**

The Air National Guard has a long and distinguished history. The past service to the nation, which has been so readily shown, only enhances the opportunities for a very challenging future. Air Guardsmen served in the Mexican Border Conflicts, World War I, World War II (in both the European and Pacific theaters), the Korean conflict, the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, The Dominican Republic in 1965, Vietnam, Creek Party, Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm. Desert Storm saw a one of the largest call-ups of our reserve forces. Today there are Guardsmen and women serving in Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and around the world (Gross, n.d.a, n.d.b.).

The lessons of the past have also taught DoD leaders to keep a close match between force structure and the people needed to sustain it. A balanced approach seems to do just that. The bottom line is that force structure must always drive types and numbers of people (Lempe 1997).

There is a current shortage of pilots and navigators (rated officers) on active duty. The Air Force predicts this shortage to continue well into the twenty-first century. This is the result of a healthy economy and a high OPTEMPO coupled with the Air Education and Training Command’s (AETC) inability to train enough replacement pilots. The Air Force along with the other services has been stretched to the limits with the reduction of personnel over the past ten years and the increase of our worldwide commitments and
contingencies. The Air Force predicts this shortage will continue well into the twenty-first century (Peter and Ryan 1998).

The Air National Guard and Reserves continue to play an important role in helping to meet the demands placed upon our Air Force. In fact, Air National Guard and Reservist, man-days per year today are almost equal to the level of effort during the height of the Gulf War (Fogleman 1997).

The senior leadership at the wing levels and below are ready to assume the leadership positions in the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. Due to the shortage of active duty rated officers, this shortage will also effect the availability of active component leaders to fill these positions. The Air National Guard has preformed with excellence in all missions assigned. This stellar performance is due to “Leadership.”

In recent years, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve have taken on a greater share of the missions traditionally performed by active duty members. In the process, they also have taken on some of the problems associated with the frequent deployments of today’s OPTEMPO (Callander 1998a).

However, at the same time, it has increased the concerns within the reserve components—the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command—about the future of recruiting and retention (Callander 1998a).

Historically, USAF’s two reserve components were the backup elements for the standing military establishment. Until recently, their units were, in theory, equals of the active duty forces, but in fact, they often were inadequately trained and poorly equipped (Callander 1998b).
The result is that the reserve components now make up about one-third of the Total Force, compared with one-fourth ten years ago and 12 percent in the 1960s (Callander 1998a).

Today, the Air National Guard provides all of USAF's air defense interceptor force, 44 percent of its tactical airlift, and 43 percent of its air refueling tankers (Callander 1998a).

At any given moment, several thousand Guardsmen and Reservists are deployed overseas with airlift, fighter, and refueling aircraft. They provided a large portion of the forces for the Gulf War and continue to furnish units for deployment to trouble spots around the world (Callander 1998a).

The mix of active, Air National Guard, and Reserves, called "rainbowing," has become virtually seamless (Callander 1998a).

The reserve components have moved into an unprecedented partnership with the active force, but it has not been without its costs. Reserve members now share the stress of OPTEMPO with their active duty counterparts and must cope with the problems of frequent deployments and prolonged separations from their families. In addition, they face the unique challenge of meshing their military duties with their civilian careers (Callander 1998a).

The United States Air Force (USAF) has said that the reserve components' participation would be a vital part of the expeditionary aerospace force approach, the idea being to levy requirements on the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Component to be filled at their discretion. General David E. Sibley, Assistant Vice Commander Air Force Reserve Command, said that Air Force Reserve Component has been dealing with
a similar concept for years with fighter units and sometimes with tankers. He said he expects the same approach will be applied to other types of units as the expeditionary aerospace force plan becomes a reality (Callander 1998a).

The Air National Guard and Reserves are also following the active force's lead in another area in their effort to reduce OPTEMPO. From a number of surveys, USAF has learned that one of the main irritants to members is undergoing inspections and participating in exercises in addition to meeting real-world contingencies. Both the active and reserve forces are trying to reduce these requirements (Callander 1998a).

For example, General Sibley stated that AFRC is making progress in that the Air Force is starting to evaluate and inspect more on the unit's participation in real-world requirements and make those count for what used to be exercises. He believes it is a way to make some big reductions in inspections and exercises without losing any combat capability (Callander 1998b).

