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Space and Missile Defense Challenges:
National Missile Defense—
Your Army Protecting Our Homeland
(First in a series of three Background Briefs based on information obtained from U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command)

We are affirming that there is a threat, and the threat is growing, and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not only to our troops overseas but also to Americans here at home. . . . On August 31st, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong I missile. . . . The Taepo Dong I test was another strong indicator that the United States in fact will face a rogue nation missile threat to our homeland against which we will have to protect the American people.

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, 20 January 1999

Next summer, our nation's leadership will make a critical defense decision that will affect our defense posture well into the next millennium. After fifty years of research and development of ballistic missiles and missile defense systems, and many aborted attempts to field systems designed to provide a limited missile defense for the homeland, our nation’s leadership will decide whether or not to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system to meet the growing threat to the homeland from ballistic missile attack. If the President decides to deploy, a limited NMD system with ground-based elements manned by the Army could be operational in 2005.

A historical perspective. The defense of the United States is and always has been a soldier's most sacred responsibility. From the beginning, in 1775, the U.S. Army has played a pivotal role in the defense of the homeland. In 1794 the U.S. Congress charged the Army to build and staff coastal defense forts. As the threat changed from big-gunned ships to bomb-laden aircraft, the Army changed the focus of its defense from coastal forts to antiaircraft installations around American cities. In World War II, advances in missile technology allowed the threat to surpass existing defensive capabilities.

The process to develop a defense against missiles began in February 1946, when the Army Air Force awarded two contracts for the purpose of developing the characteristics for antimissile systems. In November 1956, following a lengthy debate between the Army and Air Force—both conducting antiballistic missile (ABM) research and development programs—Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson issued a memorandum assigning the Army responsibility for the development, procurement and manning of land-based surface-to-air missile systems for point defense.

In 1957, the development of a strategic defense system took on a new sense of urgency when the Soviet Union launched SPUTNIK I. In 1965, the People's Republic of China exploded their first nuclear
device and announced that they were experimenting with missile technology. Strategists then began to contemplate limited strikes by nations other than the Soviet Union.

In September 1967, the administration decided to deploy an ABM system—Sentinel. This decision called for the defense of urban and industrial targets, with the expansion capability to defend selected American intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) bases. No sooner was the Sentinel program underway than a series of events caused changes to the program. Rising public opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War and the military in general, and the realization by the people who lived in the cities where Sentinel sites were to be built that the missiles contained nuclear warheads, caused a change in the deployment of this ABM system. In February 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird ordered all work on the Sentinel base construction to cease.

In March 1969, President Richard Nixon decided to deploy only ABM defenses of ICBM sites. This deployment, called Safeguard, called for 12 sites, with construction to begin immediately at two sites—Grand Forks, North Dakota, and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. Follow-on construction would take place at the other 10 sites, based upon an annual threat evaluation. When completed, Safeguard would provide limited protection against a small attack by the People’s Republic of China or an accidental launch by anyone else.

In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting each nation to two ABM sites—one at a location selected by the signatory and one at each National Command Center (Washington, D.C. and Moscow, respectively). In 1974 a protocol was added to the treaty limiting each side to only one ABM site.

With the arms limitation agreement in effect, Congress determined that, once completed, the continued operation of Safeguard was not justified. The Safeguard system attained full operational capability on 28 September 1975. On 10 February 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to congressional direction, ordered the termination of the Safeguard mission. Only the early warning radars were exempted from this order. They were transferred to the Air Force as part of the Defense Early Warning System (DEWS).

Despite reduced funding levels for ABM research through 1984, research and testing did continue and on 10 June 1984, as part of the Homing Overlay Experiment, the Army proved that an exoatmospheric intercept of an ICBM mock reentry vehicle with a nonnuclear warhead was possible.

A new era in ABM defense began on 23 March 1983 when President Ronald Reagan announced his concept for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). His goal was to create a nationwide defense shield against ballistic missiles that would make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. On 25 March 1985, President Reagan issued National Security Directive 85, which implemented his plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Funding for research, development and testing of missile defenses increased significantly.

