Japanese Military Development: Expressed Threats versus Programs and Policies

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This study investigates the development of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces into a military force capable of defending Japan and also of projecting power within the East Asian region. According to statements by the Japanese Defense Agency, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other officials, North Korea is viewed as the primary threat to Japanese security. However, neither North Korea, nor any other potential adversary is currently capable of mounting an armed invasion of Japan. Yet, Japan continues to spend billions on defense, behind only the United States and Russia, and expand the capabilities of her forces.

This study attempts to explain the motivation behind what appears on the surface to be an overly large military buildup. It does this by comparing the military capabilities being created by current Japanese ground, air and naval programs with the security threats to Japan. The threat to Japan by North Korean ballistic missiles is studied, as are other threats that have appeared in the post-Cold War environment. The final analysis shows that Japan’s military development seems to be directed toward increasing Japan’s role as a regional power and a participant in peacekeeping activities.


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JAPANESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENT
EXPRESSED THREATS VERSUS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

DAVID R. GRAMBO, LCDR, USN
B.S., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1985

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

JAPANESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENT: EXPRESSED THREATS VERSUS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES by LCDR David R. Grambo, USN.

This study investigates the development of the Japanese Self Defense Forces into a military force capable of defending Japan and also of projecting power within the East Asian region. According to statements by the Japanese Defense Agency, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other officials, North Korea is viewed as the primary threat to Japanese security. However, neither North Korea, nor any other potential adversary is currently capable of mounting an armed invasion of Japan. Yet, Japan continues to spend billions on defense, behind only the United States and Russia, and expand the capabilities of her forces.

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<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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<td>DPRK</td>
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<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>SDPJ</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since 1975, the Japanese, a people dedicated to peace by Article 9 of their constitution, have committed over one half a trillion dollars to develop and build, arguably, the region’s most-capable and well-rounded military. While much of this has been encouraged by United States (U.S.) demands for burdensharing since the mid-1970s, neighboring nations, such as South Korea, and China see it as a veiled remilitarization and potential for future adventurism. The Japanese government, however, by increasingly linking its defense development directly to the threats presented by a nuclear North Korea, claims self-defense. Is this supported by the facts? Is this military development simply a response to the threats represented by North Korean nuclear and missile development, or is it a program designed to create the military potential for a more assertive Japanese foreign policy in the region in the future?

This thesis will argue that the current trend in Japanese defense procurement goes beyond a purely self-defensive posture. This thesis will examine Japanese defense policies and compare these to the development of North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear program. Additionally, this thesis will examine other security issues in East Asia that have a profound impact on Japan’s defense policy. This will include a review of Japanese relations with neighboring nations including China, South Korea, and Russia. Most importantly the analysis will show, given Japan’s pacifist constitution and domestic environment, Japanese political leaders and military strategists have focused on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) missile threat to justify increasing military capabilities.
Historically, Japan has looked towards Korea as both a security risk and opportunity. As far back as the late sixteenth century Korea was seen by the Japanese as either a gate to the mainland of Asia, or as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. The sixteenth century Japanese Emperor Hideyoshi saw Korea as a path for Japanese access to China and beyond. His attempt to attack Ming China through Korea engendered a long-term distrust between Japan and its western neighbors. Japan, as a nascent regional power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw Korea, initially as a security threat and thus as an object to be kept from other nations. Since the Korean Peninsula commands the sea lanes to northern China, Manchuria, and the Russian Far East, Japanese leaders felt “in the hands of a strong power, the country [Korea] could be a ‘dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.’”\(^1\)

Japan’s desire to dominate Korea brought Japan into conflicts with China in 1894 to 1895 and Russia in 1904 to 1905. Subsequently, Japan initially occupied and then fully annexed Korea in 1910. Japan then implemented an economic exploitation of Korea that further bolstered Japan’s strength in the region. By 1936, Japan used Korea as an opening to begin a conquest of China, which ended with the Japan’s defeat in World War Two. The ensuing Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union allowed Japan to use the U.S. as her guarantor of Korean security. The division of the Korean Peninsula between north and south and Cold War alignments prevented a full reconciliation between Japan and Korea. Even today, with relatively close economic and political ties built up between South Korea and Japan, there remains a level of concern and distrust on both sides. The prospect of a hostile state in control of the Korean Peninsula continues to be a perceived threat to Japan. Japan’s current conflict with North Korea can be seen as
an extension of this continuous clash over the Korean Peninsula and the threat it poses to
Japanese security.

The relative stability of the Cold War allowed Japan to rebuild its shattered
economy under the defensive umbrella of the U.S. Following her defeat in World War
Two, Japan had no military inclinations. Under U.S. tutelage, Japan approved a
constitution restricting her ability to form a substantial military. Throughout the Cold
War Japan used this constitution as a shield to prevent becoming militarily involved in
America’s Cold War adventures. In the 1980s Japan began building a military fully
capable of self-defense and assisting the U.S. in a direct conflict with the Soviet Union,
which was seen then as Japan’s greatest threat. Then, in the 1990s, even as the Soviet
threat disappeared and Russia reached regional impotence, Japan began building a force
capable of projecting power throughout the East Asian region. The following chapter
will detail Japan’s military development in the post-World War Two era, and how Japan
has reached its current status.

When examining Japan’s defense policies it is necessary to assess the threats to
Japan’s security now and in the future within both the historic and current contexts. The
North Korean threat began to emerge at about the time the Soviet threat was ending. As
North Korea’s ballistic missile program became more advanced and began to threaten
areas outside the Korean Peninsula, Japan and the U.S. began to take notice. Japan began
to focus its political rhetoric in defense of military capability on North Korea. North
Korea was declared the number one security threat to Japan in the most recent defense
white papers and public statements. However, North Korea is not the only security issue
on the horizon for Japan. Korea has historically been a pressure point for Japan because
of China and Russia. As stated, these three nations have often used Korea as their battleground. Although Korea has often been the primary focus, Japan is increasingly involved throughout Asia. East Asian security, and particularly that of Japan, must be examined in a broader scale than ever before to include this dynamic in Asia. All these issues, including North Korea’s ballistic missile program, will be examined in chapter three.

After examining Japan’s military development, the specific programs will be compared to the security needs created by the threats that Japan faces. The Self-Defense Forces of Japan have undergone a significant buildup over the past several years in order to meet the supposed challenges posed by an unsettled situation on the Korean Peninsula. The equipment developed and fielded will be compared to the North Korean threat as well as other suspected threats. The final analysis will attempt to explain what the purpose of the Japanese buildup has been, and continues to be. Japan possesses one of the most modern and capable militaries in the world, and continues to spend more money on defense than all but two nations. Japan’s military spending emphasis has been increasingly on the tools of power projection—ships and aircraft. The capabilities of these systems go far beyond simple self-defense from unified or separate Korean actions. Instead, Japan’s military capacity can match any military in the region. Given Japan’s growing economic interaction in Asia, this capability seems intended to defend interests far beyond Japan’s borders.

CHAPTER 2
JAPANESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

Part I. 1945-1989

At the end of World War II, Japan’s military capability was a mere shell of the force that once dominated the Pacific from the Aleutians to New Guinea. Its navy and air force in shambles, the army’s single source of remaining strength—its manpower—was rapidly demobilized in the wake of surrender. The nation’s industrial base, attacked by the Allies in detail from 1943 until the conclusion of the war, retained little of its prewar manufacturing capability and had limited access to few resources. In short, Japan possessed little in the way of forces or industrial strength required to generate a national defense.

These conditions initially appealed to the victorious Americans and the defeated Japanese. The Japanese quickly recognized that the national effort—and all available resources—needed to be applied to economic reconstruction. Under pragmatic leadership Japan was more than happy to allow the U.S. to act as guarantor of its security. Among Americans, however, this view progressively lost favor as the Cold War and the Soviet threat loomed on the horizon. The U.S. found itself eventually in the unique position of encouraging its recently defeated enemy to rearm. For its part, Japan found itself less than sure about America’s ability to single-handedly protect Japan’s increasingly international position. The solution was to have Japan rebuild across the entire spectrum of military capabilities and once again become a regional military power.

The development of Japan’s military following the defeat in 1945 can be divided into three distinct phases. The first, the initial postwar period from 1945 to 1950, focused
on the establishment of a modest constabulary capability bolstered by the presence of occupying American forces. The country’s main focus of this period was the internalization of Japan’s peace constitution and the reestablishment of a viable economy and government.

The second period, 1950 to 1972 is defined mainly by the rise to power of the People’s Republic of China, the Korean War and rising superpower Cold War confrontation. These events significantly changed the U.S. attitude towards Japan and, thereby, attitudes regarding a Japanese military. Within this context Japan reestablished a three-service military with equipment of limited capability while the nation at large pursued continued development and expansion of heavy industrial, manufacturing, and financial sectors—all accelerated by the opportunities of the Korean War. More comfortable with its constitutional commitment to peace, the polity further advanced a political tradition of democracy, even while institutionally limiting socialist elements.

The third period, 1973 to 1989, begun with Nixon’s announcement of the “Guam Doctrine” was essentially driven by U.S. policies of burdensharing and burgeoning feelings of Japanese economic achievement and independence. This pushed Japan into a new era of military growth and a significant expansion of capabilities and missions. These increased resources, combined with a growing sense of nationalism and concern with international participation, led Japan to begin looking outward while regional competitors, increasingly concerned, put Japan’s military under greater scrutiny. To fully understand this progressive development and its implications, and to ascertain its intent, each period must be examined in greater detail.
With the end of the war in the Pacific the U.S. was determined to eliminate the Japanese military system and government. This involved the complete demobilization of all sections of the armed forces, closing of bases not being used by U.S. forces, and shutting down military industries. At the time Japanese armed forces included over three million men situated throughout the Pacific and Asian mainland. The goal of demobilization was to ensure that Japan could not present a military threat to anyone ever again. U.S. military occupation authorities, led by General MacArthur, significantly gutted Imperial Japanese government high-level office holders as well as senior military personnel from the restructured government. The only portion of the government structure left intact was the mid-level and low-level bureaucracy responsible for running the country on a day-to-day basis. These bureaucrats became the power brokers in the years after the war for the simple reason that there was no one else available who was not discredited by U.S. occupation authorities, or by the Japanese public’s desire to put the past behind them.

Another goal of the occupation leadership was to create a political environment for lasting peace and democracy. The intent was to develop a stable democratic, capitalist and decidedly pro-American surrogate that would help guarantee regional stability and promote U.S. policies. MacArthur believed he could use the influence the emperor still held with the Japanese people to help support—indeed sell—the new democratic institutions. To facilitate this arrangement, U.S. occupation forces rewrote the Japanese constitution under MacArthur’s personal guidance, retaining the emperor as the symbol of the state, albeit without sacred status. Most significantly, from a defense standpoint, the constitution included a provision renouncing war—Article 9—that also
declared that no potential to wage war would be maintained. Going even further, it
denounced the right of the state to wage belligerent war. From the viewpoint of both the
U.S. and Japan this was an ideal, as well as idealistic, constitution. For the U.S. it
appeared to guarantee that Japan could not present a military challenge in the future. For
Japan, it allowed the new government to occupy a position of limited neutrality within
the international community despite the military aggression of the previous governments.
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru stated in 1949: “It is my belief that the very absence of
armaments is a guarantee of the security and happiness of our people, and will gain for us
the confidence of the world, and will enable us as a peaceful nation to take pride before
the world in our national polity.”
It also allowed the Japanese to focus exclusively on
rebuilding their shattered economy while developing democratic institutions.

At the end of the decade, Japan had no national military force, only a police force
for local civil law enforcement. There were no Japanese forces established for national
security or defense. Instead, Japan’s defense was to be handled by four American army
divisions and aircraft and navy ships stationed throughout the country. There was no
desire on the part of American or Japanese authorities to alter this situation at this
juncture. Any future involvement in waging or even supporting war seemed thankfully
distant to the Japanese leadership and electorate and their American guarantors.

