The Role of the Army Reserve in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Program

**Title and Subtitle**

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY RESERVE IN THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM

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**Abstract**

Since the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent end of the Cold War, the United States faces a multidimensional threat never before seen within our nations’ borders. Rogue nations and stateless organizations already have or are developing the capability to threaten the United States through acts of terror, information warfare, and the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. As a nation, we are not prepared to prevent or respond to these threats. A federal infrastructure does not yet exist that can adequately prevent or react to such an attack.

Given these increasing threats to the territory, population, and infrastructure of the United States, the Army Reserve should have an expanded role in providing homeland defense capabilities. The Army Reserve is well suited to homeland defense missions. The necessary infrastructure already exists in all 50 states.

This thesis explains the role of the federal agencies tasked with missions in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program, and recommends the Army Reserve as the single training base to train first responders to weapons of mass destruction incidents.

**Subject Terms**

Homeland Defense, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missions of the Army Reserve, Military Assistance to Civil Agencies, Military Support to Civil Agencies

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UL
THE ROLE OF THE ARMY RESERVE IN THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/HOMELAND DEFENSE PROGRAM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

JOSEPH L. SMITH, MAJ, USAR
B.S., Cumberland College, Williamsburg, Kentucky, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2000

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Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Since the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent end of the Cold War, the United States faces a multidimensional threat never before seen within our nations' borders. Rogue nations and stateless organizations already have or are developing the capability to threaten the United States through acts of terror, information warfare, and the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. As a nation, we are not prepared to prevent or respond to these threats. A federal infrastructure does not yet exist that can adequately prevent or react to such an attack.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The United States has not been vulnerable to a significant attack within its borders since the early nineteenth century. However, such a threat has surfaced since the fall of the Berlin Wall, ending the cold war. Along with this came the development of sophisticated technologies and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This proliferation of weapons of mass destruction materials and technology has caused the United States government to pursue the refinement of a Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program.

Homeland defense is a continuation of the constitutional requirement to protect the population and territories of the United States (TRADOC 1999, 2). The United States military has always had a key role in this mission. The Army's history is rich in providing support to the nation in a variety of events, from disaster relief, medical research, to the quelling of rebellion (TRADOC 1999, 2). The homeland has not always been as secure as it is today; military support has always been necessary to protect civilians. In 1794 President Washington employed
the militia, a volunteer force that later became the National Guard (NG), in a show of force to suppress the insurrection known as the Whiskey Rebellion (TRADOC 1999, 4). As recently as the early 1990s all three components of the Army were deployed to Los Angeles to protect the population from riots. Military support has always been there when America needed it (TRADOC 1999, 2).

The spectrum of missions assigned to the United States Armed Forces has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The threat upon which the United States defense policy was founded in 1945 no longer exists; a similar threat is not expected in the foreseeable future (Defense Planning Guidance 1998, 7). The collapse of the former Soviet Union forced a shift in focus for of the Department of Defense (DoD). The new post-Cold War military strategy focused more on regional conflicts. America’s conventional military power remains unmatched, yet security within our boarders is not guaranteed (National Defense Panel 1997, 55). The continental United States faces a multidimensional threat never before seen in its history.

Rogue nations and stateless organizations, are developing, already have, or can purchase the ability to threaten the Unites States through acts of terror,
information warfare, narco-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and international crime, including arms trafficking, strategic materials and drugs (Quadrennial Defense Review 1987, 2). The ease in which illegal drugs and goods move through the United States borders are examples of the vulnerability of the United States to these nontraditional threats (National Defense Panel 1997, 26). Although most attempts directed against this country and its citizens have been prevented, some have not. The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City are examples of terrorists’ attacks that were not prevented. These types of attacks present the greatest threat to the national security of the United States. At this point, the United States is not adequately prepared to defend itself against these types of attacks and is even less prepared to respond to such an attack (USACOM Joint Newsletter 1999, 6).

Rather than a direct attack against our military forces, this most likely and dangerous threat to our national security will be directed to more accessible targets, such as national communications systems, transportation, and electrical systems. Even United States citizens are potential targets. A successful strike
against any of these areas will have a crippling effect on the United States' ability to defend itself (USACOM Joint Newsletter 1999, 12). The nature of the attack, such as an act of terrorism under peacetime conditions, or an unlimited attack during war, affects the United States' ability to respond to these attacks.

Concern for these new threats is widespread. Senior policy pronouncements recognize the importance of these threats to national security. The President stated in his most recent National Security Strategy report:

the dangers we face are unprecedented in their complexity . . . terrorism, drugs, organized crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global concerns and transcend national borders. National Security Strategy 1997, i)

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated this concern in the 1999 National Military Strategy:

the security environment we face includes threats to our country and our interests that are not "war" in the classical sense, and yet may call for military forces. Terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illegal drug trafficking and other threats at home require the use of military forces. (National Military Strategy 1997, 4).

This is an acknowledged problem; however, there are difficulties in addressing these types of threats. The new security environment suggests the necessity for greater

Although disaster response is essentially a civil responsibility, civil demands for disaster assistance routinely exceed civilian agencies' resources, and stretch an already extended infrastructure (figure 1). If local responders are overwhelmed by an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, they will request additional support from neighboring communities and the state. If the state, including the National Guard, does not have sufficient assets to meet the requirements, the Governor may request federal assistance (figure 2). The President through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will direct the federal response agencies to the disaster site. Only the Department of Defense has sufficient assets capable of handling all of the problems associated with a weapon of mass destruction attack. An understanding of the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction helps to identify which agencies have a specific role in this program and can assist developing a viable Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. Currently, responsibility for coordinating, planning, and countering these diverse asymmetrical threats and natural disasters
fall to a number of disparate government agencies. Technological advances, new adversaries with new motives, and a magnitude of response efforts combine to reduce the relevancy and effectiveness of the existing organizational relationships. It has been suggested that the Department of Defense create a new unified command that is specifically designed and staffed to defend the Nation against these twenty-first century threats. This command would work closely with FEMA to coordinate the efforts of the many agencies charged with responding to threats and emergencies within the continental United States, either natural or man-made (figure 3) (USACOM Joint Newsletter 1999, 6). One thing is clear: more needs to be done to ensure the United States is prepared at home to defend against this new asymmetrical threat.

**Primary Question**

The United States is in the beginning stages of determining the best way to defend against and respond to such an attack. The Army Reserve has the necessary capabilities to play a key role in this homeland defense mission and must be integrated into the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program.
This thesis will address the capabilities the Army Reserve can bring to the program and its role in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. To properly do this, the following question must be answered:

What should be the role of the Army Reserve in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program? To answer the main question, this thesis will answer several secondary questions.

1. How has this program has evolved over the last few years?

2. What is the structure of the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program, and what are the responsibilities of the agencies or organizations participating in this program?

3. What assets and capabilities does the Army Reserve currently have that fit the structure of this organization?
   a. What their wartime missions are.
   b. How do Army Reserve missions they correlate with the mission of the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program?
   c. Will the Army Reserves' participation in this program distract from its ability to accomplish its primary role of fighting this nation's wars?
Definitions

Consequence Management. Those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services and activities may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information planning, mass care, resources support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy (DODD 3025.15 1997).

Conventional Attack. An aerial or maritime attack using conventional weapons, most likely missiles. The United States homeland appears impervious to most conventional attacks in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the possibility of such an attack exists, especially an aerial or maritime attack using conventional platforms. More likely, however, is the possibility of a missile attack, given the development of such capabilities in nations whose interests diverge from those of the United States (TRADOC 1999, 4).