Over the next 10 years the world saw many changes. The Berlin Wall fell, resulting in a united Germany. The Soviet Union disintegrated into its component parts, and some former Soviet Bloc countries elected non-Communist leaders and joined NATO. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated to potential adversaries the futility of attacking U.S. forces head on. However, it also provided a vivid reminder of the destructive capabilities of ballistic missiles—with the largest loss of American lives coming when one ballistic missile penetrated our limited theater missile defenses and killed 28 American soldiers. Ballistic missile development efforts increased significantly in many countries considered hostile to the United States and our allies. The proliferation of missile technology to nations not wealthy enough to have their own indigenous development infrastructure also increased.
The Rumsfeld Report and North Korea's launching of a three-stage Taepo Dong missile this year heated up the debate over the missile threat to the United States. Knowledgeable people were quick to recognize the nation's vulnerability, and the unpredictability of the threat. On 22 July 1999, the National Missile Defense Act for 1999 was signed into law. This act states that:

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.

The leading edge of missile defense technology. Today, over 53 years after the United States began its efforts to develop defenses against missiles, the Army once again stands ready to field and operate a system to defend the United States. As a full partner with the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) and its NMD Joint Program Office (NMD JPO), the Army is conducting and participating in materiel development activities such as the successful integrated flight test conducted on 2 October 1999. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) have established a TRADOC System Manager (TSM) for NMD. This office functions as the Army user representative for NMD. The Army is also continuing to update the NMD force design; and refining the operational concepts, training plans and logistics support plans for NMD as the system concepts and specifications mature. In conjunction with BMDO and NMD JPO, the Army is also providing for the more distant NMD future by laying the groundwork required to move toward a robust NMD capability—should our nation chart that course. This effort has two major aspects:

- Basic and applied research needed to ensure we outpace the threat.
- Development of progressive operational ideas, including lessons learned from theater missile defense and applied to the NMD problem.

Collectively, these efforts and the Army's contributions to the ongoing joint NMD deployment readiness program form the main thrust in the Army's implementation of its responsibilities as the nation's lead service for defense of the United States against missile attack.

The NMD deployment readiness program is, to a large extent, a legacy of the space and missile defense research conducted by the Army in the past. Today, working in cooperation with BMDO and the other services, the Army is conducting research across a broad front to establish the technology base required for rapid solution development and insertion should the future missile threat warrant it.

Recognizing that countermeasures are inherent in the ballistic missile defense problem, the Army supports several efforts to prepare for and counter the threat's employment of penetration aids such as decoys. The Advanced Radar Technology program includes research in missile signatures, assesses our system's shortcomings, and develops solutions to prevent adversaries from exploiting those vulnerabilities.

Another effort, the Optical Signatures Code program, provides a tool to predict infrared signatures of the NMD threat complex, to include targets and decoys in all phases of their trajectory. This and other advanced technologies will enable discrimination between the warhead and nonlethal components. The miniature interceptor program, which has potential to counter the early release of submunitions, is another technology development program designed to counter future threat capabilities, keeping us ahead of the threat.
Analyzing the NMD problem through the theater missile defense (TMD) lens. Clearly, active defense (i.e., radars, interceptors and battle management systems) will remain the focal point of the Army’s contributions to national missile defense. Army assets, such as the high-power signature radars at the Army’s Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands, monitor tests and collect data to increase our understanding of threat missiles. If detected early, a limited number of ICBMs and their warhead-bearing reentry vehicles can be tracked, engaged and destroyed in flight. The Army, however, is not ruling out other techniques for suppressing, neutralizing or minimizing the effects of missile attack against the United States. For example, in some geographical areas, forward-based capabilities can contribute to the national effort to detect and assess indicators of preparations for ICBM launch. In some instances, preemptive (or reactive) strikes may preclude an adversary from launching ICBMs.

The Army will also contribute to missile attack assessment and dissemination of warning with its Mobile Multi-Mission Processor capabilities, several C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities, and the Army satellite communications and information distribution capabilities. Moreover, the Army is exploring the role of NMD within the broader mission area now termed homeland defense, which, in many aspects, resembles TMD passive defense operations. In short, the Army has become the nation’s preeminent service for integrated missile defense operations and intends to apply its TMD experiences to NMD, when the comparison is appropriate.