This idealistic situation was short-lived. The utility of Japan as a bulwark against
the perceived emergence of a USSR-PRC international communist conspiracy caused the
U.S. to reassess the idea of a demilitarized Japan. The American policy designed to meet
the communist threat, containment, emphasized the exclusionary benefit of alliances and
the forward deployment of U.S. forces to minimize the expansion of communist nations

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beyond their borders. Japan now became the U.S.'s best bet for containment in Asia and was viewed as the key blocking bastion of democracy.

This position was amplified by the invasion of South Korea by communist North Korean forces in June 1950. The only forces immediately available for the defense of the Korean Peninsula were those currently stationed on Japan. These forces were quickly sent to the Peninsula to assist in the hasty defense of South Korea. The dispatch of U.S. forces to defend South Korea forced the U.S. to encourage Japan to develop their own defense force. The problematic task of doing so in light of the highly restrictive constitution was solved by forming a force focused on domestic order called the National Police Reserve in August of 1950. MacArthur gave the Japanese government authorization for a 75,000 man National Police Reserve on 8 July 1950. By the application deadline of 13 August 1950, there were 382,000 applicants. The initial charter for the National Police Reserve was greatly limited in scope:

1. The Police Reserve shall be a peacekeeping force that deals with civil unrest, public violence and the like.

2. There would be a national command system, divided into four regional districts.

3. The Prime Minister shall have direct jurisdiction.

4. The Prime Minister shall appoint the commander of the Police Reserve.

5. The Police Reserve units shall have “mobility and armaments suitable for their function, namely, pistols and other small arms.”

Even this modest, restricted force caused some argument among the Japanese public already accustomed to the peace constitution.
As America’s involvement in the Korean War strained available national resources, the U.S. pressed Japan for further rearmament and larger armed forces, abandoning the desire for a disarmed Japan incapable of rendering assistance to U.S. efforts. Japan’s Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, felt that too large of a force would be unacceptable to the Japanese public, as well as economically unfeasible. The solution seemed to reside in increased U.S. presence and marginal increases in Japanese forces. Thus, in exchange for U.S. basing rights on Japan, Yoshida initially agreed to a relatively small (110,000 man) Japanese defense force. This force was formed from the National Police Reserve in 1952 and dubbed the Security Force. Although still not a military by name, these forces included forty M-4 light tanks, eighteen patrol frigates of 1,450 tons displacement, and forty small reconnaissance aircraft. All these forces were supplied by the U.S. at essentially no cost. Additionally, Yoshida gained U.S. acquiescence to continued prohibition on the dispatch of Japanese forces outside Japan. He wanted to avoid getting Japan involved in U.S. conflicts in the Cold War. This ensured Japan kept the focus primarily on economic development. Yoshida reasoned that: “Japan could make minimal concessions of passive cooperation with the U.S. in return for an early end to the Occupation, a long-term guarantee of Japan’s national security, and an opportunity to concentrate on all-out economic recovery.” This position became more comprehensively developed as the Yoshida Doctrine, which consisted of three main points:

1. Japan’s economic development was paramount;
2. Japan would remain only lightly armed;
3. Japan’s security depended on the U.S. support.
The second and third points directly supported the first point.

In the short term, this unwritten but widely stated set of guidelines allowed Japan to support U.S. forces in Korea without actually committing combat forces. Even though the U.S. wanted a more significant Japanese defense force of up to 350,000 men, Yoshida ably resisted calls for full rearmament by granting basing rights to U.S. forces. The support for U.S. forces eventually included basing, repair, maintenance and logistic support. For a nation emerging from the utter destruction of the war, this infusion of capitol generated by American contracts was a godsend. Theses positive effects reinforced the efficacy and strength of Yoshida's policies. A small domestic defense force, support for U.S. forces without involvement, dependency on the American defense capabilities and an unswerving focus on economic development became central elements in the defense policy of Japanese governments for three decades.

Internationally, Yoshida's goal for Japan was to reestablish the nation as an credible and trusted international actor. To do this he had to reassure the world that Japan had changed her militaristic ways and was a "good global citizen" long before that term came into usage. Article 9 of the constitution provided Japan with the international screen against criticism of her military past. Perpetually small armed forces would enhance Japan's credibility with former enemies while not threatening its regional neighbors. To facilitate this effort, Japan inextricably tied its defense to the U.S. This formal connection began with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951, signed the same day as the peace treaty officially ending World War II, with the exception of the Soviet Union and some eastern-bloc nations that refused to sign the treaty.
The treaty contained several important provisions. The U.S. and Japan were to provide mutual aid to maintain and develop capacities to resist armed attack, “subject to their constitutional provisions.” They were to consult together “from time to time and whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened” and take appropriate action if there was an armed attack on either party in the territory under the administration of Japan. Finally, “[F]or the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” While this treaty would go through several revisions, its importance would be salient to Japanese defense policy throughout the postwar period.

To support Japan’s end of the bargain, in 1954 the Japanese Diet established the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF). The initial authorized force in July 1954 consisted of 150,000 ground forces, 15,808 maritime forces, 6,287 air force personnel, a joint staff of 20 and civilian secretariat of 12,424. The equipment was effectively the same as that of the Security Force of 1952. The mission of the Self-Defense Force was stated to be: “defend against direct attacks or invasions” and “if necessary protect public order and safety.” The defense budget was substantial $480 million in 1954. By 1960, less than six years later, the budget had grown almost twenty percent to about $569 million.

Comparatively, in Asia, Australia involved in regional conflicts, spent $472 million, and in Europe the Netherlands, part of NATO expansion, spent a $555 million in 1960. With respect to specific equipment, Japan focused on coastal defense forces, light tanks (mainly U.S. M41s), and aircraft. This force could be considered consistent with the
force required for defense of the nation. There was neither an inherent offensive capability, nor an excessive defensive capability.

In addition to the growth of the Self-Defense Force, the Yoshida Doctrine expanded as well. Yoshida’s successors included provisions to prevent the export of Japanese armaments, and to prevent the dispatch of troops outside the country as part of any collective security scheme. These were easily couched in terms of maintaining Japan’s commitment to peace and non-aggression, and served Japan well to stay out of any commitment in Vietnam. In comparison, South Korea sent 300,000 men to assist the U.S. effort in Vietnam.\(^\text{16}\) Japan also pledged to not become a nuclear power. This was delineated in Prime Minister Sato’s three nuclear principles: “Japan would not produce, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons onto its soil.”\(^\text{17}\) Implicit in this statement is the fact that Japan could, if desired, do all three. The final addition to the Yoshida Doctrine became the practice of limiting defense spending to less than one percent of the nation’s GNP. This practice also began under Sato. All aspects of the Yoshida doctrine remained in effect throughout the formative years of Japan’s postwar military, and, to a large extent, to this day.

Sato and Yoshida’s other successors were so successful at maintaining focus on economic development that, by the end of the 1960s, Japan became the number two economy in the free world, second only to the U.S.’s. Yoshida’s guiding principles had “proved [their] worth by maintaining domestic political stability and avoiding involvement in regional security obligations.”\(^\text{18}\) The doctrine had both domestic and international goals; “It was a political compromise between the pacifism of opposition groups and the security concerns of the right-wing conservatives. Abroad, it attained the
American guarantee of Japanese security without obligating Japan to become directly involved in the Cold War."19 Japan’s single-mindedness had allowed her to reach the economic level she desired.

The Yoshida Doctrine was an easy, and obvious, platform for Japan to adhere to in the early years of the Cold War and even through the Vietnam War, when there was no threat to Japan itself. Relying on the U.S. was an acceptable solution for Japan’s security problems, particularly when the U.S. was so devoutly committed to the defense of non-Communist Asia, as demonstrated by wars fought in Korea and Vietnam. At that point Japan had no reason to doubt the U.S. pledge to come to Japan’s defense. But, as America struggled with internal issues driven by the war in Vietnam, Japan began to think of a more independent defense outside complete U.S. domination. This broader thought was directly linked to Japan’s ascendancy to economic power. This change in attitude can be seen in the Defense Agency’s first white paper, *The Defense of Japan*, published in 1970:

We will face a greater need to cope with serious problems arising both internally and internationally as a consequence of our economic growth. Therefore, we must now stop being imitators, and we must stop following in the wake of others; we must move on toward our own aims of our own choosing.20

With respect to specific threats, Japan saw the most likely to be from unspecified “indirect aggression,” not conventional invasion. In the 1970 edition of the defense white paper, there is no mention of specific nations posing a threat of invasion, nor is a specific nation suspected of posing a threat of indirect aggression.21 At this point there was no stated direct threat from the Korean Peninsula, or from the Soviet Union although Japan continued to increase her defense capability against the
possibility of Soviet invasion. By 1970 Japan’s defense spending ranked twelfth in the world at $1,582 million, triple that of ten years earlier. This ranked above Australia and the Netherlands, but well below such nations as Canada and Italy.\textsuperscript{22} As seen in table 1, the SDF possessed 400 main battle tanks, 450 combat aircraft, and 28 principle surface combatants. By the end of the 1970s the SDF grew to include 810 tanks and 48 surface combatants, almost doubling numbers and capability. This was due in part to Japan’s desire for greater autonomy with defense, as well as U.S. insistence for burdensharing.

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam the Nixon administration began to press all allies for greater sharing of the costs of defense and containment of communism. This was particularly true in Asia. What became known as the Nixon Doctrine, or the Guam Doctrine, stressed greater self-reliance in Asian defense. It also involved the removal of 20,000 U.S. troops from South Korea.\textsuperscript{23} The emphasis on burdensharing and removal of troops from Korea could only be seen by Japan as a decreasing level of commitment on the part of the U.S. for the defense of Asia. That would require further investment by Japan in her own defense, regardless of U.S. pressure to share the burden of defense. At this time Japan began to see more specific threats to her security. China and the Soviet Union were expanding their influence in Asia, which concerned Japan’s defense establishment, as stated in the 1976 defense white paper: “Both China and the Soviet Union have been making increasing overtures towards these countries [Asia] in recent years, and their competition for influence seems most conspicuous in this area.”\textsuperscript{24}
The 1976 defense white paper also made clear reference to the importance that Japan placed on the Korean Peninsula as an area of national security interest: "Northeast Asia is the area most important to Japan's peace and security." The paper noted: "Northeast Asia is a locus of direct confrontation between American and Soviet forces, next in scale to Europe." As a result, Japan did not feel particularly secure:

Compared to Europe, Japan's military environment cannot be considered altogether stable because of the complex mixture of rivalry and confrontation in Northeast Asia. At least for the time being, however, the United States, China and the Soviet Union seem to be discouraging any large-scale military conflict.

Japan's response to this situation was to significantly increase defense spending in the 1970s. Although still adhering to the guideline of limiting defense spending to one percent of GNP, this was one percent of a growing number. Japan moved up to eighth in the world in defense spending, easily bypassing Canada, Italy and India by 1980. The total amount of spending grew from $1.53 billion in 1970 to an impressive $8.96 billion in 1980. This also put Japan just behind France and East Germany in military spending, two nations deeply engaged in Cold War confrontation. In addition to greater spending, Japanese attitudes were beginning to change even in an area as sensitive as possession of nuclear weapons. The three nonnuclear principles were still important, but the Japanese people seemed to accept that it was "inevitable that Japan [would] become a nuclear power in her own right. A 1968 poll showed 25 percent actually wanted nuclear weapons, and 50 percent expected Japan to acquire them by the 1980s." Although this did not happen, the poll results certainly demonstrate the evolving point of view of the Japanese people in the late 1960s and 1970s.
The decade of the 1980s produced significant domestic and international discussion about Japanese defense policies. The situation on the Korean Peninsula was a cause of increasing concern for Japan's defense planners: "The U.S. commitment to the defense of ROK seems to be greatly contributing to successful deterrence . . . but due to the large military buildup of North Korea carried out in the 1970s and after, the situation there warrants no optimism."30 This pessimistic assessment led many Japanese political and military leader to think about Japan's need to watch out for her own interests. Also, many business leaders, because they felt that Japan had economically caught the U.S., desired greater autonomy in defense policy and international relations. The person exemplifying this new attitude was Japan's Prime Minister from 1982 to 1987, Nakasone Yasuhiro. He led a softening of the long-held Yoshida Doctrine, which had steered Japan throughout the postwar period. Helping to push Nakasone were the Japanese people who felt they had moved beyond the guilt of the Second World War. In 1983, 53 percent of polled Japanese felt they were "superior" to Westerners. This was compared to 20 percent who felt that way in 1953.31 Ethnic nationalism was again a political power to reckon with.

