**THE POLITICS OF INTERNAL SECURITY: RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVILIANS, THE MILITARY, AND POLICE.**

**AUTHOR(S)**
CAPT PIKEY SUNCHARL MARLEE R

**PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

**SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AFIT/CIA, BLDG 125
2950 P STREET
WPAFB OH 45433

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Abstract:

This research examines the politics of internal security in countries facing prolonged domestic conflict. The research question addresses the separation between civil-military and policing theories and investigates the effects of long-term domestic conflicts on the relationship between civilian politicians, the military and police.

A combined structural-cultural approach is applied to provide insight into the balance of power in internal security operations. A model of civil-military-police relations is applied to three cases to examine the relationship between the independent variables and theoretical outcomes for internal security politics. The independent variables of structural capability in domestic defense missions and cultural attitudes toward military and police actions are analyzed.

Comparison of country-specific research on domestic conflicts in Israel, Colombia and the United Kingdom's Northern Ireland provides insight into the research question. Results indicated more structural capability in internal security for the police forces in Northern Ireland and Colombia, while military institutions dominated Israeli internal security. Quantitative assessment of media reports revealed lower levels of support for latitude in police and military security activities in the United Kingdom than in Israel and Colombia.
The results demonstrate the value of augmenting existing structural theory on civil-military relations with cultural considerations to explain the politics of internal security. These findings provide important implications for policy-makers evaluating courses of action to improve civil-military relations and solve long-standing security conflicts in democratic nations.

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RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVILIANS, THE MILITARY, AND POLICE

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[Signature]

[Signature]
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ABSTRACT

This research examines the politics of internal security in countries facing prolonged domestic conflict. It builds upon existing theories of civil-military relations for democracies and recognizes police roles in the security matters that challenge nations. The central research question addresses the separation between civil-military and policing theories and investigates the effects of long-term domestic conflicts on the relationship between civilian politicians, the military and police.

Recognizing the weaknesses of existing structural research in civil-military relations, a combined structural-cultural approach is applied to provide insight into the balance of power in internal security operations. A model of civil-military-police relations is applied to three cases to examine the relationship between the independent variables and theoretical outcomes for internal security politics. The independent variables of structural capability in domestic defense missions and cultural attitudes toward military and police actions are analyzed. Historical institutional analysis of military and police capabilities are used along with content analysis of media sources reporting on internal security for each of the selected cases. Sample media reports are categorized based on whether or not they favor latitude in police and military security activities, favor limitations on police and military activities, or remain neutral on the subject.

Comparison of country-specific research on domestic conflicts in Israel, Colombia and the United Kingdom's Northern Ireland provides insight into the central research question. Results for these countries indicated more structural
capability in internal security for the police forces in Northern Ireland and Colombia, while military institutions dominated Israeli internal security. Quantitative assessment of media reports revealed lower levels of support for latitude in police and military security activities in the United Kingdom than in Israel and Colombia.

The results demonstrate the value of augmenting existing structural theory on civil-military relations with cultural considerations to explain the politics of internal security. In the cases studied, long-term domestic conflict forced each state to choose between utilizing police or military forces in internal defense; structural capabilities of the military and police forces as well as cultural opinions about the way in which internal security operations should be carried out ultimately affected the decisions. In addition to lending some credibility to the proposed model of civil-military-police relations, these findings provide important implications for policy-makers evaluating courses of action to improve civil-military relations and solve long-standing security conflicts in democratic nations.
INTRODUCTION

Although not specifically concerned with internal security matters, Max Weber distinctly emphasized the state "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" as part of his political theory (Weber, 1976: 78). Within modern democratic states, management of the means of physical force remains relevant as scholars examine the relationship between the military establishment and civilian politicians. In the midst of the changing international security environment, some militaries shifted toward a more internal focus and began taking on non-combat missions formerly reserved for law enforcement. At the same time, some police forces militarized in an attempt to quell internal conflict, thereby blurring the line between police and military roles. In determining how to deal with internal security matters, civilian politicians often get caught in the crossfire between military and law enforcement establishments. The focus of this study, therefore, will be on the nature of the ever-changing balance between actors involved in the politics of internal security. More precisely, what effects do long-term domestic conflicts have on the relationship between civilian politicians, the military and police?

To begin with, the notion of civilian supremacy on defense and security matters builds upon Robert Dahl's minimal definition of democratic attributes. It is not simply enough for democracies to carry out elections. In addition, effective democratic governance requires that the executive be constrained by law and an independent judiciary, that the military and police remain under civilian control.
and that independent institutions exist to represent societal interests in politics. So, “effective democratic governance involves clear and consistent subordination of the military and the police to civilian institutions” (Lowenthal, 1996: 6). Brian Loveman echoes this thought in his study of civil-military relations in Latin America:

The relationships and overlapping roles among military institutions, civilian government policy-makers, and the rest of society are the core issue of civil-military relations and a central challenge to the creation and maintenance of democratic polities in Latin America as well as elsewhere. (Loveman, 1999: xiii)

In addition, civilian politicians, who can be held accountable for bad decisions are much easier to replace than non-elected military leaders; for this reason, civilian leadership helps preserve domestic liberty (Desch, 1999: 6). Whatever logic is used to describe the relationship, most theorists agree that civilian control of the military and police forces promotes democracy.

As Weber implied, a state’s civilian representatives should ultimately control the use of force by the police and armed forces. Although police forces, whose primary role is concentrated on the maintenance of law and order, should be closely tied to civilian politicians, they should not become politicized.

Although the police believe that they are impartial and apolitical, because law and order does not operate in a political vacuum there has always been a strong relationship between the state or the dominant political regime and the police organization. It is the traditional status of the police organization that it is related closely to the state and other political bodies and is not completely independent from politics. It is clear, therefore, that the police have a close relationship with the state or the state’s policies. (Aydin, 1996: 42)
Democracy clearly becomes weakened when the state lacks a fair and impartial ability to maintain law, order and internal security via the military and police forces. As part of the internal security infrastructure and key part of states' 'monopoly of force,' police should not be overlooked.

The enduring nature of order-maintenance is derived from the fact that it fulfills a primary need of all states. If order is not maintained, the process of nation-building will be based on only incomplete and insecure foundations. In this respect, it is surprising that the police have until recently either been overlooked or taken for granted, since they are commonly (if sometimes mistakenly) understood to provide the first line of defense against internal disorder. (Brewer, 1988: 1)

Although police forces are often disregarded in much of the theoretical literature, their important role in state politics and internal security should not be overlooked.

With this brief introduction to the topic of law and order and internal politics, it is necessary to refocus on the central question of how internal conflict affects the relationship between civilian politicians, the military and police.

To simplify, this study may be characterized as an analysis of the balance of power between civilian politicians, the military and the police regarding internal security matters. For the purposes of limiting this inquiry, only democratic nations facing prolonged internal conflict will be considered. The balance of power in non-democratic or authoritarian dictatorships is not considered within the purview of this investigation. Rather, the focus here is on the way in which democratic politicians, military forces and police vie for influence and control of internal security matters and how the politics surrounding
those issues ultimately affect democracy. As has been explained and will be
explored further later in this study, the link between civil-military-police relations
and democracy assumes that extensive military involvement in internal security
matters and/or use of militarized police forces may indicate an abandonment of
democratic norms. This study focuses on long-term domestic conflict in order to
examine trends in civil-military-police relations. Although individual events and
violent acts may be examined for their individual significance, I argue that the
nature of the relationship between civilians, military and police forces can be best
examined by looking at aggregate data, rather than by concentrating on singular
incidents.

This focus on long-term domestic conflict includes analysis of several
types of political actions. Taylor and Jodice’s useful definition of a ‘political
event’ includes any physical action, verbal utterance or symbolic statement
associated with political demands (Taylor and Jodice, 1983: 8–9). In order to
focus on less than peaceful political events, this definition must be further limited
to armed attacks and as well as responses to those attacks. Taylor and Jodice
define an ‘armed attack’ as “an act of violent political conflict carried out by (or
on behalf of) an organized group with the object of weakening or destroying the
power exercised by another group” (Taylor and Jodice, 1983: 29). In other words,
the focus of this paper will be on the actions of civilian politicians, military and
police officials involved in prolonged internal political conflict, to include armed
opposition group attacks and responses—armed or unarmed—to such activity.
In order to examine this type of conflict and the internal security politics surrounding it, a combined structural-cultural approach will be used, rather than more common structure-only analyses of civil-military relations. A model of civil-military-police relations will be applied to examine the relationship between the independent variables and theoretical outcomes for internal security politics. In bridging the gap between civil-military and policing literature, this study indicates the importance of both structure and culture in internal security politics. Scholars and policy-makers concerned with civil-military relations and internal conflict, therefore, must go beyond simple solutions and recognize the complexity of internal security politics.

With these introductory arguments in mind, I first offer a review of the current theory in order to provide the basis for research on this topic. Next, critiques of competing means of analysis will be offered to justify the specific theoretical approach used in this design. Following that, I will explain my hypotheses and proposed model of civil-military-police relations. This framework will be applied to internal security politics and tested in several cases. Findings from the structural and cultural analyses of these cases will be evaluated in the concluding remarks, along with comments on the broader contributions of this study. Despite the limited nature of this particular investigation, it provides compelling results and opportunities for future research into the topic.
EXISTING MODELS OF CIVIL-MILITARY AND POLICE RELATIONS

Theories by some of the more prominent scholars of civil-military relations—Samuel Huntington, Alfred Stepan, Michael Desch, and Louis Goodman—will be analyzed to provide an intellectual niche for this course of research. While there are many scholars offering arguments about the proper role of police in society, only one, Ronald Weitzer, offers a model of police relations describing security functions in societies facing intense internal conflicts. Although each provides unique contributions to the field of civil-military relations, their theories alone do not adequately address the entirety of the central research topic.