While both Air National Guard and Reserve leaders emphasize the need to improve the lot of their members, they say they are proud of the job their forces are doing. As Sibley put it, "We don't pay them big dollars to do what they are doing. Therefore, corny as it may sound, you have to get down to the mom and apple pie and patriotism factors. They are doing it because they like what they are doing and they feel good about being front line. That's got to make you optimistic" (Callander 1998b).

Moreover, such a change in attitude can, in fact, occur. USAF's Chief of Staff, General Michael E. Ryan, points out that, as World War II ended, the drive for a separate Air Force was in full gear, but proponents of a separate Air Force saw little role for the Air National Guard in their vision of the post-World War II Air Force. "The Air National
Guard was virtually forced on a newborn Air Force by political pressure," Ryan said. "In those early years, there was very little understanding or trust between the active duty and the Guard." Ryan pointed out that one Air Force general even referred to the Air National Guard as "flyable storage" (Kitfield 1998a).

That attitude dramatically changed over the years, and was given great impetus by the establishment in 1973 of the total force policy. When the total force policy was first established, the Air Force made a conscious decision to accept the Air National Guard and to administer objective readiness tests (Kitfield 1998a).

Farrell said that General Michael E. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, tasked him to conduct a study of the problem. He made a list of bases that were involved with deployments and found that the Air Force was requiring many of them to support deployments without supplying them with the resources they needed (Callander 1998b).

Farrell said that Ryan concluded that "we aren't really organized for expeditionary operations" and instructed him to come up with an organizational plan that would properly posture the Air Force for such operations, "so that we can continue to do things like this on a consistent basis without driving the force into the ground" (Callander 1998b).

Today's Air Force--the Total Air Force--is busier than it ever has been in peacetime. As a result, Air National Guardsmen are now being deployed around the world side by side with their active duty counterparts, shouldering an increasing portion of the burden of contingency operations and deployments (Kitfield, 1998b).

In the 1990s, Air National Guard units have taken part in numerous operations--Northern and Southern Watch over Iraq, Joint Guard, Deny Flight, Provide Promise in
Bosnia; and Coronet Nighthawk and Coronet Oak in Latin America. The most recent example of the Air National Guard's mounting contribution came with the buildup of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region in February in response to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's obstruction of UN weapons inspectors. The Air National Guard sent four fighter units to the Gulf (Kitfield 1998b).

"During the height of that deployment, the commander of AMC [General Walter Kross] called just to let me know how proud he was of our Total Air Force,” said Major General Paul A. Weaver Jr., Air National Guard's Director, in an interview with Air Force Magazine. “He had expected to fill 25 percent of his extra personnel requirements with Guard and Reserve volunteers, and instead they filled 55 percent of his requirement” (Kitfield 1998b).

Weaver added, “While the Air Guard is close to being fully tasked right now, we're exploring ways we can do even more to relieve the active Air Force's OPTEMPO” (Kitfield, 1998a).

Brigadier General Paul R. Cooper, Air Force Reserves, in 1996 was the Commander of Tuzla AB, Bosnia. During his tour he commanded active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve units. Tuzla AB is the central air hub of all peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. He stated that most of his personnel did not even realize that he was a Reservist. The ones that did know did not find it odd that a Reservist was in command. He commented that there were also nine other Air Guardsmen and Reservist in positions of responsibility in Tuzla at the time (Kitfield, 1998a).
Brigadier General Cooper went on to say that he had not spent his career “bouncing around” staff jobs. He said that he had more experience managing at the wing level and had more flying hours than his active duty counterparts (Kitfield 1998b).

The Air National Guard announced that they were expanding their staff integration program due to the success they have had. The staff integration program is the Air National Guards integration of staff officers into the Air Force’s major command headquarters. These officers work side-by-side their active duty counterparts working total force issues (Air National Guard 1999c).

In stark contrast with the experience of other services, senior Air Force leaders have shown that they will not hesitate to call on the Air National Guard for operations across the spectrum of missions, from tactical airlift and aerial refueling to combat air patrol and operations involving bombers. What makes the close partnership possible, say service officials is trust. Over the decades, Air National Guard leaders have been at the table on important Air Force decisions and know they are regarded as members of the first team (Kitfield 1998b).