One major result of this change in perceptions was Japan's self-imposed spending limit of 1 percent of the nations GNP. This had, in the past, been given the image of a constitutionally imposed limit, yet it had simply been a tradition not given legal backing until 1976. The 1 percent ceiling legislation was initially proposed by the leading party of the time, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as a means of defusing opposition political pressures on defense spending. At the time, November 1976, the LDP effectively traded the 1 percent ceiling to achieve a long-range concession by the
opposition parties to agree to the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).

Domestic politics were the primary large factor in establishing the 1 percent limit rather than objective security analysis.

Significant changes in Japanese public and political viewpoints allowed the government to exceed the one percent limit in the late 1980s. These attitudes where due in large part to Japanese perception of their economic dominance and budding independence from U.S. policies. Even opposition parties showed little enthusiasm for fighting the breaking of the historic limit:

The controversial One Percent Ceiling, the symbol of Japan’s aim not to become a military power, was broken without much political conflict. The opposition parties criticized the breach but made no attempt to submit a no-confidence motion in the Diet, conduct delaying tactics, or boycott Diet proceedings.32

The spending limit was broken with spending as a percent of GDP, 1.004 percent in 1987, 1.013 in 1988, and 1.006 percent in 1989. Spending has since returned to below one percent, but the precedent had been set. One argument for a defense buildup was the aging of Japanese equipment and the requirement for a pay increase for military and civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense. Presented this way, it was more difficult for domestic opposition parties to resist the increase. A lack of outcry--domestic and international--in 1987 encouraged the later spending.33 From the viewpoint of the U.S. this new interest in defense by Japan was seen as a natural progression. At the time, the U.S. was battling high budget deficits and public debt from the Cold War defense buildup and welcomed greater Japanese participation in their own defense. Aside from breaking the one percent barrier, the other tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine remained essentially
intact throughout the decade. The shift towards a larger interest in defense had, however, been established.

From the beginning of the Self-Defense Force in 1954 there was reluctance on the part of the Japanese government to divert attention and resources away from economic development. Once the Japanese government and public felt they had economically caught up with the West, defense policies and public attitude toward the SDF began to change. Public polls showed that 50 percent of Japanese were “not interested” in the SDF or defense issues in 1978, but by 1990 that number had dropped to only 30 percent. Those considering themselves “interested” went from only 48 percent in 1978 to 67 percent in 1990. These changes in public opinion directly translated into greater financial and political commitment to defense spending. As shown in table 2, spending increased almost seven-fold from 1970 to 1980 and doubled again by 1990.

Along with the changing domestic attitudes in Japan, the Japanese government was under pressure from the U.S. to broaden its defense commitments in the eighties. In response, in 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki Kenko committed Japan to defense of sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan. This showed a greater readiness of Japan’s defense forces to complement U.S.’s capabilities. A primary mission of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force became antisubmarine warfare (ASW), integrated with U.S. forces. ASW was given priority and the first listed capability under the heading “Capability Required to Secure Safety of Maritime Traffic” in the 1989 white paper. Japan’s defense forces now figured prominently in the U.S.’s strategy of Soviet containment. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s statement that Japan would become an
“unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Pacific only affirmed its involvement in the U.S.
strategy.

The Japan-U.S. security relationship was formed in the time of the Cold War. This bond held through several decades. Even during the trade arguments in the 1980s Japan and the U.S. maintained a common defense against the Soviet Union. By then Japan had changed completely from a disarmed, demilitarized, and economically destitute nation to the second largest economy in the world. Her defense force had grown from a 75,000 man “police force” to a 247,000 man, balanced force of ground, maritime, and air forces. By the end of the 1980s, the Japanese public and government were beginning to feel restricted by the Yoshida Doctrine and starting to shed some of the long-held pacifist beliefs that had dominated Japanese society during the immediate postwar period. As the decade of the 1990s was dawning, the international environment was undergoing drastic changes that would cause a further shifting of Japan’s defense policies.
Part II: 1990-1999

The end of the Cold War began during 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and Eastern European communist states. Although these events fostered a significant reduction of military tensions throughout Europe, Asia did not feel the same sense of relief. The same security issues remained—a divided and mutually hostile Korea, the dispute between China and Taiwan, as well as numerous territorial disputes. Under these conditions Japan’s defense policy makers had to reassess the world around them. Subsequently, Japan’s defense policies began shifting. The Cold War focus of assisting U.S. forces in a confrontation with the Soviet Union had been overtaken by events. However, unlike Europe and the U.S., Japan did not see a peace dividend or a decline in defense spending. Japan’s military development continued in two steps, from 1990 to 1994, and beyond 1994. The end of the Cold War created a debate, both within and outside Japan, on the proper role for Japan’s military in Asia and throughout the world. This debate is ongoing, changing Japan’s direction in international relations. This changing international posture also led to significant transformation of Japan’s military capabilities.

The end of the Cold War did not see a significant lessening of tensions in East Asia. Although the threat of Soviet invasion had disappeared, many other points of contention emerged. Due to Japan’s economic reliance on imports, any conflict in Asia, from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea could seriously affect Japan’s sea-lanes. Japan imports 700 million tons of material, while exporting 70 million tons of goods annually. Japanese defense planners at the end of the Cold War were concerned about Asia’s volatility, even as Europe disarmed:
In the Asia-Pacific region, the picture of antagonism is complicated and countries' security perceptions are diverse, and there exist unsettled issues, such as those concerning the Korean Peninsula, the Spratly Islands and Japan's Northern Territories. A major change such as one that occurred in Europe following the end of the Cold War has not yet taken place in the region. Against such a background, many countries in this region have been trying to improve and modernize their defense capabilities.\textsuperscript{38}

In light of this unsettled situation, spending on Japan's defense jumped from $16.3 billion in 1990 to over $44 billion in 1994. In the same period Japan moved up to become the third highest nation in defense spending, surpassed only by the U.S. and debilitated Russia.\textsuperscript{39} During this time frame, U.S. military involvement in East Asia underwent significant change, as well. The U.S. government responded to domestic pressure to reduce forces worldwide in response to decreased tensions and large budget deficits by significantly cutting forces. Additionally, U.S. forces in the Philippines, long the main U.S. base in Asia, were withdrawn by 1992 due to domestic pressure within the Philippines. This created a perception of an impending power vacuum, which created anxiety in many Asian capitals. Key Asian leaders saw the U.S. presence as "primary restraint on the return of an independent, militarily capable Japan. . . . The possibility of an American withdrawal would therefore have severe repercussions for Japan's relations with its neighbors."\textsuperscript{40}

As discussed, Asia is extremely sensitive to a possible resurgent Japan based on the history of Japanese aggression in Asia, and the lack of contrition that Japan's neighbors feel from the Japanese. Any talk of a power vacuum quickly turned to concern over a strong Japanese military. The Japanese government was forced to try and soothe Asian fears, with little success:
The end of the Cold War stimulated concerns of a power vacuum in Southeast Asia. . . . Although the government has frequently said that Japan will never be a military superpower nor invade foreign countries again, the country clearly is gaining the military capabilities to do so for the first time since 1945.\textsuperscript{41}

The changing world situation forced Japan to begin to think more independently with respect to defense, but this process was also a continuation of the trend towards more self-reliance seen at the end of the 1980s. Having reached economic prosperity, Japan began to assert the international influence that historically accompanied economic power. Since neither Japanese public opinion nor Japan’s neighbors were ready to allow Japan international military influence, the instrument of choice was monetary assistance and investment:

Slowly [Japan] was shedding its parochial outlooks and stepping into the international arena, especially in economic life. As Tokyo interpreted its action, its was “recycling” some of its vast surplus into grants, loans and aid development programs.\textsuperscript{42}

In 1980 total Japanese foreign investment was $160 billion; by 1991 this had skyrocketed to $2.0 trillion.\textsuperscript{43} The majority of this went to Asian nations. In 1989 sixty-three percent of Japanese aid went to East and South Asia. The largest recipients were Indonesia, China, the Philippines, India and Thailand.\textsuperscript{44} Two-way trade between Japan and East Asia surpassed trade with the U.S. in 1990. By 1993 Japan-East Asia trade totaled approximately $200 billion, while Japanese trade with the U.S. was $150 billion.\textsuperscript{45} This did not portend a weakening of the Japan-U.S. security alliance, but it did demonstrate that Japanese ties outside of the U.S.-Japan relationship were growing rapidly.

As Japan’s money went international, so did its focus. The nation began to realize it had responsibilities commensurate with its economic status. Again, this was driven partially by U.S. pressures. During the Gulf War Japan was expected to provide support
commensurate with her interest in the stability of the Persian Gulf region. Due to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and domestic disputes, Japan only provided money for the hostilities phase of the Gulf War. This eventually totaled over $13 billion in actual payments and debt relief.\(^4\) This was seen by many nations as an easy way out of making difficult decisions and was derided as practicing “checkbook diplomacy.” In reality it showed Japan’s inability to reach a consensus for change quickly. The Japanese public and leaders were hurt and confused when the Kuwaiti expressions of gratitude to the world—a full-page ad in the *New York Times*, and an official ceremony—after the war specifically excluded references to Japan.\(^5\) Japan eventually sent four minesweeping vessels, and two support ships to the Gulf after the cessation of the fighting.

The Gulf War problems also led to the Japanese Diet authorizing Japanese Defense Agency forces to participate in United Nations sponsored peacekeeping operations. Japanese forces were allowed to participate humanitarian or logistics functions, and prohibited from armed U.N. missions, such as monitoring cease-fires, disarming combatants and patrolling buffer zones.\(^6\)

As with all nations, domestic politics have a great effect on the direction of Japan’s defense policies. Opposition politicians resisted Japan’s move to greater internationalism throughout the postwar years. Although holding a monopoly on power from the 1950s, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) still had to answer to critics, both within and outside the party. This had a balancing effect on any individual or group pushing for a greater military role or a new interpretation of the constitution. In the early 1990s this began to change. The LDP lost its grip on power in 1993, and subsequently was forced to form a coalition government in 1994 with the Social Democratic Party of
Japan (SDPJ). Throughout their history the SDPJ had opposed both the existence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The party realized that to stay in power, they would need to revise their stance to become more centrist. The SDPJ subsequently acknowledged the constitutionality of the JDF and the U.S.-Japan Treaty, and endorsed a limited defensive capability.\(^59\) This greatly changed the dynamics of Japanese domestic politics. As one Japanese political writer put it: “In one fell swoop, therefore, [Prime Minister] Murayama leveled the entire bulwark of the antiwar, peace-oriented policy the SDJP had worked so hard to build during the half-century since the end of the war.”\(^50\) What was once the opposition had moved closer to the position of ruling party. The fact that Japanese politics became more homogeneous was an indication of how Japan felt the need to be more self-reliant.