Crisis Management. Measures to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law (TRADOC 1999, 29).
Critical Asset. Those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency services, both governmental and private (PPD 63 1997).

Domestic Terrorism. Domestic terrorist groups are those who are based and operate entirely within the United States, its territories, or possessions and whose activities are directed at elements of the federal, local or state governments or the United States civilian population. Domestic terrorist groups represent interests that span the full political spectrum (TRADOC 1999, 4).

Homeland Defense. The principal task of the United States government to protect its territory and citizens. This includes deterring and defending against strategic attack; supporting domestic authorities for crisis and consequence management regarding weapons of mass destruction; protecting national security assets such as installations and deploying forces; and helping to assure the availability, integrity, and adequacy of other critical assets (USACOM Newsletter 19, 12).
Force Protection. Security program designed to protect service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personnel protective services, and supported intelligence and other security programs (JP 1-02).

International Terrorism. Activities undertaken by, or in support of, terrorists or terrorists' organizations that occur totally outside the United States or that transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons that appear to be the intended targets to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum (DODD 5240.1-R 1997).

Three general categories of international terrorists present a serious and distinct threat to the United States homeland and its overseas population and facilities. The Department of State currently designates the first category as nations who view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy as Iran, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Iraq. The second category consists of formal terrorist organizations most of which are autonomous, generally transnational
organizations with their own infrastructures, personnel, financial arrangements, and training facilities. The third category stems from loosely affiliated extremists, some of whom readily acknowledge attempts to obtain chemical and biological weapons for use against the United States. Any of these groups may include ethnic, religious, criminal, and political members within the United States who are friendly to their cause. Despite maintaining a benign cover in peacetime, they may engage in orchestrated terrorist activities against the United States. Such activities could include the employment of weapons of mass destruction against ports of embarkation and lines of communication (LOC), political assassinations, or the incitement of civil unrest. The willingness of such terrorists to carry out more large-scale incidents designed for maximum destruction places a larger proportion of our population at risk (TRADOC 1999, 4).

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. Those Department of Defense activities and measures covered under Military Support to Civil Authorities (Natural and Manmade Disasters) plus Department of Defense assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement (TRADOC 1999, 30).
Military Support to Civil Authorities. Those activities and measures taken by Department of Defense components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil agency in planning and preparedness for or in the application of resources for response to consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies (DODD 3025.15).

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (Joint pub 1-02).

Transnational threats. These threats comprise any transnational activity that threatens the national security of the United States, including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime--or any individual or group that engages in any such activity (TRADOC 1999, 4).

Troop Program Unit. The traditional United States Army Reserve unit is organized under a Unit Identification Code (UIC) and documented with a Modified Table of
Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).

**Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. These can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon (Joint pub 1-02).

**Assumptions**

The assumption of this thesis is that the Department of Defense will recognize the capabilities and availability of these USAR units, its personnel, and equipment, and will use these valuable assets.

**Limitations**

Available time permitted the researcher to evaluate only the force structure of the Army Reserve and not the readiness of specific units in terms of percentage of fill of qualified personnel and the availability of authorized or required equipment. Therefore, this thesis will evaluate the units as entities only in terms of their ability to provide needed resources and expertise in supporting the National Military Strategy and Weapons of
Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. The majority of this paper relies on data obtained from the National Guard Bureau (NGB), Department of the Army, Operations (DADCSOPS), Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

**Delimitations**

Much has been written concerning what the Army National Guard and other organizations bring to this program. This thesis seeks to answer the primary question by examining the types of resources and expertise needed by the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program versus the types and number of units in the Army Reserve force structure capable of providing the required support. This thesis will address only the capabilities of the Army Reserve to provide critical assets in the form of units and equipment to the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. It will not evaluate the capabilities or limitations of other organizations or agencies involved in this program. Also, because this thesis addresses unit statuses that are prone to change, historical data will not be used prior to the end of the fiscal year 1997. In the following chapters this thesis will identify the units
required by this program, by type, number of units, missions, and availability of these units to successfully accomplish their assigned missions.

**Significance of the Study**

This study will have an immediate impact in the determination of the level of involvement the Army Reserve could have in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. This objective analysis of the Army Reserve’s ability to provide critical support to this program will be invaluable in determining this level of involvement. More importantly, this thesis will consolidate and analyze data maintained separately in the various agencies and commands of the Army Reserve and provide a framework for additional, more detailed analysis and determination of the Army Reserve’s ability to contribute to the program.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Although the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program has been growing in prominence in the last few years, approved policy and guidance directly addressing this issue is virtually nonexistent. The information that addresses the Army Reserve's role in this program is generally found in the form of other research theses, monographs, white papers, and briefings. The evaluation and analysis portion of this thesis relies on data extracted from briefing slides, charts, graphs, and spreadsheets provided from different staffs and agencies previously addressed in chapter one. This data along with personal interviews will support my conclusions and recommendations.

The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible to provide a framework for the United States Army's support to homeland defense (TRADOC 1999, 2). This includes training and doctrine development. This document provides a recommended definition of homeland defense, a background to the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program, and addresses in-depth the program's chain of command. It also addresses
responsibilities of the various organizations and agencies involved in this program, including the role of the Army. TRADOC has identified the following eight major points in developing doctrine on this subject:

Doctrine must address the Army's roles and expand, revise, or develop new guidelines for the Army.

Doctrine must be in alignment with policy expressed in national-level documents and Department of Defense directives and instructions.

Doctrine must stress the supporting role of the Army in homeland defense.

Doctrine must address the Army's role in preemptive shaping operations.

Doctrine should provide considerations for the dual use of Army warfighting capabilities for homeland defense and other missions.

Doctrine should address weapons of mass destruction training peculiar to the homeland defense environment.

Doctrine should provide guidelines for overcoming any disconnects between Army and civilian equipment, such as communications systems.

Doctrine should take into account and provide guidelines for the employment of the extensive capabilities of the Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve in support of homeland defense. (TRADOC 1999, 4)

If doctrine is indeed the engine of change, then TRADOC's tasking is to lay the foundation that will drive how this program is driven. The above point that this thesis will focus on is that Army doctrine should take into
account and provide guidelines for the employment of the extensive assets and capabilities that the Army Reserve has to support a comprehensive homeland defense program.

The National Security Strategy (NSS), in an attempt to focus the Military Support to Civilian Authorities program, states, "Protecting our citizens and critical infrastructure at home is an intrinsic and essential element of our security strategy" (NSS 1997, ii). Various other Department of Defense documents identify homeland defense as a viable role for military forces. Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39 and 62 charge the Department of Defense with specific lead and supporting responsibilities relating to the Homeland Defense program. The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has developed and recommended a proposed organizational structure, and the command relationships of these organizations (figure 3) (USACOM Newsletter 1999, 9).

Mr. Stephen M. Duncan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs under both the Reagan and Bush administrations, offers an assessment of the capabilities of the reserve forces. He also recognizes the "remarkable talent and experience that exist in the reserve components" (Duncan 1997, 211).
The Army's Roles and Responsibilities

At a recent United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) General Officer Commander's conference, Colonel Donald A. Haus, Division Chief, Forces Command (FORSCOM) Military Assistance Division, presented a briefing titled: Domestic Support Operations Overview. In this briefing, Colonel Haus identified the key federal agencies involved in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program and the command relationships of these organizations. Colonel Haus went into depth with what FORSCOM perceives as the Army's role (USARC G.O. Commanders Conference 1999, 7).