Conclusions

This suggests that the Air Force is taking steps to employ Air National Guard officers in Aerospace Expeditionary Force leadership role. As seen with the Air National Guard staff integration program, leadership positions assumed by the reserve component during Allied Force, and Brigadier General Cooper’s command, the Air Force is relying more on the reserve components to fill leadership positions. This is due in part to the shortage of rated officers, but more importantly, it is due to the outstanding product that they receive by employment of the reserve component in every task.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The people who make up our Air Force team are the most important thing for our Service to focus on. They are the foundation of our strength. We must recruit, train, and retain the highest quality force possible. If we are to be successful, then we must take care of our people and their families. (HQ Air Force Doctrine Center 1999a)

General Ronald Fogleman, USAF
Air Force Chief of Staff (1994-1997)

Thesis Restated

With this thesis, the author tried to discover “Why is the Air National Guard ready to assume a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?” In an attempt to answer the thesis question, the following subordinate questions were investigated

1. What are the major aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

2. What are the major responsibilities inherent in the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

3. How does the Air National Guard train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?

4. How does the active USAF train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?

5. How are rated officers assigned to the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?
The Air Expeditionary Force Reviewed

The Aerospace Expeditionary Force is a tool for the Air Force to add some predictability to deployment schedules. Air Force units, including the Air National Guard and Reserves, are divided into ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. Two of the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces are on-call for a 90-day window. Units would be available for Aerospace Expeditionary Force deployment once every fifteen months.

There are two uses of the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. The first is to handle the on-going deployments such as Northern Watch, South Watch, Volant Oak, and the Bosnian peacekeeping operation. During these operations the Air National Guard is providing 10 percent of the rotational force year around. The Air National Guard manages these deployments by rotating aircrews every fifteen days. Staffs and deployment mission commanders deploy for at least thirty days.

The Air National Guard increased its participation in worldwide operational deployments by approximately 10 percent. For example, the Air National Guards C-130s prior to the Aerospace Expeditionary Force support six to eight aircraft during two non-consecutive quarters in either Southwest Asia or in Germany for Bosnian support mission. The Air National Guard with the Reserves supported Command in Chief Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) required for six aircraft for Volant Oak year around. These mission were supported by mission commanders, staffs, and the appropriate crew ratios. With the Aerospace Expeditionary Force missions the Air National Guard still support Volant Oak with C-130. Now they also provide two aircraft for each location year around in Southwest Asia and Germany. These rotations provide a detachment
commander, staffs, and aircrews. This has increased deployment schedules about 15 percent.

The second use of the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces is for SSCs. One example of a SSC in Operation Allied Force, the Kosovo operation. During these operations it may be necessary to use the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC) to activate reserve forces for longer periods of time. Allied Force started with the use of volunteers to fill mission needs. A PSRC was required for this operation to support the need for more forces. The Air National Guard provided 47 aircraft and 2,116 personnel for this operation.

The Aerospace Expeditionary Forces do not replace deliberate operational plans (OPLANS). During a larger scale contingency or a major theater war the CINCs use their OPLANs and would deploy the forces necessary to fight and win the war.

The Air National Guard has been deploying mission commanders, staffs, and aircrews to the CINCs on a rotational basis for over twenty years. The Air National Guard and Reserves have supported CINCSOUTH with C-130s year around with rotational crews since 1978. The Air National Guard also provided combat and mobility aircraft and mission staffs for operations in Bosnia and Southwest Asia since 1991. After Desert Storm the Air National Guard supports these operations for three-month blocks with crews and support staffs. The mission commander and some of the staff deploys for at least forty-five days and the crews for at least 15 days.

The Air National Guards concept of support for the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces is not a new one. It is a time tested and proven concept. The CINCs have not
seen any difference in the Air National Guards rotations and the active duty’s 90-day rotations.

**Conclusions**

What are the major responsibilities inherent in the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

Leadership faces the same issues that face squadron, group, and wing commanders during normal operations at home station. Their main concerns are their people, their training, and the mission. The main difference is that an aerospace expeditionary wing, group, or squadron may be comprised of “rainbowed” forces and training is complete. General Cooper for example commanded active Air Force, Guard, and Reserve forces at Tuzla AB, Bosnia. General Cooper stated the he had more time leading wing level organizations and flying hours than his active counterparts had. My research through interviews with Air National Guard leaders supports this contention.

