AN ANALYSIS OF THE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE by LCDR Andrea Pollard, USN, 106 pages.

Since the early 1960s, post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa has experienced significant crisis and conflict brought on by environmental disasters and internal ethnic violence. African leaders and the international community have sought resolution to these dilemmas through peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief efforts. The looming crisis in Burundi in 1996 led the United States to launch the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a program designed to work in partnership with African countries to enhance their capability to respond to crises.

This thesis seeks to determine if the current measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for ACRI satisfy strategic goals for the program. The thesis begins by providing a broad overview of post-colonial African crises leading to the evolution of ACRI. This is followed by a qualitative analysis of available military and government documents and select current literature to determine MOEs based on strategic goals, analyze currently established MOEs, and conduct a comparison between the two based on the satisfaction of the identified strategic goals. The thesis concludes by providing MOE recommendations for possible future iterations of ACRI.
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<td>ACOM</td>
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<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
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<td>BDE</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Computer Exercise</td>
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<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>HUMRO</td>
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<td>Interagency Working Group</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
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<td>Peacekeeping Force</td>
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<td>Private Volunteer Organization</td>
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<td>Reinforcement of African Military Peacekeeping Capacity</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to determine the strategic-level requirements and justifications for the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and whether the current strategic measures of effectiveness (MOEs) satisfy them. The first chapter presents a broad overview of post-colonial African crises leading to the creation of ACRI. The second chapter proceeds to examine available military and government documents and to select current literature, captured within the framework of a qualitative analysis approach to the research. The third chapter provides an analysis of the current MOEs for the initiative, identifying both viable criteria as well as possible shortcomings in ACRI MOEs. The thesis concludes by providing MOE recommendations for possible future iterations of ACRI.

Past to Present

The continent of Africa has long experienced numerous maladies. Severe human suffering and extreme violence have plagued much of sub-Saharan Africa since the 1960s, a time
when most African nations achieved independence from their colonial rulers.

Between 1960 and 1980 eight civil wars took place on the African continent; ten more occurred over the next decade. Almost one-third of the world's genocides between 1960 and 1988 (eleven of thirty-five) took place in Africa. Between 1963 and 1985, sixty-one coups d'état occurred in Africa—an average of almost three coups per year. Between 1960 and 1990, Africa’s conflicts accounted for more than 6.5 million deaths. (Stedman 1996, 238)

While not the only premise, a commonly accepted premise for African maladies is that colonial powers established their colonial territorial borders without regard for African cultural, political, or economic realities. The respective colonial infrastructures were established based on European political and economic methodologies, and in most cases, there was an extreme lack of indigenous integration into those infrastructures. Given this lack of education and responsibility within their own country and the arbitrariness of recognized international boundaries, the potential for conflict upon the departure of the colonial rulers was, for the most part, inevitable.

It has also been argued that "the roots of Africa’s violence lie principally with the political and economic conditions that existed after independence and the policies
pursued by elites to gain and consolidate power" (Stedman 1996, 238). However, it should be noted many of these elites were created by their former colonial rulers and were often members of the minority ethnic group within the country. These created elites often created highly authoritarian and centralized governments that were corrupt and unable to effectively manage their country’s economy.

The Cold War allowed many of these regimes to maintain control over their established territories by playing the two superpowers against one another. However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, single-party states throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union began to collapse. These events set powerful precedents for African prodemocracy activists, who already had begun organizing against human-rights abuses and political repression against the backdrop of severe economic mismanagement in their respective countries (Schraeder 2000, 75). The end of the Cold War meant that African leaders could no longer rely on diplomatic, financial, or military support of the foreign powers to compensate for their inability to manage internal affairs. Underlying these political, economic, and military transformations and subsequent crises has been the ever-increasing number of sub-Saharan countries
suffering from famine. Famine, caused by political turmoil and an overreliance on cash crop production as much as by extreme environmental fluctuations experienced throughout the continent, has also ravaged many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, creating its own kind of crisis often requiring international intervention.

Between 1991 and 1993, 400,000 Somalis died from war-induced famine. In little over two months in 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandans fell victim to genocide. When the civil war in Angola resumed in late 1992, the death toll reached one thousand people per day. In four years of civil war, Liberia has seen nearly half its population of 2.5 million die or flee. In Sudan, nearly 1.2 million people have died from famine and civil war since 1984. In October 1993, over 100,000 people lost their lives in Burundi during a one-month ethnic bloodletting. (Stedman 1996, 235)

Over the years, the media attention given to the continent’s struggles with death, famine, and violence has increased significantly, resulting in a heightened awareness throughout the world and in a situation whereby the international community has been forced to both take notice and, at various levels, take action. Famine and civil war in Somalia in the early nineties and, specifically, US involvement in 1993, were a media sensation. The situation was highlighted foremost by the loss of eighteen US soldiers on the heels of the loss of
twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers and surrounding the loss of untold Somali men, women and children.

Somalia not only caused a tremendous public outcry, with demands that ultimately led to a complete withdrawal of US military forces from that country, but also served as a turning point for US policy towards United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. The positive attitudes and policies toward UN peacekeeping as the best means of dealing with failed states and the problems involving millions upon millions of people caught up in humanitarian suffering and civil strife was brought into question (Oakley 1995, 70). Consequently, a review of US peacekeeping policies and programs was ordered by the Clinton administration with the intention of developing a sound framework from which US policy makers could determine the potential need and effectiveness of US participation in future UN missions. The result of this review was Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). PDD 25 established guidelines and criteria addressing the full range of UN activities—-from preventive diplomacy through traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building (Lewis n.d., 2). PDD 25 guidance does not preclude US involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, whether through support or actual
participation. However, the stated criteria promotes a more cautious approach in considering the factors of warranted and effective US participation. Many, both in the international community as well as the US, argue that the negative effects in Somalia resulted in the issuance of PDD 25. The situation also led to a UN overly cautious towards the use of force for fear of unanticipated repercussions. As a result, the international community blames these developments as direct contributions to the late reaction to the tragic genocide that occurred in Rwanda during the Hutu-Tutsi civil war in 1994.

Burundi, Rwanda's neighbor and possessing a similar ethnic makeup of Hutus and Tutsis, has, since the early 1970s, also suffered from periodic civil war and extreme violence. While not reaching the extremes of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, ethnic hatred and violence have caused tens of thousands of deaths. In 1996 it appeared that Burundi was on the brink of another potential crisis, and given Rwanda's recent experiences, there was fear throughout the international community that a similar tragedy was on the horizon. Thus, Burundi became the catalyst for the US to initiate ACRI, designed to assist in
providing an internal crisis response capability in sub-Saharan Africa.

Humanitarian emergencies and civil wars faced by sub-Saharan Africa are no longer going unnoticed by either the international community or African states. The issues facing the continent are being publicly recognized, and many regional and international institutions are making serious efforts to alleviate sub-Saharan suffering. Of significance is the evolution of open recognition by many African leaders of the need and the desire on the part of their respective nations to take positive steps towards dealing with these issues internally and fulfilling self-determination in their resolution. But the ability to internally resolve the many and varied issues facing Africa will not happen overnight, and African leaders, as well as the US and UN, recognize this. This situation provides many new policy opportunities in Africa for the US, policies that are intended to promote stability and security in the region. Stability and security will allow for economic development and growth, that will benefit the overseas security of US citizens, industrial growth, and investment opportunities. The ACRI is just one of many US policies and programs working towards that end.
The Evolution of the African Crisis Response Initiative

The UN has continuously conducted peacekeeping operations since its inception in 1948. Since 1960 sixteen of those operations have been in sub-Saharan Africa, fourteen of which have occurred in the post-Cold War period. Over the years, the organization has either sent observation missions or peacekeeping forces (PKF) to various humanitarian situations and conflicts, achieving varying degrees of success.

The observation missions are normally composed of observers or professional military liaison officers, who are unarmed and are present to observe and supervise the fulfillment of the Security Council mandate that established the mission (Fisas 1995, 70). Those mandates can be for varying missions, from providing humanitarian assistance to monitoring elections, to maintaining an agreed upon ceasefire.

The PKFs, on the other hand, are lightly armed forces and are usually complete units, either companies or battalions, made up of personnel from different countries. They can act more decisively, short of actually joining in conflict, in attempts to dissuade participants from further
conflict (Fisas 1995, 70). By UN standards, a traditional peacekeeping force (Chapter VI in the UN Charter), as evolved through the Cold War, is a military force positioned between two or more conflicting parties. It is deployed with the consent of the relevant local parties, and its main mission is to monitor an agreed-upon cease-fire. The use of force in self-defense and in deterring small-scale attacks is authorized, and the operation is normally accompanied by diplomatic efforts to resolve the underlying political conflict (Oudraat 1996, 504).

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a steady rise in the number of conflicts experienced throughout the world. While the UN continues to make valiant efforts to conduct numerous simultaneous humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, many would argue that the organization has reached a point of overload, or what is sometimes referred to as "donor fatigue." Volunteer nations are not only becoming reluctant to provide personnel to serve in situations where the possibility of casualties is very real, but with the increase in the number of ongoing missions, they are finding it difficult both economically and in terms of manpower to continue unabated support. The UN has no peacekeeping forces of its own, relying
completely on volunteer member states for equipment, personnel, and monetary support. Hesitation or actual refusal by a volunteer state to participate or contribute to a peacekeeping operation serves to exacerbate the already slow response time of the UN, which can only begin the volunteer request and organizational process after the Security Council approves a mission. While there have been many discussions of creating a standing peacekeeping force under the authority and operational control of the UN, one has yet to be established.

Recognizing the issues facing the UN and noting the abundance of crises in Africa, the international community and regional African organizations have been involved in various initiatives and programs to help African countries overcome economic hardships, famine, ethnic conflict, and civil war and to facilitate an environment conducive to economic growth and political and military stability. Former colonial powers in the region, especially France and Great Britain, have maintained close economic and political ties to their former colonies and have attempted various forms of assistance during crises. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has also attempted to intervene in humanitarian crises and provide mechanisms for conflict
resolution, unfortunately with little success to date.
And, since 1990, the US has assisted militarily in at least sixteen interventions in the region (Henk and Metz 1997, 11).