These roles are broken down into two basic categories: support and defend. Under the support category, the Army's role is to support both crisis and consequence management, the protection of national critical assets, the Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) missions of military assistance to civil disturbances, Military Support to Civil Agencies (MSCA), and finally support to counterdrug and counterterrorism activities.

Under the category of defend, the emphasis was placed on force protection and deterrence or defense against strategic attacks. The final topic was FORSCOM's role in domestic support operations. The most important of these
roles is FORSCOM's ability to provide properly trained active and reserve component forces to support civil authorities.

**Army Reserve Assets for Homeland Defense**

The capabilities and assets of the Army Reserve are of interest to most of the (nonmilitary) federal agencies involved in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program (Duncan 1997, 211). These agencies want an understanding of the organization of the Army Reserve, and an acknowledgment that the Army Reserve will provide a main piece of the overall Department of Defense response to the MSCA program. The heads of all these federal agencies agree that nearly all homeland defense and weapons of mass destruction missions require some or most of the Army Reserve's unique capabilities.

Some of the more important areas that the Army Reserve brings to the table are: Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Medical, Chemical, Mortuary Affairs, and logistics (USARC 1997, 7). Civil Affairs units provide the expertise to rebuild shattered infrastructure and provide highly experienced professionals in a wide variety of areas who offer expertise, advice, and assistance. Some ninety-
seventh percent of the Army's Civil Affairs units are in the Army Reserve (OCAR, 1998, 7).

Psychological Operations units provide communication or public information capabilities to civil authorities. This is accomplished through television, radio, and loudspeaker operations. Eighty-four percent of the Army's psychological operations units are assigned to the Army Reserve (OCAR 1998, 9).

Almost sixty percent of the Army's medical assets are assigned to the Army Reserve. These units provide trained personnel that deploy with portable facilities or who can fall in on established facilities. These personnel are also trained in the treatment and handling of chemically contaminated casualties (OCAR 1998, 12).

Over sixty percent of the Army's chemical assets are located in the Army Reserve. These units are trained to conduct surveillance, detection, early warning, and decontamination operations (Army News Service 2000, 4).

Half of the Army's total Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) capacity is in the Army Reserve and is able to expand this capability should the EPLO program expand. The United States Naval Reserve (USNR), United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), and United States Air
Force Reserve (USAFR) provide the other fifty percent of the nation's Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer capacity. EPLOs provide liaison between the military and local, state, and regional officials during civil support operations and provide support to the defense contracting officer and the Federal Coordinating Office under the Federal Response Plan (FRP) (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-1). An EPLO is assigned to each state with one assigned to each of the ten FEMA regional offices.

Other important assets in the Army Reserve force that could perform essential missions are Mortuary Affairs, Military Police, Engineer, Signal, Aviation, and extensive Logistics units (USARC DCSOPS 2000, 54).

**Federal Agency Responsibilities for Terrorist Response**

Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39 and 62 direct the federal government to strengthen its abilities to combat weapons of mass destruction terrorism. In the fiscal year 2000 budget request, President Clinton proposed ten billion dollars to address terrorism and terrorist-emerging tools. This funding will to go toward the development of a national defense against chemical and biological terrorism and the nonproliferation and transnational antiterrorism efforts. President Clinton
directed that specific organizations focus on the reduction of the threat of proliferation of biological weapons.

This section will discuss the roles of the National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, and various federal agencies with assigned roles in this program (figure 4).

The National Security Council (NSC) is the overall interagency coordinator for United States policy on combating terrorism. The national coordinator for infrastructure protection and counterterrorism is responsible to integrate government policies and programs on unconventional threats to the United States and Americans abroad (CGSOC/A504 2000, 2-3).

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is in charge of the federal aspects of consequence management to a terrorist act. This includes protecting public health and safety and providing emergency relief to state governments, businesses, and individuals. In addition to coordinating consequence management, the FEMA was tasked with reviewing the Federal Response Plan (FRP) to determine the capability for consequence management to terrorism, especially for acts of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism. This FRP, developed through the efforts of
several federal agencies, describes the basic methodology by which the federal government will mobilize resources and conduct activities to assist states in coping with the consequences of a weapon of mass destruction incident. The FEMA acts in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, DC, and on the scene of the crisis until the Attorney General transfers the lead to them (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assists in the training of first responders, conducts counterterrorism investigations, counterintelligence, and other activities related to our national security. The National Domestic Preparedness Office is a new organization within the office of the FBI, responsible to equip local first responders. The intent of this organization is to provide "one-stop-shopping" for local organizations seeking federal assistance in domestic preparedness. It also provides planning assistance and exercise support. Currently the bill payer to support this office is unknown (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The Department of Justice (DoJ) is charged with reestablishing the operational capability of an office or facility damaged or destroyed as a result of terrorist
incidents; providing support to counter, investigate or prosecute terrorists. The DoJ is also responsible to conduct a terrorism threat assessment of federal agencies, and to ensure the continuance of essential government functions during a time of emergency (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) which provides twenty-four hour access to personnel and equipment for radiological emergencies, maintains the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), which provides around the clock direct and consultative assistance in the area of human health effects of radiological hazards. This office also trains Emergency Medical Technicians, physicians, and nurses (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-4).

The Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for the acquisition, installation, and related activities supporting the deployment of bulk and trace explosive detection systems and other advanced security equipment used in airports in the United States (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The Department of Health and Human Services/Public Health is responsible for the establishment of Metropolitan
Medical Strike Teams (MMSTs) for casualties resulting from weapons of mass destruction-terrorism. These MMSTs could be called upon for on-scene support with medical response teams. Providing initial on-site response and safe patient transportation to hospital emergency rooms, medical services and medical health care, and will move victims to other regions should local health care resources be overrun as a result of a terrorist attack. Prototypes of the MMSTs were established in Washington, DC and in Atlanta, Georgia during the 1996 Summer Olympic games. Approximately twenty-five cities have been identified to begin the development of these teams (figure 5) (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) as a component of the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for protecting the public health of the country through prevention and control of diseases and other preventable conditions and responding to public health emergencies. The Office of Emergency Preparedness, another sub-organization of the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible to coordinate the health and medical response of the federal government in support of state and local governments in the aftermath of terrorist
acts involving chemical or biological agents (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The United States Treasury has two components that have specific responsibilities in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. The United States Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). The Secret Service is developing chemical and biological detection, mitigation, and decontamination support for all Presidential movements. This agency is tasked to develop a chemical and biological detection and protective program, which combines multiple systems: fixed detectors, collective protective systems, and portable detection equipment. The Bureau of ATF is the lead federal agency in investigating armed violent crime, arson, and explosions. The Bureau of ATF has four National Response Teams (NRTs) that can arrive within twenty-four hours to major bombing and arson sites. The bureau is also researching the effects of large car bombs along with the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Defense Technical Research Agency (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the responsibility for the preparation and response to emergencies with oil, hazardous substances, and certain
radiological materials. It also assists the Domestic Preparedness program with Hazardous material (HAZMAT) identification and with some environmental cleanup. The EPA is also responsible to develop community response plans for accidental or deliberate releases of hazardous substances and to participate in the first responder-training program. The Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO), a primary office within the EPA, is responsible for the overall management and coordination of the EPA's activities involving accident prevention, preparedness, and response for natural and manmade disasters. The CEPPO also oversees the EPA's Counterterrorism Planning Preparedness program and the National Security Emergency Preparedness program (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The Department of State (DoS) is the lead agency for managing and coordinating counterterrorism policy and operations abroad. It supports law enforcement efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and Department of Justice (DoJ) officials in pursuit of terrorists or terrorist suspects. A branch of the DoS with weapons of mass destruction responsibilities is the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). This interagency team conducts
counterterrorism technology research and development and prototyping, focusing on explosives detection and technologies that will detect and protect against weapons of mass destruction terrorism. This organization is made up of personnel from eight federal departments and over fifty agencies. It also has cooperative programs with Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel to develop these counterterrorism technologies (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

**Department of Defense Responsibilities**

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) leads the Emergency Response Assistance Program to train first responders. To carry out this program, the Secretary of Defense consults with the director of the FEMA, the Secretary of Energy, and the heads of other federal, state, and local agencies with expertise and responsibilities in the areas of emergency response. Consequence Management involves preparedness and response for dealing with the consequences of a terrorist incident, including alleviating damage caused by the incident. It also includes public health and safety, the restoration of essential government services, and providing emergency assistance. The DoD provides transportation for support teams to the site of the terrorist activity and to provide training of the first
responders at the state and local levels (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-5).