The Army and other services are also anticipating an expansion of the designated NMD threat set. In general, threat estimates urge vigilance with respect to the deployment of land attack cruise missiles and forward-based ballistic missiles. These may be delivered from a variety of launch platforms to include launchers affixed to commercial ships, submarines and aircraft, or mobile ground-based launchers operated in remote regions in the Western Hemisphere. Recognizing the likelihood of such threats in the future, the Army is developing an overarching operational concept for its role in a robust national missile defense. While many solutions to such threats may be cost-prohibitive today, advances in information technology, sensors and weapon systems may enable fully integrated space, terrestrial and aerial capabilities to counter the full spectrum of missiles in a way that is affordable. The concept development process is defining the azimuth for subsequent analysis and experimentation, which will begin to outline solutions to the expanded NMD threat.

Tomorrow’s NMD is on the drawing board today. Just as today’s NMD program is a legacy of the research conducted by the Army in the past, experiments being conducted today in directed energy, advanced radars, miniature interceptors and advanced space-based sensors will lead to enhanced future NMD systems. The course to a robust NMD has many tributaries. The rapid growth of commercial space capabilities and advances in information technologies are accelerating some aspects of missile defense, but there is much to be done and competition for funding will remain keen. Nevertheless, the Army space and missile defense community is well aware of two facts: The threat will change; and outpacing it is best accomplished by the interaction of continuing research to explore the limits of technology and a progressive dialogue on operational concepts. Together, they lay out the approach to the Army’s future NMD effort.
Roots of the Insurgency in Kosovo

Introduction

For Serbs and Albanians alike, Kosovo has deep historical significance. For the Serbs, Kosovo holds the most important treasures of Serbia’s medieval religious and political heritage. The defeat of the Serbs by the Ottomans at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 marked the end of an independent Serbian kingdom and the beginning of four centuries of Ottoman rule, with subsequent privation of Serbians under Islamic rule and the exodus of Serbians from Kosovo. All of these events, within the overarching clash between Christianity and Islam, became powerful themes in Serbian history and sustained a potent ideology to justify Serbian control over Kosovo as a central aspect of Serbian national identity.

As Serbs were displaced under Ottoman rule, Kosovo’s population became predominantly Albanian. Fighting against foreign intrusion in Albanian life, the Albanians of Kosovo sought to preserve their traditional clan and family organizations and customs. Since the late 19th century, Albanians in Kosovo have sought self-administration, full autonomy and independence, first from Ottoman rule and later from resurgent Serbian dominance. Many of the salient political and military events related to Albania’s struggle for national independence occurred in Kosovo, whose history therefore has a particular importance for all Albanians. Kosovo’s military-political history and its most recent crisis underscore the tenacious hold of the past on Serbia and Kosovo’s Albanians. This brief history of Kosovo highlights recurring themes in the conflict between Serbs and Albanians since the nineteenth century that contribute to the dynamics of the present insurgency in Kosovo.

The Late 19th Century Background

In the late 1870s, Albanians petitioned Ottoman leaders to unite the Albanian provinces, among them Kosovo, into a single administrative unit and to enact reforms such as sanctioning Albanian-language schools and limiting military service by Albanians to Albanian territory. At Prizren, Kosovo, in 1877, several Albanian clan chiefs met and formed a military-defensive alliance, the League of Prizren. The gathering of interclan councils to present a united Albanian front tapped a deep vein in Albanian history. Although the league expressed its fealty to the Ottoman sultan, its purpose was to prevent Albanian territory from being occupied by foreign troops and to exact reforms that would enhance local autonomy. The Ottoman government’s cooperation with the league was short-lived. In 1878 a high-ranking Ottoman official was assassinated while supervising the work of the joint Ottoman-Montenegrin Boundary Commission, which planned to cede certain
Albanian-inhabited lands in Kosovo to Montenegro. The League of Prizren then heightened its demands to full political autonomy, as opposed to merely self-administration within the Ottoman empire. The league also functioned as the de facto government of Kosovo until Ottoman military forces, supported by artillery, captured key cities in Kosovo and crushed the league in 1881.