Following Somalia and the tragedy in Rwanda, the OAU became the focal point for a number of initiatives attempting to shift responsibility for responding to African crises to Africans themselves (Malan 1998, 5). It was also observed that initiatives from outside of Africa, particularly from France and Great Britain, were being offered in support of OAU efforts regarding peacekeeping. The basis for both the French and British initiatives dealt with the establishment of a multinational African rapid deployment peace force. The French initiative, Reinforcement of African Military Peacekeeping Capacity (RECAMP), and the British initiative, UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, subscribed to the idea of pre-positioned equipment strategically located at various spots in Africa with Europe and the US providing the equipment and with Africa providing the manpower (Malan 1998, 6). Simultaneous with these external initiatives, the OAU called for a working group of military experts to "come out with practical and realistic recommendations on
the technical issues raised" on the concept and conduct of African peace operations (Malan 1998, 6). This working group, as well as subsequent working groups and African commissions, agreed that African nations must work towards enhancing the UN's capacity for peace operations by being the main provider of personnel readily available and at the disposal of the UN. More recently, South African President Thabo Mbeki has stated that African nations are determined to resolve their own conflicts rather than turn to the US or other nations for help:

There is general agreement around the African continent that it needs to build its peacekeeping capacity, which would then be integrated into the UN system. All of us agree that we need support from countries like the United States to enable us to build that capacity. (Kozaryn 1999, 1)

The US has also had some ideas on the subject, and in 1996 former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to Africa to promote the US proposal of an all-African military force, then known as the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF).

The concept of some sort of indigenous African crisis response force has existed for a number of years. Such an indigenous organization--or capability--seems natural, given the seemingly constant flow and varied nature of crises in the region. The mid-1996 ethnic crisis looming
in Burundi, Rwanda’s neighbor and ethnic and cultural sister state, served as the catalyst for the US in reviving the idea of an indigenous crisis response force and making it the centerpiece of American security policy in Africa. This was the beginning of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) (Henk and Metz 1997, vii).

The US, in accepting its role as global leader, recognizes the importance of African stability, both in satisfying US political and economic interests as well as international peace and security.

Serious transnational security threats emanate from pockets in Africa, including state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, environmental degradation and infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS. Since these threats transcend state borders, they are best addressed through effective, sustained sub-regional engagement in Africa. (Clinton 1999, 45)

The President’s National Security Strategy for a New Century stresses “the imperative for engagement” and enhancing US security through integrated approaches that allow the nation to “shape” the international environment; “respond” to the full spectrum of crises; and “prepare now” for an uncertain future.

The US military plays a key role in this effort. The US’s unparalleled military capabilities form the foundation of mutually beneficial alliances and security partnerships,
undergird stability in key regions, and buttress the current worldwide climate of confidence that encourages peace, economic growth, and democratization (Shalikashvili 1997, 6). Programs, such as ACRI, allow the US to shape the international environment so as to promote regional stability and train local militaries to allow African nations to have the confidence and capability to help themselves during crises.

ACRI Defined

The manner and wording of the original ACRF proposal caused widespread consternation in the international community and appeared to many as another US attempt for a quick fix to the volatile situation in Burundi. European allies were already involved in the previously mentioned efforts to develop African capabilities for conflict resolution and peacekeeping, and Africans were concerned by the lack of prior consultation and the perceived US failure to recognize the growing role in conflict resolution of subregional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Henk 1997-98, 102). There was also a concern that ACRF would become an excuse for a Western withdrawal from Africa. This skepticism towards US
intentions caused the idea to be transformed into an "initiative" (vice "force") with a longer-term capacity-building baseline promulgated and with the name changed from ACRF to ACRI. As developed, ACRI is a training initiative by the US Government to work with select and stable African countries in developing effective, rapidly deployable, and interoperable units that can operate in humanitarian assistance and traditional peacekeeping operations. Chosen countries must have, as a prerequisite to participating, militaries operating under an elected civilian government, and not be known to have participated in human rights violations (Scott Fisher, telephone interview, 8 November 1999). The goal is to allow these countries to respond to regional crises internally and to work towards maintaining peace throughout the continent. The idea is not to create a special, separate peacekeeping force, maintained at the ready, for every crisis that flares on the African continent. Should such a force ever come to fruition, it will be one conceived, developed, and manned by the nations of Africa. The initiative's focus is on training indigenous forces—-not manning a newly created force or standing army—based on a common peacekeeping doctrine and the supply of common communications equipment.
that will allow the units to work more effectively together (Rice 1999, 145).

ACRI does not operate in a vacuum. Liaison has been conducted and continues to occur among nations and organizations involved. The State Department is careful to coordinate with the OAU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) regarding training criteria and peacekeeping doctrine to ensure governments with ACRI trained units can deploy their forces in peacekeeping or humanitarian operations conducted by the OAU, UN, or subregional African organizations and quickly assimilate into the operation, becoming a viable asset towards achieving the mission objectives (Nunn 1998, 2).

An agreement made in May 1997 among the US, Britain, and France identified the need to coordinate peacekeeping training programs and work together under the auspices of the UN and OAU. Referred to as the "P3" initiative, the three countries recognize that each has separate peacekeeping programs with many countries in Africa and that there are advantages to be gained from complementing one another and using a more coordinated approach (Nunn 1998, 2). ACRI, the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, and RECAMP are the respective components
of the joint initiative. Additionally, nongovernmental and private organizations are invited to participate in the training, affording trainers and trainees alike valuable opportunities for increased interaction and understanding of the role of civilian agencies in peacekeeping humanitarian operations (White House, April 1998).

The five-year initiative has been a work in progress for three years. Initial training has already taken place in Uganda, Senegal, Mali, Benin, Ghana, and Malawi, with training in Cote D’Ivoire on hold due to their December 1999 coup. Follow-on training with Uganda and initial training with Ethiopia is currently also on hold: with Uganda due to their military support in the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) and with Ethiopia due to their current crisis with neighboring Eritrea. During Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s recent visit to Kenya, Kenyan President Moi indicated Kenya might be interested in participating in ACRI. Other African countries have also displayed interest, although neither Kenya nor these other countries are, to date, signed up for the program (Scott Fisher, telephone interview, 8 November 1999).
The lead agency for ACRI is the Department of State (DoS), which has established the ACRI Interagency Working Group (ACRI IWG) to work the political aspect of ACRI issues. The DoS sets the priorities for the assessment and training schedules and evaluating countries on other critical criteria: respect for civilian authority; respect for human rights; and prior success in either a peacekeeping operation or a humanitarian-relief operation (HUMRO), preferably on the African continent (McCracken 1998, 8).

According to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice, the fiscal year 1999 goal is to complete the initial training cycle and achieve a threshold of trained troops (approximately 10,000), making up ten to twelve battalions and several specialized companies from African nations, before shifting to sustaining readiness exercises and command post exercises, already being planned and scheduled for fiscal year 2000 and beyond. The executive agent for development of the military aspects for the initiative falls to the US European Command (EUCOM). The US Central Command (CENTCOM); Special Operations Command (SOCOM); Joint Forces Command (JFCOM, formerly the Atlantic Command, ACOM); and
the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) support EUCOM.
Mobile training teams (MTT) of Army Special Forces,
specifically the 3rd Special Forces (SF) Group and the
XVIII Airborne Corps, are conducting most of the actual
training (5th SF Group is responsible for the countries in
the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR)). The training
concentrates on peacekeeping operations by creating a
response capability at the battalion level. Training for a
response capability at the brigade level is currently being
finalized. Training emphasis is on a common peacekeeping
curriculum based on international doctrinal standards,
 interoperable communications, and other nonlethal equipment
(Lieutenant Colonel Mike Connell, faxed briefing, 6 January
2000). Each ACRI MTT consists of sixty to seventy
personnel commanded by a US SF major. The teams conduct an
initial seventy-day training program with 600-800 host
nation soldiers, the focus of which is on leadership,
communications, logistics, and maintenance training. The
multiecheloned training culminates with a realistic,
battalion-level field-training exercise (FTX). After the
initial training, there is a five-phased follow-on training
program (in six month intervals) that focuses on training
African trainers and uses computer exercises (CPX) and FTXs
to train leaders (LTC Mike Connell, faxed briefing, 6 January 2000). The training for each participating country will take approximately three years to complete.

Current Measures of Effectiveness

Given the potential significance of this program to stability and security in Africa and the need to justify its validity to Congress, US international partners, and the recipient African countries, the question has to be asked: How does the US determine if an established program is achieving the stated program goals and objectives and if those program goals continue to satisfy the US national security and military strategies? In other words, do the current MOEs for ACRI satisfy the strategic goals and objectives of the program? The Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2000, presented by the Secretary of State to Congress, outlines US strategic objectives for regional stability in sub-Saharan Africa. The objectives pertain to regional peacekeeping programs and agendas, including ACRI. In reviewing the African section of this document, presented by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice, the strategic objectives regarding ACRI include:
• Existing ACRI participants strengthened and exhibiting a wider range of skills due to follow-on training;

• Increased numbers of African countries participating in ACRI and battalion/brigade headquarters training complete;

• And, increased foreign participation in enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities. (Rice 1999, 15)

What may be considered operational performance evaluation criteria used to meet these strategic objectives are:

• An increased capability to participate in the UN or regional peacekeeping operations;

• An improved capability for selected African countries to better respond to regional humanitarian crises;

• And, a reduction in US outlays for humanitarian relief in conflict-driven crisis situations in Africa. (Rice 1999, 205)

These criteria will be considered achieved by the fulfillment of what this document refers to as “key indicators”:

• New program participants complete initial training cycle and begin longer-term follow-on training;

• Revised follow-on training program implemented using contractors and US Army Special Forces instructors;

• And, development of command and control procedures and instructions for peacekeepers at the battalion and brigade levels. (Rice 1999, 206)
The DoS, specifically the ACRI IWG, recognizes that the strategic objectives outlined above do not necessarily correspond to what would be defined as "measures of effectiveness." The ACRI IWG has submitted a draft, not yet formally concluded and approved document, identifying four working measures of success (versus effectiveness). These four measures are:

- Approximately twelve thousand African troops/peacekeepers trained to the standards of the ACRI program and with the capability of providing self-sustaining training (train-the-trainer);

- At least three African brigade headquarters staffs will have acquired multi-national command and control skills;

- Establishment of a functioning relationship between ACRI trained brigade staffs and the security structures of African principle sub-regional organizations;

- And, demonstrated willingness of ACRI partners to participate in peacekeeping or complex humanitarian emergencies in sub-regional areas. (Scott Fisher, telephone interview, 8 November 1999)

The recent Theater Engagement Planning document promulgated by the Joint Staff requires geographic commanders in chief and executive agents to review the effectiveness of past planning engagement activities in meeting the theater, region, or country objectives they established. The assessments are designed to contribute to determining future plans and activities, including
adjustments in activity type, focus, and numbers, as well as highlighting those means that are proving particularly effective (Joint Staff, A-9). According to currently published EUCOM criteria, the critical elements of measures of effectiveness for ACRI are the ability of the country trained to: (1) maintain the equipment provided and (2) sustain training proficiency against established standards in critical collective and leader tasks. The second stated criteria focuses on the "train the trainer" concept. It is recognized that personnel strength measured against required strength is important but ensuring that the 800 soldiers trained are the same 800 soldiers performing the mission is not a true indicator of the units' ability to accomplish the mission. If "train the trainer" concept is successful, the country should be able to integrate new soldiers into ACRI units and bring them up to required skill proficiency. ACRI contributes to EUCOM sub-Saharan area measures of effectiveness by promoting the capability of the host nation (HN) to respond to a regional exercise, increasing the professionalism of the HN military, and contributing to regional stability (Nunn 1998, 4).
Looking at what is currently viewed as measures of effectiveness naturally leads to secondary questions, specifically:

1. What are the current MOEs that should be deleted from the stated criteria?

2. What are the current MOEs that continue to meet strategic-level goals and should be maintained?

3. Are there MOEs not currently being considered which should be added to strategic and theater requirements for the next iteration of ACRI?