An initial survey of the literature reveals a distinct separation between schools of thought concerning civil-military and civil-police relations. In addition to the lack of theory on combined civil-military-police relations, most existing theories concentrate on labeling or describing the status of the civil-military relations in individual countries, but do little to explain how or why they have achieved such a level of relations. More troubling, few theories address the question of how a nation faced with poor or less than perfect civil-military relations can voluntarily improve its situation. Based on the existing research, one is left wondering: what should a country wracked with internal conflict, an overzealous military and out-of-control police force do? Criticisms of these
existing theories provide the framework for my proposed model of civil-military-police relations.

Samuel Huntington’s analysis of civil-military relations is often cited as one of the groundbreaking works in the field. In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argues for ‘objective civilian control’ of the military, which involves:

high military professionalism, subordination of the military to civilian leaders who make decisions on foreign policy and military policy, recognition of an area of autonomy for the military, and minimization of military intervention in politics. (Huntington, 1996: 3-4)

Written in the wake of the Cold War, Huntington predicts that reduction of external threats to security will improve civil military relations. Michael Desch’s later theory contradicted Huntington’s forecast. Although most scholars agree with Huntington’s premise of civilian control, not all agree that the military should be totally apolitical; some analysts question whether a truly apolitical military would still support democracy. Nevertheless, his theory provided food for thought and gave rise to additional theories of civil-military relations.

Based on the assumption that civilian control is necessary for effective democratic governance, Alfred Stepan proposes a framework for conceptualizing civil-military relations. Stepan references Latin American cases where militaries refocused on internal security missions and became over-politicized. His model attempts to explain variations in civil-military relations with the independent variables of military prerogatives and military contestation. According to his model, the levels of ‘military contestation’—the extent to which there is
agreement or dispute between the military and government on key issues, and 'military prerogative'—the military's assumption that they have a right to control or affect policy decisions in certain areas, determine the status of the relationship between civilian authorities and the military establishment (Stepan, 1988: 93).

Figure 1. Stepan's Model of Civil-Military Relations

This model emphasizes the impact of agreement or disagreement between politicians and military leaders on civil-military relations without considering the impact of other factors such as structure or culture. In addition, the theory is primarily concerned with the partnership between the military and civilian politicians and has little to say about the role of police forces in this relationship. This oversight is significant, since militaries may contest their role in internal, police-related functions. The model's application is most useful when analyzing cases of military takeover or transition to civilian democratic rule; it has less
explanatory value when analyzing cases where civilian control is not in doubt, but where the roles and missions of the military and police are in question.

In order to expand upon Stepan’s theory, Michael Desch posits a structural theory of civil-military relations which considers the location of security threats and intensity of those threats as determining factors in civil-military relations. He assumes that the structural threat environment affects the type of relationship that will exist between military and state institutions (Desch, 1999: 113).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Threats</th>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Threats</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Poor (Q3)</td>
<td>Worst (Q4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Good (Q1)</td>
<td>Mixed (Q2)</td>
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</table>

Figure 2. Desch’s Model of Civil-Military Relations

According to him, a nation facing high threats from its external environment and low internal problems is more likely to have good civil-military relations; the military will be externally oriented and less inclined to meddle in domestic politics. Militaries are more likely to challenge the civilian authorities when internal threats are high and external threats are less troublesome (Desch, 1999: 113).
His selected case studies for each type of civil-military relationship are shown in Figure 3.

**Figure 3. Desch’s Civil-Military Relations Cases**

This case selection indicates how shifts in the structural threat environment caused corresponding shifts in civil-military relations within individual countries.

Desch’s selection of cases representing mostly industrialized nations is intended to demonstrate the historical application of his theory. For example, he argues that the United States experienced good civil-military relations during World War II and most of the Cold War, with a short interlude of ‘mixed’ relations from 1945-47. He characterizes US civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War as mixed, as well (Desch, 1999: 20-21).
Less clear are Desch’s predictions for situations where nations face high internal and external threats (Quadrant 3) or low internal and external threats (Quadrant 2). In what is called a ‘mixed’ civil-military relationship (Quadrant 2), with low internal and external threats, Desch describes the potential for a “civilian leadership without knowledge, experience, or interest in military affairs,” which may result in unclear control (Desch, 1999: 16). Civilian control of the military in situations of high external and internal threat (Quadrant 3) is similarly complex, since “competing internal and external threats may cause splits among civilian institutions” as well as among military leaders (Desch, 1999: 17). In these situations, Desch admits that his structural theory must incorporate ideational factors in order to maintain its predictive validity. He states, “In quadrants two and three, structure is not fully determinate; other possible determinants are domestic ideational variables such as military doctrine” (Desch, 1999: 17). In these cases, he argues, the nation’s military doctrine, which is operationalized in missions and roles for the military, determines how it will get along with civilian politicians.

Like most structural theories, Desch’s downplays cultural influences. Although he attempts to encapsulate non-structural influences within the concept of doctrine, he fails to capture the independent effect of societal values on civil-military relations. Desch continues, stating:

The best way to identify a military’s mission is to examine its doctrine, which can be understood as the software that runs the military hardware. A particular military’s mission is determined
largely by the international and domestic security environments that the nation faces. (Desch, 1996: 14)

If his analogy is correct, then culture may be considered the operating system that runs the ‘doctrinal software’ Desch references and interprets the environment. I contend that militaries with similar doctrine may choose to react to similar threat environments differently based on their unique cultural attributes; civilian leaders and citizens also respond differently to security operations based on their cultural values. By incorporating cultural influences into this structural theory, a more comprehensive explanation may be possible.

While Desch opted to expand upon Stepan’s theory, Louis Goodman attempted to delineate military and non-military roles. Simply stated, Goodman argues that civil-military relations become complicated when militaries undertake non-combat roles. He asserts three criteria should be used as a guide to determine whether or not the military should accept a particular duty. The military should not undertake a task if any of Goodman’s three criteria are violated.

1) The military’s involvement would prevent other groups from undertaking the activity in question, thus hindering civilian organizations’ ability to develop critical skills and expand their role in society;
2) the military would gain additional privileges that it would be subsequently reluctant to give up; and
3) the armed forces might become so involved in noncombat activities that it would neglect its core defense mission. (Diamond, 1996: xv)

Although militaries are often ordered to respond to domestic terrorist incidents and natural disasters, Goodman emphasizes that such missions must only be accepted on a transitional, temporary basis. Formal schedules should dictate a
return of those duties to civilians or police and the departure of the military from that mission (Diamond, 1996: xv). Goodman provides a more comprehensive theory of Desch’s notion of ‘doctrine’ by outlining specific requirements for appropriate military roles.

In the separate field of civil-police relations, Ronald Weitzer noted the lack of research into the problems of policing in strife-torn societies and began to formulate his own pioneering theory. He explains his dissatisfaction with the existing policing literature:

...we know little about societies where police-community relations are at their very worst, where policing is the source of deep grievances and intense conflicts. In deeply divided societies, the police face more serious legitimacy problems, at least with respect to one communal group, than in more integrated societies. (Weitzer, 1995: 1)

He addresses this research problem by positing his own theory to describe policing in societies faced with severe internal threats—the ‘divided society model of policing.’ According to his model, police in such situations become politicized and operate with a systematic bias in their law enforcement, favoring dominant groups; police maintain dual responsibility for internal security and law enforcement, but are granted latitude in controlling the population (Weitzer, 1995: 5).

This model provides an excellent description of police activities in nations facing internal security problems. In such cases, Weitzer argues that police forces adopt ‘counterinsurgency policing’ practices. He explains:
Counterinsurgency policing (or security policing) refers to efforts to maintain public order, combat sectarian, intercommunal violence, and protect the state from subversive and violent opponents. We find it in crowd control during demonstrations and riots; surveillance of suspect individuals and groups; undercover operations against special targets; militarized patrolling in troubled areas; and the use of exceptional legal powers on the street, during house searches, and to detain and interrogate suspects. (Weitzer, 1995: 10)

He adds that, while there are clearly some instances where strict counterinsurgency practices are deemed necessary by the state, unchecked and overzealous policing often leads to public estrangement from the police and state.

Reviewing the theorists, Stepan attempted to provide a structural theory that incorporated military prerogatives and potential for disagreement with civilian leaders. Desch expanded that theory to incorporate more environmental factors, Goodman focused on mission separation and its relation to civil-military relations, and Weitzer offered a model of policing in divided societies. No single theory of civil-military relations or policing encompasses the modern threat environment, in which extended domestic conflict creates internal security problems. In such situations, civilian politicians, police and military leaders together determine what actions will be carried out. In the next section, the benefits of a fused structural/cultural approach to civil-military-police relations will be offered as a precursor to the proposed model and testable hypotheses.
THEORETICAL APPROACH & MODEL

Clearly, a need exists for a model to more adequately explain the politics of internal security, where politicians, military and police officials interact. While not totally abandoning existing models, I propose a framework incorporating the structural emphasis of existing models with a cultural perspective on civil-military-police relations.

Stepan and Desch’s models both rely on structural assumptions. Stepan is quoted as saying, a

central task of the political sociology of the military is to look at both the military institution and the political system and to determine how the special institutional characteristics of a particular military establishment shape its response to influences coming from the political system. (Desch, 1999: 11)

Although Desch alludes to ideational influences in his concept of military doctrine, he stops short of incorporating culture as an independent variable in his model.

