OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AT THE UNIFIED COMMANDS: THE CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST.

A MONOGRAPH

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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AT THE
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This monograph addresses the question: Do the planning staffs at the Unified
Combatant Commands have the personnel resources and training to conduct
crisis action planning for contingencies without augmentation from other
organizations? The Unified Combatant Commands are responsible for deliberate
planning, Theater Engagement Planning and Crisis Action Planning, which often
occur simultaneously. All of these activities plus required administrative tasks
require personnel that possess the right training and education. When the
Unified Combatant Command does not have the capability to conduct Crisis
Action Planning it must get that expertise from elsewhere. Recent U.S. military
operations have demonstrated a trend where the planning for crises is executed
by an organization external to the Unified Combatant Command.

This monograph focuses on the many doctrinal tasks that the Unified
Combatant Commands must execute as identified in Joint Doctrine. It then
discusses organization of the Unified Combatant Commands, requirements of
Joint Military Professional Education, requirements for joint staff officers as
established in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and
the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) education process. This
monograph then analyzes Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert
Shield/Storm, and Operation Restore Hope to identify why external planning
organizations were used.

The conclusion identifies that the combination of many doctrinal tasks,
organization of the command, mission of the command, training and education of
the staff and statutory guidance have resulted in the inability to simultaneously
conduct crisis action and deliberate planning. This monograph recommends that
this problem could be improved by restructuring the service mix of the
commands, requiring SAMS graduates in key planning positions, and
reformation of the JPME process to include elements of the SAMS curriculum.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The Armed Forces of the United States have reached the point in the evolution of warfare where most operations are joint in nature. In joint operations, more than one service is involved in both the planning and the execution of the operation. This planning is now conducted by staffs composed of each service who serve on the staff of a Unified Combatant Commander.

The United States military establishment has had many experiences in the realm of joint military operations and executing contingency operations. Experiences dating back to the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran, Operation Eagle Claw, and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada were joint operations that lacked integrated staff planning and coordination between the service components. These events began a period of re-organization and thought on how military forces can efficiently and effectively conduct joint military operations.

The successes and failures of these operations attributed to the formulation and passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This document, most notably, expanded the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, streamlined the chain of command between the President and the Combatant commanders and established the requirements for joint officers, joint education, and reorganized the structure of the Unified Combatant commands.

As a result of Goldwater-Nichols, the Unified Combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs) are responsible for peacetime engagement within their Area of Responsibility (AOR), and become the primary warfighter within their AOR in
time of war. The Unified Commands have the primary responsibility for receiving guidance from the National Command Authorities and planning and implementing action that supports the current National Security Strategy or crisis action guidance. In peace, CINCs take action to deter and prepare for war by planning and organizing for war.¹

Each unified Combatant Command has a staff that plans for contingency operations using the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). These staffs execute deliberate planning based on the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and their Theater Commander’s guidance. The planning results in plans of varying detail that can be applied to a wide range of contingencies across the spectrum of warfare. In a period of crisis, the staff prepares military options that support political objectives for the crisis, and upon approval, convert those options into plans for subordinate commands to execute.

Joint Operational Planning is an integrated process that requires uniform policies, procedures and reporting structures, resulting in coordinated problem solving and decision making.² Detailed planning and coordination set the conditions for success during an operation. Well-trained staff organizations conduct the detailed art and science of operational planning, which sets the conditions for successful execution by subordinate units.

The Unified Combatant Commands are governed by doctrine published in joint and service publications that prescribe procedures for planning conducted by staffs. This doctrine provides the foundation for the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. The size and service makeup of each Unified
Combatant Command Staff differs based on the geographic area of the command and the preponderance of assigned forces. This factor and the level of the experience of the staff could have an effect on how doctrine is executed by the staff.

Recent experience since Operation Just Cause (1989) has established a trend that decentralizes the planning for contingency operations. During "Just Cause", the CINC assigned the detailed planning for the operation to the XVIIIth Airborne Corps (a subordinate unit). Operation Desert Shield/Storm (1990-91) demonstrated independent planning by a group of graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Operations Restore Hope also demonstrated decentralized planning below the CINC Level.

These operations indicate that there is a tension between the ability of the Unified Command’s planning staff to conduct deliberate and crisis action planning simultaneously, due to insufficient staff manpower. This monograph answers the research question: "do the planning staffs at the Unified Combatant Commands have the personnel resources and training to conduct crisis action planning for contingencies without augmentation from other organizations?" This monograph examines the doctrine CINCs use to plan for operations, the organization of the staffs of the Unified Combatant Commands, and historical analysis of the operations cited above, to include which variables might have influenced the decision to conduct planning with external organizations.

Chapter II addresses current doctrine for planning joint operations. This chapter outlines the "how and what" a Unified Commander’s staff must do. It
outlines the process for translating guidance from the National Command
Authorities (NCA) into plans at the Unified Combatant Commander level through
the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). This chapter
focuses on the processes for both deliberate planning and Crisis Action
Planning. This chapter outlines the doctrinal tasks that the CINCs staff must
execute to provide efficient and effective plans to subordinate level commanders
and their staffs.

Chapter III examines the CINCs (Unified Combatant Commands) staff. This
chapter analyzes "who" conducts the planning. This chapter examines the tasks
that a CINCs staff must perform and who performs those tasks. It outlines how a
CINCs staff is organized, what training personnel receive before arriving to the
staff and during their tenure, the mix of personnel and their experience level, and
whether the training or education they receive is different than the training or
education received by a School of Advanced Military Studies graduate or
member of a Corps planning staff. This chapter also examines the effects of the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act on the organization and training
of the CINC's staff.

Chapter IV presents a series of contingency operations: Operation Just
Cause, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and Operation Restore Hope, and
examines the evolution of the plans, what external organizations were used to
assist in planning and why those organizations were used. Additionally, this
chapter examines what benefit these external planning agencies added to the
operations and whether there are systemic conditions that lead to augmentation of a planning staff.

The conclusion of this monograph answers the question whether the CINC's staff is capable of conducting deliberate and crisis action planning simultaneously, identifies any shortfalls and makes appropriate recommendations.

CHAPTER II: JOINT PLANNING DOCTRINE

The joint operation planning process entails the development of the best possible plans for potential crises across the range of military operations involving forces that can reasonably be expected in a CINC's area of responsibility. We will continue to develop plans using the collective wisdom available among all military planning staffs....The more complex the operations, the more comprehensive the planning must be to ensure success.

John Shalikashvili, CJCS, JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

This Chapter focuses on current joint doctrine that is executed by the Unified Combatant Commanders and their staffs to translate national policy into military action. This chapter focuses on the actions that a CINC and his staff must take to plan for possible operations and the actions that must be executed in time of crises. This chapter begins by defining some key joint operations terms and then outlines the actions that must be executed by the commander and staff.

Section 1: Terms

The following terms recur throughout this study and have been defined in order to provide continuity and ease of reading. Other terms will be defined as necessary throughout the text.