These secondary questions will be analyzed in chapter three with conclusions drawn in chapter four.

Assumptions

The initial assumption in researching MOEs, as they pertain specifically to ACRI at the strategic level, is that both Department of State and Department of Defense MOEs can be derived from the current literature.

Limitations

There are no identified limitations to this research.

Delimitations

The scope of this paper is on strategic level MOEs for a bilateral military-to-military program, specifically
ACRI, with the goal of analyzing the measures of effectiveness for the program in the context of meeting national-level objectives, not an evaluation of MOEs in general or how to determine MOEs in other government programs. The reality of both operational and tactical deployment and performance of ACRI-trained troops, whether regionally or under UN auspices, is not within the purview of this paper.

This paper is written from the US perspective. The international officers attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course have provided insight into ACRI from the host nation perspective at the tactical level. However, their comments were personal opinion and did not represent their respective governments or militaries and were not, therefore, included.

Finally, other regional or international programs and initiatives will only be discussed in the context that they relate to ACRI and potential integration for future training programs.

Significance of Study

The overall effectiveness of ACRI is coming under heavy scrutiny as policy makers justify funding and future
training requirements to Congress. Such justification requires clearly defined MOEs at the strategic level.

Current literature appears inadequate in clearly defining required MOEs, yet both the Congress and the Joint Staff (in their TEP) have established requirements mandating MOEs for funded programs. In this time of fiscal constraints, concrete MOEs are necessary in justifying programs, especially those programs in regions, such as Africa, where many Congressional leaders have difficulty in justifying US involvement at any level. The ACRI IWG at the State Department recognizes this need and, working in conjunction with the Joint Staff, has in draft a paper defining MOSs for ACRI.

**Definition of Terms**

**Peace Building.** In the aftermath of conflict; it means identifying and supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict; often involves elections organized, supervised or conducted by the United Nations, the rebuilding of civil physical infrastructures and institutions such as schools and hospitals, and economic reconstruction.

**Peace Making.** Diplomatic process of brokering an end to conflict, principally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter; military activities contributing to peacemaking include military-to-military contacts, security assistance, shows of force and preventive deployments.
Peace Operations. Peace support operations including preventive deployments, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building, as well as humanitarian assistance, good offices, fact-finding, electoral assistance.

Peacekeeping. PK, a hybrid politico-military activity aimed at conflict control, which involves a United Nations presence in the field (usually involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces etc.), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief.

Peacekeeping Operation. PKO, noncombat military operations undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties and designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement; 'PKOs' covers: peace-keeping forces, observer missions and mixed operations. (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2000)
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The nature of this thesis lent itself to a qualitative analysis of available government and military documentation as well as current literature and reports on or associated with the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). In order to answer the primary question, information was gathered and grouped into three categories. These three categories were: (1) research pertaining to post-colonial African crises; (2) research pertaining to the development of ACRI and how the initiative supports the strategic goals and objectives of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS); (3) and research pertaining to congressional, DoS, and Department of Defense (DoD) MOEs. These categories of literature then were applied to the five phases of analysis.

The sections below outline each phase of analysis and provides a review of pertinent literature within the corresponding literature categories. Figure one relates the phases of analysis to the corresponding literature categories. The five phases of analysis are:

Phase I: An examination of crises in Africa
**Phase I:** An Examination of Crises in Africa

- Overview of crises in Africa

**Phase II:** A recognized need for indigenous crisis response capability.

- Part I: Evolution of ACRI
- Part II: Definition of ACRI

**Phase III:** An analysis of current measures of effectiveness

- Part I: Congressional Requirements
- Part II: DoS and DoD established MOEs

**Phase IV:** An evaluation of current MOEs

- Determine if current MOEs satisfy the strategic goals of ACRI
- Yes: Validation of MOEs as they currently exist
- No: Consolidate research and apply to phase V

**Phase V:** Formulation of applicable MOEs

- Determine applicable MOEs for future iterations of ACRI
- Conclusions and Recommendations

**Figure 1: Research Methodology**

Phase II: A recognized need for an indigenous crisis response capability
Phase III: An analysis of current MOEs

Phase IV: An evaluation of established MOEs

Phase V: Formulation of applicable MOEs

Phase I of Analysis: An Examination of Crisis in Africa

Phase I of the analysis, the examination of crises in Africa, provided a foundation for understanding the post-colonial history of humanitarian emergencies and conflict-derived crises in Africa. This phase and associated literature provided a framework for understanding the evolution of ACRI and from which an analysis of current MOEs can be conducted.

The literature supporting this phase of analysis, Literature Category I, is composed of current publications and reports that provided historical background and information on the development of crises in Africa.

In African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in Peacemaking, editors David Smock and Chester Crocker brought together a series of articles by an experienced group of African and US specialists to produce a compilation of work on African conflict. This work covers a logical flow from the identification of sources of conflict in Africa to analyzing US contributions to African
efforts to prevent, manage, and resolve violent conflicts on the continent. The first two articles, "The African State as a Political Refugee" and "The African Role in Conflict Management and Resolution," are by leading African academics who discuss causes of civil conflict, potential African solutions, and early warning and preventive diplomacy by both African nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and African governments. The first two articles are followed by "The US Role in Managing African Conflict" and "A Diplomatic Perspective on African Conflict Resolution," academic and diplomatic assessments of the American experience in trying to resolve African conflicts and lessons for future endeavors. Next in the series, "African Capabilities for Managing Conflict" and "Guidelines for Preserving Peace in Africa," are assessments of African capabilities for managing conflict and recommendations for specific US actions and policies, and guidelines for preserving peace in Africa, respectively. "Institutional Capacity-Building for African Conflict Management" provides a summary of the compilation. "The African State as a Political Refugee" logically falls into phase I of the analysis, an examination of crisis in Africa, and is highlighted below. While this thesis was focused on the US
perspective of ACRI and its associated MOEs, it may prove to be beneficial to be aware of the African ideas on the nature of conflict in Africa in attempting to understand how and where ACRI fits in to conflict resolution.

In "The African State as a Political Refugee," Ali A. Mazrui, a noted Kenyan scholar, provides a set of theories to help form a foundation for understanding conflict in Africa. He identifies some of the major sources of civil conflict in Africa and considers actions that Africans, as states and organizations, might take to promote peace. His metaphorical analysis of the African state likened to the life of a refugee needing outside or international assistance for survival, followed by a comparative description of plural and dual societies, effectively demonstrates the complexity of the African state and the causes of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

In presenting potential solutions, Dr. Mazrui looks to both national (African) and pan-African solutions. The absence of international participation in his proposed solutions lends credence to the current tenet that Africans recognize the need to look internally at both how African states are organized and operated (national) and to established regional and sub-regional organizations as
potential mediators or actually creating a new organization specifically designed for conflict resolution issues (pan-African). Obviously, Dr. Mazrui provides an African point of view in his presentation with African solutions to the issues. He did not, however, discuss the African capability, either regionally or as individual states, to effectively carry out the proposed solutions without international support.

Stephen Stedman, author of the article “Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa” found in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Michael Brooks, editor) argues that Africa’s recent internal conflicts have arisen from long-term permissive conditions and more immediate related causes (1996, 236). He places the root cause on colonialism and the complete disregard for political, economic, and cultural life that was followed by, upon independence, the evolution of patrimonial politics. The strict economic conditions placed on African states by international financial institutions and the end of the Cold War served to exacerbate the problems. Stedman then describes the four possible outcomes to these conditions, all but one of which present a picture of instability and insecurity.
Stedman’s article presents a concise evolution of the tragedy and conflict that is often thought of as Africa. He acknowledges that the wide-ranging and costly effects of internal conflict on the individual state and sub-regions are long-term in nature and “their resolution will ultimately depend on economic development and the creation of regimes that are responsive to people and that have the capabilities to carry out the task that modern states are expected to perform” (1996, 264). Arguably, economic development can only happen in a secure and relatively stable environment, implying that programs initiated either internally or through international organizations must work towards the African state developing the capacity to establish and maintain that secure and stable environment needed for economic growth and development. This thought process is in line with both stated goals in the United States National Security Strategy for the sub-Saharan region and the ACRI mission statement which seek to enhance African crises resolution capacity.

**Phase II of Analysis: A Recognized Need for Indigenous Crisis Response Capability**

Phase II of analysis, a recognized need for an indigenous crisis response capability, is divided into two
parts. Part I provides a framework for the evolution of ACRI while Part II provides the definition of ACRI.

The literature supporting this phase of analysis, Literature Category II, is composed of current literature and government documents. Much of the literature overlaps the two parts of Phase II. The distinction is made as the literature is reviewed. The first two literary works reviewed describe the framework in which ACRI evolved and fall into Part I of Phase II—the evolution of ACRI.