Independent of the structural threat environment, however societal attitudes about the proper role for police and military forces in society play a part in determining civil-military relations. Samuel Huntington explains that particularly now, civilian and military cultures are diverging. Such a distancing may have ramifications for civil-military relations.

Conscription is slowly on the way out...The era of the conscript army, which began with the French Revolution, would appear to be fading into history. With it, presumably, will go the close identification between citizen and soldier, people and army. At least some theorists of democracy have argued that such close identification is highly desirable—‘every citizen a soldier, every
soldier a citizen," in Jefferson's words—and the movement away from that ideal requires rethinking the nature of civil-military relations in a democratic society. (Huntington, 1996: 10-11).

If democratic assumptions are correct—that societal opinions shape political decisions—then cultural opinions about the proper use of the military certainly have an influence on civil-military relations.

Similarly, police must operate within cultural constraints. While many police organizations share professional standards, the way in which those formal standards are applied vary in different societies. Even international police executives agreed that law enforcement organization and operation are affected by culture.

In the ultimate analysis each society has to find out what was feasible for it to do to organize the police on democratic standards and values. It must be realized that the professional police standards (the rule of law, accountability, transparency of decision-making, etc.) are to a large extent universal. However, the police function within cultural limits and constraints as well as economic realities. (Das, 1997: 628).

Because police and militaries may find themselves involved in similar internal security missions, and since societal culture and environmental threats affect both, it seems logical to incorporate these factors into a theoretical framework for studying the relationship between politicians, police and military forces. From a policy perspective, it makes sense to question whether or not states have any chance of improving their civil-military relations situations when their threat environments remain static. Desch's structural theory implies that the answer
would be 'no'; a combined structural cultural approach may offer more dynamic explanations.

Such a combination of cultural considerations into structural theory should not be surprising. Many theorists have attempted to 'round out' structural theories by adding cultural considerations. Marc Ross argues that,

...culture is too often ignored as a domain of political life and that cultural analyses can enrich the way we conceptualize areas such as political economy, social movements, and political institutions in a number of ways, often complementing the insights derived from interest and institutional approaches. (Ross, 1997: 44)

Culture frames the context in which politics occurs and allows interpretation of the actions and motives of others. This type of analysis makes sense of decisions about whether or not to involve and to what extent the military will tackle internal missions.

So, what effect does domestic strife have on the relationship between civilian politicians, the military and police? A possible answer to this research question lies in a proposed model which incorporates military structures, police internal security capabilities and cultural attitudes concerning military and police activities as independent variables; civil-military-police relations regarding internal security becomes the dependent variable. The influence of cultural attitudes on policy results in some degree of congruence, where societal expectations match the actual roles carried out by police and military forces.
**Independent Variables**
-- Structure/capabilities of Military & Police
-- Cultural attitudes

**Dependent Variables:**
-- Civil-military-police relations
-- Policy/culture congruence

**Intervening Factors**
*Threat environment*

**Figure 4.** Proposed Model of Civil-Military-Police Relations

Measurement of the independent variables is somewhat subjective, although basic guidelines may be applied. "Military structure and capabilities" refers to the degree to which the military is structured, manned and equipped to handle internal security problems. For example, militaries with special duty or regular units assigned to internal security or counterinsurgency missions will have a higher 'score' for this variable than do militaries which lack such units or are legally banned from such security operations. Along those same lines, then, 'police structure and capabilities' refers to the degree to which the police forces are structured, manned and equipped to handle internal security problems. Police units structured primarily for local law enforcement and investigation duties, therefore, 'score' lower than those with militarized, special duty organizations designed to handle internal conflicts.

Although similarly subjective, cultural attitudes may also be generalized to a certain degree. Based on historical experience or socialization, it seems reasonable to assume that a population may be either more or less inclined to
favor aggressive law enforcement. For example, if a country had recently experienced instances of military human rights abuses during counterinsurgency operations, its populace may be adverse to aggressive law enforcement tactics and more supportive of police and/or military limitations. States with positive experiences with fair law enforcement by either police or military forces may be more likely to approve policies allowing police and military latitude in security operations. Such states may even afford this latitude for longer periods of time than in states having a legacy of police or military abuse. Almond and Verba’s notion of cultural congruence is embedded in this variable, where political culture plays a role in resulting political structures “appropriate for the culture” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 21). This variable, then, represents a small portion of Almond and Verba’s overall concept of political culture. Here, only specific cultural attitudes and political orientations toward internal security operations will be considered.

This model is not designed to test whether or not the threat environment affects civil-military relations. This is assumed to be true, based on Desch’s structural analysis of internal and external threats. The independent factors that will be considered in this analysis are police and military structures and capabilities, as well as cultural attitudes toward those structures and capabilities. Cases where cultural factors become most relevant are found in Desch’s model in quadrants two and three, where the threat environment alone is indeterminate. Desch characterizes civil-military relations in these circumstances as mediocre to
poor. However, if military and police structures and capabilities as well as culture are involved in these situations, then perhaps Desch’s model can be improved.

In this case, the independent variables will be analyzed by comparing military structure and capability. Such investigation should reveal which establishment—police or military—would be more likely to command the most influence over internal security policy. The matrix in Figure 5 juxtaposes military structures and capabilities against police characteristics, yielding some theoretically interesting results. If only one of the establishments has high structural capability for internal security, then it will have more influence than the less capable organization. If the police and military are equally equipped and structured for intensive internal security operations, or if neither is prepared, then the results are less certain. If Desch’s assertions prove true, culture may be the

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Military Structure/Capability</th>
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<th>Low</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mixed/Combination</td>
<td>Primarily Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Primarily Military</td>
<td>Mixed/Combination</td>
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**Figure 5.** Proposed Comparison of Military/Police Involvement in Internal Security Based on Structure and Capabilities
significant factor in these indeterminate cases; but since the matrix does not include cultural influences, this initial framework provides little explanatory power beyond Desch's original model.

In order to represent the influences of all of the independent variables on internal security political relationships in a better way, the variables of structure and capability may be combined on a single axis; cultural attitudes toward internal security operations may be represented on the second axis. The resulting matrix is shown in Figure 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure/Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favors Latitude in Action</th>
<th>Militarized Police Force</th>
<th>Potential for Military Role Expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favors Limited Action</td>
<td>Primarily Police</td>
<td>Temporary Military Intervention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6** Proposed Model Comparing Military and Police Involvement in Internal Security Based on Structure/Capabilities and Cultural influences

The horizontal axis of the matrix depicts the relative strength and capabilities of police versus military forces regarding internal security missions; when
comparing the military and police forces, one will be deemed more ‘capable.’ For the vertical axis, cultural attitudes are categorized as either favoring limited internal security actions (strict adherence to search warrants, no suspension of individual rights) or supporting more relaxed actions by internal security forces (such as long-term emergency powers). This more comprehensive comparison includes both structural and cultural variables and generates potential outcomes, which can be tested.

Although, structural theories of civil-military relations provide important theoretical foundations, they do not adequately explain civil-military relations in all cases. The literature is especially weak in addressing situations where countries face prolonged internal conflict. In some cases, the limitations of existing models leave room for discussion of cultural factors in civil-military relations. In addition, because research on this topic remains divided between studies of civil-military relations and civil-police relations, it seems appropriate to bridge this theoretical divide by providing an integrated analysis of civil-military-police relations.
HYPOTHESES

Each quadrant of the matrix in Figure 6 produces a falsifiable hypothesis.

Four hypotheses are listed below.

**Quadrant 1/Hypothesis 1:** When police structures and capabilities in internal security surpass those of the military, and when culture supports freedom of action for internal security operations, police forces may become militarized to combat the threat.

**Quadrant 2/Hypothesis 2:** When military structures and capabilities in internal security surpass those of the police, and when culture supports freedom of action for internal security operations, the military may expand its role in combating internal threats.

**Quadrant 3/Hypothesis 3:** When police structures and capabilities in internal security surpass those of the military, and when culture supports limited action for internal security operations, police forces will remain limited in their security operations.

**Quadrant 4/Hypothesis 4:** When military structures and capabilities in internal security surpass those of the police, and when culture supports limited action for internal security operations, military forces may temporarily be used in security operations.

Case studies will be selected based on the dependent variable to examine the relationship between independent variables and these theoretical outcomes. After choosing cases with differing levels of military and police involvement in internal security, the independent variables of structure/capability and cultural attitudes can be evaluated. If the independent variables change according to the
hypotheses, then the model may be validated. If true, civil-military-police relations must be affected by something other than simply the threat level facing a country, as most theories assume. This study merely attempts to assess to plausibility of a causal inference—the relationship between structure/capability and culture to civil-military-police relations. King, Keohane and Verba describe the usefulness of research designs that select cases based on a range of values on the dependent variable. According to them:

A retrospective research design may help us to gain some valuable information about the empirical plausibility of a causal inference, since we might well find that high and low values of the dependent variable are associated with high and low values, respectively, of potential explanatory variables. (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 141).

Results in these cases may lay the groundwork for additional research to confirm causal relationships. King, Keohane and Verba continue:

If we found that high and low values of potential explanatory variables are associated with high and low values of the dependent variable, we might then want to design a study in which observations are selected only on the explanatory variable(s) to assess whether our hypothesis is correct. (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 141-42)

For the purposes of this study, cases will be selected on the dependent variable of police and military involvement in internal security in order to check the influence of structural and cultural variables upon the civil-military-police relationship. Israel, Colombia and the United Kingdom were selected based on the type of police/military involvement in internal security.
In the case of Israel, its very capable military has been executing internal security missions. Although the border police are officially responsible for internal security in the occupied territories, the military forces have challenged their duties. The police in Israel are so heavily armed and engaged in internal security that they neglect more regular law enforcement activities. An Israeli law enforcement executive comments,

...the police were militaristic, armed, and a coercive instrument of control at the disposal of the government. They could be utilized for policing democracies but they could not be democratic. His point of view was based on his experience in Israel where the police were heavily armed, disproportionately engaged in security and protective roles, and only minimally involved in service tasks. (Das, 1997: 610)

However, to more accurately prove the hypothesis in question, additional historical analysis of Israel’s security challenges, as well as more information on its evolving cultural attitudes toward security operations, are needed.