The United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) conducts research to develop technologies, procedures, and training programs for medical defense against biological warfare threats. The Army's Technical Escort Units (TEU) handle, dismantle, and dispose of chemical and biological weapons and munitions (FAS 1999, 2).

The Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), formerly known as the Chemical and Biological Defense Command, has expertise in all levels of chemical and biological response. The SBCCOM has the responsibility for training development and city training visits. This organization has chemical and biological scientists, labs, and monitoring equipment. The SBCCOM and Forensic Analytical Center has a flyaway laboratory capability, and its eight chemical storage sites have trained responders with decontamination and monitoring equipment. When needed, its Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (CB/RRT) may also be deployed. This team normally operates in response to assist federal, state, and local officials responding to acts involving weapons of mass destruction
(DA MFR 1999, 2). The SBCCOM has organized a Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) for Crisis and Consequence Management (JRU-CCM). The intent of this unit is to provide unique, multidisciplined Army Reserve crisis and consequence management subject-matter expertise to support the SBCCOM and enhance the overall DoD capability to respond to and manage the consequences of an incident involving chemical, biological or nuclear (CBRN) elements or other related hazardous materials as a result of either a foreign or domestic terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction (DA MFR 1999, 6).

The United States Navy’s Medical Research Institute conducts research, development, tests, and evaluations for the Navy and Marine Corps, on infectious diseases, casualty care, and provides biomedical research capabilities to support field laboratories and hospitals (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The United States Air Force will provide crisis response aviation support for critical national security, law enforcement, and emergency response agencies, specifically in support of the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).
The United States Marine Corps is developing the capacity to identify chemical and biological agents, to assess downwind hazards, conduct advanced lifesaving support, and decontamination of patients. They also provide additional transportation assets (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The RC Consequence Management Program

The Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office was established under the direction of the Director of Military Support in order to integrate Reserve components into the national domestic preparedness strategy. This office coordinates the training, equipping, and manning of the Reserve component units tasked with a MSCA mission (CGSOC/A504 2000, L2-3).

The National Guard currently has Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams in ten states. These Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams act in support of the first responders at the request of the State or Federal government. They are on alert to respond to a suspected or actual weapons of mass destruction attack, assess the situation, provide advice to the local incident commander, and facilitate the arrival of requested DoD equipment, services, and people in the after effects of an event.
They also advise civilian responders regarding appropriate actions and facilitate requests for assistance to help save lives, prevent human suffering. In addition to these teams, the Army National Guard has organized Technical Escort Units. These units will provide the DoD and other federal agencies a unique immediate response capability. Their missions include identifying, escorting, rendering safe, disposing of, sampling and or mitigating chemical, biological, and hazardous material (CGSOC/A504 2000 L4).

The Army Reserve, like the National Guard, will be utilized to train first responders in their communities and be mobilized in the event of an attack. The DoD plans to establish 170 reconnaissance and decontamination teams, drawn mostly from existing chemical companies, to train and be equipped to support the rapid response teams.

**Total Army Analysis**

The Total Army Analysis (TAA) generates army-wide requirements and then allocates the Army’s structure based on those requirements. It properly structures the Army, enabling it to respond to any national threat. The Total Army Analysis is an analytical, doctrine-based process. It generates the "below-the-line tactical support forces and the general purpose forces necessary to support the above-
the-line divisional and nondivisional combat forces” (Field Manual 100-11 88, 6). The Total Army Analysis is a two-year, two-phased process. In the requirements phase, the Army models DoD directed scenarios based on the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), The Army Plan (TAP), the National Military Strategy (NMS), threat data, and resource constraints (Field Manual 100-11 88, 6). From this process comes the Army’s below-the-line Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE) force. The resourcing phase distributes that force among the various components of the Army. The requirements phase validates army structure through allocation rules. Allocation rules are quantitative rules that tie a structure together by echelon, workload, or habitual relationships. Every two years the Army reevaluates potential threats to the United States, and, if necessary, reorganizes its structure to defend against this threat (CGSOC/C400 88, 6). To summarize the purpose of the TAA, it could be correctly stated that The TAA process designs and authorizes future Army structure with the current doctrine in mind, and structures the force to support that doctrine.
Mission and Composition of the Army Reserve

The mission of the Army Reserve is to provide trained and ready combat support and combat service support units, and individuals ready to rapidly mobilize and deploy (OCAR 98, 8). To perform this mission, the Army Reserve is organized into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Of these three categories, the Ready Reserve provides units and individuals to the Army. The Ready Reserve is divided into the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

The Selected Reserve is composed of Troop Program Units (TPUs), the Active or Guard Reserve (AGR) force, and the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) force. Under section 10143, Title 10, United States Code, the selected reserve force is essential to the wartime missions of the active Army, and has priority over all other reserve categories (CGSOC/C400 88, 7).

Troop Program Units (TPU) are traditional units, and predominately combat support and combat service support units. These Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE) and Table of Distribution Allowance (TDA) units are what most people think of when they think of a reserve unit or organization.
However, these Troop Program Units make up less than fifty percent of the total Army Reserve Force (OCAR 97, 25). The bulk of the Army Reserve force is an individual force. Troop Program Units or its members are subject to Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Ups (PSRC). Soldiers assigned to TPUs are authorized forty-eight paid drill periods and twelve to seventeen days of annual training per fiscal year. This TPU force accomplishes the main mission of the Army Reserve by providing trained and ready units capable of mobilizing and deploying on short notice. TPUs form almost all of the Selected Reserve and half of the Ready Reserve. They are the means by which the Army Reserve measures its ability to accomplish its mission. These units receive additional funding and resources enabling them to remain a viable and ready mobilization asset.

The Active or Guard Reserve (AGR) force provides full-time manning for the Army Reserve. These AGR personnel are assigned to MTOE and TDA units of both the Army Reserve and Active Component units, as well as other DoD organizations. These soldiers are tasked with the mission of organizing, administering, recruiting, retaining, instructing, and training Army Reserve soldiers (AR 135-2 80, 9).
The Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) force is composed of individual soldiers assigned to a Mobilization Table of Distribution Allowance unit of the Active Component, Joint, and other DoD agencies. The IMA soldiers are authorized to perform up to twelve days of Annual Training (AT) per fiscal year.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is pool of individuals available for deployment under either a partial or full mobilization. These soldiers are not assigned to any specific unit or agency. An IRR soldier cannot be called up or mobilized under a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up.