Japan’s military establishment in 1994 began to reflect a new independence and a significant enhancement of capabilities. The Ground Self-Defense Force possessed a total of 1,160 main battle tanks. This number included the first of the new Type 90 tanks. The capabilities of these tanks compare with those of the U.S. M1. The Air Self-Defense Force had 440 combat aircraft. Included in this number were F-15 jets built in Japan under license from the U.S. The Maritime Self-Defense Force numbered major surface combatants at sixty-two. By 1994 this incorporated the first of four AEGIS-equipped destroyers.\(^51\) Japan was the first nation to receive the AEGIS radar and weapons-control technology from the U.S.\(^52\) Japan’s improved hardware showed a shift in attitude towards a front-line, highly-technical force. With these weapons Japan could compete, on its own, with any force in the region.
In addition to gaining new equipment, the JDA began to realign its defense priorities. Although the Soviet threat had disappeared, there were still many threatening factors in the region. Russian forces were still seen as “an unstable factor.” In the JDA’s white paper of 1994 the Korean Peninsula had replaced the Soviet Union as the most significant threat in the region. Japan did not feel comfortable about the situation on the Peninsula:

North Korea’s response to suspicions about its nuclear weapons development further heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula. Such a situation on the peninsula constitutes a serious factor of uncertainty for the security of entire East Asia, including Japan.

In this statement, and throughout the discussion of the problems on the Korean Peninsula, the white paper is careful to point out that this is an East Asian regional problem, not just Japan’s problem. The other issue referred to often is the dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories. Also, during this time of shifting threats, Japan began shifting the focus of the GSDF. The GSDF reorganized forces so that the divisions with the highest degree of readiness were stationed on the island of Hokkaido, the northern-most island. This was done at the expense of forces in central Japan. Thus, Japan effectively reinforced troops facing the Russian Far East forces.

Due to these military improvements and rising Japanese military budgets, many Japanese felt it was necessary to calm possible fears of resurgent Japanese militarism. Masashi Nishihara, Professor of International Relations at the National Defense Academy in Japan made the following statements in an interview in 1992. When asked if Japan has any long-range strike capability, he replied: “The structure of Japan’s military forces is defensive. The country has no offensive weapons such as nuclear arms, long-range
bombers, aircraft carriers or large landing ships."56 When responding to a question regarding the fears of neighboring nations, he stated:

Japan has neither the capability nor the motivation to try to achieve a dominant position by force. For example, the 330 advanced jet fighters Japan possesses today may be impressive, but they cannot reach South-East Asia unless they are refueled while in flight. Japan has no aerial tankers for doing this.57

When examining Japan’s military development for the period following 1994, these two statements were almost prophetic when examining the forces Japan began accumulating in the second half of the 1990s.

The time period from 1990 to 1994 found Japan searching for a direction in security planning. Japan’s economic picture had become increasingly international and regional in focus. The former Soviet forces in the Northern Territories were still seen as somewhat of a threat, but the Korean Peninsula was beginning to become the center of attention for Japanese defense planners. As a background to the uncertain world in which Japan found itself, there was rising doubt of the commitment and dedication of the U.S. to the defense of Asia. Under the impetus of the Gulf War, Japan began to become more involved in the international scene.

In the period of 1994 to 1999 Japan’s main threat, as stated, was the instability on the Korean Peninsula. In the defense white paper of 1998 the Korean peninsula is not noted as being unstable, or "factor of uncertainty" as in 1994. However, North Korean missile development is singled-out as being a problem:

North Korea’s missile development and its suspected nuclear weapons development constitute a factor that could bring instability not only to the Asian-Pacific region but also to the entire international community. Japan, therefore, has a serious concern about the state of the development.58
Russian forces are no longer seen as "an unstable factor," but rather, now "it is necessary still to keep watching their activities."  

During this time Japan also fell into its most difficult economic recession of the postwar period. This followed the economic crises of nearly all Asian nations. Despite this, Japanese defense spending fell only slightly, to $40.8 billion in 1998. What Japan was buying with this shows the direction of Japanese policy. From 1994 to 1999 Japan commissioned three more AEGIS equipped destroyers, plus began a new class of modern destroyers. The GSDF continued to acquire Type 90 tanks. The ASDF throughout this time frame requested to buy air-to-air tanker aircraft. Although often refused for political and financial reasons, it appears Japan will purchase tanker aircraft in the 2001 to 2005 defense program. To prepare for this, the ASDF is sending pilots for training in air-to-air refueling in the U.S.  

The most interesting acquisition of this time frame is the new class of landing ship (LST). The Osumi class ship can carry up to ten Type 90 tanks, 390 troops, and can launch two air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC) from its floodable well deck. The ship has a flight deck of approximately 130 meters. The ship is currently configured to handle CH-47 transport helicopters. The capability of this one ship is such a significant improvement that it will only take three ships of the Osumi class to replace the lift capability of the six previous amphibious ships operated by Japan. Plus the large flight deck gives the ability of operating helicopters, which previous ships lacked. The current defense budget plan calls for a total of three Osumi-class LST's.  

The persistence of Japan's and Asia's economic woes had little effect on the direction or scope of Japan's defense policies. As North Korea worked to develop
ballistic missiles with greater range, Japan continued a defense buildup focused on defeating a Soviet-style attack. Japan’s emphasis was on high-performance aircraft, ships and tanks. The Japanese defense white papers of the late 1990s and defense officials continued to stress the Korean threat. The Director of the Defense Agency told the graduating class of the National Defense Academy in May 1999: “In addition to the continuing military confrontation between South and North Korea, the launch of a ballistic missile by Pyongyang last year has cast a serious question over our national security as well as over the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.”63 While expressing concern for North Korea, Japan’s defense policy makers persisted in the development and acquisition of equipment that had little relevance to the threat.

In addition to major equipment purchases all branches of the Self-Defense Force have undergone organizational changes to make them more relevant to the current security environment. This environment includes the increasing use of the SDF in United Nations peacekeeping operations. According to the Japanese Defense Agency’s latest National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) the future role of Japan’s defense forces will be based on three pillars:

1. The defense of Japan.

2. Response to large-scale disasters and various other situations.

3. To contribute to the building of a more stable security environment--this includes “Peace Cooperation Activities.”64

To meet these challenges the Defense Agency sees three major changes for the SDF:

1. Streamline and make more efficient and compact.
2. Be able to effectively respond to a variety of situations by enhancing necessary functions and making qualitative improvements.

3. To simultaneously ensure the appropriate flexibility to smoothly deal with the development of situations.65

These changes are geared towards making the SDF more responsive, and more able to support United Nations peacekeeping operations.

To implement these changes the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is undergoing a force reduction from an authorization of 180,000 to 145,000 active and 15,000 Ready Reserve. The GSDF is also restructuring from thirteen divisions and two combined brigades to nine divisions and six brigades.66 The six separate brigades will allow tremendous flexibility in small-unit and peacekeeping operations.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has also undergone a structural change as well as a qualitative change in equipment. The MSDF is now organized into four regional districts with one of the Kongo-class destroyers assigned to each district. Maritime districts are organized to be able to perform a variety of operations: “After reorganization, the MSDF [became] a more functionally balanced force capable of conducting a variety of operations ranging from surveillance and patrol in surrounding sea areas to such public welfare support as disaster relief activities.”67 The previous organization was geared towards functional capabilities, for example antisubmarine or antiair ships were grouped separately. The new structure allows each regional district to perform operations along the full spectrum of maritime operations--similar to a U.S. carrier battle group, without the reach.
Only the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has been relatively unchanged by reorganization. While the number of fighter squadrons has been reduced by one the focus has been on qualitative improvement:

[The remaining 12 fighter squadrons forming a more efficient and flexible system. . . . As air defense capability has the character that quantity is no substitute for quality, the modernization of fighter aircraft and equipment shall be continued.]

The qualitative improvements in the ASDF have made it “a modern, well balanced defensive air force which is gradually expanding its long-range strike potential.”

Japan has taken on two specific programs in direct response to North Korea’s August 1998 launch of a missile over Japanese territory. The first is joint research and development with the U.S. in Theater Missile Defense, or Ballistic Missile Defense, as Japan calls it. The Japanese Cabinet has also approved establishing a four-satellite reconnaissance network by 2002. This project has a projected cost of about $2 billion. The North Korean missile launch helped to coalesce Japanese public opinion and political opposition behind the idea of a national reconnaissance network. The incident pointed out Japan’s complete dependence on the U.S. for satellite intelligence.

A recent trend has been towards domestic production of major equipment. The main battle tank, Type 90, is domestically designed and produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The F-2 aircraft is produced in Japan, with all major parts, with the exception of the engines, produced by Japanese companies. All but the first eight F-15 aircraft were built in Japan. All of Japan’s new ships are designed and built in Japanese shipyards. The only aspect of Japan’s shipbuilding program not domestic is the AEGIS
system. With Japan’s technical industrial base and growing defense industry, it will be able in the future to produce more advanced and complex equipment.

Along with its increasing defense capability Japan is working to expand its influence and independence in foreign affairs. After the end of the Cold War the world for Japan became less secure. There were new threats from North Korean ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan, as well as numerous minor disputes throughout the East Asian region. Add to this a potentially resurgent China and a receding U.S., and Japan has a much more difficult situation. This outlook, and continued U.S. demands for burdensharing, helped fuel Japan’s significant military spending increases of the 1990s. Japan’s defense spending became one of the highest in the world in 1994 and has remained high. The types of systems acquired began to take on a new focus as well. A shift was seen from systems designed to integrate exclusively with U.S. equipment and capability, to equipment that can stand on its own against any threat in the region.


5Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, 16-17.

6Ibid., 8.

7Ibid., 69.


9Ibid., 235.

10Ibid., 235-6.


12Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, 76.


14Ibid., 97.


17Ibid.

18Ibid.

19Ibid. 239.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 81.


25 Ibid., 11.

26 Ibid., 13.

27 Ibid.


29 Malcom MacIntosh, Japan Re-armed (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 64.


33 Ibid., 131-149.


35 MacIntosh, Japan Re-armed, 87.


40Richard D. Leitch, et al., Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World (Westport CN, Greenwood Press, 1995), 73.

41Ebata, “Japan Poised for Promotion,” 871.


44Leitch, Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, 83.

45Mike M. Mochizuki, Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (Santa Monica CA, Rand Corp., 1995), 41.


47Leitch, Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, 76.


54Ibid; p.37.


57 Ibid.


59 Ibid., 42.


CHAPTER 3
JAPAN'S SECURITY THREATS IN THE POST-COLD WAR

During the Cold War Japan's most significant threat was the Soviet Union. This was the basis for the defense buildup from the initial inception of the National Police Reserve in 1950 through the Self-Defense Force of the 1980s. The mix of forces was designed to counter a potential Soviet offensive in Northeast Asia. Under the umbrella of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and U.S. directed burdensharing, Japan built very capable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces and agreed to help guard sea lines of communication (SLOCs) out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan. Japan also built a first-rate air defense force capable of defending the islands and associated air space from Soviet aircraft. The focus of the ground forces was to repel a Soviet invasion of the home islands--hence the preponderance of forces on Hokkaido. When the Soviet Union lost control of Eastern Europe in 1989, as witnessed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, Japan continued with many defense programs justified by the Soviet threat. For example, the AEGIS-equipped Kongo class destroyers were designed mainly for open ocean anti-air warfare (AAW), and the Type 90 tank was designed to match the Soviet T-80.¹ At first glance, it would appear that these were now weapons systems without a threat. This chapter will examine threats to Japan's security currently and in the future. The second part of this chapter will be a review of North Korea's ballistic missile development, arguably the most significant threat to Japan.

Since the end of the Cold War and the constantly evolving global security environment, Japan's stated security issues have changed drastically. While many nations are seeking ways to decrease defense spending and the burden on their
economies, as noted in previous chapters, Japan has maintained, and even increased its defense programs. There are many forces driving this buildup. Several regional issues include the instability on the Korean Peninsula, China’s rising power, territorial disputes, and increasing Asian economic and military development. To these ongoing problems add a perceived decline in U.S. commitment to the region and rising domestic concern with U.S. basing, and there are signals for significant change to Japan’s security picture.