In Colombia, its military forces have become inextricably linked to internal security operations in the name of counterdrug and counterinsurgency operations. Its heritage of caudillo-like security operations have created a culture in which intense, war-like internal operations are no surprise. And since most of these operations occur in remote portions of the country, the general population may not oppose their continuation. The Colombian military’s missions have become almost synonymous with internal security, with a virtually nonexistent external combat capability. In fact, when Colombia did deploy some of its military personnel abroad to help with United Nations operations during the
Central American peace process, they accomplished security duties, as well (Goodman, 1996: 38).

In Northern Ireland, the police forces are in the process of shifting from a “war model of policing” to more traditional law enforcement operations. During the course of its internal conflict, several emergency decrees were adopted, which granted additional investigative powers to the police. However, now that peace negotiations have proceeded, “a fundamental shift is required, so that civil policing rather than counterinsurgency policing predominates” (Weitzer, 1996: 37).

Three cases will be offered to assess the proposed model. Colombia is selected as the case for the first hypothesis, Israel as the test for the second and the United Kingdom for hypothesis three. No test case meeting the dependent variable requirement—temporary military intervention in internal security, while also sharing other similarities with the selected cases. No other democracy facing prolonged internal conflict, but in the midst of on-going negotiations between opposing parties during the 1996 through 1999 time frame, was found.

In addition, hypothesis four reflects the least problematic situation in which the military is the most restrained in its internal security operations, despite having the capability to intervene. Based on Michael Desch’s civil-military relations theory, the state of relations within such a country could be termed ‘Good,’ where their exists little division on the proper military focus. Because this inquiry attempts to address instances where the military or police forces have
been employed in long-term internal security operations rather than on a temporary basis, no specific case study will provided for this hypothesis.

If these hypotheses prove true, then it may be possible to explain shifts in civil-military relations due to cultural factors, in addition to the structural threat factors Desch suggests. Again, this cultural theory is not intended to independently determine civil-military relations; rather, combining this theory with Desch’s rationale may allow explanation of subtle shifts in civil-military relations that occur independent of structure alone. This logic may, then, explain how a particular state shifts from ‘good’ to ‘mixed’ or from ‘poor’ to ‘worst’ even though its internal and external threats remain unchanged. Reference back to Desch’s matrix helps illustrate this point visually.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Threats</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Poor ⇐ Worst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Good ⇐ Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7.** Possible Shifts in Civil-Military Relations Based on Addition of Cultural Variables
Resulting shifts in civil-military relations provide hope for nations which find themselves in unchanging threat environments. Can a state facing high internal threats and low external threats ever improve its civil-military relations from ‘worst’ to ‘poor?’ Can a more fortunate state facing low internal threats and high external threats jeopardize its ‘good’ relations to ‘mixed’ levels? Policy-related questions such as these may be answered in part by this model along with future research.
METHODS OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

The independent variables in this study are measured through two separate means. Structure and capability of military and police forces will be evaluated primarily through structural analysis of the military and police forces in each of the selected countries. Content analysis of media reports from each of the countries will be used to measure the cultural variable.

Most existing civil-military theory is based on structuralist traditions. Desch and Stepan, in particular analyze the structure of the threat environment and how it affects civil-military relations. They focus on the affects of the threat environment on institutions' organizational structure and power within the political system. When considering this research question, it seems appropriate to analyze the institutions involved—the military, the police and the civilian political structure.

Institutional structure may be analyzed in several ways, from micro-level analysis of individual personalities within institutions to larger-scale, macro studies of the interactions between organizations. Whatever the level of analysis, structural theories assert the importance of structure as a determining factor in political outcomes. For some newer structuralists, "institutions emerged as ligatures fastening sites, relationships, and large-scale processes to each other" (Katzenelson, 1997: 103). The structural approach offers several important insights, by linking structure, political processes and outcomes. The approach allows for study of historical dynamics and seems applicable to an analysis of
how different military and police force structures affect civil-military-police relations. Kathleen Thelen summarizes the focus of the approach on

...the way in which institutions shape the goals political actors pursue and the way they structure power relations among them, privileging some and putting others at a disadvantage. (Thelen, 1992: 2)

This type of analysis seems particularly relevant where there may be a balance of power between competing institutions—as in civil-military-police relations.

If structure is the only determining factor in political outcomes, then similar institutions in different countries should produce similar effects. Some structuralists, however, do admit the role of other determining factors in state politics, such as culture or history. Joseph LaPalombara explains this difficulty:

Cross-national studies, whether of whole or partial systems, tend to be culture-bound. Where cross-national studies focus on institutions such as legislatures, political parties, interest groups and the like, they may obscure the nature of politics in cultural settings where such institutions do not exist or, if they do, represent radically different meaning for the societies involved. (LaPalombara, 1970: 128)

In this study, countries with similar national structures (liberal democracies), but differing sub-structures (police and military organizations) are compared to see their affect on civil-military-police relations.

Consideration of cultural attitudes in this model attempts to compensate for some of the limitations of a structure-only approach. Content analysis offers many unique advantages, which make it an good choice for measuring the cultural variable in the study. Randy Hodson explains the specific utility of content analysis for theory development and testing:
Researchers should consider the analysis of documentary accounts if their primary research goals are the testing of particular hypotheses and theory verification and development. (Hodson, 1999: 9)

In addition, content analysis is very applicable in comparative research because it allows for evaluation of collective behavior, i.e., cultural reaction to internal conflict and security measures, in various countries. According to Janet Buttolph:

Political scientists turn to the written record when the political phenomena that interest them cannot be measured through personal interviews, with questionnaires, or by direct observation. For example, interviewing and observation are of limited utility to researchers interested in large-scale collective behavior (such as civil unrest and the budget allocations of national governments), or in phenomena that are distant in time (Supreme Court decisions during the Civil War) or space (defense spending by different countries). (Buttolph, 1991: 205)

In this study, which tests a new model and involves a variable measuring collective behavior (culture), content analysis an appropriate means of measurement.

Although foreign media sources are more widely disseminated today than ever before, gathering and translating such media reports may be difficult. Fortunately, the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translates and compiles foreign media reports on a daily basis. This government service has compiled open-source materials from its overseas bureaus for over 50 years and has just recently become available to the public. Its daily reports are available on-line within 48-72 hours from the time of the original publication or broadcast (World News Connection). The translated texts of foreign radio, television, periodical and Internet media reports are available on-line to approved U.S.
government agencies and also provided to the public on annually updated compact discs (or for older reports, in written form) in libraries serving as government document depositories. User access to the on-line database was granted for this study based on my affiliation with the U.S. Air Force and their support of my academic program.

By using existing media compilations for this content analysis, many of the difficulties associated with gathering foreign media reports, translation and compilation have been avoided. Since this very representative database already includes a wide variety of media sources from each country—from pro-government to radical sources, it appears to be an excellent source for content analysis intending to measure cultural attitudes toward internal security operations.

By using an existing data source created by a government agency, designed primarily for use by official agencies, however, the source database may be affected by certain biases. For example, countries of interest to the United States receive more attention in the FBIS database and consequentially, have more daily articles included in the database. This source bias should not be a factor in this inquiry, however, since all of the selected cases rank as high national security and political concerns for the United States. Although there were approximately twice as many FBIS articles on Israel per day—perhaps due to US strategic interests, the number of articles relating to Colombia and Northern Ireland also provided an adequate sample size.
This content analysis coded a random sample of daily articles for the presence of references to military or police internal security operations and presence of positive, negative or neutral opinions toward those actions. Only articles dealing with internal political conflict in the selected countries and including responses to that conflict by citizens, military forces, security personnel, political leaders or opposing parties were scored. Content analysis in this case generated three possible categories of cultural attitudes toward internal security operations. Articles were coded based on whether they contained opinions favoring \emph{latitude} in military and/or police actions, opinions favoring \emph{limitations} on military and/or police actions, or neutral opinions. The overall classification procedure is summarized below.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \emph{Does the article...}
    \begin{itemize}
      \item a) Deal with internal political conflict, past, present or future?
      \item b) View a response to the conflict by citizens, military forces, security personnel, opposing parties or political leaders?
      \item c) Come from a media source within the country of interest?
    \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

If the answer to all three questions is \textit{‘yes,’} then article will be coded.

If the answer to either question is \textit{‘no,’} then the article is disregarded for the purposes of this study.

Articles are coded as favoring \emph{latitude} in police and military internal security operations if they contain reporting commending police or military investigation procedures, budgets, personnel or operations, or statements supporting continued aggressive security operations rather than reconciliation and peace talks. Reports
supporting aggressive action by opposing parties in response to the internal conflict are also coded as favoring latitude.

Articles will be coded as favoring limits on police and military internal security operations if they contain reporting critical of police or military investigation procedures, budgets, personnel or operations, or statements supporting immediate and unconditional cessation of violence and peace talks. Reports condemning aggressive action by opposing parties in response to the internal conflict are coded as favoring limits.

Articles will be coded as neutral if they contain only objective facts, descriptions or analysis.