For the next three decades, Albanian resistance in Kosovo was chronic, mostly in the form of localized revolts in opposition to Ottoman taxation and conscription or to disarmament. These uprisings were suppressed by the Ottoman army. A Kosovo-wide insurgency like the one the League of Prizren had sponsored was not feasible. Relations between Muslim and Christian inhabitants deteriorated in Kosovo after Serbia became an independent country in 1878. Following a pattern that would recur throughout the next century, Albanians in Serbian lands were expelled as a matter of Serbian state policy to create an ethnically "clean" territory. Approximately 60,000 to 70,000 Albanian refugees entered Kosovo from Serbia. Thousands of Serbs left Kosovo for a variety of reasons to live elsewhere, although there was no Ottoman policy to uproot them.

Kosovo's unsettled conditions prompted Europe's Great Powers to press for Ottoman reforms that would pacify the region. Kosovo's Albanians, however, resented plans to disarm them or to create a foreign-supervised gendarmerie, which they viewed as an attempt to increase foreign and Christian influence among Albanian inhabitants. The Albanian aversion to foreign encroachment struck a sympathetic chord with reform-minded elements in the Ottoman government, the "Young Turks." Their representation was especially strong among officers of the Third Army Corps stationed in Macedonia. In July 1908, when the Young Turks of that unit mutinied, they appealed to Kosovo's Albanians to mobilize. The appeal fell on fertile ground. Kosovo's Albanians were already in ferment over Russian interference in Kosovo, an upsurge of attacks against Albanians by Serbian armed bands, and an Austrian-Hungarian railway project through Kosovo, which they misconstrued as a military expedition. In return for the support of Kosovo's Albanians, the Young Turks promised to annul unpopular reforms and to restore traditional rights and old privileges that the Albanian chiefs had earlier enjoyed under Ottoman rule. Except for their mutual antipathy toward foreign intervention, the interests of the Young Turks and the Albanians were incompatible. The Albanians looked back to the restoration of a traditional, premodern polity that preserved familial and clan institutions suitable for a rural society; the Young Turks sought to drag the Ottoman Empire toward modernity, to create a centralized and more efficient state.

Early 20th Century and World War I

By late April 1909, after the Ottoman Sultan was deposed, Albanians in Kosovo were in revolt over higher taxes imposed by the Young Turks. Turkish military reinforcements, including field artillery and machine guns, were sent to Kosovo to quell the rebels but only intensified the Albanian resistance. In 1910, for the first time since 1881, the Albanian chiefs mounted a large-scale coordinated uprising in Kosovo and called for greater autonomy. The revolt was quashed by the dispatch of Turkish military reinforcements that occupied most of the key towns in Kosovo and northern Albania. The Turks meted out harsh punishment to the Albanian leaders, and many Albanians were press-ganged into the army. The Albanians were particularly embittered by the confiscation of their weapons. The disarmament program collected nearly 148,000 guns.

In 1912, Kosovo's Albanians revolted again in what would be the culmination of all the various struggles for Albanian national recognition since 1878. Albanian rebels, their ranks having grown to 45,000 men, gained control of key towns in Kosovo. The insurgents' numerical strength precluded a military solution. Turkish negotiators, led by the acting governor of Kosovo, negotiated an end to the conflict. The Albanians demanded treatment of all Albanian lands as a unit and concessions
regarding Albanian cultural and political institutions. In August 1912, the Turkish negotiators agreed to create an Albanian quasi-state within Turkish-controlled territory in the Balkans.

The success of the Albanian revolt of 1912 convinced other Balkan states that the time was propitious for an anti-Turkish war. In the ensuing Turkish-Balkan War, an alliance of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece defeated the Turkish army, driving Turkey from most of its European possessions. About 76,000 Serbian forces entered Kosovo and defeated a disorganized force of 16,000 Turks. As they advanced through Kosovo, Serbians destroyed Albanian villages. Albanian rebels, facing superior numbers and firepower, were unable to halt the Serbians, whose principal war aim was to gain an outlet to the sea in northern Albania. Serbia viewed the subjugation of Kosovo in October 1912 as the fulfillment of a historic crusade. Serbian atrocities against Albanians, especially those committed by paramilitary bands called “chetniks,” suggested to some contemporary Western observers that Serbia was bent on a systematic extermination of Kosovo’s Muslim population to transform the ethnic character of Kosovo.