In Japan’s 1989 defense white paper, Defense of Japan, the main focus was still on the U.S.–Soviet confrontation in the region:

Particularly in recent years, the Soviet Union has strengthened its capabilities with emphasis on the areas such as the Coastal Area and the Sea of Okhotsk. As a result, the military confrontation between the two countries [U.S. and Soviet Union] has been intensified in the area close to Japan.² This showed little change since the 1976 edition, which stated:

The Soviet Union has large forces of varied capabilities deployed in this area. The military capabilities of these forces seem to have considerably improved in recent years, both in quantity and quality, along with modernization of equipment.³

By the 1994 white paper, the Korean Peninsula had replaced the Soviet Union as the main military threat to Japan. Russian forces now constituted “a destabilizing factor in the region.”⁴ The 1998 white paper almost discounted completely the threat posed by Russian forces. The quantitative and qualitative decline of forces in the Russian Far East caused the Japanese Defense Agency to state only that “it is necessary still to keep watching their activities.”⁵

Japan’s emerging post-Cold War stated threat has become North Korea. Even during the Cold War, as stated in the 1976 defense white paper, the Korean Peninsula was an area of concern for Japan: “Korean peace is a prerequisite for the peace and
security of all East Asian nations, including Japan. The increased depth of analysis of
the situation on the Korean Peninsula shows that what was a secondary issue in the white
papers of the 1970s and 1980s has become the premier problem in the 1990s. This focus
is demonstrated in the defense white papers of 1994 and beyond. These white papers
move the Korean Peninsula to the forefront of the chapter titled “Military Situation in the
Asian-Pacific Region.” In addition to the Defense Ministry, Japan’s Foreign Ministry is
also focusing attention on North Korea. In a June 1999 speech by Japanese Minister of
Foreign Affairs Koumura Masahiko, the most significant security threats were from
North Korea:

Elements of instability and uncertainty have been present in Asia since the end of
the Cold War, and a look back over the year 1998 reveals that there were a
number of incidents which had negative impacts on the Asian security
environment. The launching of a ballistic missile by North Korea at the end of
August last year resulted in crossing Japan’s airspace. Not only did this incident
have direct influence on Japanese security and was of great concern to Japan, but
it was also extremely regrettable from the viewpoint of peace and stability in
Northeast Asia. . . . Toward the end of May, a team of technical experts visited
suspected underground nuclear facilities in North Korea. . . . It, however, remains
an issue of great concern for the international community.8

This was the first, and most significant, issue addressed by the Foreign Minister in his
speech. This speech, and the shift of focus of the defense white papers helps to illustrate
the importance Japan’s leaders place on the threat to regional security posed by North
Korea.

Animosity between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) cannot be quickly
discharged as a source of concern for Japan, as well. Defense white papers consistently
refer to the total numbers of troops deployed on the Korean Peninsula by North and
South Korea, not just the troops of North Korea.
On the Korean Peninsula, approximately 1,500,000 ground troops of the ROK and North Korea are confronting each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Such confrontation has continued since the days of the Korean War and remains basically unchanged even after the end of the Cold War.9

The distrust is evident on both sides of the Tsushima Strait. A former president of Japan’s Defense Academy wrote in 1997:

Another potential source of conflict is South Korea’s anti-Japanese policy. . . . The Japanese government and people have repeatedly apologized for their past wrongdoings. If, despite these expressions of contrition, South Korea continues its anti-Japanese education and sticks to its anti-Japanese policy, relations between the two countries will be seriously undermined.10

From the Korean viewpoint, and written in the same series of articles by The Japan Times, a Korean resident of Japan, and associate professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University wrote:

This relationship is, of course, defined by history: Koreans as victims of Japan’s colonial rule vs. Japan as the perpetrator of Korean sufferings. Thus, Koreans have taken every opportunity to avenge past wrongs, while Japanese have sought to fend off Korean demands. . . . The choice of words Japanese politicians have used to express their remorse over the past is typically Japanese in its opaqueness.11

These two statements show the distrust on the part of the people of both nations. There have been recent military exchanges and bilateral maneuvers to help build trust between the two.12 These military exchanges and slowly improving cultural relations have given rise to improving perceptions of relations, at least on the Japanese side. In a recent survey, 48.3 percent of respondents said they felt friendship towards South Korea. This compared to 46.9 percent who did not feel friendly towards South Koreans. This was the first time since the inception of the poll (1988), taken by Japan’s Prime Minister’s Office that more people expressed friendship, than those that did not.13 Given the generations of animosity, and only recent steps towards emotional reconciliation, Japanese defense
officials must be concerned about what will happen with the 1.5 million troops, ballistic missiles, and nuclear potential upon (potential) reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Another security issue gaining increasing notice in Japan, as well as all of Asia, is the rise of China’s military and economic capability. The sheer size of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has always attracted the attention of Japan’s defense establishment. Through the Cold War and into the early 1990s, China’s military was not seen as a threat due to its inability for force projection. Japanese defense planners saw China as “still relying on the ‘People’s War’ theory which places great emphasis on employment of vast manpower across the wide stretch of land.” 14 The increasing ability of China to project power now concerns Japan. The PLA Navy’s increasing blue-water capability concerns Japan directly because of a dispute over the Senkaku Islands. In February 1992 China enforced the “Territorial Waters Law” which stipulates that the Senkaku Islands, as well as the Spratly and Paracel Islands, “are Chinese territories.”15 The Japanese position is that the Senkaku Islands are Japanese territory dating back to the late 1800s:

From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly made by the Government of Japan. . . . Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895 to erect a marker on the Islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan.16

Chinese claims in the Spratly Islands are also of tremendous concern to Japan due to the proximity of the Spratly’s to the sea routes to and from Japan. Any one nation in control of the Spratly’s could dominate the shipping routes throughout Southeast Asia. China’s growing blue-water naval potential can be seen as much of a threat as North Korea: “Suspicions that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons and the
modernization of China’s navy gave defense officials two strong arguments that the SDF should not be cut, despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”

Some Japanese intellectuals are very direct on their concerns about China. Mineo Nakajima, president of Tokyo University of Foreign studies, wrote in 1997:

China is [likely] to adopt a hardline approach in external relations. As clearly demonstrated by the nationalistic fanfare accompanying the reversion of Hong Kong last summer and the show of force during the Taiwan Strait crisis, China will continue its quest for the glory of Greater China.

Thus far officially, Japan is taking a much more conciliatory approach with China. The basic policy of Japan towards China is summarized by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is as follows:

In order to ensure the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to encourage China to become an even more constructive partner in the international community. In particular, the following points are stressed:

a. Support for China’s open and reform policy (implementation of economic cooperation, support for China’s early accession to the WTO, etc.)

b. Promotion of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperative relations (high-level exchanges, Japan-China security dialogue, ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, etc.)

From Japan’s standpoint, China seems to be a currently unknown quantity. The rising military capabilities concern Japan, and cannot be discounted when considering territorial disputes and potential economic competition or cooperation.

Another potential threat to Japan’s security is Russia. The Soviet threat was, as shown, the preeminent threat for Japan throughout the Cold War. Even the most recent white papers describe Russian Far East forces in detail. The greatest defense issue for Japan with respect to Russia today is the status of Japan’s Northern Territories. Japan contends that the Soviet Union illegally occupied the four islands of the Northern Territories – the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai – at the conclusion
of World War Two. Japan claims sovereignty of the islands based on historical precedent
dating back to the seventeenth century. The Soviet Union began to buildup troop levels
on the Northern Territories in the late 1970s to protect their access to the Pacific Ocean
from bases in the Sea of Okhotsk. This buildup caused immediate concern for Japan, and
has been a continuous source of conflict. From the defense white paper of 1982: “Japan
has been demanding that the Soviet troops be withdrawn from the Northern Territories,
and at the same time urging the Soviet government to start talks on the conclusion of a
peace treaty by solving the territorial question, in a determined and consistent manner.”
This is very similar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements of 1996:

The Japanese Government wishes to heighten its relations with the government of
the Russian Federation to the overall cooperative relations between genuinely
trusting and friendly neighbors. Toward that end, we want to resolve, based on
law and justice, the Northern Territories Issue, which has been a pending issue
with the Soviet Union for many years.

Despite troop reductions on the islands, conducted since 1994, Russia still maintains
approximately 3,500 military personnel on the islands. This still represents a threat, or at
the very least a challenge, to Japanese claim to the islands. The extent of the Japanese
emotion on this issue is reflected in the feelings of Japanese citizens towards Russia. In a
recent poll, Russia scored lowest of all nations when pollsters asked if people felt friendly
towards Russia. Only 15.8 percent said they did.

From the Russian viewpoint, it is not that there is an emotional or historical
attachment to the islands, but rather giving them up is too costly politically. Given
Russia’s ongoing political and economic instability, domestic issues will keep any
Russian leader from resolving the issue of the Northern Territories, unless there are
significant concessions by the Japanese. The head of the Center for Japanese Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences wrote:

Russia’s domestic circumstances offer little prospect that all the islands could be returned to Japan by 2000. Few Russians believe the islands are authentically Russian territory. . . . Even so, more Russians believe the time is not right for settling the territorial issue.  

One possible solution is joint economic development of the islands. Russia would be the main beneficiary of any development of the islands, as well as additional investment from Japan following the signing of a peace treaty. Russia is looking to get some concession from Japan in exchange for a solution to the question of the Northern Territories:

“Whatever the outcome of the issue, it should be a positive-sum game that benefits both countries, not a zero-sum game.”  

Given Russian political uncertainty, and Japanese animosity, this issue is not likely to be resolved to the satisfaction of either side by the end of the year 2000 as the leaders of both countries projected.  

Although not a direct threat to Japanese security, the changing face of the Japan-U.S. security alliance will have a significant effect on Japan’s post-Cold War defense policies. Currently, the Japan-U.S. security treaty is seen as a keystone to Japan’s national defense and security. In Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono’s speech to the Diet in January 2000, he stated:

In order to create ‘a future of greater peace and stability,’ endeavors toward ensuring the peace and stability of both Japan and the Asia-Pacific region are indispensable. And it is our alliance with the United States that serves as the foundation for this purpose.

Figure 1 is from Japan’s Defense Agency, and gives the Japan-U.S. alliance the same level of importance as Japan’s constitution.

The Japanese Diet passed new guidelines regarding cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in May 1999. These guidelines expanded the role of support Japan will provide to U.S. forces in times of crisis. This does not mean that all Japanese feel the security relationship will remain static. Some Japanese are beginning to chafe at the ‘junior partner’ relationship with the U.S. Yotaro Kobayashi, chairman and co-CEO of Fuji-Xerox Company wrote: “we should re-examine the current realities of our relations with the United States and rearrange our national priorities.” He continued, in a tone harking back to pre-war years: “We need to recover our position as a countervailing force vis-à-vis the United States, if not against the rising [power of Asian nations], including China.”28 Many Japanese are arguing for Japan to take a more energetic role in
international relations. This is based on the influence of Japan’s economy and the opportunities and responsibilities that come with this economy. A professor at Saitama University in Tokyo stated this view:

As the second largest economy in the world, there is no more room for Japan to remain passive in world affairs. A do-nothing policy is not only bad for Japan’s national interest, it is undesirable from the viewpoint of international stability.” He continues: “Looking at the future, Japan must rid itself of the so-called small country mentality and must not hesitate playing a military role in cooperation with like-minded countries if that is necessary to preserve international order.”

Although the Japanese government has expressed no desire to drastically modify or reassess the relationship with the U.S., recent issues regarding basing rights and a Japanese wish to reduce the “sympathy budget” paid by Japan to support U.S. bases, point to the difficulties in maintaining the status quo in the changing times of the post-Cold War.