Figure 8. Content Analysis Classification Procedure

Specific search criteria were used to more efficiently locate relevant articles in the electronic database. Media texts from each country were checked for the search string of “Army Military Police Security” to closely approximate the subject area for study. Although a simple Boolean search for the words “Army Military Police Security” might have adequately captured a large enough sample, the search was modified as a ‘Concept Search,’ allowing access to reports containing words similar in meaning to the search string. In this case, the search returned related hit terms in addition to the search string, including: ‘defense,’ ‘guard,’ ‘armed forces,’ ‘constabulary,’ ‘navy,’ and ‘air force.’ In general, this technique resulted in a larger number of articles for classification. However, in the case of the United Kingdom, four times more articles met the initial search criteria than in either of the other cases. To further limit the query results to relevant articles on the internal security situation concerning Northern Ireland, the
search string for the United Kingdom was lengthened with the addition of one search term to “Army Military Police Security Ireland.” This slight modification greatly improved the efficiency of the content analysis by quickly eliminating non-pertinent reports and leaving mostly relevant articles for coding.

In addition to checks for relevancy, the source of each of the media reports was also considered. Because this content analysis attempts to measure the cultural opinions of the citizenry within democratic nations, it seems logical to eliminate articles from media sources outside the target country. For example, London-based news articles describing the Israeli security situation were not coded.

Sampling was used due to the large number of media reports available for each country in the FBIS database. Reports with source dates of the eighth day of each month were evaluated according to the classification procedure. Reports from months in 1996 through 1999 were considered as part of this content analysis in order to avoid anomalies in reported opinions resulting from individual events.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS RESULTS

Organizational structure and capability are used to assess whether the military or police forces have a greater capacity to carry out internal security missions. Police and military forces in each country will be analyzed for the existence of formal organizations specifically designed to combat internal threats. While formal structure provides a starting point for this analysis, the actual internal security practices also will be analyzed to more accurately portray the use of military and police forces in internal security operations. Results for the countries studied indicate more police structural capability in Northern Ireland and Colombia and military predominance in Israeli internal security.

N. Ireland

Internal security problems in Northern Ireland are handled primarily by its police forces—the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). This organization is charged with dual responsibility for internal security and ordinary law enforcement. In problem areas within Northern Ireland, specialized RUC units, called Divisional Mobile Support Units (DMSU), augment regular RUC forces for daily patrolling and riot control missions (Brewer, 1988: 59). The British Army’s Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) also augments police forces as part of the army brigade stationed in Northern Ireland (IISS, 1998: 72). On the border between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland, however, police and military forces are hardly distinguishable; they wear identical uniforms and rank insignia.
Different caps separate the RUC police from the British army forces on the border (Brewer, 1991: 152).

The mission orientation of the RUC emphasizes its internal security mission rather than ordinary crime control. Reform advocates note this fact in their attempts to improve Northern Ireland’s policing.

But further reform is limited by a number of factors, foremost of which is the RUC’s militarization and conspicuous counterinsurgency role. Counterinsurgency policing also interferes with the RUC’s other duty, ordinary crime control. (Weitzer, 1995: 127)

The emphasis on this type policing is reflected in the RUC’s budget and personnel management, where “the resources devoted to security policing are highly disproportionate to those earmarked for ordinary policing.” Northern Ireland’s chief constable reports that up to 80 percent of police time is spent on counterinsurgency policing. As a result, the ordinary crime-fighting mission of the police forces becomes discounted (Weitzer, 1995: 28). Not surprisingly, the number of police personnel in Northern Ireland as a ratio of the population appears excessive at first glance, especially when compared to international averages. A ratio of five police per thousand residents is high by international standards; Northern Ireland boasts a ratio near seven police per thousand residents. The high number of police personnel further demonstrates the manpower emphasis placed on the counterinsurgency function (Brewer, 1988: 56).
While some police forces are limited in their intelligence gathering capabilities, the RUC features its own intelligence organization. An undercover department—E4, executes a variety of unique duties from photographic surveillance and phone tapping to planting electronic listening and tracking devices (Weitzer, 1995: 131). This organizational function is similar to military intelligence units, used to gather information on enemy forces; however, in this case the police seem to have co-opted military functions in order to more effectively accomplish their internal mission.

Institutionally speaking, laws in Northern Ireland seem to support the police internal security mission. The Prevention of Terrorism Act allows detention after arrest for up to 48 hours, and for an additional five days if authorized by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. This policy becomes problematic when arrests are used to gain intelligence information, rather than as a first step toward a conviction. In contrast to Britain, where 80 to 90 percent of arrests lead to criminal charges, far fewer of the persons arrested in Northern Ireland ever see charges filed against them. Instead,

Many of the persons arrested and detained are pressured to provide intelligence on their community or to become informers; in fact, many arrests are motivated by this aim, rather than in reaction to specific offenses with a view toward prosecution. From 1978 to 1986 only 13.7 percent of the persons arrested under the Emergency Provisions Act were charged with an offense. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 30 percent of those arrested from 1974 to 1989 were charged with an offense. The others were interrogated and released. (Weitzer, 1995: 130)
In addition to these legal, albeit questionable, arrest tactics, the RUC is also able to perform searches without the legal restrictions of warrants. Instead of obtaining a warrant, RUC personnel desiring a search need only a senior officer’s determination that “reasonable grounds exist to suspect that contraband is present” (Weitzer, 1995: 130).

Despite these seemingly pro-police laws, police actions are still restricted comparatively more than British Army troops when executing the same internal security duties. Policemen with prior military note a difference in demeanor between the police and armed forces:

Some policemen with past service in Northern Ireland with the British Army have yet to realize that a modern police force cannot adopt the same posture as the Army, and they complain about the constraints on their conduct which police professionalism imposes. (Brewer, 1988: 151)

While this observation describes the limited abilities of the RUC in war-like combat situations, it also acknowledges the existence of at least some degree of limitation on RUC activity.

One possible explanation for the policing structure in Northern Ireland, which uses well-armed police in a counterinsurgency role rather than military forces, is that the British government may seek to downplay the seriousness of the internal conflict. Instead of admitting police inadequacy and the need for a military response to the conflict, the British government chooses to strengthen its police forces to meet heightened challenges.

One obvious reason why the British government insisted on the retention of the policy of police primacy was that the use of the
Army rather than the police for combating political violence
tended to enhance the Provisional IRA’s legitimacy internationally,
by projecting an image of the organisation as a guerrilla army
fighting a war of national liberation. (Brewer, 1988: 66)

In this way, the British government meets its security challenges and avoids
drawing additional attention and criticism to its counterinsurgency policy; a
façade of normalcy in policing remains.

The structure of British organizations designed to counter the domestic
security problems in Northern Ireland, therefore, clearly favors strong police
leadership in internal security matters. Although some latent military capability
exists, via the British army presence in Northern Ireland, most security functions
are handled by well-equipped police forces. Of note, the local police forces
appear so strongly tailored to the internal security mission that ordinary policing
functions in law enforcement suffer.

Israel

Israel faces a myriad of internal security problems that are closely tied to
the external threats it faces from neighboring states. Within Israel and its
occupied territories, conflict between Jews and Arabs as well as within the Jewish
community is frequent.

Within Israel and the territories it has occupied since 1967, there
have been considerable tensions between Jews and Arabs.
Tensions have also arisen inside the Jewish community between
Ashkenazim and Sephardim or Orientals and between ultra-
orthodox religious elements and the more secular-inclined
majority. (Brewer, 1988: 130)
Despite the seriousness of these sources of friction, they are generally viewed as a by-product of larger inter-state conflict.

Israel’s security infrastructure implements defense measures against these internal threats, using its mighty Israel Defense Forces (IDF) along with a comparatively weak police force. The police structure is not as robust as the IDF’s in terms of its capability to counter serious internal security problems. This is in part due to the linkage of internal security problems with external threats. Brewer explains:

Defence against external attack constitutes Israel’s major justification for the most drastic measures it employs against Palestinians, such as deportation and collective punishment, including the demolition of the homes of political offenders. Generally speaking, the Israel Defense Forces are responsible for their implementation. Consequently, both within the occupied territories and in relation to the policing of Arab dissent more widely, the police tend to play a relatively minor and subsidiary role. (Brewer, 1988: 140)

This view of national security in part drives the institutional setup of Israel’s security infrastructure.

In addition, the current Israeli police forces find themselves laden with institutional baggage from the British mandate. The police were the “successor in institutional terms of the Palestinian Police” (Brewer, 1988: 135). Like the Palestinian Police forces, the Israeli police suffered from poor public image and a lack of finance. As a result of its low standing in public opinion, “recruitment into the police was largely from lower socio-economic groups” (Brewer, 1988: 135). Therefore, from the inception of the state of Israel, police institutions were
not highly regarded, and as individuals, most police personnel were not respected, either.

Police forces lost some credibility after much publicized security failures in the West Bank during the 1980s. Because the police forces were subordinate to military authorities in the occupied territories, their actions were ultimately controlled by the military. When security oversights became public, the police defended their actions by citing their subordination to military authority. In one case, a police officer was asked about his failure to investigate harassment of an Arab shopkeeper in Hebron by Jewish settlers. In response, the police officer referenced a letter from the military governor of Hebron, which ordered the police not to investigate the case (Brewer, 1988: 142).

Even if the police wanted to vie for supremacy in internal security, they would not have the institutional strength to do so. Within the cabinet, the Minister of Police is at the bottom of the political pecking order. Overall,

…the Israel Police has been described as the step-brother of the Israel Defence Forces, a description that in reality understates the contrast between the low standing of the police and the enormous prestige the military has acquired in a state perpetually under siege since independence. The huge disparity between the two institutions—not just in size and budget, but also in terms of political influence—constitutes the most important determinant of police-military relations…In particular, the subordinate position of the police has limited the possibility of rivalry between the two institutions in the handling of internal conflict. (Brewer, 1988: 141)

The IDF clearly possess more institutional capability to combat Israel’s internal security problems.
Beyond formal institutional weakness, frequent questioning of police orders weakens the police forces’ authority. Amos Elon describes the extent of Israeli disrespect for police actions—even in the most trivial of law enforcement activities.