**Area Of Operations** - An Operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but
should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02 1994, 37)

**Campaign** - A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02 1994, 64)

**Campaign Planning** - The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. (JP 1-02 1994, 64)

**Campaign Plan** - A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02 1994, 64)

**Combatant Command** - A unified or specified command with a broad or continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant Commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02 1994, 80)

**Contingency** - An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02 1994, 97)

**Crisis** - An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02 1994, 109)

**Crisis Action Planning (CAP)** - The time sensitive planning for deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time the planning occurs. (JP 1-02 1994, 110)

**Deliberate Planning** - A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions
regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (JP 1-02 1994, 123)

**Joint Operations** - A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02 1994, 237)

**Joint operations planning process** - A coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02 1994, 236)

**Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)** - JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. (JP 1-02 1994, 236)

**Operation Plan** - Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. (JP 1-02 1994, 317) Three types:

- **OPLAN** - An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an Operation order (OPORD). This plan includes TPFDD data. (JP 1-02 1994, 317)

- **CONPLAN (Concept Plan)** - An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it to an OPLAN or OPORD. (JP 1-02 1994, 317)

- **CONPLAN with TPFDD** - A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. (JP 1-02 1994, 317)

- **Theater Engagement Plan (TEP)** - Deliberate engagement plans for all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. A TEP is comprised of the CINC's Theater Engagement Strategic Concept plus Engagement Activities Annex. (CJCSM 3113.01, 1998, GL-5)

**Theater of Operations** - A sub area within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. (JP 1-02 1994, 439)
Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) - The JOPES data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan. (JP 1-02 1994, 442)

Unified Command - A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02 1994, 456)

Section 2: Joint Planning Doctrine

Joint Pub 5-0 is a critical document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by the Armed Forces of the United States in joint or Multinational Operations. This manual and other joint publications outline the generally accepted principles that commanders and staffs should apply in order to plan military operations.

Section 3: What is Joint Operational Planning?

Military planning includes two broad categories of planning: Force planning, which is concerned with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities, a service responsibility; and Joint operation planning, which is concerned with the employment of military forces to attain specified objectives for contingencies. Joint Operations planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commanders, and is primarily the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Joint operations planning is a sequential and simultaneous process performed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.
At the strategic level, joint operation planning develops the strategic military objectives and tasks to support national security strategy. Through this process force and materiel requirements are identified. Combatant commanders assist in this process through the production of theater estimates and theater strategies.

At the operational level, joint operations planning links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art, the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. This planning is conducted to determine the employment, commitment, and arrangement of battles to attain operational or strategic objectives.

The role of the CINC and his staff at these levels provides an important conduit of information vertically to superiors and subordinates, as well as laterally to other CINCs. These organizations provide information upward in the form of assessments and estimates that allow the NCA to make key decisions regarding National Security Strategy, capability requirements and crisis action. They also provide information in the form of OPLANS (operations plans)/OPORDS (operations orders), etc., to subordinate organizations for planning and execution of contingency operations. Laterally these organizations provide information regarding the changing environment within their Area of Responsibility.

Section 4: What does Joint Operation Planning Encompass?
Joint operations planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning and redeployment planning. Each one of these functions has an impact on the CINC and his staff.

Mobilization planning is primarily a service responsibility and is concerned with the assembling and organizing of national resources to support national objectives. Deployment planning is a responsibility of the supported combatant commander (the CINC with the primary mission) in close coordination with the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).\textsuperscript{6} Deployment planning is concerned with moving forces and their sustainment resources from their original location to the area of operations in accordance with a specific plan. Employment planning is a CINC's responsibility, and is the how force will be applied to attain military objectives. CINCs and their staffs provide the guidelines for the scope of the other four functions through this planning. Sustainment planning is directed towards providing the logistical support required to sustain planned levels of combat activity for the appropriate amount of time and appropriate level of intensity.\textsuperscript{7} Finally, redeployment planning is conducted to plan for the transfer of units, individuals, equipment, and supplies to another location or to home station for the purpose of further employment. CINCs and their staffs are responsible for conducting these planning functions to ensure that they are prepared to support National Security Strategy within their area of responsibility.

Section 5: Responsibility for Planning the Employment of Joint Forces
Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by law and directive. As previously stated, the responsibility for employment of joint forces extends from the President and the Secretary of Defense as the NCA (National Command Authority), with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders and their subordinates in the chain of command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) transmits the orders of the NCA to the combatant commanders.

The CJCS, as the principal military advisor to the president, NSC, and Secretary of Defense, is assigned specific joint operation planning responsibilities. The CJCS is responsible for preparing a national military strategy which supports national objectives, and net assessments to determine the capability of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared to the capabilities of potential adversaries. Additionally, the CJCS provides strategic direction of the armed forces, development of strategic plans, development of joint logistic plans to support strategic plans, guidance on policy, reviews joint operation plans, advises the Secretary of Defense on force capability, and prepares the integrated plans for military mobilization.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisors to the President and provide opinions other than that of the CJCS, and can provide advice on request to the President, the NSC or the Secretary of Defense when those opinions are solicited.

The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans. Combatant commanders are responsible
for deterring war during peace and by planning for the transition to war and military operations other than war. During war, combatant commanders plan and conduct campaigns and military operations to accomplish assigned missions. The CINC’s conduct operations within their assigned geographic or functional areas. Combatant commanders plan and conduct military operations in response to crises and prepare joint operation plans that may be OPLANs, CONPLANs (concept plans) with or without TPFDDs (time phased forced deployment data) in accordance with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). CINC’s are additionally responsible for the following: conducting strategic estimates, assisting the CJCS in developing national military strategy, developing campaign plans for large-scale military operations, preparing and executing OPORDs, conducting contingency planning for contingencies not identified by the CJCS, and preparing plans to discharge assigned responsibilities. As part of the system, the CINC and his staff are responsible for providing a large amount of information and producing plans that are available for possible execution. These responsibilities translate to tasks performed by a staff. This staff operates within the context of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

Section 6: JOPES and the Combatant Commander

Combatant commanders are responsible for preparing joint operation plans in accordance with assigned missions from the JSCP and regional specific needs of the CINC. Missions assigned in accordance with the JSCP are approved by the CJCS while regional missions are approved by the CINC. These plans
become deliberate plans and during time of crisis may be converted into campaign plans and OPORDs by the CINC. During a crisis, if the CINC does not have an existing plan, he will develop courses of action for decision by the NCA. An approved course of action is then converted to campaign plans and OPORDs by the CINC and his staff. These staff plan in accordance with joint operation planning processes in one of three categories: campaign planning, deliberate planning or crisis action planning.

**Campaign Planning**

The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning encompasses both deliberate and crisis action planning. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. These campaign plans are the way in which a combatant commander arranges for strategic unity of effort and how joint operations are planned within the theater. The campaign plans devised by a combatant commander may influence the joint strategic planning process. Campaign plans are subdivided into theater campaigns and subordinate campaigns. Theater campaigns may follow more than one line of operations and synthesize the operations of subordinate units into one coherent whole. Subordinate campaigns are those of a subordinate joint force commander that accomplish or contribute to accomplishing theater strategic objectives.