There has been particular domestic Japanese pressure to reduce the monetary support that Japan provides for U.S. forces stationed in Japan, officially called Host Nation Support. This provides for infrastructure costs, salaries of Japanese workers and utility costs of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Total Japanese payments were over 6.3 trillion Yen in 1996, up from 5.2 trillion Yen in 1992. Host Nation Support began in the 1970s when the U.S. was undergoing economic difficulties. It was given the name “sympathy budget” by some Japanese because it was seen as sympathy for U.S. trouble. Now that the economic picture has been flip-flopped, there have been significant calls to reduce this cost. The Japanese Ministry of Finance has proposed a one percent cut in Host Nation Support. This has been vehemently opposed by the U.S.
The Primary Threat: History of North Korean Missile Programs

North Korea’s indigenous ballistic missile program can be traced as far back as the 1960s. The first efforts came with the assistance of the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. North Korea received SS-C-2b coastal defense missile from the Soviets, then received the Chinese-produced HY-1. The North Korean military also gained assistance from the Chinese to begin domestic production of some missiles. In the early 1970s the Soviet Union refused to supply more advanced missiles. This forced the North Koreans to increasingly turn to China for missile systems, research and technology. By the mid-1970s North Korea produced its own version of the HY-1, and updated HY-2 at its own facilities. Many of the components are still supplied by China and assembled in North Korea.

North Korea’s government continued its quest for more advanced systems throughout the 1970s. A dedicated ballistic missile program emerged in the 1970s. The program transitioned from exclusive production of coastal defense missiles to true tactical and theater ballistic missiles. In April 1975 the North Korean defense minister discussed the purchase of tactical ballistic missiles with China. This meeting resulted in a 1976 agreement with China for joint development of a single-stage tactical missile with a range of 600 kilometers. This cooperation died in 1978 due to political changes in China, but North Korean technicians and scientists gained valuable experience during this period of joint development.33

Following the loss of assistance from China, North Korea worked out agreements with Egypt to cooperate and exchange technology for missile development. Egypt gave Soviet-built Scud-B missiles and launchers to North Korea in the early 1980s. The Scud-
B missile has a range of approximately 300 kilometers, making it a threat to most of South Korea, but not beyond. The DPRK wanted a missile that could range all of South Korea and reach U.S. staging areas in Japan. To reach this goal she sought help from Iran. Iran became another patron of North Korea's missile program in 1983, agreeing to assist with financing North Korea's program, provided they could obtain some of the first production missiles. The financing and technical assistance paid off in April 1984 with a successful test of a North Korean Scud-B. In 1985 North Korea began production of the Scud-B. By 1987, Scud-B production facilities near Pyongyang had an annual capacity of fifty missiles. Iran began receiving North Korean produced Scud-B missiles in July 1987. In 1988 North Korea began to develop an upgrade to the Scud-B, the Scud-C. This missile was anticipated to have a range of 600 kilometers. This range would begin to threaten Japanese territory, as well as strategic ports in southern Korea.34

In 1990 North Korea made its first successful test of the Scud-C. This successful test was followed up by full-scale production in 1991. In 1990 North Korea also began development of the next step in missile development—the intermediate range ballistic missile, the Nodong-1. In August of 1990, the Soviet Union agreed to provide rocket experts to North Korea, but then the political environment changed and when this deal was cancelled after Russia normalized relations with South Korea. The DPRK continued to try to recruit Russian missile and nuclear scientists, and in October and November 1992 two separate groups of Russian missile development scientists were stopped in Russia while on their way to North Korea. This led to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Kunadze visiting North Korea in February 1993, and demanding that North Korea stop recruiting Russian scientists. In addition to trying to buy ex-Soviet technicians, North
Korea reached an agreement with Libya. Libya provided financial support in exchange for missiles and technology. The missile involved in the deal was the 1000 kilometers Nodong-1. In early 1992 Iran joined the growing group of countries helping North Korea develop the Nodong-1. Again, the assistance was in exchange for missiles after production began. North Korea reportedly completed development of the Nodong-1 in March 1993. The first successful test firing occurred in late-May 1993.\textsuperscript{35}

In response to the development of the 1000 kilometers Nodong-1, the U.S. and Japan formed a joint committee to monitor further development. The committee consisted of U.S. officials from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Japanese Defense Agency’s Policy Bureau. Japan also began to put diplomatic pressure on Iran to end the relationship with North Korea and joint missile development. This went as far as suggesting an end to economic aid to Iran if they insist on continuing to assist North Korea. The continuing development and deployment of Iran’s Shahab series of ballistic missiles shows that these sanctions have had little effect.\textsuperscript{36}

Following closely behind the completion of the single-stage Nodong-1, North Korea began development of a two-stage missile designated by the U.S. as the Taepodong-1. Evidence of this missile was first seen in February and March 1994. There appeared to be two similar missiles under development, the Taepodong-1 of up to 1,500-2,200 kilometer range and the Taepodong-2 of 4,000-6,000 kilometer range.\textsuperscript{37}

The development of these missiles coincided with North Korean efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capability. In April 1994 North Korea’s ambassador to India stated that nuclear arms, if developed, would be primarily designed to contain Japan.\textsuperscript{38}
From a defense standpoint, Japan began to look for a system to defend against the Nodong-1 and the Taepodong missiles under development in June 1994.\textsuperscript{39}

Throughout 1996 and 1997 North Korea continued to develop the Taepodong-1 and -2 Missiles as well as assist Iran in the latter’s indigenous production of its Nodong-1 reproduction. In May of 1996 the U.S. imposed sanctions on North Korea due to the export of technology and missiles to Iran. This was further extended in 1998 due to North Korean dealings with Pakistan. North Korea and China reportedly sent a joint team of technicians to Iran to assist the development of Iran’s missile program. In June 1998 North Korea announced that it would continue developing, testing and exporting ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{40}

Development of the Taepodong-1 missile continued with the 31 August 1998 test firing across the Sea of Japan. The missile flew a total of about 1380 kilometer, landing approximately 330 kilometer east of Japan. U.S. analysts later announced that the launch was a failed attempt to place a satellite in orbit. Regardless of whether the launch was an intermediate ballistic missile test or a satellite launch, the implication is that North Korean missile technology has progressed to multiple stage ballistic missiles. The Taepodong-1 was a direct and real threat to Japan and U.S. interests in the area.\textsuperscript{41} In response to this launch, the U.S. and North Korea began talks on missile tests and exports. Despite some reports of preparations, there have been no further tests of the Taepodong-1 through 1999. In June 1999 the U.S., Japan and South Korea agreed to cooperate to prevent a North Korean missile launch. A major focus of Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s trip throughout Asia in early July 1999 was to muster pressure on North Korea to suspend missile testing and development.\textsuperscript{42}
In addition to the threat of North Korea's ballistic missiles, in 1999 Japan had an added reason to consider North Korea as a threat. Two ships suspected as coming from North Korea entered Japanese territorial waters in March of that year. The ships fled to North Korean waters after Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force ships fired warning shots and gave chase. MDSF ships fired a total of twenty-two warning shots, eight warning bombs were dropped by Air Self-Defense Force aircraft. Japan's Foreign Minister suspected the vessels of "having committed an unlawful act within Japanese territorial waters." This incident sparked calls by some to allow greater latitude by MDSF ships in taking action against territorial intrusions. An editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun called for three specific proposals:

*Relaxing current restrictions on the use of weapons by the SDF to bring them into line with international standards.
*Revising the Cabinet Law to give the prime minister discretionary power to command the SDF in the event of an emergency.
*Amending the Territorial Sea Law and other relevant legislation to ensure the security of Japanese waters.

These proposals showed the increasing readiness among many Japanese to shed some of the older laws and become a more "normal" nation. Coincidentally, this incident occurred while the Japanese Diet was debating changes to the Japan-U.S. Security Guidelines. The new guidelines passed in May 1999.

Japan's defense policies following the end of World War II were influenced exclusively by the U.S. need for a point of containment during the Cold War. Japan's defense forces, equipment and foreign policies all worked toward the goal of containment of the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, China and North Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and simultaneous end to the Cold War, the world began to reassess
defense and security policies. In Northeast Asia this reassessment was particularly difficult. The continuing confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s missile program became Japan’s greatest security concern. Additionally, Japan watched the rising influence of the PRC with unease. Territorial disputes also continued to affect Japan either directly with other nations—Senkaku Island, Takeshima Island, and the Northern Territories—or indirectly as in the Spratly’s. As a backdrop to all these issues the Japan-U.S. security relationship remained a cornerstone of Japanese security policy, but given the changing environment the Japanese have realized it was not necessarily a perpetual arrangement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery of first coastal defense missiles; SS-C-2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
<td>First Chinese-built missiles, HY-1. Some are assembled in DPRK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Development of F-1, Support Fighter</td>
<td>Production facilities for HY-1 established in North Korea.</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Il-sung requests to purchase tactical ballistic missiles from PRC.</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td>PRC agrees to joint development of 600km-range missile.</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Begin purchase of F-15’s.</td>
<td>Joint development with PRC ends without a product.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea and Egypt begin joint missile development.</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>Japan begins development of Type-90 Tank</td>
<td>Iran begins financing North Korean missile development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td>Production of SCUD-B, 300km range begins.</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Development of next support fighter (F-2) begins.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>First AEGIS-destroyer approved in JDA budget.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Development of Nodong-1, 1300km range begins.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>First flight tests of SCUD-C, 600km range.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Full-scale production of SCUD-C begins.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Libya agrees to help finance Nodong-1 development.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kim Il-sung requests help from PRC for missile and nuclear development.</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>First test firing of the Nodong-1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Japan and U.S. form joint committee to monitor Nodong-1 development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>North Korea withdraws from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>First AEGIS destroyer commissioned.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea begins development of Taepodong-1 with a 2200km range.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Development of Taepodong-2 begins.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1998  First Osumi-class LST delivered.

1999  Japan and U.S. begin joint development of BMD.
     Japan announces plans to place own reconnaissance satellites in orbit by 2002.

2000  Japan’s Diet begins discussions on Constitutional revision

North Korea conducts test of Taepodong-1, the flight path crossed Japan.

North Korean boats driven out of Japanese waters by MDF ships.


10 Inoki Masamichi, “Korea, Taiwan Situations Remain Potential Threats,” *The Japan Times*, 100 Years, 100 Views Series, 1997; available from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/100/frame100.html; Internet; accessed 12 September 1999.

11 Daekyun Chung “Will Japan-Korea Feud End?” *The Japan Times*, 100 Years, 100 Views Series, 1997; available from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/100/frame100.html; Internet; accessed 12 September 1999.


18. Nakajima Mineo “The China Factor in Japan’s Foreign Policy,” The Japan Times, 100 Years, 100 Views Series, 1997; available from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/100/frame100.html; Internet; accessed 12 September 1999.


25. Ibid., 16.


29 Sato Seizaburo “Reassessing Japan’s International Role,” The Japan Times, 100 Years, 100 Views Series, 1997; available from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/100/frame100.html; Internet; accessed 12 September 2000.


CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICIES
VS. STATED THREATS

The preceding chapters traced the development of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from their inception in 1950 as the National Police Reserve, to their current status as one of the most powerful militaries in the Asia-Pacific region. The changing security environment was also examined. Now the capabilities and direction of the Self-Defense Force needs to be compared to both the stated threats, as expressed by both the Defense Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the very real, if understated, security threats to Japan. A comparison of capabilities to threats will help show exactly what is the true factor driving Japan’s military buildup. This analysis will follow through a review of the capabilities of the major weapons systems of the SDF--the Type 90 Main Battle Tank, the Kongo-class destroyer, the Osumi-class landing ship, and the Air SDF F-15 and air-to-air refueling capability. In addition to hardware and systems, the SDF is undergoing organizational changes that affect its capabilities. These capabilities will then be compared to their applicability to security threats of North Korea, China, and Russia. The uses for Japan’s new and expanding defense capability can be found by analyzing recent foreign policy and defense statements and actions.