As stated earlier, the mission of the Army Reserve is to provide soldiers and units to assist the active Army in fighting this nation's wars. However, over the last few years, these reserve soldiers have been increasingly assigned to joint units and DoD organizations. Joint Reserve Units (JRUs) are new organizations within the Army Reserve who were established to augment the various joint staffs (i.e., USTRANSCOM, JFCOM and others). These units are organized against mobilization Table of Distribution Allowance (MOBTDAs) of these joint organizations. However, they are documented as TDA units, which count against the
end strength of the Army Reserve. Personnel assigned to
these joint reserve units are managed as individual
soldiers, and are authorized forty-eight drills and twelve
days of annual training per fiscal year. Joint Reserve
Units and its members are subject to mobilization under a
Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up.

How Can or Does the Army Reserve Provide
Support to the Program

This thesis will attempt to validate the hypothesis
that the Army Reserve is an important piece of the overall
DoD response to the Homeland Defense/Weapons of Mass
Destruction program. The Army Reserve, Continental United
States (CONUS) located units, are organized along FEMA or
Standard Federal Regions which allows response throughout
the entire FEMA operational area regardless of political
boundaries. The Army Reserve provides clean command lines;
from the Commander in Chief (CINC) through the army
component to specific Army Reserve forces. All Army
Reserve units are assigned to these army components and as
such are readily accessible.

The Army Reserve provides additional support to the
following organizations:

1. Department of Justice: National Center for
Domestic Preparedness.
2. Department of State: Office of Counter Terrorism.


4. Department of the Army Consequence Management Program Integration Office: (CoMPIO; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations) and Domestic Preparedness Division (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations)

5. Army Material Command: Soldiers, Biological, Chemical Command (SBCCOM).

6. Training and Doctrine Command: Preparing to staff the Army Homeland Defense Center of Excellence (Fort Leonard Wood) to include an Individual Mobilization Augmentee who serves as the Deputy Commander.

7. Forces Command: Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) at Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions and State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (SEPLOs) at the State Area Commands.

**USAR Assets/Capabilities Available to Support the Homeland Defense Program**

The following are the Core Competencies of the Army Reserve: Command and Control, Biological Integrated
Detection System (BIDS), Chemical (including Decontamination), Medical, Mortuary Affairs, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, Logistics, Military Police, Engineer, Installations (Logistics support and command and control), and Signal.

The Army Reserve provides the following Command and Control capabilities: ten Regional Support Commands (RSCs) in the Continental United States, one Regional Support Command in Puerto Rico, and one Regional Support Command in Hawaii. These Regional Support Commands are aligned by Federal Standard Region and have a twenty-four hour Emergency Operations Center (EOC) capability. The Army Reserve also provides the following units that provide varying amounts of command and control, specializing in logistics operations. Each of these units can provide command and control for at least one isolated event or multiple events in physical proximity (i.e., in one FEMA region):

1. Three Regional Support Groups (RSGs), which assist in command and control of geographically dispersed Army Reserve units.

2. Five Area Support Groups that provide command and control over logistical operations in a Corps area.
3. Ten Corps Support Groups that provide command and control over logistical operations in a Corps area.

4. Twenty-Two Corps Support Battalions that provide logistics support to Corps level units (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-2).

Biological Integrated Detection Systems (BIDS). The Army Reserve currently possesses the only functioning company level Biological Integrated Detection System capability in the Army force structure today, including the long-range standoff Biological Integrated Detection System (Air). The Army Reserve will have five Biological Integrated Detection Systems Companies on-line by the year 2004. These units are geographically dispersed across the United States in five FEMA regions. These units are capable of detecting and identifying a variety of common biological agents. The units are designed for long duration monitoring such as being predeployed to a National Security Special Event (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-2).

Chemical units provide a very important core competency in the Army Reserve. This chemical force is already on the ground; it will not require a new structure, training, or equipment to be able to respond to a weapon of mass destruction incident (figure 6) (USARC/GOSPC 2000,
The Army Reserve has sixty-three percent of the total army chemical assets (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-2). The Army Reserve possesses fifty-seven percent of the decontamination capability in the Army and the largest decontamination capability in the DoD, with twenty-five companies stationed throughout the United States.

Each company is capable of decontaminating up to 1,100 contaminated people in 2.5 hours (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-2). The Army Reserve also has the following chemical assets:

1. Two Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Companies.

2. Four Mechanized Smoke Companies (Nuclear Biological and Chemical specialists)

3. Two Special Forces Reconnaissance Detachments

4. Sixteen Nuclear Biological and Chemical Warning and Reporting Detachments

A robust chemical command and control structure consisting of three chemical brigades (a 4th brigade is scheduled to activate in FY 00) and eight chemical battalions.

Army Reserve Chemical Units are currently being equipped for domestic reconnaissance and decontamination operations. The Army Reserve will provide 100-127
reconnaissance and decontamination elements to support or supplement efforts of local first responders in detection, identification, and decontamination. These operations are second nature to Army Reserve chemical units, as they very closely replicate warfighting missions that are the main mission of the Army Reserve.

Medical Units provide another very important core competency of the Army Reserve. The Army Medical Corps will play a key role in response to efforts with its experienced clinicians, planners, and support staffs that can provide insight to homeland defense incidents. These existing units can be tailored to provide combat health service assets, the majority of which are located in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve has fifty-nine percent of the Total Army Medical Assets. Medical missions in civil support missions replicate war-fighting missions. The Army Reserve has the ability to provide trained personnel, facilities for medical treatment, and is trained to also handle contaminated casualties (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-3). The Army Reserve has numerous hospitals and related medical structure to include: 23 Combat Support Hospitals, 4 General Hospitals, 8 Field Hospitals, 1 Hospital Unit (Surgical), 1 Medical Holding Company, 22 Forward Surgical
Teams, 27 Other Medical Augmentation Teams, 9 Evacuation units, 10 Combat Stress Control units, 26 Preventive Medical Detachments, 11 Veterinary Detachments, 10 Medical Logistics units, 15 Medical Command and Control units, 40 Table of Distribution Allowance United States Army Hospitals, and 34 Installation Medical Support Units

These facilities can provide over 13,000 beds. This number would not be available on the first day of the incident but will incrementally build to this number. The number of contaminated patients that could be treated will vary according to the type of event, nuclear, biological, or chemical and the type of agent.

The Army Reserve also possesses a unique capability in the Regional Training Sites-Medical (RTS-Med). These sites are considered centers for excellence in combat medicine, which closely resemble medical operations that are provided in civil support operations (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-6).

These Regional Medical Training sites enhance the readiness of the DoD and non-DoD medical personnel and units through integrated clinical and tactical training and medical logistics support. In 1998, the Regional Training Sites at Fort Gordon, Georgia, hosted a national level exercise managed by the FEMA, with over 650 participants.
The scenario of this exercise was based on a weapon of mass destruction incident.

The overall objective was to evaluate the capability of participating Emergency Medical Response Teams and military units that deploy to disaster events involving weapons of mass destruction. The Army Reserve units participating included the 415th Chemical Brigade, 936th Forward Surgical Team, 314th Public Affairs Detachment, and 55th Combat Stress Company. The Army Reserve Medical Regional Training Sites sponsored three similar additional exercises in 1999 in Florida, Arkansas, and Wisconsin. There will be continued emphasis on training medical personnel in responding to chemical and biological medical events. The Army Office of the Surgeon General supports these Regional Training Sites to be the weapons of mass destruction training centers for civil-military medical response agencies should that capability be required.

Mortuary Affairs (MA) units are another core competency of the Army Reserve. There are a total of two Mortuary Affairs companies in the entire Army force structure, which have the ability to handle a mass casualty situation and are trained to handle contaminated remains. This is important because in general, civilian authorities
and private industry lack the capacity to manage large numbers of contaminated remains. The Regular Army possesses one Mortuary Affairs Company and the Army Reserve provides the other. The Army Reserve also possesses one Corps Collection Company (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-3).