Few Israelis respond to police orders on the streets without prolonged argument. Few will docilely accept a traffic ticket for jay-walking, speeding, or driving through a red light, without an intense effort to dissuade the issuing officer from writing out his form, or without, at least, an attempt to bargain over the paragraph he has chosen to describe the contravention, which may call for a higher fine that another paragraph on his list. Bribes are rare and likely to be ineffective; persistent argument, whether reasonable or not, is more often crowned with success. (Elon, 1983: 301)

Along with these ordinary law enforcement activities, the police are assigned to monitoring and controlling internal political protests. The police issue permits for all public demonstrations with over 50 participants, but generally do not respond forcefully to approved or non-approved protests (Brewer, 1988: 143-4).

The security function along the Israeli border with Lebanon officially belongs to the 6,000-person strong Border Police (IISS, 1998: 131). However, a very large number of IDF personnel also man Israel’s northern frontier. Police persistence in this mission stems from their “desire to emulate the position of the military,” to some degree, in internal security (Brewer, 1988: 141). Nevertheless, IDF members serve side by side with the Border Police along the Israeli-Lebanon border as part of a joint-security arrangement between the two groups. Whereas the police cling to this security mission out of concern for bureaucratic turf, the IDF and its personnel deeply value the border security mission. Samuel Katz
describes how the border “is guarded by the best infantrymen the IDF can field;” he notes that IDF soldiers hold their border duty in high regard, as a respected ‘rite of passage’ among their military experiences (Katz, 1990: 25). National military service requirements mean that a large number of Israelis will have personally encountered this dangerous ‘honor.’

While the police forces retain some important security function along the border, they are relegated to mostly mundane law enforcement duties within Israel and the occupied territories. This situation resulted from a combination of factors, including the view of the internal conflict as tied to external threats, the low public opinion of the police forces, and the weak political strength of the institution in the political structure. The IDF generally reign supreme in Israel’s internal security matters.

**Colombia**

In Colombia, a large and well-equipped national police force combats the internal security threat along with military forces. The national police force alone is estimated at 87,000 personnel and boasts an exceptional arsenal of attack aircraft and helicopters. Military personnel are estimated at over 145,000 (IISS, 1998: 219). However, not all of these forces are actively engaged in the controlling the internal security problems. A U.S. Army War College report estimated that as few as 30,000 of the armed forces are actively engaged in combating the internal conflict (Marcella, 1999: 30). While both the military and
the police require additional manning and equipment to counter the threats, it appears that the police infrastructure has been tailored to meet this counterinsurgency mission more than the military forces.

The geography of the land and complexity of the internal conflict complicate internal security efforts. Colombia is three times the size of the state of Montana. Its densely populated urban areas contrast with very remote mountainous and jungle regions in the eastern part of the country. Colombia faces a tangled mix of internal threats from insurgent forces, paramilitary organizations and drug traffickers (Marcella, 1999: 2). The four main leftist insurgent forces include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC), the 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril, or M-19), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación—EPL) (United States Library of Congress).

In response to the insurgent forces, landowners in rural areas formed paramilitary self defense forces to protect their lands—much of which was used to cultivate coca for the drug trade. In 1989, the Colombian government declared a ‘war’ on drug cartels, which resulted in a “backlash by the militias against the government.” New, well-armed and financed militias were formed, with backing from the FARC and ELN (Zackrison, 1997). The narco-paramilitary nexus thus links all three of Colombia’s internal threats—insurgents, paramilitary guerrillas and drug traffickers.
Although subordinate to the minister of national defense, the Colombian police have many of their own specialized units designed for counternarcotics operations as well as rural security. Its organization mirrors the military hierarchy, with separate departments for intelligence, operations and logistics. Like other police forces in countries facing internal security problems, the Colombian police maintain dual responsibility for both ordinary law enforcement and counterinsurgency work. (US Library of Congress, 1988).

Colombia’s armed forces have increased the size of their arsenal to combat the insurgency threat. The army has acquired weaponry designed to fight in conventional as well as unconventional, counterinsurgency operations (also known as COIN operations). US military advisors have also provided counterinsurgency training to many Colombian military personnel. However, the overall structure of the military does not indicate an overwhelming internal security focus. James Zackrison writes in a report from the Institute for National Security Studies that:

Colombia's armed forces (146,600 strong) are ill-prepared to fight counter-insurgency operations. Former Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Esguerra acknowledges that the Army lacks the training and intelligence capability to effectively perform COIN operations. The isolation of military outposts primarily manned by poorly-trained conscripts, the dangerous lawlessness generated by the insurgents and drug traffickers, and the lack of political will throughout the government, all adversely impact morale. (Zackrison, 1997)

The large number of personnel assigned to the geographically dispersed police structure appears better designed to counter the conflict. However, as the conflict
escalates, the military’s involvement also increased.

Overall, the structure of the Colombian internal security forces indicates more coordinated capability on the part of the police. Corruption, poor strategy and training, as well as other factors undoubtedly affect the effectiveness of this force in combating internal threats. Similar difficulties plague the military organizations. Institutionally speaking, then, Colombian police forces retain greater internal security capability than their military brethren.
CONTENT ANALYSIS RESULTS

Quantitative assessment of media reports from Colombia, Israel and the United Kingdom reveal unique differences of opinion regarding internal security operations. Approximately half of the sampled media reports from Colombia and Israel, as expected, favored latitude in military and police internal security activities. In the sample of articles dealing with the Northern Ireland-United Kingdom conflict, an even greater number—over sixty percent—indicated opinions critical of internal security activities and supporting limited action by military and police forces. Overall results are shown in Figure 9; more detailed explanations of the media reporting from each country follow.

9. Content Analysis Results.

The results from the content analysis indicated lower levels of support for latitude in police and military activities in the United Kingdom than in Israel and Colombia. In the United Kingdom, media reports concerning the Northern
Ireland security situation indicated support for limitations on police and military internal security activities. A decisive majority (64 percent) of the sampled articles in the United Kingdom favored limitations versus only 29 percent favoring latitude, for a 35 percentage point difference between groups. In Colombia and Israel, the results were more contentious. In Colombia, 53 percent favored latitude, while 32 percent favored limitations, for a 21 percentage point difference. Israeli results were similar, with 51 percent supporting latitude, 35 percent supporting limitations, and a 16 percent difference between groups.

The results of each country’s content analysis are listed in Tables 1 through 3. From left to right, the columns of each table represent: source dates of the articles analyzed, number of articles supporting latitude in police/military actions, percentage of articles supporting latitude, number of articles supporting limitations, percentage of articles supporting limitations, number of neutral articles, percentage of neutral articles, and total number of relevant articles for each sample date. Dates for which no articles met the relevancy criteria are shown with a ‘daily N’ value of zero. No data was entered for latitude, limitations or neutrality on those dates. A total of 1,091 articles were coded, representing dates from 1996 through 1999. Of that total number, 298 reported on Northern Ireland, 281 on Colombia and 512 on Israel.

Levels of support for latitude or limitations varied widely from sample date to sample date within each of the countries. In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, support for police and military latitude ranged from zero
percent to 67 percent during the first four months surveyed (January-April 1996). Low daily sample sizes on some occasions over-amplified the computed daily percentages. In cases where only one or two relevant articles were available for a specific date, it was statistically possible to produce highly exceptional results, such as zero percent or 100 percent scores. The existence of such widely divergent individual statistics warranted the use of aggregate data compilation. Therefore, it seems appropriate to draw conclusions only from the average support levels computed from 48 sample dates and hundreds of survey articles, as shown in Figure 9. The following lists of detailed results for each country are provided primarily for reference purposes.
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United Kingdom—Northern Ireland


A preponderance of articles concerning the Northern Ireland situation argued for restrained action on the part of internal security officials. Reports protested investigation, arrest and prosecution procedures, as well as policing organizations. Many contained subtle references to a need to uphold democratic rights while maintaining internal security. In one case, Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams condemned British use of a “highly sophisticated listening and tracking device” as a “hugely serious breach of faith” (McGinn, 1999). Separate reports cited the public’s right to know about the widespread use of undercover intelligence agents (Clarke, 1999). Another particularly scathing criticism of so-called ‘measured military responses’ claims that “the much-vaunted experience and professionalism of the security forces seems to disappear in a puff of gunsmoke” (“Let’s not harp back; let’s hope instead,” 1999). Several articles argued for major reform of the existing police forces, in favor of disbandment of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in favor of a new force “acceptable to the whole community and capable of providing a police service for all equally” (Maskey, 1996).
Among the articles supporting latitude in police and military operations, many argued for continued police strength and use of force, aggressive anti-terror legislation, high security postures and lenient investigation procedures. Andrew Mackay, shadow Northern Ireland secretary, argued for continued support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and against efforts to reform or weaken the force. According to him, it had been “the thin green line between the rule of law and the descent into anarchy.” He called RUC officers “real heroes of our time” (Sparrow, 1999). A separate article by the London Press Association in 1999 described successful police raids conducted under anti-terror legislation (O’Reilly, 1999). Steven King’s commentary in the Belfast Telegraph ranked among the more radical, pro-violence and pro-latitude opinions found in the press reports. He asserted that, “Sometimes a great right requires one to do a small wrong” (S. King, 1999). Other articles favored tough legislation and investigative action to locate violent political activists and offenders, while opposing seemingly ‘soft’ and conciliatory prisoner exchange policies. After a bombing incident, which resulted in 29 deaths in Northern Ireland, RUC officials promised to “relentlessly” pursue the guilty parties. According to the article, no political deals should be made with groups who carry out such actions; instead more aggressive internal security operations should be adopted (Graham, 1998).