What are African leaders perspectives on conflict management? Henry J. Cohen poses this question in his paper "African Capabilities for Managing Conflict: The Role of the United States" (1995, 78). To explore this question, Cohen refers to the 28th Annual Summit of the OAU that took place in June 1992. It was during this summit that African heads of state adopted, in principle, the establishment of a "mechanism for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in Africa," and asked the then secretary general to develop a plan for making such a mechanism operational. The formal endorsement came the following June (1995, 78).

The significance of this decision by the OAU is twofold. First, as Cohen points out, this is a clear
signal to the international community that African states recognize their own responsibility for managing conflict on the continent and acknowledging the effects of donor fatigue outside of Africa. Second, the OAU had previously held firm to a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of its member states, arguably rendering the organization ineffective in conflict management since most conflict in Africa is internal. Establishing the conflict management mechanism redefined the concept of interference, acknowledging that internal conflict in Africa presents regional risks to peace and security and therefore is subject to OAU interference (1995, 79).

In analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the African experience in conflict management, Cohen briefly summarizes past attempts made by the OAU in Chad, with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and in Rwanda. While the case studies have demonstrated some strength in negotiation and mediation, the OAU conflict management mechanism is far from operational and continues to experience problems in organization and personnel (1995, 84).

Cohen addresses the need for an African and international community partnership, with respective
commitments from both groups, to achieve the African goal of assuming responsibility for their own conflict management. The partnership includes the designation of five African combat battalions dedicated to conflict management—in effect, a permanent peacekeeping force—available for both OAU and UN conflict management requirements. These combat battalions would also enhance the capabilities of the OAU conflict management mechanism to assume the role of regional lead in African crises.

From the US policy perspective, Cohen recommends strengthening the role of the UN as coordinator in peacekeeping training and as a coordinating center for conflict management (1995, 92).

The significance of Cohen's writing, as it pertains to phase II of the analysis (a recognized need for indigenous crisis response capability) and specifically to part I of this phase (the evolution of ACRI) is the acknowledgement from the African leaders themselves that Africa needs to deal with Africa's internal conflicts. However, their capacity to perform conflict prevention through peacemaking or peace building is underdeveloped. Development of this capability requires some level of engagement from the
international community and, due to US interests in the region, the United States in particular.

However, Cohen does not specifically address the identification of a singular internationally accepted peacekeeping training doctrine (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations doctrine) or the integration of respective bilateral military to military training programs and exercises with existing peacekeeping doctrine. Nor does he identify some sort of mechanism or established criteria to measure the effectiveness of required training in successfully preparing African troops to respond to their own internal crises.

Another work setting the stage for the evolution of ACRI is Mark Malan’s paper, “Peacekeeping in Africa--Trends and Responses.” Malan identifies what he calls an “African renaissance” as an increasing determination to find “African solutions for African problems” (1998, 1). He reminds the reader of a statement made by OAU Secretary General, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ in 1997 that aptly sums up current African leadership thoughts on conditions in African and specifically crisis and conflict response.
OAU member states can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the international community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solution to those problems which in many instances have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control. (Malan 1998, 1)

Malan proceeds to analyze the current trends in international peacekeeping, the problems of peacekeeping specific to Africa, and the building of an African peacekeeping capacity. He presents a chronological evolution of the international community’s response to peacekeeping dilemmas on the continent and African responses to the various international and bilateral programs and initiatives.

In analyzing the trends of international peacekeeping, Malan begins by marking the change in traditional UN (blue helmet) peacekeeping operations. Traditionally, these missions were conducted with consent, impartiality and without resorting to the use of force. Malan notes a change in conjunction with former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali’s 1992 An Agenda for Peace. While Boutros Gali attempted to make distinctions among various conflict management tools (peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building), Malan argues that these
tools did not come with clear instruction manuals (1998, 2). As a result, most states participating in peacekeeping operations have preferred to remain with the previously established principles and practices found in traditional peacekeeping operations under UN Chapter VI mandates. This is an important consideration when realizing that capacity building programs, such as ACRI, are training to Chapter VI peacekeeping while the nature of many crises in Africa lean more towards Chapter VII peace enforcement mandates. Under Chapter VII, the opposing belligerents have not necessarily consented to UN intervention, and the use of force on the part of the UN sponsored troops, is expected. Malan highlights this issue in capturing comments made by UN Secretary General Kofi Anan regarding the lack of UN enforcement capacity.

The United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII [of the UN Charter]...the Organization still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations. (Malan 1998, 2)

Malan also explores the African response to the various programs, initiatives, and exercises to build an African peacekeeping capacity that were sponsored by the international community as a whole and unilaterally by such
countries as the US, France, and Great Britain. Of interest is the African response that Africans should train with equipment they have available in their armed forces and adapt their concepts for the conduct of peace operations accordingly (Malan 1998, 9). This response, in conjunction with the statements made at the 1997 OAU meeting, supports the premise of ACRI as strictly a training initiative and not a plan for militarily or logistically equipping a standing force.

Finally, Malan argues that the greatest flaw in international and bilateral attempts to develop an African capacity to respond to crises is the failure to line capacity building with capacity utilization. While not denying that the various training initiatives contribute to potential peacekeeping capacity, he points out that the training is geared to individual infantry battalions as opposed to a dedicated multinational force or at least a standby brigade or division (1998, 11). Arguably a valid point, the establishment of such a standing force is beyond current African capabilities.

Malan’s paper provides a succinct overview of the development of African peacekeeping operations, establishing the backdrop under which ACRI was conceived.
and where it fits into the larger picture of capacity building. However, he is not overly optimistic regarding the current status of conflict resolution on the continent. Although his analysis supports the rationale for ACRI, he is silent on the issue of appropriate measures of effectiveness for a force meeting the challenges of complex peacekeeping operations. While he identifies a valid area of concern for consideration regarding overall effectiveness of capacity building under the tenets of current training initiatives, it is difficult to glean any stated or implied specific measures that could guide policy makers and military strategists in the development of ACRI MOEs.

The following review overlapped part I (the evolutions of ACRI) and part II (the definition of ACRI) of the second phase in the research methodology (a recognized need for an indigenous crisis response capability). It deals with both the environment in which ACRI evolved and the initiative’s definition.

*The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond*, by Dan Henk and Steven Metz, provides a thorough review of the African security environment, to include the
actors, the architecture (or configuration) of the security system in which the actors operate, and the methods and procedures of how they operate. The authors also elaborate on the extent and nature of US national interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Using the 1997 version of the National Security Strategy as a base, the authors detail the various US interests applicable, recognizing that while the interests may not be, by definition, vital to the survival of the US, they are, nevertheless, important to the United States economically, militarily, and humanely.

Transitioning into a discussion of the evolution of ACRI, the authors make an assessment of the initiative to date (December 1997) and provide recommendations regarding the roles of the key players—Congress, DoS, DoD, and African leaders. These recommendations are suggestions on overcoming perceived shortcomings in ACRI and planning for future iterations of the initiative. They promote the need for Congress to continue funding the initiative, the State Department’s need to broaden the program by attempting to link it to ongoing UN peacekeeping initiatives and sub-regional organizations’ ability to react to crises, and the Department of Defense’s role to expand to possibly include, for example, the training of civilian officials during
natural disasters and pandemic disease as well as peacekeeping (1997, 33). The most compelling point the authors make concerns the role of African leaders themselves. Henk and Metz argue strongly that the ultimate success or failure of ACRI and how the African security environment evolves depends completely upon African leaders: (1) maintaining positive political and economic trends, (2) wanting the African security environment to evolve into one of peace and security, and (3) one day taking ownership of ACRI (1997, 36-37).

Henk and Metz’s work is one of the first evaluations of ACRI and, by that very fact is significant. While some of their recommendations have actually come to fruition (or at least been attempted)—i.e., creating the equivalent of the US DoD’s Marshall Center, the African Center for Strategic Studies—it is still worthwhile in realizing the evolutionary environment in which the initiative exists. It is also important to understand the current African security environment and US national interests in the region, which is provided by the authors. Such an understanding is important in order to efficiently adopt and promote programs such as ACRI, which can positively
affect the development of a secure and stable environment in African and promote US national interests in the region.

Some of Henk and Metz's recommendations are, indeed, quantifiably measurable and could be extracted as valid MOEs for ACRI. However, their broad analysis does not appear consistent with the established framework of ACRI, resulting in many of the recommendations resembling a more subjective quality. This has resulted in recommendations beyond the scope of the current iteration of ACRI.

Focusing now on part II (the definition of ACRI) of the second phase of the research methodology (a recognized need for indigenous crisis response capability) the following documents provide a definition of ACRI and elaborate on the initiative's mission and goals.

Addressing the Emerald Express Symposium at Camp Pendleton in April 1998, former Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie discussed ACRI in *The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): America’s Engagement for Peace in Africa*. Ambassador McCallie was the initial coordinator of the ACRI Interagency Working Group (IWG) in Washington, D.C., and the impetus behind the funding for the initial five-year program. As stated then, the goal of ACRI was to work in partnership with African countries to enhance their
capacity to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner. The objective was to assist in developing rapidly deployable, interoperable battalions and companies from stable democratic countries that could work together to maintain peace on a continent that has too often been torn by civil strife. The Ambassador pointed out the US intention was not to create a standing army in Africa, nor was it to withdraw from Africa. He reiterated US intentions to remain engaged on the continent and work with the respective African states to promote peace and stability, economic growth, and democracy (1998, 2).

In addition to a historical synopsis of the development and history of ACRI, Ambassador McCallie also addressed a number of key issues that were dealt with based on inputs provided by African and non-African partners. Specifically addressed were the issues of the creation of a force versus an interoperable capacity, the establishment of linkages with other already established international training initiatives, training and equipping to Chapter VI versus Chapter VII standards, and complementing common training with standard communications equipment. The Ambassador points out that ACRI does not operate in a
vacuum and that US policy calls for the continuation of work with humanitarian organizations, the OAU, the UN, and sub-regional organizations to promote peace and stability in Africa.

It has been noted that the introduction of ACRI originally met with a measure of skepticism from the international community and African states. It was perceived as a quick fix measure towards solving the conflict management issue on the continent as well as a precursor to the withdrawal of not just the US but western interests as a whole from the continent. Ambassador McCallie’s address to the symposium presented the mission and goals of ACRI and pointedly addressed identified misconceptions on the nature and intent of the initiative. Had the initiative been presented and publicized in such a way from the beginning, arguably some of the initial hesitation in readily accepting the program may have been precluded.