What are the major aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

The author learned that the leadership positions included but were not limited to aerospace expeditionary wing, group, and squadron commanders. The DIRMOBFOR is a leadership position. There are also a variety of positions available on the JAFCC’s staff. The positions most likely to be filled by the Air National Guard are the positions at or below the rank of brigadier general and the unit commander jobs. The best opportunity for Air National Guard leadership lies in command of the aerospace expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons.

How does the active USAF and Air National Guard train its future leaders for a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary forces?
By reviewing the AMC Pre-Command Course and the Air National Guard Senior Commander and Squadron and Flight Commander Courses, it was discovered that neither course held a greater advantage over the other. The courses were all extremely well written. Headquarters directorates and field leadership subject matter experts led the seminar blocks.

The author did learn through the Resource Component Employment Study that it believed Reserve officers lacked the education received through JPME Phase II. The study also stated that there was not an opportunity for Reserve officers to attend this course and the course is not offered through correspondence. The study alleged that this lack of education disadvantaged individual performance in a joint force staff position.

Professional Military Education is important in the Air National Guard. General Weaver believes it to be essential. Officers are required to complete ISS and SSS in residence, in seminar or through correspondence to be competitive for promotion. The Air National Guard believes that it is imperative that leaders attend the Air National Guard Senior Leader Development Course. This education coupled with years of experience well prepares Air National Guard leaders for aerospace expeditionary unit commands. No other information in the research about the Air National Guard's alternatives to JPME Phase II was found.

How are rated officers assigned to the aerospace expeditionary force leadership positions?

It was found that leadership positions were equitably distributed. The research supports that AMC has made good uses of their Air National Guard assets. With the
shortage of rated officers on active duty there will be increasing opportunities for Air National Guard participation in leadership roles.

Why is the Air National Guard ready to assume a major leadership role in the aerospace expeditionary force?

The Air National Guard has a proud history of support the national military strategy. Air National Guard personnel are highly trained, extremely dedicated, decisively motivated, and vastly experienced. The Air National Guard is devoted to the Air Force core values of “integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do.”

The Air National Guard is already assuming major leadership roles in the Aerospace Expeditionary Force. The Air National Guard leaders are experienced and well educated commanders. The research supports their leadership abilities through the findings of outstanding and excellent ratings on Operational Readiness Inspections. Their management and leadership skills are also evident through the Air National Guards exceptional SORTS reports. The leadership capabilities of the Air National Guard are well founded and should be looked to for support of the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces.

Finally, the research found that many Air Force leaders to include the Secretary of the Air Force, former and current Air Force Chiefs of Staff, and AMC Commanders have praised the Air National Guard for their outstanding efforts. The author believes that the Air National Guard units could not have provided the outstanding support of the National Military Strategy without solid leadership. The Air National Guard leadership should continue to be used in the Aerospace Expeditionary Force.
Final Thoughts

This research project was started with the belief that the Air National Guard was under utilized and overlooked for leadership position. The author thought that it was possible, however, not probable that the leaders may not have had the training and education required.

Research showed that the Air National Guard leaders at the unit commander’s level have a vast amount of experience and are well educated. It also found that AMC has made use of the Air National Guard leadership. The author believes that there is always room for improvement. In the Air Force and especially in AMC, the total force works and works well.

General Weaver affirmed that the Air National Guard knows that the underlying theme in making any organization better is “leadership”--it sets the tone for everything an organization does. The fundamental difference between a good unit and an outstanding unit is leadership (Air National Guard 1999a).

Further Research Topics

The first area that was found for further research was in the area of JPME Phase II. Could a correspondence course be developed? Would it effectively increase the knowledge needed for positions on joint staffs? What would be the cost and benefit ratio? Could slots be allocated for Reserve officer in residence? Are there personnel available for the slots?

The second area is to examine the difference in leadership development for rated and non-rated officers. Non-rated and support officers start in command positions earlier in their careers than rated officers. How can the Air Force best prepare officers for
leadership positions? Are non-rated officers capable of commanding a flying unit? Note: Regulations state that a commander of a flying unit must be qualified in the unit’s aircraft.

The third area is a time in command comparison between the reserve component and the active duty. Does a Reserve commander have more time commanding at the unit level than the active duty counterpart? What effect does this have on the total force?