Civil Affairs (CA) is another core competency of the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve plays an important role in Civil Affairs, providing ninety-seven percent of the Total Army Civil Affairs units to include four Civil Affairs Commands, eight Civil Affairs Brigades, and twenty-four Civil Affairs Battalions.

Civil Affairs units provide expertise that is able to rebuild shattered infrastructures: social, civil, and physical. Civil Affairs units aid in the reestablishment of Civil Administrations. Civil Affairs personnel are highly experienced professionals who provide advice and assistance across the spectrum of specialties (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-4).

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs). The Army Reserve plays an important part in Psychological Operations, providing 84 percent of the Total Army’s Psychological Operations Units to include two Psychological Operations
Groups, eight Psychological Operations Battalions, and twenty-one Psychological Operations Companies.

These psychological operations units provide, within the law (PSYOPs units are barred from performing actual Psychological Operations in the United States), communication or public information capabilities to civil authorities in case attacks have disabled the communications infrastructure and/or support personnel. These capabilities include television, print, radio (AM/FM), and loudspeaker (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-4).

A new area that is becoming more and more important to the nation is Information Operations. The Army Reserve provides the Civilian Acquired Skills Database that allows quick access to leverage our reservists' civilian acquired skills. The Army Reserve supports the Land Information Warfare Enhancement Center (LIWEC) with personnel, and provides direct support to Land Information Warfare Enhancement Agency (LIWA) in the Operations Domain of the Military Information Environment (MIE). The Reserve Information Operations Structure (RIOS) provides general support to Land Information Warfare Enhancement Agency and other organizations in the Information Systems domain of
the Military Information Environment (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-4).

Logistics is another core competency of the Army Reserve. As a Combat Service Support oriented organization, the Army Reserve provides people and equipment that comprise a significant portion of the logistics capability of the Total Force (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-5). Logistics units include:

1. Transportation:
   26 Petroleum Oil and Lubricant (POL) Companies (fuel transportation)
   35 Truck Companies
   5 Boat Companies
   5 Force Provider Companies. These units can support a total of 16,500 personnel.

2. Water Purification:
   31 Purification Companies, Detachments, and Teams that are capable of purifying water from a contaminated source (Nuclear Biological and Chemical)
   14 Water Supply Battalions, Companies, and Detachments.
3. Other logistics units include:
   15 Field Service Companies
   13 Supply and Service Battalions
   21 Supply Companies (Direct Support)
   13 Supply Companies (General Support)

   These units provide all types of logistics support, which is very important in supplying a large-scale civil support operation.

   The Army Reserve also has Military Police (MP) assets. Although other organizations have a larger Military Police presence and are capable of providing law enforcement support without potential problems with posse comitatus, the Army Reserve has fourteen Resettlement Battalions that administer Support Bases for 4,000 Displaced Persons per battalion (a total capacity of 56,000). Army Reserve Military Police units can also provide crowd and traffic control, detention capabilities, and can provide protection of critical Federal command and control nodes (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-5).

   Army Reserve Engineer assets provide the capability to rebuild or restore an infrastructure in the interim between the incident and restoration of civilian capabilities.
The Army Reserve engineer assets include sixty-eight battalions, companies, and teams consisting of highly experienced professionals who train to work in the Nuclear Biological and Chemical environment. Civil support missions are a traditional engineer mission under the Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-4). Army Reserve engineer units include: Fire fighting capability: Twenty Teams, Unique capability to generate energy, Two Prime Power Platoons, Two Power Line Platoons, Two Utilities Detachments, Four Pipeline Companies, and 412th and 416th Engineer Commands (Professional Engineering support).

Army Reserve Military Installations can be a significant mission multiplier to local agencies. These installations include:

1. Fort Dix, New Jersey, which is a Power Projection Platform
2. Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, which is a Power Projection Platform
3. Fort Hunter Liggett, California
4. Camp Parks, California
5. Fort Devens Reserve Forces Training Area, Massachusetts
The Army Reserve also possesses 1,200 other facilities (reserve centers) positioned throughout the entire United States and territories that can be used as emergency shelters, command and control locations, and staging areas (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-5).

The Army Reserve also possesses a modest Signal force that has the capability to support the battlefield and the homeland (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-6). This force structure consists of one Theatre Signal Command, three Echelons Above Corps Area Signal Battalions, four Cable and Wire Companies, two Heavy Troposcatter Companies, and one Light Troposcatter Company.

Although the Army Reserve is a Title 10 force, which has historically been accessible only under Title 42 (The Stafford Act) or after an announcement of a Federal Emergency and tasked by the Director of Military Support (DOMS), all Reserve Components have become much more readily accessible under Public Law 105-261, the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act of FY 1999. This law now provides authority under a Presidential Reserve Call up (10 USC Section 12304) to "order a unit or member to active duty to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving a use or threatened use of a
weapon of mass destruction" (CGSOC/A504 2000, L4-5-6). This change has ensured that all Reserve Components are equally accessible in the eyes of the law, not only allowing a quick response to an event but also the prepositioning of essential support elements.

In summary, the United States Army Reserve has unique capabilities needed for weapons of mass destruction and homeland defense missions. The Army Reserve is also easily and readily accessible. These forces are prepared to deploy anywhere to support domestic preparedness missions and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The remainder of this thesis will expand on the information provided by the agencies involved in this program to determine the extent of involvement the USAR will have in the Homeland Defense or Weapons of Mass Destruction Program.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The primary question of this thesis is based on the idea that the Army Reserve can and should provide significant assets and capabilities to the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. This thesis will determine what the role of the Army Reserve in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program should be. The methodology used to answer this question is the tiered approach. Each tier drives the collection, evaluation, and analysis of the published data needed to answer this question. This first tier sets the conditions for the research and analysis required to answer the main question, establishes a baseline, and will identify the structure, strength, and mission of the USAR. These answers will build the base for the second tier, which is the evaluation criteria that can be applied equally throughout the Army Reserve force. Finally, the information gained from this second tier will draw the reader to the answer of the primary question: What is the role of the Army Reserve in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program?
The First Tier

The first step in answering the primary question is to identify how the Army Reserve plans to provide this support. The Army Reserve will capitalize on its core competencies to man, equip, and train a fully interoperable response to the requirements of civil support operations as part of the Federal Response. This thesis will identify what federal agencies are involved in this program and what their responsibilities are. The focus will then shift to the capabilities and availability of the Army Reserve force and how these capabilities match up with those required of the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program.

The USAR is an important piece of the overall DoD response to weapons of mass destruction/homeland defense missions. The Army Reserve is organized along FEMA regions, allowing them to respond throughout an entire FEMA area of responsibility regardless of political boundaries. All Army Reserve units are assigned to army components, and, as such, are readily accessible.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program is Combat Support/Combat Service Support intensive. The Army Reserve is organized to provide this type of support in a wide range of operations. The Army's Active
Component cannot perform the full spectrum of weapons of mass destruction response missions without the Army Reserve. Nearly all large-scale weapons of mass destruction missions require some or most of the Army Reserve’s unique capabilities and core competencies.

Support

The support evaluation criterion attempts to determine the types of units and organizations the Army Reserve has in its force structure that can provide support to the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. The analysis of this criterion determines if supporting the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program distracts from the unit’s ability to accomplish its primary role of fighting this nation’s wars.