The last two documents under review in support of Phase II of the research methodology (a recognized need for indigenous crisis response capability) are official products by the Bureau of African Affairs (State
Department) and Office of the Press Secretary (White House).

The Bureau of African Affairs released an information sheet entitled *African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)* in March 1998. It provides the vision statement for ACRI, to include a status of training and the acknowledged challenges to Africa in shaping its own future and to the US in providing internationally coordinated training to African states.

The White House *Fact Sheet: African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)* was released on the occasion of President Clinton’s visit to Senegal in April 1998. As the title implies, this fact sheet provides a brief background on the launching and purpose of ACRI: “The purpose of the initiative is to work with international partners and African nations to enhance African peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capacity” (p.1).

The fact sheet also discusses integration of NGOs and private volunteer organizations (PVO) into the training; efforts to compliment already established programs with such countries as France, Britain, and the Nordic countries; and continuous coordination with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the OAU and its
Crisis Management Center, and African subregional organizations already pursuing capacity enhancement.

Both documents provide official definitions of the nature and intent of ACRI, confirming US commitment to a dedicated program of crisis response capacity building. Additionally, both documents discuss aspects of ACRI that could be extracted as either specified or implied objectives. However, the broad overview provided in each fails to specifically address MOEs or the issue of program requirements for MOEs, identify which organization determines ACRI MOEs, or establish any type of oversight mechanism to validate the successful accomplishment of the program’s objectives.

Phase III of Analysis: The Analysis of Current Measures of Effectiveness

Phase III of the analysis, the analysis of current measures of effectiveness, draws upon Literature Category III, research pertaining to Congressional, Department of State, and Department of Defense MOEs contained in government and military documents. Phase III is divided into two parts. Part I (congressional requirements) is an analysis of the legal requirements for the submission of MOEs in justification of funding for new and continuing
military engagement programs. Part II (an analysis of DoS- and DoD-established MOEs) identifies the established MOEs for ACRI. Both parts I and II analyze ACRI MOE's applicability to the current US National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The first government document reviewed provides the congressional framework for foreign operations, specifically ACRI and regional stability, and falls into Part I of Phase III—Congressional requirements.

In the *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2000*, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice provides an overview of US policy in sub-Saharan Africa, outlining various programs and initiatives that support the two identified policy goals in Africa. These two overarching goals for the region are: (1) integrating Africa into the global economy by promoting economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, and conflict resolution; and (2) defending the United States against transnational security threats emanating from Africa—principally state-sponsored terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation and disease (1999, 1). Correspondingly, conflict resolution is critically
important in satisfying the goal of integrating Africa into
the global economy. Democracy and sustained economic
growth cannot effectively develop and blossom in an
environment fraught with by continual armed conflict. ACRI
is one of the key programs in place to support regional
stability aimed at peacekeeping and conflict resolution
capacity. As stated in paragraph III of her statement, “a
continued near-universal US presence in African countries
is critical to our ability to represent and advance US
interests there” (1999, 8). Building cooperative
relationships with African militaries through joint
exercises and conflict resolution training under ACRI
provides that presence and advances US interests in the
region.

The Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations,
FY2000 clearly identifies ACRI as an important program for
the US in achieving our strategic goal of regional
stability in sub-Saharan Africa. More directly, ACRI works
toward the regional goal of having African regional and
subregional structures capable of preventing and responding
to crises and conflict. The overarching strategic
objectives for the region are presented and encompass the
success of various initiatives and programs. The strategic
objectives specific to ACRI were outlined in chapter one of this thesis. It should be noted that the stated objectives are based on the assumption that Africans will take an increasingly active leadership role in resolving threats to regional stability, an issue that to date admittedly has been dealt with by non-Africans.

In the section outlining specific programs and initiatives, what may be considered operational performance evaluation criteria used to meet the strategic objectives for ACRI are presented (refer to chapter one of this thesis). The document also refers to key indicators, presumably milestones achieved in successfully fulfilling the performance evaluation criteria. While both the strategic objectives and the performance evaluation criteria are measurable in the simplest of definitions, a comparison of the key indicators with operational performance evaluation criteria may reveal inadequate nesting or possible disconnect of objectives. This will be more fully explored in Chapter Three.

For part II (DoS and DoD established MOEs) of phase III of the research methodology (an analysis of current MOEs) the following documents provide the strategic
framework with which ACRI falls and the established MOEs, or requirement for MOEs, from DoS and DoD.

Both the *National Security Strategy for a New Century* and the *National Military Strategy* outline the overarching objectives for sub-Saharan Africa, thus providing a framework for an initiative such as ACRI.

As stated in the NSS, US security strategy is founded on continued US engagement and leadership abroad and has three core objectives:

- Enhancing American security
- Bolstering US economic prosperity
- And, promoting democracy and human rights abroad (Clinton 1999, iii)

The US military’s crucial role in achieving those objectives is expressed below:

Through overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and training and exercises with allies and friends, our Armed Forces help to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies. (Clinton 1999, 11)

In sub-Saharan Africa the US promotes regional stability through engagement, specifically with sub-regional organizations and designated key African states using “carefully harmonized” US programs and initiatives (Clinton 1999, 45). Arguably, continued levels of conflict and political instability in various areas of the region
are significant hindrances to Africa's economic development and to US political and economic interests. ACRI was developed to foster regional stability and peace in Africa through capacity building training in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian emergencies, thus contributing to African efforts of economic growth and development.

The objectives of the NMS provide a strategy of "shape, respond, prepare now" for the US military. These national military objectives: (1) promote peace and stability and (2) defeat adversaries, support the NSS objectives by describing how the military instrument of power can and does contribute to the overall security of the US. As stated, the military plays a significant role in shaping the international environment through presence abroad and peacetime engagement programs, such as ACRI.

The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggression and coercion. (Shalikashvili 1997, 9)

It must be pointed out that neither the NSS nor NMS specifically outlines MOEs for any of the multitude of programs and initiatives in place to satisfy the overall political, economic, or military objectives promulgated. However, a clear understanding of their content and how
each drives theater engagement plans and policies is important when developing and justifying initiatives answering the military tenet of the strategic instruments of power, such as ACRI.

In addition to the national strategic and military strategies, there is another significant document that falls into part II of the third phase of research, an analysis of current MOEs. This is the Theater Engagement Planning document (Chairman Joint Staff Manual 3113.01), referred to as TEP, which established the DoD requirement for programmatic MOEs from the theater commanders in chiefs (CINCs). Signed in 1998, this DoD document was promulgated by the Joint Staff as a result of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 1997 NMS. It was the QDR and NMS that formally recognized DoD’s role in shaping the international environment and identified peacetime engagement as one of the pillars of the national military strategy (Hosack 2000, 2). The TEP process brings the shaping element of the US National Military Strategy into the arena of deliberate planning and national-level oversight (Shelton 2000, 4). The purpose of TEP is to provide a better linkage of global priorities, strategic objectives, and available resources.
TEP defines theater engagement as “all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime within a geographic theater as described in the Unified Command Plan (UCP)” (Joint Staff 1998, GL-5). However, military activities include civilian and interagency support, implementation of DoS-managed programs, and other assistance that is required for TEP programs to function. TEP standardizes planning of peacetime activities. It assists in the CINCs and JCS in prioritizing objectives, allocating resources, and connecting overall strategies both within theater and within DoD.

In the TEP process, the CJCS gives each CINC prioritized regional objectives that support strategic planning and assessments for the CINC’s area of responsibility (AOR). The CINC must then develop criteria for priorities within his AOR, producing three tiers of prioritized regional objectives. Implementation of TEP is dependent on variables not under the CINC’s control, such as US and HN resource availability and policy. The last process in TEP is to assess the cost, impact, and value of the event.
The TEP Manual describes the planning for development of TEPs. One of the procedures in the initiation phase of TEP is a review of past activities. At the beginning of each planning cycle, CINCs and executive agents review of the effectiveness of past engagement activities in meeting the theater, regional, or country objectives they established (Joint Staff 1998, A-9). This review provides the basis of the CINC engagement assessment required in each TEP cycle, as outlined in enclosure C of the TEP Manual--Format and Content of Theater Engagement Plan (Joint Staff 1998, C-7). There is now an established requirement on the part of CINCs and executive agents to develop MOEs to ensure there is a disciplined methodology to justify allocation of resources and funding in assessing CINCs TEPs.

A final consideration in this phase of the research (an analysis of current MOEs) is a review of the role of the theater command responsible for implementing the initiative in the context of established national and military strategic goals and objectives. As executive agent for ACRI, EUCOM is responsible for ensuring full compatibility not only with EUCOM theater objectives but also in meeting the strategic objectives of the NMS. As
stated in the *African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)* Concept paper, enhancing peacekeeping and humanitarian operations capabilities within Africa directly supports the NMS objective of promoting peace and stability. The training conducted leads to an apolitical, professional military that respects human rights and provides additional options for US response (Nunn 1998, 1). The concept paper also delineates criteria for countries wishing to participate in ACRI training. Promulgated by DoS and enforced by EUCOM, countries with professional military units may participate in the program assuming the following criteria:

- Acceptance of democratic civilian authority
- Respect for human rights
- Participation in prior peacekeeping operations or a demonstrated interest in engaging in peacekeeping activities
- And, a relatively high level of basic military proficiency. (Nunn 1998, 2)

The paper goes on to outline how EUCOM intends to execute ACRI, ensuring coordination with already established organizations, such as the OAU and UN. It discusses equipment and training, command and control structures, and long-term strategy. Of significance, the idea of MOEs is specifically addressed, as required by TEP.
In addressing MOEs, what might be considered the all-important question is asked, "can the unit effectively operate as part of a PKO/HUMRO mission?" Brought out in chapter one of this thesis, EUCOM views the critical elements of MOEs as: (1) the ability of the country trained to maintain the equipment provided and (2) sustain training proficiency against established standards of critical collective leader tasks, or train the trainer (Nunn 1998, 4). It is pointed out that personnel strength measured against required strength is an important but not a true indicator of the units' ability to accomplish the mission. From the EUCOM’s perspective the success of the program rests in the train the trainer concept, the HN’s ability to integrate new soldiers into ACRI-trained units and bring them up to required skill proficiency.