Finally, what is the availability of Reserve force personnel to serve in leadership position? Are there enough volunteers to support greater than thirty-day command deployments? Who should manage these positions and assignments?
APPENDIX A

AIR NATIONAL GUARD VISION STATEMENT

Introduction to the Air National Guard Vision Statement
The lynch pin of the Integrated Planning Process is the Vision statement. The Vision statement must define the elements that are crucial to our continued success and effectiveness and it must be timeless. Creating this document required us to look ahead and to look back. As we considered who we are and why we have been so effective, we were led to this definition of those things that have been, are, and will always be essential to the Air National Guard. This document provides, in detail, the imperatives for our success. Our vision is not a short slogan; we provide useful guidance to the planners at all levels of our organization.

Our Vision was born out of love for our Air National Guard, respect for our traditions, and belief in our future. Read this document carefully and see the future for yourself, your unit, and our Air Guard.

The Vision.....
We stand on the verge of a new century having just celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Air Force as a separate service. The United States is the only dual economic and military superpower. Our country has invested in military capacity and has seen that investment pay dividends in Operation Desert Storm. Our parent service, the United States Air Force, has embraced the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to create the most cost effective and lethal military force in the world.

The future will hold many challenges as the pace of technological change quickens and military budgets are more and more constrained. Our people, our most valuable asset, are faced with enormous demands on their time and talents and with some uncertainty as to future roles and missions. It is critical, now, that we organize to meet the new realities. Our retention, community representation, and interchangeability with the Active component are the competencies that have led to our success. We believe that there are five critical components to continuing and enhancing those competencies:

- Our Processes must be more responsive, open, and fully integrated.
- We must use our peoples' Time as efficiently as possible.
- We must continue to demonstrate that we perform at the highest Air Force Standards.
- We must offer the fairest Opportunity to any and all Americans with a desire to serve.
• We must offer our people **Career Paths** that are updated as weapons systems change.

These themes are not new; this is a restatement of those things to which we have dedicated our service. This document provides the overarching vision that ties these concepts together.

Our units must be able to meet state, and federal requirements. Our members must respond to their families, their employers, and the Air National Guard. Satisfying all these competing demands requires efficiency, flexibility, and leadership that ensures those only relevant demands is placed on our people. Failure to satisfy these demands is not an option.

We envision an organization that maximizes the unique capabilities of the citizen soldier; welcomes every American interested in serving the community, state, and nation; and responds rapidly and effectively to the needs of our force. We recognize that we have a responsibility to communicate openly and honestly and to create interlocking "systems of systems" that provide timely and accurate information to our members.

We are the stewards of a proud legacy, we are entrusted with the most precious resources of our country: our young women and men; and a significant percentage of Americas’ Aerospace warfighting capability. We present to the American people a fully trained, cost-effective force ready when called to **Fight and Win** as part of the **Total Aerospace Force**.

**Processes**

We are the leaders in planning among all military services. Our **Long-Range Planning** effort has been used as the benchmark by the Air Force as they first engaged in their planning processes. In 1997 the concept of an **Integrated Planning Process (IPP)** was developed that defined a consistent working environment to tie all planning processes together and to directly relate our future vision (**Long-Range Plan**) our nearer term goals (**Strategic Plan**) and our budgeting processes. Greater accountability is an inherent goal of the IPP in order to enhance our ability to be responsible stewards of the resources entrusted to our care. The IPP goes farther to connect planning, programming and budgeting efforts with a feedback process that defines and critiques the "here and now", evaluates new missions, and closes the loop back to our planners and leaders. We must refine the IPP over time so that every weapon system and career field has entry and insight into the process. The Board of Directors (BOD) oversees the vision and IPP process. The **Enlisted Field Advisory Council (EFAC)** and the **Air Directorate Field Advisory Council (ADFAC)** are the clearinghouses for field issues that are surfaced by the various councils. This process must be open and responsive so that any member of our organization can stay current on issues that affect their weapon system and their career. We will use issue tracking data to continuously monitor the effectiveness of the IPP in resolving field issues on a timely basis. Every step in the process uses input from the field. Our continuing challenge is to test new initiatives against the collective wisdom
of the IPP and to commit to change in the context of our common constructs. Our planning process must be coherent, consistent, and measurable. The process is dynamic and will evolve based on the needs of the field.