Despite the fact that all sides in the Northern Ireland debate had suffered losses, there appeared to be a high level of support for restraint in retaliatory
responses to the conflict. Nevertheless, approximately one third of the articles surveyed supported continued aggression and latitude in security operations.

**Colombia**

FBIS articles on the Colombian internal security situation came from a variety of media sources, including *El Tiempo, El Colombiano, El Espectador, New Colombia News Agency, Caracol Television, Radio Cadena Nacional, and Inravision Television.*

Content analysis results for Colombia appear to almost mirror the United Kingdom’s figures. While a majority of articles supported *limitations* in the Northern Ireland situation, a majority of articles in Colombia supported *latitude* in security operations. Similar to the United Kingdom’s results, approximately one third of the Colombian articles countered the prevailing pro-police/military position in favor of limitations. Even among those articles espousing pro-peace ideals, forceful action by police and military officials was usually seen as a viable means to achieve peace.

Articles supporting police and military latitude offered opinions favoring counterguerrilla operations, stiffened security precautions and pro-military interpretations of the law. As an example of a pro-latitude stance, Armed Forces Commander General Manuel Jose Bonnett argued for armed forces immunity for crimes committed while carrying out official duties (*El Tiempo, August 8, 1997*). Other articles warned against hasty peace agreements and disarmament, referring
to the dangers of falling into ‘traps’ set by narcoterrorists who offer ‘rhetorical shows linked to the peace issue’ while continuing to their violence. While noting the need for peace, most articles warned of giving the guerrillas the advantage over government forces, who still need to maintain their tactical positions (El Tiempo, April 8, 1998). Pro-latitute opinions also commended the activation of a new Colombian Rapid Deployment force “trained to react quickly to unexpected guerrilla attacks” as well as a tougher Anti-kidnapping Plan which elevated the problem of internal security from a state mission to a “mission for all Colombians” (El Tiempo, December 8, 1999 and “Samper Announces Creation of Antikidnapping Plan,” 1996). Despite some government waffling on peace negotiations during the survey period from 1996 to 1999, its overall stance remained aggressive, favoring latitude in combating the internal security problem; this stance was firmly reflected in the content analysis results.

Approximately one third of the articles supported limitations on security operations based on claims of police and military corruption or abuses and an apparent need to reform the forces. El Colombiano accuses the government of corruption and covering up its own participation in massacres, stating that, “Peace starts with truth” (“ELN’s Beltran on Christmas Cease-fire, Interview Part 4,” 1999). The Santa Fe de Bogota Semana (Internet version) supported the continuing peace process in Colombia—the need to “Move Forward, No Matter What,” as was typical of many other articles (“Semana Update on Peace Process Progress,” 1999). Several of the articles called for military reforms to avoid
human rights abuses. Former Finance Minister Rudolf Hommes offered criticism of former defense policies:

Thus, the pragmatism that made torture, the dirty war, and other human rights violations advisable had led to the proliferation of legitimate complaints by several national and international agents and the control and diligence of the Attorney General’s Office (Hommes, 1998).

Additional articles criticized overzealous spending on inefficient and unproductive security operations, which limited the government’s ability to adequately fund other social welfare programs (“Planning Office Revises Expenses Budget, Includes Military,” 1997). Despite these concerns, however, a majority of the Colombian media sources supported latitude in security operations.

Israel

Sources selected for content analysis for the Israeli internal security situation included Ramallah Al-Ayyam, Tel Aviv Ha-aretz, Tel Aviv Hatzofe, Jerusalem Qol Yisra’el, Jerusalem Post, Ramallah Voice of Palestine, and Israeli Defense Forces Radio. These media sources represented a wide spectrum of opinions on all sides of the issue, from official government positions to more radical political ideas.

In the Israeli case, in particular, it was difficult to separate articles referring to internal security from external, strategic concerns. However, several guidelines were used in an attempt to focus primarily on opinions regarding
internal security. Articles referring to the status of Israeli or Israeli-held territories as well as Palestinian-held areas were considered relevant. Reports dealing only with negotiations between Israel and its neighbors concerning external security only, such as missile defense or arms control, were not coded. This process of elimination limited the population of articles to those dealing primarily with internal security issues.

Articles were coded as favoring latitude in internal security operations if they referred to an intifadah, jihad or holy war as a justification for unrestrained action in pursuit of political objectives. In addition, articles indicating support for violent retaliation for previous armed or unarmed attacks were also coded as supporting latitude in security operations.

As an example of an article favoring latitude, a report in the Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el favored Israeli Defense Force strikes on Hizballah groups and claimed that forceful action would eventually lead to victory ("IDF Intelligence Chief on Syria’s Peace Quest," 1999). Mirroring this stance, other reports recommended strong intelligence procedures to combat internal security problems. Ultra-orthodox Mosad chief Efrayim Halevi commented that, “the intelligence community needs to be in the dark” in order to continue its mission ("The Mosad is Worried by Media Infiltration," 1999). In this case, opposition forces supported latitude in investigation and intelligence collection. Many more reports warned against unilateral military withdrawals and urged continued security measures, including harsh prosecution of Hizballah activists. Israeli
opposition leader Ari'el Sharon addressed the Knesset plenum in Jerusalem, arguing that lives must be protected, even at the expense of democracy and liberty. His opinion clearly represents a pro latitude stance.

Israel is the only democratic state in the region. It is a genuine democracy and we are all proud of it. This democracy, however, is aimed at protecting lives. Democracy is a most important thing and we must all strive to strengthen it. The protection of lives, however, is even more important. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is mainly aimed at protecting lives and not murderers, and we must bear this fact in mind. ("Sharon Knesset Address on Sharm Agreement," 1999)

His statement highlights the importance of aggressive security operations, even at the risk of limiting democratic liberties.

On the other hand, approximately one third of the articles advocated limitations on internal security operations by one or all sides involved in the Israeli conflict. An article interviewing Israeli Police Commissioner Yehuda Wilk quoted him as saying that “a balance must be found between maintaining security and permitting people to go on with their daily lives” (Limor, 1999). That article represented a unique instance where an official representative of the security infrastructure admitted the need for restraint. Another voice of opposition to aggressive security operations comes from Torah Observing Sephardim (SHAS) leaders who criticized the Israeli Defense Forces commando ‘vengeance operations.’ According to this group, such operations only “provoke countervengeance ad infinitum” (Kohen, 1997). Many more articles opposed policies advocating identification cards and restrictions of freedom of movement and immigration in the name of security.
In addition to these charges against security operations, several groups voiced criticisms of government safety precautions. Yisra’el Medad, director of Israel’s Media Watch, a civic advocacy group concerned with the ethical and legal standards of electronic media in Israel, objected to recent Israeli government actions. Medad claims that the government overreacted to unsubstantiated on-line threats by shutting down web sites without warning. He reiterates that Israel is “a country of law and not a police state;” according to him, such drastic security measures are excessive. The Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, also protests the Israeli ‘muzzling policy’ of ‘unjustly’ arresting its activists “due to their political stances” (“Hamas Denounces PA’s ‘Muzzling,’ ‘Arrests’ Policy,” 1999). Although other articles discussing Hamas positions advocated more aggressive protest and latitude in action, this particular article represents an example of the group’s more conciliatory statements.

Overall, more articles favored latitude in police and military internal security operations in Israel. Sampled media reports represented government opinions supporting aggressive security measures as well as opposition group support for forceful action to resolve the conflict. Few articles indicated unconditional support for conflict resolution and limited security operations. Israel’s ‘score’ for the independent cultural variable, therefore, appears to be one of relative latitude in police and military action.
Analytical Caveats

When considering the results of this content analysis, it is important to remember the initial purpose of the examination. The content analyses aimed to reveal the cultural attitudes toward internal security operations in each of the countries studied. This research was not intended to explain broader cultural attitudes on other issues beyond the scope of this study. For example, it would be inappropriate to use the results from the Israeli content analysis to argue that most Israelis favor aggression over peace. The articles surveyed represented only a small subject area relating to public and media opinions on internal security.

Despite the seemingly clear results of this analytical tool, there are many limitations to using a cultural approach to explain political events. One of the most powerful arguments leveled against culturalists is the claim that culture cannot be singled out as an independent variable. Critics claim that culture is only a reflection of other factors, including institutions, history and societal structure. Admittedly, cultural findings may be somewhat indeterminate. However, in this case, an attempt was made to find cultural differences between states with similar democratic institutions. This is not to say that politics in Colombia, the United Kingdom and Israel are equivalent. There are clearly many differences between the countries. By remembering the specific focus and limitations of the cultural data in this study, misinterpretation may be avoided.

The limitations of this content analysis, however, provide grounds for future research. Additional countries may be studied using the same content
analysis technique. Likewise, the same technique may be used to sample media reports from a larger sample timeframe. While only four years of sample data were used in this study, different findings may result from analysis of longer or different time periods in each country. Because of the limitations of the FBIS database itself, additional resources, may be considered as an additional reliability check to FBIS sources. Instead of relying on a second-hand collection of articles, content analysis of a selected set of newspapers or media sources could be accomplished. Finally, the data generated by a single coder in this study may be repeated using additional coders to improve the reliability of the results.
CONCLUSIONS

Despite the complexity of the internal security problems and civil-military-police relations, several important conclusions may be drawn from this study. This thesis attempts to provide a closer look at the structural and cultural dynamics of civil-military-police relations in societies facing long-term internal conflict. In the cases analyzed here, the data reflect findings consistent with the hypotheses. After reviewing the findings, I offer some additional policy implications and theoretical ramifications from my research.