What the concept paper does not do is directly associate specific objective accomplishments with MOEs. While it identifies a long-term strategy of training ten to twelve interoperable African battalions, it does not associate that to a measurable objective to be successfully achieved in completing the program’s goals.
Phase IV of Analysis

Phase IV, an evaluation of established MOEs, determines if the current MOEs in place for ACRI satisfy established requirements and strategic goals of the initiative. This is accomplished by comparing specified and implied objectives extracted from strategic documents to the ACRI IWG draft MOSs. The results of this analysis determine Phase V of the research, formulation of applicable MOEs for ACRI, either as they currently exist or recommendations for possible future iterations of the program.

Conclusion

This chapter began by graphically depicting (figure one) and describing a framework of conflict and crisis in sub-Saharan Africa in order to understand the environment in which ACRI evolved. It continued by establishing national security and military regional objectives under which ACRI falls and a requirement for CINCs to provide a valid assessment of their engagement plans effectiveness. It concluded by identifying and analyzing existing DoS and DoD MOEs for the program, and providing the groundwork for analyzing the validity of the program MOEs, as they currently exist. Chapter three provides the analysis
necessary for drawing the conclusions and making recommendations found in chapter four.
CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter is an analysis of the effectiveness of ACRI and the implications for continuation of the initiative. To evaluate the initiative, this analysis used the concept of MOEs, already established as a required feature of theater engagement plans by congressional decree, as a guide to the evaluation. The analysis begins by defining the term "measures of effectiveness," followed by a determination of MOEs. This is followed by an evaluation of ACRI in the context of fulfilling implied and specified goals of strategic documentation and testimonial documents, and, finally, a discussion on issues for consideration regarding the program.

Defining MOEs

In evaluating the MOEs of ACRI it was necessary to establish a definitional premise on the meaning of the term. To accomplish this task, the term "measures of effectiveness" is broken down by its two parts--measure and effectiveness--for analysis before then discussing the term as a whole.
To measure an objective, event or goal is to apply a dimension or capacity to it. The word "measure" implies the idea that an objective, event or goal has quantifiable features. Quantifiable, in turn, implies objectivity and a clear definition, allowing for comparison and contrast with other like objectives, events or goals. While an objective, event or goal can be evaluated based on qualitative merit, this implies the application of subjective consideration and lends any incremental or final evaluation susceptible to interpretation and influence from the evaluator or other outside influences.

Effectiveness, by definition, is producing a definite or desired result. It also implies a link with the concept of efficiency, or resource management—achieving, or producing, the desired result utilizing available resources.

In defining measures of effectiveness, therefore, it is logical to assume that a designated goal or objective has a quantifiable dimension that can produce the desired result within current resource availability. Based on this assumption, for MOEs to be useful to program or policy planners, objectives or goals must be specifically defined and measurable and the desired result, or end-state, must
be clearly identified in order to allow for measurement. Additionally, measurable objectives based on this definition lend themselves to incremental evaluation and comparison to similar objectives in the analytical process.

MOEs are a type of program performance assessment, or performance measurement. According to the GAO, *Performance Measurement and Evaluation, Definition and Relationships*, performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program accomplishments, particularly towards pre-established goals, and focuses on whether a program has achieved those goals via objectives expressed as measurable performance standards (1998, 3-4).

**Determining MOEs**

ACRI, as discussed in chapter two of this thesis, supports the United States strategic engagement strategy by providing training to selected African states for participation in oftentimes-complex contingency peacekeeping operations.

Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, recognizes complex contingency operations as those composed of the various elements of the national instruments of power, and thus requiring multiagency participation. PDD-56 calls for the
establishment of appropriate interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of these contingencies (PDD-56 1997, 3). According to PDD-56, the planning stage includes the provision of demonstrable milestones and measures of success. The ACRI Interagency Working Group (IWG), composed of DoS and DoD personnel and civilian contractors, has drafted a proposal recommending measures of success for the initiative and is, arguably, one of the few strategic level organizations operating in the spirit of PDD-56.

Analyzing ACRI MOEs

In analyzing the MOEs for ACRI it is necessary to review strategic level documents and testimony regarding goals and objectives for sub-Saharan Africa as they apply to stated MOEs. For those documents that do not specifically address MOEs, it is possible to extract logical, measurable objectives for ACRI that can be construed as potential MOEs for the program. Upon analyzing the previously reviewed strategic documents and testimonials (refer to chapter two) the stated and extracted MOEs (based on specified and implied objectives) for each is identified, assimilated, and compared against the ACRI IWG draft measures of success (MOS, refer to
Chapter One). For the comparison, a tabular format based on the categories of troop strength, training standards, command and control, logistics and equipment, participating countries, and interoperability is used.

Comparing NSS/NMS Extracted MOEs to ACRI IWG Draft MOSs

The National Security Strategy for a New Century (1999) clearly states the United States strategy is founded on a policy of engagement. The US must be prepared and willing to use appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and nonstates to advance US national interests worldwide (p. 3). As described in chapter one of this thesis, ACRI was developed to foster regional stability and peace in Africa through capacity building training in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian emergencies, thus utilizing the US's military instrument of power in direct bilateral, military-to-military peacetime engagement. This is consistent with the NSS, which explicitly recognizes the need to promote engagement policies through regional and subregional organizations and designated key states.

Our immediate objective is to increase the number of capable states in Africa; that is, nations that are able to define the challenges they face, manage their resources to effectively address those challenges, and
build stability and peace within their borders and their sub-regions. (Clinton 1999, 45) Persistent conflict and political instability are acknowledged as obstacles to not only African’s development but also to US national interests—political, economic, and security. Further, the document recognizes the United States cannot operate in a vacuum and endorses the need to coordinate with other nations and organizations, both internationally and regionally, in developing regional exercise programs to promote a capacity to overcome conflict and instability on the continent.

The National Military Strategy (1997) was written by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to, and in support of, the National Security Strategy. Thus, it is logical that military goals and objectives for sub-Saharan Africa are a direct reflection of those stated in what could be termed the parent document, the NSS. Based on that assumption, in evaluating the two documents it is reasonable to extract the following MOEs for ACRI:

1. Increase the number of African states participating in ACRI, focusing on designated key states in each region (specified);
2. Establish a cooperative relationship with existing regional and subregional organizations through planned exercises and inclusion in ACRI training (specified);

3. Increase international participation and cooperation through multinational exercises and training (specified)

4. Increase the frequency of posttraining exercises to facilitate self-sustainment capabilities (implied)

5. Train to common, internationally recognized and accepted doctrine to promote interoperability on the regional and subregional levels (implied);

Table 1 compares the extracted MOEs from NSS and NMS with ACRI IWG draft MOSs.

The extracted MOEs from the NSS and NMS documents are representative of broad goals and objectives. The nature of these two documents does not lend them to a more detailed plans or policies breakdown to determine how the goals and objectives will be achieved. Therefore, it is not surprising that the issues of command and control and logistics and communications are not specifically addressed other than in the context of promoting interoperability on regional and subregional levels. However, there is a possible disconnect regarding the issue of participating
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSS/NMS Extracted MOEs</th>
<th>ACRI IWG Draft MOSs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troop Strength</td>
<td>Increase overall number of states</td>
<td>Approx. 12,000 troops/peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Standards</td>
<td>Common, internationally accepted doctrine; facilitate self-sustaining capabilities</td>
<td>ACRI program doctrine; self-sustaining (train-the-trainer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>At least three African BDE staffs-multinational command and control skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics and Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries Participating</td>
<td>Focus on key states in regions</td>
<td>Demonstrated willingness to participate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Cooperative relationship with regional and sub-regional organizations</td>
<td>Functioning relationship with principle African sub-regional organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
countries. NSS specifically focuses on desired regional partnerships and coordinated training with key states in established regions. The ACRI IWG draft MOSs focuses on partners demonstrating a willingness to participate in peacekeeping or humanitarian operations without defining willingness or specifying their regional status.

Comparing Stated Congressional MOEs with ACRI IWG Draft MOSs

The Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY2000, outlines the Secretary of State's programmatic plans, policies, and budgetary outlays in support of the President's NSS. The strategic objectives for the sub-Saharan region are provided and those directly pertaining to ACRI are identified. Additionally, in describing various regional plans and programs in place to satisfy the stated overall strategic objectives, the document specifically identifies regional plan objectives, or performance evaluation criteria, for ACRI. These regional plan objectives are measured, or considered achieved, by the fulfillment of what the document refers to as key indicators (refer to Chapter One for complete listing).

Table 2 compares the Stated Congressional MOEs with ACRI IWG draft MOSs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stated Congressional MOEs</th>
<th>ACRI IWG Draft MOSs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troop Strength</td>
<td>Increase number of African countries participating</td>
<td>Approx. 12,000 troops/peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Standards</td>
<td>Continued follow-on training; wider range of skills</td>
<td>ACRI program doctrine; self-sustaining (train-the-trainer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>HQ/C2 at the battalion and BDE level</td>
<td>At least three African BDE staffs-multinational command and control skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics and Equipment</td>
<td>Reduction in US outlays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries Participating</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrated willingness to participate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Foreign participation; operate in UN/regional contingencies</td>
<td>Functioning relationship with principle African sub-regional organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In analyzing the congressional presentation, ACRI regional plan objectives are satisfactorily nested with strategic objectives if it is assumed that an increase in foreign participation in enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities implies, by default, a reduction in US outlays.
for humanitarian relief in conflict-driven crisis situations in Africa. And all are, by definition, measurable.

One noted discrepancy within the congressional presentation MOEs is in the relationship between the key indicators and the ACRI regional plan objectives in terms of the key indicators capturing all of the measurable items. The stated key indicators do not specifically address the following strategic objective:

- Increased foreign participation in enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities. (Rice 1999, 15)

Nor do they specifically address the following regional plan objectives:

- An increased capability to participate in the UN or regional peacekeeping operations;

- A reduction in US outlays for humanitarian relief in conflict-driven crisis situations in Africa. (Rice 1999, 205)

Arguably, effective key indicators measuring the accomplishment of specified objectives should be representative of all the stated measurable objectives of the initiative. Thus stated, the key indicators, in measuring the achievement of the objectives, should make direct reference to an increase in foreign participation in
the program, UN and regional cooperation, and reducing US outlays in crisis situations.