Skills and Training

This criterion evaluates the skills of the Army Reserve Combat Support/Combat Service Support force. The training evaluation criterion evaluates the capability of the Army Reserve to train and sustain critical Military Occupational Skills (MOS) competencies. Specifically, to identify those skills in which the Army Reserve Combat Support/Combat Service Support units are competent, and those in which they are not. Combined, the skills and
training criteria support each other. These results will answer the question: Will the Army Reserve’s participation in this program distract from its ability to accomplish its primary role of fighting this nation’s wars? This will start to develop the recommendation portion of this study.

Force Structure

Force Structure, according to Field Manual 100-11 is the “Composition, by number and type of organization, of the current, planned or proposed” force (Field Manual 100-11 88, 12). The effectiveness of the force structure is measured by ability of a force to support its assigned missions. This force structure evaluation criterion will identify the type and number of Army Reserve Combat Support/Combat Service Support units the Army Reserve has that could support the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. This will determine if the Army Reserve has enough of the right types of units and if they are available and capable to support the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. This criterion will determine how well the Army Reserve force structure can support the Weapons of Mass Destruction program and still meet the requirements of its primary wartime missions.
Analysis, Conclusions, and Recommendations

This portion of the thesis deals with how many additional missions can the Army Reserve assume and still be successful without jeopardizing its soldiers and their families, and ending with how the Army Reserve force is built and resourced. At this point, this thesis methodology will establish a basis from which to determine how to maximize the Army Reserve’s core competencies to support the Active Component in fighting and winning this nation’s wars, while providing support to the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Overview

To properly provide the effective, comprehensive weapons of mass destruction homeland defense mandated by law, the Army Reserve must be integrated into the program as an active participant that brings much needed resources and capabilities. The Army Reserve already has the ability to assume a major role in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. The skills and capabilities most needed in this program are already in the Army Reserve structure.

The Army Reserve has an assigned strength of 205,000 soldiers and over 2,000 units (Army News Service 2000). Of those units, fifty percent are Combat Service Support, nineteen percent are Combat Support, thirty percent are Mobility Base Expansion units, and the remaining one percent is composed of Infantry and Attack Aviation units (USAR Briefing 1997, 3). As explained earlier, the core competencies of the Army Reserve are almost an identical match for those skills required in the Homeland Defense/Weapons of Mass Destruction program.
Support

As an evaluation criterion, support addresses what the Army Reserve force is doing now. It examines the form and extent of the Army Reserve’s participation in contingency deployments throughout the world. Since the Gulf War, the Army Reserve has participated in operations on every continent except Australia and the Antarctica. Army Reserve soldiers have provided assistance and support to counterdrug operations in South America, deployed to Operations Safe Haven in Cuba, Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and to Honduras as part of Joint Task Force Bravo. Army Reservists have also engaged in providing life-saving support to refugees in Africa.

Other operations in which Army Reserve soldiers have demonstrated their availability and competence include Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia, the Beirut Air Bridge in Cyprus; the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Desert; Operation Desert Falcon in Saudi Arabia; mission support in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; operational support in Japan; demining in Cambodia; school construction in Laos; and radar construction in Kwajalein. This is not to mention the dedicated, selfless sacrifice
Reserve soldiers have made in the peace process in Bosnia (USAR Briefing 1997, 4).

Army Reserve Facilities and Installations

The Army Reserve is responsible for five army installations formerly managed by the Active Army. These installations combined have over 2,600 buildings. The Army Reserve's ability to train active and reserve component forces directly stems from this ability to provide fully functional regional training sites. Organizations, roles, and missions of the Army Reserve dictate the need for widely dispersed military facilities. The Army Reserve currently occupies over 1,400 four hundred facilities, consisting of more than 2,800 buildings. These facilities must be adequate to meet the readiness training requirements of the units assigned to them. These facilities also serve as local extensions of the Army's power projection platforms by providing essential and cost-effective places to conduct training, maintenance, storage of contingency equipment and supplies, and preparation for mobilization and deployment that simply cannot be accomplished elsewhere. Additionally, these reserve operated installations support mission-essential training
for thousands of soldiers from each component of the Army each year.

Training

Training is the cornerstone of readiness, and readiness is the bedrock of the Army Reserve. Despite reductions in soldiers and the realignment of the Army Reserve, units still enjoy some of the highest levels of readiness in their history. Due to the turnover and increased operational tempo of contingency deployments, training and maintaining individual military occupational skill proficiency in the Army Reserve is a constant challenge. The Army Reserve sustains its force through recruitment, both enlisting soldiers and qualifying them through initial active duty training (basic and advanced individual training) or reenlisting soldiers as they leave active duty. Unique to the reserve system is the ability to retrain and reclassify soldiers through accredited military occupational skill producing Army Reserve schools. This training is conducted through two-week incremental training sessions. Although this takes longer than the traditional active duty procedure, this method allows the citizen soldier to accomplish his or her training and remain in good standing with his or her civilian employer.
Training for homeland defense operations must incorporate many of the skills that the Army Reserve soldier already has. More often than not, homeland defense missions will mirror those tactical missions for which the Army Reserve soldier already trains. However, this scenario involves conducting those tactical missions in the civilian sector within the continental boundaries of the United States. The Army Reserve school system already instructs those essential tasks needed for the weapons of mass destruction/homeland defense mission. Some of these include:

1. Force protection and antiterrorism at the installation level.


3. The Chemical School provides institutional training for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

4. Medical training for military responders on emotional or psychological stress experienced during catastrophic events.

5. Interagency training on civilian and military medical capabilities and communications.
6. The Army Medical Center and School provides institutional training for the medical aspects of weapons of mass destruction incidents.

Leader Development

Leaders will still require traditional leadership skills in conducting homeland defense missions. However, with these missions taking place in a joint and interagency environment, more emphasis is required to develop those skills, knowledge, and abilities needed by leaders conducting weapons of mass destruction/homeland defense missions.

Soldiers

Quality soldiers trained and led by competent and caring leaders remain key to the success of homeland defense operations. Soldiers will face a myriad of challenges, some of which may cause unusual stress as they operate in communities much like their own, witnessing devastating destruction and mass civilian casualties. The soldier’s motivation to accomplish these missions will, no doubt, be high, however, the emotional impact of operating in this type of environment will be great. These soldiers must be well led, competent, and prepared for these missions to ensure operational success.
The Department of Defense faces increasing concern over emerging potential threats within the borders of the United States. The United States Joint Forces Command will play a key role in efforts to address these concerns within the context of the homeland defense mission and its associated requirements. The unique characteristics, dispersed regional locations, and the similarity between the weapons of mass destruction response mission and the assigned wartime mission, makes the Army Reserve a prime candidate for homeland defense mission support. As elements of the DoD develop and establish the structures for the command, control, and management of DoD homeland defense responsibilities, it is becoming increasingly important that the Army Reserve be fully integrated into the manning allocations within the evolving structure of this civil support-related Joint Task Force.

The Army Reserve has been significantly involved in addressing potential DoD requirements driven by emerging weapons of mass destruction and other unconventional threats to the territory and population of the United States. The Army Reserve is dispersed regionally throughout the nation and is already structured to provide a single source-training base for the weapons of mass
destruction/homeland defense first responders. These unique characteristics make the Army Reserve an excellent candidate for supporting the consequences of a weapon of mass destruction attack. Several of the tasks inherent in providing such support are similar to the activities currently performed by most Army Reserve units under the existing relationships with their active component counterpart in support of their assigned wartime mission. The ability to perform these tasks in support to the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program can be maintained without significant risk to the wartime combat capabilities of Army Reserve units. Participation of these select Army Reserve units in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program may make them prime candidates for dual-missioning, providing the National Command Authority (NCA) with available capabilities should a weapon of mass destruction attack occur.