The Type 90 Main Battle Tank was designed to match and better the Soviet T-80 tank. Design work began in 1982. The initial request was made during the 1988 fiscal year, while the Soviet threat was still the number one issue to the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA). Once the Soviet Union imploded, and the threats of the Cold War dissipated, the Type 90 continued to roll at the same pace as before. For the 1996-2000
Mid-Term Defense Program the GSDF acquired a total of ninety new Main Battle Tanks. In the Mid-Term Defense Program from 1991 to 1995 the total was 108 tanks. The Type 90 tank’s 120mm gun and 70 kilometer per hour speed make it comparable to the U.S. M1. The weight of the Type 90, at fifty tons, makes it significantly lighter than the M1. The reduced weight makes it ideal for the terrain of the Japanese islands, and more transportable, than the M1.

Another stated goal of the GSDF is to “streamline and make more efficient and compact.” In fulfilling this goal, the GSDF is reducing its force level from 180,000 to 160,000 and reorganizing its force structure from thirteen divisions and two Combined Brigades, to nine divisions and six Combined Brigades. The force level reduction is a somewhat hollow reduction, since the GSDF had not been reaching the approved level of 180,000 prior to the reduction. As of 31 March 1998, the GSDF was manned at a rate of only 85.3 percent (151,836 actual from an authorization of 178,007). Comparatively, the Maritime SDF and Air SDF are each manned at approximately 96 percent. The force structure reduction only brought the authorization in line with reality. Rather than having a glass that was only partially full, the GSDF got a smaller glass. The force reductions are purely superficial and in no way affect the past abilities of the GSDF.

With this force the role of the GSDF, as stated by the JDA, is to be prepared in case “any enemy troops launch an attack on any part of the Japanese territory, the GSDF will directly defend the territory in concert with the MSDL and the ASDF.” The Type 90 tank contributes to defense by giving the GSDF a highly capable armor force. The question becomes who is the most likely invader? The main threat of North Korea is from ballistic missiles, not from amphibious or airborne invasion. The DPRK has no
capability of direct, ground, attack on Japanese territory. The only nation in the region with that capability is Russia. As stated in Japan’s 1998 defense white paper, “[T]hough the number of Ivan Rogov-class and other amphibious assault landing ships has decreased, it still holds strategic amphibious capabilities.” The likelihood of armed invasion of Japan is remote, particularly by forces employing the latest Russian-designed T-80 tank. The only threat to which the Type 90 tank could possibly apply is a Russian invasion of Japanese territory.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is undergoing a qualitative improvement similar to the GSDF. The centerpiece to the MSDF forces is the Kongo-class destroyer. This ship is equipped with the AEGIS weapons system. This system is designed for area air defense in an open ocean environment. It is also the basis for the U.S. Navy Theater Missile Defense development program. The MSDF has, thus far, built four Kongo-class ships. One ship is based as a flagship with each of the four regional escort flotillas. This arrangement allows the positioning of one ship close to the Korean Peninsula, and one close to Tokyo at all times. In this light, the Kongo-class is seen as a likely cornerstone for Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. Japan is currently in joint development with the U.S. to develop a missile defense system. The U.S. term is theater missile defense. Japan does not like the term ‘theater’ since it implies areas outside of Japan. However, the BMD program is still in development, and Japan has yet to choose a specific system or systems for production and employment.

In the meantime, what is the utility of an AEGIS-equipped ship? The AEGIS weapon system allows a ship, or group of ships, to operate in areas with a relatively high air threat without the benefit of organic aircraft for defense. The AEGIS system allows a
ship to engage multiple air targets—planes or cruise missiles—at distances well beyond the
range of other ship-based systems. With this capability ships can operate well away from
land-based air cover, and still have an effective air-defense capability beyond short range,
point defense systems. This is an important ability for ships assigned a role of sea-lane
protection, as is the MSDF. Defense of shipping lanes is seen as a primary function of
the MSDF:

Japan relies heavily on maritime traffic for its survival and prosperity. Therefore,
obstruction or interception of maritime traffic to and from Japan would have
serious consequences on its people’s livelihood, economic activity and the
sustenance of defense capability. . . . Therefore, Japan’s maritime defense
capability has an important role to protect the safety of maritime traffic.8

When compared to the requirements of the MSDF, the Kongo-class ships fill a very real
niche within the framework of defending Japan’s interests. This ship also allows the
extension of that defense to reach to a much greater distance and with greater
survivability.

In addition to the AEGIS destroyers, the MSDF has acquired a new class of
amphibious ship, or tank landing ship (LST). This is the Osumi-class LST. The first ship
of this type was delivered in 1998. This ship is capable of transporting tanks, men and
supplies. It has two significant improvements over previous ships. First, the Osumi has a
large deck to operate helicopters. Currently configured to operate CH-47 transport
helicopters, it does not have a dedicated hanger; it can only land, launch and refuel the
CH-47. This is still an improvement over Japan’s previous LST’s, which had no
helicopter support or landing capability. Additionally, it is believed that the lack of a
hanger could be easily remedied if desired.9 The other improvement is the Osumi’s well
deck. This allows the ship to launch and recover smaller landing craft by opening a stern
dock, and partially submerging the internal well deck. Thus the landing craft simply float
in and out of the ship. This allows the Osumi to operate well offshore, and not beach
itself as previous classes of landing ships had to do. With both of these capabilities, the
Osumi can operate in many more areas than previous ships, and project its power from
well offshore.

The question again arises, what is the utility of a ship with the capabilities of the
Osumi? The JDA states that the purpose of the Osumi, like previous landing ships, is
logistical support. Given Japan’s geographic makeup, it is argued that the amphibious
ship is a logical choice. If the mission is solely logistic support throughout the Japanese
islands, then the standoff capability is not required. The Osumi goes well beyond
logistical support and gives the MSDF the beginnings of a credible power projection
capability.

The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is also undergoing significant qualitative
improvement. The ASDF possess almost 200 F-15’s and has begun purchase of the F-2,
a domestically produced ‘support fighter’ based on the U.S. F-16. The first round of
purchases for the F-2 took place in the 1996-2000 Mid-Term Defense Program, with a
total of 45 aircraft. The F-2 will replace the domestically produced F-1 and the F-4,
imported from the U.S. The ASDF operates a total of 169 of these types of aircraft. The
F-15 gives the ASDF a highly capable air interceptor as well as strike aircraft.
Unrefueled, it has a combat radius of 685 miles. The F-2 is essentially a modified F-16
designed to carry air-to-air missiles as well as anti-ship missiles to help repel invasion
forces. With air-to-air refueling, both these aircraft could reach out to the extended sea
lanes.
The primary role of the ASDF is the defense of the homeland. From the 1998 JDA white paper: "Equipped with aircraft and ground-to-air missiles, air defense capability executes low- and high-altitude air defense operations, blocks ground and maritime forces of enemy countries, and supports Japan’s ground and maritime units."\textsuperscript{13} The F-15 and F-2 can satisfy this requirement and defend the home islands without an air-to-air refueling capability. Support for maritime forces will require an extended range. Expanding roles also necessitate the range of air-to-air refueling. The 1998 defense white paper continues, under the title "Other Roles and Missions": "Moreover, the capability carries out missions, such as disaster relief operations, international peace cooperation assignments and international disaster relief activities."\textsuperscript{14} This requirement, for international cooperation, is not included in previous white papers. A role of support for international disaster relief is partial justification for air-to-air refueling capability.\textsuperscript{15}

When taken as a whole, the increasing capabilities of the SDF give Japan the beginning of a credible force projection capability. The extended range of aircraft with air-to-air refueling extends the strike capability to the entire Northeast Asia region. The combination of the Osumi landing ship with the Kongo destroyer extends maritime power projection to shores throughout the region. This does not mean that Japan is planning to exert its military throughout Asia and threaten its neighbors as it did more than fifty years ago. However, this ability does give Japan the military basis to back up and defend its claims to territory from the Senkaku Island in the south to the Northern Territories. With the Type 90 tank, the GSDF can take on any ground force in the region that might challenge these claims militarily. Given China’s belligerence towards Taiwan, which it considers Chinese territory, Japan may be preparing for the same course of action with
respect to Senkaku Island. This same attitude can be applied to the Northern Territories. Japan is backing up its claims to these islands with a credible force. Add to this possible American reluctance to militarily support territorial disputes, and Japan has the feeling that it needs to prepare for these possibilities on its own. Overall, the combination of ships, aircraft and tanks allow Japan to provide a very credible force to defend outlying territorial claims.

The power projection capabilities can also be applied to Japanese assistance to, and increasing participation in, United Nations peacekeeping operations. If Japan is to legitimize its claim for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council it will have to back its claim with the capability to participate and significantly contribute to United Nations operations. It is not likely that Japan will begin to push its power around the region, but the ability to play a significant part in United Nations humanitarian assistance or evacuation operations will provide an additional boost to Japan's efforts for a seat on the Security Council commensurate with its economic contribution. However, participation in peacekeeping operations may encourage Japan to seek a more independent role. One of Japan's first U.N. operations may have foreshadowed a drift in Japan-U.S. relations. In the 1994 relief operation in Rwanda Japan agreed, under U.S. pressure, to send a medical and transportation detachment to Goma, Zaire. The U.S. could not arrange support to the Japanese forces, which eventually arrived on Russian transport aircraft. After years of prodding by the U.S., Japan had begun to take actions to be more active in the international arena, only to turn to a previous adversary for assistance. Although this is only one incident, it illustrates how the U.S. and Japan can
begin to grow operationally apart, and how Japan can work to employ a more independent foreign policy.

With the changing security environment Japan has begun a review of not only its defense policies and equipment, but also the Constitution. In February 2000 the Japanese Diet formed a study panel to review the Constitution and its applicability to the current world and national reality. Once this committee completes its review, it will recommend changes or revisions to the constitution, or recommend no changes. It is anticipated that the review alone will take up to five years. Any revision will require a two-thirds majority of the Diet and more than half of the voters in a national plebiscite. One view about the constitutional debate is that it is a means of focusing political and popular attention on a sensitive topic. Any change will take time. In the opinion of former Prime Minister Nakasone Yashiro: “The first five years [of debate] should be set aside for general discussion, then another five years should be allowed to consider revisions to the Constitution.” The debate will range over the entire constitution, but the aspect of defense is probably the most sensitive issue both domestically and internationally. One of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) leading politicians and chairman of the party’s research commission, points out: “The constitutions of one hundred twenty four countries make note of pacifism, but none of them considers pacifism synonymous with the rejection of armed forces.” Japan is not likely to rescind the basic peaceful aspects of its constitution, but will most certainly reinterpret the meaning to allow more freedom of action in the future. Change of any sort will not be easy. Opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Japan Communist Party, have vowed to oppose any revision to Article 9, or peace article. These two parties account for nearly eighty seats,
or one fifth of the total seats, of the Diet’s representatives. The Japanese public appears to be ready for some sort of modification of the constitution. A poll conducted in 1995 showed that 50.4 percent favored revision to the constitution; 30.9 percent opposed any revision.

There are other events currently taking place that portend a significant shift in Japanese defense and foreign policies. First is a change in economic focus for Japan towards Asia. Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Asia began to climb in 1990. From 1990 to 1993 Japanese FDI in East Asia was $26 billion. During the same time frame U.S. FDI in the same region was only $15 billion. The economic center of gravity of Japan has been shifting towards Asia since the late 1980s. This trend continued throughout the 1990s. Despite the serious economic problems across Asia in the late 1990s, Japanese imports and exports to and from Asia remained well above that to North America and Europe (see figures 1, 2 and 3). In 1997 Asia accounted for over 46 percent of Japan’s total trade, while North America accounted for 29.6 percent. This is compared to an Asian share of 39.8 percent and 31 percent for North America in 1991. North America had been Japan’s largest trading partner until 1989.