In comparison to the ACRI IWG draft MOSs, the congressional presentation appears to only glance at the issue of training standards. An increased capability of African troops to participate in UN or regional peacekeeping contingencies as well as demonstrating a wider range of peacekeeping skills implies training associated with a broad, internationally sanctioned peacekeeping doctrine. Based on that assumption, incorporating such criteria as the basis for ACRI training standards appears to be a logical measure in achieving desired interoperability and capabilities. ACRI training standards have been developed to equal established UN peacekeeping training standards (Fisher-Thompson 2000, 1).

Comparing Extracted Testimonial MOEs with ACRI IWG Draft MOSs

In reviewing testimonial documentation, the White House Fact Sheet: African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was released in April 1998, on the occasion of President Clinton's visit to Senegal. It provides a brief overview of the initiative and an update on training. Specific issues discussed include the invitation to non-governmental
and private organizations to participate in ACRI training, the periodic return of US military training teams for self-sustaining training development, complementary training efforts by other non-African states, and consultation with the UN and regional organizations regarding capacity enhancement. As this is a fact sheet, the issues are not discussed in the context of achieving established objectives but simply as recognition that activities are taking place. As such, it can be ascertained that the following implied objectives provide the background of this document:

1. Increased cooperation with and participation by nongovernmental and private organizations (NGOs and PVOs) in ACRI training and exercises (implied);

2. Provide continued post-training exercises to facilitate self-sustainment capabilities (implied);

3. Train to common, internationally recognized and accepted doctrine to promote interoperability on the regional and sub-regional levels (implied);

4. Coordination with other non-African states in building complementary capacity training programs (implied).
Another testimonial comes from the Bureau of African Affairs in their African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) paper released in March of 1998. This document provides a clear vision of the program, a basic description of African partners, and the actual size and number of troops to be trained over a specific time frame. It also identifies the inherent challenges stemming from Africans themselves intent on shaping their own future and coordination with regional organizations and international donor nations. The following specified and implied objectives are surmised:

1. Train and equip 10,000 to 12,000 African soldiers in companies and battalions to established and accepted peacekeeping and humanitarian relief doctrine and procedures (specified);

2. Train at the battalion level, focusing on communications interoperability (specified);

3. Coordination with other non-African states in building complementary capacity training programs (implied).

Table 3 compares extracted testimonial MOEs with ACRI IWG draft MOSs.
Table 3. Comparison of Extracted Testimonial MOEs and ACRI IWG Draft MOSs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extracted Testimonial MOEs</th>
<th>ACRI IWG Draft MOSs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troop Strength</td>
<td>10-12,000 troops</td>
<td>Approx. 12,000 troops/peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Standards</td>
<td>Self-sustainment capability; internationally accepted doctrine</td>
<td>ACRI program doctrine; self-sustaining (train-the-trainer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>Battalion level</td>
<td>At least three African BDE staffs—multinational command and control skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics and Equipment</td>
<td>Communications interoperability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries Participating</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrated willingness to participate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>NGO/PVO cooperation; Regional, sub-regional, and international coordination</td>
<td>Functioning relationship with principle African subregional organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both of these testimonial documents focus on increased cooperation and interoperability, not only with regional and international militaries but also with NGO/PVO participants. Self-sustainment capability and training to a common, internationally accepted doctrine is also emphasized. While communications interoperability does not
address actual equipment, to communicate during a peacekeeping operation with a myriad of military and civilian participants implies a commonality of equipment as well as procedures.

The one noticeable difference in comparing the extracted testimonial MOEs with ACRI IWG draft MOSs is regarding command and control. The testimonials identify command and control training at the battalion level whereas ACRI IWG objectives work towards training at the battalion level with follow-on training at the brigade staff level. This difference may be attributed to a reevaluation of this particular objective—the testimonials were released in 1998, the ACRI IWG draft MOSs was submitted in the fall of 1999.

**Comparing Extracted Symposium MOEs with ACRI IWG Draft MOSs**

Another significant document reviewed in chapter two that helps in laying the foundation in establishing clear measurable objectives is Ambassador Marshall McCallie’s “Emerald Express” Symposium presentation, *The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): America’s Engagement for Peace in Africa*. During this presentation, Ambassador McCallie reiterated the goal of ACRI as working in

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partnership with African countries towards an enhanced capacity to respond to peacekeeping challenges and humanitarian emergencies (1998, 2). From this document, the following objectives can be extracted:

1. Train and equip African companies and battalions to established and accepted international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief doctrine and procedures (specified);

2. Train at the battalion level, focusing on communications interoperability using standardized equipment (specified);

3. Increased cooperation with and participation by non-governmental and private organizations (NGOs and PVOs) in ACRI training and exercises (specified);

4. Increase interoperability with international, regional and sub-regional organizations (specified);

5. Train to standards as promulgated by the UN under Chapter VI mandates (specified);

6. Provide continued post-training and command post exercises focusing on train-the-trainer skills, the development of civil/military operations in humanitarian emergencies, logistics, and battalion and brigade leadership (specified);
7. Increase the number of African countries (stable and democratic) participating in ACRI (implied).

Table 4 compares extracted symposium MOEs with ACRI IWG draft MOSs.

Table 4. Comparison of Extracted Symposium MOEs and ACRI IWG Draft MOSs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
<th>Extracted Symposium MOEs</th>
<th>ACRI IWG Draft MOSs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase number of countries</td>
<td>Approx. 12,000 troops/peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Standards</th>
<th>Internationally accepted doctrine; Chapter VI standards;</th>
<th>ACRI program doctrine; self-sustaining (train-the-trainer)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command and Control</th>
<th>Battalion level</th>
<th>At least three African BDE staffs-multinational command and control skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics and Equipment</th>
<th>Communications interoperability and standardized equipment</th>
<th>ACRI IWG Draft MOSs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries Participating</th>
<th>Stable democratic countries</th>
<th>Demonstrated willingness to participate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interoperability</th>
<th>NGO/PVO; international, regional and sub-regional</th>
<th>Functioning relationship with principle African subregional organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
As the original coordinator of the ACRI IWG, it is reasonable that extracted MOEs presented by Ambassador McCallie at the Emerald Express Symposium should be reflected in the current ACRI IWG draft MOSs. Given the nature of his presentation, it is also reasonable that he would discuss, in more detail, the various aspects of the training being provided to African partners. However, in comparing the two sets of objectives, the detail reflected in the extracted MOEs was not necessarily provided in the ACRI IWG draft MOSs.

Similarly to the reviewed testimonials, there is a noted difference in regarding the level of command and control training. It may be assumed that this difference is attributable to a reevaluation of this particular objective--Ambassador McCallie made his presentation in April of 1998 and the ACRI IWG draft MOSs were produced in the fall of 1999.

Regarding logistics and equipment, Ambassador McCallie specifically addresses not only communications interoperability but also the provision of standardized communications equipment. The ACRI IWG draft MOSs address multi-national command and control skills but do not directly address communications or standardization of
equipment. Standardization of communications equipment has been noted as part of the ACRI training package (Troy Shirley, telephone interview, 30 November 1999) and, arguably, should be specifically addressed in the ACRI IWG draft MOSs.

Finally, Ambassador McCallie identifies participating ACRI partners as those from stable and democratic countries. The ACRI IWG draft MOSs describe participant countries as those who demonstrate a willingness to participate in complex peacekeeping operations or humanitarian crises. While defining democracy is beyond the scope of this thesis, based on current member participation it can be assumed that those countries having the willingness to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations have met the required standards of relatively stable and democratic countries.

Comparing Stated and Derived MOEs with ACRI IWG Draft MOSs

The review of strategic government and military documents and strategic testimonial identified specified and implied measurable objectives for ACRI. By definition, these extracted measurable objectives provide the logical basis for ACRI MOEs. The extracted MOEs from each document
have been individually compared to the ACRI IWG draft MOES. In order to conduct a final comparison, the extracted ACRI MOEs have been compiled and assimilated into the list below:

1. Increase the number of stable and democratic African states participating in ACRI, focusing on designated key states in each region;

2. Establish a cooperative relationship with existing regional and sub-regional organizations through planned exercises and inclusion in ACRI training;

3. Train and equip 10,000 to 12,000 African soldiers to common, internationally recognized and accepted peacekeeping and humanitarian relief doctrine to promote interoperability with international, regional and sub-regional organizations;

4. Reduce US outlays for humanitarian relief in conflict-driven crisis situations in Africa;

5. Increase cooperation with and participation by international, non-governmental and private organizations (NGOs and PVOs) in ACRI training and exercises;

6. Coordination with other non-African states in building complementary capacity training programs;
7. Train to standards as promulgated by the UN under Chapter VI mandates;

8. Provide continued post-training and command post exercises at the battalion level, focusing on train-the-trainer skills, development of civil/military operations in humanitarian emergencies, logistics, and battalion and brigade leadership, and communications interoperability using standardized equipment.

Table 5 compares stated and derived MOEs with ACRI IWG draft MOSs.

In analyzing the first ACRI IWG MOS, or objective, it is recognized as measurable and focuses on train-the-trainer skills, an objective notably repeated in multiple documents. It can be assumed (McCallie 1998, Fisher-Thompson 2000, Connell 2000, Nunn 1998) that the "standards of the ACRI program" represent coordinated and approved international doctrine regarding peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.
Table 5. Comparison of Stated and Derived MOEs and ACRI IWG Draft MOSs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stated and Derived MOEs</th>
<th>ACRI IWG Draft MOSs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troop Strength</td>
<td>10,000 to 12,000 troops; increase the number of countries</td>
<td>Approx. 12,000 troops/peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Standards</td>
<td>Internationally accepted doctrine; Chapter VI mandates; train-the-trainer skills</td>
<td>ACRI program doctrine; self-sustaining (train-the-trainer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>Battalion level</td>
<td>At least three African BDE staffs-multinational command and control skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics and Equipment</td>
<td>Standardized communications equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries Participating</td>
<td>Key states; stable and democratic</td>
<td>Demonstrated willingness to participate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Cooperative relationship with regional and sub-regional organizations; NGOs and PVOs; communications interoperability</td>
<td>Functioning relationship with principle African subregional organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second ACRI IWG MOS is also measurable, however, it discusses training of command and control skills at the brigade level instead of battalion level. This objective does support the Congressional Presentation's third key
indicator "development of command and control procedures and instructions for peacekeepers at the battalion and brigade levels" (Rice 1999, 206). However, to date, the Congressional Presentation is the only noted document to specify either command and control issues or brigade level training. Training beyond the battalion—at the brigade level—has not yet been approved by JCS (Cohen and Woods 1999, part 2/p.2). Of significance, regarding the issue of command and control, Ambassador McCallie specifically addressed this issue during the Emerald Express Symposium, stating:

ACRI is a training initiative. It is not an attempt to impose a command structure upon our African partners. While we are able to provide bilateral training—including command and staff training—and while we can work with African partners to support sub-regional and regional training exercises, we recognize that it is for Africans themselves to determine what the appropriate command and control structures will be. (McCallie 1998, 6)

It can be assumed this objective reflects goals for future training.