The Research Question

So, what effects do long-term domestic conflicts have on the relationship between civilian politicians, the military and police? According to this analysis, the need for a response to the internal threat creates an institutional dynamic in which either the police or military forces will lead internal security operations. Long-term domestic conflict forces the state to choose between utilizing police or military forces. In democratic societies where citizen opinion and cultural congruence play a role in affecting state decisions, cultural opinions about the way in which internal security operations are carried out are also important. In each of these cases, states seem to have chosen courses of action consistent with their own political culture.

The answer to this question goes far in addressing the lack of civil-military-police theory, as identified in the literature review. Researchers should
include police institutions in their analysis of internal security matters.

The primary responsibility for restoring internal order may be allocated to a functionally specialized unit, or it may be shared widely between a variety of forces, whose personnel are trained in the techniques of quelling disorder. Where external threats to the state combine with conflict founded upon internal divisions—as in Israel, South Africa and Northern Ireland—the linkages between the police and military are clearly evident, and the armed forces may emerge as the primary enforcers of order. In others, such linkages are more discrete, and (as in Britain) police militarisation has become the preferred policy. (Brewer, 1988: 4)

Clearly, the fact that civilian politicians choose between military and police institutions indicates the need to study all three groups together, rather than in separate schools of thought.

Admittedly, this study does not provide a definitive answer to this research question. However, the analyses do indicate that politicians in democratic nations facing internal security problems make political decisions regarding the implementation of internal security policy; they decide how police and military forces will be used. These political decisions are bounded not only by the nature of the security threats facing the nation—both internal and external, as existing civil-military relations theory suggests. They are also affected by the institutional structure of the police and military forces expected to carry out specific security actions as well as domestic culture toward the activities of those institutions. Existing theory remains inadequate because it fails to recognize the role of both military and police officials in internal security politics; an integrated approach to civil-military-police relations provides a step in the right direction on this neglected research niche. Clearly, more study is needed on instances where
internal conflict becomes so severe that increased military intervention in internal security or police militarization are needed. My study represents only a small contribution to the literature by fusing the two disparate schools of thought.

**Results From Test Cases**

Colombia was used as the test case for hypothesis one:

*When police structures and capabilities in internal security surpass those of the military, and when culture supports freedom of action for internal security operations, police forces may become militarized to combat the threat.*

Structural analysis confirmed the predominance of the police forces in internal security in terms of personnel strength and organization. Although it seems that neither institution has reached an adequate level of effectiveness in combating the serious threat. Cultural analysis of Colombian attitudes toward internal security operations indicated a general attitude favoring latitude in action. Media reports indicated high levels of support for tough government prosecution of its counterinsurgency efforts.

These findings are no surprise to those who argue that Colombia is a failing democracy on the verge of breakdown, including James Zackrison in his report on Colombian sovereignty (Zackrison, 1997). Some may even argue that Colombia should not have been chosen as a test case for this research based on its history of internal difficulties. However, I argue that Colombia’s weakness provides a justification for research into its situation, rather than an excuse to overlook the case. If one of the best ways to test theory is to constantly apply it to
more and more cases, shouldn’t models of civil-military relations be assessed based on their explanatory value in a variety of cases, including not-so-perfect democracies? A look back at Michael Desch’s study of civil-military relations reveals that he considered mostly industrialized countries, such as the United States, India, the United Kingdom and Russia. Although his research contributed greatly to the body of available literature, he did not purposefully choose cases with problems of regime stability as severe as Colombia’s. In other words, Colombia’s uniqueness as a case only adds to the value of this study. It sets a precedent for additional studies into internal security politics in other less than perfect democracies in the Latin American region and around the world.

In the case of the second hypothesis, Israel was analyzed.

When military structures and capabilities in internal security surpass those of the police, and when culture supports freedom of action for internal security operations, the military may expand its role in combating internal threat.

While the findings are consistent with this hypothesis, it is important to acknowledge the importance of historical factors in shaping the institutions (for example, in making the police forces weaker) and the state and public perception of the internal threat as a by-product of the external threats. The public perception for latitude may be in part due to this historical circumstance. In other words, the nature of the threat or how it is interpreted by the ruling regime features prominently in how its security forces are organized and utilized. Therefore, it is not only the threat itself, as existing theories argue, but also the interpretation of that threat by the state and its citizens, which shapes its security
response. Culture plays an important role in this interpretation process. If theories of cultural congruence hold true, then politicians in democratic societies would not want to adopt policies which stray too far from culturally-acceptable notions of the correct policy.

In the case of Ireland, the test case for hypothesis three, more capable police structures were backed by cultural attitudes of restraint in internal security.

*When police structures and capabilities in internal security surpass those of the military, and when culture supports limited action for internal security operations, police forces will remain limited in their security operations.*

Ireland’s militarized police forces operate within an institutional environment of police dominance in internal security, but within a cultural environment supporting a higher level of accountability and restraint in internal security matters than in Colombia or Israel.

However, the use of the police rather than the military in internal security here may be due to calculated political decisions, in addition to institutional concerns. Civilian politicians may choose to achieve a more positive political ‘spin’ and to avoid the unwanted appearance of cracking down too harshly with the military or police or responding to weakly. In this case, use of the military forces in internal security may represent a sign of defeat for the government. Brewer notes:

In most societies, the use of the military in an internal security role is a most unattractive option for government outside of a national emergency or of circumstances such as low level guerrilla warfare that the police are not equipped to handle. The reason is obvious enough. Deployment of the military constitutes a signal to the
outside world of the existence of a serious threat to the state that is
likely to detract from the state’s legitimacy in an international
context. In particular, any government seeking to convey an
impression of normality to the outside world will deploy the police
rather than the military, where it can. (Brewer: 1988: 155)

The threat itself, then, as well as how that threat is filtered through a cultural lens,
play a role in decisions where politicians choose between using military or police
forces in internal security.

Toward a Model of Civil-Military-Police Relations

Structural explanations of civil-military relations are not adequate to
explain cases of internal conflict. Existing theories admit some limitations in the
structural approach for ‘middle ground’ or ‘mixed’ cases. Based on this research
problem as well as the need to bridge the gap between policing and civil-military
relations theories, it seems appropriate to study cases where both schools of
thought may be improved. Civil-military relations theory can be broadened to
include culture as well as consideration of police involvement in internal security.
Policing studies may be broadened to include situations where the military
becomes heavily involved in internal security operations.

The proposed model of civil-military-police relations frames the question
in an entirely different manner—combining two schools of thought, while also
providing some explanatory power by demonstrating the combined effect of
institutional factors and culture on civil-military-police relations. In addition, this
model also possesses additional applicability because it analyzes variables that
may be independently affected by the country facing an internal threat situation.
Policy-makers from the U.S. and around the world, who have attempted to 'fix' the civil-military relations in other countries or 'solve' internal security problems must still address the question: what should a country wracked with internal conflict, an overzealous military and out-of-control police force do?

Current structural theory leaves the state of civil-military relations up to fate, assuming that the strategic threat situation of each nation determines its plight. Often the sources of these threats are beyond the control of individual nations. In other words, existing structural theory states that a nation faced with serious internal threats and few external threats is stuck with 'poor' civil-military relations. By contrast, this study uses variables that are, at least to some degree, under the control of the politicians in individual countries. They can clearly choose between the military and the police in internal security operations. While they may not be able to quickly change cultural attitudes toward security operations, there may be room for improvement.

This combined theoretical approach mirrors policy changes in internal security operations in the United States, where 'force protection' policy now encompasses both military and civilian police responses to internal security problems. Much of the integration in this area was spawned by the lack of coordination between military and civilian security after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers barracks, used to house U.S. military troops in Saudi Arabia. Although these cases represent isolated incidents of terrorist violence, the response to those incidents is very similar to the
type of response that would be required by a nation facing a more prolonged internal security problem. Policy-makers are already making great strides in force protection; perhaps it is time that theory catches up to practice with more research on combined civil, military and police involvement in internal security.

**Policy and Research Implications**

U.S. foreign policy has on many occasions aimed to help resolve internal political problems in foreign countries. The current Middle East peace process and negotiations in Northern Ireland represent two very recent examples. While the United States often attempts to simplify differences between opposing parties and solve the source of the conflicts through negotiation, such policies are not guaranteed to work all of the time. If negotiated settlements do not reflect cultural attitudes, then they may have only limited success.

The United States offers many programs attempting to improve the civil-military relations in foreign countries. Programs vary from offering professional military training to high-ranking foreign officials at the School of the Americas to providing financial assistance to support other improvements. Clearly, these programs cannot be expected to be a ‘quick fix’ to the serious problems facing nations around the world. However, by showing the importance of culture in internal politics, this study does provide hope for the possibility of slow, incremental change in public attitudes and civil-military-police relations. Indeed, there are no simple answers to the problems in democracies facing internal difficulties. Colombia’s combined drug war and counterinsurgency, Israel’s
internal disagreements, and conflict surrounding Northern Ireland are far from resolved. This study does, however, indicate that some of the answers to the problems are in the hands of policy-makers within those countries.

While this study has revealed some initial results using a few test cases, it is not beyond dispute. Additional research, perhaps duplicating this same method or applying the same method to other cases, would clearly contribute to the literature in this area. There are still ample opportunities for further scholarly research in the field of internal security politics and Weberian notions of the 'use of physical force within a given territory.'
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