A gradual movement in Japan’s foreign relations focus is mirroring the shift the in economic center. Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999, Komura Masahiko, wrote: “Through Eurasian diplomacy Japan now seeks to build closer ties with Russia, China and the Republic of Korea, as well as the nations of Central Asia and the Caucasus...and hopes thereby to foster stability on the Eurasian continent.” While this policy is not in conflict with U.S. policies, it shows the beginning of an independent Japanese foreign policy that will likely continue in the next decades. Japan does not disavow the
importance of its relationship with the U.S., but is beginning to look beyond this association. Japan's current Foreign Minister stated in a speech to the Japanese Diet:

In addition to the presence and engagement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region in which Japan is located, the strengthening of bilateral relations with neighboring countries is of paramount importance, and as part of these efforts, it is of utmost necessity that we deepen multilateral dialogue and cooperation in the region. I will focus all my efforts into strengthening relations with these neighboring countries as a pillar of Japan's foreign policy.\(^{26}\)

This statement takes the alliance with the U.S. as a given and moves beyond this to a larger engagement with Asia.

These foreign policy announcements and agendas are also reflected by the Japanese Defense Agency. The JDA is beginning to see potential shortfalls in the U.S. commitment to the region. From the JDA "East Asian Strategic Review 1998-1999":

From the standpoint of long-term defense planning, also, questions were raised as to the validity of the [United States'] strategy for coping with two major regional conflicts. A report drawn up by the National Defense Panel established by the Congress points out that when viewed from a long-term (2010-20) standpoint, this strategy could present financial difficulties in funding the procurement of military equipment that will be needed for its operation in coming years.\(^{27}\)

The ability and devotion of the U.S. to honor its commitments to East Asia in general and Japan in particular are under question in Japan. This perception was enhanced in August 1998, when North Korea launched a missile over Japanese territory: "The lack of American interest in what Japan regards as the most serious and direct threat from a potential enemy raised a fundamental question regarding the U.S. security commitment to Japan, thereby widening the perception gap between the United States and Japan."\(^{28}\) In response to this event, the perceived lack of U.S. interest, and lack of warning, Japan has decided to develop its own reconnaissance satellite.\(^{29}\) The missile launch gave Japanese
defense planners a specific, and concrete threat to rally public support for further expansion of defense capabilities, and justify previous expenditures.

When taken as a whole, the hardware development—the Type 90 tank, the Osumi-class LST, air-to-air refueling capability—added to defense and foreign policy statements, show the foundation of a more independent Japan. These developments cannot be related back to only a response to a direct security threat to Japan from North Korea. The North Korean threat is set forward as the most important issue for Japan, but it is seen as only the first of many threats beginning to emerge in the post-Cold War era. The equipment being developed and acquired by the Japanese Defense Agency will give Japan far greater flexibility and projection capability in the years to come. The maritime projection of the Osumi-class LST, protected by the Kongo-class destroyer and refueled F-15’s and F-2’s, will in the future be able to project the capabilities of the GSDF throughout the territory of Japan, or areas of interest. The desire to extend Japan’s political and military influence shows in an increasing desire to play a major role in Asia. A larger maritime role for Japan was announced in February 2000:

[The] Japanese government decided on February 16 to cooperate with the PRC, the ROK, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in preventing piracy in the Southeast Asia region. According to the Japanese government’s plan, Japan, the PRC, and the ROK, all of which depend on the Malacca Strait for vital sea-lanes of communications, would provide coastal patrols to the region.30

This proposal has yet to be adopted, but shows a desire by Japan to cooperate with other Asian nations, and extend its maritime reach far beyond what has been considered normal in the postwar era. The expansion of Japan’s projection capabilities ties directly to this proposal. Conducting the patrols with regional nations will also add legitimacy to the undertaking and help to minimize regional fears of Japanese remilitarization. As Japan
continues to expand its regional capabilities it will become increasingly important, and
difficult, to soothe the fears of Asian neighbors. Japan’s growing military will allow a
more independent foreign policy as well as greater regional influence to offset a possible
rise in the power of the PRC. Japan will also be able to back up claims to disputed
territories with a credible force. Given Japan’s increasing economic focus in Asia, a
wider use for the Self-Defense Force is likely. Since the end of World War Two Japan
has seen its economy as the most important factor in its national well-being. Initially, the
U.S. provided for Japan’s defense because it suited the U.S. to do so. Japan increasingly
doubts this commitment. The Japanese military buildup is a means of preparing for more
independence from the U.S.


www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/kouho/taikou/kore_e.htm; Internet; accessed 12 March 2000.


\[6\] Ibid., 44.

\[7\] Todd Crowell et al., “Japan’s Missile Vulnerability,” Japan Quarterly 44, no. 2


\[10\] Ibid., 54.


14 Ibid.

15 Usui Naoaki “Japan Takes First Step Toward Air Tanker Buy” Defense News 15, no. 6 (February 14, 2000).


19 Ibid., 20.


22 Mochizuki, Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy, 64-5.

23 Ibid., 39.


CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The main threat expressed in Japan’s most recent defense white papers has been the military power of North Korea and the ensuing instability of the Korean Peninsula. However, the capability of new equipment being acquired by Japan does not seem to match that which would be required to meet the stated threat. New amphibious ships, fifty-ton main battle tanks and F-15 aircraft will have little effect on DPRK missiles. Additionally, even following the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994 to stop North Korea’s nuclear program and further agreements to stop testing ballistic missiles, Japan’s defense spending remained at the same high levels. The acquisition of a new main battle tank, expanded amphibious capability and the continuous effort to acquire air-to-air tanker aircraft will give Japan the ability to regionally project influence. Using North Korean missile development as a cover, Japan’s real goal seems to be an increase in its ability to sway her neighbors and maintain her economic wealth and position.

Following her defeat in World War Two, Japan’s main focus was to rebuild her economy. Using single-minded determination to stay out of the military conflicts of the Cold War, Japan was able to become the second largest economy in the world and establish herself as a peace-loving, pacifist nation. This resolve often irked the U.S., but Japan’s focus did not stray for over three decades. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated that “Japanese decisions have been the most farsighted and intelligent of any major nation in the postwar era.”¹ There is no reason to believe that the decisions now being made regarding Japan’s defense policy are any less prescient. With the end of the Cold War, Asia is witnessing significant security changes. The U.S. military
presence is seen as increasingly uncertain. A major consequence of the end of the Cold War is that the U.S. commitment can no longer be assumed. This has caused a shift in Japan’s focus: “Japan has hedged its bets in the recent past towards Asianization and away from the United States.”2 The trend in Japanese defense policies has been towards a greater self-reliance. The purchase of warships capable of substantial air defense and aircraft capable of air-to-air refueling will allow SDF forces to divorce themselves from the U.S. umbrella now required.

Japan’s immediate defensive center of attention is the unsettled Korean Peninsula. Historically, this area has been of great concern to Japan. For centuries Japan has been willing to go to war to ensure that Korea is not a potential threat to Japan’s security. This is not to say that Japan is now preparing to go to war over Korea. Japan is working to build stronger relations with South Korea, likely in preparation for the future reunification of Korea. Good relations with a unified, and potentially nuclear armed, ballistic missile-toting Korea would be in Japan’s best interests. Japan’s military buildup is not likely directed toward Korea. It would do no good to have an antagonistic Korea, either North, South or both. Japan’s issues with the Korean Peninsula have normally revolved around bigger issues with either China or Russia. In 1894 Japan went to war with China via Korea, and in 1904 Japan went to war with Russia via Korea. Japan saw Korea as the center of gravity for its interests in Asia. If there were a strong, stable and democratic government in Korea Japan does not need to worry about other nations exploiting the peninsula.

Japan has greater interests throughout Asia. These interests are increasing economic ties, and a significant interdependence, as witnessed by the Asian economic
crisis. Many nations, including Japan, are still struggling out of this crisis. With this economic relationship, Japan is looking to be able to defend its economic interests throughout Asia. The best way to do this is with a capable navy and air force. Japan needs to be able to protect and defend its commerce. It has already taken steps to do that by proposing joint naval patrols in the Strait of Malacca.³

This expansion of interests is also shown by Japan’s increasing willingness to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Greater international contribution will also boost Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Japan’s growing naval and air capabilities will allow the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to provide real support for peacekeeping operations. The significant amphibious lift and transport capability of the Osumi-class LST permit Japan to access areas without improved port facilities--just the type expected in peacekeeping or evacuation operations.

The Japanese defense buildup does not directly address the threat of North Korea. The capabilities in hand and being pursued are more focused on projection of power across bodies of water than defense against ballistic missiles or armed invasion. These capabilities are suited for the defense of territorial claims. Japan has several possible disputes, two with its historical rivals of China and Russia. The issue of the Northern Territories has kept Japan and Russia from signing a peace treaty to bring World War Two to a formal close. This issue is highly emotional for Japan and a favorable resolution would be a tremendous boost to Japan’s national self-esteem. Given political instability in Russia, this issue is not likely to be resolved soon. Japan’s ability to defend its claim may help convince Russia to negotiate seriously. The territorial problems with China revolve around uninhabited islands north of Taiwan. China claims it as territory
associated with Taiwan. Japan claims it as the southern-most portion of the Ryukyu Islands, and therefore, part of Japan. This issue will probably not be settled until after the greater issue of the relationship between China and Taiwan is resolved.

Japan’s defense buildup is much more long-term than just a defense against North Korea. Despite the rhetoric of the North Korean threat, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are preparing for a time when they will be called upon for far more independent operations. These operations could be in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations, civilian evacuations from natural or political disasters, or in support of Japanese territorial claims. Either way, Japanese political leaders are reviewing the nation’s constitution. Revision to Article 9 of the constitution, the pacifist clause, will be debated. Whether there will be an outright rewriting, a reinterpretation, or no change at all, remains to be seen. As noted in a previous chapter, Japanese leaders expect this process to take as long as ten years. Japan’s defense policy already seems set. It is now only for the political process to catch up.

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### Table 2

Japanese Defense Force
Significant Equipment
1954-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main Battle Tanks</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Principle Surface Combatants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Definitions:**

- **Main Battle Tank:** Gross weight of at least 16.5 tons, main gun of at least 75mm.
- **Combat Aircraft:** Aircraft capable of delivering ordnance, either air-to-air or air-to-ground.
- **Principle Surface Combatant:** Ships of at least 1000 tons displacement, with a weapon of greater than Self-Defense capability.
Table 3

Japanese Defense Budget
(based on exchange rate for given year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense Budget (Millions, US$)</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8,960</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>16,311</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>44,600</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40,891</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4

Self-Defense Force Equipment Possessed
(as of 30 December 1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicle</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landing Ship</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Tonnage</td>
<td>174,000tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5
Self-Defense Force Equipment Possessed
(as of 31 March 1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicle</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landing Ship</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Tonnage</td>
<td>212,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>F-15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-1</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6
Self-Defense Force Equipment Possessed
(as of 31 March 1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>1,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicle</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landing Ship</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Tonnage</td>
<td>280,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>F-15</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-1</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 7

Midterm Defense Program (FY 1991-1995)  
Revised December 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Kinds of Equipment</th>
<th>Total Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Tank (Type 90)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple Launch Rocket System</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicle</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Tonnage</td>
<td>about 87,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Fighter-Interceptor (F-15)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## Table 8

Midterm Defense Program (FY 1996-2000)  
Revised December 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Kinds of Equipment</th>
<th>Total Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Tank (Type 90)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple Launch Rocket System</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicle</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Tonnage</td>
<td>about 94,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Fighter-Interceptor (F-15)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter-Support (F-2)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9

Self-Defense Force Equipment Possessed
(as of 31 March 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicle</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landing Ship</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Tonnage</td>
<td>364,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>F-15</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-1</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 10

Self-Defense Force Equipment Possessed
(as of 31 March 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicle</td>
<td>710</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landing Ship</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Tonnage</td>
<td>357,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>F-15</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-1</td>
<td>52</td>
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Japanese GNP 1983-1997


Economic Growth Rate

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<td>12</td>
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<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>13-32</td>
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