The fate of Kosovo became increasingly entangled in the geopolitical calculus of Europe’s Great Powers. In the wake of the Turkish-Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the major European powers denied Serbia access to an Albanian outlet to the sea but sanctioned an autonomous Albania, whose boundaries had yet to be determined. Austria-Hungary sought to include portions of Kosovo in any Albanian entity, but Russia, Serbia’s patron, pressured the Great Powers to cede Kosovo to Serbia. In Kosovo, Serbia imposed military rule and subjected Albanians to curfews and deportation. Serbians also replaced Albanians in local administrations and again forced Kosovo’s Albanians to disarm. Albanian armed resistance, however, prompted Serbian forces to thrust deep into Albania before they were obliged to withdraw by an Austrian-Hungarian ultimatum. World War I, which erupted on 28 July 1914 when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, forestalled the final determination of Albania’s boundaries. Kosovo was occupied in part by forces of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and finally France and Italy. Serbian forces followed quickly on the heels of the Franco-Italian forces in 1918 to bring Kosovo once again under Serbian rule.

The Interwar Years and World War II

When the Yugoslav state was proclaimed on 1 December 1918, Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, one of the members of the Yugoslav federation. Kosovo’s majority Albanian population, however, did not enjoy all the rights of Yugoslav citizens with regard to the protection of national minorities. Albanian-language schools and newspapers were suppressed. Yugoslavia held that the Albanians were not a national minority but Albanian-speaking Serbs, an ethnographic theory once fashionable among Serbian intellectuals in the late 19th century. Yugoslavia also began colonizing Slavs in Albanian-inhabited areas, often confiscating land from Albanian villagers. The colonization program’s aim was to encourage Albanian emigration from Kosovo.

During 1918 and 1919, Kosovo’s Albanians renewed armed resistance in the face of Yugoslavia’s anti-Albanian policies. Approximately 10,000 Albanian insurgents were involved in local revolts in many areas of Kosovo, but they were no match against the better-armed Yugoslav army. Albanian Kosovars, meanwhile, formed a Committee for the National Defense of Kosovo. The committee petitioned the United States at the Paris Peace Conference to end the Yugoslav killing of Albanians in Kosovo and to include Kosovo in a new Albanian state, whose boundaries were then being determined. The Kosovo Albanians’ effort to “internationalize” their plight was to no avail, and local revolts by Albanians continued throughout Kosovo in 1920. The superior Yugoslav army defeated a large rebel force in north-central Kosovo in late 1920. In the wake of this military success, Yugoslavia in early 1921 launched an ill-conceived pacification effort that
offered amnesty to Albanian rebels and army deserters. The poor Albanian response to this offer and continued Albanian resistance spurred Yugoslavia to intern the wives and families of rebel chiefs in central Serbia, a measure that only fortified the insurgency. Belgrade also revived colonization efforts along the Kosovo-Albania border. As in the past, colonization entailed the dispossession of Albanian homesteads. Such efforts would continue until the onset of World War II.

Yugoslav military commanders increasingly believed that suppressing the revolt in Kosovo required controlling rebel safe havens in Albania. After Yugoslavia conducted punitive crossborder raids into northeastern Albania, the Allied powers (excluding the United States), still meeting in postwar conferences in Paris, agreed to settle quickly the Yugoslav-Albanian border question. As part of the settlement, Belgrade created a demilitarized zone along portions of the new Kosovo-Albanian border. The zone had mixed results. It became a refuge for some rebels, causing Belgrade to attack Albanian bases within the zone in 1922. The zone also isolated some rebels, cutting them off from support elsewhere. More decisive in undermining rebel support, however, was a political sea change in Albania in late 1921 that brought to power a new Albanian regime. Fearing that the rebels’ use of Albania as a base of support would give Yugoslavia an excuse to attack Albania, the new regime sought to cooperate with Yugoslavia to subdue the Kosovo Albanian rebels. Joint Yugoslav-Albanian patrols were conducted for a time within the demilitarized zone. Albania’s enmity toward the Kosovo Albanians prevailed throughout the 1920s and most of the 1930s. As Albania and fascist Italy grew closer in the 1930s, Albanian leaders attuned their foreign policy to Italy’s. Under Mussolini, Italy sought to destabilize Yugoslavia and pressured Albania to revive irredentist claims on Kosovo. On 7 April 1939, Italy invaded Albania and subsequently installed a puppet fascist government.