**Deliberate Planning**
Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information, and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the JSCP. The deliberate planning process is a highly structured process that is conducted during peacetime to establish plans for contingencies assigned in the JSCP. In the eyes of a CINC's staff, this work is time consuming, requires specific procedures and develops the necessary cohesion and competence among the staff to conduct crisis action planning (CAP).

The deliberate planning process is performed in a continuous cycle that supports other DOD planning cycles. This process is accomplished in five phases: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review and supporting plans.

During the initiation phase the planning tasks are assigned to the CINC. The guidance is provided in the JSCP and includes apportioned forces and resources, the type of plan required and any additional guidance. The combatant commander can also initiate planning for internal requirements not specified by the JSCP.

During concept development, the CINC (supported commander) uses these six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander's estimate, CINC's Strategic Concept, and CJCS review. These steps are an integral component to the process, since no further planning will progress until the CJCS has reviewed the concept.

Once the CJCS has approved the concept of operations, the plan is expanded into a complete OPLAN during the plan development phase. The
supported CINC guides the process through the following eight steps: force planning, support planning, nuclear planning, transportation planning, shortfall identification, transportation feasibility analysis, TPFDD refinement, and documentation. Throughout these steps, the staffs are identifying shortfalls and coordinate the use of resources.

The end of this effort results in plan review. The CJCS conducts a final review of the submitted OPLANs and assesses and validates the plans. The plan is then approved or disapproved by the CINC, either with or without shortfalls. Once this occurs, the CJCS directs the completion of supporting plans by the subordinate and supporting commanders.

During this phase the supported CINC is responsible for approving the supporting plans of the service components and the subordinate joint force commanders.

The reality of the deliberate planning process is that it is time and resource intensive, very specific, and requires a high degree of competence on the part of the CINC's staff to execute it properly.

_Crisis Action Planning_

Crisis Action Planning (CAP) is based on current events and conducted under time constraints. The combatant command plans using assigned, attached and allocated forces and resources. CAP planners use existing conditions when the planning occurs. Although Deliberate plans are based on assumptions about how a future situation may occur, Crisis Action Planning includes the
consideration and exploitation of deliberate joint operation planning whenever possible.¹⁵

The crisis action planning process is conducted in six flexible phases: situation development, crisis assessment, course of action development (COA), course of action selection, execution planning, and execution.

During the situation development phase, events that have potential national security implications are detected, reported and assessed.¹⁶ The supported commander (CINC whose region the event occurs) prepares and submits and assessment on the event to the NCA and the CJCS.

This crisis assessment is used by the NCA and the CJSC to determine whether a military response is required and should be prepared. This phase ends when an NCA decision has been made regarding the preparation of military options.

During the COA development phase, the supported commander is given instructions to plan for military options in response to the crisis. During this phase, command relationships are established as well as any constraints for planning. The combatant commander's staff reviews existing OPLANS for applicability and develops OPLANS in support of the mission. The supported CINC then submits the proposed COAs to the NCA for decision.

The NCA selects a course of action (COA) during the COA selection phase. The NCA then directs all CINC's to conduct execution planning in support of the COA through a CJCS Alert Order.
During Execution planning, the NCA-approved COA is transformed into an OPORD. The supported CINC refines any campaign plans to integrate the COA into the theater campaign plan if necessary, supporting CINC's task specific units to support the operation, the component commanders identify and update sustainment requirements, and USTRANSCOM develops transportation schedules to support the requirements of the supported CINC.\textsuperscript{17}

The execution phase begins when the NCA decide to execute a military option in response to the crisis.\textsuperscript{18} During this phase the supported CINC issues an execute order to subordinate and supporting commanders.

Through the different planning processes subordinate to the JOPES system, the combatant commander and his staff are required to negotiate an intricate process that requires providing detailed information, plans, and assessments based on possible futures, as well as being able to quickly adapt to the reality of a crisis. In order to negotiate this process, these staffs produce products that support the process.

Section 7: Staff/Commander Products/Planning Efforts

The combatant commander's staff is responsible for producing plans and operation orders according to deliberate, campaign and crisis action planning procedures. The responsibilities to produce plans is incumbent both on the supported CINC as well as the supporting CINC's to produce the necessary formats. The combatant commanders produce the following deliberate plans: OPLANs, CONPLANS, with or without TPFDD or functional plans. The staff of
the supporting CINC produces the plans to support each OPLAN of the supported CINC.

**OPLAN**

An OPLAN is a complete and detailed operation plan containing a full description of the concept of operations and all required annexes with associated appendixes.¹⁹ These plans are very specific, providing the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence and resources associated with executing the plan. These plans require detailed support because of the sensitivity of the national interest, the nature requires detailed planning, and determination of requirements for the operation.

**CONPLAN without TPFDD**

A CONPLAN without TPFDD is an operation plan (concept plan) in abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan or OPORD.²⁰ These plans do not include all of the appendixes that a complete OPLAN contains, but only contain the required annexes and appendixes in accordance with the JSCP or the CINC. TPFDD files are not prepared in this type of plan.

**CONPLAN with TPFDD**

A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a concept plan that requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. The contingency it is associated with is of a compelling nature to national interests but is not considered likely in the short-term. The timing of units deploying during the operation is important enough to provide a basic TPFDD.
Theater Engagement Plan (TEP)

Preparation of a Theater Engagement Plan is a relatively new addition to the responsibilities of the combatant commander and his staff. Theater Engagement Plans are deliberate engagement plans for all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.21 The TEP is based on planning guidance provided in the JSCP. The Geographic CINC's have the responsibility to publish annually, the type and scope of engagement activities to be conducted in support of the CINC's strategy. The TEP also provides the linkage between strategic objectives and engagement activities.

Engagement activities categories, for the purpose of the TEP, are operational activities, combined exercises, and other foreign military interaction which includes combined training, combined education, military contacts, security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and any other activity the CINC designates.22

Each CINC's TEP is forwarded to the CJCS for review and is then integrated into a "global family of engagement plans."23 These plans are reviewed to ensure that they support national objectives, plans and programs, and where interagency support is required, receive the priority and attention necessary to be sufficiently funded.

The JSCP directs CINC planners to use both assigned forces, those rotationally deployed to the theater and those which have historically been temporarily deployed for engagement activities. The CINC's resources are synchronized during two phases of the TEP process: (1) regionally during plan
development by the CINC's planning staff working with components, supporting CINC's and other agencies, and (2) globally during the plan review process when the individual TEP is integrated into the global family of engagement plans by the CINC's representatives, the Services and the Joint Staff.

**TEP Planning Procedures**

TEP planning phases closely parallel the deliberate planning process outlined in Joint Pub 5-0. The five phases are: Initiation of Theater Engagement Planning, Strategic Concept Development, Annex development, Plan Review, and Supporting plans.

In phase I, Initiation of Theater Engagement planning, CINCs are assigned missions in the JSCP. The CINCs planners conduct a review of past activities to gauge the effectiveness of past engagement activities in meeting the theater, region, or country objectives they have established. This assessment leads toward determining the requirements for the means to accomplish effective engagement strategy.