The third objective is measurable and reflects the increased emphasis at the strategic level of working through already established regional and sub-regional organizations. It directly reflects the NSS, NMS and
Congressional Presentation focus on regional and sub-regional organizations.

The fourth and final objective is measurable if it is assumed that a "demonstrated willingness" to participate in peacekeeping or humanitarian operations implies previous recognized participation versus only a stated willingness on the part of the designated partner. However, the applicability of this requirement as a measurable objective may be questionable. Specifically, does a partner's previous participation in such operations reflect the effectiveness of ACRI as a training initiative? Arguably, it does not and this point might be more appropriately stated as criterion for participation vice a measurable objective of the program.

The ACRI IWG draft MOSs (or objectives), as stated, do not appear to fully encompass the compilation of extracted MOEs derived from the reviewed strategic level documents and testimonials. Specifically, they do not address the issue of logistics and equipment. This issue is frequently discussed (Rice 2000, McCallie 1998, Nunn 1998, Cohen and Woods 1998, and Shirley 1999) when defining ACRI methodology in providing standardized communications equipment to promote regional and international
interoperability. It is unclear if this is meant to be implied when discussing multi-national command and control skills or the establishment of functioning relationships with sub-regional organizations.

Issues for Consideration

In reviewing selected editorial documentation on ACRI, there were a number of issues that frequently were in the forefront of discussion regarding the success of the initiative. These issues may require further consideration by program planners when analyzing the effectiveness of ACRI. These issues are, specifically:

1. Conducting training to Chapter VI (peacekeeping) vice Chapter VII (peace enforcement) levels;

2. Sovereignty, regarding the utilization of trained troops;

3. Defining “democracy”, a criteria for participation in the program;


Issue 1: With regards to Chapter VI training, initial discussions regarding the level of ACRI training acknowledged that many conflicts in Africa would appear to require robust intervention forces and Chapter VII training
would possibly be more appropriate level of focus. However, it was agreed by the United States to accept the advice of the UN military experts and concentrate initial training on Chapter VI peacekeeping (McCallie 1998, 4). By definition, peacekeeping implies that both sides in a conflict agree to have peacekeepers present in their sovereign territory and accept their presence as internationally accepted mediators to the conflict in a noncombat role. As argued by Cohen and Woods in their *Prospects for the African Crisis Response Initiative* report to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/African Affairs, the non-lethal nature of training is fundamentally flawed. Most conflict resolution in Africa, in attempts to provide regional stability, defy that definition and require some form of combat, or lethality to attempt to restore regional or sub-regional stability (1999, part 2/p.5). Under this premise, consideration should be made regarding a long-term training focus on standards and doctrine outlined under Chapter VII mandates vice Chapter VI mandates. Arguably, it maybe more beneficial to train peacekeeping troops under peace enforcement doctrine and standards, prepared for possible military enforcement of peace, then training for
traditional peacekeeping operations with potentially unprepared troops faced with an escalation in conflict.

Issue 2: The issue of sovereignty has arisen in the case of ACRI with respect to command structure and force utilization. As stated by Ambassador McCallie, while ACRI is a training initiative, a partnership for building a crisis response capacity in Africa, it is the Africans themselves who will ultimately decide upon their own command structure and how to utilize their troops.

They will decide when and how to deploy their peacekeeping troops. And they will decide whether to work through continental or sub-regional organizations to establish standby command structures. (p. 6)

Mark Malan, in his *Peacekeeping in Africa: Trends and Responses* (1998) identifies as the greatest flaw in the whole African capacity-building response, which would include ACRI, as the failure to establish a credible connection between capacity building and capacity utilization (1998, 11). His point is that trained troops can only respond to a crisis at the level to which they were trained and can only participate in those crises in which their governments choose to respond. Arguably, this is an issue of not only sovereignty but also long-term force structure development on a level ultimately to be decided by Africans themselves.
Issue 3: One of the criteria for participating in ACRI is for a potential partner to function under a civilian controlled, democratic government. This criteria is based on the United States' definition of democracy with, seemingly, little regard for indigenous political and cultural structures pertaining to government. As such, some major regional powers were precluded from participating in the initiative. As pointed out by Cohen and Woods, this situation deprived the program of participants with significant experience in command and control, logistics, transport and lift, and pre-positioning of equipment—all important training areas if the program is to move towards the brigade level (Cohen and Woods International, part 2/p.2). If the goal of achieving greater participation in ACRI by both designated key countries and a subregional power is to be met then restrictions imposed regarding the definition of democracy may need to be revisited.

Issue 4: The final issue for consideration is the recognition of ACRI as a long-term training concept. As the initiative currently stands, it is funded for five years and the IWG projects a program life of up to seven years in order to complete the three year training cycle of
each participating partner (Fisher 1999, Cohen and Woods 1999, part 2/p.5). Planning for long-term engagement will allow for greater flexibility in training cycles, provide greater opportunity for more countries that want to participate to do so, enhance US presence and credibility in the region, and provide the necessary continuity in training vital to any capacity building program. Long range issues such as “ownership,” management and funding of ACRI, as brought out by Cohen and Woods, are beyond the scope of this paper.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

Internal conflict and humanitarian emergencies are not new to the continent of Africa. Since the 1960's, a time when most African nations achieved independence from their respective colonial rulers, African states have had to work within borders and infrastructures imposed upon them regardless of indigenous political, economic, or cultural lifestyles. Faced with a lack of education and experience in the mechanics of these infrastructures, led (in many cases) by a colonial decreed elite unable to effectively manage their country's economy, and dealt one environmental catastrophe after another, the many instances of crises and emergency have been, arguably, predetermined.

Preventing or reacting to these crises has been an issue for many years. The UN has continuously conducted peacekeeping operations since its inception in 1948 and has been heavily involved in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1960s. However, the UN does not possess its own peacekeeping force and relies completely on volunteers from the international community. As the number and complexity of many of the peacekeeping and humanitarian relief
operations on the continent have increased, troops and resources available to react have diminished.

Recognizing the issues facing the UN, the international community and regional African organizations have been involved in various programs to help African countries overcome their hardships and facilitate an environment conducive to economic growth and political and military stability.

Since the end of the Cold War, many African leaders have publicly acknowledged the need for African states to help themselves in these matters of crisis. However, admittedly they cannot do it alone and must rely on the international community’s support in building an indigenous capacity to respond to the various calamities.

The US, in accepting its role as global leader, recognizes the importance of African stability in not only satisfying US political and economic interests but also in promoting international peace and security. The looming ethnic crisis in Burundi in 1996 was the catalyst for the United States to launch what has evolved into the African Crisis Response Initiative.

Coming on the heels of the end of the Cold War and following a significant French withdrawal from the region,
many Africans perceived ACRI as a signal of an impending US withdrawal as well. However, the US did not intend to withdraw from Africa, but instead to build a capacity for self-reliance in responding to crises and establish a working relationship with African partners to promote an environment conducive to economic growth and stability.

ACRI is just one of many international programs in place to support capacity building efforts and it must be viewed in that context.

It is important to place the African Crisis Response Initiative in the context of a broader vision of multinational peacekeeping training, which extends far beyond the capabilities of any one nation or group of nations. (McCallie, p.2)

Conclusions

This thesis has established criteria for evaluating ACRI by determining if current MOEs satisfy the goals of the program and justifies its continuation. In so doing, current government and military documents were reviewed to determine where the initiative fits into the strategic strategies of the United States, the goals of the initiative, and current measurable objectives on the strategic level. Current literature was reviewed to provide background to the evolution of the initiative and the environment in Africa to which it evolved.

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By extracting specified and implied measurable objectives from strategic level government documents and testimonials a comparative analysis was made with those already established measures as well as those in draft from the ACRI IWG.

Based on the analysis of this thesis, it is determined that, within the context and spirit of the vision for African peacekeeping capability, ACRI is a worthwhile military engagement tool and an important part of the international community’s efforts to enhance Africa’s capability to respond to internal crises and humanitarian emergencies. However, the analysis did reveal the opportunity for potential revision regarding effective and measurable objectives.

Recommendations

The ACRI IWG measurable objectives, or MOE/measures of success (semantics), should capture, at the strategic level, the essence of the NSS, NMS, and Congressional Presentation goals for Africa. They should provide the single, definitive programmatic list of measurable objectives from which the initiative’s executive agent, EUCOM, can derive nested operational and tactical
objectives. The following MOEs are suggested for the next iteration of ACRI:

1. Increase the number of African partners (participation criteria defined) in ACRI, ensuring at least 10,000 to 12,000 African soldiers are trained and equipped to common, internationally recognized and accepted peacekeeping and humanitarian relief doctrine;

2. Provide continued post-training and command post exercises at the brigade level. Focus on train-the-trainer skills, development of civil/military operations in humanitarian emergencies, logistics, battalion and brigade leadership, communications interoperability with standardized equipment, and multinational command and control skills;

3. Establish a cooperative relationship with existing regional and subregional organizations and nongovernmental and private organizations (NGOs and PVOs) through planned exercises and inclusion in ACRI training;

4. Continued coordination with other non-African states in building complementary capacity training programs;
5. Train to doctrine and standards as promulgated by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) under Chapter VII mandates;

6. Reduce US outlays for humanitarian relief in conflict-driven crisis situations in Africa;

Establishing the desired crisis response capacity within Africa is a long-term goal and must be accepted as such. In the interim, the United States and the international community must remain engaged in the political and economic evolutions of sub-Saharan Africa in order to promote growth and development and enhance stability and security.

**Topics for Further Studies**

1. Follow-on research to determine if the measures of effectiveness regarding ACRI have been met.

2. Additional research into establishing MOE for government programs. Current MOE are inconsistent and vary greatly in scope and detail.

3. The viability of the notion that sub-regional organizations promote stability.
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