In early April 1941, Yugoslavia’s Kosovo Division, recently mobilized but containing none of Kosovo’s Albanians, advanced into Albania to attack Italian forces. On 7 April, German forces entered Kosovo; by 9 April they were on the outskirts of Prizren, in southern Kosovo. Yugoslav forces quickly withdrew from Albania in a belated effort to defend Kosovo. The Italians, close on their heels, entered Prizren on 14 April. Kosovo had been conquered by the Axis powers in one week. Yugoslavia signed an unconditional surrender on 17 April. As in World War I, Kosovo was occupied by several armies. Germany, Bulgaria, and Italy each occupied portions of the province. Albania, governed by Italy, received the lion’s share of Kosovo in order to prevent Albanian irredentism from becoming a driving force of anti-German resistance. The area of Kosovo ceded to Albania was governed by a civil administration rather than by military government, as elsewhere in the province. Kosovo’s Albanians were allowed to restore Albanian-language schools and form a council, composed of elders and hereditary local clan leaders, that set rules based on Islamic law. Even after Italy capitulated, German policy was to court the sympathy of Kosovo’s Albanian population by exploiting the rhetoric of Albanian nationalism and Albanian independence.

Tensions between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo persisted throughout World War II. Albanian rebels attacked Serb settlements in reprisal for Yugoslav Army depredations against Albanian villages before the surrender. Groups such as the Second League of Prizren, established in 1941, helped defend Albanian villages in Kosovo against chetnik raids. Despite German protests, Albanians expelled Serb colonists to regain confiscated lands. Both Germany and Italy, in addition, were unsuccessful in enlisting Albanians in Kosovo to form local police or military units to quell local insurgents. With few exceptions, Kosovo’s Albanians were not collaborators. When collaboration did occur, it generally was not ideologically driven but represented simply a desire by Albanians to seize the opportunity offered by Yugoslavia’s collapse to reverse Yugoslav Slavicizing policies of the past two decades. Likewise, most Albanians in Kosovo felt no loyalty
to the previous Yugoslav regime and viewed the Axis conquest, at least potentially, as a kind of liberation. Unlike in other areas of occupied Yugoslavia, resistance movements in Kosovo led by either chetniks or the Communists were weak, both being almost exclusively Slav-based movements. Despite a quickening of Albanian partisan activity toward the end of World War II, primarily under British auspices, the number of actions in Kosovo was small. Albanians in Kosovo during World War II were motivated primarily by the transcendent issue of Albanian-Serb relations rather than by any political philosophy or feelings toward the occupying powers.

**Kosovo in Post-World War II Yugoslavia**

Following World War II, a Communist regime was installed in Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito. The regime's immediate postwar strategy toward the Albanians of Kosovo was twofold: to make some slight concessions toward Albanian nationalism and to suppress the rise of any non-Communist resistance movement. In September 1945, the People's Assembly of Serbia established Kosovo as an autonomous region and declared it a constituent part of Serbia. Communist rule in Kosovo was generally harsh and dominated by Serbs in the party and Yugoslav security apparatus. Despite the second-class status of Kosovo's Albanians, instances of dissidence and insurgency among them were rare immediately after the war. Yugoslavia also enjoyed amicable relations with Albania until 1948, facilitating the influx of Albanians into Kosovo. Yugoslav attitudes toward Kosovo's Albanians hardened more after Enver Hoxha, the Communist leader of Albania, became a vociferous critic of Tito. The split between Albania and Yugoslavia and the latter's ejection from the Cominform (the association of European Communist parties) in June 1948 stemmed in part from Tito's opposition to Moscow's desire for Yugoslav-Albanian unification as the best way to solve the Kosovo problem.