During Phase II, Strategic Concept development, CINCs identify the factors affecting engagement in their assigned theaters or countries. They define the critical framework of military activities required to support achieving their objectives. The staff conducts mission analysis, receives planning guidance and conducts staff assessments to determine the level of military activity required to achieve national objectives in the diplomatic, economic and military arenas. The result of this planning is the Theater Engagement Strategic Concept which becomes the foundation of the TEP. This concept includes the commander's
intent, and prioritized objectives. The CINC's strategic concept is then reviewed by the CJCS. The Joint Staff integrates the plans into the global family of Strategic Concepts and the CJCS approves or disapproves these concepts.

During Phase III, Annex Development, the CINCs planners use historically assigned forces or identify shortfalls in forces to accomplish the major engagement activities. The planners address Force Planning, Support Planning and Transportation Planning during this phase.

Force Planning is the prioritization of the mission, tasks, and activities to available forces, and establishes the requirement for a certain force capability to implement a specific engagement activity. Support planning consists of determining the materiel and personnel requirements to conduct activities and sustain forces during engagement activities and Transportation Planning identifies the strategic movement requirements for the forces conducting planned engagement activities.

During this phase the planners address the following categories of engagement activities: operational activities, combined exercises, and other foreign military interaction (such as combined training, combined education, military contacts, security assistance, humanitarian assistance and other engagement which results from treaties, obligations or negotiations).

In phase IV, Plan Review, the Joint Staff, Services, CINCs and defense agencies review the TEPs. These plans are validated or invalidated as a result of this review.
In final phase, Phase V, Supporting Plans, supporting plans are completed, documented and validated. The supported CINC will review and approve any required supporting plans.

**Functional Plans**

The final type of plan that staffs must prepare is the functional plan. A functional plan involves the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment. These plans are produced for specific tasks such as logistics but can be applied to disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and peace keeping operations.

**Section 8: Conclusions**

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the many tasks that a unified combatant command is required to execute as doctrine is written. Each combatant command has responsibilities that include providing information to determine budgets, providing information to shape strategic plans, planning campaigns and operations for possible contingencies, reacting to crisis within their area of responsibility and planning for peacetime engagement.

Each one of these major areas causes action by the CINC and his staff. Manpower is required to staff these diverse functions. In many cases, the same personnel are simultaneously conducting the many tasks to support these functions.

The many directions in which the staff and commander focus their attention creates a tension among the staff. This tension when applied to a finite
organization affects the ability of the staff to perform the assigned functions simultaneously.

The simultaneous nature of these requirements is quite realistic considering the world situation in the year 2000. The commander and staff is then required to prioritize what is important and what is not. The unforgiving nature of the doctrinal requirements can result in situations that has the combatant command performing at an optimal level in one area, but failing to address other tasks that are no less important despite the situation.

When the commander and staff can no longer execute those assigned doctrinal tasks in an efficient manner a vulnerability is created. A vulnerability in deliberate planning due to an ongoing crisis could cause the command to be unprepared to react to the next crisis which occurs. A vulnerability in Theater Engagement Planning could exacerbate existing conditions in the CINC’s AOR and speed the onset of a crisis that may not have occurred had TEP planning continued as normal.

The expectations of current doctrine as outlined in JCS Pub. 5-0 appear to be realistic. The volatile nature of many regions of the world require simultaneous planning for peacetime engagement, deliberate planning and crisis action planning. The CINC must therefore figure out what is important in relation to time and space and dedicate the assets at his disposal to accomplish his assigned missions. However, the CINC must be aware of the tension that exists between the ability to plan under crisis action circumstance while simultaneously trying to execute the other assigned tasks and the effect this tension has on the
execution of his theater mission. This tension affects mission accomplishment and may require a CINC to find the personnel he needs to execute the simultaneous requirements from outside of his organization.

The decisions that the combatant commander makes regarding the execution of doctrinal tasks that support his mission are impacted by the personnel resources that he has at his disposal. The number of personnel assigned, statutory requirements for service specific staff members and the training of those personnel have an impact on the ability of the combatant commander’s staff to execute the multitude of simultaneous tasks as outlined in doctrine. The makeup of these staffs will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III: ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

This chapter examines the planning staffs of the combatant commands. The focus is on how the staffs are organized, the training requirements for members of the staff, the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act on the make-up of joint staffs and whether there are any fundamental differences between the training that joint officers and School of Advanced Military Studies graduates receive.

The makeup of the staff in terms of service representation, organization, and education has an impact on how the staff performs the diverse and simultaneous tasks outlined in chapter II. Although there are existing requirements for standardized joint training, each individual service member brings different skills and different bases of knowledge to the organization. It is intuitive that a tipping of the scales in a particular discipline or service could change the effectiveness
of the staff which could create a void in expertise that must be filled. This chapter focuses on the effects of regulatory guidance for staffing joint organizations, organization of unified combatant commands based on geographical or functional mission, and the joint education process and how these variables can effect the simultaneous execution of critical tasks and the need for planning augmentation by other organizations. Do statutory requirements and training programs create an invisible shortfall for planning expertise needed by the unified combatant command?

Section 1: Combatant Command

A combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.25

The staffs of these organizations are different in size and scope based upon the functional or geographic responsibilities of the command. As an example, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is made up of over nine hundred personnel with a large percentage of those staff members coming from the Air Force and Army, due to the large amount of land territory. In contrast, the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) has a staff of close to one thousand with the larger percentages of staff members coming from the Navy and Air Force due to the distance and the large amount of ocean included in the AOR.
A preponderance of one service represented can affect an organization. The skills that each service brings to a joint organization reflect the training base of its institution. These skills can be beneficial when coping with situations that require that expertise, for example naval experts in a crisis, or deliberate planning requiring sea options. The ability of those same staff members may be less than optimal in a situation requiring ground expertise. The shortfall in a specific area of expertise thus creates a requirement to be filled as will be shown in chapter IV.

Tasks

Each of the combatant commands executes the processes outlined in chapter II, in order to plan for contingency operations within its Area of Responsibility. The specific tasks that the CINC of a unified combatant command chooses from the Universal Joint Task List to develop his Joint Mission Essential Task List are influenced by the CINC’s mission and the specific needs of the AOR. The JMETL (joint mission essential task list) is designed by the CINC to provide a warfighting focus for the Battlestaff, ensuring that National Vital Interest and Theater Strategy are met. These needs may result in special expertise required by the combatant command. This special expertise may be focused in security assistance, for example, as was the case in USSOUTHCOM as will be discussed in chapter IV. This special expertise results in a focus by the staff and commander that takes time away from other tasks and leads to vulnerabilities in the CINC’s ability to execute all the types of planning that must occur simultaneously.
Section 2: Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is critical to whether the unified combatant commands can simultaneously conduct contingency planning without augmentation, because it is the foundation for the skills that are required by the staff members of the command. JPME is an area that has risen in importance as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Each of the services, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, are responsible for establishing curriculum at their Military Education Level 4 (MEL4) equivalent school that focuses on the requirements that officers will have to execute if selected for joint duty. Joint education at these schools includes education on sister services, the requirements determination process, the budgeting process and joint campaign planning.²⁷

In accordance with the selection process for officers who will fill Joint Billets, they receive additional training by the Joint Forces Command at the Armed Forces Staff College. This course provides detailed training in how to operate as part of a joint staff and is a prerequisite for coded positions on the staff that result in the award of a joint identifying code. All of the graduates that attend this school serve in key positions on the staff, many serve on the planning staffs of those organizations. However, attending this school and the service schools provides only a basic knowledge in the intricacies of joint operations. These schools do not make any of the individual service members “experts” in the other services doctrine. The requirement for JPME from the Goldwater-Nichols Act establishes a framework that the joint community is striving to improve but
currently falls short in educating joint officers in the elements of operational
design and campaign planning as will be demonstrated in chapter IV. This point,
tied in with the organization of the staffs at the different unified combatant
commands, creates voids in the corporate knowledge of those organizations.