**Time**
The strength of our Air National Guard (ANG) is our people -- talented, dedicated, patriotic Americans. This mix of full time and traditional Guardsmen and women provide a cost-effective, skilled, and vital team to the total force, our communities, states, and nation. During the cold war our Guard members served in a predictable, stable operating environment. Today, that stability has been lost. High PERS and OPTEMPO (days of duty at home or deployed), resource limitations, and furious technological changes have driven an order of uncertainty that characterizes our operating environment. Coupled with that is a global economy that has seen all-out competition, downsizing, and tight resources -- an arena where 70% of our force, our traditional guard members, operate. The result is constant turmoil for our people, with potentially adverse impacts on recruiting, retention and the ability of the ANG to meet its expected role. For our ANG to be successful, we must afford our guard members the ability to thrive in these two environments. The key is better appreciation and use of our guard members’ time. We must continuously prioritize our direct and ancillary training to insure that our people are prepared to respond to a wide range of contingency operations. We must make more predictable our contributions to the total force expeditionary commitments to reduce the uncertainties that contribute to high PERS and OPTEMPO. We must maintain the ability to retain and attract skilled men and women to meet today’s and tomorrow’s missions and roles. We must provide our traditional guard member’s employers a more predictable impact on their operations. In allowing for this, we must insure that our people can balance their commitments to their employer, family and the Guard. In this way, we hope to better enable our people to be successful and thereby our ANG to be relevant and vital to the total force, states, and nation.

**Standards**
To be a force that may be readily accessed, and integrated within the Total Air Force, we must have standards of performance. These standards portray a minimum level of expectations upon which a unit or personnel may be measured. These standards, while being achievable, must be the source for our benchmarking among the members units of our collective organizations. Not only do they embrace Air Force values; they should encompass the traditions that have propelled the Air National Guard to be accepted as a full partner in the Total Force. These standards include areas from levels of participation by units to succession planning documents that guide the individual airman through PME and the Career Development Courses necessary to be a viable and productive member of the Air National Guard. Meeting our standards is our “report card” to the taxpayer and demonstrates the national warfighting capability that has been purchased with precious national resources.
Opportunity
The Air Guard must offer an opportunity for every American interested in service. We must be fair and open both in recruiting and retaining our young men and women. We can never sacrifice mission standards, but we must never allow ourselves to prevent or discourage the involvement of any qualified citizen or group of citizens. We are a community-based force: it is our heritage and our unique strength as we respond to local and global contingencies. If we exclude any part of our constituency, we do so at the risk of our relevancy to our community. We must be in touch with the requirement to train, possibly before entrance into our organization, so that that opportunity to serve exists. We must be rigorously fair in our promotion policies and absolutely intolerant of favoritism. We must create an environment where our members can move from unit to unit and state to state, as necessary, to ensure that we make the maximum use of every member of our organization. We will make use of new technologies as they enable us to work and train at home on the most flexible schedules and, in the future, to include even larger segments of the population as new missions dictate.

Career Paths
The military forces of the United States of America are in a state of dramatic evolution. After the anomaly of nearly forty years of Cold War, the end of that era has offered an opportunity for our nation to downsize its large standing force and return to its militia roots. This has resulted in the United States Air Force downsizing its active force structure by nearly forty percent. Beginning in the near term and continuing for the next few decades, significant new missions will migrate to the Air National Guard. Tremendous changes will be required of our units as equipment leaves the inventory and mission requirements change. As this occurs and new missions emerge, the impact on that most valuable asset, our people, will be substantial unless a planning process is in place. It is essential that we be prepared for these changes in order to minimize the impact on our members. We must offer them a clear sense of career options and further, we must provide weapon system “road maps” that define the expected life cycle of each weapon system. The IPP must be used and metrics must be established in order to ensure that the proper decisions are made. Although these road maps must be coordinated with Air Force plans, it is essential that guidance from the Field Advisory Councils, EFAC, and the ADFAC be considered and acted upon. As unit’s transition, they must be given as much notice as possible, and every effort must be made to minimize the impact on our members, their employers and their families.