Yugoslavia's split with Moscow had damaging consequences for Kosovo. Tito was apprehensive regarding the subversive potential of Kosovo's Albanians. Belgrade mounted periodic searches for weapons among Kosovo Albanians and detained and tried many Albanians as suspected agents. A frequent Yugoslav tactic was to cordon off entire Albanian villages to search homes, interrogate menfolk, confiscate weapons, and arrest suspected dissidents. The first major postwar Albanian dissident movement in Kosovo, the Revolutionary Movement for the Unification of the Albanians, was not organized until the early 1960s. It was quickly suppressed, with the arrest of its leaders and many of its 300 members. A Yugoslav treaty with Turkey in the 1950s, moreover, paved the way for extensive immigration of Yugoslav "Turks" (a euphemism for non-Serbs, Muslims and Albanians) and contributed to the movement of approximately 100,000 Kosovo Muslims, mostly Albanians, to Turkey between 1953 and 1966. These measures added to the ethnic polarization in the province.

While Yugoslavia's highly effective security measures dampened Kosovo Albanian dissidence, Kosovo's constitutional status within the Yugoslav federation was eroded and made a function of internal arrangements of the Serbian Republic. This constitutional change reflected Tito's policy of creating a homogeneous "Yugoslavism" that would treat Serbia as a single "national" unit. In a major policy shift in 1966, Tito adopted the principle of decentralization. Kosovo was reestablished as a legal entity at the federal level, with the potential for exercising the powers of a republic. From 1966 on, the political ambitions of Kosovo's Albanians would be directed at what seemed the natural next step—a Kosovo Republic. Tito made several major concession in this direction. Kosovo's Albanians were permitted to fly, as their own national emblem, the Albanian flag, a measure that intensified Serb fears of the growth of separatism or irredentism. Tito also expanded Albanian-language schools, liberalized commercial contacts with Albania, and opened
the Communist Party ranks to Albanians, increasing their representation in local administrative positions.

At least as a matter of constitutional theory, 1974 was the zenith of Kosovo’s autonomous status. In the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, which remained in effect until the final collapse of the Yugoslav Federation, Kosovo gained equal status in most ways with Yugoslavia’s six republics, with its own direct representation in the main federal Yugoslav governing bodies. Tito downplayed the main Serbian objection to a Kosovo Republic, namely that nationalities are not equal to nations and thus cannot hold sovereign rights. Serb resentment grew over Kosovo’s autonomy and the expanding Albanian population in Kosovo. Union with Albania, given that country’s economic backwardness and its suppression of religion, appealed only to a small minority of Kosovo’s Albanians. Also exacerbating Serb discontent was the continued emigration of Serbs from Kosovo. Although some Serbs fled because of threats from local Albanians, most left for economic reasons, as did thousands of Albanians who departed Kosovo to reside in other European countries. The steady rise in the Albanian population in Kosovo during the last several decades reflects their high birthrate (the highest in Europe) and the steep decline in the Serb birthrate, attributable in part to the high incidence of abortion among urban Serbs. By the 1990s, nearly 90 percent of Kosovo’s population was Albanian.

On 11 March 1981, Albanian students at the University of Pristina began rioting over poor living conditions. The disturbances soon spread among Albanians in other cities in Kosovo. As the demonstrations grew in number and size, the demonstrators demanded greater autonomy for Kosovo and even unification with Albania. Belgrade reacted with military force and declared a state of emergency. More than 2,000 Kosovar Albanians were arrested, and security measures, some of which had been relaxed since 1974, were tightened. Serbs tended to view Albanian appeals for greater autonomy as synonymous with calls for unification with Albania. The most damaging effect of the 1981 crisis was the unleashing on both sides of emotionally charged nationalistic claims that appealed to ethnic chauvinism.