Section 3: Organization of the Staffs

Each of the combatant commands is organized with the normal Joint Staff
sections, J-1 (Personnel), J-2 (Intelligence), J-3/5 (Plans and Operations), J-4
(Logistics), J-6 (Communications) and other areas such as Judge Advocate
General representatives. Each of these sections is responsible to execute the
types of planning outlined in chapter II as well as daily administrative functions.

The combatant commander then organizes special functions such as Crisis
Action Planning Cells in regard to their SOP, based on the needs of their
command. The sub-organization of each of these sections applies to the
deliberate planning, Crisis Action Planning and Theater Engagement Planning
processes. These staff sections remain responsible for accomplishing their
specific function in support of these doctrinal tasks. Within each of those
functions, the number, service component and individual discipline vary among
the unified combatant commands based on their mission. As stated above, this
mixture of service component, individual expertise and number assigned to the
staff section linked with the focus of the command creates vulnerabilities in the
ability to execute many simultaneous tasks.

Section 4: Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was a major step in reforming the relationship between political and military decision makers and had a profound effect on the selection and requirements for joint officers. This legislation was a key step to fix the problems of Operation Eagle Claw (Failed Iranian Hostage rescue) and Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada). These two operations demonstrated inadequacies in staff planning processes, communication and inter-operability among the services in addition to other issues addressed by the Act.

Those experiences led to the following provisions in the Act:

**Education and Experience Requirements**

An officer who is nominated for the joint specialty may not be selected for the joint specialty until the officer successfully completes an appropriate program of education, successfully completes a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment.\(^{28}\)

The length of a joint duty assignment for other officers shall be not less than three and one half years.\(^{29}\)

Requires that 50% of joint duty positions in grades above captain/navy lieutenant be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected for the joint specialty.\(^{30}\)

The senate amendment contained a provision (section 112) that would require each unified combatant command to have a joint staff with officers in key positions of responsibility from each military department having forces assigned to the command.\(^{31}\)

The Senate amendment contained a provision (section 115) that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the curricula of joint military colleges and schools are oriented to preparing officers for joint duty assignments and that the curricula of the military colleges and schools of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps gives appropriate emphasis to instruction in joint military matters.\(^{32}\)

These provisions made training prospective joint officers and resourcing the unified combatant commanders mandatory for all services. The intent was to
provide officers from each service who were versed in the activities of the combatant commands and ensuring that the officers that served, were stabilized long enough to provide continuity on the staff. The Goldwater-Nichols Act continues to be adhered to by the services and provides the framework for officers trained in the nuances of joint operations and doctrine.

Although Goldwater-Nichols is a great improvement on how U.S. Military forces think about and conduct joint operations, it does not fill the invisible shortfall of the right density of experience in the right unified combatant command. As stated earlier in this chapter, CINCs select the critical tasks that support their mission and subsequently organize their staffs to perform those tasks. So despite the requirement to educate and assign joint staff officers, there is no mandatory requirement for a balanced staff organization in all of the unified commands. The Goldwater-Nichols Act creates a requirement for selection, training and education but does not explicitly require a unified combatant command to possess the capability to conduct simultaneous planning tasks. This leads back to the commander determining the priorities for his organization and solving the problem of tension between deliberate and crisis action planning processes through the use of other sources.

**Section 5: School of Advanced Military Studies Education**

Graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies are a resource that in recent history have been used by the unified combatant commands to conduct operational planning when their resources were not adequate. The School of Advanced Military Studies is designed to educate selected officers in operational
art and campaign planning through a rigorous one year graduate education. The purpose of SAMS is to provide educated officers who possess a breadth of knowledge, a common basis of tactical and operational concept understanding and a common problem-solving outlook. SAMS students are exposed to military theory, doctrine, operational art, campaign design and the detailed study of military history.

This unique curriculum provides the students with a much greater opportunity to understand their profession than basic joint education. The course continually ensures that the students are prepared to plan in complex operational environments.

What SAMS graduates bring to a unified command is a deeper knowledge of the joint use of force to translate strategic goals into tactical action. The SAMS curriculum, through the study of theory, history, doctrine and thought provoking exercises produces an officer that is equipped to be thrust into a new environment and work to define the problem and design concepts that support the strategic objectives in question.

The depth of this education is understood by the commanders of the unified combatant commands. Although, SAMS graduates do serve on the staffs of the unified combatant commands, the requirements for those officers are not covered in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Therefore, this resource is not always resident on a CINC’s staff. This causes the unified commander to find that resource when it is needed.

Section 6: Conclusions
This chapter demonstrates that the tension between deliberate planning and crisis action planning is exacerbated when the organization, training and education, and regulatory guidance do not support the missions assigned to the combatant commander.

Each one of the combatant commands is different. Each command has a different mission which spawns a series of tasks and skill sets that must be mastered by the staff in order for that command to accomplish its mission within its functional or regional area. The way in which the staff of the combatant command organizes to accomplish the routine and the extraordinary has a great effect on how that command performs.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act provides the guidance necessary to ensure that the combatant commanders are receiving moderately trained staff officers required for duty. Joint training is a continuous enterprise that provides a good starting point, but cannot replace the synergistic effect that cohesion and experience bring to an organization. Joint training cannot guarantee an officer that “knows it all.” Programs like SAMS complement JPME and provide personnel resources to the unified combatant commanders that have been used quite frequently. The issues discussed in this chapter show that doctrinal requirements, combined with shortfalls in manpower, can result in the commander of a unified combatant command to look elsewhere for planning experience when simultaneous planning exceeds the capability of his staff. The next chapter will address recent historical examples where unified combatant
commanders sought assistance in their planning efforts for contingency operations.

CHAPTER IV: CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

This chapter presents a series of contingency operations planned and executed since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This chapter outlines the planning of those operations, assesses whether external organizations were used to plan the operations, explains why those organizations were chosen and assesses what benefit these external planning agencies added to the planning effort.

The operations that are analyzed are: Operation Just Cause; Operation Desert Shield/Storm; Operation Restore Hope.