Some of the tasks involved in providing weapons of mass destruction support require specialized equipment and training (e.g., chemical decontamination, mass casualty treatment). Though some Army Reserve units are able to perform these tasks, these units are currently allocated to a Major Theater of War (MTW) war plan. However, if the
Army Reserve assets are used to provide a single source-training base for first responders, those units with a Major Theater of War support mission will not be affected.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Any weapon of mass destruction attack may exceed the nation’s current ability to respond. Preparation and effective response to such an incident requires a commitment of resources before the attack occurs. Although disaster response is essentially a civil responsibility involving all levels of local, state and federal government, only the DoD can field and maintain the capabilities required to mitigate the consequences of a weapon of mass destruction attack. The National Defense Plan identified domestic preparedness and the management of the consequences of weapons of mass destruction as an area where the DoD should expand its activities regarding homeland defense (NDP 1997, 5). At the beginning of the Clinton administration, a Bottom Up Review identified the need for military forces, particularly the National Guard, to support civil authorities during domestic crisis (RAND 1993, 27). However, the National Guard as currently organized cannot meet the stated expectations. In 1993, the Rand Corporation conducted a study examining the state and federal missions of the National Guard. This survey found that National Guard forces are routinely employed in
supplemental roles, rather than being the primary responder in state emergencies. National Guard units in many states were often unable to provide required capabilities, thus were assigned labor-intensive, rather than military skill-related, missions and tasks (RAND 1993, 37). This is due to the National Guard's force structure, which consists predominately of combat units with the primary mission of mobilization and employment as a relevant combat multiplier in the event of a general war.

A weapon of mass destruction attack will likely exceed the capabilities of many civil systems, such as fire and rescue, medical treatment, patient decontamination, and transportation, all undermining public order. These attacks are expected to contaminate a community's primary water and food source. If this does occur, the land and air near the incident site will also be contaminated, requiring large-scale evacuations. The Army Reserve with its unique strengths, characteristics, and ability to respond to disasters make it the force of choice to prepare first responders, and to provide additional assets as needed.
Recommendation

The current first responder-training program is effectively a one-time shot. It is unlikely that civil agencies, which do not already have a weapon of mass destruction type mission, will be able to maintain the necessary level of proficiency. This initial first responder and the subsequent refresher or follow on training, must be conducted throughout the country. This training must be established and conducted by an organization that has the ability to maintain the proficiency, standardization, and currency of skills at that level. The requirement to prepare first responders, as well as participating local, state, and federal agencies to ensure planning is done, and to develop the capability to execute a timely and effective response, can be met with the right organization. That organization is the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve, with its established installations, facilities, and accredited training divisions, is already organized, trained, and equipped to provide this preparedness training, ensuring the readiness of first responders and initial response managers.

The two largest capabilities the Army Reserve brings to the program are its chemical and medical assets. In the
Army Reserve's organization are chemical detection, and reconnaissance companies, a host of medical and medical support organizations, and a number of other highly specialized units with the skills and equipment capable of countering the effects of weapons of mass destruction (once local and state resources have been exhausted).

The Army Reserve has biological detection systems, which can alert to the presence of biological agents or weapons. Some of the medical units assigned to the Army Reserve include thirty-five various types of hospitals, twenty-two forward surgical teams, and the ability to provide mass patient decontamination. In addition to these assets, the Army Reserve has other functional units that can provide assistance if needed. These units have specialized missions including engineering, civil affairs, transportation, and military police holding companies.

Once local and state resources have been expended, these units can be mobilized to provide support as needed. It makes sense to utilize these assets since these units are already in the force structure and the additional missions for these units match those wartime missions for which they are already prepared.
Future Research

The intent of this thesis was to determine what role the Army Reserve should have in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense program. In doing so, the researcher tried to evaluate and determine if the Army Reserve had the assets required by the program, and, if so, could they provide the required support while maintaining competency in its primary wartime mission. The end result is more of a broad overview than an in-depth categorical analysis.

In seeking to evaluate the requirements of the program versus the assets and abilities of the Army Reserve, this thesis focused more on the core competencies and force structure of the Army Reserve rather than the abilities of individual units. Future research in support of this thesis should focus more on the capabilities and limitations of the individual units, principally, the ability to accomplish their primary wartime missions. This thesis did not attempt to analyze the IRR or the IMA force. Future research could identify both, the capabilities, and limitations of the combat support and combat service support assets assigned to this force.
Conclusion

National preparedness for responding to weapons of mass destruction incidents will require intensive and sustained training of first responders. The management of the consequences of such incidents will require immediate and follow-on coordination and support in every FEMA region. The Army Reserve's core competencies in the areas of weapons of mass destruction subject matter training and chemical and medical response forces, its structural flexibility, and immediate response capability make it the ideal training and response arm of the Federal Government. The Army Reserve will be the nation's premier trainer of first responders and the Army's primary follow-on consequence management coordination and response element.

The USAR is prepared to deploy anywhere to respond to and support terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The Army Reserve is not only relevant to the war fight, but is readily applicable to weapons of mass destruction response missions to include medical, chemical, logistical, engineer, mortuary affairs, water purification, resettlement, aviation, signal, civil affairs, transportation, and biological detection. The Army Reserve is ready to use its unique capabilities and core
competencies to be a major player in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense mission.
Figure 1. Domestic Emergency Continuum. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army Reserve Command "USAR Strengths and Opportunities in Civil Support/Consequence Management" (briefing slides, Atlanta, GA: USARC, 2000), 3.
Figure 2. Disaster/Emergency Response, Deliberate Response Process. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army Reserve Command "USAR Strengths and Opportunities in Civil Support/Consequence Management" (briefing slides, Atlanta, GA: USARC 2000), 4.
PROPOSED USAMCOM ORGANIZATION/COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

PRESIDENT

SECDEF

CINCUSAMCOM

Interagency Staff*

COUNTER DRUG

DISASTER/HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

COMBATTING TERRORISM

BORDER SECURITY

WMD

COAST GUARD

Chemical/Biological
Nuclear

BMD

STATE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ADJUTANTS

JIATF EAST

JIATF WEST

JIATF SOUTH

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Legend:

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
CINMACOM Commander in Chief, United States America Command
Dept Department
JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction


*Representatives from all Agencies (See Figure 2) (Replaces/subsumes FEMA functions)


Figure 4. Agency Structures for Terrorism Response. Source: Department of the Army, Center of Excellence for Homeland Defense “Domestic Terrorism: Interagency Operations in the USA Initiatives, Battle Space Appreciation” (Briefing slides, Fort Leonard Wood, MO: NGB, 2000), 1.
Figure 5. Map of Domestic Preparedness Programs. Source: Department of the Army, Center of Excellence for Homeland Defense "Domestic Terrorism: Interagency Operations in the USA Initiatives, Battle Space Appreciation" (briefing slides, Fort Leonard Wood, MO: NGB, 2000), 14.
Chemical Assets: The Bottom Line

Aggregate of all types of Chemical units

Based on TAA 05

The USAR Chemical Force is on the ground TODAY; does not require new structure, training or equipment

Figure 6. Chemical Assets: The Bottom Line. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army Reserve Command “USAR Strengths and Opportunities in Civil Support/Consequence Management” (briefing slides, Atlanta, GA: USARC, 2000), 25.
REFERENCE LIST


Field Manuals. See US Department of the Army.

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United States Army Reserve Command. 1999. The United States Army Reserve and Homeland Defense. Briefing Slides, Atlanta, GA.


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