When Serb protests erupted in the town of Kosovo Polje in April 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, the deputy to the Serbian Party president, spoke passionately of the sacred rights of Serbs. His demagogic speech was the catalyst that transformed him into a national political leader and began the dismantling of the autonomy that Kosovo’s Albanians had gained under Tito. In 1989 the Serbian constitution was amended to give Serbia control over Kosovo’s police, courts and civil defense and greater supervision over social and economic matters, thus reducing Kosovo’s autonomy to a mere token. As demonstrations and strikes increased in Kosovo and harsh security measures were put in force, a series of new measures was decreed by the Serbian Assembly in March 1990 to shore up the position of Serbs in Kosovo. These measures provided economic inducements for Serb settlement in Kosovo, concentrated economic investment in Serb-majority areas, encouraged Albanians to leave Kosovo to work in other parts of Yugoslavia, introduced family planning among Albanians to lower their birthrate, and annulled, retrospectively, sales of property to Albanians by departing Serbs. Albanians already were forbidden to buy or sell property without special permission. In June 1990, several Albanian cultural organs were discontinued and thousands of Albanian state employees were dismissed. A special law on labor relations made possible the expulsion of 80,000 Albanians for their jobs. Finally, in the summer of 1990, in reaction to a resolution passed by nearly all the Albanian representatives to the Kosovo assembly that declared Kosovo an equal and independent entity in the Yugoslav federation, Serbian authorities dissolved both the Kosovo assembly and government. In reaction, the Albanian legislators met in secret in September 1990, proclaimed a Republic of Kosovo, and established a shadow government.
led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, an Albanian intellectual. The political movement that Rugova headed was the Democratic League of Kosovo, the word “League” having been deliberately chosen to link the nascent movement with the historic League of Prizren.

Rugova’s aims were threefold: to prevent violence to preclude Serbian countermeasures; to internationalize the Kosovo problem through the involvement of international organizations such as the United Nations; and to deny the legitimacy of Serbian rule by boycotting elections and censuses and creating a parallel state apparatus. He adhered to this course despite Serbian suppression of nearly every aspect of Albanian life in Kosovo and widespread human rights violations against Kosovo’s Albanians. Serbia’s war of territorial expansion against Bosnia in April 1992 caused the position of Albanians in Kosovo to worsen. To the drumbeat of Serbian nationalism that called for restoration of Greater Serbia and ethnic purity, Serbia raised the specter of a fundamentalist Islamic threat, even though Islamic fundamentalism played only a slight role among Kosovo’s Albanians. Economic sanctions on Serbia by the Western powers adversely affected the already depressed economic conditions throughout Serbia, including Kosovo. In addition, Milosevic renewed programs of Serb colonization, even though obtaining an overall ethnic balance in Kosovo remained as illusory as ever.

Meanwhile Rugova’s policies came under attack by other Albanians in Kosovo. Some Albanian activists argued that his absolute refusal to negotiate with Belgrade except in an international forum was unrealistic. Others believed Rugova should try to regain some degree of autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia, by armed action if necessary. Prospects of unification with Albania, always an ambivalent goal, dimmed after the political collapse of Albania in 1997. Impatience with Rugova’s political agenda led to more frequent direct action and terrorism by Albanians in Kosovo against Serb police and prominent personalities. In the summer of 1997, an organization known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) took responsibility for many of the attacks. Since 1997, the militant KLA has become the advocate of autonomy, independence and, to some degree, union with Albania for Kosovo’s Albanians. The KLA has grown rapidly, attracting thousands of new members, enlarging its area of control in Kosovo, and expanding its base of support in northern Albania. Serbian military, militia and police units have mounted counterinsurgency operations to close Kosovo’s borders with Albania, to engage the Kosovo Albanian insurgents within Kosovo, and to pacify Albanian settlements in the region. In this struggle, each side has appealed to historical claims to the land. The insurgents, while seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the dominant political power, as they had sought to do in many past revolts and rebellions, couched their political agenda in terms of freedom to live by their own traditions and not to be interfered with in areas historically occupied by Albanians. Serbia, despite its less than lustrous record of accommodation with Kosovo’s Albanians, has historical and constitutional claims to Kosovo.

Conclusion

Surveys of ethnic conflicts suggest a limited number of possible solutions—suppression or defeat of the insurgents or of the dominant power; de facto partition; autonomy; or independence. The successful resolution of ethnic conflict often has required the separation of warring parties, occasionally by international intervention, to create conditions for a political accommodation. The most successful political solutions to ethnic conflict have allowed a regional minority to control its destiny through regional autonomy for the areas where it forms a majority of the population.