Section 1: Operation Just Cause - Panama

In 1987, the Manuel Noriega regime was becoming more dangerous to U.S. interests in Panama, which were the protection of U.S. citizens and interests, and the installment of a friendly, democratic government. The crisis caused by Noriega's leadership led the USSOUTHCOM commander to revise the contingency plans for defense of the Panama Canal. USSOUTHCOM was to revise contingency plans intended to protect U.S. lives and property, to keep open the Panama Canal, to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in peaceful or hostile environments, and to develop a plan to assist any government that might replace the Noriega regime.

As the crisis developed, Brig. General Marc Cisneros, the director of operations and plans, began to revise the contingency plans for defense of the
Panama canal with a scenario where the PDF was the enemy.\textsuperscript{36} The
SOUTHCOM plans were originally code-named \textit{Elaborate Maze}, then changed
to \textit{Prayer Book}.

These plans covered a wide range of combat and post-combat operations.
The combat portions of the plan were called \textit{Blue Spoon} and covered a wide
range of contingencies, from conducting a surgical operation oriented on
Noriega, to full-scale combat operations.\textsuperscript{37} These options included large
concentrations of forces. Cisneros was concerned that such operations could
quickly grow beyond the ability of SOUTHCOM to manage them, threatening
unity of command.\textsuperscript{38}

By the end of 1987, the Panama planners were ready to discuss their plans
with the various Army organizations that would serve as augmentations to the
force in Panama. Discussions were held with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Forces
Command and Training and Doctrine Command. US Army South (USARSO)
was considered as the warfighting headquarters, initially assuming the name
Joint Task Force Panama (JTF Panama).

In 1988, the special operations community became more involved in the
planning for operations in Panama. A Joint Special Operations Task Force
(JSOTF) was formed and the commander of USSOCOM, General James
Lindsay decided that the current SOUTHCOM special operations forces
organization was too small to handle an operation of the size they were planning;
those in Panama agreed.\textsuperscript{39} SOUTHCOM Special Operations Command
(SOUTHSOC) agreed with the assessment and became involved with the planning effort of the JSOTF.

The combat portions of the *Prayer Book, Blue Spoon*, were dependent upon another part of the plan called *Elder Statesman* (later, *Post Time*). This was a plan for the buildup of forces on a piecemeal basis, over a week.

The second element in *Prayer Book* was known as *Klondike Key*. This portion of the planned called for a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) to evacuate the families of U.S. soldiers and U.S. citizens. There was doubt as to whether this operation would be run simultaneously with *Blue Spoon*.

At the Joint Chiefs of Staff level there was uneasiness with the *Prayer Book* series. The Joint Staff regarded the plan as too complex and some found it incomprehensible. The JCS operations staff considered *Prayer Book* to be an extremely complicated plan. This reinforced the feeling that USARSO could not manage the operation. Says General Tom Kelly: “[The] USARSO [headquarters is] four hundred guys, but what have they been doing all their lines? They’ve been administering security assistance in Latin America. So I made that clearly known in very, very strong terms with Cisneros that I thought they needed to reconsider command and control.” Tension between General Woerner and General Cisneros resulted in no changes to the *Prayer Book* plans either in terms of complexity or command and control relationships.

In June of 1988, General Cisneros convinced General Woerner that the XVIIIth Airborne Corps should run the operation in total. The XVIIIth Airborne Corps planning staff began to design an operation to their own standards. One
of the problems the corps planning staff encountered was intelligence information. The SOUTHCOM intelligence staff was targeted on American strategic interests within the theater. Information collected was often compartmented and was kept from planners. XVIIIth Airborne Corps planners started looking for a new version of *Prayer Book/Blue Spoon* that allowed them to mass combat power more quickly in Panama.

In the summer of 1989, General Woerner was replaced by General Maxwell Thurman as the CINC of SOUTHCOM. After studying the Panama plans, General Thurman tasked the XVIIIth Airborne commander, LTG Steiner, with the responsibility for planning and executing operations in Panama. Steiner's primary planners began to rework the plans from scratch. These planners designed a campaign based on a series of objectives and planned backwards from the endstate of operations. A result of prodding from General Thurman was the redesign of the command and control structure of the Special Operations Forces. The plan now called for unity of command of all forces under the XVIIIth Airborne Corps commander. The OPLAN developed by the corps planners was designated OPLAN 90-1.

Under this plan the corps planners broke the tasks of the operation into stages based on the forces involved and their locations at the beginning of hostilities. The staff developed triggers that allowed the build up of forces necessary to accomplished the assigned missions. Planning was conducted with the Special Operations community, allowing the sharing of ideas and information critical for the synchronization of action during the operation.
The results of the planning effort resulted in the identification of four different levels of force they could bring to bear, depending on the scenario.\textsuperscript{43} The consensus was that an overwhelming, knockout punch could be delivered within forty-eight hours, and that if a reasonable level of operational security could be preserved, the PDF could indeed, be decapitated.\textsuperscript{44}

The final plan called for multiple task forces attacking multiple targets simultaneously at the highest level of force. These plans had been coordinated and rehearsed among the key participants such as the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division, 75\textsuperscript{th} Ranger Regiment, 7\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division (LI), and the members of the Special Operations community.

This operation is an example where external expertise was used to plan and execute operations above the combatant commanders staff. A factor leading to outside assistance was the change of commanders in SOUTHCOM. The removal of General Woerner was a political decision based on the heightened awareness of a new presidential administration, and disagreements within the military community over the effectiveness of the commander and his staff. Members of the Joint Staff clearly were concerned with the \textit{Prayer Book} series of plans due to their complexity. Joint Staff members such as General Tom Kelly believed that the Planning staff at SOUTHCOM was not capable of developing and executing the \textit{Prayer Book} plans with the necessary assurance of victory.

General Thurman's actions upon taking command, assigning the responsibility for planning and executing the operation to the XVIII\textsuperscript{th} Airborne
Corps, also demonstrates a lack of confidence in the planning and execution capabilities of the staff.

Another contributing factor may have been the focus of the staff. The comments from General Kelly and General Thurman are quite potent in terms of what the staff was prepared to do versus what it had to do for this operation. Planning for the Operation on the part of SOUTHCOM was very Panama-centric, even when the XVIIIth Airborne Corps was assigned to conduct planning. An indicator cited above was the focus of the intelligence apparatus on other U.S. interests in the region, rather than providing needed intelligence for the planning effort. Additionally, the SOCOM commander was concerned with the capability of the Joint Special Operations community in SOUTHCOM to be able to plan for an operation of the size that was expected.

Another variable may have been the relationship between the CINC with his staff. General Woerner, in addition to his shaky relationship with members of the Joint Staff and the civilian decision makers, had a different view of South American policy and what actions should be taken specifically in regard to Panama. It is possible that his personal views on what action was effective and his personal baggage hindered the planning process in addition to the other variables mentioned.

In closing, the analysis of this operation does show that there was a tension between what the planning staff was capable of doing and what they had to accomplish. The variables discussed above had an effect on the combatant commanders staff that eventually resulted in the responsibilities for the planning
of Operation Just Cause to be assigned elsewhere. The focus of the staff and
the inability of the staff to operate in concert with other agencies helped to build
a perception that led to the delegation of planning responsibilities to another
organization.