Our Air Guard – a world class organization of warriors, community based men and women, serving the Total Force, Nation, State, Community, and Family. Always Ready AND Continuously Preparing for the Challenges of Tomorrow.
APPENDIX B

WHITE PAPER ON ANG AEF IMPLEMENTATION

As the Air National Guard (ANG) will be relied upon in the Shape and Respond roles, policies need to be addressed which guide ANG participation.

ANG units were constituted during the Cold War to train at home and, if needed could be activated for a deployed operations. The unit’s current culture and UMD may not support the continuous OCONUS demands of an AEF. The ANG can be re-engineered to support the AEF, but some policy changes need to be made to support such a re-engineering effort.

POLICIES, WHICH NEED TO BE ADDRESSED:

- Unit integrity must be respected during an AEF deployment. An ANG unit cannot be asked to split itself between different AEF during a 15-month cycle. The unit will be constantly deployed and will never be able to train.

- Maintain current ANG end strength – Re-engineer to Shape and Respond. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) states the ARC will augment in engagement operations. ANG units are constituted today the same way they were during the Cold War when the Department of Defense was not used for Shaping operations. The DPG is calling for a tremendous increase in ARC operations. DoD must leave the ANG end strength alone as the ANG re-engineers itself to a Shape and Respond capacity. Understanding budgetary constraints, the ANG will largely have to be funded and resourced from within.

- The ANG is currently exploring what career fields will be the most heavily demanded and need to be robust. Some areas are quite apparent. The increase in OCONUS operations will require increased crew ratio in order to keep PERSTEMPO within reason.
The training requirements associated with an increased crew ratio will drive an increased UTE rate, which translates into an increased maintenance force. Security forces and services, as well as other mission areas, will need to be reviewed.

- If the ANG hires the additional aircrews, it will need incentives to retain them. When the active duty service commitment was increased to ten years for attending pilot training, the effects to the ANG were not considered. Currently, a crewmember coming off active duty into the ANG will be a senior Captain. The person can be hired into a Majors billet in an ANG unit, but must be promoted within three years. There are not enough Lt. Colonel billets in an ANG unit to support accessions and retention. ROPMA constraints and grade relief policies need to be addressed.

- If an ANG member is to support deployed AEF operations and the demands of unit training, there is the possibility that legislation be created that promotes employer support for the ANG.

- ANG members often use their annual leave from their civilian job in order to deploy OCONUS. That is how they explain their absence from the civilian job. It is also the basis for ANG insistence that deployment duration not exceed 15 days. Institutionalize 15 days as a standard ARC OCONUS rotation.

- There are multiple pay and entitlement systems. If active and ANG members are expected to combat ready on a continuing rotational basis, or on demand in times of crisis, inequity of active and ARC entitlements needs to be addressed. A candidate area is flight pay for aircrew members.

- Deployment policy: Rotate our personnel with 15 days in theater requirement

(Depending on theater – total deployment time could be about 18 days max)
- 30 Days for supervisory personnel

- No PSRC

- We will be forward deployed – no backfill tasking for the AEF

- Inspections: The traditional guardsman has a finite number of days of availability. This time can be utilized to support AEF deployments for ORE/ORI, but not both. The Air Force must develop a methodology to administer the ORI in concert with AEF deployments.

- Leadership Role: The ARC, like the Active Duty, must have a means to groom future leaders. It is critical and necessary to insure that the ARC has an opportunity to fill AEF leadership positions on an equitable basis.
### Challenges Initiative

#### Accessibility
1. **Involuntary call-up authority**
   - a. Extend 12301(b) to 30 days
   - b. Extend PSRC beyond 270 days
2. **Counting Reservists on AD in FY end strength**
   - Chg law to count RC separately
3. **Variations in accession process**
   - a. Standardize accession process in DoD
   - b. Publish handbook on accession rules
4. **Lack of funding for RC on active duty**
   - a. DoD level purple contingency fund
   - b. CINC level purple contingency fund
   - c. Speed up reimbursement for AD

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#### Utilization
6. **Difficulty in tailoring units for CINCs needs**
   - Ensure RC representation in decisions
7. **Incompatible eqpt between AC and RC**
   - a. Improve AC & RC eqpt match
   - b. Equip & train RC at level closer to AC
8. **Lack of flexibility in meeting CINCs needs**
   - Require CINCs to request capabilities

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<td>c Assign more RC GO/FO to Joint HQ</td>
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APPENDIX D

GLOSSARY

Administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Aerospace. Of, or pertaining to, Earth’s envelope of atmosphere and the space above it; two separate entities considered as a single realm for activity in launching, guidance, and control of vehicles that will travel in both entities. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998) [Of, or relating to, the total expanse beyond the earth’s surface.] [Italicized definition applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.]