Section 2: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

As the crisis in the Gulf began, USCENTCOM (Central Command) began to
execute plans that had been developed during an exercise, “Internal Look”. The
immediate problem was not liberating Kuwait, but protecting Saudi Arabia. The
original plans for a buildup focused on the use of the 82nd Airborne Division, 7th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and large
contingents of Navy and Air Force units. The establishment of the defense of
Saudi Arabia allowed planning for the Liberation of Kuwait.

The planning for air options, or the air campaign as it was known, began with
an honest appraisal of the CENTCOM air staff by General Schwarzkopf.
General Schwarzkopf reviewed his air staff at CENTCOM and decided that they
were not strategists, and not prepared to provide the President the ability to
retaliate.\(^{46}\) Schwarzkopf called Powell and told him he needed help from the air
staff at the Pentagon.\(^{46}\) General Powell gave General Schwarzkopf permission
to contact the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who gave the mission to
support CENTCOM to COL John Warden III. In ten days, COL Warden had
developed an air war-plan that was ambitious, yet provided the conceptual
framework for CENTCOM's strategic air campaign. This planning was eventually
placed back into the hands of the CENTCOM Air Staff and was subsequently executed with minor modification during the war.

In October, planning for ground offensive operations began. Virtually no work on offensive planning had been done at CENTCOM before Iraq invaded Kuwait. Planning to this point had been defensive in nature and focused on preventing Iraqi forces from seizing any additional terrain. General Schwarzkopf was aware that a ground operation must be planned.

My staff and I were completely stumped: no matter how many times we looked at it, we saw no way to stretch the force we had available into a winning offensive. Not satisfied that we were thinking creatively enough, I sent a message in early September to the Army requesting a fresh team of planners.

The top officers on the CENTCOM staff in charge of planning and operations were a sailor and an airman: Admiral Grant Sharp was the chief planning officer while Air Force Major General Burton Moore was in charge of operations. Neither had the experience to plan a land campaign, and although there was some talent on the staff, they were burdened with the job of managing the deployment of forces to the Gulf and getting a defense in place. The CENTCOM staff was coordinating the movement of forces from all services into the area of operations and the logistical details required to support those forces and the defense of Saudi Arabia.

The team that was sent to assist CENTCOM was a group of four graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies. The planners would be known as the Special Plans Group, and they would report through CENTCOM’s J-5 staff, the directorate headed by Admiral Sharp that was nominally in charge of military
planning; only a handful of top CENTCOM officials would know of the effort.\textsuperscript{50}

Schwarzkopf told the team that they should draw up a plan entirely on the basis of what made the most military sense, not on the basis of what was needed to keep all of the services and coalition partners happy.

We briefed them on our thinking to date and then I instructed: “Assume a ground attack will follow an air campaign. I want you to study the enemy dispositions and the terrain and tell me the best way to drive Iraq out of Kuwait given the forces we have available.”\textsuperscript{51}

The original planning guidance given by the CINC resulted in a ground offensive that used the available forces, this plan was not well received by decision makers in Washington.

A result of what was seen as “unimaginative” thinking on the part of CENTCOM resulted in General Powell launching a parallel planning effort that considered more troops and more of an envelopment to the west of the Iraqi forces. The communications that ensued between Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf resulted in a renewed planning effort by the SAMS team.

The result of this planning was options that included the use of the available forces in the area of operations and the expansion of force levels to include two U.S. corps. Once this plan was approved by the National Command Authority, the plan was turned over to the CENTCOM staff proper for execution.

The planning for air and ground operations for Operation Desert Storm is another example of a large planning effort by agencies external to the combatant commanders staff organization. The evidence presented hints that the staff structure of the combatant command did not have the resident expertise necessary to plan an operation of this magnitude.
One of the variables affecting this planning was the assignment of key officers and their individual planning experience. The plans and operations officers were not ground operations experts. This lack of ground operations experience caused a shortfall in the needed experience to plan a major ground operation. Additionally, by General Schwarzkopf's own admission, he did not have faith in his air planners to provide the necessary options that the president might need as the crisis continued.

Another variable was the perceived workload of the staff. CENTCOM did not have a complete OPLAN for this type of operation, therefore it had to create the plan for deployment, defensive employment and logistics support as the operation progressed. Attending to these matters appeared to exceed the staff's capacity to concurrently plan for future offensive operations.

A final variable worth noting was the importance of the mission in the eyes of the NCA. When the combatant command did not produce options that were compatible with what the NCA wanted, they were provided criticism and "help". This "help" as seen during the ground operations planning created additional cells working in parallel. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor's book, The General's War has a useful passage that demonstrates this point:

There are many secrets of the Gulf War, but one of the most sensitive episodes concerns the genesis of the air-campaign plan. The official mythology of the war holds that Congress had been so successful in strengthening the role of the theater commands through defense reform legislation that CENTCOM had the expertise and resources to do the war planning on its own and that civilian and military officials in Washington, mindful of the errors of the Vietnam War, took a virtual hands-off approach toward the planning of the war in the Gulf.52
The evidence presented demonstrates that the CINC's staff was not fully prepared to plan and execute an operation of this magnitude. The lack of required expertise in response to military and political requirements of the crisis caused the CINC to resource his planning from external sources available to him.

General Schwarzkopf believed that his air staff was not capable of providing the kind of menu of air options that the National Command Authority needed. He also believed that his staff was not able to plan for offensive ground operations because it was overwhelmed with coordinating the details for the troop buildup in Saudi Arabia as well as was lacking creativity.

To remedy the planning staff deficiencies, General Schwarzkopf received assistance from COL Warden's Checkmate planning staff to generate air options and assistance from the four SAMS graduates to generate ground offensive operations plans. These teams developed plans that began an iterative process that led to the final air and ground operations plans for Desert Storm.

Additionally, the feedback provided by the CINC and his planning effort caused other decision makers in the system to provide assistance to bridge the perceived experience gap. The perceived gap indicates that the National Security Council and Department of Defense believed that CENTCOM was overwhelmed and resulted in parallel planning efforts to devise the ground offensive operations plan for Desert Storm.

Section 3: Operation Restore Hope
Operation Restore Hope was a reaction to the continued decline of the country of Somalia. The United States felt compelled to provide assistance in reaction to the situation in Somalia. The lawlessness and the images of starving children, exerted pressure on the Bush Administration to take some sort of definitive action to ease the suffering of the Somali people.

As the situation in Somalia deteriorated during the early 1990's, the NCA had directed USCENTCOM to prepare for the possibility of intervention, and the USCENTCOM staff had created several broad concept plans for this eventuality. The staff had limited the response plans to evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel and definitive political and military intervention, but not decisive ground operations. CENTCOM had not planned for decisive ground operations due in this area because Somalia was not considered a vital interest and because the threat was minimal; however, CENTCOM had examined options employing humanitarian aid.

On 20 November, 1992, USCENTCOM notified I MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) of the possibility of a time-sensitive contingency operation to support humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia. Once the I MEF and CENTCOM concept design for Somalia was approved by the JCS, President Bush directed the use of military force contingent upon approval of a U.N. resolution in support of the operation.

I MEF was officially designated as Joint Task Force Somalia and was responsible for the overall command and control of the operation. CENTCOM's mission statement was:
When directed JTF Somalia will conduct military operations in Somalia to secure the major airfields, seaports, key installations, and relief distribution sites; to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for relief convoys; to provide security for relief organization operations; and to assist United Nations/non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. (CJTF Somalia Plan 1992)

The JTF planners were tasked with the responsibility for developing and implementing the campaign plan. I MEF planners based their JTF staff on CINCCENTCOM's Plan 100-90, the CINC's standing plan for peacetime emergency humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{55} 56 The JTF had to split its resources into two groups; one for planning the time phased force deployment data list (TPFDL) and the other to plan the remainder of the operation. CENTCOM was responsible for coordinating for the necessary lift to move U.S. forces and multinational forces to the area of operations. CENTCOM additionally coordinated for the force mix that would be employed during the operation.

This example illustrates that the combatant command can delegate the detailed planning of missions to subordinate headquarters. CENTCOM's large Area of Responsibility seems to have dictated the decentralization of planning to a lower level in order for it to continue to prepare for its continuing mission in the rest of the AOR. The combatant command delegated the detailed planning for this operation to the JTF in accordance with established joint doctrine. The evidence would indicate that CENTCOM was willing to relinquish this responsibility in order to manage the affairs of the remainder of its large area of responsibility. This would indicate that the staff either lacked the experience or had not been sufficiently re-organized since Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm to adequately plan for the crisis and simultaneously react to the other...
requirements in the AOR. Additionally, the time sensitive nature of the mission does indicate that detailed planning time at lower echelons was important.

Section 4: Conclusions

The historical analysis in this chapter shows that in all three operations discussed, the combatant command employed outside planning groups to conduct the planning for the operation. The analysis suggests that the staffs of both USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM did not possess the personnel and experience necessary to plan for their respective crisis operations while continuing the simultaneous execution of the other responsibilities in the AOR. In each operation it is apparent that the CINC realized that his expectations for planning would not be met and either requested or assigned the planning responsibilities to another organization.

The salient issues are mission of the combatant command, structure of the staff, experience level, and the influence of high level decision makers. These variables influenced the outcomes of each of these operations, not only in the outcome of the operations but in terms of the planning effort.

Operation Just Cause demonstrated that the mission of the unified combatant command has a great deal to do with how that CINC's staff is organized and where the shortfalls in resident experience might occur. It also demonstrated the importance of personal preference. General Thurman’s approach to the problem of planning and organizing the invasion of Panama was much different that that of General Woerner. General Thurman’s internal look at his organization was intended to optimize the planning for the operation when he realized that there
was a shortfall in the ability to plan for war operations as opposed to security assistance.

Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that due to an almost non-existent war plan for operations of the type he faced, General Schwarzkopf’s organization became overwhelmed by the large amount of tasks required just to move and sustain a force. General Schwarzkopf may have felt additional pressure to quickly find an organization that could plan decisive offensive operations from the NSC and the NCA. This pressure, coupled with the complexity of the problem, the busy nature of his staff and his perceived lack of the requisite skills needed for the planning effort, may have caused him to seek out the COL Warden’s Checkmate staff and the SAMS graduates. These historical events reiterate the idea that crises take on a life of their own and require problem resolution.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS

The evidence and the analysis of this study indicates that the unified combatant commands have more to do than personnel, organization and training will allow to conduct crisis action planning for contingencies without augmentation from other sources.

The evidence suggests that current joint doctrine provides extensive guidance to combatant commanders and their staffs for the production of theater engagement plans, deliberate planning and the mechanism to plan for a crisis situation. Joint Doctrine presents a comprehensive list of tasks that the unified combatant commands must execute which requires a great deal of simultaneous
execution. A lot of tasks, a JPME program that is still maturing, and the
differences in the service makeup of each unified combatant command results in
staffs that are not capable of conducting the multitude of tasks that they are
responsible for in order to accomplish the CINC's mission.

Well trained and resourced staffs execute tasks which result in
accomplishment of the mission. Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act sets
requirements for joint staff officers, it does not link the personnel requirements to
any parameters requiring a list of minimum fundamental tasks that must be
executed by unified combatant commands simultaneously. The CINC
determines what tasks support his mission and decides what he will and will not
do.

Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act provided for JPME to train these officers,
it did not establish the precise training requirements. Those requirements are
left for the services and the CINCs to establish.

The tension to plan during an ongoing crisis and continue deliberate planning
has caused CINCs to look to other organizations that could fill the void caused
the crisis. Recent history has shown that the commanders of the unified
combatant commands knew the strengths and weaknesses of their organization
and knew when to seek assistance.

The fact that the both Generals Woerner and Schwarzkopf knew when to ask
for assistance and what assistance to ask for would indicate that the growing
pains of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and deficiencies in Joint Professional Military
Education are recognized by senior leadership.
The military community should consider reevaluating the manner in which SAMS graduates are placed in combatant commands. As the JPME program continues to grow and be defined, the resources that are most commonly used, SAMS graduates should be required to serve in staff positions in the combatant commands. This places that valuable asset in reach of the CINC prior to a crisis and allows battlestaff training and cohesion to occur.

Additionally, the services should re-examine the mix of service staff officers that are required in each unified combatant command, based on the nature of the mission and the AOR. The services should consider a standardized mix of staff officers that possess the skills necessary to simultaneously execute the required tasks for each unified combatant command’s mission.

Finally, the Joint Military Professional Education program should continue to change as the services and the unified combatant commands require. Since the School of Advanced Military Studies is a respected institution by the combatant commands, Joint Forces Command should study the feasibility of integrating portions of the curriculum into Joint Education conducted at the service schools and the Armed Forces Staff College.

Augmenting a combatant command in crisis can portray the image that the command does not trust and believe in its personnel, and is not capable of accomplishing its assigned missions. Additionally, it reflects poorly on the military institution to properly resource the units that are tasked with supporting and defending the Constitution of the United States.
**ENDNOTES**


3. Ibid., iv.

4. Ibid., vii.

5. Ibid., I-2.

6. Ibid., I-3.

7. Ibid., I-3.

8. Ibid., I-4.

9. Ibid., I-5.

10. Ibid., I-6.

11. Ibid., I-7.


15. Ibid., III-9.

16. Ibid., III-12.


19 Ibid., I-11.

20 Ibid., I-11.


22 Ibid., A-1.

23 Ibid., A-2.


29 Ibid., 39.

30 Ibid., 98.

31 Ibid., 124.

32 Ibid., 137.


37 Ibid., 18.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 23.

40 Ibid., 25.

41 Ibid., 26.

42 Ibid., 37.

43 Ibid., 71.

44 Ibid.


46 Ibid., 76.

47 Ibid., 125.


50 Ibid., 124.


53 Christopher L. Baggot, A Leap into the Dark: Crisis Action Planning for Operation Restore Hope (School of Advanced Military Studies, United States
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