Aerospace expeditionary force. An organizational structure composed of force packages of capabilities that provides warfighting CINCs with rapid and responsive aerospace power. These force packages are tailored to meet specific needs across the spectrum of response options and will deploy within an Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force as aerospace expeditionary wings (AEWs), groups (AEGs), or squadrons (AESs). An AEF, by itself, is not a deployable or employable entity.

Aerospace power. The use of lethal and nonlethal means by aerospace forces to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

Air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Airlift. Operations to transport and deliver forces and materiel through the air in support of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. (AFDD 1 1999a)

Air refueling. The capability to refuel aircraft in flight, which extends presence, increases range, and allows air forces to bypass areas of potential trouble. (AFDD 1 1999a)

Air superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)
Air supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Assign. (1.) To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. (2.) To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. See also attach. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Attach. (1.) The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. (2.) The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. See also assign. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Battlespace. The commander’s conceptual view of the area and factors that he must understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, and land operations that the commander must consider in planning and executing military operations. The battlespace dimensions can change over time as the mission expands or contracts according to operational objectives and force composition. Battlespace provides the commander a mental forum for analyzing and selecting courses of action for employing military forces in relationship to time, tempo, and depth. (AFDD 1 1999a)

Combatant command (command authority). The nontransferable command authority established by title 10, (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combat-ant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, the authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)
Command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Core competency. The basic areas of expertise or the specialties that the Air Force brings to any activity across the spectrum of military operations whether as a single Service or in conjunction with the core competencies of other Services in joint operations. Core competencies represent both aerospace power application theory and physical capability represented in a well-trained and equipped air force. (AFDD 1 1999a)

Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services and supported by intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02 1998) Because terminology is always evolving, the Air Force believes a more precise definition is: [Measures taken to prevent or mitigate successful hostile actions against Air Force people and resources while not directly engaged with the enemy.] [Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.]

Information. (1.) Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. (2.) The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and in-firmation systems. Also called IO. (DODD S–3600.1). The US Air Force believes that in practice a more useful working definition is: [Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend or attack information and information systems and includes both information-in-warfare (IIW) and information warfare (IW).] [Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.]

Information superiority. The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Also called IS. (DODD S–600.1) The US Air Force

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prefers to cast “superiority” as a state of relative advantage, not a capability, and views IS as: [That degree of dominance in the information domain that allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition.] [Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.]

Intertheater airlift. Airlift that operates between the continental United States and a theater or between theaters. [Formerly strategic airlift] (AFDD 1 1999a)

Intratheater airlift. The common-user air transportation and delivery of personnel and equipment within a commander in chief’s area of responsibility. [Formerly called theater airlift] (AFDD 1 1999a)

Joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. See also doctrine. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. See also joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)
Joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: (a.) Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (b.) Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (c.) Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and (d.) Acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02) [An umbrella term encompassing a variety of military operations conducted by the Department of Defense that normally complement the other instruments of national power. These military operations are as diverse as providing support and assistance (when consistent with US law) in a nonthreatening environment, and conducting combat not associated with war. ] [Italicized definition applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.] (AFDD 1 1999a)

Military strategy. The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

National strategy. The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate
organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint
force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.
Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and
forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control
considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does
not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of
administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called
OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within
theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by
establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives,
sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and
applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply
a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and
administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical
successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces,
equipment, or materiel from Air Force organizations that are not forward
deployed.

Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other
detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or
potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic,
or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate
the circumstances and limitations under which the United States forces will
initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also
called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group
of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security
objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish
those objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational
military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use
of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or
theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and
other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)
Strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks as-signed. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Tactics. (1.) The employment of units in combat. (2.) The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Task force. (1.) A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. (2.) Semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task. 3. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

Theater. The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (Joint Pub 1-02 1998)

War. Open and often prolonged conflict between nations (or organized groups within nations) to achieve national objectives. (AFDD 1 1999a)
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